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Mind Association

Review
Author(s): Jordan Howard Sobel
Review by: Jordan Howard Sobel
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 112, No. 447 (Jul., 2003), pp. 521-525
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3489201
Accessed: 27-03-2015 02:16 UTC

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BookReviews 521

wouldwellserare
beginninggraduatestudentsadequately
versedin contemporaryepistemology
andshouldbe especiallywelcomeforthat.Atthesametime
importantinterpretative
issuesarethoroughlyexplored.Andallthisis donein
a friendlyand readablestyle.A considerableachievementis beforeus and
hopefullya furthersignificant
boostto thenumberof seriousstudentsof Reid.
Departmentof Philosophy
UniversityofAberdeen
Old Brewery
OldAberdeenAB243UB
Scotland

ROGER GALLIE

TheDesign Inference:EliminatingChanceThroughSmallProbabilities)by WilliamA. Dembski.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,


1998.Pp.xvii+ 243.Hlbt3s.oo,$54.95.
CLast
nightthe starsaboveshiftedinstantaneously
to spell('GoToronto!',and
aftera momentflashedbackto theiroriginalplaces.Don'ttell me it didn't
happen.Pleasehelpme to understand.'
WilliamDembskiwouldoblige:'Necessityby lawsof naturecanbe eliminatedin this case.Readmy book for the eliminationof Chance.Thatleaves
"Design",
whichis to say,"NeitherNecessitynor Chance".
As for yourquestion, yourguessmaybe as good as mine, evenif different."We[or anyway
you]mayhaveto livewithouta [believable]
causalexplanation"(p.227). One
canseethata moreinformative
titleforhisbook,thoughthiscouldhurtsales,
wouldbe Elimanating
ChanceThrough
SmallProbabilittes:
StepOneana PosstbleInference
toDesign.Having'sweptthe fieldclear'of everyrelevantnecessity
andchancehypothesisthatcouldbe responsiblefor an eventE (p. 50), there
maybe no tenableexplanationfor it of whichone canthink.In thatcasethe
conclusion,wellcommunicated,
is not that'Eis due to design'(pacepp. 49 and
222-3, emphasis
added),butthatE 'conformstoa pattern[blueprint
or design]'
(p. 227, emphasis
added),as it mustdo in orderthatchancehypothesesfor it
shouldbe eliminable.'Thenotion of designthat emergesfromthe design
inferencemustnot be confusedwith intelligentagency'(p. 227). (CDaWkill'S
titlealludesto WilliamPaley's(1802)' iS theonlymentionof Paley.Thereis not
evenanallusionto an allusionto Hume'sDialogues.)
Cha??ce
Elimination
Arguments
(pp.145-6,165,184-5and198).Herecome
illustrations
to exposesomeof theirtwistsandturns.Eachconcernsconsideringthe stringS:
1100001101011000110111111101000110001101100111011100011001000010111101110
10011111010010100101011110

