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DE GALA v. DE GALA (1922)

Plaintiff-appellant: Sinforoso de Gala
Defendant: Pedro de Gala
Appellee: Josefa Alabastro and Generoso de Gala
Ponente: Johnson, J.
FACTS:
An action was commenced to compel defendant Pedro to recognize the plaintiff Sinforoso as his natural son. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff Sinforoso had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the cond uct of the
father and his fathers family. The defendant interposed a general denial. Josefa Alabastro is the widow and Generoso is the
legitimate son of Pedro (so he is the half-brother of Sinforoso).
CFI Tayabas dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed to the SC. However, while this appeal was pending, the father died, and
the widow and half-brother were substituted as defendants.
In the appeal, appellant (plaintiff) Sinforoso alleges that the CFI committed an error in not admitting his Exhibit C in evidence. Exhibit
C is a transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the trial of an election protest case (Nadres vs.Javier) in the CFI of Tayabas,
2 years before the trial of the present case. During that trial, Generoso, the said only legitimate son, testifying as a witness, declared
in open court that Sinforoso, was his brother.
The defendant objected to its admission because it was impertinent. CFI sustained the objection, stating that, in the first place,
Generoso was not an interested party in this case, and also, the mere fact that Generoso declared that Sinforoso was his brother
would not entitle Sinforoso to be recognized as a natural son of the defendant.
ISSUE: Was Exhibit C impertinent?
HELD: No, it is not impertinent.
RATIO:
Related to topic in outline:
Generosos spontaneous admission, publicly made, in open court, cannot be said to be "impertinent" for the purpose of proving the
plaintiff's claim because that admission was a "conduct" which tends to confirm the status claimed by the alleged natural child.
Neither can it be said that the said only legitimate was not an interested party in this case because he is a forced heir of the
defendant, and his recognition of the plaintiff as a natural son would diminish his hereditary rights.
While it is true that such admission would not, of itself, be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a compulsory recognition by the
defendant as his natural child, it should have been admitted in evidence as a factum probans, which would help to establish
the factum probandum the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. Such status cannot be proved by a single
specific act or conduct of the defendant or of his family. It must be proved by showing a series of acts, conduct, and circumstances
indicative of the intention of the father to acknowledge his alleged natural child. Hence, to reject evidence of a single act, conduct, or
circumstance as being insufficient to prove the status claimed, would be to prevent the claimant from proving it at all.
Not related to topic in outline:
However, considering that the plaintiff was born in 1879, before the adoption of the Civil Code, the provisions of la Ley de Toro may
govern in the solution of the question of recognition. Under la Ley de Toro, a natural child might be recognized tacitly, and the
recognition was open to such proof as would support the fact in an ordinary action.
It will be found upon an examination of the facts hereinafter stated, that the defendant not only made a tacit, but a express
recognition of the plaintiff as his natural child, both before and after the adoption of the Civil Code (year 1879). If acts of recognition
took place before the adoption of the Civil Code, and if they were sufficient under the prior law to constitute a recognition, then the
defendant cannot require the proof of recognition prescribed by the new law (Civil Code).
Several instances prove recognition by the father:
1. During plaintiffs infancy and childhood, he lived with his mother in the same barrio of the defendant.
2. The defendant not only frequented the house where the plaintiff lived, but provided sustenance for both the mother and
the plaintiff, giving them rice out of his camarin.
3. Defendant sent the plaintiff to a school and paid for his instruction.
4. While in school, the plaintiff was enrolled under the name of "Sinf oroso Dimatulac," but was known and called by his
classmates and others by "Sinforoso de Gala." When he became old enough to know that his father's surname was not
Dimatulac but "De Gala," he adopted the de Gala surname, with the acquiescence of the defendant.
5. Defendant continued to give the plaintiff money and had a house built for the plaintiff, and also gave him a parcel of land
to cultivate as his own
6. Plaintiff always addressed the defendant as "father" (tatay), in public as well as in private, to which address the defendant
responded.
7. Plaintiff used to kiss defendant's hand after the evening prayers and sat at the table with defendant and his family
frequently.

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8.

He was in constant company with defendant in the cockpit and was regarded as a brother by defendant's only legitimate
son; and even the whole town knew the plaintiff as the natural son of the defendant.

A perusal of the testimony for the defense is impressed with its inherent weakness, it being purely negative. It is a general rule of
evidence that, all other things being equal, affirmative testimony is stronger than negative; in other words, that 'the testimony
of a credible witness, that he saw or heard a particular thing at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of an equally
credible witness who, with the same opportunities, testifies that he did not hear or see the same thing at the same time and place
The fact that the defendant disowned the plaintiff during the trial of this cause, cannot divest the plaintiff of the right to recognition,
which had theretofore been vested in him.
Judgment of LC revoked.