Levels of Difficulty in Introducing e-Voting

Alexandros Xenakis and Ann Macintosh

International Teledemocracy Center
Napier University
10, Colinton Rd., Edinburgh, EH10 5DT
{a.xenakis,a.macintosh}@napier.ac.uk

Abstract. Recent e-voting pilots in the UK have demonstrated that there are
different factors to be considered in the administration of electronic voting. In
this paper we present a framework for the evaluation of the level of difficulty
involved in the deployment of e-voting schemes. Taking the public authoritys
point of view we identify eight factors, which increase the overall difficulty of
e-voting administration. We suggest that as new e-voting technologies and associated activities are introduced in the re-design of the electoral process, its
administration becomes increasingly more difficult. We provide examples explaining the practical use of the suggested framework based on some of the
2003 UK e-voting pilots. In concluding we refer to existing limitations of the
framework and suggest future work, which could expand its analytical value.

Introduction
Two recent publications, one from the US and one from the UK, highlight the fact
that the successful deployment of electronic voting is proving to be more difficult to
achieve than originally envisaged. In the US, one of the most publicized experimental
projects SERVE, on behalf of the US Department of Defense, was cancelled [12]. In
the UK, the evaluation of the 2003 e-voting pilots highlighted many areas of current
e-voting practice that need to be improved [2]. The UK e-voting pilots in particular,
have provided us with useful experience, aspects of which we analyze in this paper.
In our research we have found it necessary to differentiate clearly between e-voting
pilots that provided an additional voting mechanism, i.e. a new channel for voting,
and those which add technology to different stages of the electoral process but which
did not provide technology for actually casting a ballot we define these as e-enabled
elections. Overall 36 fully evaluated e-voting pilots have been conducted in the UK to
this date, 16 in May 2002 and a further 20 in May 2003 [14], [3]. These were in all
cases legally binding elections on a Local Authority level. The possible e-voting
channels for casting a ballot were: touch-screen voting kiosks, internet voting, interactive voice response (IVR) landline telephone voting, SMS text message voting, digital
television voting. Seventeen of the UK pilots (4 in 2002 and 13 in 2003) provided
voters with multiple e-voting channels. When these channels were offered concurrently the need for an electronic on-line version of the electoral register was created to
allow real-time valid voter identification. When paper ballot voting was maintained as
an option, whether polling station or postal, that added extra channels in which a
ballot could be cast. The use of the e-register, in combination with traditional polling
R. Traunmller (Ed.): EGOV 2004, LNCS 3183, pp. 116121, 2004.
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

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station voting, also enabled voters to cast a ballot at any polling station within their
ward. Additionally smart card technology was used for partial voter identification and
there was electronic counting of paper ballots. These e-voting pilots, which used the
e-register or the e-counting of paper ballots, are examples of semi-automated processes, which partially supported or e-enabled the voting process. Finally it should
also be noted that some of the new e-voting channels piloted, due to their nature,
allowed remote, unsupervised voting. The introduction of such a range of technical
innovations makes the management of an election more difficult for public authority
electoral administrators. The purpose of this paper is to provide public authorities,
considering deploying e-voting in the future, a framework to assess the potential degree of difficulty that a suggested e-voting pilot fosters.
The research presented in this paper forms part of a doctoral program concerned
with the identification of the emerging constraints in re-designing the electoral process in relation to information and communication technologies (ICTs). Empirical
research was undertaken which comprised interviews and observations, conducted
both during the run-up to the election and on the actual polling day in one of the 2003
UK pilots. The analysis of the published evaluation reports combined with findings
from our empirical work have lead us to conclude that there are eight main factors
which can increase the level of difficulty of an e-voting pilot. In the following section
we present these factors and justify why we consider them to increase the level of
difficulty involved in deploying electronic voting.

