Professional Documents
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122 SCRA 296
FACTS
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and
Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing fi
led a petition for judicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasings
application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff enforcing
the seizure order seized the machinery subject matter of the mortgage. In a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on the ground that the same
can-not be the subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to Article415 of the new Civil
Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from
Wearever textiles plant would be to drill out or destroy the concrete fl oor. When the motion for
reconsideration of Makati Leasing was denied by the Court of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the
matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties.
HELD
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out the present case from the application of the
pronouncement in Tumalad v Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143. If a house of strong materials, like what was
involved in the Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a
chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party
will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its
nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.
This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from the denying the existence of the
chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioners assertion on the applicability of the Tumalad doctrine, the CA lays stress on
the fact that the house involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner of such
house. But the law makes no distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on which the house
is built and We should not lay down distinctions not contemplated by law.
It must be pointed out that the characterization by the private respondent is indicative of the intention
and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated in Standard Oil
Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may, by
agreement, treat as personal property that which by nature would be a real property as long as no
interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
The status of the subject matter as movable or immovable property was not raised as an issue before
the lower court and the CA, except in a supplemental memorandum in support of the petition filed in
the appellate court. There is no record showing that the mortgage has been annulled, or that steps
were taken to nullify the same. On the other hand, respondent has benefited from the said contract.
Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another.As such, private respondent
could no longer be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited
therefrom.Therefore, the questioned machinery should be considered as personal property.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or
apparatus to PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route
international long distance calls using PLDTs facilities constitute Subtraction.
Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is capable of
appropriation, and not included in the enumeration of real properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal property
which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of
subtraction penalized under the said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be considered as
personal property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said
calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone
calls were taken without its consent.
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without PLDT's consent.
The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the theft were
services and business of the offended party.
This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Co.,
(119 Phil. 328) where Meralco's steel towers were exempted from taxation. The steel towers were
considered personalty because they were attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and
could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled.
Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as the tools and equipment in the
repair shop of a bus company which were held to be personal property not subject to realty tax
(Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501).
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the City Assessor's imposition of the realty tax on Caltex's gas station and equipment.