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IN RE: THE HON. RAFAEL C.

CLIMACO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH


I, SILAY CITY
FACTS: The , respondent is charged with gross malfeasance in office, gross ignorance of the law, and for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment. The aforecited charges stemmed from the order of respondent and his decision acquitting accused Carlos
Caramonte for Robbery in Band with Homicide.
Under the first indictment, complainants bewail as gross malfeasance in office and gross ignorance of the law, the following
behaviour of the respondent Judge in the case:
GROSS MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE and GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
About one and a half (1-) months thereafter, or at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, 11 August 1968, respondent judge
made a secret ocular inspection of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz. Without anybody to guide him, he visited the places which he
thought erroneously were the scene of the robbery where the Chief of Police was killed by the Montemayor gang at about 11:00
o'clock of the dark night of December 31, 1967. It should be noted that Cadiz City is 65 kms. away from Bacolod City, the capital of
the province. Because of that undeniably biased ocular inspection, the honorable trial judge, who is reputed to be brilliant, issued a
reckless, extremely senseless and stupid order dated 5 September 1968.
ISSUE: WON THE RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF CHARGED.
HELD: YES, The charges impute upon respondent (a) dereliction of duty or misconduct in office ( prevaricacion), which
contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment knowingly, and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the
judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. "Es tan preciso," commented Viada, "que la falta se cometa a sabiendas, esto es, con malicia,
con voluntad reflexiva, que en cada de uno de estos articulos vemos consignada dicha expresion para que por nadie y en ningun
caso se confunda la falta de justicia producida por ignorancia, la preocupacion o el error, con la que solo inspira la enemistad, el
odio o cualquiera otra pasion bastarda y corrompida. Esta es laprevaricacion verdadera." 1
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be
shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that
diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are
inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only
exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, in the contrary it results, logically and
reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
It is also well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally, for any error
he commits, provided he acts in good faith.
From a review of the record, We find that the decision respondent contains clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is
based. We cannot conclude on the basis thereof that respondent has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment, much less could it be
held that respondent in the performance of his duty has failed to observe the diligence, prudence and care required by law.
As noted in the aforecited report, the Acting City Fiscal of Cadiz had employed offensive and abusive language his complaint and
memorandum. It bears emphasis that the use in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or containing offensive
personalities serves no useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby exonerated of the aforestated charges. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. Zulueta, of Cadiz
City, is, nevertheless, censured for his use of offensive and abusive language in the complaint.
A.M. No. ELISEO M. TENZA, complainant,vs. RODOLFO M. ESPINELLI, respondent.
FACTS: Atty, Eliseo M. Tenza charged Rodolfo M. Espinelli a deputy sheriff of Quezon City, with grave misconduct in office in that
on or about December 18, 1978 at about 2:00 to 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon during office hours, while the complainant was walking
in the corridor of the sixth floor of the City Hall of Quezon City on his way to the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City, the
respondent, without any valid reason whatsoever, immediately accosted and boxed the complainant, after pretending to ask why

said complainant refused to give documents in his office in connection with a pending case in the Court of Appeals, thus catching
the complainant off-guard and by surprise; that the complainant was boxed on the left side of the head causing him to lose
consciousness and while dozed the respondent followed the attack with another blow on complainant's right jaw thus causing both
his upper and lower teeth to be thrown far away; and that it was only when the complainant was personally escorted and brought to
the room of Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan that the complainant was able to get away from the place of attack. 1
In his explanation, the respondent denied having physically assaulted the complainant and alleged that while the respondent was on
the sixth floor of the Quezon City Hall Building he met the complainant; that the respondent inquired from the complainant about
pertinent documents relating to Civil Case No. CA-50577 involving the respondent's parents; that the complainant who was the
counsel of record, took offense and answered bluntly that the respondent is not concerned with the case, at the same time pointing
his right index finger to the respondent's face in front of so many persons; that the respondent merely parried the complainant's
hand; that the complainant became violent and assaulted the respondent with fistic blows; that the respondent simply acted in selfdefense; that the respondent suffered physical injuries and he filed a criminal case against the complainant; and that after a
preliminary investigation, the case was filed in the City Court of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 192949 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Eliseo Tenza" and a warrant of arrest was issued.
