G.R. No.

190810
July 18, 2012
LORENZA C. ONGCO vs. VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY, RESPONDENT.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in
the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable
the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings. This remedy, however, is not a right. The rules on
intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not
the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.
It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is
left to the trial court's sound discretion. The trial court must not
only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also
take into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to
the original parties that the intervention will cause. Both
requirements must concur, as the first requirement on legal interest is not
more important than the second requirement that no delay and prejudice
should result. To help ensure that delay does not result from the granting of a
motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be
allowed only before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight, this Court explained intervention
in this wise:
Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the
court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the
statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a
person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court
has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate
character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual and
material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic
or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent,
indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral.
However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest,
permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the

court, the exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or

not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding."
Indeed, in Manalo v. CA, the Court said:
The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:
"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court x x x."
After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is
because, basically, intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary
and supplemental to an existing litigation.
There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court for the filing of a motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay
would result from many belated filings of motions for intervention after
judgment has already been rendered, because a reassessment of claims
would have to be done. Thus, those who slept on their lawfully granted
privilege to intervene will be rewarded, while the original parties will be
unduly prejudiced. This rule should apply more strictly to land registration
cases, in which there is a possibility that a great number of claimantoppositors may cause a delay in the proceedings by filing motions to
intervene after the trial court sitting as a land registration court has
rendered judgment.
Petitioner Ongco would now like the Court to exceptionally allow
intervention even after judgment has been rendered by the MTC in the
land registration case. She cites instances in which this Court allowed
intervention on appeal. However, the cases she cited are inapplicable to
the present case, because the movants therein who wanted to
intervene were found by the Court to be indispensable parties. Thus,
under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they had to be joined
because, without them, there could be no final determination of the
actions. Indeed, if indispensable parties are not impleaded, any
judgment would have no effect.
In Galicia v. Manliquez, the first case cited by petitioner, the Court found that
the defendant-intervenors were indispensable parties, being the indisputable
compulsory co-heirs of the original defendants in the case for recovery of
possession and ownership, and annulment of title. Thus, without them, there
could be no final determination of the action. Moreover, they certainly stood
to be affected by any judgment in the case, considering their "ostensible
ownership of the property."
In Mago v. CA, the intervenor was the rightful awardee of a piece of land that
was mistakenly awarded by the NHA to another awardee. Thus, the latter
was given title to land with an area that was more than that intended to be
awarded to him. The NHA then cancelled the title mistakenly awarded and
ordered the subdivision of the lot into two. The recipient of the mistakenly
awarded title filed a Petition for injunction to enjoin the NHA from cancelling
the title awarded. The Petition was granted and the judgment became final.
The other awardee filed a Motion to Intervene, as well as a Petition for Relief
from Judgment, which were both denied by the trial court. The CA affirmed

the Decision of the court a quo. This Court, however, found that the
intervention should have been granted, considering the indisputable
admission of the NHA, the grantor-agency itself, that the intervenor was the
rightful awardee of half of the lot mistakenly awarded. Thus, the intervenor
stood to be deprived of his rightful award when the trial court enjoined the
cancellation of the mistakenly awarded title and the subdivision of the lot
covered by the title. The intervenor's legal interest, in other words, was
directly affected.
G.R. Nos. 182136-37 August 29, 2008
BON-MAR REALTY AND SPORT CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES NICANOR
AND ESTHER DE GUZMAN, EVELYN UY AND THE ESTATE OF JAYME UY,
et al. (writ of execution was already issued)
To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur: (a) the movant
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention
must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the parties nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest,
which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, must involve the
matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.
On third party claims:
Sec. 17, Rule 39 bestows upon third parties claiming rights to property under
execution the right to protect their interests by interposing a third-party
claim in the same case, or by instituting a separate reivindicatory action
against the executing creditor. The third-party claim that is heard in the
same case may be tried at length or summarily. Proceedings to resolve the
possession of third-party claimants may proceed independently of the action
which said claimants may bring to enforce or protect their claim of ownership
over the property.
G.R. No. 155785 April 13, 2007
SIMPLICIO GALICIA, for himself, and as Attorney-in-Fact of ROSALIA
G. TORRE, PAQUITO GALICIA, NELLIE GALICIA, LETICIA G. MAESTRO
and CLARO GALICIA vs. LOURDES MANLIQUEZ vda. de MINDO and
LILIA RICO MINANO (writ of execution was already issued)
It is true that the allowance and disallowance of a motion to intervene
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the case.
However, jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein the Court
ruled that a motion to intervene may be entertained or allowed even
if filed after judgment was rendered by the trial court, especially in
cases where the intervenors are indispensable parties. In Pinlac v.
Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the

Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of

judgment by the trial court.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties
as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final
determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making
of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties where
possible and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all
conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that
the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present. The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding
the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be
affected by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be
rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.
G.R. No. L-45168
September 25, 1979
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents,
GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORP., intervenor, ALABANG
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAMON D. BAGATSING,
intervenors.
Rule 12, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
intervention. According to Section 2 thereof, which reads:
Sec. 2. Intervention. - A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by
the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof.
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the
movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial has already been
concluded, a judgment thereon had been promulgated in favor of private
respondent and on appeal by the losing party, the Director of Lands, the
same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for
certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the
Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under the aforecoded Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and
object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and
completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not
to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always

striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to

obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict
application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the
alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will lead the Court to
commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successors-ininterest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and
thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation
should intervenors' claims be proven to be true. For it cannot be
gainsaid that if the petition for reconstitution is finally granted, the
chaos and confusion arising from a situation where the certificates
of title of the movants covering large areas of land overlap or
encroach on properties the title to which is being sought to be
reconstituted by private respondent, who herself indicates in her
Opposition that, according to the Director of Lands, the overlapping
embraces some 87 hectares only, is certain and inevitable. The aggregate
area of the property claimed by respondent covering Lot 1 and Lot 2 is
1,435,062 sq. meters which is situated in a fast-growing, highly residential
sector of Metro Manila where growth and development are in rapid progress
to meet the demands of an urbanized, exploding population. Industries,
factories, warehouses, plants, and other commercial infrastructures are rising
and spreading with the area and the owners of these lands and the valuable
improvements thereon will not simply fold their hands but certainly will seek
judicial protection of their property rights or may even take the law into their
own hands, resulting to multiplicity of suits.
This Tribunal can take judicial notice of innumerable litigations and legal
controversies spawned by overlapping and encroaching boundaries, each
party relying on certificates of titles issued under the Torrens System or the
Spanish registration laws or other deeds and documents which prima facie
show their lawful interests or ownership therein. To the ordinary land
purchaser not fully acquainted with the intricacies of the law nor the validity
much less the authenticity of these instruments which in many instances are
found to be forged or simply reconstituted with areas that have increased in
"table surveys" with the cooperation of unscrupulous officials, the courts by
hastily stamping their approval on reconstituted titles have wittingly and
unwittinglly aided and abetted these fraudulent transactions resulting in the
wiping out of the lifesavings of many a poor, unlettered and inexperienced
lot buyer. The court must guard against such haste and carefully take due
precautions that the public interest be protected.
In the case at bar, the sprawling area of the property in question where
various subdivisions., residential houses and homes and infrastructures have
mushroomed and the great number of people living or having proprietary
rights and interests in such a vast property would certainly bring about the
swamping of the courts and the clogging of their dockets with cases
involving not only the original parties and the movants but also their
successors-in-interest. This litigation will have no end, which this Court will
not allow nor tolerate.
But over and above these considerations and circumstances which We have
pointed out, there is the basic and fundamental requirement under
the Rules of Court, Section 7, Rule 3, that "Parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants," The joinder of

indispensable parties is compulsory, under any and all conditions,

their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial
power.
The herein movants, Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang
Development Corporation, Ramon D. Bagatsing, and all buyers from them, at
least those with ostensible proprietary interests as the MERALCO, Alabang
Hills Subdivision, Cielito Homes Subdivision, Tahanan Village, the Ministry of
Highways insofar as the South Super Highway is affected, are
indispensable parties to these proceedings as it has been shown
affirmatively that they have such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in their
absence, without injuring or affecting such interest. The joinder must
be ordered in order to prevent multiplicity of suits, so that the whole matter
in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation. The evident
aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and
necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only
between the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who
may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot seven be
rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in view of the higher and greater
interest of the public and in order to administer justice consistent
with a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the respective
claims of the parties and their numerous successors-in-interest, the
motions for intervention are hereby granted.
G.R. No. 184589; June 13, 2013 DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be
filed, the Court allowed exceptions in several cases. This rule, however, is
not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the
period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher
interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be
heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,
when the petition for review of the judgment has already been
submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where
the assailed order has already become final and executory.
In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the
Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and
to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties. In fine,
the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on
the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the
appropriate circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court
fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the
rules of procedure on intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and
Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the CFI Decision dated

