Calimutan v.

People of the Philippines

FACTS:
In the morning of February 4, 1996, Victim Cantre and
Saano, together with two other companions had a drinking- spree in a
videoke bar at 10:00. Then, they decided to part ways and went to their
respective houses. On their way home, Cantre and Saano crossed paths
with Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao. Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacao
because he is suspecting the latter as the one responsible for throwing
stones at his house the previous night. After being hit, Bulalacao ran away.
Petitioner picked-up a stone which is as big as mans fist, ran toward Cantre,
and threw it to the latter, hitting him at the left side of his back. When Cantre
turned his attention to the petitioner, Saano tried to pacify the two. Both
Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses. When Cantre
arrived at his house, he complained of the pain on the left side of his back,
which was hit by the stone. That night, he again complained of backache and
also of stomachache. His condition immediately worsens, and at around 3:00
am, Cantre died.
Right after his death, Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday,
the Municipal Health Officer and made findings that the cause of death was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. Unsatisfied, the
Cantre family requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the
victim by the NBI. Dr. Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and
reported that the cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen.
The victim suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive
accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen
caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.
Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim but
Cantre refused and pulled out an eight-inch balisong. When he saw the
victim was about to stab Bulalacao, he picked up a stone and threw it at
Cantre. He contended that the throwing of the stone was in defense of his
companion.
The RTC rendered a decision, which was later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, holding that petitioner was criminally liable for homicide and that
the act of throwing a stone from behind was a treacherous one and the
accused committed a felony which caused the death of the victim and held
that the accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been
intended.
ISSUE:
homicide.

If the petitioner is criminally liable for the crime of

HELD:
While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual
findings of the RTC and the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence
proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated
spleen which is the result by the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the CA as to the
determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner
should have been convicted for.
The Supreme Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner
any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the
absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner
Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the
stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very
least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was
petitioner Calimutans intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that
point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as
earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.

Manuel v. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
This is a case filed against Eduardo Manuel for bigamy by
Tina B. Gandalera. Complainant claims that she met the petitioner in
Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. When he visited her in Baguio,
things escalated quickly as they went to a motel where, Eduardo succeeded
in having his way with her. Petitioner proposed to her and even brought his
parents to assure that he is single. Tina finally accepted the marriage
proposal and they were married on April 22, 1996. In their marriage contract,
it appeared that Eduardo is single. However, their relationship turned sour
as Manuel started making himself unavailable most of the time and went to
their house only twice or thrice a year. One day, petitioner took all of his
cloths, left and never returned. Out of curiosity, Tina went to NSO in Manila
where she found out that petitioner had been previously married to Rubylus
Gaa.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he informed Tina of his previous
marriage, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. He abandoned her
when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck, suspecting it that it

came from another man. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was
"single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court
to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Rubylus
was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in
jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married
Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not
heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. After trial, the court rendered
judgment, finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. It
declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not excuse him
from liability for bigamy and that even if the private complainant had known
that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally
liable for bigamy. Eduardo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
maintaining his contentions. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a
felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant
because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful
marriage. Hence, the petition by Eduardo Manuel.
ISSUE:
If the petitioner has criminal intent to contract on the
second marriage to be liable for bigamy.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution proved that
the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not
judicially declared null; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant
in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. The petitioner is
presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an
excuse
because
everyone
is
presumed
to
know
the
law. Ignorantialegisneminemexcusat. It was the burden of the petitioner to
prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he
was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he
had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the
presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial

declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and
would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private
complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in
such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony
cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an
intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice"
do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included
in the word "voluntary."
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt
act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers
injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have
been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends
the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of
proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.

United States v. Ah Chong

FACTS:
Ah Chong, the defendant was employed as a cook at
Officers' quarters No. 27 at Fort McKinley, Rizal and at the same place
Pascual Gualberto, the deceased, was employed as a houseboy or
muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants, occupying a
small room toward the rear of the building. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and
were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening
the door by placing against it a chair. At 10:00 pm of August 14, 1908,
someone who was forcefully opening the door of the room awakened Ah
Chong. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, Ah Chong leaped to his feet and called out.
"If you enter the room, I will kill you."
At the moment, the chair that was placed to block the door struck Ah
Chong. In the darkness and confusion Ah Chong thought that the person who
had forced the door open had inflicted the blow. Seizing a common kitchen
knife, which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Consequently, Pascual ran out the porch and fell down on the steps. Seeing
that Pascual was wounded, Ah Chong called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind

up Pascual's wounds.Pascual was brought to the military hospital but died

the following day and Ah Chong was arrested.
Ah Chong alleged that it was because of repeated robberies that he
kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. He admitted that he
had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that
Pascual was "a ladron" (burglar) because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite warnings.
The trial court decided that Ah Chong was guilty of simple homicide,
with extenuating circumstances. Ah Chong admitted that he killed his
roommate but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do
a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
ISSUE:
If Ah Chong can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts.
HELD:
There is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
Ah Chong is acquitted.
Ah Chong struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a
thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at
the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of selfdefense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.
People of the Philippines v. De Fernando
FACTS:
This is an appeal that has been taken by the defendant
Fernando de Fernando from the judgment of First Instance of Zamboanga in
which he was held guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 20 years cedena temporal to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Buenaventura Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs, by virtue of
a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the said crime.
Before the day of the crime, residents of Barrio of Municahan of the
Municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the presence of 3 suspicious
looking persons prowling around the town, suspecting them as
Moro
prisoners who recently escaped from Jail.
Fernando de Ferrnando, a policeman, when passing in front of the
house of Remigio Delgado was called by Pacencia Delgado, the latter's

daughter and said to him that her father wanted to talk to him. Remigio told
Fernando that 3 unknown and suspicious looking fellows were prowling
around the house, dressed in blue same as those purportedly worn by the
escapees. Fernando stayed in the house talking to Pacencia, both seated in a
bench near the window. At about 7:00 pm, there appeared a figure in the
dark about 4 meters from the stairs, a person in dark clothes, calling
MangMiong. Fernando and the daughter of Remegio had no idea who was
calling. Fernando asked the man what he wanted but instead of answering
the question the man continued to the walk with bolo in hand. Fernando
upon seeing this took out his revolver and fired a warning shot. But then,
having fired a shot into the air the man continued to ascend the stairs, so
Fernando shot him. However it was found out that the unknown man was
Buenaventura Paulino, nephew of Remigio.
The trial court held that Fernando was guilty of the crime of murder.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:

If Fernando is criminally liable for his acts.

HELD:
The Supreme Court decided that yes, Fernando de Fernado
is criminally liable but not for the crime of murder but for homicide through
reckless negligence. The accused being agent of the law, to whom notice
was given of the presence of the suspicious looking persons who might be
the escapees caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man was one
of the escaped convicts, and after firing a warning shot, the man still did not
stop to advance with a bolo in hand. Because of the circumstances and
believing that the man was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first
fired into the air and then at the alleged intruder. At that psychological
moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the
accused was not able to take full account of the true situation. However, a
circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only
a friend but a relative when the man called NongMiong, and in not asking
the daughter of the owner of the house who was it who was calling to her
father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he
should have used before talking such fatal action. Hence he is liable for
homicide through reckless negligence.
Diego v. Castillo
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed against Regional
Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment in a criminal case and or rendering judgment in gross
ignorance of the law in a bigamy case.
On January 9, 1965, Crescencia Escoto (Lucena Escoto) contracted
marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., both Filipinos and was their marriage was
solemnized by then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. On February 15,
1978, Jorge de Perio , the petitioner was issued a Decree of Divorce by the
Family District Court of Harris County, Texas. It was ordered, adjudged and

decreed, that the bonds of matrimony therefore existing between Jorge de

Perio and Cresencia de Perio are hereby dissolved, cancelled and annulled
and the petitioner is hereby granted a divorce. Subsequently, on June 4,
1987, CrescenciaEscoto using the name Lucena Escoto married the brother
of Eduardo P. Diego, Manuel P. Diego before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy,
parish priest of Dagupan City
The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against
Escoto and after the trial for bigamy, on February, 1999, respondent Judge
acquitted Cescencia Escoto since the state failed to prove guilt beyond
whisper of a doubt and gave credence to the defense of the accused that she
acted without any malicious intent for believing in good faith that her
marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment. Therefore, an
administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code
ISSUE:
If Judge Castillo validly took up mistake of fact to acquit
Crescencia Escoto from criminal liability.
HELD:
The Supreme Court decided that Judge Castillo did not
validly take up mistake of fact to acquit Escoto. As carefully distinguished by
the Supreme Court in its previous decisions that mistake of fact, which could
be a valid defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from mistake of law, which
does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. In People vs.
Bidtu the Supreme Court held that even if the accused, who had obtained a
divorce decree under Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in
contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of
law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify the her
act also. The Court further that it is sufficient to say that everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of law does not exempt him from the consequence
thereof.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Petitioner former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is being
prosecuted under RA 7080 - An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder as amended by RA 7659. He contends that the, Plunder law is
unconstitutional for 1) it suffers from the vice of vagueness 2) it dispenses
with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions and 3) it
abolishes the element of mensrea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code which are said to be clear violations of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
On April 4, 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as:
1. Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659

2. Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,

par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) And 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively
3. Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees)
4. Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal
Code)
5. Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085)
On April 11, 2001 Joseph Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the
grounds of lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation
of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause, which was
denied. On April 25, 2001 the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim.
Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder
exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused On
June 14, 2001 the petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case
No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional
for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more
than 1 offense which was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malumprohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so
classify it.
HELD:
It is malum in se, which requires proof of criminal intent.
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of
mensrea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that
the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement
of mensrea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner
cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation
on S.B. No.733.
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to
commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act
done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mensrea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the
Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates
quite clearly that mensrea is an element of plunder since the degree of
responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se

must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the
case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
People of the Philippines v. Go Shui Ling
FACTS:
The case is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Pasay
City, Branch CX finding accused-appellant Antonio Comia guilty of conspiracy
with four others to import regulated drugs in violation of Art. 6 paragraph 14
in relation to Art. IV, paragraph 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
In the middle of August 1992 Chief Inspector Amador Pabustan of the
Criminal Investigation Section of the Philippine National Police received a
report from the International Police Organization that a large shipment of
narcotics was arriving in Manila by air mail so he conferred it to Pastor Guiao,
Collector of Customs at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, who ordered
an inspection of parcels of commercial quantity coming from Hong Kong,
Singapore, Indonesia and Bangko. On September 3, 1992, Antonio Comia,
who works for TASCO went to the Airmail Distribution Center to inquire about
packages of their client Mary Ong consisting of about 30 parcels which were
addressed to various individuals and bearing the identifying marks "VGM" or
"VGMO" which were supposed to have left the Hong Kong Airport on
September 2, 1992. TeresitaBajar informed him that they arrived but under
inspection and that the packages marked "VGM" had arrived in bad order
and that its contents, which turned out to be watches. Meanwhile, 3
packages out of 9 that were marked "VGMO" and addressed to Comia was
found to contain plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Evangelista, who was present denied any knowledge of the importation
and claimed that the cargo belonged to Mary Ong. On the contrary, Mary
Ong was called and she executed an affidavit admitting that the packages
marked "VGM" were hers, but were actually meant for Mrs. Go Shiu Ling, the
sister of the sender in Hong Kong who asked her to facilitate the importation
of the boxes of what she thought contained watches.
About September 9, 1992 an Information against Comia was filed for
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously import or bring into the Philippines Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug which he pleaded not guilty on.
On October 12, 1992 the Information was amended to include Teodoro
Evangelista.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against Bajar because the
circumstance was insufficient to prove that she was in conspiracy with the
others in the importation of shabu.
It also granted the demurrers of Ong and Go since Evangelista's
affidavit was inadmissible as evidence because Evangelista was not
presented to identify it. Likewise, Ong's own affidavit, in which she pointed to
Go as the real consignee of the packages, was also held to be inadmissible
on the ground that it had been taken while she was under custodial
investigation without assistance of counsel. She also made no mention of the
packages marked "VGMO" in her affidavit and admitted that the parcels were
sent to her by Yu Yen Jian, whereas the three parcels appeared to have been
shipped by a certain Ching Ming.
Meanwhile, Comia's demurrer was denied and was found guilty.
ISSUE:
If a crime for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act is a crime
malumprohibitum.
HELD:
Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot
escape criminal responsibility. The crime with which he is charged is
a malum prohibitum. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not
exempting circumstances. As held in People v. Lo Ho Wing:
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a
"malumprohibitum" because it is punished as an offense
under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by
law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be
considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said
act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing
the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.
People of the Philippines v. Bayona
FACTS:
The defendant, who was a special agent of the Philippine
Constabulary, contends that he stopped his automobile in front of the
municipal building of Pilar for the purpose of delivering to Major Agdamag a
revolver that the defendant had taken that day from one Tomas de Martin,
who had no license therefore; that he did not know there was a polling place
near where he parked his motor car; that he was sixty-three meters from the
electoral college when the revolver was taken from him by Jose E. Desiderio,
a representative of the Secretary of the Interior. The evidence shows,
however, that the defendant was only ten or twelve meters from the polling
place when he was found standing near his automobile with a revolver in his
belt, and that the municipal building could not be seen from the polling
place; that the defendant was at the time employed as a chauffeur by a
senator for that district, and that he had been sent to Pontevedra, a
municipality adjoining Pilar. The defendant did not arrest Tomas deMartin, nor
does it appear that he caused him to be prosecuted. Tomas de Martin

was not called as a witness in this case. Furthermore there is one other
fact of record that completely discredits the testimony of the defendant.
Major Agdamag, to whom the defendant claims he intended to deliver
the revolver, was not the provincial commander of Capiz, but an officer sent
from Cebu to Capiz for the purpose of supervising the elections in that
province; and taking into consideration the intelligence of the defendant and
the nature of his employment.
ISSUE:
If appellants intent should be taken into consideration in
the instant case.
HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the appeal and that it did not
take into consideration the intent of the accused.
The court does not believe that appellant did not know the location of
the polling place in question.
The law, which the defendant violated, is a statutory provision, and the
intent with which he violated it is immaterial. The act prohibited by the
Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to
interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the
offense. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent,
but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was
intentionally done.
United States v. Mallari
FACTS:
On the morning of September 25, 1913, in the barrio of
Batasan, municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, before going to
his work, the defendant MaximoMallari went to the house of the married
couple, Vicente Sunga and Canuta Flores, and from the shed outside asked
Vicente Sunga to cure his wife of a sickness from which she had been
suffering for several days, and which he thought was due to enchantment on
the part of the said Vicente. As the latter refused, averring that he was not a
wizard and that he had not caused the illness of defendants wife, the former
became enraged and insulted the said spouses. Threatening to kill them, he
ascended the stairway carrying in his hand a thin, sharp bolo. At his wifes
suggestion Vicente Sunga tried to get out reporting the matter to the
teniente of the barrio, who lived at some paces from their house, but as he
met the defendant on the stairway, he immediately went back inside and
jumped out of a window. He was straightway pursued by the defendant and
on arriving almost in front of the house of the teniente saw that the
defendant was following closely behind him. He therefore turned to face his
pursuer and defend himself as well as he could with his hands. Thereupon
the defendant with a single slash of the bolo mortally wounded Vicente
Sunga in the abdomen. In this condition the victim sat down, endeavoring
with his hands to keep his intestines from falling out, while his assailant took
to flight. 3 days after, Vicente died due to the mortal wound inflicted upon
him.

Defendant on his defense, declared that on the morning of the

occurrence his wife, who was ill, told him before going to work to stop in at
Isidro Sungas house and ask the latters wife to treat her, for it was reported
that she was a witch; that when he reached the yard of Isidro Sungas house
he asked the latters son, SilvinoSunga, for his mother; that at Silvinos
invitation he entered the yard and Isidro Sunga asked him from the window
what he wanted and invited him to come in; but that he refused to enter,
saying that he could tell what he wanted from outside; that thereupon Isidro
Sungas wife appeared at the window and upon seeing him called to her
children, saying that a bad man had come. Then they began to insult him,
and when he tried to get away, Vicente Sunga, SilvinoSunga, Isidro Sunga,
and Florentino Sunga, armed with long bolos, pursued him. At that instant
Vicente Sunga, who was foremost among them, struck him a blow with a
pocket-knife on one of his rumps.
ISSUE:
deceased.

If Mallari was doing a lawful self-defense against the

HELD:
The court denied his contention. It appears fully proven in
the case that the defendant Mallari did not go to Isidro Sungas house to
perform his wifes errand but that he went directly to another house, in which
Vicente Sunga lived apart, to compel the latter to cure his sick wife. But
when the latter insisted that they have nothing to do with it, Mallari
threatened to kill them.
Isidro Sunga, who lived in another house with SilvinoSunga and
Florentino Sunga, was not in his house at the time of the occurrence and
none of these persons saw the affair, so they could not have pursued the
defendant with weapons, as he affirms.
It does not therefore appear to be duly proven in the case that the
defendant was attacked and wounded with a pocket-knife by the deceased,
and consequently that there was any prior unlawful aggression on the part of
the deceased, to justify the finding that the defendant was compelled to
wound him in the belly with a bolo in lawful self-defense. The plea or
circumstance of exemption from responsibility must be fully proven in the
same way as the principal fact, in order to hold that the perpetrator of the
crime is not responsible therefore.
Bataclan v. Medina
FACTS:
Past midnight on September 13, 1952, bus no.30 of Medina
Transportation operated by owner defendant Mariano Medina, left the town
of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by ConradoSaylon with
approximately 18 passengers and Bataclan is one of the passengers of the
said bus who was seated beside of the driver. At 2:00 am, while the bus was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and
the vehicle began to zigzag until it fell into the canal on the right side of the
road and the bus turned over. Consequently, four passengers including

Bataclan were trapped inside the bus and could not get out. After an hour,
ten men, carrying lighted torch made of bamboo fueled with petroleum,
approached the bus and a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers.
By reason of the death of Bataclan, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her
name and in behalf of her five minor children filed a suit to recover from
Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. This is for the reason that the proximate cause of the death
of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus including the four passengers. That Bataclan, though he must
have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive and so the
damages were awarded not for his death but for the physical inquiries
suffered by him.
Plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to CA but the latter
endorsed the appeal to SC because of the value involved in the claim of the
complaint.
ISSUE/S: If the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus; If Medina
Transportation is liable.
HELD:
The Supreme Court decided that the overturning of the bus
was not the the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan. Proximate cause
as defined in American Jurisprudence is 'that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we
do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect
the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with
a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to
the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the

driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Medina Transportation is liable. The case involves breach of contract of
a common carrier. There was negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the
time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the
witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the
front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging,
there was a distance of about 150 meters. The driver, after the blow-out,
must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it
over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
Also when the bus has already overturned, driver should and must have
known that in the position of the bus, gasoline could and must have leaked
from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be
smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on
the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions abovereproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Quinto v. Andres
FACTS:
On November 13, 1995 at 7:30 are Edison Garcia, an 11
year-old and grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson
Quinto saw Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage
culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the
drainage culvert. Wilson agreed while Garcia seeing that it was dark inside,
opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance
of
the drainage
system.
Unfortunately,
only
Pacheco
had
a
flashlight. Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage
system and left without saying a word. Then, Andres came out, went back
inside, and emerged again carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid
his body down in the grassy area. Garcia, shocked, fled from the scene and
Andres went to the house of Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed
her that her son had died. They rushed to the drainage culvert. Wilson was
buried without Melba Quinto filing a complaint.
November 28, 1995: National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) took the sworn
statements of Pacheco, Garcia and Quinto. Pacheco alleged that he had
never been to the drainage system catching fish with Andres and Wilson
Dr. Dominic Gaud of the NBIs autopsy showed that the cause death is
drowning with traumatic head injuries as contributory so the NBI filed a
criminal complaint for homicide against Andres and Pacheco with the RTC. Dr.

Dominic Gaud testified that Wilson could have fallen, and that the occipital
portion of his head could have hit a blunt object. That the 14x7-centimeter
hematoma at the back of Wilsons head could have rendered him
unconscious so he drowned. The 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side
of Wilsons face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete
wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that
the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of
strangulation. The RTC granted the demurer of the respondents to evidence
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE:

If the accused has criminal liability for the death of the victim.

HELD:
The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It failed to prove the guilt of the accused is
criminality liable although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial and appellate courts
that the proximate cause of the death of the victim was not cause by any
wrongful act of the accused. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove the
corps delicti, which consists of criminal act and the defendants agency in
the commission of the act. This, the prosecution failed to do.
People of the Philippines v. Balmores
FACTS:
Balmores is being prosecuted for the crime of estafa
through falsification of a security. It is alleged that Balmores tore off the
bottom of a genuine 1/8 unit Phil Charity Sweepstakes Ticket. This way, the
real number on such ticket was removed and that by substituting and using
ink. Balmores allegedly wrote 07400 instead which is actually the winning
number.
Balmores presented the ticket as genuine to the PCSO so he could
claim the money. However, he was not able to perform all the acts of
execution, which would produce the crime of estafa through falsification of a
security because Bayani Miler, the employee to whom the ticket was
presented, immediately discovered the falsification and caused Balmores
apprehension.
ISSUE:
If the consummation of the crime of safaris actually an
impossible crime.
HELD:
The Supreme Court that there is no impossible crime. The
recklessness and clumsiness of Balmores in falsifying the ticket did not make
the crime impossible under Art.4 Par.2. Examples of impossible crimes are as
follows: trying to kill another by putting an arsenic substance in the latters
soup but it turns out the substance was just common salt; or when one tries
to murder a corpse. In this case, even if the ticket was patently falsified on
its face, it cannot be said that it was impossible to consummate the crime of

estafa thru falsification.

Into v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner, SulpicioIntod, filed this petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the RTC,
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder. SulpicioIntod and 3
other men went to Salvador Mandayas house to ask him to go with them to
the house of BernardinaPalangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 pm of that
same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at
Palangpangans house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned
out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied
by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused
fired. No one was hit by the gunfire.
The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Intod seeks a
modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an
impossible crime Art. 4 (2).Intod contends that, Palangpangan's absence
from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets
made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent, the
People of the Philippines, argues that the crime was not impossible instead
the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent.
Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that the
crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of
accident other that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3). Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible.
ISSUE:

If Intods act constitutes an impossible crime.

HELD:
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical
impossibility that rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment
and under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be
either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the
act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts,
even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to
this category.

In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility

of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between
factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted
Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4,
which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of
the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
Jacinto v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Jacinto with a postdated
BDO Check in the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for Aquino's purchases
from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land
Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle, the
sister of petitioner. Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of
Mega Foam, received a phone call from Land Bank looking for Generoso
Capitle to inform him that the BDO check deposited in his account had been
dishonored. Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia asking her to
inform Jacqueline Capitle about the bounced check. Valencia told Ricablanca
of a plan to take the cash and invited Ricablanca to join the scheme.
Ricablanca, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.
Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino had
already paid Mega Foam in cash as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the NBI and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. With the help of Ricablanca, petitioner
and Valencia were arrested upon receiving the marked money. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two. The RTC found the accused
guilty of qualified theft. The CA modified the judgment by reducing the
sentence of Valencia and Capitle but Jacontos sentence remained.
ISSUE:

If the theft constitutes an impossible crime.

HELD:
Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto was found guilty of impossible
crime. Under Article 308, in relation to Article 310 of RPC, the personal
property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen. Article 309 further bolsters this,
where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is
dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed

would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done
with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible,
or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be
either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal
impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime
of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Were it not for the fact
that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof,
which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at
the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing
unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash
to replace the value of said dishonored check.
Valenzuela v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged in an Information
with the crime of theft. The two were sighted outside the Super Sale Club by
security guard Lago. Valenzuela, wearing a Receiving Dispatching Unit ID,
was seen hauling a pushcart with cases of Tide and unloading these cases in
an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela then called
a cab and the two loaded the cartoons of Tide and boarded the vehicle. Lago
tried to stop them by asking for a receipt, but the two reacted by fleeing on
foot, prompting Lago to fire a warning shot. Valenzuela and Calderon were
apprehended and 4 cases of Tide Ultramatic, 1 case of Ultra 25 grams and 3
cases of detergent were recovered.
Valenzuela and Calderon pleaded not guilty on arraignment and
claimed to be innocent bystanders. According to Calderon, he went to the
said supermarket with his neighbor Rosulada to withdraw from his ATM. Due
to the long queue, they decided to buy snacks and went outside after
hearing a gunshot. Suddenly, a security guard grabbed them. As for
Valenzuela, he and his cousin Gregorio were walking in the parking lot to ride
a tricycle when they saw Lago fire a shot. People started running and Lago
apprehended him. During Valenzuelas cross-examination, he admitted that
he had been employed as a bundler of GMS Marketing, assigned at the
supermarket though not at SM.
The RTC found Valenzuela and Calderon guilty of consummated theft.
The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
established the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as
perpetrators of the crime.

Only Valenzuela filed a brief with CA, causing the dismissal of

Calderons appeal. Valenzuela argued in CA that he should only be convicted
of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended; he was never
placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC hence, Valenzuela filed
Petition for Review.
ISSUE:
If the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely
frustrated?
HELD:
Consummated. Theft is already produced upon the
taking of personal property of another without the latters consent. There is
no frustrated theft.
There is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in
theft the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the
provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must
further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with
intent to gain; without force upon things or violence against or intimidation
of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of the property.As
applied to the present case, the moment Valenzuela obtained physical
possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such
seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict
violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, Valenzuela
forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would
have afforded him.
In order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it
is necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft produced.
Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is
one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is
already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another
without the latters consent.
The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not
a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension
in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as
the mensrea or actusreus of the felony. To restate what this Court has
repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. The presumed inability
of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the
fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession
upon the completion of the taking.