ISSUE: WON the respondent was guilty of charge.
HELD: YES, Judge Aloysius C. Alday found as a fact that the respondent inflicted physical injuries on the complainant and
recommended that the respondent "be meted the penalty of forced resignation without prejudice to reinstatement .
It will be noted that the acts complained of are not in ally manner connected with the performance of the official duties of the
respondent as deputy sheriff of Quezon City. The respondent did not look for the complainant. Their meeting at the sixth floor of the
Quezon City Hall Building was accidental. Moreover, it does not appear that when the incident took place the courts were in session.
It is, therefore, clear that the respondent cannot be guilty of misconduct in office, because:
Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects
his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. (Mechem supra, section
457). 'It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Rodolfo M. Espinelli, deputy sheriff of Quezon City, is hereby found guilty of inflicting injuries on a
member of the Philippine Bar and is hereby suspended from office for four months effective from the finality of this decision, without
salary, and the period of suspension should not be charged to his accumulated leave.
FLAVIANO B. CORTES, Complainant, vs. JUDGE SEGUNDO B. CATRAL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Aparri, Cagayan,
respondent.
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross
Ignorance of the Law committed He granted bail in murder cases without hearing,
On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castanedas Criminal Case No. 11-6250 for Illegal Possession of Firearm was raffled
and assigned to his sala. The provincial prosecutor granted a bailbond of P180,000.00 but it was reduced by Judge Segundo Catral
for only P30,000.00. The worst part of it no hearing has been made from 1995 to the present because according to his clerks, he is
holding it in abeyance. This Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda is one of the goons of Julio Bong Decierto his nephew who has a
pending murder case;
Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo
Catral. The amount is too low. It is because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto;
Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in
MTC. Jimmy Siriban appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siribans house to get the
envelop.
However respondent with regard to the First charge clarified that for frustrated homicide pending in Branch 7 of the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri where the presiding judge is Hon. Virgilio Alameda. The court, mindful of the fact that the prosecution is banking on
weak circumstantial evidence and guided by the factors prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular 12-94 4 issued an order for
reduction of the bailbond fromP200,000.00 to P50,000.00. Second, the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with

no bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the provincial prosecutor,
the information made no mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge
acting on the said recommendation and again guided by the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with
the evidence extant on the record approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao. A duplicate copy of trial prosecutor
Apolinar Carraos letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to the provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented by the
respondent to disprove the accusation that he granted bail to the accused without conducting any hearing. Third, concerning the
illegal possession of firearm against Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda, the bailbond recommended by the prosecutor
was P180,000.00. Accused, through counsel Atty. Bulseco, filed a motion for reduction of the bailbond to P30,000.00. Counsel even
vouched and guaranteed the appearance of the accused in court, whenever required. The motion for reduction of bailbond was
submitted without serious opposition and the prosecutor mindful perhaps that there is nocorpus of the crime as no firearm was
caught or taken from the possession of the accused merely submitted the same to the discretion of the court. Finally, respondent
judge says the accusation regarding the acquittal of one Jimmy Siriban is simply the product of a dirty imagination and is a dirty trick
intended to defame the name of his family by rumor mongers who are unwilling to come out in the open to substantiate their
accusation.
ISSUE: WON the respondent charge was guilty of charge.
HELD: Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged with murder, without having conducted any hearing
as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. In the case of People v. Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, et al., accused
Ahmed Duerme together with four other persons were charged with the crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor recommended
the sum of P200,000.00 as bailbond for each accused. The records do not reveal whether a hearing was actually conducted on the
application for bail although respondent judge implies that there was one, stating that acting on this recommendation of the
provincial prosecutor and taking into account the guidelines prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative Circular 12-94, the court issued
a warrant of arrest and fixed the amount of P200,000.00 for the provisional liberty of each of the accused. The order granting the
reduced bailbond, however, did not contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.
In the recent case of Inocencio Basco v. Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, his court ruled that x x x the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion
of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and
fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.
Respondent judge justifies the grant of bail in the two cases by stating that the prosecutor recommended the grant of bail.
