DEL MUNDO VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE/S:
1. The two awards one for actual damages and the other for moral damages cannot be dealt with in the
aggregate; neither being kindred terms nor governed by a coincident set of rules, each must be
separately identified and independently justified. A requirement common to both, of course, is that an
injury must have been sustained by the claimant. The nature of that injury, nonetheless, differs for while
it is pecuniary in actual or compensatory damages, it is, upon the other hand, non-pecuniary in the case
of moral damages.
2. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be
presumed, and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
FACTS:
The Spouses Francisco are the owners of a parcel of land. Del Mundo, on the other hand, is the operator of
a dive camp resort adjacent to the property.
Sometime in June of 1980, Del Mundo proposed a corporate joint venture with the Franciscos for the
development of the latter's property. The corporation (to be named the "Anilao Development Corporation")
would have a capital stock of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos to be subscribed equally between Del
Mundo and the Franciscos. To cover the proposed subscription of the Franciscos, Del Mundo assured the
couple that he could get from them a P125,000.00 loan secured by the realty.
The Franciscos executed a special power of attorney ("SPA"), dated 25 July 1980, 4 in favor of Del Mundo
authorizing him to obtain a bank loan.
Only the duplicate copy of the SPA was given to Del Mundo by the Francisco. The latter kept the original
copy but agreed to have it delivered to Del Mundo once he would have been able to firm up the
P125,000.00 financing to cover their (the Franciscos) proposed subscription. Aside from the special power
of attorney, the Franciscos, who were then about to depart for abroad, turned over to Del Mundo the
physical possession of the real property along with its existing facilities and equipment.
Del Mundo proceeded to the Republic Planters Bank ("RPB") to apply for the loan. After the loan
application was approved, Del Mundo executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the Franciscos'
property to secure a P265,000.00 loan. The mortgage, however, could not be annotated on the owner's
copy of OCT NO. 0-3267 (lot of Franciscos), then in the possession of the Development Bank of the
Philippines ("DBP") which had a previous mortgage lien on it. To obtain said owner's copy, the RPB agreed
to assume, and thereafter paid, Franciscos' outstanding indebtedness to the DBP. The latter, despite the
payment, refused to release the owner's copy of the certificate of title due to Franciscos' objection. In
order to allow the release of the loan proceeds, Del Mundo submitted additional collaterals. The RPB then
withdrew its previous payment to the DBP of P22,621.75, and the P265,000.00 loan was forthwith
released to Del Mundo.
The joint venture did not materialize. The Franciscos wrote a demand letter addressed to Del Mundo for
the payment of rentals for the use of their property at the rate of P3,000.00 a month (totalling
P42,000.00) and for the return of the equipment taken by Del Mundo from the bodega of the Franciscos
valued at P15,000.00.
Since Del Mundo failed to settle with the Franciscos, the latter sued Del Mundo, along with the RPB, for
annulment of the mortgage, as well as for damages, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
RTC- ordered Del Mundo and RPB to pay jointly and severally the Franciscos the sum of 200k by way of
actual and moral damages.

CA- Affirmed trial courts decision with certain modifications

ISSUE: W/N the award of moral and actual damages is correct.
HELD:
NO, the court modified the decision of the CA by DELETING actual and moral damages.
Actual Damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts,
in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.
In this case, it fails to show that substantial legal basis was shown to support the herein questioned
collective award for the questioned damages. We are, therefore, constrained to disregard them.
As regards the other issues raised by petitioner, the findings of the appellate court, involving such as they
do mainly factual matters that are not entirely bereft of substantial basis, must be respected and held
binding on this Court.
In passing, we have taken note of the fact that the RPB, itself a judgment co-debtor in solidum with Del
Mundo, did not join the latter in this appeal. The Court, accordingly, cannot here and now make any
pronouncement on the effects of said bank's payment to Del Mundo under and by virtue of the appellate
court's appealed decision.

JOSE CHING SUI YONG vs. IAC, ET. AL.

GR# L-64398 November 6, 1990
DOCTRINE/S:
1. It is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party must be presented. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved, and proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial,
no damages will be awarded.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Jose Ching Sui Yong, bought 7 foreign cinematographic films from a certain Norberto
Concepcion, who was alleged to be an authorized agent of Intercontinental Film Distributors. It was
agreed upon, as shown in the receipts of payment, that the said films shall be delivered directly to the
petitioner upon their arrival in the Philippines. However, the said films were not delivered to the petitioner
despite repeated demands.
The petitioner then filed an action for replevin before the CFI. The court ordered the sheriff to take
immediate possession of the 7 films. Meanwhile, the Intercontinental HK filed a 3 rd party claim, alleging
ownership and asserting the right to possess the said 7 films.
RTC- The lower court, after trial, dismissed the complaint and set aside the writ of seizure it had issued
earlier. It further ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondents the sum of P10,000 per day as
damages from December 23, 1969 until the said 7 films are returned to the private respondents, or pay
the sum of P250,000 representing the value of the said films.
CA-affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
W/N the award of damages of P10,000.00 a day is supported by evidence and the law on the matter?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from with modification that the award of
damages in the amount of P10,000 a day for alleged unrealized profits is eliminated.