LetE be the eventof my typingthatstringhereandnow(Toronto,March22,


1:58pm). PleasewonderwhetherE resultedfrom a chance-process,

2002,

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522 BookReviews

specifically
the processof hypothesisH thatsaysthatI generated
E by flipping
a faircoin1ootimes which,let us agree,wouldhavebeena 'randomchance
process' andrecordingin theorderof theirappearances
eachheadby '1'and
eachtailby 'o'.According
to the theoryof Dembski'sbook,you couldbe entitledto eliminatethishypothesisin oneof thefollowingways.Fromthewaysof
theseeliminationscanbe seen(i) somethingof the complexity
anddiffcultyof
chanceeliminationsconductedaccordingto thebook,and(ii) howeasyit can
be forsomeonewhohasgottenthehangof themto eliminatechancehypotheses.
Elimination
bya possibleprediction'Youbringto mindthe 'information'
I
thatthe stringS occursin a bookpublishedby Cambridge
UniversityPressin
1998.'Information'
forpurposesof a ChanceElimination
Argumentneednot
be true (p. 147),thoughas it happensthis informationis true.Settingaside
yourknowledgeof the orderof o'sand1'S in the stringof E (lookingawayand
pretendingto forgetit), you assume(p. 146),you pretend(p. 143),thatI containsinformationconcerningthis order,andcomeup withthe ideathatthe
publicationof S in 1998'predicted'the stringin E at leastin the Pickwickian
sensethat'[a] subject... exhibited'(p. 160)it in advancewithoutpredictive
intent.Holdingthatthought,you formulatea description
D that'delimits'the
stringin E (pp.136-7).Formulating
evena matchingdescriptionis in thiscase
easy,it is 'tractable'.
It canbe simplycopying(pp.159-60).
Summingup so far:DescriptionD 'specifies'
E, forD 'delimits'E, andD is
for you 'tractable'
givenI. Tothis canbe addedthatE is for H conditionally
independentof I (p. 145):Prob(E/H& I) = Prob(E/H).Random-chance
hypothesisH 'screensoff)thisI fromE. (It doesnot, DavidLewismightcaution,screenoff every'information'
thatmightcometo mind.Youcouldbring
to mindthe 'information'
thatthe stringS resultedfromthe random-chance
processof H.) Togeton withthe eliminationof H forE, to getinto a particularlydifficultstageof itsreasoning,let me tellyouthataccording
to yourneeds
andinterests,andespeciallyhowimportantit is to you to avoida 'falsenegative'here,you look into the conditionalprobability
not of a D on H to determinewhetherit is 'smallenough',butof Ds on Hs, certain'generalizations'
of
D and(I addwithoutprejudice)H. In Dembski's
termsyouidentify'probabilisticresources'
thatyourneedsandinterests(pp.175ff.,185and19l)make'relevant'in this case.These'relevant'resourcesaretermsof Ds andHs which
'factorthemin'.Thelessimportanta falsenegativein the caseis foryou, the
greaterrelevant'probabilistic
resources'
and'saturations'.
(Pp.183-4.)Letyour
needsandinterestsmakethe avoidanceof a falsenegativein thiscaseofalmost
no importance,you could careless, but not much less:let this stipulation
regardingyourneedsandinterestsmakeappropriate
forDs the presentation
of the stringin E anywhere
andanytimein space-time,andforHs the generation of length-loostringsbyprocessesthatagreein theirchanceswiththoseof
coinflips.Youfind,let us assume,thatthe probability
of a Ds conditionalon
Hs is still smallenoughby the standardof ChanceEliminationArguments,

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BookReviews 523

whichstandardis lessthan'themagicnumber1/2'(pp.1go-8).It followsbythe


Lawof SmallProbability,
theprinciple
of thesearguments,
thatE didnot occur
accordingto chancehypothesisH (pp.48-50),or better,that'[youare]warrantedinferringthatEdidnot occuraccording
to chancehypothesisH) (p.185,
cf. p. 222). '[S]uccessfulpredictionsarealwaysspecifications.
Tractability
is
immediate... Conditionalindependenceis immediateas well ...' (p. 160,
emphasisadded).Andthe relevantconditionalprobabilityis lessthan1/2.So
awaywithH forE.
Fromthisillustration
it canbe gatheredthatDembski's
theorywouldentitle
us to conclude,regarding
anyevente of describable
complexityatleastasgreat
as E's(whichis not verycomplexas eventsgo) withthe providenceof which
evente we arehardlyconcerned(asis the caseformostevents),thate didnot
takeplaceby a chance-process.
'Predictions'
of the complexityof E couldhave
beenwrittendownin advance,andsaturationsof the specifications
of these
predictionsshouldallbe lessprobablethannot on saturationsof all relevant
chancehypotheses.Similarly,
of course,forpredictionsof muchgreatercomplexitythanthat.I haveheardthatno two snowflakes
areexactlyalike.If that
is right,and a snowflakelandson my nose, since it does not matterto me
whetheror not it landedthereby chance,I thinkthataccordingto the bookI
amentitledto inferthatit didnot landthereby any'relevantchance[-process]
... thatcould[havebeen]responsible
for [thatevent]'(p.50).
Eliminationbypossiblydelimitingpatterns
thatincludeonethatis actually
delimiting.Youidentifythe 'information'
I thatfor any1oo-lengthstringof
o'sand1'S, if h is thenumberof 1'S in thisstringandt is thenumberof o's,then
the absolutedifferenceIh-tlis an evennumbern suchthato S n S 98. Pretendingthat1*'contains'informationaboutE 'it is a simplematter... to formulatevarious"[discrepancy]
patterns"'
(p. 164),to make'alistof patterns. . .
[t]hemorepatterns'in the list the better'foreliminatingchance'(pp.150-1).
Youproducethelistof discrepancy
patterns,
D:Ih-tl= o;D2:Ih-tl= 2;

...;

D98:Ih-tl= 98.