Respondent also added that in the case of People v. Ahmed Duerme, there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the offense
as borne out from the affidavits and sworn statements of the witnesses.
With respect to the last charge, we adopt the findings of the office of the Court Administrator that there is nothing in the record to
substantiate the allegation of the complainant that the acquittal of a certain Jimmy Siriban by respondent judge was tainted with
irregularity. Other than his bare allegation, complainant has yet to present evidence as to any irregularity committed by respondent
judge in acquitting Mr. Siriban.
In sum, we find respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused in
Criminal Cases No. 07-874 and 08-866 without having conducted the requisite hearing. It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming,
that the Court should be besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is
no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate
the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be
guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense
is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably
expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice
can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine P20,000.00 with
the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OSCAR R. VICTORIANO, CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, complainant, vs.ABRAHAM B. ALVIOR, CLERK
III, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,respondent.
FACTS: This is an administrative charge against Abraham B. Alvior, Clerk III, Administrative Staff, Office of the Clerk of Court, CFI
Negros Occidental for dishonesty, neglect of duty, and misconduct in office, which was initiated by Executive Judge Oscar R.
Victoriano, CFI Negros Occidental.
Atty. Aquiles G. Java, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, respondent
prepared and signed Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV) No. 443, requisitioning various office supplies for use of the administrative
staff of the Court of First Instance. Said voucher, which was presented to and approved by Atty. Aquiles G. Java, was thereafter filed
with the Office of the Provincial Canvass Committee. The latter body failed to act immediately on the matter due to the absence of a
complete description opposite the items. As per testimony of Nelson Villaroza, Rural Development Technician of the Provincial
Barangay Secretariat assigned to the Provincial Canvass Committee with specific duty to examine items or articles delivered as to
quantity, quality, specifications and prices thereof, when RIV 443 was delivered to his office in July, 1976, he could not take any
action thereon as there was no specification of the items in the voucher. Villaroza thereupon informed respondent through a certain
Mr. Caponpon of the omissions. Villaroza further declared that someone got back the voucher for respondent sometime in the
second week of October, and that subsequently, the said voucher was brought back to him (Villaroza) on October 19, 1976 by one
Genaro Garbanzos, duly accomplished, together with the different requests for quotations already fined up, namely: request for
quotation for Gella & Sons, for Lopue's Mercantile Company, for Ernado Commercial, and for Twin Supply.
After confirming the fact of delivery of the items covered by subject requisition voucher by Ernado Commerce and the signing of the
Abstract Quotation of Price, an inspection was made, and it was discovered that the 100 bundles of braided abaca twine (item No.
4) were overpriced at P12.00 per unit; and that as a result, Atty. Java was directed to inquire from the office of the Provincial
Governor how such overpricing could have been sanctioned by the Provincial Canvass Committee.
Accordingly, the civil security unit of the office of the pro. provincial Governor of Negros Occidental conducted an investigation and
submitted its written report dated November 22, 1976, finding that a possible substitution of inferior quality abaca twine may have
been effected by Genaro Garbanzos (a representative or middleman of Ernado Commercial, in whose favor the award was made),
and requesting appropriate action with respect to herein respondent, who connived with the former (Genaro Garbanzos) in the
commission of the fraud.
The charge against respondent Alvior for misconduct in office for having received money, in connection with the performance of his
official duty, from Garbanzos, as token of the latter's gratitude, is clearly meritorious. Respondent's acceptance of money under the
circumstances is a dishonest act
ISSUE: WON the respondent was guilty of dishonesty, neglect of duty, and misconduct in office.
HELD: YES, Being a public officer, and having accepted a gift in the form of money which was offered to him by reason of his office,
herein respondent Alvior is chargeable with indirect bribery punishable under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. The fact that
the evidence is wanting as to direct connivance between Alvior and Garbanzos is of no moment since in indirect bribery "it is not
necessary that the officer should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to
him by reason of his office
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT ABRAHAM B. ALVIOR IS HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF
ALL RETIREMENT PRIVILEGES AND WITH PREJUDICE TO RE- INSTATEMENT IN THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS IN ANY GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY OR AGENCY INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.

