Digests - Article VIII

Political Law Review
Atty. Jacinto Jimenez
ARTICLE VIII JUDICIARY

SECTION 1
SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA
judicial power and judicial function
Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3 rd Honors (3rd placer).
3 days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor
students. They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the
committee on rating honors.
They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that
o
the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5
only.
o
That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5
o
that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining
unfair advantage)
o
The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.
o
That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank
o
That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was erased and replaced
with second place
o
That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his
grievances.
The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was
proper, the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded).
Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee
on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a
remedy against judicial functions)
ISSUE: may judicial function be exercised in this case? What is judicial power?
SC:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the
doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
(TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TRIBUNAL OR BOARD EXERCISES JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS)
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination. , and
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the
not the legislative nor the executive)
It maybe said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
The phrase judicial power is defined:
as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuring therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties.
There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual merits
of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not presented the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by the Committee.
The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges.
Updated Champ Digests
Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

And for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.
NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE
Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision
plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title
The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain.
Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He
claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court
Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES)
Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court
(in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)?
SC: NO.
If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges,
the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it
would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive
officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative
functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the
exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.
As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not
intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution.
The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid.
Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative
process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if
the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the
resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIO

power to recommend
Ang was convicted and was granted conditional pardon. He was never to return to the Philippines. In
violation of his pardon, he returned. He was recommitted by order of the Executive Secretary.
He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CA made a
recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available transporation
abroad.
The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by the CA should not be part
of the decision, because it gives the decision a political complextion, because courts are not
empowered to make such recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial
powers. The Solgen contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state
exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of sending an
undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with,
nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?

SC: NO.
The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether the RTC correctely denied the
petition. The CA was not called upon the review any sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence against
him had long become final and in fact, he was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited to the
affirmance of the decision of the RTC, and no more.
The recommendatory power of the courts are limited to those expressly provided in the law, such as Art 5
RPC. (when an act is not punishable by law judge should report it to the executive).
The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not under the Director of
Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that
would suggest a modification or correction of the act of the President. The matter of whether an alien who
violated the law may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the
President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciary to
express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action by the
President, which are purely political in nature.
After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and
application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which
may only reflect unfavorably upon the competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
Summary:
1) Recommendatory powers of the SC under RPC does not include matters which are purely political in
nature. (otherwise it violates separation of powers)
2) deportation of aliens is a political question
3) opinion of judges should be relevant to the question presented for decision.
In re LAURETA
power to preserve judiciary s honor
Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a
land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust
resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1 st Division, that it was railroaded with such
hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.
Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from
finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference.
Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was
established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and
counsel for the opponents.
The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was
issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also
made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.
Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to
expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.
True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the
Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were
also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.
Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without
any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption.
The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.
Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.
They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the
court.
SC:

The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is
unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustres letters, nor with the complaint filed
with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as undue influence, powerful
influence in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the
complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio.
Lastly, as Illustres lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.
In short, SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of
separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of
government.
ECHEGARY VS. SOJ
suspension of execution of decision
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the
imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of rape.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, 4 and passed Republic Act No. 8177,
Petitioner filed a Petition 8 for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin
respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the
execution by lethal injection, claiming it as cruel form of punishment, among many others.
the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT
thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties "to
MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."
(from poli compendium: The decision sentencing him to death pursuant to RA 7659 became final. Upon
motion of the petitioner, the SC issued a TRO restraining his execution on the ground that there is a
possibility that Congress might repeal RA 7659. Respondent argued that the TRO was illegal because in
effect it granted petitioner a reprieve, which was the exclusive prerogative of the President)
SC:
The constitutional provision granting the Presidnet the power to grant reprieves cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of the courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. An
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights, and these can be
claimed in a proper court. For instance, a convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of death sentence is an exercise of judicial power.

SECTION 5(2)
LINA VS. PURISIMA

power to dispense rules
Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB.

Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to
her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej.
It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant
to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable.
The RTC dismissed the petition because:
o
Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to
Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to
review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power
of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos.
o
The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any
decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081.
SC:
The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was
nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that
the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of
Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the
Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity
of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations.
Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the
authority and jurisdiction of the SC.
Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case. Ordinarily, the case should
be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do
justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution
of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the
best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the
case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and
rended the final judgment on the merits.
SC reinstated Lina to work.
TAN VS, MACAPAGAL

judicial review for adjudication
Tan et. al (as taxpayers) filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the LAUREL
LEIDO RESOLUTION which deals with the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to declare
that it has no power to consider and adopt proposals which seek to revise the constitution through the
adoption of a new form of government. Under the Resolution, the Con-Con is merely empowered to
propose amendments to the Consti, without altering the general plan.
The SC dismissed it. Tan filed a MR.
The members of the Con-Con claim that Tan has no personal and substantial interest in the case.
ISSUE: Whther the petitioners had the standing to seek a declaration of the nullity of the resolution of the
Con-Con.
SC: NO.
The rule is, Any person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

However, there are many instances where taxpayers can nullify laws. But this is upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds for purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. Hence, it may be enjoined at the instance of taxpayers.
Nevertheless, the Court has the discretion whether to entertain a taxpayers suit. In the Gonzales case, it
was held that taxpayers must wait before filing the suit until AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE. It
was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its
hands off. The judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action (separation of
powers).
Hence, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for judicial
oversight. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.
Here, what is being asked was that the judiciary inquire into the validity of the acts of the Con-Con.
However, it is a pre-requisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed before court
may inquire. What the Con-Con did was merely to propose an amendment to the Consti.
There is no room for judicial review.
TELECOMS VS. COMELEC

locus standi
Telecoms and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and tv
companies. They are suing as taxpayers and citizens and registered voters. They assail the validity of
BP 881 which requires that radio and tv companies provide free airtime to Comelec for the use of
candidates in the campaign and for other political purposes.
Telebap claims that the law takes property without due process and that it violates the eminent
domain clause which provides for payment of just compensation.
GMA Network, also filed a similar case.
ISSUE: Whether Telebap and GMA have locus standi

SC:
Telebap No standing as CITIZENS.
A Citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
government, that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. In this case, it has not shown that they will suffer or have suffered harm
as a result of the operation of BP 881.
Telebap No standing as REGISTERED VOTERS.
No interest as registered voters since this case does not concern their right to suffrage. Their
interest in BP 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity.
Telebap No standing as TAXPAYERS.
No interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the execise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain direct injury as a
resulf of the enforcement of the questioned statute.
Telebap No standing as CORPORATE ENTITY
No standing to assert the rights of radio and television companies which they represent. The
mere fact that Telebap is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this
suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only
if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third
party cannot assert his constitutional right.
GMA7 has standing.

Since GMA operates radio and tv broadcast stations, they will be affected by the enforcement of
BP 881. It suffered losses amounting to several millions in providing Comelec time in connection with the
1992 and 1995 electoins. Now, its stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year (1998 elections). GMAs allegations that it will suffer losses again is sufficient to give it standing to
question the validity of BP 881.
KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO
locus standi
Kilosbayan is an organization of civil spirited citizens, priests, pastors, nuns and taxpayers. They are
joined by some members of Congress. (Tanada, Joker A.)
They assail the lease of lottery equipment by the PCSO on the ground that it was similar to the one
earlier nullified by the SC.
There was a lease contract between PCSO and Phil. Gaming Mgt. Corp. The equipment lease
agreement covers online lottery equipment to be leased to PCSO. The agreement was invalidated by
the SC for it violated the Charter of PCSO.
An Amended Lease Agreement was later made providing for 4.3% of the gross sales as consideration.
PCSO and PGMC claim that the Amended Lease Agreement is a different lease contract. They claim
that the Agreement did not have to be submitted for public bidding because it fell within the exception
under EO 301. They also claim that the power to determine whether the Agreement is
disadvantageous belongs to the Board of Directors of PCSO. Thus they question the petitioners
standing.
PCSO and PGMC claim that the petitioners have no standing since they are not parties to the contract,
and have no personal or substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the Contract.
Petitioners however contend that the earlier case sustained their standing to challenge the validity of
the first contract, and as such, that is now the law of the case (that they have standing).
SC:
The law of the case is not applicable in this case because this case is NOT a sequel to the previous case.
It is not its continuation. This proceeding is essentially different from the 1993 Lease Contract. Hence, a
prior case that petitioners had standing to challenge that 1993 Contract does NOT PRECLUDE their
determination of their standing in the present suit.
Concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down as
rule since the previous ruling sustaining petitioners intervention may itself be considered a departure
from settled rulings on REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. (It seems here that the real issue is not lack of legal
standing but whether they are real parties in interest.) Standing is not even an issue in this case since
standing is a CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, and here no constitutional question was actually
involved.
Standing has constitutional underpinnings. It is very different from questions relation to whether a party
is the real party in interest. Party in interest ensures that only certain parties can maintain an action,
Standing requires partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader public policy concerns.
The question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largele depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
NO STANDING. Here, petitioners have not in fact shown what particularized interest they have for bringing
the suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest
falls short of the required to maintain an action. It is true that the present action involves not a mere
contract between private individuals but one made by a government corporation. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO
ALLEGATION THAT PUBLIC FUNDS ARE BEING MISSPENT SO AS TO MAKE THIS ACTION A PUBLIC ONE,
and justify the relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest.
A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Because this is an action for annulment of contracts, the real parties in interest are those who are parties
to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with

respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the deteriment which would positively result to
them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it.
The phrase present substantial interest means such interest of a party in a subject matter of action as
will entitle him to recover if the evidence is sufficient. Petitioners here DO NOT HAVE SUCH PRESENT
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST in the Lease Agreement as would entitle them to bring this suit.
Questions as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding can be raised
in an appropriate case before the COA, or before the Ombudsman.
Requisites of TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE:
1) public funds involved
2) utter disregard for the constitution
3) lack of party who can bring a suit.
FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)."
On June 2, 2003, President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed and
was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 200 8 in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance.
Thereafter, the second impeachment complaint was filed by Representatives Teodoro of Tarlac
and Fuentebella of Camarines Sur, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the
Members of the House.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
Respondent House of submitted a Manifestation asserting that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally
mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. Senator Pimentel filed a Motion to Intervene and
Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the
Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,
be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."
Issue: W/N the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Such power of judicial review was expounded upon by

Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission : x x x In times of social disquietude or political

excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
This "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches
of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent
in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the
court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."
Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our
republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative
of the Constitution.
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review. Briefly
stated, it is their position that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. In defense of their claims, Respondents rely on
American jurisprudence, American Constitution and American authorities.
However, said American jurisprudence and authorities are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted
to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality
and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court
to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should
defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."
o
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave

the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
Issue: W/N the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been fulfilled.
The courts' power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged.
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Respondents contend that petitioners do not have
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. On the
other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in
the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest and transcendental importance.
There is a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the
former is a concept of civil procedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. While
rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and
members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
Ripeness and Prematurity
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and
enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit has been complied with.
Justiciability
Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. SSection 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that
10

there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
In the present case, five substantial issues are raised: 1. Whether the offenses alleged in the
Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution; 2.
Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI
of the Constitution; 3. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the
Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; 4. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, and 5. Whether the second impeachment complaint is
barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court
has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two
of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Hence, courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is applied."
The Court held that these two issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota
of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Issue: W/N the Supreme Court should exercise Judicial Restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment.
11

Rspondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to
not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment." But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of
Representatives are subject to them.
o
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can
jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred." Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII,
Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution.
o
More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance
of the instant petitions. According Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty." Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down
by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the
possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing
and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.
o
Such an argument is specious, to say the least. Tthe possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the
Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional
duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Such an argument also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would
behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of
the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social
upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental
law of the land.
David vs. Arroyo

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.
and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction ; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all
these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. 4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
12