Palagnas v. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
On January 16, 1998, around 8:00 am, brothers Servillano,
Melton, and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house
but later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking
spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas arrived together with his
nephew, Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. Later, when Jaime was
singing, Melton Ferrer sang along with him, as he was familiar with the song
My Way. Jaime got irritated and insulted. He felt he was being mocked by
Melton Ferrer that caused him to go to Ferrers table and utter statements,
which began the fight. With this, Ferdinand, Jaimes nephew, sought help to
his brother, Rujjeric Palaganas, who was now the petitioner in this case. They
went to the bar and upon seeing the Ferrer s outside, Ferdinand, pointing at
the Ferrers, instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot
Servillano, Melton, and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a
result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded, and Michael was
shot in his right shoulder. On October 28, 1998, RTC of Pangasinan decided in
3 Criminal Cases finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and two (2) counts of frustrated homicide of Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. On September 30, 2004, Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
the decision of the lower court with modifications considering his voluntary
surrender as ordinary mitigating circumstance. However, on November 16,
2004, petitioner prayed for the reversal of the decision holding that the CA
erred in affirming the judgment of conviction of RTC and in not aquiiting him
on the ground of self-defense. Hence, this petition on certiorari.
ISSUE:
If Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts
of Frustrated Homicide.
HELD:
The Supreme Court decided that Rujjeric is guilty of the
crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide. The following is the
decision of the court:
1. Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm attempted homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance
of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2)
months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision
correccional as maximum period
2. Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm homicide is reclusion temporal - There being a special aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of
prision mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum period
3. Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm frustrated homicide. There being a special aggravating circumstance of

the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor
as maximum period.
Petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present
in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that
when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a victim of an
unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact,
sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones
thrown by the Ferrer brothers
When the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of
a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on If any of
the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are
present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were
not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or
attempted homicide.
If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s
sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious,
less serious or slight physical injury.
Rivera v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
While Ruben went to a store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera, one of
the accused, mocked the former for being jobless. A heated exchange of
words between the two soon followed. The following day, Ruben, together
with his 3-yr old daughter, went to the store, again, to buy food. Then,
accused Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo Rivera emerged from their house
and ganged up on Ruben. They mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to
the ground. While in that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times
with a hollow block on the parietal area, while the other two continued
mauling him. Although feeling dizzy, Ruben managed to stand up. Ismael
threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When the policemen arrived,
the accused fled to their house. The Rivera brothers were then convicted by
the trial court of frustrated murder. On appeal, the CA modified the RTC
decision and convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The accused insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they had
the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled him with a hollow block.
Furthermore, even if they had intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to
prove treachery, thus, they should be guilty only of attempted homicide.
ISSUE:
If the accused should be found guilty only of attempted
homicide instead of attempted murder.
HELD:

An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in

their consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders

to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by
direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed
from the commission of a felony by dolo. evidence to prove intent to kill in
crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately
after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and
Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as Ruben fell to the
ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault
of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried
to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in
the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions. In
addition, even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head,
petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the
felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a
hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If
Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
People of the Philippines v. Anticamara
FACTS:
About 3:00 am of May 7, 2002, house helper AAA and
driver Abad Sulpacio were sleeping in their employers' house located in
Barangay
Carmen
East,
Rosales,
Pangasinan.
Their
employers,
ConradoEstrella and his wife, were out of the house at that. Momentarily,
AAA was jolted from sleep when she heard someone going inside his or her
house.
Thereafter, AAA observed about six (6) persons enter the house, who
she later identified as accused Dick Taedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Taedo, a
certain Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias Al Camara, and
Fernando Fernandez alias LandoCalaguas. One of the intruders
approached her and told her not to move.
Then they decided to tie AAA. Later, AAA was untied and led her
outside the house. Outside, AAA saw Abad, who was also tied and
blindfolded, seated inside a vehicle.
The group later brought AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by their
employers. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle and led him away
where he was killed thereafter.
Later, LandoCalaguas and Fred boarded the vehicle taking along
with them AAA. They later proceeded towards San Miguel Tarlac, where
LandoCalaguas resided. They stayed in Lando's house where they kept AAA

from May 7 to May 9, 2002. She was kept in a motel where LandoCalaguas
raped her.
On June 4, 2002, AAA managed to escape and reported the incident.
ISSUE:
liability.

If Al Anticamara is entitled to be exempt from criminal

HELD:
Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging
that he was only forced to participate in the commission of the crime
because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's defense fails to
impress us. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt
from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force,
or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
because such person does not act with freedom. To avail of this exempting
circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the
fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For
such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.
There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence
that he was under duress from his co-accused while participating in the
crime that would suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability. The
evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station
himself across the house of the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to
1:00 a.m. of the following day, while the rest of the group was waiting in the
landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since
he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However,
he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas for almost six (6)
hours, and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was
waiting for his report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas
house. When the group entered the house, Al stayed for almost one (1)
hour outside to wait for his companions. Later, when the group left the
house aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to SitioRosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, bringing with them Sulpacio and
AAA. Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished to,
but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities
or any person passing by the house of the Estrellas during the period he was
stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any effort to perform an overt act
to dissociate or detach him from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof that would exempt him from criminal
liability. Therefore, it is obvious that he willingly agreed to be a part of the
conspiracy.

People of the Philippines v. Baharan

FACTS:
On February 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to
Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious according to
Elmer Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the
bus exploded. After the explosion, the spokes person for Abusayyaff
announced over radio that the explosion was a valentines gift. Accused
Asali, member of Abusayaff, gave a television interview, confessing that he
had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing.
The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, andco
nfirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the
evening of 14 February. Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan
and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City.Accused
contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant toSec. 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:

If Asalis testimony admissible?

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that Asalistestiminoy is
admissible. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator
against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence
of the conspiracy.However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag , if the
declarant repeats the statement court, his extrajudicial confession becomes
a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following: We
must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions.
An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant
but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants
co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial
acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes
admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is
admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a coaccused implicating his co accused is competent evidence against the
latter.
People of the Philippines v. Comadre
FACTS:
At around 7:00 pm of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog,
Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a
drinking spree at the terrace of the house of Roberts father, Barangay
Councilman Jaime Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao,
NuevaEcija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the banister of the terrace
listening to the conversation of the companions of his son.

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants
Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three
stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio
suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants
immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.
The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a
hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and
slumped unconscious on the floor.
The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of
throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely
looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any
act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere presence of George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano provided encouragement and a sense of security
to Antonio Comadre, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.
ISSUE:

If theres a conspiracy from the acts of the accused.

HELD:
There is no conspiracy. Only Antonio is liable for the crime.
When Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked without uttering a single word of
encouragement or performed any act to assist him.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that
to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere
cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. The evidence shows that
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the
commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere
presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with
Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they
performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was
an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. There being no
conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.
Ladonga v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Evangeline and AdronicoLadonga were convicted by the RTC for
violation of BP. Blg. 22 under three Informations. Adronicoapplied for
probation while Evangeline appealed arguing that the RTC erred in finding
her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband, as the principle of
conspiracy is inapplicable to BP Blg. 22, which is a special law.
ISSUE/S:
1. If the cases cited by the Honorable Court of Appeals in affirming in

toto the conviction of petitioner as conspirator applying the

suppletory character of the Revised Penal Code to special laws like
BP Blg. 22 is applicable.
2. If conspiracy is applicable in violations of BP Blg. 22 by invoking the
last sentence of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly prescribe the suppletory
application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary
provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the Revised Penal Code
that, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
The court cited the case of Yu vs. People, where the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 were applied
suppletorily.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is
analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in
U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
The Court in this case however ruled in favor of Evangeline Ladonga as
the prosecution failed to prove that she performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
People of the Philippines v. Bustinera
FACTS:
ESC Transport hired LuisitoBustinera as a taxi driver. It was
agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 pm after
which he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary
fee in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant
admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on
the same day as he was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi
stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and
revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to recovered. The
trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft.
ISSUE:

If the act of Bustinera is a special law.

HELD:
Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain
vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN
ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When statutes are in
parimateria or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same
class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they
should be construed together. The elements of the crime of theft as provided
for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of

personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft
is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft
is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave
abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fish
pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act
No.6539, as amended defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things." The elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor
vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the
owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using
force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping
is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of
unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping being the same. From the
foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a
Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping law and not the provisions of
qualified theft which would apply.
Tan v. Spouses Tan
FACTS:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and
Steven L. Tan were married. Out of this union, two female children were born,
Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into
the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section
5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004."
ISSUE:
If respondents-spouses Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law
of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective
order, in accordance with republic act no. 9262
HELD:
Section 3 of R.A. 9262 defines: "Violence against
and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,

women
by any
woman
or with

whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or

illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.

Urbano v. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner Urbano testified being, in the afternoon of
September 28, 1993, in the nearby town of Bugallon for a picnic. He was with
Tomelden and several others, including Dominador Navarro, Chairperson of
Lingayen Water District. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered goats
meat and drank beer. When it was time to depart, Navarro asked petitioner
to inform Tomelden, then seated in another table, to prepare to leave.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he
had no business stopping him from further drinking as he was paying for his
share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner returned to his table to report to
Navarro. At that time, petitioner saw that Tomelden had already consumed
17 bottles of beer. In all, the group stayed at the picnic place for three and a
half hours before returning to the LIWAD. Upon reaching the LIWAD
compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him, calling him
"sipsip" just to maintain his employment as Navarros tricycle driver.
Tomelden allegedly then delivered several fist and kick blows at petitioner, a
couple of which hit him despite his evasive actions. Petitioner maintained
that he only boxed the victim in retaliation, landing that lucky punch in the
course of parrying the latters blows.
Thereafter, Tomelden went to the hospital several times complaining of
dizziness, headache, and other pains. The last time he went to the hospital,
things turned for the worst. Tomelden died due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
Orje Salazar, their co-worker, attests to the provocative acts of
Tomelden and to his being the aggressor.

ISSUE:
and uttered
provocation?

If the victims insulting remarks directed at the accused,

immediately before the fist fight constitute sufficient

HELD:
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating
circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, the reference is to
an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be sufficient to excite one
to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This
third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was
given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not
sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by
the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by
the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act
of aggression.
In the instant case, Tomeldens insulting
remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before the fist fight
constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon.
Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.

Sanchez v. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Sanchez's account of the facts shows that he and Jamero
were tenants of adjacent lots located in San Jose, Mahayag, Zamboanga del
Sur. At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of September 4, 1993, Sanchez saw
Jamero destroying the dike which served as the boundary between the two
lots. Sanchez confronted Jamero and told the latter that he was encroaching
on his land. Jamero struck him with a shovel. The shovel got stuck in the mud
so Jamero resorted to throwing mud at Sanchez. Fighting back, Sanchez
hacked Jamero with a bolo, resulting in the latter's death. Sanchez then
proceeded to the municipal building to surrender upon the advice of his sonin-law.
According to the OSG, Jamero's attack on Sanchez was unsuccessful
because the latter was able to evade it and Jamero's shovel got stuck in the
mud. Jamero fled toward the ricefield when Sanchez unsheathed his bolo.
Sanchez pursued him and struck his head with a bolo. Jamero fell down but
was able to stand up again. He ran away but after a short distance, fell down
again. Sanchez approached him and stabbed him several times. Not
satisfied, Sanchez pushed Jamero's face down into the knee-deep mud. After
Jamero's aggression ceased when he fled and left his shovel stuck in the

mud, there was no longer any justification for Sanchez to go after him and
hack him to death.
ISSUE:
If unlawful aggression, if not
constitute aggression-warranting self-defense?

continuous,

does

not

HELD:
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,
unless the accused proves the first essential requisiteunlawful aggression
on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden
and unexpected or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person a
mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. There must be
actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it
must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined,
intent to cause injury. Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute
aggression-warranting self-defense.
In this case, the twin circumstances of Jamero's shovel getting stuck in
the mud and his running away from Sanchez convincingly indicate that there
was no longer any danger to the latter's life and limb which could have
justified his pursuit of Jamero and subsequent hacking and killing of the
latter.
Sanchez's failure to prove unlawful aggression by Jamero and the
prosecution's evidence conclusively showing that it was Sanchez who was
the unlawful aggressor completely discounts Sanchez's claim of self-defense.
Even incomplete self-defense by its very nature and essence would always
require the attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim, which
must clearly be shown.
People of the Philippines v. Beltran
FACTS:
On 25 October 1999, at about 10:00 in the evening, the
witness while traversing the Velasquez Road, he saw appellant holding a bolo
and standing in front of his house situated at the side of Velasquez Road. On
the opposite side of the same road, he saw Norman H. Concepcion (Norman)
standing in front of an automobile repair shop. Exhausted by the travel, Ever
decided to stop by and rest momentarily at a nipa hut near the same road.
Minutes later, he saw appellant, from a distance of six meters, stalking
Norman who was then walking near the automobile shop. Appellant
approached Norman, and, without a warning, hacked him with a bolo.
Norman tried to avoid the blow by moving backwards and shielding his face
with his left arm. However, Norman's left hand was hit and wounded by the
bolo. When Norman turned around and ran, appellant hacked him at the back
causing him to fall down on a grassy area. Appellant repeatedly hacked
Norman with a bolo.
Appellant admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but insisted
that he did the same in self-defense.

ISSUE:

If appellant acted with lawful self-defense.

HELD:
The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It reasoned that appellant's
claim of self-defense cannot be sustained in view of the positive and credible
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
People of the Philippines v. Genosa
FACTS:
Accused MarivicGenosa is charged with the crime of
parricide. She used the defense of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) which
allegedly constitutes self- defense under Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code. She suffered battery from her deceased husband Ben Genosa
whenever the latter is drunk. She testified that one year after their marriage,
her husband would slap her, pin her down the bed and sometimes beat her.
The neighbors of the couple have witnessed their frequent quarrels could
testify to this. Accused Marivic has also visited doctors and psychiatrists
during her marriage with deceased every time her husband would beat her.
On the day of the crime, accused was 8-months pregnant and was
looking for her husband as she was afraid that he was gambling and might
het drunk again. Eventually that night, Ben Genosa came home from
gambling and was drunk.
Deceased Ben purportedly nagged Marivic for following him, even
challenging her to a fight. She ignored him and instead attended to their
children who were doing their homework. This angered Ben and switched off
the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or
wire to keep her from watching television. According to Marivic, Ben was
about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands
and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for
help. Ben left. At this point, Marivic packed Bens clothes because she
wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, this
angered Ben even more and so he dragged Marivic outside of the bedroom
towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be
killed so nobody would nag me.Marivic testified that she was aware that
there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it,
Ben got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however,
smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his
wallet. Marivic then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about
to pick up the blade and his wallet. She then ran into their childrens room.
According to Marivic, she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. After the
incident, Marivic and the children locked the house and left. The lifeless body
of Ben was discovered by the neighbors due to the awful smell, which
emanated from the couples house.
ISSUE/S:

If there was a valid self-defense.

HELD:
After a thorough explanation of Battered Woman
Syndrome, the court finds that it is not a valid self-defense for
MarivicGenosa. The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the
cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
MarivicGenosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to
the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension- building phase of the cycle. She was
able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage.
However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome.
In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant provided sufficient evidence in regard to the third
phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to
her mothers or fathers house; that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual
experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the
essential characteristics of the syndrome. They failed to present in court the
factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at
all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
Balunueco vs. Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
FACTS:
The accused, Ricardo Balunueco, was charged with the crime of
homicide for the death of Senando Iguico and frustrated homicide for the
injuries inflicted upon his wife, Amelia Iguico. It was stated that on May 2,
1982, the accused, together with his father and two brothers were chasing
his brother-in-law, and, to keep himself safe, went to the house of the
victim.the victim was then unaware and cooking outside their house when he
was likewise chased and killed by the offenders. Protecting her husband,
Amelia was likewsie hit on the leg. In defense, the accuseed said that he saw
the victim hacking a bolo to his brother, Reynaldo and thus, handed him an
axe to repel the alleged attack of the victim and thereafter, defended his
brother from such atack, hence claiming that he acted in defense of
relatives.
ISSUE:
If there is a valid claim of the justifying circumstance of
defense of relatives.
HELD:
For a valid claim of such circumstance, three requisites
must be present: (a) that there must be an unlawful aggression; (b) there
must be a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and that (c) in case of provocation was given by the person attacked, the
one making the defense had no part therein. In the case at bar, it was proved
that the petitioner failed to prove that the unlawful aggression was initiated
by the victim and that it was established by the court that, rather, he and his

kin initiated the unlawful aggression. Thereby declaring that there is an

absemce of the first and indispensable requisite of self-defense, the unlawful
aggression. Hence, the petition is denied.
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gaonzales Vda De Carungcong,
represented by Mediatrix Carungcong vs. People of the Philippines
and William Sato
FACTS:
The accused, Willima Sato, was charged of the crime estafa thru
falsification of public document by willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong by making the latter sign
and thumbmark a special power of attorney to sell, assign transfer or
otherwise dispose the properties of the latter located at Tagaytay City. The
accused was the brother-in-law of the complainant, therefore, claiming the
exempting circumstance that he is related, by affinity, to the owner of the
properties. The claim was denied due to the fact that the daughter of the
owner, the wife of the accused, died beforehand, hence terminating such
privilege.
ISSUE:
If the death of wife terminated the relationship by affinity
of the husband to the blood relatives of the former.
HELD:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides the
exemption from criminal liablity of the xxx relatives by affinity in the same
line: xxx on criumes of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief. Affinity is
defined as the relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting of
marriage. It was ruled that the affinity still remains even if the spouse is
already dead. Basing on the jurisprudence of the United States and by
construing the provision of the RPC, the accused should be exempted on the
crime committed. However, such exemptions are only limited to the
enumerated felonies under Article 322 of the RPC. Therefore, despite the fact
that affinity still remains as a valid claim of exemption, the crime committed
by the accused is not provided to be exempted on criminal liability.
People of the Philippines vs. Eduarte
FACTS:
The crime of murder was charged to Florentino Eduarte,
qualified by treachery, after killing Roberto Trinidad but invoking the
justifying circumsatnce of defense of relatives. The accused was said to have
shot the victim after the he attempted to help the brother of the accused.
When the victim saw the latter lying on the ground and upon getting out of
his jeepney to lend help to the brother of the accused, Trinidad what shot by
the accused which caused his death. On the defense of the accused, the
victim, together with other three people, have allegedly ganged up the
brother of the accused. Hence, helping his brother from the attack caused by
the victim and his companions.

ISSUE:

If the justifying circumstance is admissible on the case.

HELD:
Under Article 11, par.2 of the RPC, anyone who acts in
defense of the person or rights if his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters xxx provided that the first
and second requisite in the next preceding circumstances are present and
the further requisite, in case of provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein, is not
criminally liable. The burden to prove the above mentioned requisites are
given on the accused to prove his innocence. Nevertheless, based on the
pices of evidence found on the scene, the court found no merit on the claim
of the accused. The claim that there is an unlawful aggression was rebutted
by the evidence that the headlights of the jeep owned by the victim are still
lightened, hence, the victims intention was to really help the brother of the
victim, otherwise, it was turned off. Further, the immediate flee of the
accused after shooting the victim portrays a guilty conscience. The absence
of the clear implication of unlawful aggression, the petition is denied.
People of the Philippines vs. Dijan
FACTS:
The crime of murder was idicted upon Crispulo Dijan and
other two accused after, armed with a knife and an ice-pick, attacked and
assaulted Alvaro Hilario which directly caused his death. As stated by the
prosecution, a bad stare was given by Hilario to the group of the offenders
which, after a while, made the offenders gang up on the Hilario. On the part
of the defense, the victim was allegedly assaulted on of the offenders with a
knife, and, as friend, Dijan helped one of accused and thereby stabbed Dijan.
The latter appealed and invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of
stranger.
ISSUE:
mentioned.

If there is a valid claim for the justifying circumstance

HELD:
The requisites of a valid claim for such circumstance are
as follows: (a) the existence of unlawful agression on the part of the victim;
(b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (c) that the accused has not been induced by revenge, resentment, or
other evil motive. It was further discussed that the unlawful aggression must
be a continuing circumstance or must have been existed at the time the
defense is made. Based from the statement of the accused, the court found
out that at the victim was already disarmed when the accused attacked the
victim. Further, he number of wounds inflicted upon the victim negates the
claim of defense of stranger. Hence, petition was denied.
People vs. Toring et. al.

FACTS:
Toring was accused of murder. A benefit dance was then
happenning in Lapu Lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for candidates
for princesses. The victim and father of the declared winner, Samuel, was
stabbed from behind by the accused, thereby inflicting wounds which caused
the death of the latter. Toring claimed for the justifying circumstance of
defense of stranger. He claimed that he cated in defense of his cousin, Joel
Escoba for the victim was allegedly pointed a gun to Escoba after he was
about to dance with agirl.
ISSUE:
If Torings claim for the justifying circumstance of defense
of stranger is admissible.
HELD:
The justifying circumstance of defense of stranger is
inadmissible. Based on the statements of the accused, the Supreme Court
ruled that there is no clear evidence that there is an unlawful aggression,
hence, inadmissible. Further, it was admitted by the accused that there was
a feud between their family which makes the SC to rule that the accused as
motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive. Hence, does not comply on
the requisites of the valid claim of such circumstance being: (a) the
existence of unlawful agression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) that the
accused has not been induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
Ty vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Seven (7) informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed
against the petitioner. Vicky Ty allegedly issued checks for the payment of
the hospital expenses of her mother with the knowledge that she did not
have enough funds with the drawee bank for the payment of such checks. In
defense, she said that she issued the checks due to state of necessity that
her mother might not be released from the hospital which was, allegedly,
treated her mother inhumanely and harshly. Hence, filed a petition to reverse
the decision rendered upon her, being guilty of the voilation of B.P.22.
ISSUE:
If the claim that the issuance of checks due to the impulse
of an unctrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or
injury is admissble.
HELD:
There is no clear showing that the issuance of the checks
are justified by such justifying circumstance. Hence, the petition should be
denied. The threat that casued the unctrollable fear must be of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should
be based on a real, imminent fear for ones life or limb. Likewise, it should
not be speculative, fanciful or remote. Clearly, the allegedly threat does not
fall under the requisites of the fear to be qualified as justifiable to commit
such issuance of checks. The threat that the mother of the accused will be

treated harshly does not qualify as on the state of necessity, hence, petition
is denied.
People of the Philippines vs. Ricohermoso et.al.
FACTS:
The victim, Geminiano de Leon, was an owner of a parcel of land
farmed by Ricohermoso. The former asked the latter about his share on the
palay that was farmed by Ricohermoso. The offender told the victim that he
should get his part of the palay on the victims house. The victim went to the
house of the offender to get his share of the palay, the former insisted that
the victim is not going to have his share of the palay. Possessed with a bolo,
the offender approached the victim and then stabbed him at the back and
the neck which caused his death. As defense, the accused said that the
victim pointed out a gun on the offender and that he stabbed the victim in
order ro avoid a greater injury.
ISSUE:
If the justifying circumstance of an act committed in the
state of necessity is admissible.
HELD:
The statement of the offender is inadmissble due to the
facts given. It was stated that the crime was committed with treachery and
that there is no necessity of killing the victim for the victims hands were
upraised while pleading with mercy when the offender struck him on the
neck. Hence, the state of necessity to be invoked is not present on the case.
Ambil Jr. Vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
On the 6th day of September 1998, the accused, Ruperto Ambil,
Jr, the duly elected provincial governor of Eastern Samar and Alexandrino
Apeladom the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, allegedly connived to
release Mayor Francisco Adalim, being accused in the Criminal Charge No.
10963. The said governor and warden was said to release and help the said
mayor without any court order. In defense, the accused of this case said that
there are threats posed to the life of the Mayor. However, the Sandiganbayan
rejected the claim and said that the basis of the release of the Mayor is just
an advice from the lawyer of the latter. Hence, the release is contrary to law
by violating R.A. 3019 and the said Governor and Warden are criminally libale
for such acts.
ISSUE:
If the petitioners are entitled to to the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or duty.
HELD:
To invoke such justifying circumstance, two requisites must
be present: (a) that the accused acted in performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office and (b) the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or

the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the case, both circumstances are
absent as the Governor exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer
and detention of Adalim at his house. Further, the release and transfer of
Adalim from the prison to the house of the Governor is unlawful, hence, the
justifying circumstance is cannot be invoked.
Mamangun vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
A Policer Officer named Rufino Mamangun was vharged with the
crime of murder. On July 31 1992, a certain Liberty Contreras shouted for
help because of a robber who entered the yard of Antonio Abacan. As the
policemen heard the report about such event, the evening of the same day,
the policement went to the rooftop of the said house where the robber was
believed to take a refuge. The policemen saw a man on the rooftop and
thought that he was the thief and thereafter, the accused fired his gun
against the man unknowingly it was Gener Contreras and not the robber.
Contreras eventualy died due to the gunshot wound inflicted upon him by
Mamangun. In defense, the policemen who accompanied Mamangun on the
event testified that they warned the victim to stop, but when the victim
stopped, he allegedly wanted to attack Mamangun, who was the leader of
the squad, with a steel pipe. Mamangun was able to evade the atack and
thereafter fired a gun on the victim. After the gunshot, it was said by
Contreras that he is not the man that the policemen where chasing. Hence,
this petition is to acquit the offender from his criminal liability because of his
fulfillment of duty as a policeman.
ISSUE:
If the offender can be acquitted due to the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or duty.
HELD:
The two requisites must be present to invoke such
cirsumstance, to wit: (a) that the accused acted in performance of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office and (b) the injury caused or the
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The first requisite is present
for the policeman responds on an incident of a robbery-holdup incident. But
the second requisite is missing. It was found out that the attempt of the
victim to hit Mamangun with a steel pipe is just a story created for him to
evade criminal liablity. Further, given the fact that the victim said that he was
not the man that the policemen are chasing, the latter should not have shot
the victim. Hence, the justification is inadmissble thereby only subjet to a
privileged mitigating circumstance under Artice 13 and 69 of the RPC.
Baxinela vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela was charged with the crime of murder
after attacking, assaulting and shooting the victim Ruperto Lajo, thereby

