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> The Moral Route and the Amoralist: An
Exegesis of Bernard Williams The Amoralist
The Moral Route and the Amoralist: An Exegesis of Bernard Williams The
Amoralist
March 22, 2012Joshua ParkerLeave a commentGo to comments
Williams constructs a picture of a person who poses, perhaps, the greatest
objection to the necessity of morality. The amoralist is a person who, despite
acquiescing to the publics claims of moral considerations, holds no such
considerations himself. In other words, the foundational principles of morality,
which guidefor the most partthe actions of others, do not have the same
sway on the amoralists decisions. For example, an amoralist may choose not
to lie, but he would not do so from a moral principle that defines lying as bad;
rather, the amoralist would choose not to lie from self-interest or any other
non-moral consideration. In short, Williams argues that an amoralist is one
who is not bound by any sort of morality.

Williams uses the example of a stereotypical gangster to illustrate his point.

This man one might picture as having some affections, occasionally caring
for what happens to somebody else. He is still recognizably amoral, in the
sense that no general considerations weigh with him, and he is extremely
short on fairness and similar considerations. Although he acts for other
people from time to time, it all depends on how he happens to feel (Williams
9). The gangsterthe amoralistis not convinced by the necessity of
morality for humanity. He will argue that all morality is simply social
conditioning and therefore invalid as sufficient for a general and obligating
consideration (Williams 6).

However, even if we were to grant that all morality is simply social

conditioning, Williams argues that this would not dismiss the relevance of
morality to everyday living within society. Extending the amoralists claim,
Williams claims that, if because of social conditioning he dismisses morality
from relevance, then he must necessarily dismiss his language, his methods
of thought, his tastes, and even his emotions (Williams 6, 7). He would be
forced to dismiss these things necessarily, because they too would be derived
from social conditioning. The amoralist must be consistent here if desires to
be rational.

But, the amoralist would counter that there are more foundational,
animalistic impulses that are self-interested contra other-centric values found
in morality. Williams, though, finds these claims to be insufficient. For he
questions why the Hobbesian State of Nature ought to be standard by which
we judge what men are really like, if men are rarely placed into that
position. Nevertheless, Williams finds that the amoralists impulses to be
Hobbesian in nature, in the sense that they are interested in self-preservation
and the preservation of others insofar as they suit his whims. (Williams 7)

Williams contrasts the amoralist, the one who is not bound by morality, with
the psychopath. He defines the psychopath as the one who is unaffected by
the sufferings or distresses of anybody other than himself. The fundamental
difference between the psychopath and the amoralist is the ability and desire
to care for somebody other than ones self. Even if such a care is wholly selfinterested and contingent on how one is feeling on a particular day, this
fleeting feeling distinguishes the amoralist from the psychopath (Williams 8).
And for this reason, Williams dismisses the psychopath as being a possible
alternative to living a moral life. The psychopath merely appalls us, and he
leads us to seek to understand why (Williams 9).

And so, having dismissed the psychopath from the conversation, Williams
claims that the amoralist remains a viable opponent to moral living.
Nonetheless, the amoralist is absolutely dependent on the moral systems
already in place. In Williams word, the amoralist is a parasite on the moral
framework (4). This parasite would be nonexistent and ineffective unless
others were bound by a specific framework, around which he could maneuver
and within which he could take refuge from being taken advantage of himself.
The gangster illustration is apt here as well: a gangster would find it much
harder to exist in a Hobbesian reality; the gangster has certain rights secured
to him, even if he were to be arrestedbecause he violated the laws, or the

moral rules, of the statebecause he lives within the social contract already
established; and the gangster can operate with greater impunity because he
knows that others do bind themselves to the moral considerations of society
as a whole. And so, as the parasite is dependent upon another, the amoralist
necessarily needs others to live morally so that he can live peacefully.
However, Williams does not consider these worries to be particularly troubling
for the amoralist, as society does not seem as if it will devolve into a State of
Nature.

However, and into the mind of the amoralist we go, he faces a number of
problems. First, according to Williams, what distinguishes the amoralist from
the psychopath is the potential to care for other people, especially in their
distress or their suffering (8). This potential is the springboard into moral
thinking (10, 11). Once the amoralist begins to grant in his mind that [t]hey
(the others) need help, then he may begin to think morally. As Williams
explains, This man is capable of thinking in terms of others interests, and
his failure to be a moral agent lies (partly) in the fact that he is only
intermittently and capriciously disposed to do so. But there is no bottomless
gulf between this state and the basic dispositions of morality (Williams 10).
It is a short step between acknowledging that others have needs, desiring to
help them, and morally considering their plight. Williams argues that, if we
push the amoralist to at least imagine someone elses plight, he may begin to
consider and acknowledge their situation as something that exists apart from
him and his interests. Upon this consideration and acknowledgment, we
extend his sympathies. And if we can get him to extend his sympathies to
less immediate persons who need help, we might be able to do it for less
immediate persons whose interests have been violated, and so get him to
have some primitive grasp on notions of fairness (Williams 10). Once this
occurs, our amoralist will no longer be an amoralist.

A second problem facing the amoralist is that of universalization. The

amoralist cannot, without forsaking his amoralism, think that it is okay,
permitted, right, or proper, in a moral sense, for others to behave as he does.
Once he approaches the arena of obligatory and permitted actions and
calculating those within his mind, the amoralist has entered the realm of
morality (Williams 3). And if he sees his amoralism as a courageous act and
worthy of consideration, then the amoralist has undoubtedly placed himself
firmly within the moral realm. As the amoralists reasons concerning the way
he lives begin to develop into universal ought and ought nots, the amoralist
has moved out of amoralism, for his particular considerations have evolved
into general considerations for the way others ought or ought not live.

In universalization, the amoralist faces particularly difficult problems. The

mental hoops through which the amoralist must jump, Williams suggests, are
impossible to count. By extension of Williams argument, the amoralist may
neither suggest nor accept that others ways of life are as good or acceptable
as his own, for then he would approach cultural relativism, a moral position.
Considering the mental tasks and fortitude required of an amoralist, it seems
that he is at least a theoretical implausibility.

Williams seems to suggest throughout this article that an amoralist is

theoretically possible but altogether practically impossible. He sets up a
trichotomy between the psychopath, the amoralist, and the moralist. He
points out that the difference between the psychopath and both the amoralist
and moralist is the fact that the psychopath is unable and unwilling to care
for another, even in periods of great suffering and distress. Nevertheless, the
difference between the amoralist and the moralist is not so great as it may
seem. Williams exaggerates the gap when he explains that it is not a
bottomless gulf; in fact, the difference is quite small. Once the thought in the
amoralists mind has shifted from I like this person and he is in trouble; so I
should help them to This person is in trouble; so I should help them, the
amoralist is on the slow, but steady, path to moralism. Williams claims that
the man with extended sympathies to those outside of his own immediate
involvement is clearly within the realm of morality (Williams 11). For
Williams, the amoralist merely has to begin to consider the needs of those
not immediately tied to him, whether societally, geophysically, or
economically, and, when he has begun to consider those people, he
approaches morality.

Source:

Williams, Bernard. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Harper and

Rowe, 1972. The Amoralist. 1-12. You may purchase the book cheaply here.

Note:

Do not attempt to copy this and use it as your own. It has been submitted

into the TurnItIn Database, and I need not explain to you how foolish it is to
steal a paper for an ethics course.

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Categories: Ethics, PhilosophyTags: Amoralism, Ethics, Morality, philosophy

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