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners counsels.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
1.
whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review
enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --The
Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political
authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously
or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it
in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate
the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is
the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." Courts may
exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or
controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or
valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in
the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no
rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; 33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the
instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution.
There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the
peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police,
on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. 35 And lastly, respondents contested
actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
2.
whether petitioners (Escudero et al, Cadiz et al, and Legarda) have legal standing
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 37 In private
suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
13

is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The
same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc.
They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.
They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those
affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the
alleged violations of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng
Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the
petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly
may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert
the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP
as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No.
5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of
its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that
petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there
are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no
consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker
have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise
aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from
pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the
proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue
involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
14

enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people 68 but he may be
removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. 69
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that
"judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct," but
that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if
he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report
and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United
States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment" (freedom of speech).
econd, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly
and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded
in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law
may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
15

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is
also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it
is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its
application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the
meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes
beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President
must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act
under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no
so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President
invoked was her calling-out power.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, 115 the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws
are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to
take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others,
"execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers
attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,117 including the
Philippine National Police 118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government.119
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to
16

enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution
do hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP
1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also
to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant
the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section
23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not
excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch
of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying
out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting
a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called
upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over
or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however,
without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take
17

over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power
to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in
the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. As Applied Challenge
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military
necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in
the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest
blow.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In
general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused
and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The
validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an
invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all
forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted
President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is
to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result
arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe
declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were
so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what
are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their
authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have
normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts
were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one
similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that
allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently,
the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to
prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President
for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to
enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are
ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility
and private business affected with public interest.
18

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as
Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made
punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been
denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts,
to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the
warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any
prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical
seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the
law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given
their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not
been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific
pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are
ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without
unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic
state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet
they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political
philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without
surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary
power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to
lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined
and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were
committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the
Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
PHIL ASSOC. COLLEGES VS. SEC OF EDUCATION

justiciable controversy / locus standi
Petitioners assail Act 2706 requiring the inspection and recognition of private schools. It makes it
obligatory upon the Secretary of Educ to inspect said schools.
19

They contend that the law deprives the school owners of liberty and property without due process,
and they deprive the parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children.
They claim that requiring previous governmental approval before they could exercise their right to
own and operate a school amounts to censorship of prior restraint.
Solgen countered that the matter has no justiciable controversy. The government argues that the
petitioners suffered no wrong, nor allege any, from the enforcement of the statute. The government
insists that for the past 37years the DepEd has supervised and regulated private schools with the
general acquiescence of the public. Solgen claims that there is no cause of action because all of them
have permits to operate and are actually operating schools already. There is no threat that the
permits will be revoked, hence they have suffered no wrong.
Issue: Is there a justiciable controversy?

SC: NONE.
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of parties concerned.
When the private schools are actually operating by virtue of the permits issued by the Secretary, who is
not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no justiciable controversy that would
authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of said Act.. Mere apprehension that the Secretary
might under the law withdraw the permit of the petitioners DOES NOT CONSTITUTE JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY.
An action must be brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, no matter how intellectually solid the
problem may be. This is specially true where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there
come into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues UNLESS AVOIDANCE
BECOMES EVASION.
*the textbooks were also not shown by petitioners. They claimed that the Board prohibited certain types
of textbooks.
DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB
effects of constitutionality
**Justice Fernando ponente kaya wordy at magulo**
Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later.
15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM.
Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by prescription. She also claims that she
obtained an injunction against the sheriff.
PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to
the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted.
o
E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium
o
RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium
The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified.
Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war
sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think what Justice Fernando was
saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the non-impairment of
contractual obligations clause in the constitution).
PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the
bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.
ISSUE: Has the action prescribed?

SC: NO.
The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of
legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
20

However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and
had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity,
it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.
This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it
can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the
law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication.
The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of
a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.
During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the
prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.
(read orig)..
PEOPLE vs. MATEO