EUTIQUIO A. PELIGRINO petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent


FACTS: That on or about October 15, 1991 and/or for sometime prior thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EUTIQUIO PELIGRINO y ALAAN and BUENAVENTURA V. BUENAFE, both public
officers, being then Examiner II and Supervisor respectively both of Region IV-A of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Makati, Metro
Manila, and as such are tasked, among others, to examine or investigate the Books of Accounts for Income and Business Tax and
other accounting records of professionals (medical practitioners) and to determine their compliance and/or tax deficiencies
after assessment, and to collect payments thereof, taking advantage of their public positions,while in the performance of said official
duties as such public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutual helping each other, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
criminally demand directly from taxpayerAntonio N. Feliciano, a practicing [g]enetology [d]octor holding office at Pasong Tamo,
Makati, Metro Manila, found by both accused to have incurred an alleged deficiency income tax assessment of P500,000.00 for the
calendar years 1988 and 1989, the amount of P200,000.00 Philippine currency, for the purpose of applying a portion thereof in the
amount of P51,858.57 as full payment for deficiency income tax due from said taxpayer for fiscal years 1988 & 1989 and the
balance of P148,141.43 to be appropriated by both accused for themselves as gift or consideration for their promise to make as they
did lower assessment for said fiscal years 1988 & 1989 in the amount of P51,858.57, which request or demand for money was in
connection with a transaction between the government and Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano wherein both accused in their official capacities
had to intervene under the law, and thereafter, accused Eutiguio A. Peligrino wil[l]fully, unlawfully and criminally received the amount
of P200,000.00 in behalf of both accused,to the damage and prejudice of Dr. Antonio Feliciano in the amount of P148,141.43 and
the government in the amount equal to the deficiency income tax due it.
In his defense accused Buenaventura V. Buenafe said that he is 59 years old, married and a Revenue Officer IV with designation of
Supervisor in the Bureau of Internal Revenue; that he first came to know Dr. Feliciano when he served a letter of authority for the
examination of the 1988-89 books of account of the doctor to establish his tax liability; that said letter of authority was issued by the
[d]eputy [c]ommissioner of [i]nternal [r]evenue (Exhibit 9) which has a [life-time] of 30 days within which to be served and since
Examiner Eutiquio Peligrino was on leave he took it upon himself to serve the same personally on the doctor at the latter's office;
that since the letter of authority came about pursuant to a letter of denunciation of the doctor-complainant, he was checking on the
veracity of the said letter of denunciation and except for the item in the said letter of denunciation about his ownership of ten (10)
cars as the doctor said he ha[d] only three expensive cars [but] he was able to confirm that the subject [was] living in Forbes Park,
ha[d] been treating more than thirty (30) patients a day, ha[d] a share in Puerto Azul, ha[d] an island off Atimonan, and ha[d] many
househelps; that he charged P200.00 per consultation from low income patients but with respect to foreigners he asked for a
package-deal $1000 for consultation, laboratory examination, etc
THEREFORE In its well-written 40-page Decision, the Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the offense described in Section
3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),11 had been proven. Being a public officer, specifically
an examiner of the BIR, Peligrino had the right to intervene in the subject transaction. He was a member of the Special Project
Committee tasked to verify the tax liabilities of professionals, particularly physicians, within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4A, Manila.
Based on the testimony of private complainant, the NBI agents' entrapment scheme, and the positive results of the chemical
examination done on petitioner, the latter was found by the anti-graft court to have demanded and received money for his personal
benefit in connection with private complainant's tax liabilities. After noting that they had no improper motive to testify against
petitioner, the court a quo accorded full faith and credence to the testimonies of the NBI agents and the complaining witness.
As regards Buenafe, however, the Sandiganbayan held that there was no sufficient proof that he had conspired with petitioner: "[A]ll
told, as to this accused, there were whispers of doubt anent his culpability, which the prosecution despite its commendable efforts,
has failed to still. Such doubt must set him free."