causing the death of the latter. An information that a man, possessed with a
gun, was at the bar and is accosting several people on the said club. The
victim allegedly possessed a gun while he was on a bar, drinking liquor. The
accused, together with other policemen wnet on the club to respond on the
information and saw the victim. Yet, the victim was about to draw his gun
and point to the accused but the accused fired the victim before latter was
able to attack him.
ISSUE:
If the act of the accused is subject to the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or duty.
HELD:
The requisites of the said circumstance must be present,
these are: (a) that the accused acted in performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office and (b) the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office. Though the first circumstance is
present for the accused was there to respond on the information about the
incident happening on the club, the second requisite is lacking. It was stated
by the Supreme Court that the purpose of Baxinela is to investigate why the
victim had a gun. The act of firing upon the victim is not a necessary
consequence of his duty. Thereby only subjecting the accused to a privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty.
Ambil Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
On the 6th day of September 1998, the accused, Ruperto Ambil,
Jr, the duly elected provincial governor of Eastern Samar and Alexandrino
Apeladom the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, allegedly connived to
release Mayor Francisco Adalim, being accused in the Criminal Charge No.
10963. The said governor and warden was said to release and help the said
mayor without any court order. In defense, the accused of this case said that
there are threats posed to the life of the Mayor. However, the Sandiganbayan
rejected the claim and said that the basis of the release of the Mayor is just
an advice from the lawyer of the latter. Hence, the release is contrary to law
by violating R.A. 3019 and the said Governor and Warden are criminally libale
for such acts.
ISSUE:
If the Warden is subject to the justifying circumstance of
obedience to an order issued by the superior for some lawful purpose.
HELD:
For the claim of such justifying circumstance, three
requisites must be present: (a) that an order has been issued by the
superior; (b) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (c) the means
by the subordinate to carry out the said order is lawful. In the present case,
only the first requisite is present. The act being ordered by Apeladom is not
lawful and that the means by which he carried out the order of Ambil is
likewise unlawful. The release of the prisoner should be by the order of the

court and not by just an order of the governor for he only serves as an
overseeing officer of the province. Hence, the claim of the justifying
circumstance is denied.
Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Pres. Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to
the presidents office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC). About a week later, Tabuena received from
Mrs. Fe Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential
Memorandum directing Tabuena to pay the PNCC immediately, through the
office of the President, the sum of PhP 55M in cash as partial payment of the
MIAA. In obedience to the order of the President, Tabuena, by means of 3
withdrawals in PNB, paid the PNCC. Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta, Generam
Managers and the Acting Finance Services Manager of MIAA, were convicted
for malversation, a violation under Article 217 of the RPC, for the said
payment. It was said that the payment made was out of the ordinary and
not based on the normal procedure, hence convicted without reasonable
doubt fro the said violation. On the other hand, the said respondents filed a
petition for their acquittal invoking the justifying circumstance of obedience
to an order issued by the superior for some lawful purpose.
ISSUE:
If the said respondents acted in good faith and that they
should be acquitted for their acts beingsubject to the justifying circunstance
of an obedience to an order issued by the superior for some lawful purpose.
HELD:
The defense is a valid claim of the said circumstance.
Hence, petition should be granted. Criminal intent should be present on the
commission of the crime of malversation. In the case, criminal intent of the
respondents is absent. Clearly, the act committed by the respondents are
just an obedience to the Memorandum issued by President Marcos, their
superior. The power of President to control and direct the government
agencies such as the MIAA is likewise applicable to the officers of such
government agencies, hence, should be complied by the latter. The
compliance of the respondents on the Memorandum makes them innocent
for they just obeyed the order of their superior.
People of the Philippines vs. Beronilla
FACTS:
During the outbreak of the war, Manuel Beronilla was appointed
by Lt.Col. R.H. Arnold as Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra. Operating as a
huerilla unit in the province of Abra, Lt.Col. Arnold issued a memorandum to
all Military Mayors of Northern Luzon, authorizing them to appoint a jury of
12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and
abetting of enemy. Arsenio Borjal, the former Mayor of La Paz was one
among the people listed on the persons specified as puppet government
officials. Borjal was investigated and tried and after 19 days, Borjal was
found guilty on all accounts imposed upon him by the military superiors. On

the night of the same day of conviction, Beronilla ordered the excution of
Borjal. Two years after, Beronilla and the executioners of Borjal was charged
with the crime of murder and found guilty. In defense, Beronilla said that he
merely acted upon the order of his military superior, hence, petitioned for his
acquittal, invoking the justifying circumsance of obedience to an order issued
by the superior for some lawful purpose.
ISSUE:
If the execution ordered by Beronilla against Borjal is
justifiable based on the ground that Beronilla acted in obedience to an order
issued by his superior, Lt. Col. Arnold, for some lawful purpose.
HELD:
The defenses claim is valid. Given the situation that the
province was under the military control and that Beronilla was under the
superiority of the military officers, Beronilla cannot question the orders of his
superiors and thus, acting in good faith. The evidence that a message was
given to Beronilla with regards to the execution of Borjal was clearlt
established. The accussed acted without criminal intent, without any
negligence or fault and that merely acted upon the order of his military
superior. Therefore, the accused was acquitted.
People of the Philippines vs. Bulagao
FACTS:
Two counts of rape was charged to the accused, Aniceto Bulagao.
Criminal Cases No. 197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001 states that on or about June
17 and 29, the accused, armed with a knofe, with force and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, have
carnal knowledge of AAA, 14 years old, against the latters will and consent.
The victim, during the cross-examination said that she was sleeping on both
nights of incident when the accused raped her. On the other hand, the
accused stated that they did not have sexual intercourse and what they did
was merely kissing because the victim was allegedly asking for PhP300 after
they kissed. Nevertheless, the accused was found guilty and sentenced him
a punishment of death penalty. On the appeal of the case, the accused said
that the victim merely fabricated the story against him and that he is
suffering from mental retardation, as proven by the psychologist, hence,
should be subject to the exempting circumstance of insanity.
ISSUE:
If the accused is a subject of the exempting circumstance
of instanity and therefore should be acquitted on the rape case.
HELD:
Though its was proven that accused is suffering from
mental retardation, it was however proven that he can discern on what is
right and what is wrong. According to the law, the exempting circumstance of
insanity is can be invoked by the accused only when there is complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. The
burden of proof to prove such complete deprivation of intelligence is given
upon the accused and on the case, the accused failed to prove such

instance. The guilt of the accused, therefore, is sustained, but the

punishment is modified by sentencing him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
because of the enactment of the law, Republic Act 9346 and with moral
damages and civil indemnity to be awarded to the victim.
People of the Philippines vs. Valledor
FACTS:
On or about the 6th day of March 1991, at Brgy.
Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, the accused, Enrico Valledor, attacked,
armed with a knife, Elsa Villon Rodriguez, which caused her death, and Roger
Cabiguen. The accused was charged with the crime of consummated,
attempted and frustrated murder for the three acts committed against the
above-named victims. It was stated that on the afternoon of the incident, the
victims were on a room in the house of Cabiguen when the accused entered
the room and attacked Cabiguen with a knife but he was able tp parry the
thrust and was instead stabbed on his right forearm. But the accused
stabbed elsa on the chest which caused her immediate death. The act of the
accused was to be a revenge against the victims for Cabiguen was suspected
by the victim for killing his dog and Rodriguez was said to be courted by the
accused, yet the latter was jilted by the former. The accused was found guilty
on both crimes but then filed an appeal invoking the exempting circumstance
of insanity.
ISSUE:
insanity.

If the accused in entitled to the exempting circumstance of

HELD:
The court pressumes that an act is always in favor of
sanity, hence, the burden of proof is given to the accused to prove his
insanity. As characterized by a deranged amd perverted condition of the
mental faculties which is manifested in the language and conduct, insanity
was not proven on the case. The acts of the accused was not able to sustai
his claim on insanity. It was said that during the incident, the accused was on
the state of mind and was able to discern on who will be his subject of
stabbing and his act of immediate flee likewise rejected his claim of insanity.
Hence, the petition for acquittal was denied.
People of the Philippines vs. Jacinto
FACTS:
On or about the 28th day of January 2003, Hermie Jacinto was
charged with the crime of rape. He allegedly raped a five-year old child but
was denied during the trial. The victim and the accused were neighbors and
that they know each other well. Nevertheless, on the date mentioned above,
the accused was said to be with the victim, as seen by the witnesses. On the
same day, the victim went with the accused and walked towards the rice
fields. Thereafter, the accused boxed the victim on her chest and started to
rape her. The victim went home crying and told her father about the incident.

The victims brother then called the policemen to arrest the accused. Thus,
the accused was found guilty on the crime and sentenced with a punishment
of death penalty. The accused then filed an appeal invoking his claim of
minority for he was only 17 years old when the crime was committed.
ISSUE:
minority.

If the accused is entitled to the exempting circumstance of

HELD:
The presumption which makes a minor exempted from the
criminal liability incurred from the unlawful act is the lack of discernment.
Discenrment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. However, it was found and proved that the
accused has acted with discernment during the crime. The effects of RA 9344
was likewise recognized on the case but the case at the bar rejects the spirit
of the law which exempts the minor who does not acted with discernment.
Hence, the accused appeal was denied for he has acted with discernment
during the said crime.
People of the Philippines vs. Arpon
FACTS:
The accused, Henry Arpon, was charged with 8 counts if
rape. It was stated on different information submitted to the court that AAA
was raped by the accused 8 times of different date. As an evidence, it was
confirmed by the medico-legal taht the victim was indeed raped. In defense,
the accused said that it was impossible for him to rape the victim for their
families have feud that he cannot go to the house of the victim.
Nevertheless, the accused was found guilty and sentenced with death
penalty. The accused appealed, and by the automatic review of the Supreme
Court, the accused invoked the exempting circumstance od minority for he
was only 13 years old and 17 years old when the crime was allegedly
committed.
ISSUE:
If the accused is entitled to the exempting circumstance of
minority given the fact that he was only 13 and 17 years old when the crime
was committed.
HELD:
The petition is denied and that the ruling of the lowr
courts are sustained. One count of stautory rape, being commited in
violation of having a carnal knowledge to a woman under 12 years old (for
the victim was then 8 years old) and 7 counts of rape under the RPC was
charged on the accused. It was stated that every charge of rape is distinct
and separate and distinct.The fact that the first count of rape was committed
while he was still 13 years old, it was resolved in favor of him because it was
said that during that time of his age, discernment is absent on the
commission of the crime. However, the guilt of the accused on the
succeeding counts of rape, being committed while he was 17, was sustained
for he was said to be acted with discernment. Nevertheless, the death

penalty imposed was modified which makes the accused to suffer the
punishment of reclusion perpertua and likewise ordered to pay moral and
exemplary to the accused.
Llave vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Niel Llave, then 12 years old was charged with the crime of rape.
He allegedly acted with discernment when he willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have a carnal knowledge of Debbielyn Santos, then 7 years old. It
was stated that on September 24, 2002, the victim was raped by the
accused in a vacant house near the store of her mother. A witness was the
incident and proved that the victim was, indeed, raped by the victim.
Further, it was confirmed by the medico-legal that a penetration was
happened on the genital and anus of the victim. Hence, as proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused was said to be guilty and thus charged, in
consideration of the special mitigating circumstance of minority, with prision
mayor minimum to eight years and to pay civil indemnity. The accused filed
an appeal invoking the exempting circumstance of minority for he was said
to have acted without discernment during the commission of the crime.
ISSUE:
If the accused is subject to acquittal for he has invoked the
exempting circumstance of minority.
HELD:
During the trial and the cross-examination. It was proved
that the child, before, during and after the act, has acted with discernment.
Discernment is constututed as an exempting circumstance if the mental
capacity of the accused to understand the difference between right and
wrong is absent. Further, it is the capacity of the mind to appreciate the
consequences of the unlawful act. In the case, it was proved that the
accused, by claiming that he is a consistent honor student, and having
proved that he is aware of the unlawful act he did, the court rejected the
petition and sustained the decision of the lower courts with modifications of
removing the civil indemnity to be awarded to the victim.
Talampas vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Virgilio Talampas was charged with a crime of homicide for the
killing of Ernesto Matic. It was stated that on July 5, 1995, the accused
arrived in front of the house of a certain Jose Sevillo. The accused who was
riding a bicycle passed by, stopped and alighted on the said place and, with
a revolver, poked the gun to Ernesto Matic and was shot on the right portion
of his back and, thereafter, who took refuge at the back of Eduardo Matic
but the same was shot on the nape. The former died due to the gunshot.
However, on the part of the defense, Talampas said that his enemy was
Eduardo and the the latter was about to hit the accused with a monkey
wrench but he parried the blow. While they are grappling on the monkey

wrench, the accused noticed that Eduardo had a revolver and that he
struggled to take the revolver form Eduardo but was fired at Ernesto. The
revovler was once again fired hitting Eduardo on the thigh and at the time
the accysed seized the revolver, he shot Eduardo in the head and fled the
scene. The RTC ruled that the accused was found guilty on the said crime.
However, the accused filed a petition saying that the death of the victim was
caused by an accident and likewise invoking the exempting circumstance of
accident.
ISSUE:
If Talampas is subject to the exempting circumstance of
accident with the given facts above.
HELD:
The accused is not entitled to the said circumstance. The
elements of a valid claim of the circumstance are: (a) the act should be legal;
(b) exercised with due care; (c) the act was caused by an accident; and (d)
without fault or intention of causing it. An accident is an event that happend
outside the sway or our will, and although it comes about through some act
of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of human foreseeable consequences.
Accident presupposes the lack of intention to comiit the wrong done. Clearly,
on the case, the records eliminate the intervention of accident. The defense
of the accused was rejected by the court and sustained the statement of the
victim and the witnesses. The act of poking the revolver, although it hit
Ernesto, is intentional and unlawful. Hence, petition is denied.
Toledo vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Noe Toledo was charged with the crime of homicide for the killing
of Ricky Guarte. It was stated that on September 16, 1995, the accused saw
the victim with other men, drinking gin. As the accused passed by, he told
the men to refrain from making any noise and went home. On the other
hand, the victim, went home and had not laid down for long, heard stone
hurled at the roof of the house, he peeped at the window and saw the
accused stoning their house. The victim went to the house of the asked the
accused why he is stoning their house but the accused did not answer and
without any warning, stabbed the victim of the abdomen. Due to the massive
blood loss, the victim died on the hospital after the operation. In defense, the
accused said that the victim went on their house, armed with a balisong and
forcing to open the door of the house of the accused. The accused ran to get
his bolo and pointed it to the victim and accidentally hit Ricky on the
stomach. The accused, thereafter, surrendered to the Barangay Captain.
After the trial, the accused was found guilty on the crime of homicide. On
appeal in the CA, the accused, now petitioner, asked for his acquittal on the
ground that the death of Ricky was due to accident, hence, invoking the
exempting circumstance of accident.
ISSUE: If the appelant is subject to the exempting circumstnace under
Article 12, Par.4 of the RPC.

HELD: No. The petitioter failed to comply the requisites of a valid claim of
the exempting circumstance, to wit: (a) the act should be legal; (b) exercised
with due care; (c) the act was caused by an accident; and (d) without fault or
intention of causing it. The inconsistencies of the testimony of the accusedappelant makes the defense-statement incredible and barren of probative
weight. Hence, petition is denied and the decision of the lower court was
sustained.
People of the Philippines vs. Conception
FACTS:
On November 24, 1997, Lorenzo Galang was brought on the
Barangay Hall of Cut-Cut II, Municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac Province. It was saud
that Galang was involved on a fight at the town plaza. Upon the arrival of
Galang to the Barangay Hall, the accused, Rodolfo Concepcion likewise
arrived and fired an armalite gun to Galang. The victim wasnt hit on the first
blow of the gun but it was fired again by the accused towards the abdomen
of the victim, hitting the latter on the chest and thigh which caused his
immediate death. In defense, the accused was said to be on the town plaza,
observing the acts of the victim, being drunk and unruly. The victim,
allegedly, verbally challenged the accused into a fight. The accused further
stated that he fired warning shot but the victim grappled the gun and
accidentally hit him. Thus, the accused, after being sentenced as guilty on
the crime of murder, filed a petition invoking the exempting circumstance
under Article 12, par.4 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
If the accused is subjected to the exempting cisrcumstance
of accident and should be acquitted.
HELD:
The accused-appelants acts did not comply on the
requisites of a valid claim of the circumstance. With the statements of the
witnesses, the statement of the accused was rejected by the court and that
the wounds incurred by the victim do not show that the gunshots were
merely caused by an accident. Hence, the accused was sentenced to serve a
sentence of imprisonment of prision mayor as its minimum and reclusion
temporal as its minimum and to award damages to the heirs of the victim.
Ty vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Seven (7) informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against
the petitioner. Vicky Ty allegedly issued checks for the payment of the
hospital expenses of her mother with the knowledge that she did not have
enough funds with the drawee bank for the payment of such checks. In
defense, she said that she issued the checks due to an unctrollable fear of
greater injury that her mother might not be released from the hospital
which was, allegedly, treated her mother inhumanely and harshly. Hence,
filed a petition to reverse the decision rendered against her in violation of
B.P.22.

ISSUE:
If the guilt of the accused in her violation committed by the
accused should be reversed on the ground that it can be qualified as an
exempting circumstance of untrollable fear of greater injury.
HELD:
The law prescribes two requisites for the claim of the
exempting circumstance be valid. First, that the evil sought to be avoided
actually exist; second, that the injury be feared is greater that the one done
to avoid it; and third, that there be no other practical and less harmful means
of preventing it. Clearly, the acts of the accused do not qualify on the said
requisites. Hence, the petition was denied by the court in the grounds that
the greater injury feared is not clearly established and that there are other
less harmful means in order to avoid the allegedly-feared injury of the
accused.
People of the Philippines vs. Dequina
FACTS:
A violation of RA 6425 or otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is present on the case. It was stated that the accusedappelants, Nelida Dequina, Joselito Jundoc, and Nora Jingabo were found
guilty after transporting prohibitted drugs weighing 32,995 grams. It was
confirmed that the accused-appelants possession is marijuana and thus,
violated the said law. In defense, the accused Dequina said that she brought
the other two accused-appelants with her and did what a certain Sally said to
themto pick up something form Dau, Pampanga and to give it to a certain
person on SM North EDSA. It was said that Sally threatened Dequina that
she doesnt comply with the will of Sally, something bad will happen to her
child. Fearing the threat posed by the lady, the accused did what the former
told her. Hence, a petition to reverse the decision due to the exempting
circumstance of fear of greater injury is being invoked by the appelants.
ISSUE:
If the exempting circumstance of fear of greater injury is
admissible on the case.
HELD:
A threat of future injury is not enough to be accepted. A
person who acts under the mpt from compulsion of an irrisistible force is
exempted from criminal liablity if he acted to be mere instrument who acts
not only without his will but against his will. However, the duress, force or
fear must be present, imminent and impeding. The threat which Dequina
claimed was unclear and that according to her acts and based from the
cross-examinations, the acts is not against the will of the accused, hence,
the petition is denied having no merit.
People of the Philippines vs. Dansico

FACTS:
Romeo Dansico, the accused, was charged for a crime of
violation of the RA 6425. The information states that on September 7, 1998,
the accused possessed 900 grams of marijuana but was caught and arrested
for selling marijuana during a buy-bust operation. Together with Augusto
Cuadra, the Dansico was arrested by the Tigaon Policemen and seized the
marijuana they possessed which is wrapped in a newspaper. In defense, the
accused-appelants said that they were victims of frame-up and police
extortion and that the police who arrested them, allegedly, poked a gun at
Cuadra. the other policemen was informed that that appelant Cuadra was
being arrested for selling marijuana. Thereafter, the appelants were charged
with selling marijuana. The appelants were found guilty of illegal sale of
marijuana and sentenced to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
corresponding accessory penalties. Hence, executing this appeal on the
ground that the evidence failed to establish the existence of a buy-bust
operation and that the accused-appelants were victims of frame up and
police extortion.
ISSUE:
If the grounds of appeal of the appelants are admissible.
HELD:
No. The issues raised by the appelants are lack of merit. It
was stated that, to convict an accused of illegal sale of marijuana, the
prosecution must establish the following essential elements: (a) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the things sold and the payment. All the elements
mentioned above were proven during the trial. Further, the inconsitencies
and improbabilities of the statement of the prosecution casted doubts on its
credibility and the defense of the accused that they are victims of frame-up
and police extortion were contradicted by the appelants own conduct during
the appeal on the CA. Hence, petition is denied.
People of the Philippines vs. Sta. Maria
FACTS:
A violation of the RA 9165 otherwise known as the
Compehensive Dangerous Act of 2002 was charged against Rafael Sta. Maria
after willfuly unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, give away, the dispatch
in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting one heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine hydrochloride
weighing 0.042 gram. It was stated that on November 23, 2003, an
itelligence report about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay
Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan. Thereafter, the surveillance team prepared a
buy-bust operation and then arrested the accused. In defense, the accused
said that his house was raid and accused him for selling shabu. The accused
wa found guilty of the violation the said law. He then appealed that it was
instigation and not entrapment preceded his arrest and that his affirmation
of his guilt should be reversed by the court.

ISSUE:
If the it was instigation, not entrapment preceded the
arrest of the accused, hence should not be held liable for the violation of the
law.
HELD:
It was entrapment, not instigation, preceded the arrest of
the accused. In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to way and means to trap
and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. On the other
hand, in Instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-bedefendant into committing the offendse, and himself becomes a co-principal.
The buy-bust operation reveals the activity happening even without the
asset of the policement to buy shabu from the accused. Further, the accused
had other judicial criminal cases. The court was not persuaded by the
defense of denial of th accused, hence, the petition is denied.
Chang vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Roberto Chang was the Municipal Treasurer of Makati who was
tasked to examine or investigate tax returns of private corporations or
companies operating within Makati. The other accused, Pacifico San Mateo
was the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division,
Makati Treasurers Office. An information dated June 20, 1991 reads that the
accused, now appelants, were charged a violation of RA 3019 or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Pracitices Act after demanding the amount of One Hundred
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 125,000) from Group Developers, Inc. In
defense, San Mateo, after a lunch meeting at the Makati Sports Club, saw a
brown envelope being tossed and suddenly placed in front of him. as he held
the envelope, he was, together with Chang and Feraren, thereafter, arrested
by the NBI. Chang and San Mateo was convicted while Fararen was
acquitted. A petition then was filed by the accused-appelants stating that
what was transpired was an instigation and not an entrapment.
ISSUE:
If it was an instigation, and not an entrapment, which
caused the arrest of the appelants.
HELD:
It was held that, there is an entrapment when the law
officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the
criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. On the other hand,
there is an instigation when the accused is unduced to commit the crime.
The criminal intent is established in entrapment, otherwise, it is an
instigiation. From the evidence of prosecution, it was establshed that the
criminal intent originated from the minds of the peitioners and that the an
entrapment was caused their arrest and not instigation. Hence, petition was
denied.
People of the Philippines vs. CA and Tangan

FACTS:
The accused, Eladio Tangan, a Navy Captain was charged and
convicted with the crime of murder after shooting Generoso Miranda after an
encouter along Roxas Blvd. It was stated that a conflict on the road while
both the accused and the victim were driving caused the fight. In defense,
the accused stated that the other Mirandas who acompany Generoso
grappled the gun that Tangan possessed prior to the shooting incident and
that the accused lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his
car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell and exploded, hitting
Generoso Miranda. The accused, then, filed a petition asking for the
modification fo the decision and invoking the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense.
ISSUE:

If Tangan acted with incomplete self-defense

HELD:
In order for the modifying circumstance be appreciated, it
is necessary that a majority of the requirement of self-defnse be present,
particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Further, with the absence of unlawful aggression, there can never be a selfdefense because the other two requites will not have their basis. In the
present case, it is ruled that there is no unlawful aggression in the first place
and thus, the claim of the accused of incomplete self-defense is denied by
the court.
People of the Philippines v. Callet
FACTS:
Elbert S. Callet used a hunting knife in stabbing Alfredo
Senador on the left shoulder near the base of the neck causing his death
shortly thereafter. Callet was charged and found guilty of murder but he
appealed his conviction. Callet claimed that the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Dumagete City failed to consider the mitigating
circumstance of the fact that he had no intention to commit a wrong so
grave Senador therefore his liability should be mitigated.
ISSUE:
If the criminal liability of Callet should be mitigated the fact
he had no intention to commit a wrong so grave.
HELD:
The Supreme Court denied his appeal. The lack of intent to
commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the
weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the
manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife
in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to
defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did.
Therefore he must suffer the sentence imposed upon him without the benefit
of any mitigating circumstances.
People of the Philippines v. Sales

FACTS:
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then
nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial
procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia without the permission of their
parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan
Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby
Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and Junior
initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When
the two kids reached home at around 8 oclock in the evening of September
20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them
with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their
house. With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a coconut tree,
appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the
beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared
for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house
with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior
fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemars head and injuries in his
legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and
legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness.
Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her
efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent
could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of
difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to
him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more
than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak
heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy.
Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out.
But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally
occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
ISSUE:
If appellant is entitled to a mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
HELD:
The trial court held that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing
the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in
the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since
there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court
appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
Romera v. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
While lying in bed, Romera heard the victim Roy call him
and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer
Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for Romera but
when the latter's wife told him that he was already asleep, Roy told her to
wake her husband up. Romera went down the house and asked who was at
the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He
successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy
answered he would kill Romera. Romera tried to prevent Roy from entering,
so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, Romeras wife
held the door to allow Romera to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a
stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he
parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the
stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. Romera ceased
harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
ISSUE:
If there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of
passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense
HELD:
There was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of
passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense. Thrusting his
bolo at Romera, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his
house are sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and
obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in
danger. Romera stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and
while Romera was still in a fit of rage.
The court however stressed that provocation and passion or
obfuscation are not 2 separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the
rule that if these 2 circumstances are based on the same facts, they should
be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts
established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the
same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two
separate mitigating circumstances.
People of the Philippines v. Torpio
FACTS:
While having a drinking spree in a cottage, Anthony tried to
let Dennis Torpio drink gin and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis
with gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table
and Anthony tried to stab him with a 22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis
got up and ran towards their home. Upon reaching home, he got a knife. He
went back to the cottage by another route and upon arrival Anthony was still
there. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony avoided Dennis and ran by passing the
shore towards the creek but Dennis met him, blocked him and stabbed him.
When he was hit, Anthony ran but got entangled with fishing net beside the
creek and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted on him and continued
stabbing him resulting to the latters death. Thereafter, Dennis left and slept

at a grassy meadow near a Camp. In the morning, he went to Estrera, a

police officer to whom he voluntarily surrendered.
ISSUE:

If the accused is entitled to have mitigating circumstance

HELD:
The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense is properly appreciated. Dennis was
humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the
unlawful aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony, it was
nonetheless a grave offense for which the Dennis may be given the benefit
of a mitigating circumstance. However, the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and
the same incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they
should be considered
People of the Philippines v. Malejana
FACTS:
On July 28, 1990 at around 7:15 p.m., while Andres Madrid
was seated in front of his jeep parked at the side of the road at Marisfoque,
Pilar, Sorsogon with Janus Roces, Antonio Sy, Samuel Andrade, Bernarda Sy,
Jose Belmonte and Ernesto Francisco, he saw appellant heading their way.
Upon reaching their place, appellant asked if they saw Roces. When
appellant noticed that Roces was sitting beside Madrid, he raised his rifle and
fired shots in the open air 5 times. Then he pointed his gun at Roces and shot
him 5 times. When Roces fell to the ground, appellant ran to his house about
150 meters away from the scene. Roces inflicted 3 gunshot wounds and
eventually died instantly.
ISSUE:
If that the accused was
circumstance of passion and obfuscasion

entitled

to the

mitigating

HELD:
Passion and obfuscation cannot be appreciated in favor of
the accused. The following must be present in order to be entitled with this
mitigating circumstance: 1) There should be an act both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind, 2) The act that produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his
normal equanimity. The bare assertion that the victim and appellant had an
argument does not provide justifiable basis for applying to him this
mitigating circumstance. The cause that produced the passion and
obfuscation has not been established nor proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
People v Genosa

FACTS:
That
Marivic
Genosa,
the
Appellant
on
the
15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led
to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would
hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In
fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as
she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her
husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent
and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his
recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists has been shown to
be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her
husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUE:
If Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of
Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of
treachery?
HELD:
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense,
her penalty is REDUCED.
People of the Philippines v. Bates
FACTS:
While Edgar, Simon, and Jose are along a trail leading to
the house of Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick
banana plantation surrounding the trail, aiming his firearm at Jose who was
then walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlito's right hand and
elbow and tried to wrest possession of the firearm. While the 2 were
grappling for possession, the gun fired, hitting Carlito who immediately fell to
the ground. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr.,
brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively, emerged from the banana
plantation, each brandishing a bolo. They immediately attacked Jose hacking
him several times. Jose fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son
kept on hacking him.
ISSUE:

If passion and obfuscation may be appreciated.

