Siddharth Vashi

PH270

On Hume and Statistical Causal Correlation

The methodology of modern science is concerned with establishing

statistical causal correlation. However, the question remains as to what extent
this correlation proves a causal relationship between a given set of variables.
According to David Hume in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, true
causality can never be determined by empirical means. If this is the case, then it
would appear as though the empirical methodology science is insufficient to
establish causality. This paper will focus on the implications of Hume's argument
on scientific theory, while briefly considering the extent to which this argument is
substantive.
As previously noted, Humes argument involves the claim that causal
relationships can never be determined by empirical means. This claim is justified
by the apparent implications of the empiricist premise that knowledge can only be
gained a posteriori, or through experience. Taking this to be the case, Hume
categorizes all obtainable knowledge as either matters of fact or relations of
ideas.
A matter of fact is something that can be known only through experience.
For example, when we shoot a billiard ball in the direction of another ball, we

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know that it will cause the other ball to move because our past experience has
told us that it is highly probable. It may be the case that we have played billiards
before, or observed other round objects of equal mass colliding and displaying
similar behavior. It might even be the case that someone else who has observed
the motion of billiard balls conveys this information to you before you play the
game. Irrespective of the source, Hume argues that some kind of experience is
required in order to obtain matters of fact, which in this case involves the ability to
reasonably predict the movement of the ball.
The relation of ideas on the other hand, does not directly depend on
experience. The best example of this is in mathematics and geometry - consider
the fact that a triangle is a three-sided figure whose internal angles add up to 180
degrees. Unlike the movement of billiard balls, this property of triangles does not
depend on experience to be true but is rather a matter of logical necessity.
However, this does not mean that the relation of ideas always tells us something
necessarily true about reality. For example, we might say that all horses are
brown and all brown things are good, so all horses must be good. While this is
conclusion is logically sound based on the premise, it is not the case that all
horses are brown or that all brown things are necessarily good. Therefore the
validity of any knowledge gained through the relation of ideas ultimately depends

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on premises that are either incontrovertibly true (e.g. a triangle has three sides)
or empirically determined matters of fact.
This is where Hume's argument on causality comes into play. He claims
that since matters of fact can only be known through experience, they contain no
logical necessity. In fact, since the contrary of any matter of fact does not pose a
logical contradiction, it could be equally as true as the matter of fact itself. Given
that we obtain new information about the physical world empirically through
matters of fact, any 'causal' relationships we perceive are not logically
necessitated and therefore fail to establish true causality. According to Hume, any
observed notion of cause and effect that cannot be founded on rational certainty
is simply a belief that is propagated by habit or custom. He goes on to claim that
this habit comes about by consistently observing two effects in temporal or
spatial conjunction with one another. Though this constant conjunction might lead
us to believe that certain things do in fact have causal power, this is truly not the
case because it is still logically possible for the contrary of any effect to occur
instead of the one we are habituated towards.
The methodology of modern science is very much reflective of this view of
causality. When we conduct experiments, we seek to isolate and control a
number of variables in order to observe any potential relationship between them.

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If through controlled experimentation we are able to observe a change in one

variable that occurs in conjunction with a change in another, we might infer a
causal relationship between the two. However, since the perception of a change
in a variable is only available to us as a matter of fact, we cannot truly say that
one change is actually the cause of another. Instead we claim that a relationship
known as statistical causal correlation exists between the two variables, and use
evidence of this correlation as a means of developing further theories about the
nature of the physical world. In doing so, we make no actual claims about logical
necessity and instead rely on the use of functional but superficial causal
relationships to understand nature.
If this is the case, then we must consider the extent to which scientific
knowledge can be useful. The development of modern science and technology
has shown that causal relationships inferred through statistical correlation are
robust enough to develop theories about the natural world and apply them in
practical contexts, despite a lack of what Hume would consider 'true' causal
knowledge. For example, we are able to monitor changes in cellular composition
that correlate with the symptoms of a disease, in order to develop new and more
effective drug treatments. In this way, the empirical determination of functionally
causal relationships is in many ways sufficient for the Baconian aim of holding

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dominion over nature.

Although this methodology is practically useful, one cannot deny the
epistemological vulnerability that accompanies empirical science. Hume
illustrates this point when he claims: "That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no
less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the
affirmation, that it will rise" (Enquiry, IV:21) In other words, we have no reason to
believe the sun will rise tomorrow other than the fact that it has risen every day
before that. Even though we have theories of gravitational force and planetary
movement to explain why the sun rises and sets, all these theories can be
rendered false or incomplete if we were to observe the sun failing to rise one
morning. Likewise, any theory developed on the basis of statistical causal
correlation can be made questionable by only one instance of an empirically
determined correlation that runs contrary to it. Scientific theories are therefore
only as good as their ability to account for empirically determined statistical
relationships. As technology progresses and we are able to observe more and
more correlated variables in the natural world, it may very well be the case that
our most successful theories are proven false by new evidence. This is the
unsettling conclusion that arises from Hume's view of causality.
Although Hume's argument makes it clear that any knowledge concerning

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matters of fact does not imply logical necessity, we might have reason to doubt
this conclusion by questioning his empirical premise. While a full refutation of
Hume's theory would be beyond the scope of this paper, we can begin to show
doubt in his conclusion by assessing his theory of personal identity. According to
Hume, the concept of personal identity is a fiction because an individual cannot
identify any impression or gain any experience of the self from introspection. This
argument follows from his claim that all human beings are simply a "bundle of
perceptions," and that introspection can only lead us to recall these perceptions.
Since Hume believes all ideas must first come from experiences of impressions
and that it is not possible to form an impression of the self, he claims that any
idea of the self cannot logically exist and is therefore a fiction.
In this respect, I believe Hume's theory on personal identity is not
convincing because it fails to reconcile the empiricist premise with our intuitive
sense of personal identity. Human beings clearly have a sense of self, if by
nothing else than the virtue of being temporally and spatially distinct from one
another. It does not seem to be the case that we gain this sense of self by
experience (though this claim is often disputed and could very well be the basis
of a whole other argumentative paper). Regardless, it is clear that Hume skates
around the idea of personal identity because it is difficult for him to develop a

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stable formulation of the self that is not founded on a priori knowledge or innate
ideas. Since Hume himself states that he is not convinced he has really solved
the problem of personal identity, I believe this is where the empiricist argument
falls off and I remain unconvinced of the validity of the rest of Hume's claims.
As I have shown earlier, the validity of a theory entirely depends on its ability
to account for matters of fact. Since Humean empiricism cannot account for
personal identity, we have less reason to believe that what Hume says about
causality in science is true. Instead it may very well be the case that science is
bringing us closer to true causal knowledge, and that empirical methodology is
sufficient in proving the ontological reality of causal relationships in the physical
world.

Works Cited:

Hume, David, and Tom L. Beauchamp. An Enquiry concerning Human

Understanding. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.