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PEOPLE VS. SUCRO, 195 SCRA 388
FACTS:
Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP) to monitor the
activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling
marijuana.
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana
from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with
marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer
later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the
Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro. The police team was
able to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart
inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante
ISSUES: Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance
of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by
the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought
the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to
Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal
knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police officers have
personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance
activities of the accused.
People VS Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791
Facts:
This is an appeal on the decision of the RTC Branch 10 Legaspi finding on Rodrigueza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425, as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and costs.
A team was formed by Major Zeidem after receiving information that a that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay by a confidential informer. The team was given P200
tainted with ultraviolet in different denominations in order to buy the marijuana. Taduran was given the
treated money and was asked to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. He went to
Tagas alone and along the road met Segovia whom he asked where he could buy marijuana from and
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where he could find Don. Segovia left and was later on accompanied by Don, herein appellant. As soon as
the sale was negotiated (P200 for 100 grams of marijuana), Don alighted a tricycle driven by Lonceras and
when he came back, he gave Taduran the marijuana. Taduaran returned and made a report on his
purchase of illegal drugs. Based on the information, Major Zeidem assembled a team to arrest the
suspects, however they were not armed with a warrant of arrest when they arrested them. NARCOM then
conducted a raid in JOvencioRodriguezas house (father of the appellant) and seized dried marijuana
leaves and a syringe among others, but the raid was effected without a search warrant.
The next day, the appellants father was released but he remained detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken
from and executed by him, was sworn to by him before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no
counsel when his sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation. The arrestees were also
examined by personnel of the PCCL and were found positive for ultraviolet powder.
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) admitting in
evidence the sworn statement of appellant which was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (2)
convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves
allegedly bought from him were not properly identified; (3) convicting appellant of the crime charged
despite the fact that the evidence for the prosecution is weak and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling or at least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of
marijuana to CIC Taduran late in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in its judgment.
HELD:
The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the
suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a
buyer,since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused right
againstunreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search
may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by
invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their
intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search
warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against the
appellant.:
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced
therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against
the appellant were the following items: One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A" Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic
bag.
Exh."B" Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored
plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D" Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh."E"One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the
house of Rodriguezas father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana
leaves thatbecame the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to
rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of
the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do
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so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted.

People vs. Molina and Mula, GR No. 133917, February 19, 2001
FACTS:
SPO1 Paguidopon received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao
City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Mula, as the pusher. As to Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had
no occasion to see him before the arrest.
Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to theknowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon
only after they were arrested.
He called for assistance at the PNP where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by near the house
of SPO1 Paguidopon. A trisikad carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance,
SPO1Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police officers then ordered the
trisikad to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant
Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle this. SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed driedmarijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and
Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.
Accused-appellants contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible asevidence
for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searchesand
seizures.
ISSUE:
WON the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence for having been seized in violation of appellants
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizure?
RULING:
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may
be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3)search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accusedhimself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules
of Court,however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense(arrest in flagrante delicto ); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts orcircumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);and
(c) whenthe person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where heis servingfinal judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from oneconfinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
In the case at bar, accused-appellantsmanifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest.
In holding a bag on board a trisikad,accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committeda crime. The response of Molina that Boss, if possible we will settle this is an
equivocal statement whichstanding alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto
arrest. Note that were it notfor SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely
pointed accused-appellantsto the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable orotherwise. SPO1 Paguidopon only learned Mulas name and address after the
arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note
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that, before the arrest, he wasable to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while
they were on the side of theroad. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a
closer look at accused-appellantMula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpseof him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted
that he had never seen himbefore the arrest.
The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptionsallowed by the
rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, themarijuana seized
by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence.
WHEREFORE accused are ACQUITTED
People vs. Sy Chua, GR No. 136066-67, February 4, 2003
FACTS:
SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that
accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City.
On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief immediately formed a team of operatives.
The informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance
of the Thunder Inn Hotel. Accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2
Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accusedappellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from
his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which firearm bullets. When
SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance
(later confirmed to be shabu). SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the
Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accusedappellant.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of the
incident.
He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel on his way to Manila to buy cigarettes and
candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside of his car. When he called
the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car
with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the
policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car
keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the scene in
two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while
the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters,
Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being
taken.
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision wherein Sy Chua was charged with
for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of of shabu

ISSUE: Whether or not this was a valid warrantless search and seizure?
RULING:
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis
should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it
is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Accordingly,
for this exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
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overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that when
accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the McArthur
Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed
Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime.
The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant.
Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two
years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have
obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person. Whatever
information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before accused-appellants arrest was not a product
of an on-the-spot tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the
arresting teams contention that their arrest of accused-appellant was a product of an on-the-spot tip is
untenable.
In the same vein, there could be no valid stop-and-frisk in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the
act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) [25] or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. [26] It should be emphasized that a search and seizure should
precede the arrest for this principle to apply.[28]
There was no valid stop-and-frisk in the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was
first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in the
vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his
arrest, accused-appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to
dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore, no genuine
reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellants arrest.
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accusedappellants possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic bags
found in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not
inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-appellant and intentionally searched
his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and later on ascertain
that the crystalline substance was shabu. These prohibited substances were not in plain view of the
arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree.
The evidence is inadmissible since they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED.