Includedis thepatternD8,gh-tl= 8, that'delimits'E:in thestringof E, h = 56,


andt = 44. D8specifies
E, forE is forH conditionally
independent
of the informationIs you usedeasily(whichtakescareof tractability)
to formulateD8:
sinceI is necessarily
true,Prob(E/H&I+)= Prob(E/H).Avoidinga falsenegativeis, we supposeforthisillustration,
ratherimportantto you.Fordefinitenesslet its importanceleadfromD8to the slight'saturation',
'a 56/44stringof
1'S ando's in a philosophic
textotherthanDembski'sandthis reviewduring
thelastdecade',
and,forH, thesaturation
Hs aboverestricted
to generations
of
stringsforphilosophictexts.YoufindthatProb(D8s/Hs)< 1/2. (Calculations
forthe reasonableness
of thisfindingarein a noteto theversionof thisreview
thatis linkedto my homepage,http://www.scar.utoronto.ca/
sobel/.) It followsby the Lawof SmallProbability
thatE didnot occuraccordingto chance
hypothesisH, or better,thatyou areentitledto concludethatit didnot.

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524 BookReviews

Fromthissecondillustrationit canbe gatheredthatDembski'stheoryenablesmoderately


imaginative
personseasilyto eliminaterelevantchancehypothesesfor an event,if avoiding'falsenegatives'forthesechancehypothesesis
somewhat(it neednot be very)importantforthem.Thetheoryallowsimaginativepersonsto worktheseeliminations
withlistsof possibledelimitations
of
the event,lightlysaturated.
Fromour illustrations,we maygatherthatby Dembski'slightsnot much
happensby chance.His theoryallowsmoderatelycleverpersons(almost?)
alwaysto eliminateall relevantchancehypotheses.Presumablythe theory
impliesthat(almost?)alwaysallrelevantchancehypothesesarefalse.
Youwouldbe rightif, by a ChanceEliminationArgument,you eliminated
H forE. I did notgenerateS by flippinga faircoin1ootimesandrecordingin
the orderof theirappearances
eachheadby '1'andeachtailby 'o'.I copiedit
frompage32of TheDesignInference.
Suppose,however,thatreadingthatbook
sometime ago,you wonderedas you consideredthe stringwhetherDembski
generatedit by flippinga fairpenny1ootimes,notingthe stringof headsand
tailsproduced,andletting'1'standforeachhead,'o' foreachtail.If it wasnot
veryimportantto youto avoida 'falsenegative'regarding
it, youwereentitled
to eliminatethatchancehypothesisin essentially
the firstway,usingthe'information'I (wereyou to bringit to mind)thatexactlyS wasgoingto be 'postdicted'(Pickwickian)in a reviewof the book, andyou remainedentitledto
eliminateit afterreadingdirectlyunderit, 'Thisis in facta sequenceI havejust
now obtainedby flippinga [fair]pennyloo times'(p. 32). Accordingto the
theoryof the bookyou wouldbe entitlednot to believethe book,andto concludethat Dembskiwas eitherlying or mistakenwhen he wrotethat!And
thereis worse.Dembskihimselfwas entitled,when readinghis published
book,to eliminatethatchancehypothesesconcerningthe stringon page32 in
lightof the 'information'
of the string's'prediction'(presumably
false'information'),unlessit wasthen muchmoreimportantfor him, in whichcasehe
couldbe entitledto eliminate'nullsaturations'of D andH identicalwithD
andH, or saturations
nearenoughto themfor'themagicnumber1/2'.
'Surely,however,his ChanceEliminationArgumentdoesnot entitleDembskito eliminatethatchancehypothesis,if he wasforimpeccable
reasonssure
thatit wastrue,as he wasbarringreasonsforhimto doubt,whenreadinghis
book,his short-termmemory,or his honesty,at the timesof its composition.'
Theproblemis thatthisargumentof his cando that,forthereis no placein it,
thereis no place in its principle,the Lawof SmallProbability,for 'prior'
unconditional
probabilities
of challenged
chancehypotheses.
Ofthethreetypesof probabilities
thatappearin Bayes'stheorem posteriorprobabilities,likelihoods,andpriorprobabilities onlyone is relevantto thedesigninference,namely,thelikelihoods.Theprobability
of an eventgivena chancehypothesis
is the only type of probabilitywe need to consider[wheneliminatingrelevant
chancehypotheses].
Posteriorprobabilities
andpriorprobabilities
playno role.This
I taketo be a hugeadvantage... priorprobabilities
areoftenimpossibleto justify.
(p. 68,emphasisadded)