Difficulty Factors
The introduction of e-voting technology. The traditional voting process makes little
use of ICTs. In contrast e-voting implies the introduction of technological elements in
some or all stage of the voting process. In the UK pilots we have identified five different e-voting channels: Voting kiosks, which have been used in two variations,
either dedicated hardware for the sole purpose of voting as was the case in the 2003
Epping Forest pilot [4] or existing multiple-use kiosks as was the case in the 2003
Sheffield pilot [5], interactive Voice Response (IVR) touch tone telephone voting,
SMS text message voting, interactive Digital television voting (iDTV) and Internet
voting, accessed either from PCs, at home, work, and publicly made available PCs, or
internet connected kiosks. The use of WAP enabled mobile telephones has been suggested in the literature as an extra gateway for casting an e-ballot [13], [11], however
it has not been piloted yet in the UK and therefore not included in this analysis as an
extra voting channel. It has also been suggested that e-voting channels and the necessary technical infrastructure to support them should be considered differently [11],
and that the ownership of infrastructure should initially remain with the control of
public authorities [1]. However, the provision of channels and infrastructure has been
outsourced to commercial suppliers, with the exception of the 2003 Broxbourne pilot
e-enabled schemes where an in-house PA developed e-counting system was deployed, [6]. Thus Local Authorities (PAs) remained with the task of providing the
necessary administrative support to make all these technologies operational for voting. Such tasks included the provision of voter and candidate data to commercial
suppliers, the dissemination of pins and passwords to voters or the collation of results
from the different voting channels used. The fact that PAs typically had no ownership

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of the technology decreased the level of control that they had over a process for of
which they were legally liable. In effect PAs had to rely on technology providers for
adequate performance and support of the e-voting technologies. Furthermore PA staff
had little or no experience in the use of the voting technologies. Therefore the introduction of the innovative e element in the voting process makes its delivery more
difficult than the delivery of traditional elections.
Paper ballots along with e-ballots. In most cases the introduction of e-voting channels was complementary to existing polling station voting. That meant that provision
had to be made for two different kinds of ballots: the paper ballot and the e-ballot.
Double voting could be encountered in more than one ways: two paper ballots, two eballots or one paper and one e-ballot. Therefore the parallel provision of paper and eballot provides malicious voters with three alternatives of double voting instead of
one in the traditional process (two paper ballots). Having two versions of ballots also
means that two separate counting processes must be held and results of the two need
to be collated at the end to produce the overall final result.
Multiple channels of voting. Every extra channel for casting a ballot provided to
voters has two main effects. In the first instance it creates additional workload for
those charged with the administration of the extra channel, i.e. the PA staff. Moreover
the voting process in general becomes more vulnerable to double voting as each extra
channel provides voters with one more opportunity to cast a ballot. It is therefore
harder to secure the overall integrity of the election, as every extra channel requires its
separate authentication mechanism. However in introducing this factor we consider
that the multiple channels offered are not made available at the same, or overlapping
voting periods.
Duration of the voting period. In the traditional polling station voting, all voters cast
their ballot within the same time frame. The usual time frame for voting at polling
stations of one day (8am to 9pm in the UK) is considerably increased when e-voting
channels are introduced. To provide an example, internet voting, at the 2003 South
Somerset pilot, was available 24hours a day for a period of one week [7]. Extending
the voting period, also extends the time frame during which the electoral process has
to be safeguarded and therefore more resources, dedicated to this aim, are required.
Simultaneous multiple channels. When multiple channels of voting are available
over the same or overlapping voting period then the degree of difficulty is increased,
as they need to be secured against multiple uses from the same person. To achieve
this objective each voter needs to be uniquely identified through the authentication
options followed in the different channels. In effect it requires an integrated e-register
available in real-time. On the other hand if voting channels are offered in successive
voting periods, then the channels can be more easily controlled, as this is done for one
channel at the time. This creates a paradox in relation to the traditional single channel
polling station voting, where the fact that voters cast their ballot within the same time
frame makes the process more controllable
The use of the electronic register of voters. The deployment of an on-line, real-time
updated version of the electoral register was proven to be a more difficult task than
originally expected [8], [9]. The e-register has two main uses. Firstly, as back-office
application, it serves as a single point of reference for voter authentication, and thus
allows multiple channel simultaneous voting. Secondly, as a front office tool, the use

