Appeal; modes of appeal from decisions of regional trial court. In Murillo v.

Consul, we had
the opportunity to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) by petition for review under Rule
42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by
petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The first mode of appeal is
taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal
is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode
of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
XXX XXX XXX
Here, petitioners appeal does not only involve a question of law. Aside from the trial courts ruling
that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint, petitioner likewise questioned the other basis for the trial
courts ruling, which refers to previously decided cases allegedly upholding with finality the
ownership of the Malabanans over the disputed property. As correctly argued by petitioner, the
question of whether the ownership of the Malabanans has in fact been sustained with finality is
factual in nature as it requires the presentation of evidence. Since the appeal raised mixed
questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on petitioner for invoking the appellate jurisdiction
of the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelo B.
Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010

Petition for Certiorari; Rule 65 petition for certiorari no substitute for a Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari. It is at once evident that the instant certiorari action is merely being used by the petitioner
to make up for his failure to promptly interpose an appeal from the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision and
March 4, 2009 Resolution. However, a special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure petitioners
failure to timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is settled
that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal,
especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own neglect or error in the choice of
remedies. Raul Escalante v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013.

Alibi and Denial; alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. It is a time-honored
principle that the positive identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the defense of alibi and
denial. In this case, Romeo positively identified the appellants, whom he both knew since he was a
child, thereby rendering the defenses of alibi and denial weak. Certainly, it was not physically
impossible for appellant Abundio to be at the hilly portion of Sitio Liki where Pablo was attacked, the
same being only a kilometer away from his own house and two (2) kilometers away from the farm
where he and his father allegedly were on that fateful day. Appellant Benjamins bare denial, on the
other hand, is definitely self-serving. It cannot stand against the positive identification of an unbiased
and credible witness. People of the Philippines v. Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo, G.R.
No. 187048, January 23, 2013.
Evidence; credibility of witnesses best evaluated by the trial court. XYZ positively identified
the appellant as the person who embraced AAA and spread her legs; who held AAAs breast; and
who placed his hand inside the latters underwear sometime in 2002. XYZs testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of her daughter XXX who declared that the appellant would embrace
AAA and touch her vagina whenever the appellant came home from work. The lower courts found
XYZs and XXXs testimonies credible and convincing. In convicting the accused, the Supreme Court
emphasized the well-settled doctrine that the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses, as it was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior on
the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-examination. Its assessment is entitled to
respect unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case.People of the Philippines v. Patricio Rayon Sr., G.R. No. 194236,
January 30, 2013.
Evidence; denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses. In light of the straightforward and
credible testimony of the victim, AAA, her positive identification of appellant as her assailant and the
lack of ill-motive on her part to falsely testify against appellant, the latters defense of denial and alibi
must necessarily fail. Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with
disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles
in the light of positive identification of the accused, as in this case. Verily, mere denial,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on
affirmative matters. Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by the trial court. It also cannot
prevail over witnesses positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. In any

event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his presence at
another place at the time of its commission, it is likewise essential that he show physical impossibility
for him to be at the locus delicti, which the appellant in this case failed to do. Here, the houses of the
offended party and the appellant are only divided by a fence and the place of the incident is only at
the back of the house of the appellant. As such, despite the appellants allegation that he was having
a drinking spree and that he was dead drunk at around 6:00 p.m of that date, still, given its apparent
proximity, there is no impossibility for him to be physically present at the scene of the
incident. People of the Philippines v. Rey Monticalvo y Magno, G.R. No. 193507, January 30,
2013.
Evidence; dying declaration; requisites. The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is
admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made when death appears to be
imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would
have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a
case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants death. People of the Philippines v. Ramil
Rarugal Alias Amay Bisaya,G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013.
Evidence; dying declaration; requisites. Here, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals that the statement of the victim, Florendo, made to his brother, Renato, has complied with
the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by
appellant twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was
appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an expression of the cause and
the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death. There
being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been competent
to testify had he survived. It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness. Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.
The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an
impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein appellant. People of the
Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal Alias Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013.
Information; designation of the crime charged not controlling; language of the statute
need not be used. Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d), of the Revised Penal Code. It is undisputed that AAA was over 12
years old on July 10, 2000; thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory rape. Nonetheless, it
does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed under any of the other

circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as long as the
facts constituting the same are alleged in the Information and proved during trial. What is controlling
in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged
or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being by and large mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged. People of the Philippines v.
Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013.
Information; designation of the crime charged not controlling; language of the statute
need not be used. In this case, a perusal of the Information against Amistoso reveals that the
allegations therein actually constitute a criminal charge for qualified rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Section 266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force,
threat, or intimidation. But when the offender is the victims father, there need not be actual force,
threat, or intimidation. Then to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B,
paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must concur. The foregoing elements of qualified rape under Article 266A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B , paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, are
sufficiently alleged in the Information against Amistoso,viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12 years old on the day of
the alleged rape; and (3) Amistoso is AAAs father. Amistoso cannot claim that he had been deprived
of due process in any way. He adequately understood from the Information that he was being
charged with the rape of his own daughter AAA to which he proffered the defense of denial and alibi,
totally refuting the fact of AAAs rape regardless of how it was purportedly committed. People of the
Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013.
Petition for Certiorari; Rule 65 petition for certiorari distinguished from Rule 45 petition
for review on certiorari. The petitioner committed a serious procedural faux pas by filing before
the Supreme Court (SC) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have
been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for review under Rule 45, which

would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. The period to file a
petition for review oncertiorari is 15 days from notice of the decision appealed from or of the denial of
the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Here, the petitioner received a copy of the CAs May 5,
2010 Resolution, which denied his second motion for reconsideration, on May 20, 2010, thus, he
only had until June 4, 2010 to file a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. This he failed to do.
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory.
Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and,
hence, unappealable. Thus, the petitioners failure to file a petition for review under Rule 45 within
the reglementary period rendered the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision, as modified by its March 4, 2009
Resolution, final and executory. Raul Escalante v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No.
192727, January 9, 2013.
Petition for Certiorari; Rule 65 petition for certiorari no substitute for a Rule 45 petition
for review on certiorari. It is at once evident that the instant certiorari action is merely being used
by the petitioner to make up for his failure to promptly interpose an appeal from the CAs June 24,
2008 Decision and March 4, 2009 Resolution. However, a special civil action under Rule 65 cannot
cure petitioners failure to timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy
of appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own neglect or error in the choice
of remedies. Raul Escalante v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 192727, January 9,
2013.
Preliminary investigations; probable cause; courts may review probable-cause findings
of public prosecutors where grave abuse of discretion is shown. Petitioner contends that the
Court of Appeals (CA) should not have taken cognizance of the petitions for certiorari filed before it
because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has been determined and
the corresponding information has been filed in courts. The Supreme Court, invoking its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, held that, settled is the rule that courts
retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in a mere
few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion. Although policy considerations call for the
widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their
power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether prosecutors findings are supported
by the facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary
that are exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to
settle cases and controversies. Antonio L Tan, Jr. v. Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Carolina
Tanjutco/Antonio L. Tan Jr. v. Julie O Cua, G.R. Nos. 179003 & 195816. January 9, 2013.

Preliminary investigations; probable cause; courts may review probable-cause findings

of public prosecutors where grave abuse of discretion is shown. While the findings of
prosecutors are reviewable by the Department of Justice (DOJ), this does not preclude courts from
intervening and exercising their powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings. In the
exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals (CA)
may take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Based on the
grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the appellate courts exercise of its
power to review was also the proper and most prudent course to take after the Secretary had
successively issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
existence of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the Office of the City Prosecutor
that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such circumstance was not indicative
of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear issue on the Secretary of Justices appreciation of
facts, which commanded a review by the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended the
discharge of his functions. Antonio L Tan, Jr. v. Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Carolina Tanjutco/Antonio
L. Tan Jr. v. Julie O Cua, G.R. Nos. 179003 & 195816. January 9, 2013.
Preliminary investigations; probable cause defined; determination of probable cause is
an essentially executive function. Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information,
pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere
probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that
would justify a conviction. The strict validity and merits of a partys accusation or defense, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and pieces of evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper of the
case. The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first
place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation on the offended partys
complaint. The prosecutors ruling is reviewable by the Secretary of Justice (Secretary) who, as the
final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutors
determination. As a rule, the Secretarys findings are not subject to interference by the courts, save
only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; or when
he grossly misapprehends facts; or acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the
contemplation of law. Baron A. Villanueva, et al v. Edna R. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969, January
30, 2013.