On October 1996, ten information, one for each count of rape, all allegedly committed on ten different
dates were filed against appellant Efren Mateo. The accused was the live-in partner of Rosemarie
Capulong, the mother of the victim. Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being malicious
retribution of a vengeful stepdaughter. Allegedly, he tool private complainant to task after his son, Marlon
Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the
room of their house. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going
out at night and leaving her siblings alone in the house. Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of complainant,
rose to testify in defense of her common-law husband. She believed that the charges may have been
fabricated by her relatives who were jealous of appellant because it was he, not they, who had been
receiving the remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia. The court found accused guilty for ten counts
of rape.
Issue: Whether or not the SC can create an intermediate review for death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment cases by the CA before the case is elevated to the SC
Held:
Up until now, the SC has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice
finds justification in the 1987 Constitution in Article 8, Section 5: The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (d) All criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The same constitutional article has evidently a thesis
for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of RA 7659, as well as procedural
rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of
Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not
21

preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed
intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these
cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and
liberty is at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused
and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the
Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then
render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from
entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
The cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding
71.77% of the total death penalty cases directly elevated before the Court on automatic review that
translates to a total of 651 out of 907 appellants saved from lethal injection.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme
Court. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the CA, a subordinate
appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.
(As to the rape, the Court held that while it may be argued that appellants moral ascendancy over Imelda
was enough to intimidate her to suffer in silence; still, it could well be improbable for a victim who had
been raped no less than ten times not to make a simple outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had
every opportunity to do so. Also, the Court took notice that the victim did not undergo any change in
behaviour which was the typical attitude of a victim of rape.)
SECTION 5(4)
PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ

transfer of venue to avoid miscarriage of justice
This is the case of Bingbong Crisologo. A group of armed men set fire various inhabited houses in
Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Bingbong was charged but pleaded not guilty.
AO 221 the Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La Union, to hold special
term in Ilocos Sur.
AO 226 Secretary of Justice authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the case to Judge
Anovers Court in La Union.
Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to the La Union Circuit Court by
virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety of the witnesses.
The accused obviously opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the transfer of the case would
be railroading them into a conviction.
Judge Gutierrez denied the transfer.
Prosecution now imputes gadalej on Judge Gutierrez.
SC:
The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard. Any such power even in the guise of
AOs trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and Judiciary. The law creating the
transfer of cases to Circuit Criminal Courts should be effected by raffle.
Nevertheless, the COURT WILL ORDER THE TRANSFER. There is a justified refusal by the witnesses in
Ilocos Sur to testify where they felt their lives would be endangered. Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the
possibility of miscarriage of justice may result. The witnesses had earlier manifested of the imperious
22

necessity of transferring the place of trial outside of Ilocos Sur, in the interest of truth and justice, and the
State is to be given a fair chance to present its side.
Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to
reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. The exigencies of justice demand that
the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor.
Anyway, regardless of the place where the case is tried, the prosecution will always be obligated to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On of the incidental and inherent powers of the courts is that of TRANSFERRING THE TRIAL OF CASES
from one court to another of equal rank, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or
of preventing a miscarriage of justice so demands.
*judicial power includes the transfer of cases. It is one of the incidental or inherent attributes necessary
for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to
preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.*
SECTION 5(5)
PNB Vs. ASUNCION

power to promulgate rules / procedural vs. substantive rights
PNB granted credit accommodations and advances to Fabar Inc, for the importation of machinery and
equipment. The outstanding balance was P8.4M
The credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Barredo, Borromeo
(respondents). For failure to pay their obligations, PNB instituted a collection suit against Fabar and
the Barredo, Borromeo.
Before the case could be decided, one of the respondents, BARREDO, died.
So the court issued an order of dismissal of the case, since money claim is a personal action, it is
extinguished upon death, and that the remedy is to file a claim with the estate during settlement
proceedings.
The case was dismissed against ALL defendants.
PNB filed a MR claiming that the dismissal should only be against the deceased Barredo. Hence they
file this certiorari.
SC:
According to the Rules of Court, nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving
solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor
choose to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor.
What is applicable in this is Art 1216 of the Civil Code. The creditor has the right to proceed against
anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The choice is left to the solidary
23

creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of death of one of the solidary
debtors, the creditor can choose to proceed against the surviving debtors, without necessity of filing a
claim in the estate of the deceased debtor.
To require the creditor to proceed against the estat would deprive him of his substantive rights under the
Civil Code. If the Rules of Court (Rule 86) would be applied literally, in effect, it would repeal the Civil
Code (Art 1216), because the creditor would have no chose but to proceeed against the estate of Barredo
only. Obviously, this would diminish the PNBs right under the Civil Code to proceed against any one, some
or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle that, SUBSTANTIVE
LAW CANNOT BE AMENDED BY PROCEDURAL LAW. The rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over the
Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter substantive.
Moreover, the Constitution provides that the rules promulgated by the SC should not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.
SANTERO VS. CAVITE