HELD:
Passion and obfuscation may not be properly appreciated
in favor of the appellant. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance,

passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a
spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present
case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by
Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the first time that
Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter.
When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if
appellant refrained from doing anything else fter that, he could have validly
invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when,
upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then
was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again
was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.
People v. Nimuan
FACTS:
Eulalia Garcia was tending her sari-sari store in La Union
when the armed appellant and Lambert told her that they were going to kill
the doctor. The two left when they saw the doctor pass by en route to the
poultry farm. Ten minutes later, Garcia heard two gunshots coming from the
direction of the poultry farm. In the poultry farm, after the doctor had given
medicines and bread to his workers Manolong, Yaranon and Anasario, he
went to another building. Said workers then heard gunfire coming from the
victims direction and went down to investigate. On the way, they met the
appellant and Lamberte, who threatened them with harm should they tell
anyone that they (the appellant and Lamberte) were responsible for the
killing of the victim. The appellant and Lamberte left. The appellant denied
any participation in the killing of the victim, and pointed to Lamberte as the
person solely responsible. He claimed that he merely accompanied Lamberte
to the victims farm when the latter suddenly shot the victim.
ISSUES:
If there is conspiracy; If there is evident premeditation; If there is
treachery; If the killings are murder.
HELD:
The prosecution has clearly proven that a conspiracy
existed between appellant and Lamberte, who had the common design of
killing the victim. Both were armed and both threatened workers Manolong,
Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they tell anyone that they (accused)
had killed the victim.
It doesnt matter who actually shot the victim because of the
conspiracy that existed. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all; each of
the accused is equally guilty of the crime committed. The qualifying
circumstance of treachery is present as the victim was shot at the back. The
attack was deliberate, sudden and unexpected; it afforded the unsuspecting
victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. The aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation is not appreciated; there was no
proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of (1) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time

between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon

the consequences of his act. In this case, there is little evidence when
the accused first conceived of killing the victim and that they were afforded
sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of their contemplated crime
before its final execution. Moreover, the span of time(less than thirty
minutes), from the time the accused showed their determination to kill the
victim (when they told Garcia that they were going to kill the doctor up to
the time they shot the victim, could not have afforded them full opportunity
for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime
they committed.
Murder is killing qualified treachery, evident premeditation, among others, as
per Art. 248 of the RPC. Its punishment is reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the
felony, the proper imposable penalty on the appellant is reclusion perpetua.
People of the Philippines v. Maglian
FACTS:
On January 4, 2000, the accused and Mary Jay were having
dinner at their home in Dasmarinas, Cavite when they got into an argument.
The accused did not want Mary Jay to attend a party, causing them to fight.
Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that Mary Joy had given him for
Christmas and told her he would burn them all and started pouring kerosene
on the clothes. Mary tried to wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at
the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife's plea, the
accused still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on
fire.
The accused brought Ma Jay to the De la Salle University Medical
Center Dasmarinas. After four days, she was transferred by her aunt to the
burn unit of the East Avenue Medical Center in Quezon City, were her
condition improved. Subsequently, however, the accused transferred her to
St. Claire Hospital, which did not have a burn unit. Since her condition
deteriorated, Lourdes Rios, Mary Jay's mother, had her transferred to the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) in Manila but she was no longer able to
recover.
The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely
accidental.
ISSUE/S: If the accused was right in contending that he never or did not
intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed or so grave an offense
as the felony charged against him; If the accused had voluntarily, and of his
own free will, surrendered or yielded to the police or government authorities
and should be entitled to mitigating circumstances
HELD:
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the
mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining

when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the

accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed.
It is extremely far-fetched that accused-appellant could accidentally pour
kerosene on his wife and likewise accidentally light her up and cause third
degree burns to 90% of her body. We, thus, agree with the trial court's
finding that accused-appellant knew the fatal injuries that he could cause
when he poured kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to ignite a fire.
There was no disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and
the resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.
An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender if the following requisites are present: "1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary." The
court explained, "The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the
intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities
the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture."
The court finds that in the case of accused-appellant, all the elements
for a valid voluntary surrender were present. Accused-appellant at the time
of his surrender had not actually been arrested. He surrendered to the police
authorities. His surrender was voluntary, as borne by the certification issued
by the police. There is, thus, merit to the claim of accused-appellant that he
is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
People of the Philippines v. Concillado
FACTS:
On August 24, 2002, Diosdado Pido was shot, stabbed and
hacked with 26 wounds. On the same night, Edgar Concillado surrendered
himself to the police. He was implicated along with his wife Dolores and his
cousin Erlito due to a witness testimony claiming that all accused jointly
acted to commit murder. The defense contends that Dolores and Erlito were
not involved while Edgar only acted out of self defense (when the deceased
hacked him while he was urinating by a fence). The Regional Trial court found
all the accused guilty of murder and rejected the pleas for self-defense due
to the fact that the wounds inflicted makes the claim doubtful. Upon appeal,
the Court of Appeals found fault in the witness testimony and acquitted both
Erlito and Dolores. Edgar was held liable only for homicide and was granted a
lower penalty due to voluntary surrender. The Supreme Court affirmed the
ruling from the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE/S: If the appellant acted in self-defense; If if there was alevosia
(treachery); If if there was evident premeditation; If the appellant qualifies
for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
HELD:
The burden of proof in claiming self-defense is shifted to
the accused after admittance to the crime. The nature, number and location

of wounds inflicted on the deceased as opposed to three superficial wounds

on the accused were seen to belie the plea for self-defense.
There was a lack of evidence to establish alevosia(treachery) since the
requisites that means and method of execution to ensure safety from the
defense of the victim; and that these were deliberately adopted. This must
be present and seen by a witness at the inception of the attack.
There was no proof showing that the crime was planned before its
execution.
Yes. The accused immediately surrendered to the authorities on the night of
the event, clearly in a spontaneous manner and before an actual arrest. The
requisites of voluntary surrender were clearly met in pursuant to Art. 13 on
mitigating circumstance.
People of the Philippines v. Dawaton
FACTS:
On September 20, 1998, Leonidas Lavares and several
companions, including Dawaton were drinking in the house of the accuseds
unlc. Already drunk, Leonidas Lavares decided to sleep while the accused
and his companions continued drinking. Dawaton awakened Lavares by
stabbing him at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing Lavares
until the victim died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his other
relative, where he was later on arrested by the police. Edgar Dawaton was
found guilty by the trial court of murder qualified by treachery and was
sentenced to death.
ISSUE:
If the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon the
accused was correct?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not
considering the alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of the
accused. Under Art. 15 of the RPC, intoxication of the offender shall be
considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender commits a felony
in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the
plan to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The allegation that the
accused was drunk when he committed the crime was corroborated by the
prosecution witness. The accused and his drinking companions had
consummated four bottles of gin at the house of Emeraldo Cortez, each one
drinking at least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four shared
another bottle of gin at the house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused
that drank most of its contents. The court further stated that under Art. 63,
par. 3, of the RPC, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the
commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no
aggravating circumstance attended the killing but there existed the

mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be sentenced

only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People of the Philippines v. Montinola
FACTS:
On November 18, 1996, William Montinola, armed with an
unlicensed pistol deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence against or
intimidation of persons, with intent of gain, take and carry away cash amount
of P67, 500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion. Montinola shot the
victim on the neck, killing Reteraction. Two criminal cases were filed against
Montinola and he was later on sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery
with homicide and death for illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUE/S: If the use of an unlicensed firearm on the killing perpetrated by
reason or on occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense or
as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide
HELD:
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 provides that if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall
be imposed. Said Presidential Decree was however, amended by R.A. 8294,
while Montinola case was still pending. R.A. 8294 provides that if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Canta v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Narciso Gabriel owns a cow that was passed on from one
person to another and each person was responsible for the care and custody
of the said cow. At the time the cow got lost, it was under the care and
custody of Gardenio Agapay. Agapay took the cow in the mountain of
Pilipogan, 40 meters away from his hut, at around 5:00 in the afternoon.
When he came back to get the cow at past 9 in the evening, the cow was
gone. However, Aagapay saw footprints that led to the house of Filomeno
Vallejos. Vallejos told Agapay that Exuperancio Canta took the cow.
Agapay and Maria were instructed by Narciso to get the cow and on
their way to Florenitno Cantas house, they saw Exuperancio. The latter told
them that if it was really Narciso who was the owner of the cow, he should
get it himself. Exuperancia accompanied the two to his fathers house and
both recognized the cow but Florentino was not home. Exuperancio told
Maria and Agapay that he would call them the next day to talk about the
matter with his father. Exuperancio never called. The matter was reported to
the police and Narciso and Exuperancio were called for investigation.
Exuperancio admitted taking the cow but claims that he was the real owner
of the cow and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. However, Narciso
presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the
municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and

female. Then, the petitioner also presented a Certificate of Ownership of

Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985 and a statement executed by Franklin
Telen, who was the janitor at the treasurer's office of the municipality, that
he executed the certificate of ownership in favor of Exuperancio. The trial
court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
Exuperancio filed a Motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of
Appeals and affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
If the lower courts were correct in sentencing Exuperancio
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal
medium,
as
maximum,
and
to
pay
the
costs
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found
petitioner guilty of violation of 2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and
11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court
apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and applied 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is punished
by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v. Macatanda, P. D. No.
533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code,
thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised
Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of
the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise
known as the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders,
instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in
this case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e., prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which
is prision mayor in its maximum period.
People of the Philippines v. Navasca
FACTS:
At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of March 17, 1959, Go
So and his wife are having dinner at their house in Curbada, Bansalan, when

three persons namely Navasca, Geraldes, and Marquez, armed with a pistol
and a carbine entered their house, ordered them to go upstairs and directed
her husband to open a trunk where their money was kept. Go So gave the
money amounting to P1,800.00 to the men, after which Navasca, holding a
pistol fired at Go So many times. Subsequently, Lorenzo Soberano was
outside of the house acting as a guard with the three armed men inside the
house. After shooting the victim, the men fled, and her husband was brought
to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital where he died as a result of "gunshot
wound through and through, with involvement of abdominal organs" and
severe, secondary hemorrhage.
ISSUE:
If Lorenzo Soberano
circumstance due to his plea of guilty.

was

entitled

to

mitigating

HELD:
The Court considers this a mitigating circumstance in his
favor similar to a plea of guilty, that is a mitigating circumstance of "similar
analogous nature", and, hence, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The subsequent retraction by Soberano of his extra-judicial statement
and his testimony in court regarding the same cannot detract from its truth
and voluntariness, considering that his retraction came, not at the trial for
he affirmed the truth of the contents on his statement at the trial but only
after he had been convicted and sentenced, together with some of his coaccused. Nor was the denial of the motion for new trial which was filed by his
counsel on the ground of the retraction by Soberano of his testimony in
court, an improvident act by the trial judge, for, time and again, it has been
held by this Court that retraction of previous testimony is not a ground for
new trial.
People of the Philippines v. Monaga
FACTS:
The spouses Herminio Balderas and Marina Balderas were
tenants of Juanita Barrido in her riceland located in Piliwan, Ajuy, Iloilo. As
such tenants, the spouses occupied the house of Juanita on her land under
tenancy. In 1971, Juanita Barrido-Ledesma, elder sister of Jesus Barrido, and
her husband went to Ajuy. Finding the portion of her land occupied by
Herminio Balderas neglected, Juanita told the spouses that she would give
them P800.00 if they vacate the land and her house. Herminio Balderas
refused to vacate unless she would pay sum P3,000.00 or settle the matter
in the Court of Agrarian Relations. Jesus Barrido, younger brother of Juanita,
on several instances tried to persuade the spouses to vacate the house and
land of his elder sister. Herminio refused to vacate the house and land. By
use of force or intimidation Jesus Barrido succeeded in driving away the
spouses Herminio Balderas and Marina Balderas from the house of his sister,
but they continued to occupy the land. Benhur Banaban, also a tenant of
Juanita Barrido, lost his female carabao. Benhur and his son Danilo Banaban
suspected Herminio Balderas to have stolen it. When they confronted

Herminio, he told them that they would get the carabao if they pay him
P50.00. The matter was brought to the Barrio Captain and then to the Mayor
of Ajuy before whom Herminio Balderas, Benhur Banaban, Barrio Captain
Celso Yap appeared. Herminio admitted having asked Benhur P50.00 but he
did it in a jest for he was drunk at that time.
On January 25. 1972 the carabao was found dead, tied to a tree in the
mountain of thebarrio of Pedaga. Ajuy. The following morning, January 26,
Celso Yap, Benhur Banaban and his son Danilo Banaban went to Mayor Jose
Rojas, Jr. of Ajuy and reported what they found. The Mayor sent Pat. Ben
Sason to call for Herminio Balderas who came with the policeman. Herminio
promised before the mayor that he would pay Benhur Banaban P400.00 for
the carabao on February 1, 1972. Herminio tried to borrow this amount from
Jesus Barrido but the latter refused to lend him the amount. Herminio did not
pay the P400.00 as promised before the mayor. So the mayor sent his
policemen Pat. Ben Sason, Pat. Subanas and Pat. Wilson Paragona
accompanied by Jesus Barrido to call for Herminio Balderas, They found him
in the store of Norman Alejan in Punta Equi, Culasi, Ajuy, drinking beer with
T/Sgt. Nicolas Belicano of the Constabulary. Herminio refused to go with them
although they told him that he was under arrest for theft of large cattle,
coconut, and for refusing to vacate the house and land of Juanita Batrido. He
told T/Sgt. Belicano that if he would go with Jesus Barrido and his
companions, fee would be killed by them. T/Sgt. Belicano asked Jesus Barrido
for a warrant of arrest. They had none. The sergeant told Jesus Barrido and'
his companions not to arrest Hermino for they had no authority to make
arrest without any warrant of arrest. That night, Herminio Balderas slept in
the house of T/Sgt. Nicolas Belicano in Culasi, Ajuy, Iloilo.
At about 8:45 in the evening of February 8, 1972, while Herminio
Balderas was walking along the road with his child on his right shoulder,
followed by his wife Marina Balderas, he was ambushed, shot and wounded
by Jesus Barrido, Benhur Banaban, Danilo Banaban, Jimmy Monaga, and two
other unidentified men, near the bodega of Mr. Blancaflor in Piliwan, Ajuy,
Iloilo. He was immediately brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital in the City of
Iloilo where he died eventually.
ISSUE:
If Benhur Banaban is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance analogous to, if not the same as, vindication of a grave
offense
HELD:
It results that the trial court did not err in finding the
appellant Benhur Banaban guilty of the crime of Murder. The appellant,
however, is entitled to the mitigating circumstance analogous to, if not the
same as, vindication of a grave offense committed by the deceased when
the latter took away the carabao of the appellant and held it for ransom, and
thereafter, failed to fulfill his promise to pay its value after the carabao had
died.
The offense being attended by a mitigating circumstance without any
aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum
of that provided for by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the

appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate

penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
People of the Philippines v. Palaganas
FACTS:
On January 16, 1998 brothers Servillano and Michael Ferrer
went to Tidbits Videoke bar singing and drinking beer. On the same evening
Jaime Palaganas and Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived. The
two groups occupied separate tables. After the Ferrers singing Jaime
Palaganas started singing and was joined by Tony Ferrer who sang loudly and
in mocking manner. This insulted Jaime and soon a fight ensued between
Ferrers and Palaganas. Ferdinand ran towards his house and sought help
from his brother Fuijeric, the latter went outside however he was stoned by
the Ferrer brothers. As they were continuously stoned the appellant
Ferdinand suddenly pulled the trigger with the gun in his hands. The trial
court rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of
Homicide and Frustrated homicide but not guilty of violation of COMELEC
RES. 2958.
ISSUE:
If violation of COMELEC RES. 2958 may be considered as
Special aggravating circumstances which will negate consideration of
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender.
HELD:
With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997,
the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as
a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating
circumstance.68 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it
took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore,
the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should
be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and
not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
People of the Philippines v. Evina
FACTS:
Gerardo Gavina was serve sentence of Reclusion Pertpetua
for raping certain Ms. Maritess Catcharo. Based on the given facts, Gerardo
took advantage of the time when the victims mother was not around. He
would likely forced Maritess to have carnal knowledged against her will and
even poked a knife at her while doing the deed in the victims dwelling and
threthened the victim to kill her family should she tell her parents what
happened. On November 13, 1991 when the appellant arrived at the
Catcharro residence he proceeded inside the bedroom of Maritess, the latter
ran out of the bedroom and told her mother not to leave her because her
Papa Gerry might raped her again. Surprised by what he heard, the following
day Maritess was brought to Tacloban City Medical Center for a check-up and

found to have lacerations to the victims genitalia. Contrary to the facts

above, appellant claimed that the night of the incident he was working as
porter until 10 PM, thus it cannot be said that he committed the crime
accused of him. Based on the information submitted, aggravating
circumstances of use of weapon and dwelling were not alleged.
ISSUE:
If aggravating circumstances proved during trial but was
not alleged in the information may be considered?
HELD:
The supreme court held in the negative. Although the
special aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon and the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven, these aggravating
circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because they were
not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes charged were
committed before the effectivity of the said rule, nevertheless, the same
should be applied retroactively being favorable to the appellant.
People of the Philippines v. Mendoza
FACTS:
Efren Mendoza was charged with the crime of murder for
killing Anchito Nano. In this case Efren alleged that Anchito Nano arrived at
their house and upon arrival it started to destroy the house and that the her
wife was shouting for help. Efren immediately look for something to protect
his family but found a bolo. He approached Anchito but the latter tried to
hacked him but he was able to hacked him first on the right side of his neck
resulting to the death of the victim. Thereafter Mendoza went to Municipal
Hall of Vinzon and voluntarily surrendered to the police. He claimed that it
was self defense. The autopsy revealed that location of the wounds found on
the body of the victim came from the back of the victims body. The court
ruled rejecting appellants self defense. This court finds that the accused
was not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to
defend himself by means which appeared unreasonable by using a long bolo
is unjustifiable. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
If voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the negative. A qualifying
circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating
circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the designation of the
crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its
maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be
offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not.
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating
circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it
cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating

circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. Thus, it

cannot offset voluntary surrender.
People of the Philippines v. Villamor
FACTS:
Brothers Jerry and Jelord Velez were on their way home on
board a motorcycle. Jerry was driving. As they neared a junction, they heard
a speeding motorcycle fast approaching from behind. The brothers ignored
the other motorcycle, which caught up with them. As they were about to
cross the bridge leading to their home, gunshots rang out from behind them.
They abruptly turned the motorcycle around towards the direction of the
gunfire. The light of their motorcycle's headlamp fell on their attackers
aboard the second motorcycle. The assailants fired at them a second time
and fled. Jerry saw PO3 Villamor and Maghilom on board the motorcycle
behind them.
Maghilom was driving the motorcycle while Villamor was holding a
short gun pointed at them. Jerry sustained gunshot wounds but survived.
Jelord, however, died on the spot during the first gunburst.
ISSUE:
If the Trial Court properly applied
circumstance of taking advantage of public position?

the

aggravating

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of public position under paragraph 1 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was improperly applied.
A public officer must use the influence that is vested in his office as a
means to realize the purpose of the crime to be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. The question Did the accused abuse his office to
commit the crime must be asked in order to appreciate this circumstance as
an aggravating circumstance.
No proof was shown that Villamor took advantage of his position of
being a policeman when he shot Jelord Velez. Neither was his influence,
prestige or ascendancy used in killing Velez. Even without occupying a
public position, the accused could have committed the crime.
Fortuna v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
While Diosdada Montecillo and her brother Mario were standing
at the corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets waiting for a ride home, a mobile
patrol car of the Western Police District with 3 policemen on board stopped in
front of them. The policeman seated on the right at the front seat alighted
and without a word frisked Mario. He took Marios belt, pointed to a
supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word "evidence." Then
he motioned to Mario to board the car. The terrified Mario obeyed and seated
himself at the back together with another policeman. Diosdada instinctively
followed suit and sat beside Mario. They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard.

The driver then asked Mario why he was carrying a "deadly weapon," to
which Mario answered, "for self-defense since he was a polio victim." The
driver and another policeman who were both seated in front grilled Mario.
They frightened him by telling him that for carrying a deadly weapon outside
his residence he would be brought to the Bicutan police station where he
would be interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled
by the press. As they approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car pulled
over and the 2 policemen in front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for
carrying a "deadly weapon" was P12,000.00. At this point, the driver asked
how much money they had. Without answering, Mario gave his P1,000.00 to
Diosdada who placed the money inside her wallet. Diosdada was then made
to alight from the car. She was followed by the driver and was told to go
behind the vehicle. There, the driver forced her to take out her wallet and
rummaged through its contents. He counted her money. She had P5,000.00
in her wallet. The driver took P1,500.00 and left her P3,500.00. He instructed
her to tell his companions that all she had wasP3,500.00.
While going back to the car the driver demanded from her any piece of
jewelry that could be pawned. Ruefully, she removed her wristwatch and
offered it to him. The driver declined saying, "Never mind," and proceeded to
board the car. Diosdada, still fearing for the safety of her brother, followed
and sat beside him in the car. Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the
policeman at the front passenger seat to place all her money on the console
box near the gearshift. The car then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the
Montecillos were told to disembark. From there, their dreadful experience
over, they went home to Imus, Cavite. The three policemen were charged
and convicted with robbery. Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
If the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public
position should be appreciated against the policemen
HELD:
To our mind, the success of the accused in taking their
victims' money was premised on threats of prosecution and arrest. This
intense infusion of fear was intimidation, plain and simple. As a police officer,
it is his primary duty to avert by all means the commission of an offense. As
such, he should not have kept his silence but, instead, should have protected
the Montecillos from his mulcting colleagues. This accused-appellant failed to
do. His silence then could only be viewed as a form of moral support which
he zealously lent to his co-conspirators.

People of the Philippines v. De Mesa

FACTS:
Barangay Chairman Patricio Motas of Sta. Cruz Putol, San
Pablo City was pronounced dead on arrival on October 15, 1996 at San Pablo
City District Hospital. The autopsy report showed that the cause of death was
shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds at the back of the victim.