ISSUES: In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"I. That the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that petitioner demanded and received the envelope with the boodle money;
"II. That the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioner on the basis of the lone testimony of Dr. Feliciano an
admittedly discredited witness;
"III. That petitioner was denied his right to equal protection of the law
HELD: First Issue:Demand and Receipt of"Boodle Money"
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) provides:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
"(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The elements of this offense were summed up in Mejia v. Pamaranand we restate them here: (1) the offender is a public officer (2)
who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person (4)
in connection with a contract or transaction with the government (5) in which the public officer, in .an official capacity under the law,
has the right to intervene.
Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked "x x x to undertake verification of tax liabilities of
various professionals particularly doctors within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila x x x." Since the subject
transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official
capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present.
However, petitioner disputes the prosecution evidence establishing that he demanded and received grease money in connection
with the transaction.
Specifically, he contends that the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that he demanded money from complainant was based merely on an
assumption that was not supported by any evidence. He avers that he merely informed complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that
it was the latter who requested the reduction of the amount claimed.
We are not convinced. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or requesting; (2) receiving; or (3)
demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official
capacity has to intervene under the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from each other. Proof of
the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction. The lack of demand is immaterial. After all, Section 3 (b) of RA 3019
uses the word orbetween requesting and receiving.
Averring that the incident in complainant's clinic was a frame-up, petitioner contends that there could not have been any payoff,
inasmuch as there was no demand.
Furthermore, the Court held in the said case that there must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider it as his or her own property from then on. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime has been committed. To hold
otherwise would encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some
gift, money or other property.
The duration of the possession is not the controlling element in determining receipt or acceptance. In the case at bar, petitioner
opened the envelope containing the boodle money, looked inside, closed it and placed the envelope beside him on the table. Such
reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery, especially considering that he was not supposed to accept any cash from the
taxpayer. The proximity of the envelope relative to petitioner, as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies petitioner's contention
that he refused the bribe.

A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent execution of a wrongful act is presumed to be both the taker and the
doer of the whole act.
Second Issue:Credibility of Complaining Witness
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan with inconsistency. Supposedly, while stating on the one hand that complainant was not a
credible witness on account of his character, on the other hand it accorded credibility to his testimony that petitioner had received
the boodle money. Likewise, petitioner adds, the same court found complainant's testimony insufficient to establish Buenafe's
complicity, yet deemed the same testimony sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt.
The Sandiganbayan findings adverted to are as follows:
"While the Court is reluctant to consider this declaration of the offended party as satisfactory proof that the accused
[therein petitioner] requested or demanded x x x the sum of P200,000 not only because it was vehemently denied by the
accused but likewise considering the nature and character x x x [or] person of the said offended party (Exhibit 14 to 18),
we are at a loss why in the ensuing event, particularly in the entrapment laid out by the complainant and the NBI agents,
this accused was present and x x x a brown envelop[e] containing the 'boodle money' was retrieved [from him]. x x x."
Obviously, the anti-graft court did not tag complainant as a discredited witness. It simply said that his testimony by itself was not
sufficient evidence of the commission of the offense. But, taken together with the other pieces of corroborating evidence, it
established a quantum of evidence strong enough to convict petitioner. While the case is weakened by the many suits filed for and
against complainant, the court a quo did not say that he was not at all worthy of belief.
We see no cause to fault the lower court. The assessment of the credibility of a witness is primarily the function of a trial court, which
had the benefit of observing firsthand the demeanor or deportment of the witness. It is well-settled that this Court will not reverse the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of arbitrariness, abuse of discretion or palpable error.
It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the evidence presented by the parties, as well as to accord full faith to those
it regards as credible and reject those it considers perjurious or fabricated
Petitioner further contends that he tested positive for fluorescent powder because the NBI agents had pressed the envelope to his
body.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner failed to ascribe to the NBI agents any ill motive to deliberately implicate him. No malice was
imputed, either, to the chemist who had examined and found him positive for the chemical; thus, we see no cogent reason to
disbelieve her testimony. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies of public officers are given full faith and
credence, as they are presumed to have acted in the regular performance of their official duties.
Third Issue:Right of the Accused to the Equal Protection of the Law
Petitioner asserts that he should be accorded the same treatment and, thus, acquitted because of his right to the equal protection of
the law.
