Office of the Court Administrator v.

Pascual
259 SCRA 604
Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a
letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and
corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and
corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered to
conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco
Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo,
HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They
proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the
letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character.
In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence
of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondents sala.
In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward
Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No.
2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent
judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case,
decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and
so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz
believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in
view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum
of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in
all probability, would need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused
respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was
thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta
and Olazo filed the following report:

On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ

met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the
Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the
graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL
that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is
asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money
because according to him there were plenty of people around. He
then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his
office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993),
CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him
four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and
after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and
signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already
received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered
the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject
denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a
thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the
pages of a blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he
was subjected to ultra violet light examination.
After finding
Subjects right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was
booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our
Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the
person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest
Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with

the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery

as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge
Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him.
Held:
We find that the evidence on record does not warrant
conviction. We note that the only bases for the Report and
Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon
consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the
respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing
of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The
respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial
wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and
present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an
administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no
less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only
after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence,
especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted
Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen
short of the requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI
Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who
must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who,
by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case,
did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter.
The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify

crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent

with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have
been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself
from such vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of
the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a
discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead
caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not
having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person
exists, they sought out an accused before respondents court who
could possibly be respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by
the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought
before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary
investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge
gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido
Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he
had original jurisdiction to try the case.
But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time
before Candido Cruz was persuaded to participate in what they (the
NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to
bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing
Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries.
No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask
for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable
verdict having been rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite
the fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in search of the
envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he
had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can
locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the
allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30
oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with

the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan.

Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges chambers,
located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope
containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was
placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido
Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room
adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the
money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent
judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the
desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor.
Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket
of Cruz polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents
Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judges
chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that
the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told
them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz.
After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless
proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every
nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the
pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers
of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing
marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.

Atty. Napoleon S. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000
Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the
constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of
her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his

clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his
position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client
Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present
Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although
she was willing to testify at that time.
Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the
assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and
sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With
regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the
accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V)
and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the
evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to
substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by
complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it
cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative
case. The complainants failure to present his principal witness, in
the absence of other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said
Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the
said affiant being placed on the witness stand.
The employment or profession of a person is a property right within
the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to
Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the
charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the
said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process
would be infringed.

LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA282 SCRA 125

In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite
not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time.
It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the
counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the
latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such

FACTS:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio,
the Regional Cashier, for dishonestydue to questionable gas expenses under his

office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts forreimbursements and

be bound by such proceedings. Theassistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not

that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00.Zamudio also

indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the dueprocess clause

complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she

such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed

filed the twocomplaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings

ignored or violated.The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot

on the complaints were conducted on July 3and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was

validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.In administrative

not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting

proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain

toJuly 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel.The committee

ones side.Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the

granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the

committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal andhis subsequent filing of

date he himself hadchosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for

motions for reconsideration.

resolution. The Investigating Committee recommendedthe dismissal of

Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued

Fabella v. Court of Appeals

AO 52 dismissingLumiqued.

G.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 256.

ISSUE:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry?

FACTS:

HELD:

On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-

The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived

outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to

unless the waiver is in writing and inthe presence of counsel, is a right afforded

October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment

a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not anabsolute

of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in

right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with

Congress. On

more reason, in anadministrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke

filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of

the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to havecompetent and

Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents

independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of

to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having

any crime in theproceedings below. The investigation conducted by the

taken

committee created by Department Order No. 145 was forthe purpose of

laws.Administrative hearings

determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the

Respondents,

complaints filedagainst him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to

the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they

due process unless required by the Constitution or thelaw.There is nothing in

were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for

the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled

the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the

to berepresented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not

investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove

work order to allpublic school teachers who had participated in walk-

part

October

in

the

1990,

mass

through

action

in violation of

started

counsel

Secretary

on

assailed

Carino

civil

service

December

1990.

the

legality

of

their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally

public schoolteachersadministrative cases should be composed of

constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the

the

Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing

representative of the local or any existing provincial or national

the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating

teachers organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present

committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and

case,

ordered their immediate dismissal.

the administrativecharges

school

the

superintendent

various

of

the

committees
against

division

as

chairman,

formed

by

private

respondents

DECS

to
did

hear
not

include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing

provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them

ISSUE:

were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the

Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a

representative of a teachers organization in these committees was
indispensable

to

ensure

an

impartial

tribunal.