rules of court vs. civil code
Pablo Santero was had 2 sets of children from 2 different wives. He died.
The respondents were the Santero Children, the children by the 2 nd wife, although she was not
married to the father.
A motion for allowance was filed by the Santero children, through their guardian/mother Diaz. The
filed the motion for support, education, clothing, and medical allowance. This was granted by the
court.
This was opposed by the other set of Santero Children (petitioners), the children by the 1 st wife, who
was also not married to the father.
They claim that the wards are no longer schooling and have already attained the
age of majority.
Diaz countered that the reason why the children were not enrolled was due to lack of funds. She cited
Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (on support), as well as Rule 83 of the Rules of Court (allowance to the
widow and family in estate proceedings).
The allowance was granted by the court.
Another motion for allowance was filed by Diaz for 3 additional children. These 3 additional children
were already of age, but Diaz claims that all of her children have the right to receive allowance, as
advance of the shares in their inheritance.
Again, this was opposed by the other Santero Children (petitioners), claiming that the children are
employed and married, and that there is insufficient funds. They claim that under the Rules of Court,
they are no longer entitled to allowance.
SC:
The controlling provision should be Art 290/188 of the Civil Code (support) and not Rule 83 of the Rules of
Court (allowance to widow and family).
The fact that respondents are of age, and are gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should
not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art 290/188.
While the Rules of Court limits allowances to the widow and only the minor children, the New Civil Code
gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, even the children who are no
longer minors are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father.
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the children the
right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired
by Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.
DAMASCO VS. LAGUI

speedy disposition of cases.
24

Atty Damasco was charged with grave threats. He pleaded not guilty but was convicted only of light
threats. He was order to pay a fine of P100.
Damasco filed a motion to rectify and set aside the dispositve portion of the decision. He claims that
he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in the grave threats charge, as the lighter
offense had already prescribed when the information was filed. (light offenses prescribe in 2 mos, but
the information was filed 70 days after)
The lower court denied the motion, explaining that since the Court had acquired jurisdiction to try the
case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for grave threats, the same
cannot be lost by prescription, if after the trial what has been proven is merely light threats.
SC:
Prescription of a crime is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited or
punished by law. While it is a rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading is deemed
to waive all objections, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art 69 of the RPC
extinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion could contravene said Art, which is part of
substantive law.
This position is further strengthen by the Rules on CrimPro, which added the extinction of offense as one
of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to
quash.
The claim that when an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within a
graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense if it has already prescribed can only be
done through an overhaul of some existing rules on crimpro to give prescription a limited meaning (ie, a
mere bar to the commencement of criminal action and therefore waivable).
BUT this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of rights.. such rules shall not
diminish, modify or increase substantive rights.
THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED! PETITION IS GRANTED! (Damasco wins.)
PEOPLE VS. LACSON
Lacson et al were charged with multiple murder for shooting and killing 11 male persons who were
members of the Kuratong Baleleng. SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the
eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout.
The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 11 Informations for MURDER, against respondent
Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as
principals.10
Upon motion of the Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation.
The participation of Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court. 12Arraignment then followed
and respondent entered a plea of not guilty.
On March 29, 1999 Judge Agnir issued a Resolution25 dismissing Criminal Cases because:
o
with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private
complainants, there is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that
the accused are probably guilty thereof.
On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new
affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng
incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter.
Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a
petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from
conducting the preliminary investigation.
Judge Pasamba denied the TRO (meaning the case could continue). The decision stated that the
preveious dismissal of Criminal Cases is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment
25