Hernando De Mesa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder by the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, pay the costs and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim. Treachery, nighttime, in contempt of or
with assault to public authorities, were appreciated by the trial court as
aggravating circumstances attending the case thereby qualifying the crime
committed to murder.
ISSUE:
If the trial court erred in determining the nature of the
crime committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed?
HELD:
The prosecution failed to positively prove the presence of
anyqualifying aggravating circumstance whereby the crime committed is
only homicide for which the imposable penalty provided by the Revised Penal
Code is Reclusion Temporal.
Being the case, Indeterminate Sentence Law may now be applied and absent
any aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty that may be
imposed is prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to reclusion
temporal in its medium period as maximum.
People of the Philippines v. Tac-an
FACTS:
Renato Tac-anand Francis Escanowere close friends being
classmates in high school and members of the local Bronx gang. Francis
withdrew from the gang on the advice of his mother who saw that Renato
carried a handgun on his visits to their home. Things started turning sour
between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14, 1984. After an earlier
altercation on that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He entered the
Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for
Francis. After locating the victim he fired at him but missed. He was later
able to hit him in the head as he was running to the door with his classmates
to escape. After this, Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher
unknowing that Renato was the culprit, asked him for help unwittingly
informing him that Francis was still alive. Renato immediately re-entered the
room and saying "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over
Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the
chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below
the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple.
Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No.
1866. An amended information for murder was subsequently filed
aggravated by the use of illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUES:
If illegal possession of a firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance in crimes of homicide and murder?
HELD:
Under an information charging homicide or murder, the use
of an unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance nor can it be

used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to
death or reclusion perpetua. The character of the instrument used in taking
or destroying human existence is not one of those included in the
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On the other hand, under an information for unlawful possession of a firearm
or ammunition, P.D. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty
for unlawful possession if the unlicensed firearm was used to destroy human
existence. Though it is not one of the enumerated aggravating
circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be
considered to increase the penalty imposed because of the explicit provision
of the said special law.
People of the Philippines vs. Reyes
FACTS:
On the 11th of July 1998, a seventy four year-old lady was found
bloody dead sprawled sideways on the floor opposite the sink near the
kitchen. The fact that the crime was committed inside the victim's dwelling
without the permission of the latter is indeed an aggravating robbery with
homicide. The appellant; Antonio Reyes said that he was not aware of what
he was doing while he was committing the robbery because he was drunk
and killing Ms. Lagrada is not his intention because she started shouting
upon seeing him. However, the accused is already on the bus terminal when
the police caught him.
ISSUE:
Is Reyes guilty of the crime of consummated robbery with
homicide regardless of the age and sex of the deceased.
HELD:
The counter statement of the appellant which stated that
he was drunk while committing the felony was not found as evidence by the
court as a mitigating circumstance to the crime. Another fact found is the
accused did not consider the age nor sex of the deceased since according to
appellant, he killed the deceased with a bolo because she was shouting for
help. Antonio was caught in the bus terminal with all the jewelries and bank
passbook of the deceased which determines the consummated robbery.
Antonio Reyes Magano is found guilty by Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and was sentenced a punishment of Reclusion Perpetua or 20 years
and 1 day up to 40 years of imprisonment and a penalty for the heirs of the
deceased of P25,000.
People of the Philippines v. Tagoba
FACTS:
Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide in
an Information which reads that with intent to gain, and with violence against
persons, entered the house of one Francisca Tubon, and once inside, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, assault, attacked and stabbed
Tubon, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which necessarily caused

the death of said Tubon and took away several personal properties belonging
to Tubon. He was likewise indicted for Arson for setting the victims house on
fire.
After finding the burnt house and charred body of Tubon, Baranggay
Captain Pagao confronted Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he
killed Tubon and set her house on fire, causing the whole house, including
the dead body of the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr.
Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to Police Station to interview
the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted killing the deceased and setting her and
her house on fire.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of "Not
Guilty" to the crimes charged and interposed an alibi. Accused-appellant also
claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the
crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Contaoi, he narrated that
the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station
where policemen were present and that there porter acted as an agent for
the prosecution. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of
the policemen. The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of both crimes.
ISSUE:
If confession made by the accused to a radio reporter, a
private person, can be admitted as evidence against him.
HELD:
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio
announcer colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence
against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on record which even
remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to
extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the
reported even asked permission from the officer-in-charge to interview
accused-appellant. Nor was the information obtained under duress. In fact,
accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on. The records
also show that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio reported
but to several others.
People of the Philippines v. Evangelio
FACTS:
On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a
17-year-old househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house of BBB
situated in Tacloban City, four persons, one of whom was armed with a
handgun while the other three with knives, suddenly barged inside the house
through the open kitchen door. The four men accosted her, warned her to
keep quiet, and brought her to the living room. There, they herded all the
other members of the household whom they caught and bound their hands
and feet, and thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives eyes.
With her eyes partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the
appellant inside the comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the

robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and removed her panty. AAA resisted and
fought back but they slammed her head twice against the concrete wall,
causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained her senses, appellant
and the other robbers were already gone, and she found herself lying on the
side on the floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands still
tied behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side. She
suffered pain in her knees, head, stomach, and her vagina, which was
bleeding. Later on, AAA was freed from the comfort room by the other
occupants of the house, who were earlier freed.
ISSUE:

If the aggravating circumstances should be given.

HELD:
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following
elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
The following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution,
when analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that
the appellant raped AAA: first, while two of the robbers were stealing,
appellant and one of the robbers brought AAA inside the comfort
room; second, inside the comfort room, AAA was stripped off her clothes and
her panty; third, when AAA resisted and struggled, appellant and the other
robber banged her head against the wall, causing her to lose
consciousness; fourth, when she regained consciousness, the culprits were
already gone and she saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side; and fifth,
she suffered pain in her knees, head, stomach and, most of all, in her vagina
which was then bleeding.
People of the Philippines v. Agcanas
FACTS:
On May 4, 2000, at around 9 oclock in the evening, Warlito
Raguirag and his wife Beatriz Raguirag were having dinner in their humble
abode when accused Arnold Agcanas entered through their kitchen door,
which then the accused had pointed a gun at the back of the left ear of the
victim and shot him point-blank. The wife identified the accused, who was
actually the son of her cousin.
After the incident, the accused fled to the house of his brother in the
nearby barangay where he took refuge, to where the police had found
eventually found him. The accused, in his testimony, denied that is was him
who did the felony, that during the time that the crime was committed, they
were celebrating the birthday of his brother, thus making him physically
impossible to be at the place where the incident happened.After careful
investigation, the police found out that the accused does not have a license
to carry firearm, however, such circumstance was not alleged in the
information.

ISSUE:
If the accused is guilty beyond reasonable of murder with
attending aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime, and dwelling
HELD:
He is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. His denial and alibi
were negated by the positive identification made by Beatriz Raguirag. Also,
his contention that he was out celebrating his brothers birthday is
untenable, because the crime happened in May 2000 but his brother was
actually born on July 1950, thus making his alibi incongruent with factual
basis.Moreover, he was also guilty of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, dwelling, and illegal possession of firearm.
Citing People v. Dela Cruz, The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Such requisites are
present in the present case. Victim was not able to defend himself because
the accused had entered the house through the kitchen and has suddenly
shot the victim which caused the latters instantaneous death. The second
requisite is also present when the accused had deliberately planned the
attack to the victim.
Dwelling is also attendant in the case as the victim has invaded the
sanctity of privacy to which the law accord to human abode. He who goes to
anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere.
Lastly, he is guilty of aggravating circumstance of Illegal Possession of
Firearm as best evidence by his admission of not having a license to carry
such firearm, which he used to kill the victim, during his pre-trial.
People of the Philippines v. Colangui
FACTS:
The case at bar states two counts of rape committed by
Alejandro Conlangui to his first cousin Marinel Colangui, who was only 13
years old when the felony was committed. First instance happened on
January 1, 1998, at about 2:00 oclock in the morning in Tagbong, Pili,
Camarines Sur, when the accused, with lewd design, and by means of
threats, force and violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously lie, sexually assaulted Marinel Colangui at the latters house
against her will. The same incident happened also on September 26 of the
same year.
The victim did not tell anyone of the incident because the accused told
her that if she tells anyone, he would kill her and her family. Bearing such
fear, the victim remained silent of the incidents until the accused had left for
a job and she had the chance to tell her mother what happened.

ISSUE:
If Alejandro Conlangui is guilty of two counts of rape with
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, relationship, and use of
deadly weapon
HELD:
The court ruled that the accused is guilty of two counts of
rape, sentencing him with imprisonment of reclusion perpetua in each case
plus civil indemnities. However, the court ruled that there were no
aggravating circumstances attending in both cases.
Dwelling cannot be appreciated because the victim and accused lived
in the same house at the time of the rape incidents; the violation by the
offender of the sanctity of the home of the victim by trespassing therein to
commit a crime is absent. Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated because
there is no proof that the appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness
to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Similarly, relationship is not aggravating because the relationship
between Marinel and the appellant as first cousins is not within the concept
contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Abuse of confidence is
likewise absent because the prosecution did not establish that it facilitated
the attainment of the rape. Finally, use of a deadly weapon cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because Marinels belated
assertion on cross-examination that the appellant used a knife to perpetrate
the two rapes raised doubts as to the knifes existence. She also stated on
cross-examination that what she saw was an object that looked like a knife.
People of the Philippines v. Arrojado
FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of June, 1996, Mary Ann Arrojado
was found lying dead in her own house by accused Salvador Arrojado, who,
allegedly, told their relatives that the victim had committed suicide. In the
post mortem examination, it was found that the victim had received 11 stab
wounds. Testimonies from relatives of both parties, which are first cousins,
states that the accused had been holding a grudge or sama ng loob to the
victim after the latter had said very demeaning and disrespectful words unto
him this led to the suspicion that the accused was the one who did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously stabbed the victim multiple
times causing the latters death. The accused denied the allegation and
reiterated that the victim had purposefully committed suicide.
ISSUE:
If the accused is guilty of murder with aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
HELD:
He is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing Mary Ann
Arrojado. Testimonies and post mortem results did not corroborate accused
allegations of suicide. People who have known the victim testified that the
victim was a very jolly person and is very unlikely to commit suicide. Also,
the physician who had done the autopsy said that the number and location
of wounds from the stabbing would not be possible if the victim did it upon
herself. Moreover, the court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of

treachery because its requisites, (1) the employment of means of execution

that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously
adopted, have been established in this case. The victim was not in a position
to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she was
asleep. As regards the second requisite, the number and nature of the
wounds sustained by the victim lead to no other conclusion than that
accused-appellant employed means in killing the victim which tended
directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the victim might take.
However, evident premeditation and dwelling is not appreciated by the
court in this case as it does not possess all of the requisites to invoke both
aggravating circumstances. Evident premeditation presupposes three
requisites, to wit, (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act, which have not been established in this case. Dwelling cannot also
be established since the accused and the victim were living in the same
house.
The court, however, found that there was the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence in the case, but was not alleged in the
information thus likewise was not invoked upon the accused.
People of the Philippines v. Ancheta
FACTS:
On March 20, 1987, in his farm in Manggahan, Rizal, Nueva
Ecija, Alfredo Roca, together with Marjun Roca, Benita Roca, Febe Roca, and
Virgilita Roca-Laureaga, were about to have their lunch in their hut. By then,
Alfredo noticed the arrival of an owner-type jeep with trailer which stopped at
a spot not far from his hut. He recognized the occupants as accused Antos
Dacanay, Edgardo Liling Areola, William Ancheta, Lito de la Cruz, Ely
Calacala and Felipe Boy Ulep who all alighted from the jeep. Dacanay,
Areola and Ancheta stood on one side of the irrigation canal facing Marjun
Roca who was standing on the other side. From a distance, Alfredo saw
Dacanay suddenly pull out a gun and shoot Marjun on the head, causing the
latter to fall to the ground. As he lay on the ground, Marjun was again shot,
this time by Areola and Ancheta. Thereafter, Ulep, de la Cruz and Calacala
started firing at Alfredos hut. Alfredo was not hit, however, because he was
able to get out of the hut and dive into the irrigation canal in the nick of
time. However, Benita and Febe were fatally hit by the initial volley of
gunfire. Ancheta then hurled a grenade which exploded near the hut. When
the group ran out of bullets, Alfredo emerged from the canal and hid inside
his hut. He saw the group load onto the trailer 35 sacks of palay, each
containing an average of 50 kilos valued at P4.50 per kilo. Alfredo owned the
stolen palay. Ulep and his companions then boarded their jeep and left.

ISSUE:
If the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide with attendance of aggravating
circumstances of treachery and band
HELD:
The court ruled that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide upon willfully, intentionally, and
feloniously killing three members of the victim Roca family. Crossexamination of witnesses and evidence corroborated the allegations of the
prosecution, hence negating the accused-appellants alibis and denials of the
facts presented in the case, The time-tested rule is that alibi cannot prevail
over the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses more so in this case
where appellant failed to prove that he was at another place at the time of
the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene.
There is also the attendance of aggravating circumstance of treachery
and band in the case at bar. There was no opportunity for the victims to
defend themselves as the assailants, suddenly and without provocation,
almost simultaneously fired their guns at them. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the
part of the person attacked. A crime is committed by a band when at least
four armed malefactors act together in the commission thereof. In this case,
all six accused were armed with guns which they used on their victims.
Clearly, all the armed assailants, including appellant, took direct part in the
execution of the robbery with homicide.
People of the Philippines v. Evangelio
FACTS:
On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a
17-year-old househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house of BBB
situated in Tacloban City, four persons, one of whom was armed with a
handgun while the other three with knives, suddenly barged inside the house
through the open kitchen door. With her eyes partially covered by the tape,
AAA was brought by the accused inside the comfort room and thereat,
accused and one of the robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and removed her
panty and then and there raped her.
BBB came home around 7:00 in the evening and when he entered the
sliding door facing the garage, he saw the four armed accused inside. He
recognized their faces, particularly the leader of the group, whom he
identified as accused Edgar, who previously worked for him as a laborer in
the construction of the extension of his house. The accused tied BBB up.
Accused Edgar, then struck him with the gun on his head, leaving him
unconscious. After a while, the accused went out of the house, through the
kitchen door, carrying two traveling bags and the jewelry box of BBBs wife.
CCC, the wife of BBB, came home that evening seeing that their house
was being robbed by armed men. One of the accused then poked a gun at
her head and told her to come inside, otherwise, he would kill her children.
She ran away from their house, and cried out for help from the neighbors.

They called the police. Shortly thereafter, the policemen arrived. They found
the house in complete disarray, the cabinets were forcibly opened, CCC's
jewelry box and her pieces of jewelry stolen, and the members of the
household traumatized. An inventory was taken of the stolen valuables which
amounted to PhP336,000.00, more or less. Some of the stolen items were
later recovered from the house of accused Edgar.
ISSUE:
If the accused is guilty of robbery with rape with
aggravating circumstance of band and dwelling
HELD:
One of the accused then poked a gun at her head and told
her to come inside, otherwise, he would kill her children. She ran away from
their house, and cried out for help from the neighbors. They called the police.
Shortly thereafter, the policemen arrived. They found the house in complete
disarray, the cabinets were forcibly opened, CCC's jewelry box and her pieces
of jewelry stolen, and the members of the household traumatized. An
inventory was taken of the stolen valuables which amounted to
PhP336,000.00, more or less. Some of the stolen items were later recovered
from the house of accused Edgar. Aggravating circumstance of band and
dwelling, as it was alleged in the information, was proven. In this case,
robbery with violence was committed in the house of the victims without
provocation on their part. The prosecution also established that one of the
accused was armed with a handgun, while the other three had knives when
they committed the crime, thus establishing a band.
People v. Villanueva
FACTS:
In 1959, Simplicio Villanueva was charged with Malicious
Mischief in Alaminos, Laguna. In the aforementioned case, the private
offended party asked the help of his lawyer friend Ariston Fule to prosecute
the said case. Villanueva opposed the appearance of Fule, averring that such
appearance is contrary to Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys, specifically those
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal, from
private law practice, with Fule being the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna
ISSUE:
If San Pablo, Laguna Fiscal Ariston Fule is engaged in
private law practice when he appeared before the court as aid to his friend,
the offended party, thus committing malicious mischief
HELD:
Private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated, for he is doing it for
free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. We believe that

the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more
than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise
People of the Philippines v. Dacillo
FACTS:
On the night of February 6, 2000, Rosemarie B. Tallada was
seen on a bridge near the accused-appellant Francisco Dacillos house at
Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City. Later on that night, the
victim went inside the house of the accused after being called by the latter.
Witnesses testified that on the same night, they heard that a struggle was
happening in the house of the accused. Witness Roche Abregon saw that the
victim was being tied and beaten up by two men, one of which is appellant
herein.
The following day, February 7, 2000, at around 8:00 am, appellant was
seen entering his house carrying construction supplies. When asked about
what he will do with those supplies he answered that it is for the sink he is
constructing. On February 11, 2000, neighbors started smelling the rotten
odor of a dead body. On that same day, witnesses reported the matter to
barangay officials who called the police. At about 10:00 pm, the policemen
arrived at the appellants house and investigated the matter. They saw a
tomb like structure to where the rotten smell appears to be coming from.
When cracked open, the tomb revealed the decomposing body of victim
Rosemarie Tallada.
Post-mortem examination revealed that the victim received multiple
stab wounds that eventually caused her death. The accused admitted to be
involved in the crime, however, his admission tells that he only held the legs
of the victim and that he was not the person who actually killed the victim.
He referred to a certain Joselito Picot as the main perpetrator of the crime,
who allegedly is the lover of the victim.
The Regional Trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
crime of murder with the attendance of recidivism and superior strength as
aggravating circumstances. Hence, this appeal from the accused averring
that the RTC had erroneously rendered its decision.
ISSUE:
If the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder with aggravating circumstance of recidivism and
abuse of superior strength
HELD:
He is guilty of the crime of murder. His contention that he
only held the legs of the victim is untenable. The court ruled that he is a
principal by direct participation whose requisites, (1) they participated in the
criminal resolution, and (2) they carried out their plan and personally took
part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end, were

met. Evidence and testimonies of witnesses also corroborated the facts to

establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, having
alleged in the information, is likewise appreciated by the court. s found by
the court a quo, two grown-up men against a young fragile woman whose
ability to defend herself had been effectively restrained revealed a shocking
inequality of physical strength. The victim was much weaker in constitution
and could not have possibly defended herself from her stronger assailants.
After finding that the accused has been previously convicted of the
same crime to his live-in partner, the court appreciated it as a generic
aggravating circumstance, thus increasing his penalty. However, recidivism
cannot be imposed upon him because of the prosecutions failure to include
it in the information. To appreciate recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance, in pursuance to Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, it is necessary to allege it in the information and to
attach certified true copies of the sentences previously meted out to the
accused.
People of the Philippines v. Malngan
FACTS:
On January 2, 2001, Edna Malngan, a housemaid of
Roberto Separa Sr. was accused of setting her employers house on fire
which resulted to its destruction and the death of six persons including
Roberto Separa Sr., also affecting several adjoining houses. Malngan was
apprehended by the Barangay officials and was brought to their custody. She
was then identified by their neighbor, whose house was also burned, as the
housemaid of the Separas. Upon inspection, a lighter was found inside the
accused bag, which made the accused-appellant confess to the barangay
chairman.
On January 9, 2001, information was filed before the Manila RTC
charging the accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple
homicides. The RTC and the appellate court rendered their decisions
respectively, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
aforementioned crime of Arson with multiple homicides.
ISSUE:
If Edna Malngan was guilty of the crime of destructive
arson or simple arson
HELD:
It was held that the crime committed by the accused is a
simple arson. The court ruled that there is no complex crime of Arson with
multiple homicide. Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5 of
Presidential Decree 1613 are the laws governing the crime of arson where
death results therefrom, both of which states penalties for such crime.
It falls under simple arson since it was stated in the information that
the accused, with intent to cause damage, xxx deliberately set fire upon
the two-storey residential house, xxx that by reason and on the occasion of
the said fire, xxx which were the direct cause of their death. It is clear,
therefore, that her intent was merely to destroy her employers house

through the use of fire. When fire is used to actually, with intent to kill a
person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by the burning
house, the crime is murder only. The resulting homicide, in the case at bar,
may be absorbed by the crime of arson.
People of the Philippines v. Comadre
FACTS:
At around 7:00 pm of August 6, 1996, Robert Agbanlog,
Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat, and Lorenzo Eugenio were having
a drinking spree on house of Agbanlogs father, Jaime Agbanlog, who at that
time was seating at the banister of the terrace. During their drinking session,
Robert and his companion noticed the here in accused-appellant Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre, and Danilo Lozano walking and stopped in front
of the victims house. Comadre suddenly threw an object to Agbanlog and
companys direction and immediately fled to a nearby school. The object was
a grenade, exploding at the roof their house, causing not only destruction
but also the loss of consciousness and shrapnel injury of the victims. Robert
Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital, while the others only sustain
their shrapnel injuries.
The appellants were arrested the following day and denied the
allegations, claiming that they are elsewhere when the incident happened,
and that there is no animosity between them and the victims. However, the
trial court convicted the three of the complex crime of Murder with multiple
Attempted Murder for having conspired and mutually helped each other, with
intent to kill and by means of treachery and with the use of explosive.
ISSUE/S: If the use of explosives qualifies the crime to murder; If the
appellants conspired to kill the victims.
HELD:
The killing by means of explosive qualifies the crime to
murder. Treachery and use of explosive were alleged in the information as
aggravating circumstances. The court held that when the killing is
perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosive, the latter shall be
considered as qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence support
this view, but also reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should
qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely
as generic aggravating circumstance.
NO, the court held that there was no conspiracy in the case at bar. The
facts show that when Antonio Comadre threw the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word
of encouragement or performed any act to assist him. Evidence shows that
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the
commission of the crime and must be set free. Mere presence in the scene of
the crime as well as relationship to the accused does not necessarily
constitute conspiracy.

People of the Philippines v. Paling

FACTS:
In the evening of July 1, 1996, Richard Nolasco, Jojo Paling,
Rolly Talatag en route to Palings house in Brgy. Greenhills, together with the
victim Walter Nolasco, were invited by Alex Paling, Ernie Vibar and barangay
kagawad Rene Mondejar to a drinking spree. Everyone except for Richard
Nolasco accepted the invitation, the latter just waited outside Palings house.
About 15 minutes later, Richard went back to his companions and told them
that they had to go home since they still have to go to school the following
morning. The three acceded, but Ernie convinced Walter to stay with them a
little longer. Thus, Richard, Jojo, and Rolly went ahead, while Walter stayed
behind.
Later that night, Fransico Nolasco, uncle of the victim and a witness,
saw the victim together with Alex Paling and Ernie Vibar walking towards
Palings farmhouse. Richard Nolasco was woken up by the commotion
happening outside the farmhouse. When he checked to see whats
happening, he saw Paling and Vilbar assaulting the victim and was
threatened to be killed if he says anything to anyone. Incidentally, Francisco
also recounted that about 30 minutes after he first saw Walter in the
company of Vilbar and Ernie heading towards Brgy. Greenhills, he was
awakened again by the barking of the dogs. When he checked again, he saw
Vilbar and Ernie running. But this time, he did not see Walter with them. The
following day, July 2, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., Walters cadaver was found in the
farm of one Jonathan Policarpio.
ISSUE/S: Whether the judge who penned the case has the right to decide
on the case at bar even though he is not the one who heard the case from its
inception to its termination; If there is the attendance of aggravating
circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation in the case at bar.
HELD:
The fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not
the one who heard the witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of
conviction. The judge "can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and
calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to
common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such
reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.
No. The killing of the victim is qualified by abuse of superior strength,
not by treachery or evident premeditation. Requisites of treachery was not
clearly established, there was no sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, because they were even seen by a
witness walking alongside with each other. Evident premeditation cannot
also be considered since there was neither proof that Paling and the other
accused indeed planned or determined to kill Walter nor was there any proof
that the perpetrators had sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and the execution to allow them to reflect.
However, the court considered the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of

defense available to the person attacked. Taking advantage of superior

strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless.
In the present case, the victim, Walter, while being restrained by
Vilbar, was simultaneously stabbed by Paling and Ernie. Plainly, not only did
the perpetrators outnumber their victim, more importantly, they secured
advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime with impunity.
Under these circumstances, it is undeniable that there was gross inequality
of forces between the victim and the three accused.
People of the Philippines v. Segobre
FACTS:
On March 15, 1997, Lester Villafana was walking along
Crisostomo st, Antipolo City, when he saw appellant standing at a nearby
electric post. Two minutes later, he saw the appellant block the victim
Roberto Crescini, who was coming from Sumulong Highwar on a bicycle.
Appellant grabbed the victim on his right shoulder and stabbed the same on
his right chest. The appellant ran away. The appellant was convicted by the
trial court with the crime of murder. On appeal, appellant avers that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the
trial court merely relied on the weakness of his denial and alibi.
ISSUE:
If the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of
murder with proper appreciation of qualifying circumstance of treachery and
evident premeditation
HELD:
Both the trial court and the appellate court gave credence
to the testimony of Villafana. However, only treachery was proven by the
prosecution and not evident premeditation. The essence of suddenness was
present when the accused stabbed the victim, thus the court properly
appreciated treachery. Evident premeditation was not appreciated because
of insufficiency of evident to prove the same.
People of the Philippines v. Lagubuen
FACTS:
Bonifacio Angeles, the victim, was engaged in buying and
selling cows in the public market. One day, Vivencio Labuguen, the accused,
told him that he knows a place where three big cows were up for sale and
that the place was just near. Giving interest to what the accused said,
Angeles went home to get some money amounting to 40,000php then drove
his motorcycle with the accused to see the cows. While they were on their
way, several witnesses have seen them, who later on identified them in court
as the victim and the accused. The accused, according to the witness, was
wearing a jacket with a bandana tied on his forehead. Another witness, a
driver of a minibus, said that he saw the accused behind a talahiban when he
was on his way to his destination, and that he saw the accused wiping
something from his face. The conductor of the minibus, whos also a witness,

said that it was also the same man who rode their bus, who, at that time,
was soaked in what it seems like blood and had plenty of cash in the inside
pocket of his jacket. The man alighted when he reached his destination
without saying a word.
Later that afternoon, news broke that a corpse of a man was found in
the middle of a rice field. He was later on identified as Bonifacio Angeles.
With the strength of the testimony of the witnesses, a complaint and
information was filed against Vivencio. The RTC found him guilty of the crime
of robbery with homicide and was sentenced with the penalty of death. the
case was brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
ISSUE:
If the court has correctly appreciated the employment of
generic aggravating circumstance of fraud and craft in the commission of the
crime even if not alleged in the information
HELD:
The generic aggravating circumstance of fraud and craft
were properly appreciated by the trial court even if it was not alleged in the
information. Craft involves intellectual trickery on the part of the offender.
Fraud is present when there is a direct inducement by insidious words or
machinations. Fraud is present when the offender told the victim that he will
accompany the latter to a place where they sell three big cows, which in
reality he just lured the victim to go with him.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Robbery
with Homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63 of the same
code, the imposable penalty under the premises is death in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of craft and fraud and the absence
of any mitigating circumstance.
People of the Philippines v.Laog
FACTS:
At about six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, AAA
and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, while walking along the rice
paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen in San Rafael, Bulacan,
were waylaid by Conrado Laog. Laod, herein accused-appellant, struck both
women on the head using a lead pipe and stabbed Jennifer to death using an
ice pick. AAA was struck again by the pipe and was thrown off-ground and
slightly lost her consciousness. By then, accused partially removed her
clothing and did then and there rape her. The case at bar is a review of the
decision made by Court of Appeals which affirmed appellants conviction for
murder and rape.
ISSUE:
If accused is guilty of separate cases of rape and murder
and if there was any aggravating circumstance attending the crime
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the accused is guilty of
complex crime of Rape with Homicide and not as separate cases of Murder
and Rape. Circumstances like treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of

superior strength cannot qualify the crime as Murder. The aggravating

circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only.
Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with
a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her
defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably
showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to his unarmed victim, hence abuse of
superior strength as an aggravating circumstance can be appreciated in this
case.
People of the Philippines v. Ambrosio
FACTS:
On February 24, 1998, Diego Mangsaya and Roberto
Sanchez went to a construction site where they were told that illegally cut
coconut lumber where in place. When they got to the place, where
apparently accused Carlito Francisco, Joseph Andrade, Benigno Ambrocio,
and his sons Ben and Benny were having a drinking spree, they were
confronted by Ben who asked for the reason for the visitation of the
barangay captain, to which was answered by the latter in a slightly provoking
tone saying who are you to question me? I am the barangay captain here
which agitated Bens group. Ben suddenly hacked Sanchez in the back then
followed his group. Mangsaya managed to flee while Sanchez was not very
fortunate, before he can run away, he suffered another blow, to which this
time Benny was the one to cast the blow.
ISSUE:
If the accused are guilty of murder with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength
HELD:
Ben Ambrocio, Benigno Ambrocio Sr. and Joseph Andrade
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder with the attendance of
an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Superiority in
number does not necessarily amount to the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of superior strength. But in this case, it has been shown
that the aggressors cooperated in such a way as to secure the advantage of
their numerical strength and advantage. There is proof of the relative
numerical strength of the aggressors and the assaulted, a ratio of 5 to 2.
There is also proof that the aggressors simultaneously assaulted the
deceased. When all five accused, armed with bolos, joined forces to attack
and pursue Sanchez and Masangya, in a concerted effort, they definitely
abused their superiority in number and in arms. Since this aggravating
circumstance was alleged in the information and duly proved, it qualifies
properly the killing to murder.
People of the Philippines v. Calpito