Preliminary investigations; probable cause defined; determination of probable cause is

an essentially executive function. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Justice
(Secretary) acted with grave abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding
probable cause to charge Villanueva with homicide. The Secretary, in this case, calibrated the
evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion vis--vis the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaintaffidavit vis--vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already went into the strict merits of
Villanuevas defenses. Whether the alternative scenario on the cause of Renatos injuries and death
(as supported by Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and which Villanueva proposed by way of
defense) is more credible and more likely than the narrations of Edna in her complaint-affidavit, in the
affidavit of her witness, and the NBI autopsy report should best be left for the trial court to determine
after a full-blown trial on the merits. When the Secretary made a determination based on his own
appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against Villanueva, he effectively assumed the
function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his
jurisdiction. Baron A. Villanueva, et al v. Edna R. Caparas, G.R. No. 190969, January 30, 2013.
Searches and Seizures; conduct of house searches; presence of owner of house during
search not indispensable where witnesses present. The Supreme Court held that there was
nothing irregular in the conduct of search of petitioners house. There were variations in the
witnesses testimonies as to whether petitioner was inside the house during the search. One witness
testified that petitioner was coming in and out of the house during the search while the other
witnesses claimed that petitioner was waiting just outside the house. Assuming that petitioner was
indeed outside the house, it does not taint the regularity of the search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court allows the absence of the lawful occupant provided that two witnesses are
present. The presence of the two barangay officials was not disputed by petitioner. As found by the
trial court, accused-appellant and his wife were not prevented from entering their house to observe
the search conducted therein. This is bolstered by the testimonies of police officers. Thus, PO3
Villano testified on cross-examination that the wife of the accused was inside, watching. Likewise.
P/C Insp. Perfecto de Lima Jr. testified that the accused-appellant and his wife went in and out of
their house while the team was conducting a search inside said house; that Valleno and his wife
stood outside and sometimes, came in while the search was being conducted; and that before the
search the Valleno spouses were requested not to go inside the house, but during the search they
kept going in and out of said house. In addition, the search was conducted in the presence of two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, in the persons of Brgy. Kgd.
Reynaldo Brito and Chief Tanod Wilfredo Brito. Resultantly, the seized items cannot therefore, be
considered as fruits of the poisonous tree. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 192050, January 9, 2013.

Testimony of Police Officers; presumption of regularity in the performance of functions;

minor inconsistencies in testimonies not fatal. The Supreme Court (SC) noted the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, particularly that of barangay
tanod Reynaldo Brito and PO3 Molina, relating to the place where one of the plastic sachets was
found and to the person who brought the illegal drugs to the crime laboratory, respectively. The SC
however brushed aside these inconsistencies as inconsequential. Indeed, one can hardly expect
their testimonies to be in perfect agreement. As held in the past, it is perhaps too much to hope that
different eyewitnesses shall give, at all times, testimonies that are in all fours with the realities on the
ground. Minor discrepancies in their testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the
essential integrity of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility of
witnesses. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192050, January 9,
2013.
Testimony of Police Officers; presumption of regularity in the performance of functions;
minor inconsistencies in testimonies not fatal. For a successful appeal, the inconsistencies
brought up should pertain to that crucial moment when the accused was caught selling shabu, not to
peripheral matters. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and
relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. The inconsistent testimony of Reynaldo Brito
deserves little weight in light of the consonant testimonies of all the police officers who testified in
court. It is well-settled that the testimonies of the police officers in dangerous drugs cases carry with
it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Absent any clear showing that
the arresting officers had ill-motive to falsely testify against the petitioner, their testimonies must be
respected and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties must be upheld.
Petitioner himself testified that he never had any personal encounter with the police prior to his
arrest, thus negating any ill-motive on the part of the police officers. Nelson Valleno y Lucito v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192050, January 9, 2013.
(Lindy thanks Izabel Seria, Elaine de los Santos, and Vince Juan for their assistance in
the preparation of this post.)