and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan
does not put the case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without
any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the
Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant.
Thus, June 6, 2001 11 information for Murder were again filed before the RTC Judge Yadao.
Lacson now assails the decision of Judge Pasamba mainly on the ground of : illegality of the
proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been
dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued. He claims, under Section
8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty
imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the
date the dismissal order was issued.
ISSUE: The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the
respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. The rule of
provisional dismissal took effect only on December 1, 2000 (in between the period of dismissal and
revival). More specifically, 1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the
accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the
cases beyond the 2-year period.
SC: NO. NOT BARRED.
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to
a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the
criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. 7 Where the accused
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my
conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. 8
The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case 9 or his
failure to object to a provisional dismissal 10 does not amount to express consent.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph
of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did
not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent
merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
witnesses. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the cases. Neither
did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal the cases or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days
before said hearing. There is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of
the victims of said motion or of the hearing.
26

Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir,
Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the
respondent.
Even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal, and all the
heirs of the victims were notified before the hearing the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the
State.
To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would
violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States
substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal complaints against the accused.
However, under the new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the
order of dismissal within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1,
2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the
Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. In case of conflict between the Revised Penal
Code and the new rule, the former should prevail.
The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of
the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof,
so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. 35
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
a substantive law.36 It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the
accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused. If a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not
concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not
thereby diminished.40 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of
limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same.
Also, It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work
injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In
this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the new rule should
not be applied retroactively against the State.
A mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the
case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for
employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his
family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He
continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. 55 He
may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may
diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice
system.56 The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead
of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on
March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar
retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which
to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the
other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1,
2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the
27

intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC

Article VIII (6)
Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by private respondent Bienvenido Aricayos before the
NLRC. He alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home.
However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name
included in the semi-monthly payroll. Later, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its VAT to the BIR.
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of
Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner. Private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas
contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of
gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
However, when mother of Amelita passed away, Amelita took over the management of the business. After
discovering that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, she then made
some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that
petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. The NLRC then set aside the said decision and remanded the
case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner
alleging gadlej.
Issue: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC.
Held: YES
Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC.
However, pursuant to a previous ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any
further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 of ROC.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasijudicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been
ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting
clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this
Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition,
also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended
that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that
matter.
28

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have
been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology
used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in
labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of
review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the
considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the
Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still
is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation
thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate
courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly
concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of
this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
There is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and
that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
SECTION 6
MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ
administrative supervision of inferior courts
Abrera was from the Public Attorneys Office. He alleged that Maceda, the Judge of RTC-Antique,
falsified his certificate of service. Maceda was said to have certified all criminal and civil cases have
been decided within a period of 90 days.
Abrera claims that in truth and in fact, no decision has been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases.
Macedas defense is that he had been granted by the SC an extension of 90 days to decide the said
cases. He also argues that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over him since the offense charged
arose from the performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the SC.
(He claims that the Ombudsman encroaches on the SCs power of supervision over inferior courts).
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction? What is scope of SCs power of supervision?

SC:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct
and inefficiency, AS WELL AS criminally liable to the State under the RPC for felonious act.
However, in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the SC with regard to his
certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
29

The SCs administrative supervision includes all courts and all court personnel, from the Presiding Justice
of the CA, down to the lowest MTC clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter to the SC for determination whether the said
certificates reflect the true status of his pending case load, since only the Court has the necessary records
to make such determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, to submit its records, or to allow
its personnel to testify on this matter.
Should a judge, having been granted by the SC an extension of time, report these cases in his certificate
of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by this Court, how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal case that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must DEFER ACTION on said complaint and REFER THE SAME to
this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
SECTION 10
NITAFAN VS. CIR
salaries of judges
The judges here seek to perpetually prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes
from their salaries.
They submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries which is contrary to the Constitution mandating
that their salaries shall not be decreased during their term. They also contednt that this is anathema
to an independent judiciary.
ISSUE: Are the salaries of judges exempt from income tax?