FACTS:
On November 21, 1990, Fransisco Calpito armed with a
deadly weapon, intent to gain did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously by means of violence and intimidation on victim Florentina Villas
take and rob properties that belonged to the latter amounting to 30,000php.
The accused attack Florentina and Israel Montilla, the grandson of the
deceased, inflicting wounds that caused the death of Villas and the
hospitalization of Montilla.
Upon his second arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty. The court
convicted the appellant with Murder not Robbery with Homicide, which led
the accused to file a motion for reconsideration averring that the court erred
in convicting of murder and not homicide. The court denied his motion and
affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
murder

If the abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to

HELD:
The Supreme Court rendered its decision in the affirmative.
Evidence show that abuse of superior strength attended the crime. This
circumstance depends on age, size, and strength of the parties, as supported
by existing jurisprudence. It was held that an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes abuse
of superior strength.
In the case at bar, the abuse of superior strength is evident from the
notorious disparity between the relative strength of the victim, a 74-year-old
woman, and the assailant, a young man armed with knife.
People of the Philippines v. Yanson-Dumancas
FACTS:
Acting upon inducement of spouses Jeanette and Charles
Dumancas, under the direction and undue influence by P/Col. Nicolas Torres,
taking advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the PNP, with
the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspectors, concurring and
affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct,
kidnap and illegally detain Rufino Gargar Jr., with evident premeditation and
treachery, nocturnity, and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot
and kill the victim, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that the accused
secretly bury the corpse in a shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the
crime of murder.
ISSUE:
If accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
murder of Rufino Gargar Jr. with aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, treachery, nocturnity, and the use of motor vehicle.
HELD:
The court acquitted Jeneatte Yanson-Dumancas and Adonis
Abeto for not proving beyond reasonable doubt their guilt in the case at bar.
Nicolas Torres was dismissed by reason of death. And all other accused was
found guilty. It was also held that aforementioned aggravating circumstance,

except of the use of motor vehicle and nocturnity, were in appreciated by the
court in this case, as there was obviously a carefully planned attacked by
several persons conspiring to kill the victim without the knowledge of the
latter.
People of the Philippines v. Piliin
FACTS:
On November 19, 1997, Rodrigo Zayenis arrived at the
gate of his house aboard on an owner-type jeep he was driving. Norma
Zayenis, his wife, went out to open the gate. When Rodrigo was about to
park his vehicle, a man, who was later on identified as Eugenio Piliin,
approached him and shot him point blank in the neck and immediately ran
away. By reason of the gunshot wound, the victim thereafter died. Piliin
confessed his criminal act and stated that Yu and Caballes were his coperpetrators. However, after trial, the accused was found guilty and the
other two were acquitted for lack of evidence to prove their guilt.
In the pendency of his appeal, Piliin argues that the prosecution failed
to establish the existence of treachery. According to him, the witness failed
to see the inception of the attack because she was in the act of opening the
gate when her husband was shot, thus making it impossible for her to see
the incident.
ISSUE:
circumstance

If treachery must be appreciated as an aggravating

HELD:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in their
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the unsuspected and
sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter unable to defend
himself. Appellants wife witnessed the incident from start to beginning.
In the case at bar, treachery is present when the accused shot the
victim while the latter was parking his car, unsuspecting of any harm that
might happen to him. He had no chance to defend himself because the
attack is with utter suddenness. Furthermore, the use of a lone gun proves
that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted that particular mode
of attack to ensure the commission of the offense with impunity.
People of the Philippines v. Villarico
FACTS:
In the evening of August 8, 1999, Haide Cagatan was
preparing dinner in the kitchen of his family house. While in the comfort
room attending to her child, Remedion Cagatan, victims sister-in-law, saw
four armed men standing behind Haide Ricky Villarico, Gilberto Villarico Jr.,
Gilberto Villarico Sr., and Jerry Ramentos. Gilberto Jr. saw Remedios and told
her to drop to the ground and call for help, which right after three gunshots

were fired. Lolita Cagatan, Haides mother, went to the kitchen to check on
her son, to which she eventually found out was shot by one of the accused.
The accused denied said allegations and averred that they were in
different places when the incident happened. Some of them have witnesses
to corroborate their statements. However, the regional trial court and the
court of appeals rendered their decisions convicting the accused of the crime
of murder with aggravating circumstance of dwelling and treachery. The
accused then appealed to the high court a review of the decision given by
the lower courts stating that the court of appeals gravely erred in convicting
the accused of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
identity of the assailant as well as the guilt of the accused-appellant.
Furthermore, he avers that the court erred in considering treachery and
dwelling on the assumption that they are indeed guilty.
ISSUE/S: If for identification to be positive, it has to be made by a witness
who actually saw the assailants; If treachery is attendant in the killing of
Haide as to qualify as murder.
HELD:
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and
sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an
eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there
are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can
equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally
presumed innocence of the accused.
Here, the elements of treachery were present. His assailants gunned
Haide down while he was preoccupied in the kitchen of his own abode with
getting dinner ready for the household. He was absolutely unaware of the
imminent deadly assault from outside the kitchen, and was for that reason in
no position to defend himself or to repel his assailants.
Accused Gilberto Villarico Sr., Gilberto Villarico Jr., Jerry Ramentos, and
Ricky Villarico were found guilty of murder and was sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua with indemnity to the heirs of Haide.
People of the Philippines v. Cachola
FACTS:
At around 6:00 pm on December 28, 1999, in Bauang, La
Union, two armed men, namely Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay,
entered the house of Jessie Barnacher, then 12 years old, who managed to
hide under her bed. Her mother Carmelita Barnachea, brother Felix
Barnachea, cousin Rubenson Abance, and uncle Victorino Lalorga was shot
by the two malefactors. After being shot, Victorinos penis was also cut by
the malefactors. Jessie identified the shooters after the incident when they
were in the police line-up after being apprehended by the police immediately
after the incident because of the timely reporting of their neighbors to the
authorities. Cachola and Amay were convicted for murder.

ISSUE:
If ignominy was properly appreciated by the trial court as
an aggravating circumstance.
HELD:
The fact that Victorinos penis was cut off does not
immediately give rise to the aggravating circumstance of ignominy. For
ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a
manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the
victims moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body
or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the
accused. Here, Victorinos penis was cut off after he was already dead.
Moreover, ignominy must be alleged in the information, which the
prosecution failed to make.
People of the Philippines v. Bumindang
FACTS:
At about 2:00 am of September 29, 1993, accused
Bumidang loudly called Melencio Imbat, father of the victim, to open the
latters door. Melencio, hurried opened the door because the accused
threatened to kill them if he wont do as he wishes. The accused entered the
abode of Melencio and looked for the latters 56 year old daughter, Gloria
Imbat, who was still sleeping at that time. The accused ordered for the old
man to remain still in his room while he went to Glorias room. When he got
in Glorias room, he poked the latter with a spear-like rod he got from
Melencios room ordering Gloria to take off her clothing. After which the
accused immediately raped the victim. The accused told Gloria and his father
to remain silent or else he would kill them, and eventually left the area.
Despite the threats, Gloria reported the incident to a kagawad who
handed a note to be given to proper authorities. The accused was
immediately arrested. The RTC found the accused guilty of rape with the use
of a deadly weapon under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code and was
sentenced to death by lethal injection.
ISSUE:
If dwelling, nighttime, and ignominy shall be appreciated
as aggravating circumstances of the crime of rape.
HELD:
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, as the case was a clear violation of the sanctity of
the victims place of abode.
However, aggravating circumstance of
nighttime was not appreciated by the court even though the incident
happened at around 2:00 am. It was not proven that the accused
deliberately intended to commit the crime in nighttime.
Ignominy was appreciated in the case. The accused humiliated the
victim in front of his father in his perverted acts like examining the victims
genitalia using a flashlight and the actual act of rape.
People of the Philippines v. Jose

FACTS:
At about 4:30 oclock in the morning of June 26, 1967,
Maggie de la Riva, accompanied by her maid, were en route to her house in
New Manila, Quezon City when a group of men in a two-door Pontiac crossed
her way which caused her to stop the car. After stopping the car, a man, who
was later on identified as Basilio Pineda, Jr., opened the door of the victims
car and forcibly pulled her out of the car. There has been as struggle
between the two as the victim tried her hardest to get the hold off the victim
from her. However, even with the help of her maid, the victim was abducted
by these men. The three other accused were identified as Jaime Jose, Rogelio
Caal, and Eduardo Aquino.
Pinedas group brought the victim to a hotel in Pasay, where they took
turn in raping and abusing the victim. Initially, they asked the victim to have
a striptease in front of them, to which the victim reluctantly did in fear of
greater harm posed by the accused. Each time the accused took turn in
fulfilling their carnal desires unto the victim, they also inflicted physical harm
on her by punching her in the stomach.
After the incident, Pinedas group order Maggie not to tell anyone what
happened and that if anyone asked why she went home late shes supposed
to tell that she was mistaken as a hostess by a group of men and was
immediately released upon knowing that she was an actress. The accused
threatened the victim of throwing acid on her face if ever she turned them to
the police.
Pineda pleaded guilty during trial; however, the other three men
denied the allegations. The trial court rendered its decision convicting the
four men guilty of complex crime of forcible abduction with rape with the
attendance of aggravating circumstance of nighttime, abuse of superior
strength, ignominy, and use of motor vehicle.
ISSUE:
If the abovementioned aggravating circumstances were
properly appreciated by the RTC.
HELD:
First is nighttime. The accused purposely sought such
circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes. The incident
happened at around 4 oclock in the morning when the surroundings were
still dark. Second is abuse of superior strength. It is clear that the accused
were four men as opposed to the woman victim whose strength is very much
weaker than those of the men. She cannot defend herself in any way
possible.
Third is ignominy. since the appellants in ordering the complainant to
exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping
her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the
crime more humiliating. Lastly, the use of a motor vehicle, which was used in
forcibly abducting the victim.
The Supreme Court modified the decision made by the lower court,
imposing four death penalties to the accused who were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape with
attendance of several aggravating circumstances.

People of the Philippines v. Mallari

FACTS:
On July 7, 1996, at about 4 oclock in the afternoon, Joseph
Galang reprimanded Mallari for driving too fast in front of the farmers house.
Mallari got irritated and challenged Galang into a fist fight. Galang did not
heed Mallaris challenge and apologized instead. At about 6:30 pm of the
same day, Mallari returned and tried to stab Galang but the latter was able to
flee. Mallari boarded his truck and drove after Galang until he was able to
catch him. He bumped Galang and crushed his head. Mallari was convicted
for murder and was sentenced to suffer to death.
ISSUE:
If the qualifying circumstance of motor vehicle was
correctly appreciated by the trial court in imposing death penalty.
HELD:
Evidence shows that the accused used his vehicle as the
actual means to kill or pursue the victim. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, a person who kills another by means of motor vehicle is guilty of
murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The
alleged aggravating circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation in
the prosecutions information was not proved by sufficient evidence, thus, it
was not appreciated by the court.
People of the Philippines v. Enguito
FACTS:
On or about September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme was driving a
motorela together with his wife Rosita and another passenger, herein victim,
Wilfredo Achumbre. They were on their way to bring the latter to his house
when a white vehicle suddenly bumped and pushed their vehicle. The white
vehicle, which was being driven by accused Thadeos Enguito, kept on
bumping the victims vehicle until it turn on its side. Spouses Felipe and
Rosita sustained injuries, while Achumbre were announced dead on arrival
when he got to the hospital. It was later on found on the investigation that
the victim and the accused were not in good terms.
The RTC convicted the accused of Homicide with Less Serious Physical
injuries with the attendance of an aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle.
ISSUE:
If the trial court properly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle in this case.
HELD:
Evidence showed that the means used by the accused was
by, indeed, the use of motor vehicle, which qualified the killing to murder.
Simangan v. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
On February 10, 1980, at about 8:00 pm, Simangan and
four other men wearing fatigues knocked on the door of the store owned by
Ernesto and Sofronia. The couple was having dinner with their daughter
Lorna at that time. Simangan asked Ernesto to be their guide on the road as
they were not familiar of it. Ernesto agreed and ordered his house boy
Romeo to accompany him in guiding Simangans group. The following day,
Romeo reported to Sofronia that Ernesto is dead. The victim was found dead
near a creek, having sustain multiple stab wounds.
ISSUE:
If Simangan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing
Ernesto with the attendance of an aggravating circumstance of cruelty.
HELD:
The testimonies of Romeo and Sofronia were found credible
by the court. Thus, Simangans conviction was affirmed. It was found that
Simangan indeed stabbed Ernesto 10 times, three of which were fatal that
caused the latters death. But the number of stab wound does not qualify as
an aggravating circumstance against Simangan for it must be proven that
Simangan intended to exacerbate the suffering of Ernesto. Nighttime is also
not appreciates as it was not included in the original information.
People of the Philippines v. Guerrero
FACTS:
Orlando Pablo Guerrero, Jr. and Orlando Dino Guerrero, Sr., were
being accused of murder. The accused conspired and mutually helped each
other, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously attack,
assault, beheaded and cut the penis off of the victim Ernesto Ocampo, which
caused his death right after.
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Testimonies show
that Dino Guerrero surrendered to the police. While other testimonies say
that it was the son who killed the victim. Another witness, Ireneo Acierto,
testified that while he was resting at his house at past 11:30 in the morning
of July 7, 1987, he heard some screaming. He went to the house of the
Guerreros where he saw Ernesto Ocampos head about to be severed by the
appellant. When the head was cut off, appellant placed the same on the right
side of the victims trunk. Right after, accused cut off victims penis. Ireneo
and Ana tried to stop Pablo but the latter told them to shut up or else they
would be next. The whereabout of Dino at the time of the incident is
unknown to Ireneo. He had not seen the older Guerrero at the scene of the
crime.
ISSUE:
If the court a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of cruelty and/or outraging and scoffing the corpse in order to
classy the crime as murder even though the same was not alleged in the
information.

HELD:
The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of
treachy and evident premeditation. It also states that there was cruelty in
the perpetration of the crime, where there was a deliberate and inhumane of
the victim and the offender scoffed at the victims corpse. Treachery and
evident premeditation were not appreciated due to lack of sufficient evident
to support it, but Cruelty was appreciated by the court.
People of the Philippines v. Whisenhunt
FACTS:
On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally
charged with the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo. During the pendency of the
trial, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the
prosecution without reasonable doubt, to wit: that on September 23, 1993,
the accused brought the victim to his apartment; thant on September 24,
1993, the accuse-appellants housemaid was looking for their kitchen knife
and was told by the accused that it was in his bedroom; that on September
25, 1993, the accused and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body
parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside the accused-appellants bedroom;
that the body and the belongings of the victim were disposed to a roadside
somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna and Bagac, Bataan; that several body parts
of the victim were recovered upon Demetrios instruction; that pieces of
evidence were found in the bedroom and bathroom of the accused that
would corroborated the allegations against him.
ISSUE:
If the trial court is correct in appreciating the crime to be
murder with qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength and
outraging and scoffing at the victims corpse.
HELD:
Abuse of superiority is in attendance whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor. The fact that the
victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant
committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be
enough evidence to prove that relative strength of both accused and victim
were being taken advantage of. in the case at bar, nobody witnessed the
actual killing. No witness could testify to corroborate the circumstance.
Abuse of superior strength is not properly appreciated by the trial court.
However, the circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of
the victim were correctly appreciated by the trial court. The dismembering of
body parts of the victim undeniably constitutes scoffing on the part of the
accused, thus, qualifying the crime to murder.
People of the Philippines vs. Rebucan
FACTS:
On or about November 6, 2002, Rosendo Rebucan Lamsin,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hacked Felipe Legara

and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. using a long bolo. On accounts of witnesses, they said
that accused went to the house of the victim and started hacking the victim
to death. Felipe was still able to run outside their house even if he was
already wounded, but Rosendo already caught up with him and gave another
hack of the bolo which eventually caused the death of the victim. While
inside Felipes house, the accused managed to hack Ranil also with the bolo.
Ranil was still a child then.
Witness of the defense corroborated the allegations saying that Felipe
and a certain Timboy were allegedly sexually abusing the wife of the
accused, which is the reason why the accused went up to the house of the
victims and tried to settle the grudge between them.
ISSUE:
If the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, abuse of superior strength and
minority
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in
appreciating the abovementioned aggravating circumstances. When the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treacher, the former
is absorbed in the latter. On the other hand, dwelling, minority, and
intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstance in the case
considering that the same were not alleged in the original information.
People of the Philippines v. Nimuan
FACTS:
Eulalia Garcia was tending her sari-sari store in La Union
when the armed appellant and Lambert told her that they were going to kill
the doctor. The two left when they saw the doctor pass by going to the
poultry farm. Ten minutes later, Garcia heard two gunshots. In the poultry
farm, after the doctor had tended to his workers, went to another building.
Said workers heard the gunshots and went down to investigate. On the way,
they met the appellant and Lambert who threatened them with harm should
they tell anyone for they have done. Both the appellant and Lambert left.
The appellant denied any participation of the crime and pointed Lambert as
the sole principal. He claimed that he merely accompanied Lambert to the
doctors farm when the Lambert suddenly shot the victim.
ISSUE/S: If there is conspiracy; If there is evident premeditation; If there is
treachery; If the killings are murder.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the appellants conviction for murder.
Based on the testimonies, it has been clearly proved that there was
conspiracy. There is a qualifying circumstance of treachery since the attack
on the victim was deliberate, sudden, unexpected and left no room for the
victim to defend himself. However the CAs ruling on both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances were questioned. There is no clear evidence on the
existence of evident premeditation and in case of intoxication, it must be

proved that the state of being drunk impaired the willpower of both the
appellant and Lambert.
People of the Philippines v. Licyayo
FACTS:
Licyayo was charged with homicide by the RTC for stabbing
Rufino in different parts of his body. The RTC convicted Licyayo guilty of the
crime there being no attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The
petitioner appealed contenting that sufficient provocation and intoxicatin
should be taken regard as mitigating circumstances present in the case. He
insisted that there is sufficient provocation because it was the victim who
pushed him first and when the incident happened, he was drunk and
intoxicated.
ISSUE:
If sufficient provocation
considered as mitigating circumstances.

and

intoxication

should

be

HELD:
The petitioner cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance
of sufficient provocation because the alleged provocation was not proved.
There is no sufficient record for this to be true. The petitioner cannot also
invoke intoxication as a mitigating circumstance because it was not
established that his state impaired his reason and mental faculties.
People vs. Fragante
FACTS:
Ernesto Fragante was charged with nine counts of acts of
lasciviousness and one count of rape all committed against his own daughter
AAA. In between the period of April-May 1993, the accused, by taking
advantage of his then ten year old biological daughter, and with lewd
designs, fondled his daughters breast. Sometime in between May to August
1993, the accused fondled his daughters breasts, touched and inserted his
finger into the vagina of the victim twice. That sometime in between the
period of October to December 1993 at Shaolin Chinese Restaurant, the
accused sucked her breasts and touched her vagina. The same thing has
happened in six more instances. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
both found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crimes charged against him.
ISSUE:
If the Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellants
conviction for nine counts of acts of lasciviousness and one count of rape.
HELD:
The Supreme Court sustained seven counts of acts of
lasciviousness and one count rape. The SC acquitted the appellant for two
counts of acts of lasciviousness on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Calongui vs People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Alejandro Calongui was found guilty for two counts of
rape. On January 1, 1998 at 2:00 a.m. in Tagbong, Camarines Sur, Calongui
raped the 13 year old girl named Maricel in her house. On September 26,
1998 at arounf 3:00 in the morning, the accused once again raped the
Maricel, the victim. Both incidents of rape were witnessed by the brother of
Maricel.
ISSUE:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling be
appreciated against Calongui.
HELD:
Calongui and Maricel are cousins, and both of them are
living under the safe roof. At the time of the incident, both were living on the
same house. Therefore, there was no trespassing to the sanctity of the house
of the victim on Calonguis part. However, his conviction on the crime of rape
was still affirmed.
People of the Philippines v. Vasquez
FACTS:
Luis Luable testified that he was conversing with his
brother-in-law, Antonio Cortez and intervened with a fight that was
happening along the street. The fight was between Pedro Pacheco and his
sons Roel and Marlon Pacheco. The men did not appreciate Luis intervening
and Roel suddenly grabbed a bolo from his brother and hacked Luis. Luis was
able to parry the blow but was hit on his index finger. Luis ran toward his
brothers house, Geronimo, saying that he was being stoned and chased and
asked to be accompanied to his house. They were met by Roels uncle,
Domingo Vasquez, who was with Roels brother, Ramon and five others. They
were armed with bolos and waited for them at the end of the street. Luis and
Geronimo fled afraid for their lives. They were separated and Luis found out
that Geronimo was already killed. A cousin of theirs testified and said that
she witnessed the pursuit. The accused Ramon Vasquez was acquitted on
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and attempted murder. Accused
Domingo Vasquez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and attempted homicide.
ISSUE:
If the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused-appellant
despite not having been established sufficient motive, inconsistent
testimonies, and weak evidence on the part of the prosecutor.
HELD:
The appeal has no merit. The trial court only gave
credence to the testimony of Maria Luisa Abellanosa and rejected the
testimonies of Luis Luable and Debbie Dorado. Appellant Domingo Vasquez is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the crime of murder and attempted
homicide without modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime.

People of the Philippines v. Dacillo

FACTS:
On a drizzly night, Rosemarie Tallada was seen standing
near a bridge presumably waiting for someone. Later, Fransisco Dacillo called
her into his house. The people in the adjacent house of Dacillo heard and felt
a struggle happening in the latters house. The next day, Dacillos actuations
were found to be suspicious by the neighbours because he was carrying
ready mixed cements into his house. This bothered and puzzled the
neighbours who eventually called the polices attention to investigate. Later,
the police discovered the tomb of the decomposing body of Tallada. The
accused was found to be a recidivist during trial.
ISSUE:

If recidivism is to be appreciated in the trial.

HELD:
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not
alleged in the information and evidence. Although evidence may show that
indeed the accused has previous convictions, this does not sufficiently prove
or make the aggravation circumstance be appreciated. It must be alleged in
the information pursuant to the rules of court and criminal procedure.
People of the Philippines v. Dela Torre
FACTS:
Appelle Wilfredo Dela Torre had three children with his
common-law wife Melinda Torre, namely: M1, M2 and M3. Melinda left her
family when M1 was about seven years old bringin with her M3. The victim
lived with her father and brother M2 in Zambales. In January of 2007, M1s
teacher noticed sudden changes in her behaviour and when confronted, she
admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. DSWD took her under
its custody. M1 testified that her father committed secual abuses on her and
a medical examiner confirmed this and added that the girl is also suffering
from UTI.
ISSUE/S: Id appellee should be penalized with reclusion perpetua in each
of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of
death; If an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate
the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
HELD:
The court refused to impose the supreme penalty of death
on appellee maintaining that there were circumstances that mitigated the
gravity of the offenses. Moreover, the ban on double jeopardy is deeply
rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposed and
primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an
instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases
with accumulated trials.

People of the Philippines v. Tomas., Sr et al

FACTS:
In an information filed on July 21, 2006, the three accused,
Tony Tomas, Benedicto Doctor and Nestor Gatchalian, were indicted for the
crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly
committed as follows: That on or about July 19, 2006 at around 10:00 pm,
the accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another assaulted and
shot several times on Estreall Doctor Casco which caused her instantaneous
death. The RTC ruled that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals
likewise affirmed.
ISSUE:
If the RTC erred in disregarding their defense of denial and alibi
and their insistence of the lack of treachery and conspiracy.
HELD:
The appeal is partly meritorious. The RTC did not err in
disregarding their defense and alibi. However, the court was compelled to
affirm the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
conspiracy, but the the evidence adduced and the records do not support a
finding of conspiracy against Gatchalian. The Court finds accused Tomas and
Doctor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder and
Gatchalian guilty as an accomplice to the offense of murder.
Abarquez v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On November 21, 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Paz, Ricardo Quejong
and their friends were in Boyets house celebrating the latters birthday and
drinking liquor. At 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home along with
Bardie and Masula. Almojuela, Ising and Abarquez were also drinking near
Boyets house. As Pazs group were passing towards the main road,
Almojuela and his companions blocked their path and asked Paz, Are you
brave? to which Paz replied, Why? Almojuela attacked Paz with a knife
while the latter parried the attack with his left arm but still sustaining an
injury. Almojuela and Quejong confronted each other resulting to a scuffle
while Paz was trying to get away from Abarquez and found Quejong already
bloodied. Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up
Quejong but failed so he left him and ran to ask for help. He heard Abarquez
shout, You left your companion already wounded! Paz returned and found
Almojuela and Abarquez still with Quejong. They brought him to the UST
Hospital, but he died there. Upon investigation by the police, they learned
that Almojuela assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Abarquex voluntarily
appeared at the police station and Almojuela voulnatarily surrendered.
The trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice of the crime of
homicide. It held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a coconspirator of Almujela in the killing of Quejong. Abarquez could not be
convicted as a principal. However, it ruled that he, in holding an restraining

Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong. The Court of Appeals
affirmed its decision.
ISSUE:

If Abarquez should be liable as an accomplice?