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Appellate review; the trial courts factual findings are accorded great respect and even
conclusive effect; these factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they

are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide, after accosting sisters AA and BB along a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the
bag of AA which contained money and fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused attacked the
credibility of AA as a witness by citing the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. In finding against
the accused, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that findings of the trial court on such
matters involving the credibility of witnesses cannot be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to
materially affect the disposition of the case. AA is more than just an eyewitness, she is a surviving
victim of the crime. Her testimony, as described by the RTC, was categorical and straightforward.
AA had positively identified all the accused. There is therefore no reason to disturb the factual
findings of the trial court. People of the Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al., G.R. No.
201449, April 3, 2013.
Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. In this case,
accused was convicted by the trial court for carnapping with homicide, aggravated by the
circumstance that the offense was committed by a member of an organized or syndicated crime
group under Article 62 of the Revised Peanal Code, as amended by RA 7659, although the said
aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the information. As a result, on appeal, the Supreme
Court held that since there is no allegation in the information that accused was a member of a
syndicate or that he and his companions had formed part of a group organized for the general
purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime
group, the same cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against him. The Supreme
Court thus modified the judgment by not considering the said aggravating circumstance. People of
the Philippines v. Arnel Nocum, et al, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013.
Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. Under Rule 110,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending
cases since it is favorable to the appellant. People of the Philippines v. Arnel Nocum, et al, G.R. No.
179041, April 1, 2013.
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act; requirements under R.A. No. 6981. A certain
Kenny Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) under R.A. 6981, otherwise known as The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, in
connection with the prosecution of the crime of murder filed against 196 accused in what became
aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre. Petitioner, one of the accused, wrote to respondent

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request
the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already
confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. After the DOJ
denied his request, petitioner filed a case for mandamus seeking to compel respondents to include
Dalandag in the informations. The RTC denied the petition. In affirming the decision of the RTC, the
Supreme Court held that there is no requirement under R.A. 6981 for the prosecution to first charge
a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness
Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under R.A. 6981 also operates as an
acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when
he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial
court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor,
upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall
petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and
exclusion of said accused from the information.Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. v. Sec. Leila De Lima, as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013.

Alibi. To counter the clear and categorical declarations of AAA that accused-appellant raped her,
accused-appellant proffered the defense of denial and alibi, totally denying that he was at their house
in when the rape happened. The Supreme Court had consistently held that for alibi to prosper, it is
not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he
must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time. This, accused-appellant failed to do. Although defense witness Guinonoy testified
that he was with accused-appellant in Chapeh on March 10, 2001, he also acknowledged that the
travel time of one to two hours from Chapeh to does not pose an insurmountable barrier for accusedappellant to actually take the trip from Chapeh to and back after committing the crime. Clearly, it was
not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission.People of the Philippines v. Lino Paldo, G.R. No. 200515, December 11,
2013.
Certiorari; reglementary period to file certiorari; recognized exceptions. Section 4, Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a
period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. While there
are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules. In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the

petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the
petition was filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on
July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it
will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it
to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve
leniency. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioners failure to monitor incoming
court processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of
inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb smuggling activities
which rob the government of millions of revenue every year. The display of patent violations of even
the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect that the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was
doomed by design from the start. The failure to present the certified true copies of documentary
evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to
identify the accused in court; and, worse, the failure to file this petition on time challenging a
judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the case.
This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the Supreme Courts vigilance
against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under
the executive branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a
high sense of competence and fervor is expected. People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito
C. Castaneda Jr., et al, G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013.
Civil liability of the accused; appeal of by private party. The parties here have conflicting
interpretations of the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC), which
states: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Muoz claims that the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies only if the civil
liability ex delictois separately instituted or when the right to file it separately was properly reserved.
In contrast, Co claims that Muoz acquittal of the crime of libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of
the case because Muoz utterance of the libelous remarks remains undisputed. The Supreme Court
rejected Muoz claim. The last paragraph of section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions
to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged regardless if the action is instituted with or filed
separately from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations
when the offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its
title When separate civil action is suspended. Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms,
governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. Elizalde S. Co v. Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr., G.R. No.
181986, December 4, 2013.

Criminal complaint; crime charged determined by allegations in the complaint or

information. The Supreme Court here held that Roallos claim that the Information filed against him
is duplicitous as it charged him with the commission of two crimes is plainly untenable. The
designation of the crime in the Information is clear Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. The mention of the phrase acts of
lasciviousness in the Information does not mean that Roallos was charged with the felony of acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness against Roallos is
specifically delimited to that committed in relation to section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. In any case,
the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information. Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198389,
December 11, 2013.
Evidence; testimonies of rape victims given full weight and credit. Well-established is the
rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given full weight and credit. In this
case, the victim AAA was barely eight years old when raped by accused-appellant. In a litany of
cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has
been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl
who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape,
because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation
and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the
offender apprehended and punished. People of the Philippines v. Lino Paldo, G.R. No.
200515, December 11, 2013.
Ombudsman; Ombudsman can file appeal or certiorari from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court. Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to file
the petitions for certioraribecause only the Solicitor General could file the petitions in this Court
pursuant to section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code as amended by E.O.
292. The Supreme Court found respondents contention grossly erroneous. That only the Solicitor
General may represent the People on appeal or certiorariin the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general rule, but the rule admits the exception concerning
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to E.O. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. More