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BookReviews 525

Omitting'priors'from considerationis, however,not an advantagewhen


'filtering'explanations(pp.36 ff.) foran event,if, as it surelydoes,this omissionseriouslycompromises
theexerciseno matterhowit is detailed.('Whyare
youlookingforyourkeyshere,underthislamp,whenyouknowyou dropped
themthereamongstthebushes?''Becausethereis morelighthere.'Not a good
reason.)
It is a fatalflawthat,in contrastwithBayesian
absolute,'less-than-one-half',
disconfirmation,
Dembskianchanceeliminationproceedswithoutregardto
'prior'probabilities
of the chancehypothesesthatit wouldeliminate.Another
seriousdeficiencyis that, againin contrastwith Bayesianabsolutedisconfirmation,thisformof argumentdoesnot takeintoaccountmeritsof hypotheses'againstwhich. .. chancehypotheses[would]compete'(p. 68):againthere
areno 'places'in the Lawof SmallProbability
for alternatives
to a challenged
hypothesis.Curiously,
thereis in thebookimplicittestimonyto the effectthat
disregardby its mainprincipleof hypotheseswithwhichchancehypotheses
'underelimination'
wouldcompeteis a deficiencyof thistheory:'it is onlyby
lacking/possessing
warrant['shades'of 'priors']forattributing
E to something
other than chancethat we can assertthat E did/didn'toccur by chance'
(p. 220).

Suppose,as couldhappen,thata personhas for good reasonseliminated


every'relevant'Necessityhypothesisof whichhe can think,andevery'relevant'IntelligentDesignhypothesisof whichhe canthink,for someevent(for
example,that stellarboost for Toronto).Suppose,as couldbe true,thatfor
good reasonshe despairsof findinga crediblehypothesisof this eventthat
involveseitherIntelligence
or Necessity.It couldbe reasonable
forthisperson
to puttheeventdownto Chance,purechance,or reasonable
forthispersonto
maintainat leastan open mindwith regardto thatpossibility.Eitherwayit
wouldbe unreasonableforhimto 'sweepthefieldclear'of Chance.
Thereis, I think,enoughgoingagainstthe formof the ChanceElimination
Argumentto licenseomittingnot only for lackof space,but also for whatI
considerlackof interest,discussionof, amongstotherthings,Dembski'sapplicationof it to an originof life debate,arcanedetailsand difficultiesof the
book'stheoryof 'specifications'
of eventsfor chanceeliminationarguments,
its theoryof 'probability
resources'and'saturations'
of specifications,
andthe
playin thesearguments
of 'themagicnumber1/2'.Forbalancelet me saythatit
is only for lackof space,and not lackof interest,that I omit discussionof
Dembski'streatmentof randomness(pp. 167-74),whichWilliamWimsatt
judges'themostsophisticated
to be foundin theliterature'
(on thedustjacket
of TheDesignInference).
Universityof Torontoat Scarborough
1265MilitaryTrail
Scarborough,Ontario
M1C 1A4 Canada
sobel@scar.
utoronto.ca

JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL

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