HELD:
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices
as those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

People of the Philippines v. Pilola

FACTS:
On February 5, 1988 at 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside
their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr.
were drinking beer and were joined by Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba.
Edmar has a heated argument with Julian iwho was pacified by Elisa and
advised them to go home since she was ready to close her store. Edmar and
Odilon left then returned to block Joselito and Julian. Edmar punched Julian in
the face while Elisa shouted for them to stop. As Joselito tried to stop the
fight, Odilon pulled out his knife and stabbed Joselito. Ronnie and Rene Pilola,
who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim
and decided to join. Ronnie who was joined by Pilola also stabbed Joselito
and the latter fell into a canal.
A security guard witnessed Ronnie repeatedly stabbing Joselito. The RTC
declared Pilola as guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:

If Pilola is guilty of murder.

HELD:
Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim.
However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie
agreed to join. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and Pilola before, during,
and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill
the victim. Since the victim is not yet dead, the crime is not yet
consummated so Pilola is a principal by direct participation.
People of the Philippines v. Tolentino
FACTS:
On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his
cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in
Zamboanga City when their neighbot Wilfredo Tolentino called them. He did
not tell them the reason why and simply told them to follow. Wilfredo
revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheilas stepfather saying that it was
the only way to free Sheilas mother and his aunt of her sufferings. Wilfredo
instructed Merwin to get a bolo and for them to wait for Hernan. At 8:30 pm,

Hernan arrived. Wilfredo hit Hernan on the right side of his neck making him
unconscious and falling face down on the ground. Wilfredo stabbed Hernan
successively which resulted to the latters death. Wilfredo called Jonathan,
Sheila and Merwin and warned them that if they tell other people, he will kill
them. The followed him out of fear. Jonathan and Wilfredo were arrested but
both denied to the killing and intead pointed to each other as the killer.
However, Wilfredo was guilt-stricken and admitted as the sole principal of the
crime implicating Jonathan as a result.
ISSUE:
the crime.

If Jonathan Fabros should be convicted as an accessory to

HELD:
Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory because
under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who
had knowledge of the commission of the crime and did not participate in the
its commission as a principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its
commission.
People of the Philippines v. Antonio
FACTS:
An amiable game of cards that started the night turned
ugly and tragic event that resulted in the fatal shooting of Arnulfo Tuadles by
Alberto Antonio. Arnulfo Tuadles who is a professional basketball player,
succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound located right between
his eyes. The wound was inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .
9mm calibre Beretta pistol. Alberto Antonio was charged with murder.
ISSUE:

If Alberto Antonio is guilty of murder qualified by treachery.

HELD:
The Supreme court held that appellant Alberto Antonio is
liable for the crime of homicide, not murder. There was no treachery in this
case because there is no basis for the trial courts conclusion which stated
that accused Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of
attach to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to
himself. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into a murder.
There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for
a specific purpose. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a
heated verbal argument between Tuadles and the appellant, then it cannot
be concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery. The evidence
clearly shows that the incident was an impulse killing. Antonio can only be
convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
People of the Philippines v. Cui

FACTS:
In the evening of December 5, 1990, some ten armed
robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim in Cebu City. They
were able to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo Garcia and two of his mean,
Mawe Garcia and Edgar. They carted away cash and jewelries, abducted their
daughter Stephanie and demanded a ransom of 1M for her release. They
reported the kidnapping to the police. They were able to identify Garcia as
leader of Baong Gang. They questioned their security guard who was able to
pinpoint the robbers. He revealed that his neighbot and close family friends,
the spouses Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan. The Cuis were
arrested but was later granted bail. Basingan, the security guard, executed a
second sworn statement adding the detailed role of the Cuis in the planning
of the crime. Later on they found out that the Cuis were only accomplices.
The trial court convicted the Cuis along with Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and
Nacario with the crime charged with conspiracy.
ISSUE:
If the trial court erred in not excluding hearsay evidence
offered to prove alleged conspiracy and participation of the Cuis as
accomplices in the crime charged.
HELD:
The trial court used the statements of Basingan as proofs
of guilt of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. They are undeniably hearsay for any
oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
some other person who was never present on the witness stand. Conviction
cannot be based on hearsay evidence. The Court holds that Cuis profited
from the kidnapping and are liable as accessories and not accomplices.
People of the Philippines v. Mariano
FACTS:
Michelle Priol was employed as a maid at the household of
the sisters, Ruth and Ruby Mariano. Jenny Priol, Michelles older sister,
testified that she often visited her sister. However, they couldnt properly talk
to each other as the sisters were always hovering and eavesdropping so
Jenny didnt visit her again. Sometime afterwards, Ruth and Ruby brought
Michelle to Jenny complaining that the former broke their rice cooker. Jenny
noticed an uneven patch on Michelles hair and decided to tell the sisters
that Michelle should stop working for them, but the sisters did not allow it
and went home with Michelle. That was the last time Jenny saw Michelle
alive. On August 17, 1997, a police received an anonymous tip that a woman
was seen carrying a box with a protruding human leg and drove away.
Eventually, the police were able to track down the car and found out that it
was the Mariano sisters. Ruth admitted to what she did to Michelle such as
dousing her boiling water everytime they fight and banging her head on the
wall. On June 22, 1998 Ruth and Ruby were convicted of murder by the trial
court. Ruth was sentenced to death while Ruby was found guilty as an
accomplice.
ISSUE:
If Ruby is considered by law as an accessory exempt from
criminal liability by reason of their relationship.

HELD:
Accused-appellant Ruby Mariano is the sister of the
accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. As such, their relationship exempts Ruby
from criminal liability under Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason
for the exception is based on ties of blood and the preservation of the
cleanliness of ones name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed
by relatives so near as those mentioned in the RPC.
US vs Insierto
FACTS:
The defendant, Ramon Insierto, inflicted upon his nieces,
Marcelina Cainela who is twelve years of age, three wounds which required a
little over a month to cure, without medical assistance. The Court of First
Instance sentenced him to two years and four months of prison correctional
takinf into consideration the aggravating circumstance of parentage and in
addition that of abuse of person of tender age. Mercelina Cainela said that
her uncle is also her teacher and he has never hit her before only this once
when she was not able to answer his question. Ramon also testified that his
mental faculties were not balanced ever since he suffered an affection on the
head. Olivia Insierto also confirmed Ramons testimony.
ISSUE:
If Ramons relationship as an uncle to Marcelina should be
considered to either mitigate or aggravate criminal liablity.
HELD:
His relationship to Marcelina is not capable to be regarded
as either aggravating or mitigating circumstance because it is stated under
Article 10 of the Penal Code: When the injured person is the spouse, or
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degress of the offender. Ramon is her uncle
and this does not include what was previously stated in the Penal Code.
People of the Philippines v. Evina
FACTS:
Maritess Evaller an eleven year old daughter of Basilio and
Luciana who lived in a one bedroom house in Tacloban City. The appellant,
Gerry Evina, was the son of Lucianas second cousin who lived nearby and
worked as a porter at a bus terminal. In the evening of November 3, 1991,
Luciana, along with Gerrys mother, went to the barangay captain to check
out loan transaction. Left in the house were Basilio, Maritess, her older sister
and some visitors. Maritess decided to sleep at around 9:00 pm and entered
her room. Though not lighted, she noticed Gerry but did not mind and dozed
off. She noticed that he locked the door and proceeded on gagging with her
own dress, tied her up and poked a knife at her. He raped her. Afterwards, he
told Maritess to leave the room and watch television. She did not tell her
father because of fear. This happened again and on the third attempt, she
told her mother. As a defense, Gerry Evina said that he was a victim and that

he was hated by the family. The trial court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on two counts.
ISSUE:
If the trail court erred in giving full weight and credence to
the evidence and finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Rape is hard to prove but harder for him to disprove. The
testimony of Maritess should be carefully scrutinized. The inconsistency of
the testimony is too minor and trivial to impair the integrity of the
prosecutions evidence as a whole. It cannot affect the veracity or the weight
of her testimony.
People of the Philippines v. Pacificador
FACTS:
On October 27, 1988, Arturo Pacificadoe, the Chairman of
the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, was charged
before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of RA 3019 or the AntiGraft and Corruption Practices Act. During the period of December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976, together with Jose Marcelo, he cause the sale, transfer and
conveyance of the rights, titles and interests over parcels of land owned by
NSSC to Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where Jose Panganiban Plant is
located. NSSC is a government-owned corporation and received only
P85,144.50 as consideration for the sale. This caused injury to the
Government because real fair market value of the lands were P862,150.00.
the Deed of Sale, the filing of action against him should have prescribed. He
further contends that during December 29, 1975, there was a constructive
notice to the world of such registration and this should be tantamount to
concealing his crime during that day and not on May 13, 1988 when the
complaint was filed by the Solicitor General with the PCGG.
ISSUE:
If the prescription of the offense committed by Pacificador
shall run from the date the Deed of Sale was executed.
HELD:
The date of the prescription shall run from the day the
crime was committed and if that date is unknown, the date of discovery
should be used as the reckoning point. In this case, since the land was
transferred and presumably registered on December 29, 1975 when the
perpetrators are already aware of their own crimes, the reckoning point
should be that day. The Deed of Sale when registered constitutes a notice to
the whole world, including the petitioner, of its contents, as well as all
interests, legal and equitable. All persons charged with the constructive
knowledge of what it contains despite no actual knowledge on their part.
People of the Philippines v. Lazaro

FACTS:
On May 5, 1990 at around 3:00 pm, Police Sgt. Alejandro
Bonnet was conducting an inspection of traffic policemen. His attention was
called by bystanders who were shouting that was a bloodied man beside the
driver of a Toyota jeep. He went after the vehicle. He was able to chase the
car and instructed the driver to go to the nearest hospital because of the
bloodied man beside him. Upon arriving he asked Lazaro, the driver, to step
out of the vehicle. While doing so, he noticed that Lazaro took a handgun
from its holster and dropped it at the back of the drivers seat. The gun was a
.38 caliber revolver containing six empty shells. He did not have a license.
The prosecution presented that Ronquillo, the bloodied man, died due to loss
of blood from his gunshot wounds. The accused-appellant rebutted and
testified that both of them fell from the jeepney while grappling for the gun
and that this was the cause of the gun shooting. The lower court found him
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
Section of PD No. 1866.
ISSUE:
If the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition qualified by homicide.
HELD:
In cases involving illegal possession of firearms, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements such as (1) the existence
of the subject firearm and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess
the same. Both these elements were proven.
Sta. Catalina v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Private complainant Lorenzo Ballecer was the president of
Sunrise Industries Development, Inc. while his friend, Arnold Sta. Catalina the
petitioner, was the president of Century United Marketing and Trading Corp.
They decided to venture into a joint business. Due to some unfortunate
events in with regards to payment of their order, Ballecer deposited the
payment to the petitioners bank account. Ballecer found out some
discrepancies in their order and wanted to take back his money to no avail.
His defense was that he did not misappropriate the money but spent it on
office supplies, salaries and other expenses. The trial court convicted the
petitioner of the crime estafa.
ISSUE:
If the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner
for the crime of estafa despite the missing transcript of stenographic notes
dated February 5, 1991.
HELD:
There is no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the
appellate court. The elements of estafa under 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code are present. The provisioins are: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or

for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make

delivery of, or return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part
of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another.
Balderama v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Rolando Balderama and Rolando Nagal, the petitioiners,
were employed with the LTO assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law
Enforcement Services. Juan Armamento, respondent, operates a taxi
business with a fleet of 10 taxi units. Both respondents were part of the team
to look into the complaints that taxi drivers in NAIA discriminate against
passengers and would only accept on a basis of contract. On July 14, 1992,
the team flagged down and impounded a taxi owned by respondent.
However, it was proved that the meter was functioning and that the vehicle
was returned. The respondent felt aggrieved thus, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint for bribery stating that both respondents had been
collecting money from him. They have agreed to the payment of P300.00 to
be paid twice a month as protection money. They were convicted on the
crime charged.
ISSUE:
If the guilt of the accused, now petitioners, in these cases
has been proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The elements on the crime of direct bribery are found
present. It was duly established that the accused demanded and received
money as protection from respondent on several dates. The Court was not
convinced to the prayer for acquittal of the petitioners. The petition was
denied.
People of the Philippines v. Dimaano
FACTS:
Maricar Dimaano charder her father, Edgardo Dimaano of
2 counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape. She was ten years old when
she was first sexually abused in September 1993. In January 1996, Maricar
and her mother went to Camp Crame wherein they finally filed a complaint
upon the advise of their relatives. The Medigo-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime
Lab found Maricar to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and
was in a non-virginal state. Edgardo, her father, denied the accusations
against him claiming he was in the office from 7:00 am to (:00 pm. The trial
court found Maricar;s testimony credible and likewise disregarded the
compromise agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since
Maricar was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same.

ISSUES:
If the evidence adduced by the prosecution has overcome the
presumption of innocence of the accused; If the voluntary and due execution
of the affidavit of desistance by Maricar should have been duly considered as
a factor which put to doubt the reasons behind the filing of the criminal
charges of rape against her father.
HELD:
The credibility given the trial court to Maricar is an
important aspect of the evidence. It gave due credence to the testimony of
Maricar who was only twelve years old when she testified. Conviction is
affirmed since the sexual intercourse is proven.
Courts attach no persuasive value to desistance, especially when
executed afterthought. Close scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance shows
that Maricar never retracted her allegation of rape and neither did she give
any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her allegation.
People of the Philippines v. Novio
FACTS:
Maricel Talisay, the victim, tends to their store whenever
she was free from school and if her parents are working for an additional
income as caretakers in a beach house not far from their store. Noli Novie,
the accused, is the younger brother of the husband of Maricels older sister.
Noli frequented the store when he met Maricel because he was enamored by
her. In the evening of September 23, 1994, Maricel slept together with her
brothers. As she was sleeping at around 3:00 am, she felt a ticklish sensation
and a stabbing pain in her vagina. When she woke up, she was surprised to
find Noli naked and top of her. He immediately covered her mouth and
warned her not to make anoise. He then raped her. Her parents caught this
act, but he was able to escape. They reported the incident. Noli denied the
allegation saying that they were sweethearts and that Maricel was the one
who let him in the house. The trial court found him guilty without reasonable
doubt of rape.
ISSUE:
If the trail court erred in giving full weight and credence to
the testimonies of the private complainanr and that of her mother and not
considering the defense by the accused-appellant.
HELD:
When the credibility of the witness is in issue, the trial
courts assessment is accorded great weight because it has a unique
opportunity to hear the testimony of the witness and observe their
deportment and manner of testifying. The Court is convinced that Maricel
and her mother were credible witnesses.
People of the Philippines v. Zacarias
FACTS:
Wally Ticalo was convicted of murder for the death of
Christopher Sacay. He was charged together with three other persons. Rene

Matugas and Wally Ticalo were arrested and put to trial, while the other two,
Sammy and Rodel Zacarias, remained at large. The conviction of Ticalo was
anchored based on the eyewitness account of Sergio Pelicano. He testified
that he heard a commotion outside his home and saw that Christopher
Sacay, a teenage boy was being chased by Sammy and Rodel. Seconds later,
Wally and Rene also went after the boy. Pelicano followed the group and saw
that Rodel holding the boy while the rest took turns in stabbing the victim.
They denied the testimony and gave an alibi. The trial court accorded
greater credence to the positive declaration of Pelicano.
ISSUE:
If the trial court ahas erred in finding the appellant guilty
of the crime charged.
HELD:
The positive testimony of a single witness could be
sufficient for conviction if found credible, for truth is established not
quantitatively but qualitatively. Where there is nothing to indicate that the
witness has been actuated by improper motives, his statement under solemn
oath deserves full faith and credence.
People of the Philippines v. Ramirez
FACTS:
In the evening of May 23, 1993, in Ormoc City, Montano
Banez invited Jonathan Alkuino to a drinking session at a nearby sari-sari
store. While the two were in the middle of their drinking session, Pedro
Ramirez, the accused appellant, walked towards the two and suddenly
stabbed Alkuino on the right side of his body. Alkuino was immediately
brought to the hospital but eventually died the next day because of massive
blood loss. Before succumbing to death, Alkuino told his father the identity of
his assailant. This was presented as a testimonial evidence during trial as a
dying declaration of the victim. The trial court found Pedro Ramirez guilty of
murder and sentenced him 40 years of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:

If the trial court correctly sentenced Ramirez.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the trail court erred in
sentencing the appellant of 40 years of reclusion perpetua, which is an
indivisible penalty under the Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court
previously held that since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has
no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It should be imposed in its
entirety.
People of the Philippines v. Latupan
FACTS:
On April 29, 1991 at 4:00 pm, Ceferino Dagulo was outside
his house in Cagayan when he heard the shouts of a woman and a child
coming from the north. Moments later, he saw the accused Gerardo Latupan

walking in his direction with a thin bloodied knife. The latter entered the
Ceferino house and started chasing his wife and saying that he will them all.
Latupan tried to hit Ceferino but was able to parry it. Later on Gerardo told
Ceferino to bring him to the authorities but the latter refused to which the
former ran away. Another person, Emilio, whose house was near Ceferinos,
found his wife dead and the face of his one year old son Leo lacerated. He
saw his three year old son Jaime and asked where Jose was, his eldest son.
He asked Jose who was stabbed who attacked them and said that it was their
Uncle Jerry. They went to the hospital to treat Jose and Leos wounds. They
were able to treat Leos wounds but Joses was much more serious and he
died even before arriving to the next hospital. Jaime testified that it was
Latupan who killed his mother, threw his brother Leo and stabbed Jose. The
court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
offense of double murder.
ISSUE:
If the court erred in the decision stating that the accusedappelant pleads guilty to the singly offense of multiple murder with multiple
frustrated murder.
HELD:
The trial court erred in convicting Latupan of the complex
crime of double murder and separate offenses of serious physical injuries
based oon Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused-appellant is
liable for two separate counts of murder, and separate counts of physical
injuries.
People of the Philippines v. Bautista
FACTS:
At around 9:00 pm, a neighbour saw Alexander Bautista
running after the victim, Allan Joe Clemente. At around midnight, the
accused went to Hilarios house together with his brother and confessed that
he killed Clemente and requested if they can sleep in the house to which
Hilario permitted. The accused andhis brother left the house in the morning.
Hilario wrapped the bolo that was used to kill the victim and surrendered it to
the authorities. He then went to his friend Bugayan and confessed the
incident, this he was compelled to report the matter to the police. Bautista
interposed self-defense as his alibi. He narrated that during the drinking
spree, Clemente told about the hacking of his uncle by his cousin. He
defended himself and said he was not like his cousin. This only led further
confrontation and eventually a fight that killed Clemente. Bautista was found
guilty by the lower court for the crime of murder with treachery.
FACTS:

If there was treachery in the killing.

HELD:
The Court said that the allegation of treachery must be
proven together with the crime itself. It added that treachery is present if the
two elements are present namely: (1) the employment of means of execution

that gives the person who is being attacked no opportunity to defend or

retaliate; and (2) the deliberate adoption of the means of execution.
People of the Philippines v. Comadre
FACTS:
At around 7:00 pm, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree.
They noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed a grenade, exploded ripping
a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and
slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the San Jose
General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However,
Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital.
ISSUE:

If Comadre should be convicted of a complex crime.

HELD:
Under the Article 48 (complex crimes), when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case. Applying the
aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime
(murder) is death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death
penalty.
People of the Philippines v. Sanidad
FACTS:
On 16 January 1999 at around five oclock in the a group of
people were on board a passenger jeepney to attend a barangay fiesta in the
neighboring town of Langangilang, Abra. When they arrived they joined the
residents in a drinking spree that lasted up to the wee hours the following
morning. In the course of their conviviality, accused-appellants Jimmel
Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong and several other residents of
Lagangilang joined them in drinking.
On 17 January 1999 at about four oclock in the morning Jimmel
Sanidad and his companions finished drinking and left. Soon after, the others
left as well. With Delfin Tadeo on the wheels the jeepney left. As the jeepney
approached a plantation, its headlights beamed at accused-appellants
Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel and two (2) other unidentified companions
who were positioned next to a mango tree at the left side of the road
approximately fifteen (15) meters away. Accused-appellants were armed with
an armalite, a .45 caliber pistol and shotguns with buckshots.
As the jeepney moved closer, the accused suddenly and without
warning unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney. Miraculously, almost all

of its passengers, except for one, survived the ambush and suffered only
minor injuries. The accused caught up with the crippled jeepney. Moments
later, fire engulfed it.
An Information for murder with multiple attempted murder and
malicious mischief was filed against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel
alias Pambong, John Doe and Peter Doe.
ISSUE:
If the accused should be convicted of the complex crime of
murder and multiple attempted murder.
HELD:
The Revised Penal Code, speaking of complex crimes,
provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum
period. In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in
the conscience of the offender.
Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in
firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to
determine who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover,
there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire at each and
every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. The
decision of the court a quo finds accused-appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and
PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG guilty of the complex crime of murder and
multiple attempted murder.

People of the Philippines v. Garcia

FACTS:
Cortez, who was originally the person the accused intended to
lease a car from, got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio to lease his vehicle to
Cortez for two days. Bernabe and Garcia, the accused, rented the vehicle
from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00 drivers fee. They
agreed to pay the rental fee upon their return from Bicol.
In the early morning of December 18, 1996, Cortez and his driver,
Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacios Tamaraw FX at his residence in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at
8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.
Four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez
began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so
he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. On the
21st day of December, 1996, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Garcia and Bernabe, conspiring, with intent of gain, forcibly took
from the driver Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No.
UJL-761 owned by Fernando Ignacio. The said accused, armed with bladed

weapons, stabbed Wilfredo Elis in different parts of his body causing mortal
wounds which directly resulted in his death. Garcia and Bernabe were guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Carnapping with
Homicide.
Appellant Bernabe raised errors by the trial court.
ISSUE:
If appellant Bernabe should be convicted of the special
complex crime of carnapping with homicide as well.
HELD:
The court found no merit on any of the claims the appellant
has raised. The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on appellant Bernabe and his co-accused, Garcia. The appellant
Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe is guilty of Carnapping with Homicide.
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
On or about October 17, 1988, accused MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation, manifesting partiality in the exercise of her
official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of 32
aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of
Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization
of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified,
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.
ISSUE:
If there should be 32 separate information/cases filed
against Santiago.
HELD:
The court finds that, technically, there was only one crime
that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one
information to be file against her. The 32 Amended Informations charge what
is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred
to as "continuous crime." The resolution was affirmed yet modified in the
sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations into
one information charging only one offense.
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense and
Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) carried out an
extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and the alleged anomalies" in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems
(AFP-RSBS). In its Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined,
among others, the anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan, Batangas,

Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and described the modus
operandi of the perpetrators as follows:
The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the same
transactions with two deeds of sale. One deed of sale would be signed only
by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed). Another deed of sale would be
signed by the seller or sellers and the buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed).
These Unilateral Deeds of Sale recorded lower consideration paid by the
System to the buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
to "prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret),
past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale
covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land," Ombudsman
Investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint
Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, B/Gen. Jose
Ramiscal, Jr., among others, may be charged with falsification of public
documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019.
ISSUE:
If petitioner may be charged and prosecuted for all five (5)
counts of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
HELD:
The question of the number of criminal charges that must
be instituted against a criminal respondent (whether one count or multiple
counts of the same offense) is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
prosecution service. It is enough, as this Court has already ruled, that the
informations filed in these cases are based on facts establishing probable
cause for the offenses charged. This Court will not compel the Office of the
Ombudsman to file only one information for Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents when its preliminary investigation established the
commission of several counts thereof as such action on the part of this Court
would constitute undue interference with the Office of the Ombudsman's
control over the prosecution of these cases. In the second place, this Court is
not persuaded that what is involved in these cases is a continuous crime,
that is to say, a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a
single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division, with each act
in that series being merely the partial execution of a single delict. On the
contrary, the Court is of the view that what is involved herein are several
completed and distinct purported criminal acts which should be prosecuted
as multiple counts of the same type of offense. Thus, as correctly perceived
by the prosecution, there are as many alleged offenses as there are alleged
anomalous transactions involved in these cases.
People of the Philippines v. Espina
FACTS:
The appellant was charged in the lower court with the
crime of theft of articles valued at P585.15 and, having pleaded guilty, was
sentenced to six months and one day of prision correccional and, being a

habitual delinquent, to an additional penalty of two years, four months and

one day of prision correccional. Being a recidivist and having pleaded guilty,
both circumstances should compensate each other and the penalty should
he imposed in its medium period, that is, one year, eight months and twentyone days. As the appellant is a habitual delinquent, this being his third
conviction, the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional should also be imposed upon him.
ISSUE:
If the additional penalty on the appellant as habitual
delinquent, recidivism, as an aggravating circumstance inherent of habitual
delinquency, should still be taken into consideration in filing the principal
penalty.
HELD:
There is no doubt that the purpose of the law in imposing
additional penalty on a habitual delinquent is to punish him more severely.
However, the result would be otherwise if, for imposing the additional
penalty, recidivism could not be considered as aggravating circumstance in
fixing the principal penalty.
According to this, the imposition of the additional penalty would make the
penalty lighter, instead of more severe, contrary to the purpose of the law.
Therefore the appealed judgment is affirmed in all other respects, with other
costs.
People of the Philippines v. de Jesus
FACTS:
On April 28, 1936, Basilio de Jesus y Javier was convicted
by the Court of First Instance of Manila in criminal case No. 52270 of said
court, of the theft of an umbrella and a buri hat valued at P2.65. He was
therein sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor with the
accessory penalties, to indemnify Francisco Liwanag in the sum of P2.50
representing the value of the umbrella which was not recovered, and being a
habitual delinquent, the additional penalty of two years, four months and one
day of prision correccional with the corresponding accessory penalties. Not
agreeing with said penalties he appealed from the sentence undoubtedly for
the review of his case.
ISSUE:
If the penalty first imposed by the lower court was proper
given de Jesus habitual delinquency and confession.
HELD:
In view of the foregoing facts and considerations and
furthermore taking into account provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the
court deemed it clear that the appellant deserves the additional penalty
imposed by the lower court upon him. What was imposed upon the appellant
is the minimum of said penalty and he has absolutely no reason to complain
because after all he can not be exempt from the additional penalty by reason
of his admission at the trial that he is a habitual delinquent, having
committed the crime of theft for the third time before the expiration of ten

years from the commission of his former crime. The appealed sentence was
modified by the supreme court.
De Guzman v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
On or about the 8th day of February, 1995, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, the accused took, stole and carried away several pieces of
jewelry valued at P4,600,000.00 belonging to one Jasmine Gongora. After
due hearing, the trial court rendered its judgment rendering De Guzman
guilty for theft. She appealed and it was found that the decision of the trial
court was tried and decided by a biased judge; and that the judgment of
conviction was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner passed away on January 13, 2003, due to a vehicular
accident.
ISSUE:
If the criminal and civil liability is extinguished because of
the death of the petitioner.
HELD:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer
a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal.
The judgment of conviction was pending review until her untimely
demise. It has, therefore, not yet attained finality. Thus, pursuant to Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the Court to dismiss the
instant petition for review. The Court is dismissing the case because there is
no longer a need to continue with the review of the appeal. The lower
courts decision has thus become ineffectual.
People of the Philippines v. Pacana
FACTS:
At around 5:30 p.m. on January 28, 1979, Edwin Sormillon passed
by a store along V. Rama Avenue, Cebu City. Accused-appellant Vicente
Pacaa was at the store drinking with friends. He invited Edwin for a drink
but the latter begged off as he had to go home to take a bath. When he got
home, Edwin was told by his sister that Vicente maligned her and challenged
their father to a fight. Edwin immediately went out to talk to Vicente. Their
confrontation led to a fistfight.
Later, a friend of Edwin, Felizardo del Solo, accompanied by his cousin,
Raul Leyson, tried to talk to Vicente to settle his dispute with Edwin. Vicente
brought Felizardo and Raul upstairs to accused-appellant Victoriano Pacaas
house. At the balcony, Felizardo was met by Victoriano, Virgilio and Bernardo
Pacaa. Felizardo asked Vicente what was the cause of his quarrel with
Edwin. Vicente suddenly hit Felizardo in the face and they ended up fighting.
Raul tried to stop the fight and was struck at the back of the neck with a lead

pipe by Victoriano. This caused Raul to stagger forward. Bernardo, Vicente

and Virgilio ganged up on him and stabbed him. He then fell backwards, and
Victoriano also stabbed him at the back. Suddenly, the lights went off.
Felizardo slowly went downstairs and met Edwin Sormillon at the yard.
Together, they boarded a jeepney to the Cebu City Medical Center. He was
later transferred to another hospital where he was treated for several days
and later released. Raul was rushed to the hospital, where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
The Pacanas were all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt at the
lower court but the appealed. Three of them waived their appeal, but during
the pendeny to waive appeal, Bernardo Pacana died.
ISSUE:
civil liability.