specifically, section 4(c) of R.A. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz: c. Civil and criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection with [E.O.] 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Consequently, the filing
of the petitions in these cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, was authorized by law. People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First
Division and Third Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo and
Enest Escaler/People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third
Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo, Enest Escaler and Ramon
Castillo Arceo, Jr.,G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063, December 11, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; lack of timely objection. The Supreme Court here held that Roallos
claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that
he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable. Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised
the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the
Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsmans
verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the
merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own
behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the
conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever argument
Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been
mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his
right to preliminary investigation.It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did
not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary
investigation. Indeed, he actively participated in the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
198389, December 11, 2013.
Warrantless arrests; arrests in flagrante delicto. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting
the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The circumstances here
do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto, to wit: (1) The police officers claim that
they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay
City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to

give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car
and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead
gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it; (2) Admittedly, the police
officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted
their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned
rule. George Antiquera y Codes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180661, December
11, 2013

Alibi. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that appellant was at another place at the time
of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene. In this case, appellant attempted to show that he was at barangay Ananong at the time of the
rape incident. However, as found by the trial court, the distance between barangay Ananong and
barangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and could be traversed in one hour or even less. Hence,
appellants assertion that the trial court and the appellate court should have considered his alibi must
fail. People of the Philippines v. Jerry Obogne, G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014.
Appeal; issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. Petitioners anchor
their defense on the nature of their respective positions to prove that they acted within the bounds of
their functions. However, Garcia and Brizuela only raised their functions as Assistant Regional
Director for Comptrollership and Disbursing Officer, respectively, for the first time before the
Sandiganbayan when they filed their separate Supplements to Motion for Reconsideration and after
a decision had already been rendered by the Sandiganbayan. The settled rule is that issues not
raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal in this case, in a motion for
reconsideration for being offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Points of
law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are barred by
estoppel and cannot be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Danilo O. Garcia and Joven SD. Brizuela v. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 197204, March 26, 2014.
Evidence; credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies. Appellant here
pointed out inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Espejo and Arce, to wit: (1)

Espejo testified that he found the aluminum foils and the marked money tucked on appellants
waistline while Arce testified that he saw Espejo frisk appellant and found the specimen in the latters
pocket; (2) Espejo stated that appellant was then wearing basketball shorts while Arce described him
as wearing a six-pocket short pants. Appellant argued that these inconsistent statements render
Espejo and Arce incredible witnesses. The Supreme Court was not convinced. It held that the minor
contradictions in Espejo and Arces testimonies are inconsequential and do not detract from the
proven elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. People of the Philippines v.
Sherwin Bis y Avellaneda, G.R. No. 191360, March 10, 2014.
Evidence; credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies. It is now too wellsettled to require extensive documentation that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses,
which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their
testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the accused. Significantly, in the case at bench, the testimonies of the said
witnesses for the prosecution were in harmony with respect to their positive identification of appellant
as the one who sold the illegal drugs to Espejo, the poseur-buyer, in a planned buy-bust operation,
as well as to the other surrounding circumstances that transpired during the said operation. People
of the Philippines v. Sherwin Bis y Avellaneda, G.R. No. 191360, March 10, 2014.
Information; the court has the sole prerogative to resolve motions to withdraw an
Information filed by the Secretary of Justice. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of
Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of
such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding farther with the trial. Indeed, once a
criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal
or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the
trial court. The rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even
before or after arraignment of the accused. When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in
compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not
out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in the sound
exercise of its judicial prerogative. Barry Lanier and Perlita Lanier v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 189176, March 19, 2014.