People V. Del Rosario, GR No. 127755, April 14, 1999

FACTS:
Accused-Apellant Joselito del Rosario Y Pascual was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of
Roberry with Homicide of Virginia Bernas, and was sentenced to death. The conviction of the
accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that Del Rosario was the
one who drove the tricycle which was used as the get-away vehicle of the suspects. Only Del
Rosario was tried for one of the suspects was killed in a police encounter, and the other two
remained at large.
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Accused-Apelllant(also a tricycle driver) alleged that he was just hired by the suspects for the
amount of P120.00. He was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna
St. where one of the suspects alighted on the pretest of buying a cigarette. Then the robbery and
the killing happened. Del Rosario was ordered to drive the suspects towards Dicarma with a gun
pointed at him, and when the suspects alighted, he was warned not to inform the police
otherwise he and his family will be harmed.
Del Rosario contends that the court erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and
irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused; (2) Not considering his defense that he
was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide;
(3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not
considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.
HELD:
NO. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused

JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or
caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously
outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the
commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before
a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense
was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between
the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the
sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the
crime. Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier
explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was
arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not
actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the
getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
Rolito Go y Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138
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FACTS:
Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and
drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and
reported the same to the police.
An information for murder was filed against petitioner Rolito Go for the killing of Elton Maguan
before the Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself with his two lawyers to
the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately
detained and denied his right of preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver
of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon petitioners omnibus motion for
immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground
that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before
the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on
reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in
sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioners warrantless arrest was valid in
view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there
exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner.
ISSUE: WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful
HELD:
NO. Petitioner's arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within
the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."
"Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.