If Bernardo Pacanas death extinguishes all criminal and

HELD:
The death of an accused extinguishes his criminal liability
even if his death should occur during the pendency of his appeal. Accusedappellant Bernardos death not only extinguished his criminal liability
concerning the personal penalties but also whatever pecuniary penalties
have been imposed on him, considering that he died before final
judgment. An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Hence, the death of one does
not mean the extinguishment of all co-accused.
People of the Philippines v. Abungan
FACTS:
Pedro Abungan filed an appeal assailing the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. V-0447, in which he was
convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay
P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased with the ff facts:
"That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan,
Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms,
with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on
the different parts of his body x x x injuries [which] directly caused his death,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached to the
letter was Abungan's Death Certificate.
ISSUE:
liabilities.

If appellant Abungan's death extinguishes all criminal and civil

HELD:
The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the
finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities (civil liability
ex delicto) arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the criminal case against
him, not the appeal, should be dismissed. However, it must be added that his
civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this
reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may
be warranted by law or procedural rules
Panaguiton v. DOJ
FACTS:
This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis
Panaguiton, Jr. petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration. In 1992,
Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment
both signed by Cawili and his business associate Tongson. But checks were
dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or closure of account. Panaguiton
then made a formal demands to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no avail. So
Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg.
22 before QC Prosecutor's Office.
During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent since petitioner had lent money to
Cawili in Cawili's personal capacity. He averred that he was not Cawili's
business associate and claimed that he himself has criminal cases against
Cawili. Tongson also denied that he had issued bounced checks and that his
signatures on the checks had been falsified.
As counter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's
signature which was the same as the signatures on the checks. Panaguiton
presented also an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.
December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Panaguiton filed a partial appeal
before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court.
Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign
the bounced checks and had altered his signature in pleadings submitte
during PI, Chief State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of QC to
conduct reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and refer the signatures
to NBI.
On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against
Tongson without referring to the NBI, holding that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the 4 year
period started on the date the checks were dishonored and that the filing of
complaint in QC prosecutor's office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial and not administrative
proceedings. Four years had elapsed and no information was filed against
Tongson. And the order to refer the matter to NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of rules of criminal procedure because
the initiative should come from the petitioner himself and not from the
investigating prosecutor.

Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary Teehankee but was

dismissed. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of DOJ and
through undersecretary Gutierrez ruled in his favor and declared that the
prescription period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint in the
Prosecutor's office.
However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration
filed by Tongson ruled the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered the withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
Tongson. DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts
that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the
august resolution of the DOJ, but was dismissed by CA in view of failure to
attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed
grave error on dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that
the petition before it was without merit and questions are too unsubstantial.
The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for noncompliance with the rules of court.
Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did
not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari, and they also claim that the
offense of violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the long delay,
attributable to petitioner and the State violated their constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases. The petition is meritorious.
ISSUE:

If the offense has already prescribed.

HELD:
Verification is merely formal requirement intended to
secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct-the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them
and waive strict compliance so that the ends of justice may be served. We
find that by attaching pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner has sufficiently complied with the verification requirement. We also
agree that CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to
attach a certified copy or duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ.
Brillante v. CA
FACTS:
Roberto Brillante, then a candidate for the position of
councilor in Makati City held a press conference where he accused Jejomar
Binay, a candidate for mayoralty in Makati, and Nemesio Prudente of plotting
an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco, another mayoral candidate in
Makati. Several journalists wrote articles regarding the same and an open
letter was published as well. Later, Binay and Prudente both filed libel
charges against Brillante. The trial court foundBrillante guilty of four counts
of libel, which decision the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
If the act of libel charged against petitioner has prescribed
when the Information was filed before the trial court.
HELD:
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
crime of libel shall prescribe within one year. In determining when the one
year prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made to
Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of
prescriptive periods of offenses which states that period of prescription shall
be interrupted bythe filing of the complaint or information. In the case, a
proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or
acquittal.
People v. Recebido
FACTS:
On September 9, 1990, private complainant Caridad Dorol went
to the house of her cousin, petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon,
Sorsogon to redeem her property, which Caridad Dorol mortgaged to
petitioner sometime in April of 1985. Petitioner and Caridad Dorol did not
execute a document on the mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead gave
petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 executed in her
favor by her father, Juan Dorol.
In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her
property on his claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Caridad
Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving
her property was a mortgage.
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that
there exists on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979, allegedly
executed by Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner and that the property was
registered in the latters name. After comparison of the specimen signatures
of Caridad Dorol in other documents with that of the signature of Caridad
Dorol on the questioned Deed of Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio
Magbojas, found that the latter signature was falsified.
ISSUE:
If the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the
information was filed.
HELD:
The crime charged has not prescribed. Under the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty is a correctional penalty in the same way that the
fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being
correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The petitioner is of the
impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the
time the crime was committed. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x
x x.
The prosecution has established that private complainant Dorol did not sell
the subject land to the petitioner-accused at anytime and that sometime in

1983 the private complainant mortgaged the agricultural land to petitioner

Recebido. It was only on September 9, 1990, when she went to petitioner to
redeem the land that she came to know of the falsification committed by the
petitioner. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the crime had not
prescribed at the time of the filing of the information.
Pangan v. Gatbatile
FACTS:
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction. During the trial
of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case
for decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant
absence at hearings. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted
of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months
and one day of arresto mayor.
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was
apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24,
2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds
that the penalty has prescribed.
ISSUE:
If the petitioner has satisfied the requisites for prescription
of penalties properly.
HELD:
The petitioner argues that evaded is not exactly the same
as escaped as what the court has been following in previous cases, and that
he has successfully evaded his sentence even without actually serving a part
of it. The court upheld ART. 157. The elements of evasion of service of
sentence being: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is
serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the
provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or
by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution,
. . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail
breaking." Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who
sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was thereafter never placed
in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.
Del Castillo v. Torrecampo
FACTS:
On May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in
Barangay Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, the
accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted himself in a disorderly
manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps

lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting
of the votes in said voting center plunging the room in complete darkness,
thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election
Tellers. On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the 1978 Election
Code. The execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which
prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the
confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He
remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a
motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of
prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
If the penalty have prescribed after 10 years that the
accused remained at large.
HELD:
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding
that
the
penalty
imposed
upon
petitioner
has
not
prescribed. Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The Court of
Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision, engaged in judicial
legislation when it added the phrase by escaping during the term of the
sentence thereto, so petitioner claims.
In this, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding.
Petitioners guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to
answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded
therefore.
People of the Philippines v. Patriarca
FACTS:
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed
against Jose Patriarca. On or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00
o'clock in the evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence
and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO
thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting

Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have
Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in
Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably
granted by the National Amnesty Board.
ISSUE:
Accused was found guilty of murdering a fellow member of
the NPA. Accused now appeals on the ground that the crime of murder is an
offense committed in pursuance or in furtherance of rebellion.
HELD:
The court acquitted the appellant. His application for
amnesty was approved and one of the acts listed in the resolution of the
Natl Amnesty Commission is the killing of the victim in this case. The
approval was pursuant to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty to all persons who
shall apply who have committed crimes on or before June 1 1995 in pursuit
of their political beliefs.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the
concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration of
the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence (Art 36).
Qunito v. Andres
FACTS:
An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that
the accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating,
and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where
the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The
respondents filed a demurer to evidence whichthe trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the
respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant
evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death. The petitioner appealed
the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of the case was
concerned. The CA ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merely based
on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did
not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule
and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper.
Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising there from where

the judgmentof acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal
acts imputed to them.
ISSUE:
If the extinction of respondents criminal liability carries
with it the extinction of their civil liability.
HELD:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. The prime purpose of the criminal action is
to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of
the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from where the
civil liability may arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner failed to
adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the
deceased and as held by the the trial court and the CA, the prosecution
failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil
liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages.
Phil Rabbit V. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the rules of court
assailing resolutions of CA. Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the RTC
of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed.
On July 1994 accused Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty. The court ruled that rabbit bus lines shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused in the event of the accused insolvency. Evidently,
the judgment against the accused had become final and executory. Then the
accused jumped bail, worth mentioning that rule 8, rule 124 of the rules of
court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. The
counsel for accused hired by rabbit bus lines filed a notice of appeal which
was denied by the trial court.
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the
institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Making the
subsidiary civil liability of the bus line becomes conclusive and enforceable.

ISSUE:
If an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of
its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently
of the accused?
HELD:
Petition has no merit. In the case before us, the accusedemployee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities;
thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.
Civil Actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. but rabbit bus
line is not a direct party to the criminal case. While they may assist their
employees, the employer cannot act independently on their own behalf, but
can only defend the accused.Petition denied.
Basilio v. CA
FACTS:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of Reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property with double homicide and double physical injuries.
Simplicio Pronebo was the driver of a dump truck with plate number NMW
609owned and registered under the name of Luisito Basilio. The said driver
operated the truck without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations
and without taking the necessary care and precaution to prevent damage to
property and avoid injuries to persons. As a result of which said dump truck
hit and sideswiped a motorized tricycle, Toyota Corona, motorized tricycle,
Mitsubishi Lancer and a Ford Econo Van.
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the
driver. The trial court also found out that Pronebo was an employee of Luisito
Basilio. Pronebo applied for probation so that the above judgement will
become final and executory. On March 27, 1991, Luisito Basilio filed with the
trial court a Special Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration to set aside
the judgment rendered last February 4,1991. He said that it affected him and
subjected him to subsidiary liability for thecivil aspect of the criminal case.
This motion was denied for lack of merit. On September 23, 1991, private
respondent filed a motion for execution of the subsidiary liability of petitioner
Basilio.
ISSUE:
If CA erred in holding that the petitioner is neither an
accused or a party in criminal case and he is not entitled to file a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment of Subsidiary Civil Liability against him.
HELD:
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is
found in Article 103 of the Revised penal Code. This liability is enforceable in
the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before
execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination ,in a
hearing set for the purpose of: 1) the existence of an employer-employee
relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3)
that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any

offense he commits while in the discharge of such duties); and 4) that said
employee is insolvent. There are two instances when the existence of an
employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle
owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the
other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both
instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is
the essence of due process. Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was
filed against the accused because it was his truck that was involved in the
incident. Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was
insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the
stipulations in their contract.
Francisco v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Jovita Rodriguez hired Pacita Linghon as a household
helper. Sometime in October Pacita contacted hisbrother, Macario, and asked
him to sell some jewelries, which the latter obliged and sold them toErnesto.
After sometime Jovita found out that her jewelries were gone and accused
Pacita for stealingthe same, which was then proved by the court. Later on
Jovita filed against Ernesto Francisco forviolation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing
Law.Accused contends that he did not know Pacita and he only saw her
during the preliminary investigation,and that he never had transactions with
Macario. RTC ruled against him which was affirmed by the CA.Accused then
petitioned that the court erred in proving him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and thatthere was no sufficient evidence to prove that he was liable
for PD 1612.
ISSUE:
If there is sufficient quantum of evidence for the accused
to be liable for PD 1612.If he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the
accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based
on the value of the property. The stolen property subject of the charge is not
indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies
and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of
fencing. We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution
mustered the requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of
Jovita, that Pacita stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the
main house of her then employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the
jewelry and the loss thereof, and narrated that Pacita had access to the
cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry. It bears stressing that, in the
absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry
was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances
from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the
property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic

purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and,(b) to
enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since
the penalty depends on the value of the property; otherwise, the court will fix
the value of the property at P5.00,conformably to our ruling in People v.
Dator. In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value,
this Court fixed the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on
the attendant circumstances of the case. The petition is granted.
Tan v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Complainant Rosita Lim is a proprietor engaged in the
business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. She had under
her employ petitioner-accused, Manuelito Mendez, but later on left and went
home to his province in Negros. After his employment however, Rosita
discovered that some of her inventories in her business, amounting to
P48,000, were missing. Suspecting that it was Manuelito who took them, she
informed Victor Sy, her nephew, who was in turn Manuelitos uncle.
Acting on the matter, Victor had Manuel arrested and brought to
Manila. However, when asked about the incident, Manuel, after admitting the
taking of the lost items asked for forgiveness from Rosita and as a result the
latter did not file a complaint against him. Instead, she filed a complaint for
violation of PD1612, against Ramon Tan, the petitioner, whom Manuel
identified as the person with whom he had sold the stolen items for P13,000.
Despite the filing of said complaint, Rosita, however, failed to report the
incident of theft with the police authorities. In the meantime, Rosita, together
with the confessed thief Manuelito, and the latters uncle, Victor Sy, all
testified for the prosecution. Manuelito testified that it was Mr. Tan who had
personally accepted the stolen items and paid himP13,000.For his part,
Ramon Tan, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied all the charges, alleging that
while he is engaged in the selling hardware (marine spare parts) he did not
buy the stolen spare parts and that he never talked nor met Manuelito. The
trial court found him guilty of violating PD 1612. When he appealed, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, hence the present
appeal.
Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt hence he should be acquitted.
ISSUE:
If the prosecution had sufficiently established the elements
of fencing as against the petitioner?
HELD:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act
of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and
sell, or inany manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated
in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the
commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. But, without petitioner knowing
that he acquired stolen articles, he cannot be guilty of fencing.
People of the Philippines v. Temporado
FACTS:
Beth Temporada is an accused for the crime of Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment in which the prosecution alleged that the accused recruited and
promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi,
Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio
and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. After collecting the
alleged placement fees amounting to P282,160, it was also noted thatsuch
placement fees are in excess of or greater than that specified in the
scheduled of allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and without reasons and
without fault of the said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and
failed to reimburse them the expenses they incurred in connection with the
documentation and processing of their papers for purposes of their
deployment. The accused-apellant now contends that the prosecution failed
to establish all the elements of the offense that were charged to them.
ISSUE:

What constitutes the crime of Illegal Recruitment?

HELD:
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and
placement thusly:ART. 13. Definitions. x x x(b) "Recruitment and
placement"
refers
to
any
act
of
canvassing,
enlisting,
contracting,transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contractservices, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profitor not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for afee, employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.It was
held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements
mustconcur: (a) the o ffender has no valid license or authority required by
law to enable him tolawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; (b) the offender undertakes anyof the activities within the meaning
of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any
of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of thesaid Code (now
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the sameagainst
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.In the case at bar, all
the elements were present thus the SC convicted the accused for thecrime of
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment.
Marcelo v. CA
FACTS:
On May 7, 1982, private complainant Clarita Mosquera was
at home when her cousin Milagros Gasmen arrived with Nemia Magalit

Diu. Nemia Magalit Diu presented herself as one authorized to recruit babysitters for the United States and convinced Clarita to apply. Clarita applied
because of the attractive salary of about $300.00 a month.
Clarita together with her aunt, Helen Paminsan, and joined by coaccused Nemia Magalit Diu and herein petitioner Emma Marcelo went to the
office of Angelica C.J. Offemaria, mother of petitioner, at 2170 Karapatan St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. Emma Marcelo introduced the two to Angelica Offemaria
who presented herself as the General Manager of the Office and allegedly
authorized to recruit baby-sitters for the United States and that they are in
need of two baby-sitters. In the process she required the applicants to
deposit P5,000.00 each.
Private complainant Clarita Mosquera and her aunt, Helen Paminsan,
gavewhat was asked of them and accused told them to wait for the good
news so they waited until June and July 1992. Angelica Offemarias nieces,
Flor Nocete and Leilla Briones, went to private complainants house and told
them to pay the balance of P18,000.00 to Angelica Offemaria so that the
latter could get their plane tickets for the United States. Complainants
complied and thereafter was told to wait for the good news.
After one week of waiting without receiving any news, private
complainant went see the accused, only to find out all of them are nowhere
to be found and that Angelica Offemaria was not at all authorized to recruit
workers, was issued to her.
On February 13, 1984, an information for the crime of Estafa was filed
against Angelica C.J. Offemaria, Emma Offemaria Marcelo, Nemia Magalit
Diu, Leila Briones and Flor Nocete. The lower court found petitioner Marcelo
and Diu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as charged.
From the judgment of conviction, only Marcelo appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the appellate courts affirmation of the trial courts
decision but the same was denied.
Petitioner contends that she should not be held guilty as principal for the
crime of estafa since the established facts fail to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the allegation of conspiracy between her and the other accused.
ISSUE:
If Marcelo should be held as principal of the crime of
estafa through falsification.
HELD:
Petitioners contention is devoid of merit.
The elements of the crime of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse
of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is thereby caused to the offended party or
third person. Both elements have been proven in this case. The evidence
for the prosecution shows that the accused were able to make private
complainant part with her money upon their fraudulent misrepresentation
that they can provide her and her aunt with work abroad.
Accused-petitioners protestation that her direct participation in the
crime has not been established is contradicted by the complainants

testimony that it was accused-petitioner who introduced the complainant to

her mother and co-accused, Angelica C.J. Offemaria.
People of the Philippines v. Angeles
FACTS:
Maria Tolosa Sardea was working in Saudi Arabia when
she received a call from her sister, Priscilla Agoncillo, who was in Paris,
France. Priscilla advised Maria to return to the Philippines and await the
arrival of her friend, accused-appellant Samina Angeles, who will assist in
processing her travel and employment documents to Paris, France. Heeding
her sisters advice, Maria immediately returned to the Philippines. Marceliano
Tolosa who at that time was in the Philippines likewise received instructions
from his sister Priscilla to meet accused-appellant who will also assist in the
processing of his documents for Paris, France. Maria and Marceliano
eventually met accused-appellant. During their meeting, accused-appellant
asked if they had the money required for the processing of their documents.
Maria gaveP107,000.00 to accused-appellant at Expert Travel Agency.
Subsequently, she gave another P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 as additional
payments to accused-appellant. Marceliano, on the other hand, initially gave
P100,000.00 to accused-appellant and he gave an additional P46,000.00 and
US$1,500.00 at the United Coconut Planters Bank in Makati. Analyn Olpindo
met accused-appellant in Belgium. At that time, Analyn was working in
Canada but she went to Belgium to visit her in-laws. After meeting accusedappellant, Analyn Olpindo called up her sister, Precila Olpindo, in the
Philippines and told her to meet accused-appellant upon the latters arrival in
the Philippines because accused-appellant can help process her documents
for employment in Canada. Precila
Olpindo eventually met accusedappellant at the Expert Travel Agency. Accused-appellant asked for the
amount of $4,500.00, but Precila was only able to give $2,500.00. No
evidence was adduced in relation to the complaint of Vilma Brina since she
did not testify in court. Accused-appellant told Precila Olpindo and Vilma
Brina that it was easier to complete the processing of their papers if they
startfrom Jakarta, Indonesia rather than from Manila. Precila Olpindo, Vilma
Brina and accused-appellant flew to Jakarta, Indonesia. However, accusedappellant returned to the Philippines after two days, leaving behind Precila
and Vilma. They waited for accused-appellant in Jakarta but the latter never
returned. Precila and Vilma eventually came home to the Philippines. They
started looking for her but they could not reach her.Elisa Campanianos of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency presented a certification to the
effect that accused-appellant was not duly licensed to recruit workers here
and abroad. In her defense, accused-appellant averred that she
never represented to the complainants that she can provide them with work
abroad. She insisted that she was a marketing consultant and an
international trade fair organizer. She met Priscilla Agoncillo in France and
they became friends. Priscilla asked her to assist her siblings, Maria and
Marceliano, particularly in the processing of their travel documents for
France. Accused-appellant told Priscilla that she can only help in the

processing of travel documents and nothing more. It was Priscilla who

promised employment to Maria and Marceliano. She received money from
complainants not in the form of placement fees but for the cost of tickets,
hotel accommodations and other travel requirements. She has the same
defense for Analyn Olpindo whom she met in Belgium. After trial on the
merits, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment
and four (4) counts of estafa. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant alleged that she never promised nor offered any job to the
complainants. She pointed out that not one of thec omplainants testified on
what kind of jobs were promised to them, how much they would receive as
salaries, the length of their employment and even the names of their
employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would first
determine.
ISSUE:
If is guilty with four (4) counts of estafa and one (1) count
of illegal recruitment
HELD:
Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements
occur: 1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law
to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
and 2) that the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34.
Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:(b) "Recruitment and
placement"
refers
to
any
act
of canvassing,
enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement. To prove illegal recruitment, it must
be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for
work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to
be employed.
To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain
that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the
person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad. Plainly, there is no
testimony that accused-appellant offered complainants jobs abroad. Hence,
accused-appellant Samina Angeles cannot be lawfully convicted of illegal
recruitment.2.) Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,t
he elements of estafa are: (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse
of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly,
these elements are present in thiscase.
Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that
she could find employment for them abroad, nonetheless, she made them
believe that she was processing their travel documents for France and

Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina Angeles would
use it to pay for their plane tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel
requirements. Upon receiving various amounts from complainants, Samina
Angeles used it for other purposes and then conveniently disappeared.
Complainants trusted Samina Angeles because she was referred to them by
their own relatives. She abused their confidence when she led them to
believe that she can process their travel documents abroad, thus inducing
them to part with their money. When they demanded from Samina their
travel documents,s he failed to produce them. Likewise, she failed to return
theamounts entrusted to her. Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded
complainants by falsely pretending to possess the power and capacity to
process their traveldocuments.
Colinares v. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Arnel Colinares was found guilty of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months
of prision correccional , as minimum, to six years and one day of prision
mayor , as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment
under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
ISSUE:
If he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower
offense and a reduced probationable penalty.
HELD:
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for
probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him
for frustrated homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser
crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty
imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor , as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional ,
as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the
right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. Some in the
Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by
the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law
(PD 968)provides: "That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he
should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying forprobation. But,
firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that
Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has
is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail
term should only be 2 years and 4months. If the Court allows him to apply for
probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to
decide If to grant him the privilege of probation, takinginto account the full
circumstances of his case. Secondly, it is true that under the probation law
the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified
from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two

judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. If the Court
chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court's annulled judgment against
him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that
such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court's judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend
over to the trial court's judgment--even if this has been found in error. And,
worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court's erroneous
judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be
given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter;
to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation
Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law
but to achieve its beneficent purpose. One of those who dissent from this
decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he
appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction would not be
consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be
interpreted to" provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting
him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
Moreno v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno
from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was
convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the
RTC. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of
action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the
case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as
well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued
that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probation shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order
of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his
probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
elections.
The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Samar recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for
reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First
Division was affirmed.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec.
40(a)1 of the Local Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who have
served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not

serve the adjudged sentence. He alleges that he applied for and was granted
probation within the period specified therefore. He never served a day of his
sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under the LGC does not
apply
to
him.
ISSUE:
sentence

If Moreno is qualified to run, which is dependent on If his

was
served.

HELD:
Morenos sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to
run for Punong Barangay. The resolution of the present controversy depends
on the application of the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence
found in Sec. 40(a) of the LGC.
We hold that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of
the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph
which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly
suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is
not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory
penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be
equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of
the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve
the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply
with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
Francisco v. CA
FACTS:
Feliciano Francisco (Feliciano) is the duly appointed
guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro (Estefania) in Special
Proceedings No. 532 of CFI Bulacan presided over by respondent Judge. On
August 30, 1974 Pelagio Francisco(Pelagio), claiming to be a first cousin of
Estefania, petitioned the court for the removal of Feliciano and for the
appointment in his stead. Among other grounds, the petition was based on
the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward
and to render an accounting. The respondent judge found theclaim to be
true, ordered the retirement on the ground of old age. Petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration, contending that he was still fit to continue with
the management of the estate of his ward but the court denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
If the trial court is correct in ordering the retirement of
petitioner on the ground of old age.
HELD:
In determining the selection of a guardian, the court may
consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment,
prudence and trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the
present and past history of a prospective appointee, as well as the
probability of his being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for
the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. A guardian, once
appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise
incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefore, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render
an account or make a return. There is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco
to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. As correctly pointed out by the appellate
court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory
made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be
detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a controlling criterion in
determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained
as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.