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of the e-register can allow voters to cast a ballot at any polling station linked to the eregister. The concept of specific voters being attributed to a specific polling station
has long served the integrity of elections, therefore the use of the e-register creates a
less secure environment for voting as voters are no longer related to a specific polling
station. This is even more relevant in the UK, where no formal token identification is
required in the voter authentication process, other than stating ones name and address
to the polling staff. In this case, the idea of familiar faces going to a certain local
polling station offered some extra layer of security to the process which is now lost.
Security is therefore sacrificed for the sake of convenience.
E-enabled voting. The electoral process becomes e-enabled when at least one of its
sub-processes is re-engineered to a semi-automated procedure that introduces some
technical element to the electoral process, and involves the action of a human agent
for its completion. In such cases the overall process is e-enabled and no longer the
same as the traditional process. Still, it cannot be characterized as e-voting as technical elements are introduced in some of the electoral process stages and not all. Ecounting of paper ballots is an example of hybrid processes as there is staff involved
in the operation of the e-counting machines. The operation of the e-register by staff at
polling stations (front office version) is another example. The use of the e-ballot box,
which automatically counts a specially printed paper ballot at the same time a voter
casts the ballot at a polling station, as piloted in 2003 at South Oxfordshire [10], is yet
another example. The human element in these sub-processes although providing
greater transparency to the overall process, imply staff costs and effective staff training, while at the same time opening the process to human error related risks.
Unsupervised voting. Polling station voting provides a controlled environment. A
supervised process is by nature more secure, as there are more opportunities for audit
of the process, therefore a higher level of transparency provided. The presence of a
human agent in supervised voting insures voter authentication, voter privacy and
eliminates the possibility of undue influence imposed upon a voters free choice. All
these benefits are lost when voting is unsupervised. Remote voting from home or
workplace, using any of the available technologies, voting from public kiosks and
postal ballot voting are examples of unsupervised voting channels.
It should be noted that we do not suggest in our analysis, nor have identified in our
research that some factors pose greater difficulty than others, or that some channels
are more difficult to deliver than others. We therefore attribute the same degree of
difficulty to all factors and voting channels. As each factor or channel is introduced
the level of difficulty of an e-voting pilot is increased. The starting point for establishing the degree of difficulty is the traditional polling station voting process. This is
attributed a difficulty degree of 0 as none of the eight factors which could increase its
existing level of difficulty is applicable. In the following section we demonstrate how
the framework can be used to assess the potential levels of difficulty of e-enabled or
e-voting pilots.

Using the Framework to Establish the Difficulty Level

of an e-Voting Project
Paper ballot based voting can be polling station voting, all postal ballot schemes (no
polling stations), or a combination of polling station voting with postal voting. As no