It

was

this

requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the

right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of

HELD:

procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of

notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues:

YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized

Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because

to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice

the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation.

of the institution ofproceedings which may affect a respondents legal

We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective

rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the

teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized

assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones

representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of

favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent

RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses

jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged

the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the

administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as

DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot

impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by

be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public

substantial

during the

schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute

hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties

that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its

affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the

investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a

Magna

specifically

teachers organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9

schoolteachers.

of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent

evidence

submitted

Carta for Public

School

for

consideration

Teachers,

covers administrative proceedings involving

which

public

Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear

general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an

express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita

[GR 130442, 6 April 2000]
Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp.
Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife
with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up
owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with
four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita
Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pickup has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision
almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda
Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red
Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the
hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with
del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but
the same had no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men
around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at
this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the
back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt.
Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12
verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse
of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints
were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of
a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find
sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with
a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the
parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the

charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven.

Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of
his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly
committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in
the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was
suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of
time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board
of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the
appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita
filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
(Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense
for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law).
The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC
granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of
simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed
from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could
not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases
were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for
breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him
were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent
be informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of
specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty
is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut
to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious offense
is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged
and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary
requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases
filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or

made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the

performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all
in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being
charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking
alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission
is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the
offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the
cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed
breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual
findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was
prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been
found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of
duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of
liquor; he was on a privatetrip fetching his wife.

Justice Secretary v. Lantion

[GR 139465, 17 October 2000]
Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin
M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution
11,
expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the
documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification
by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state
resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department
of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note
Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the

Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.

District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United
States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense
or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt
to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire,
radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or
entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in
name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued
Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1
July 1999requested copies of the official extradition request from the
US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed
with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the
Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to
give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to
comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside the Justice Secretarys letter dated 13 July 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court;
and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The
trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote
of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the
Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request
and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3

February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of an extradition process.
Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition
in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the
summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision in the Treaty and in
PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the
Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon
while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the
DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and
PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an
international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of
the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the extradition process evaluation stage. Further, as an
extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the
evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do
not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process
required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not
all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind
of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of
notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide
to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial
of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan

G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
In the case of Government of the United States v. Hon. Purganan
the court had the occasion to resolve the issue as to whether or not
extraditees are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending. Private respondent
(extraditee) invoked the constitutional provision under the 1987
Constitution, that persons are entitled to bail except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when
evidence of guilt is strong. The court, in rejecting the claim of private
respondent held that said constitutional provision is applicable only
in criminal cases but not to extradition proceedings.Again, the court
reiterated its pronouncement in the Lantion case that the Ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether theextradition request complies with the Extradition treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.
Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof
the requested state has the discretion to grant or deny bail and that
as a rule bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the
court enunciated that thereare exceptions to this rule if only to serve
the ends of justice, (1) once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or danger to the community; (2) that thereexist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. Having no statutory
basis the applicant bears the burden of proving these exceptions
with clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court exercised its
discretion in denying bail to private respondent who considered him
as a flight risk when he fled the United Statesafter learning of the
criminal charges filed against him.

FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US
Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing
was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be
issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court
allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing
before issuance of warrant of arrest
2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition
proceedings
RULING:
Held:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1.

2.

Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of

Crime.First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose
of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer of a fugitive from one state to theother.With the advent
of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of
affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose
of committing crimeand evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods
of
dealing
with
criminals
and
crimes
that
transcendinternational boundaries.Today, a majority of nations
in the world community have come to look upon extradition as
the major effective instrument of international co-operation in
thesuppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has
been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
competent to try them in accordancewith municipal and
international law.xxxIndeed, in this era of globalization, easier
and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be
anisolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in
order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own
country.
The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the
Accused Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both

3.

parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust,
each others legal system and judicial process.More pointedly,
our duly authorized representatives signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
the willingness of the other stateto protect the basic rights of the
person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full
faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to
therequesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or wouldhave been directly
attacked for its unconstitutionality.
The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of theaccused are at fore; in extradition which is sui
generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.An extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged
in thecourt of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine
the guilt or innocence of an accused cannotbe invoked by an
extradite. There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding
is summary in nature while criminalproceedings involve a fullblown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of
evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while afugitive may
be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima
facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment
becomes executory uponbeing rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable
but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
TheUnited States adheres to a similar practice whereby the

4.

Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the

equities of the case and the demands of thenations foreign
relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.Given
the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called
upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person
sought to be extradited. Suchdetermination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication
and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international
judicial assistancethrough which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best
claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of
theassisting authorities to enter into questions that are the
prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determinewhether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and
whether the person sought is extraditable.
Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.Fourth, our executive
branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition
Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries thepresumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest.Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition
Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other
hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paintsa bad
image of our country before the world community. Such failure
would discourage other states from entering into treaties with
us, particularly an extraditiontreaty that hinges on
reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to
comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to therequesting
country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in
the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, the demanding
government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law
require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the
issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is
underobligation to make the surrender. Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.

5.

There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be

extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the
executive branch: nothingshort of confinement can ensure that
the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state
in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.The
present extradition case further validates the premise that
persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the
accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country.
Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state
right beforethe conclusion of his indictment proceedings there;
and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that
the requesting state is seeking his return and thatthe crimes he
is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion
to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at allcost. These circumstances
point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee.
Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

Due Process
Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of
a warrant of arrest?It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would berendered nugatory by
setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and
argumentsfrom them, and giving them time to prepare and present
such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered immediate. Thelaw could not have intended
the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if
it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out the true

and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition.

From the knowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding
-- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the
arrest anddetention of the accused.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of
a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons orthings to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or
affirmation -- of complainantsand the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the
present case, validating the actof respondent judge and instituting
the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early
stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If
the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present
evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to
negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedurecould convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case

superfluous. Thisscenario is also anathema to the summary nature

of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a
criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure
were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated
predisposition to flee.
Right to Bail
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only when
a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa
case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended does notdetract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
Hence, the secondsentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken tomean that the right is

available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in

nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in
the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminalcases
against him, not before the extradition court.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb
grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enoughto include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of
every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so
hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed
under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that,
once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger to
the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above twotiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.
The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct

foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of

police assistanceamongst states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of
this power should be characterized by caution, sothat the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is
ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes
the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19,
2007)

Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.

Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the
validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the
private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject
to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition

Ruling

that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear

for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this
Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the

Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to

government

bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest

office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets
be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by
the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to

bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of
United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same
being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took

Issue

cognizance of the following trends in international law:

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public

international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal

human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition,
on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where
emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of
human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and
held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
Guzman vs. National University,
G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142
SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow the petitioning
students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective
courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may
be conducted in connection with their participation in the protests
that led to the stoppage of classes.
Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and
Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have
come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their
school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In
their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984,
they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were
active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of
the University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the
petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year
1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged
exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to

Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in

leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman is facing criminal charges
for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
University. The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not
of good scholastic standing.
Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents'
comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not
petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities
within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from
school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or
perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander,
noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case
for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against
petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant
for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is
the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published
rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused reenrollment for poor scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE

DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on

certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the
refusal of PSBA to readmit them.

Alcuaz v. PSBA
[GR 76353, 2 May 1988]
Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna
Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona,
Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide
students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)
Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA,
Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their
activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the students
felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the
negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by
the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school
entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8
October 1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA
giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete
out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or
conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and
anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter
was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter.
During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly
blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY
1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student
Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring
the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders.
Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the
President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of
the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another
demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan
Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his
clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared

Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer
has any existing contract either with the students or with the
intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is
no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to
enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The
right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been
recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid
grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and crossexamination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the
minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied
with.
The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the
school authorities in the interest of
justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special
knowledge and expertise gained from the

handling of specific matters falling under their respective

jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to
factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual
findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave
abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the

Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of

the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were,
in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to
graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should
be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.