Information; when the Information is filed in court, the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
with respect to the existence of probable cause is not binding on the court. The Regional
Trial Court here clearly deferred to the finding of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice without
doing its own independent evaluation. The trial court even expressed its apprehension that no
prosecutor would be willing to prosecute the case should the motion to withdraw be denied. The only
matter discussed by the trial court was its concurrence with the Department of Justice relative to the
service and conduct of the search for illegal drugs. The trial court declared that the evidence is
inadmissible in view of the manner the search warrant was served. Settled is the rule that the
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense,
the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. In the case at bar,
the grounds relied upon by petitioners should be fully explained and threshed out not in a preliminary
investigation but during trial as the same are matters of defense involving factual issues. The
Supreme Court thus emphasized that the trial court, having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not
bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While
the Secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. Barry Lanier and Perlita Lanier v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 189176, March 19, 2014.
Probation; appeal and probation are mutually exclusive remedies. Aside from the goals of
according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the treatment of appeal and
probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions.
An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for
probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment
of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to
the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable for
the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his
bid. Enrique Almero y Alcantara v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 188191,
March 12, 2014.
Probation; appeal and probation are mutually exclusive remedies. In the present case,
petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which
is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he did not file an appeal before applying
for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing
the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D.
1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. The assignment of
errors in the Petition before the Supreme Court reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken by
accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the

promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he
persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any
procedure for probation precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent. Enrique Almero
y Alcantara v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 188191, March 12, 2014.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Alibi. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. For
the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the
offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
In the case at bar, the testimony of defense witness Filomeno Suson made known to the trial court
that the distance between the scene of the crime and the copra kiln dryer where appellant claimed to
have been working the entire time during which the incidents of rape occurred can be traversed in
less than an hour. Thus, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis on
the occasion of the rapes owing to the relatively short distance. People of the Philippines v.
Mervin Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014.
Alibi; physical impossibility. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access
between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the
accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at
the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. People of the
Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014.
Alibi; when applicable as a defense. It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime during its commission. Here, appellant Jastiva utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted
requirements. From the testimonies of the witnesses, it was shown that the distance between AAAs
farmhouse and appellant Jastivas house was only 150 meters, more or less. Certainly, 150 meters is
not too far as to preclude the presence of appellant Jastiva at the farmhouse of AAA. People of the
Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014.
Circumstantial evidence; affidavit is hearsay unless affiant presented in court. Castros
purported possession and eventual return of Volume 266 was only premised upon the statement of
one Nelson de Castro (Nelson), i.e., the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated August 9, 1995, who averred
that on May 18, 1995, at around 11:50 in the morning, Castro told him to pass by his office and there

handed him a bag which, as it turned out, contained the missing Volume 266. Nelson was not,
however, presented before the Regional Trial Court during trial, hence, was not subjected to any incourt examination. It is settled that while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they
are acknowledged before a notary public (here, a public officer authorized to administer oaths), they
are still classified as hearsay evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon and the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine them.
With the prosecutions failure to present Nelson to affirm his statement that Castro caused the return
of Volume 266, the prosecutions evidence on the matter should be treated as hearsay and, thus,
inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims. Consequently, there exists no
sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Castros guilt. Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A.
Castro v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014.
Circumstantial evidence; when sufficient for conviction. Circumstantial evidence consists of
proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based
on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To
uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test
to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused
is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and
every circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence. Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
188694, February 12, 2014.
Circumstantial evidence; discrepancy of accounts on the subject matter of the crimes
charged. While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having attempted
to bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from the Reporters Division, the
fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different document, that is Volume 266.
The discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes the strength of
the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the bribery attempt may be deemed as a
demonstration of interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard,
constitutes proof of motive. However, it is well-established that mere proof of motive, no matter how
strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable evidence

from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the malefactor. Ricardo L. Atienza
and Alfredo A. Castro v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014.
Denial; denial is a weak defense. Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed
upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Inherently weak,
denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the appellant, as in this case.
The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecutions evidence is such that it
does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on
affirmative matters.People of the Philippines v. Vicente Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February
19, 2014.
Double jeopardy; elements. Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2)
it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid
indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. Saturnino C.
Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014.
Evidence; defense of denial versus positive identification. Denial cannot prevail against the
positive testimony of a prosecution witness. A defense of denial which is unsupported and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no
weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and
probable testimony on affirmative matters. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y
Balverde, et al, G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014.
Evidence; defense of frame-up. Appellant cannot likewise avail of the defense of frame-up which
is viewed with disfavor since, like alibi, it can easily be concocted and is a common ploy in most
prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. To substantiate this defense, the evidence
must be clear and convincing and should show that the buy-bust team was inspired by improper
motive or was not properly performing its duty. Here, there is no evidence that there was ill motive on
the part of the buy-bust team. In fact, appellant himself admitted that he did not know the police
officers prior to his arrest. There could therefore be no bad blood between him and the said police
officers. Moreover, there was no proof that the arresting officers improperly performed their duty in
arresting appellant and Parcon. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et
al, G.R. No. 190621. February 10, 2014.