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e-voting channels are included, the degree of difficulty of e-enabled paper ballot voting can increase by the remaining six factors: more voting channels (in this case up to
two), offered for a prolonged period of time, being run concurrently, allowing voting
from any polling station through the use of the e-register, involving semi-automated
processes such as the e-counting of ballot papers and finally some channel being unsupervised (in this case postal voting). As each factor is added the degree of difficulty
is increased by one level. Polling station voting can be jeopardized by a prolonged
voting period, an e-enabled element or the use of an e-register. The fact that it is supervised and the only voting channel offered, excludes all the remaining difficulty
factors, so this option can reach the third degree of difficulty. Similarly all postal
voting being the only channel offered and unrelated to the use of the e-register, can
also reach the third degree of difficulty. When both polling station and postal voting
are available over the same voting period, then the sixth degree of difficulty can be
reached by introducing an e-register of voters and in addition e-counting.
The second part of this framework starts from the premise that at least one e-voting
channel is present. The use of e-voting technology automatically attributes one degree
of difficulty. Each of the remaining seven factors could then increase the degree of
difficulty by one level for that specific e-voting channel. However this does not cover
the extra levels of difficulty that occur with the introduction of more than one evoting channels, nor the option of paper ballots being offered both at polling stations
and as postal voting. On the basis that any extra channel, whether e-ballot or paper
ballot, adds one more degree of difficulty, we therefore increase the level of difficulty
by one degree for every extra channel offered (other than the original e-channel).
Given that we have a total of five e-channels and two paper channels, the degree of
difficulty could increase up to six (5 e-channels 1 e-channel already calculated +2
paper ballot channels). Therefore, according to the suggested framework the maximum degree of difficulty that an e-voting scheme could reach is fourteen, (8 difficulty
factors, plus 6 if all possible channels are offered). To demonstrate the use of the
framework to assess the degree of difficulty involved in an e-voting pilot, we provide
an example based on the 2003 UK pilots. In Sheffield, the local authority piloted a
simultaneous multiple channel e-voting process involving IVR, unsupervised kiosk,
SMS and internet voting, provided for period of seven days, combined with e-register
enabled polling stations and postal voting. According to the suggested framework this
pilot reached a total difficulty degree of 13, adding the 8 levels of difficulty factors,
the 3 extra e-voting channels and the 2 paper channels.

Conclusions
The framework presented in this paper aims at providing public authorities with a
method to evaluate the prospective level of difficulty that the deployment of an evoting scheme might foster. As such it could facilitate the strategic planning of similar pilots, on the basis of which difficulty factor poses an acceptable risk to the overall
successful delivery of an election. Some factors are inter-related. The difficulty,
which occurs from the administration of simultaneous channel voting, can only apply
when multiple channels of voting are made available to voters, as we need at least two
voting channels being offered to provide simultaneous process delivery. Similarly
when more voting channels are provided concurrently then the introduction of the e-

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register is imperative since it provides the necessary infrastructure for all-channel

voter identification. Furthermore in e-voting pilots, when the paper ballot is also made
available then the multiple channel factor is always applicable, since the existence of
a paper ballot option presupposes the existence of at least one extra voting channel.
This framework does not address the issue of multiple agents being involved in the
delivery of such schemes, as we consider this is more of an organisational issue rather
than an implementation one, which proper management can resolve. Finally we suggest that the classification of channels and factors in different levels of difficulty
could expand the analytical value of the presented framework.

References
1. California Internet Voting Task Force (2000), A report on the feasibility of Internet Voting,
January 2000
2. Electoral Commission. (2003a). The shape of elections to come: A strategic evaluation of
the 2003 electoral pilot schemes, July 2003
3. Electoral Commission. (2003b) Local electoral pilot schemes 2003, April 2003
4. Electoral Commission. (2003c) Pilot scheme evaluation Epping Forest District Council 1
May 2003
5. Electoral Commission. (2003d) Pilot scheme evaluation Sheffield City Council 1 May
2003
6. Electoral Commission. (2003e) Pilot scheme evaluation Broxbourne Borough Council 1
May 2003
7. Electoral Commission. (2003f) Pilot scheme evaluation South Somerset District Council 1
May 2003
8. Electoral Commission. (2003g) Pilot scheme evaluation Sheffield City Council 1 May
2003
9. Electoral Commission. (2003h) Pilot scheme evaluation St Albans City and District Council 1 May 2003
10. Electoral Commission. (2003i) Pilot scheme evaluation South Oxfordshire District Council
1 May 2003
11. Fairweather, B. and Rogerson, S. (2002), Technical Options Report, De Montfort University, Leicester, 2002
12. Jefferson, D., Rubin, A., Simons, B., Wagner, D., (2004), A Security Analysis of the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment -SERVE, January 2004
13. OASIS (2003) Election and Voter Services Technical Committee, Election Mark-up Language (EML), Version 3.0
14. Pratchett, L. (2002) The implementation of electronic voting in the UK LGA Publications, the Local Government Association