SC:
NO.
The clear intent of the Con-Com was to delete an express grant of exemption from payment of income tax
to members of the Judiciary, so as to give substance to the EQUALITY AMONG THE THREE BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT.
The Court has since then authorized the continued deduction of withholding tax from the salaries of all the
members of the Judiciary. The Court has discarded the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer which exempted them
from payment of income tax.
30

The Court thus reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to the general
income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such taxes does not fall within
the constitutional protection against the decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
(there was a discussion on the intent of the framers.. Fr. B in the deliberations proposed an amendment
that the salaries shall not be diminished but may still be subject to the general income tax.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to make the salaries of the Judiciary taxable.
In the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government, they
must all share in the burden of general income taxation equitably.
SECTION 11
VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA

security of tenure
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Sec 14 of the Peoples Court Act.
Section 14 provides: SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under
the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit
and vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a
person who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and
the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
"If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges,
in Rule 126, section I of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence or temporary disability
the requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case
is not present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance,Judges-at-large
of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section
one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justices of said Court, in order to form a
quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached."
They claim that:
(a) It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in
section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
"(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 4, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to
Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
"(d) It deprives the' Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to
confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
"(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
"(f) It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII, of
the Philippine Constitution.
"(g) it is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who
rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.
"(h) it denies the equal protection of the laws
"(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
"(j) it amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine
Constitution.
"(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme court
in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President."
The Solgen countered that:
"1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
"2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional
qualification :for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
31

"3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article Vill of the
Constitution 'apply to permanent "appointees"--not to temporary 'designees.'
"4. Section 5, Article Vill of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section
14, commonwealth Act No. 682.
"5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and
vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.
"6. It does not create an additional 'Special Supreme Court,'
"7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the - Supreme Court but merely supplements the
Rules of Court.
"8. It is not a bill of attainder.
"9. It is not an ex post pacto law.
"10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected
or to the treason indictees; concerned.
"11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
"12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court."
ISSUES:
1) Whether the Congress had power to add to the pre-existing ground for disqualification of a Justice.
2) Whether a person may act as Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed by the President and
not confirmed by the CA, even only as DESIGNEE
3) Whether the manner of designation by the President can constitutionally sit temporarily as Justice of
the SC.
SC:
NO. NO. NO.
1. NO. If section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court who held any office or position under
the Philippine Executive Commission, would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case,
because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office under the PEC. In other words, what
the constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the
Court, the challenged law would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. IN short, what the
constitution directs, the section 14 prohibits. This is a clear repugnancy to the fundamental law.
Whatever modification the legislature may propose must not contravene the provisions of the constitution.
Thus, the disqualification added by Sec 14 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution is arbitrary, irrational and violative of the constitution.
2. NO. No person not so appointed by the President WITH the consent of the CA, may act as Justice of the
SC. The designation made by Section 14 does not comply with the requirement of appointment. An
additional disqualifying circumstance of the designee is the lack of confirmation or consent by the CA.
So, it may happen that a designee under Sec 14 sitting as a substitute Justice of the SC, and
participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the SC, does not possess the qualifications of
regular members of the SC.
NO temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the Constitution. The phrase unless otherwise
provided for by law does NOT authorize any legislation that would alter the composition of the SC, no
matter how brief a time it may be imagined. In principle, what matters is not the length or shortness of
the alternation of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence and unalterability
of that constitution so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered.
3. NO. No matter how brief or temporary the participation of the judge, there is no escaping that he would
be participating in the deliberations of the the SC, and his vote would count as much as that of any
regular Justice. A temporary member thereof is a misnomer, for that is not a position contemplated by
the constitution. The Constitution is clear that the CJ and the Justices who compose the SC have to be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the CA. Mere designation under Sec 14, does not satisfy said
requirement.
The designees cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been appointed nor
confirmed.
SEC 14. NULL AND VOID.
32

Digests - Article VIII

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Digests - Article VIII

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Political Law Review

Atty. Jacinto Jimenez

ARTICLE VIII JUDICIARY

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS VS. ANG CHO KIO

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

ISSUE: Whether the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

LINA VS. PURISIMA

Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB.

TAN VS, MACAPAGAL

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

TELECOMS VS. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether Telebap and GMA have locus standi

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission : x x x In times of social disquietude or political

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Ripeness and Prematurity

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

David vs. Arroyo

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

PHIL ASSOC. COLLEGES VS. SEC OF EDUCATION

Updated Champ Digests

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara. Charms

Political Law Review

Issue: Is there a justiciable controversy?