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ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of
the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, 219 SCRA 756
Facts:
Gerente together with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren was said to be using marijuana and drinking liquor, as
witnessed by Edna Reyes at around 7am of April 30, 1990. There and then, the witnessed also overheard
the plan of the 3-accused in killing Clarito Blace.
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a call with regards to the killing of Blace.
And with the testimony by Edna, Patrolman Urrutia frisked apof his and found a coin purse in his pocket
which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau
of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Gerente contends that there was a violation of his constitutional rights and that there was an illegal
search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless
arrest by the police officers.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure instituted, violates the rights of Gerente
Decision:
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession
were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;"
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. With regards to the testimony of Edna, the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death
of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would
have fled the law as his two companions did.
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
ROBIN CARIO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES, GR No. 121917, March 12, 1997
Facts:
This case involves a hit and run accident whereby accused was later on held liable for illegal possession of
fire arms. Manarang and Cruz saw a fast running car which they thought might get into an accident
considering the inclement weather.
True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a
screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast followed by a
sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something.
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle. "Manarang went to the
location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody. However the vehicle then, left.
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The car(Pajero) under plate number PMA 777 was reported by Manarang to the PNP. Later, the car was
sighted by the Police Patrol and arrested the driver, who happens to be Robin Padilla. Upon arrest the
following high powered firearms were found in his possession:
1.
.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2.
M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3.
.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4.
6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby
armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta
SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla.
Issue:
Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course
thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to
carry the subject firearms
PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Decision:
There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his
apprehension illegal.
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Under Par. (a), it was clear that Robin has committed a crime(hit and run) which was witnessed by
Maranang and the Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than
mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. With regards to the illegal possession of firearms, there was also a valid arrest since he was again
actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the
presence of a peace officer when he he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of
his waist was revealed.
It has been held that "(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense,
the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they
are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person
and the taking of the corpus delicti."
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure
even without a warrant."
B.
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the
subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly
proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are
inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the
records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and
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issued under suspicious circumstances. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not
in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would
justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher
than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
C.
Petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a nonsubversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on
illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He
stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is
cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to
apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as
it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated
the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a
penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to the court. The
courts role is to interpret and applythe law as it is. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower
court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as
maximum.
PEOPLE VS ABRIOL, GR No. 123137, October 17, 2001
FACTS:
PO2 Albert Abriol, Macario Astellero and Januario Dosdos are appealing for the reconsideration for their
criminal cases of the murder of Alex Flores and the illegal possession of firearms. Abriol was a policeman
who ended up being a detention prisoner for a murder.
Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC who ended up being the warden's personal driver. Dosdos is a
BBRC prisoner for highway robbery.
Backstory:
An eyewitness (Romeo Sta Cruz Jr) saw a man (Alex Flores) along the intersection of P. Del Rosario street
and Jones Avenue being chased by a 'jiffy' and shot to death, multiple times. Immediately, PO3 Alex
Rustela heard the gunshots and called for backup and to make chase to the 'jiffy'. They were able to corner
the 'jiffy' and fired a warning shot. The three men alighted and were inspected along with their vehicle.
Police seized a revolver from Abriol's waist and two (2) pistols inside the vehicle.
For their murder case, the three accused cited numerous reasons why they shouldn't be convicted, which
constitute: inconclusive paraffin tests, unreliable eyewitness testimony, ambiguous medical reports,
unplausible motives, among others.
For the case on illegal possession of firearms, the accused contend that the police had no warrant to effect
a search and seizure, and thus are inadmissible as evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the police erred in seizing the accused of their firearms without a warrant to do so.
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HELD:
Defendants are found GUILTY of murder with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms.
There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure is valid:
(1) Consented searches
(2) An incident to a lawful arrest
(3) Searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs and drug laws
(4) Searches of moving vehicles
(5) Searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders
(6) Where the prohibited articles are in "plain view"
(7) Searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary and building regulations
(8) "Stop and frisk" operations
In this case, the warrantless search and seizure is valid for two reasons. It was a (2) search incidental to a
lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting, and pursuit of a (4) fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude
pursuing police officers, and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing
suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take
immediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless
arrests under the Rules of Court.
Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto (caught in the act) with firearms and ammunition which they
were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually violating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid
arrest under the Rules.
Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule mandates that evidence obtained from an illegal arrest, unreasonable search, or
coercive interrogation must be excluded from trial.
A rule of evidence that excludes or suppresses evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights.
DEMAISIP VS COURT OF APPEALS, 193 SCRA 373
FACTS:
Surveillance was made by the agents of the 10th Narcotics Regional Unit at the residence of petitioner
Johnny Demaisip for the confidential information that he was in illegal possession of marijuana. Although
the search warrant was issued, it was never shown nor submitted as part of the evidence for the
prosecution. It was only mentioned in testimony of Sgt. Cario.
They proceeded to the Demaisip residence after a 'test-buy' was made to the petitioners brother, and
confessed that the leaves came from there. The search warrant was shown to the petitioners father Atty.
Peter Demaisip who was in the house. The search was then made and they were able to recover a small
plastic pocket containing ten (10) grams of marijuana leaves
Accused Johnny Demaisip who was present, was confronted and then confessed that it was his, and was
later sent to he Narcom office for further interrogation and stated that he didn't need counsel and that he
will tell the truth. Sgt. Cario accompanied Demaisip to get the latters sworn statement signed and
verified.
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in:
(1) Classifying the evidence as marijuana due to inconclusive examination
(2) Assuming it is, admitting it in evidence because of invalid search
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court erred in searching his residence despite no warrant produced.
HELD:
Decision of the Court to find Johnny Demaisip GUILTY of illegal possession of marijuana.
Firstly, under the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, "marijuana" or "Indian hemp"
"embraces every kind, class, genus or specie of the plant cannabis sativa L., including cannabis americana,
hashish, bhang, guaza, churrus and ganjab, and embraces every kind, class and character thereof,
whether dried or fresh and flowering or fruiting tops or any parts or portions of the plant, seeds thereof,
and all its geographic varieties, whether as a reefer, resin, extract, tincture or in any form whatsoever."
Secondly, it is a fact that no warrant was shown in court, although there were supposed testimonies of its
existence. The Court is of the opinion nonetheless that this is not necessarily fatal. As found by the Court
of Appeals:
"At any rate, objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained thereby were deemed waived when no objection to the legality of the search warrant was raised
during the trial of the case nor to the admissibility of the evidence obtained through said warrant."
People vs Diaz, April 18, 1997
FACTS:
This is an appeal from finding accused-respondents of the crime of robbery with homicide.
On October 30, 1992, the accused-respondents entered into the office of the victim and shot him and died.
There were 2 witnesses (the employees of the victim) who identified the accused respondents. They were
then apprehended and were convicted by the trial court of robbery with the crime of homicide.
They then filed an appeal contending that the court erred in accepting the testimonials of the unworthy
testimonies and that the search, seizure and arrest conduction was a violation of their constitutional rights.
They also assert that the trial court gravely erred when it admitted in evidence the gun, five bullets and
magazine taken from them by the police at the time of their arrest since they were obtained during a
warrantless arrest.
ISSUE:
W/N the objection was
HELD:
Supreme Court held that their objection is too late. The records show that they failed to object to the
admissibility of said evidence during their formal offer of evidences . Thus; they waived their right against
their admissibility. The trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.

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