After all, the Sandiganbayan believed the testimony of Buenafe that the latter had not asked for any payoff money; and he was,
thus, cleared of the charge against him.
We disagree. Petitioner alludes to the doctrine that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the same evidence used to convict
the co-accused, the acquittal of the former should benefit the latter. Such doctrine does not apply to this case. The strongest pieces
of evidence against petitioner were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in which Buenafe was not involved. Hence, the evidence
against petitioner and that against his co-accused were simply not at par with each other.
All in all, petitioner failed to show that Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error. Quite the contrary, it had acted judiciously
and correctly. Hence, this recourse must fail.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.

AURORA MEJIA, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL PAMARAN, HON. ROMEO ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO MOLINA, Presiding
Justice and Associate Justices of the First Division SANDIGANBAYAN, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents
FACTS: The findings of facts of the respondent court are as follows:
The instant prosecutions had their roots on six (6) ejectment cases filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against
Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All were decided
by the City Court of Manila against the defendants, all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance of Manila
On August 22, 1979, Meimban and Atty. Espano went to the City Hall and Atty. Espano filed his formal appearance as counsel for
Meimban in Civil Case No. L-22795, Branch XXVI. On that Atty. Mejia again mentioned to Meimban the gift she was asking from the
latter to be given to the Judge, and added that if Meimban wanted to win the case and she wanted her help, they have to give to the
Judge because she was the one making the decision. She was not able to give any reply. She went home without telling Atty.
Espano what Atty. Mejia had told her When she returned on August 30, 1979 to deposit her rental, Atty. Mejia asked her why her
companions were not yet moving when they had a chance of winning the case provided they returned the money they received from
the plaintiff under the compromise agreement. She replied she would tell them again. When she told Pilar Bautista and Gloria
Antonio about it, the two replied that if they could still win their cases by returning the money, she accompany them to Atty. Espano.
They saw Atty. Espano on October 26, 1979. After knowing the purpose of their visit, Atty. Espano agreed to help Bautista and
Antonio and prepared a MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE E AND TO FILE MEMORANDA (Exh."B") Bautista and
Antonio signed the motion for their fathers. The three women Meimban Bautista and Antonio and Atty. Espano proceeded to the City
Hall and filed the motion. From the court they went down to the canteen at the mezzanine floor of the City Hall where Atty. Espano
left them to have some documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia followed them to the canteen. This time Atty. Mejia told Bautista she could
help them provided they gave her P500 for expenses. Bautista and Antonio just kept silent. Atty. Espano returned to the canteen and
rejoined them. Atty. Mejia told Atty. Espano there was a chance of winning the Meimban case. Before leaving them, Atty. Mejia told
her Meimban to take care of her companions.
When she deposited her rentals on October 30, 1979, Atty. Mejia told her the Judge needed the money right away. She promised to
give Pl,000 on November 20, 1979. From there she went to Atty. Espano and told him about it. At Atty. Espano's suggestion they
agreed to meet in Branch XXVI at 10:00 a.m. on November 20 when the, would entrap Atty. Mejia in the delivery of the money with
the assistance of her policeman friend assigned in the office of the Mayor. She arrived in court with Sylvia Dizon from whom she
borrowed P500 to complete the Pl,000 at about 11:00 a.m. but did not meet Atty. Espano. At Atty. Mejia's instruction they waited for
about an hour Sylvia Dizon seated outside in the corridor fronting the door of Atty. Mejia office. Atty. Mejia asked her if she had
brought the money, she replied she had and gave the P1,000 to Atty. Mejia. She and Sylvia Dizon then left and looked for Atty.
Espano in the different sala.8 of the court. Not finding him, they went to his office. Atty. Espano got mad upon knowing that she had
given the money to Atty. Mejia and told her not to give anymore.