November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and
executory. PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI on November 13,
1973 and was issued TCT No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975; while
Rodriguez bought the subject property from Landicho on November 14,
1996. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez
trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the
original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Third, the latest proceedings in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion, filed
before the RTC on May 18, 2005, in which he prayed for the execution of the
November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the
case only to oppose Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground that the
subject property is already registered in its name under TCT No. 482970,
which originated from Landichos TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning
of Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the
November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was reasonably
expected to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and
expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguezs name. For this
reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
G.R. No. L-12826
September 10, 1959
LUCINA EVANGELISTA vs. PEDRO DEUDOR, ET AL.
Facts: Plaintiff Lucina Evangelista and Pedro Deudor entered into an
agreement to sell lot No. 126 situated in Quezon City, with an area of 750 sq.
meters for the sum of P2,250.00, payable in installments. Said lot is a portion
which forms part of a bigger parcel of land which Deudor possessed and over
which he claimed ownership and possessory rights. Evangelista made some
payments on account of the purchase price.
It would appear, however, that the large parcel of which Lot No. 126 forms a
part, was also claimed by Tuason & Co. under a Torrens Title. Deudor filed an
action against Tuason & Co. involving said large parcel. To protect her rights,
Evangelista filed a motion for leave to intervene in the case filed by Deudor
against Tuason & Co., but said motion was denied by the trial court on the
ground, among others, that "she can protect fully her rights claimed in her
motion to intervene, aforementioned, in a separate proceedings."
Thereafter, Deudor and his other vendees, and J. M. Tuason & Co. entered
into a Compromise Agreement, whereby in consideration of the sum of
P1,201,063.00 Deudor recognized the title in fee simple of Tuason & Co. and
Araneta & Co. over the big parcel aforementioned and he hereby renounce,
cede and quit claim unto and in favor of the owners, any right, title or title of
whatever nature they have had in the past, or may now have or any ever
have in and the said property, in the future. The Compromise Agreement
included a list of the vendees of Deudor and those who had already made
payments on account, this list including the name of Evangelista; Tuason &
Co. acknowledged said persons to be purchasers, and that they may
purchase from it the said lots which Deudor agreed to sell to them. It seems,
however, that Tuason & Co. contemplated new sales agreements between
itself and the said purchaser under its own conditions and under sales prices
different from the agreement entered into with Deudor.

On the basis of the compromise Agreement, the case filed by Deudor was
dismissed. Thus, Lucina Evangelista filed this present action against Deudor
and Tuason & Co. praying that she be allowed to pay the balance of the
purchase price to Lot No 126 to Tuason & Co. and Araneta & Co. and that the
latter companies be required to accept said payment and to execute in her
favor the corresponding deed of sale, and that should it be adjudged that her
agreement to sell with Deudor could not be enforced against Tuason & Co.
and Araneta & Co. and that she is forced to enter into a new contract with
them at a higher price per square meter than that agreed upon under the
first agreement, the difference should be deducted from the P1,201,063.00
which was to be paid by the two companies to Deudor.
The trial court dismissed the present case filed by Evangelista as against
Tuason & Co. on the ground that plaintiff had not shown her right which has
been violated by Tuason & Co. as would constitute a valid cause of action;
that in the agreement to sell between Deudor and Evangelista, Tuason & Co.
was not a party and so may not be held liable for any breach or nonfulfillment of the same; that in the Compromise Agreement, aforementioned,
Tuason & Co. has not assumed any obligation in favor of Evangelista which
could be a basis of an action.
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal, claiming that by virtue of the contract of sale
between her and Deudor, she acquired primary rights over the lot which
Deudor agreed to sell to her; that this right was valid when Deudor entered
into the Compromise Agreement and renounced his rights to the big parcel of
land, including the lot in question, in favor of Tuason & Co., for a money
consideration and that her right as a purchaser was recognized by Tuason &
Co., by including her name in the list of those who had purchased lots from
Deudor.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff Evangelista has a cause of action against
Tuason & Co. Tuason & Co.
Ruling: By the Compromise Agreement, it is clear that there exists a sort of
contractual relation between the plaintiff and Tuason & Co. as regards the
sale of Lot No. 126; and that as regards said lot plaintiff is the purchaser and
has made payments on account of the purchase price, and Tuason & Co.
acknowledges the partial payments already made, the same to be deducted
from the sum payable to Deudor. That Deudor has an obligation and
responsibility to the plaintiff there is no question; and the case is still
pending against him, thereby giving the trial court an opportunity to
determine the nature and extent of said obligation and responsibility.
Tuason & Co., by reason of the Compromise Agreement, also assumed
certain obligations with regards to plaintiff, recognizing her as a purchaser
who has made partial payments. Whether the plaintiff can enforce against
Tuason & Co. the terms of the sales contract between her and Deudor or
whether Tuason & Co. can compel her to enter into a new sales contract with
it under new conditions and terms, especially as to the purchase price, will
have to be determined by the court. This can be done only if Tuason & Co.
continues to be a party defendant in the present case. As a matter of fact,
the trial court would have done well had it allowed plaintiff to

intervene in the case filed by Deudor against Tuason & Co. so that
her rights with regards to Deudor and Tuason & Co. could have been
finally determined. But she was not allowed to intervene and was
told that she can enforce her rights in a separate action. That is the
reason why she has brought the present suit not only against
Deudor but also against Tuason & Co.