Evidence; fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. To give full protection
to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation
of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, the interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and that warrantless searches and seizures have
long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances: (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected
in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. People of the Philippines v. Vicente
Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.
Evidence; testimony; momentary lapse in memory reinforces credibility of the
witness. Appellants claim that the testimony of PO2 Soriano does not deserve credence due to his
failure to identify and/or recall the markings he made on the subject specimen fails to convince. His
failure to immediately recall the markings on the specimens only show that he is an uncoached
witness. Such momentary lapse in memory does not detract from the credibility of his testimony as to
the essential details of the incident. It must also be considered that aside from the fact that police
officers handle numerous cases daily, he testified three years after appellants arrest. It is therefore
understandable that PO2 Soriano could no longer easily remember all the details of the
incident. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R. No. 190621,
February 10, 2014.
Evidence; testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity. The testimony of the
offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for the
charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape,
especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated
and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges
ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks
justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the
law. People of the Philippines v. Felimon Patentes y Zamora, G.R. No. 190178, February
12, 2014.

Evidence; tests for determining the value of the testimony. The time-honored test in
determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with human knowledge,
observation and common experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of
human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial
cognizance. Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days
in a house where the abusers entire family, including the abusers minor nephews and nieces live.
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among
AAAs family members, AAAs father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to
appellants house to discuss AAA and appellants marital plans on 7 December 1998. Clearly, this is
contrary to human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the prosecutions claim. People of
the Philippines v. Felimon Patentes y Zamora, G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014.
Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
entitled to great weight and respect. Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), are entitled to great weight and respect and are deemed final
and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record. The Supreme Court (SC) found that both
the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense,
and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the
petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. In the absence of any
showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts and circumstances that could
substantially affect the outcome of the present case, SC upheld the rulings of the RTC and the CA
which found the elements of these crimes fully established during the trial. Rodolfo Guevarra and
Joey Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.
Factual findings of the trial court; trial courts assessment of credibility of witnesses. It is
a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and which involve the
credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect, more so, when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The reason behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the trial
courts findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. People of the Philippines v. Vicente
Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.
Information; amendment or substitution. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
that if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper

offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not
be placed in double jeopardy. Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should
have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the
Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double
jeopardy. Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830,
February 11, 2014.
Information; defects in the Information should be raised in a motion to quash. Morilla
primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure to
substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy,
but was only inferred from the words used in the Information. Even assuming that his assertion is
correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this point, is deemed to have been waived due to
Morillas failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash before entering his plea. Further, it must
be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict the allegation of
conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a
reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. People of the Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833,
February 5, 2014.
Jurisdiction; jurisdiction over falsification of public document cases. The Regional Trial
Court did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of Criminal Case No. 01-197426 (i.e., the
falsification case) since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) of the RPC, which is
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of B.P. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. 7691. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first
time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the
first time on appeal. Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014.

Preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation is not a casual affair. It is conducted to

protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to
have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive
right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice. In the context of a
preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves
to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondents side with regard to the accusation.
Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it.
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint. Saturnino C. Ocampo v.
Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014.
Rule 45; questions of fact not reviewable in petitions for review. Petition for review under
Rule 45 generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is
that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain
exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial courts judgment or the
appellate courts misapprehension of the adduced facts. The petitioners failed to convince the
Supreme Court that it should review the findings of fact in this case. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey
Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014.
Preliminary investigation; if respondent could not be subpoenaed. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before
him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made,
and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to
delay the prosecution of offenses. In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to
serve subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due
process. It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or
evidence. Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830,
February 11, 2014.
Warrants of arrest; definition of probable cause. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830,
February 11, 2014.

Warrants of arrest; determination of probable cause. Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses, the Supreme Court has ruled that a hearing is not necessary for
the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant and the
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of
arrest. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to
disregard the prosecutors resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in determining its existence. Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et
al, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014.