December 7, 1979 was the date set for the hearing of the MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE AND TO FILE
MEMORANDA (Motion in short) filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their father (Exh- "C"). Meimban and Pilar
Bautista went to Branch XXVI for that hearing. Atty. Mejia told them to wait and that if an oppositor to the Motion would appear, she
would accompany them to the sala of Judge Cui of Branch XXV (the pair branch of Branch XXVI 1), where the Motion would be
heard since Judge Alejandro of Branch XXVI was on leave. While they were waiting, Atty. Mejia approached her Meimban and said
no oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had brought one-half (1/2) of the P1,000.00. She asked Bautista and the latter
replied she did not have anything as she thought it was Meimban who had the money. In the meantime, Atty. Mejia left and told her
that if Bautista would have the money, just put it in an envelope. Bautista borrowed P500 from her, which was supposedly intended
for the branch Clerk of Court of Judge Cui. Bautista placed the money in an envelope and the two of them, Bautista and Meimban,
went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed the envelope containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it.
ISSUE: WON the according to petitioner that respondent court acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the guaranty of due
process of law.
HELD: Those who are involved in the administration of justice from the highest to the lowest level must live up to the strictest
standard of honesty and integrity in the public service. The general public should respect and support such imperative. No attempt
to influence them one way or the other much less to bribe them should be made. One cannot buy a bad case nor sell a good one.
No amount of money can make out a good case out of a bad one. And even if one succeeds in so doing it would certainly be
uncovered and reversed on appeal. Justice will prevail.
The elements of the offense are that
1. It must be committed by
1) a public officer;

2) who requested and who received a gift, present, etc.;


3) the gift, present, etc. was for the benefit of said public officer;
4) said public officer requested and/or received the gift, present, etc. in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government; and
5) said officer has the right to intervene in such contract or transaction in his/her official capacity under the law.
The finding of the respondent court is that the petitioner demanded and received money from the persons involved in certain cases
in Branch 26 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila where the petitioner was the branch clerk of court in consideration of a
promise that she will help in getting them a favorable judgment. In the case of the complainant Josefina Meimban although it is true
that she did not enter into an amicable agreement regarding her case as erroneously alleged in the information, nevertheless it has
been shown, and as it is also alleged in the information, that she yielded to the request of petitioner for some money in consideration
of a promise that petitioner wig get a favorable judgment. In a prosecution under the foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the
value of the gift, money or present, etc. is immaterial nor is it determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused or the penalty to
be imposed. What is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit by a public officer in connection with
a contract or transaction with the Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in his official capacity.
Under the fifth assigned error petitioner argues that there was an ulterior motive on the part of the complainants in testifying against
her and that the prosecution evidence is hearsay.
Petitioner therefore raises the question of credibility of the witnesses. The rule is that the findings of facts of the respondent court
are conclusive unless there are some facts or circumstances that may have been overlooked that may otherwise affect the result of
the case. Petitioner has not successfully demonstrated any cogent reason why this Court should depart from this rule.
Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting of the hearing of cases and she does not
formulate resolutions thereof. The branch clerk of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist
in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the
judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner with the judge who presumably has reposed confidence in her which appears to have
been taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give her money in consideration of a promise to get a
favorable resolution of their cases.
Under the seventh assigned error the recall of petitioner for further cross-examination on her attempt to bribe the Tanodbayan
prosecutor is a matter within the sound discretion of respondent court. Indeed the testimony of said prosecutor that petitioner tried to
persuade her not to prosecute petitioner by giving her a gold chain with pendant wrapped in tissue paper which said prosecutor
returned is material evidence to establish the guilt of petitioner.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds and so holds that the guilt of the petitioner of the offenses charged
against her has been established beyond reasonable doubt. She took advantage of her position as branch clerk of court by
persuading the offended parties Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista to deliver to her the sums of P 1,000.00 and P500.00,
respectively, in consideration of a promise that petitioner WW get a favorable resolution of their cases in court.
The evils of corruption are slowly corroding the pillars of our society. Our courts are not spared by this plague. More often than not
those in government who are persuaded or tempted if not actively involved in graft and corruption are the court personnel who lead
litigants to believe that they could get a favorable judgment or action in their favor or are otherwise approached or persuaded to so
help for a consideration. Worse still there are instances when the corruption reaches the level of the judge which spells the doom of
our quest for an honest and impartial administration of justice. Anyone involved in such corrupt exercise should be denounced. This
Court does not hesitate to apply the scalpel to cut off the roots of this cancer in the judicial system that can destroy the very purpose
of its existence.

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