The sole basis for the award of damages against the petitioner is the alleged unrealized profits of
private respondents for the non-screening of the seven (7) films. We believe that respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at the amount of P10,000.00 a day as unrealized profits
suffered by private respondents due to the filing of the present action by the petitioner. As correctly
averred by petitioner, the films had yet to be passed by the Board of Censors and being "bold" or so called
"bomba" films, there was the probability that some scenes therein would have been cut or censored or the
films totally banned, as in the case of one of the films.

Besides, no document or proof was presented to prove that private respondents really lost such
amount daily for non-exhibition of the films to the public by reason of the action instituted by petitioner.
The amount of P10,000.00 a day as alleged unrealized profit was arrived at by mere speculation and
conjecture by respondent court. Hence, the award of damages for the anticipated loss of profits is
unwarranted.

Again, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved,
and proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.

PRUDENCIADO VS. ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM

DOCTRINE/S:
1. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful
act or omission. (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 [1984]).
2. It is undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages
(Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount
awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57
O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636 and Adone v. Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
far too excessive compared to the, actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that
they should be reduced to more reasonable amounts. (TEST OF REASONABLENESS)
3. In the case of San Andres v. Court of Appeals (116 SCRA 85 [1982]) the Supreme Court ruled that while
the amount of moral damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of a court, the same when
found excessive should be reduced to more reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.
4. In (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 578-579 [1985]), the Supreme court, reiterating the above
ruling, reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages which were far too excessive compared to
the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and where the records show that the injury suffered
was not serious or gross and, therefore, out of proportion to the amount of damages generously awarded
by the trial court.
5. "Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant.
They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action." The
award of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted & B Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 745 [1984] citing Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v.
Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 966).
FACTS:

Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with the
intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left, to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound
where she would hold classes. She claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph; that
before crossing Taft Ave. she stopped her car and looked to the right and to the left and not noticing any
on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same, but when she was
almost at the center, near the island thereof, Jose Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned and
operated by Alliance Transport System, Inc., suddenly bumped and struck Dra. Prudenciado's car, thereby
causing physical injuries in different parts of her body, suffering more particularly brain concussion which
subjected her to several physical examinations and to an encephalograph test while her car was damaged
to the extent of P2,451.27. The damage to the taxicab amounted to P190.00.
Dra. Prudenciado filed a complaint for damages at the Court of First Instance against the Alliance
Transport System and Jose Leyson.
RTC- ordered the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27 for actual
damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral damages;
CA- reduced the award of MORAL DAMAGES from 25k to 2k.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA is correct in reducing the award of moral damages from 25k to 2k.
HELD:
YES, the damages should be reduced to more reasonable levels.
It is undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages
(Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount
awarded when they are palpably and scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57
O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636 and Adone v. Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
far too excessive compared to the, actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that
they should be reduced to more reasonable amounts.
Further, the court cited the case of (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 578-579 [1985]), the
Supreme court, reiterating the above ruling, reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages which
were far too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and where the
records show that the injury suffered was not serious or gross and, therefore, out of proportion to the
amount of damages generously awarded by the trial court.
Coming back to the case at bar, a careful review of the records makes it readily apparent that the injuries
sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the
damages awarded by the trial court. In fact, a closer scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate damage

to the car can by no stretch of the imagination produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous effects of
the accident sought to be established, actually took place, not to mention the fact that such were not
supported by the medical findings presented. Unquestionably, therefore, the damages imposed' by the
lower court should be reduced to more reasonable levels.
On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction of the damages made by the Court of
Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness, which appears to
be the underlying basis to justify such reduction.
While the damages sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the
petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the
respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild can admittedly
produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and
can lead to some, serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp.
52-54). Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more real and intense than an ordinary person.
Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are proportionate to her
suffering.
The SC MODIFIED insofar as the award of damages is concerned; and respondents are ordered to jointly
and severally pay the petitioner; sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages.

PHILIPPINE AIR LINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 120262, 17 JULY 1997
DOCTRINE/S:
The discriminatory act of an air carrier ineludibly makes it liable for MORAL DAMAGES under Article
21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of Civil Code. As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al, such inattention
to and lack of care by petitioner airline for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost
consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to BAD FAITH which entitles the passenger to
the AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES.
FACTS:
Leovigildo A. Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in
Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon
Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. To accommodate the needs of its stranded
passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P 100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their
expected stay of 2 days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at the PALs
expense because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, Pantejo was forced to
seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an engineer named Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a
room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon reaching
Surigao.
On 25 October 1988 when the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo came to know that the hotel
expenses of his co-passengers, one Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales and a certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an
Auditor of the Philippine National Bank, were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo informed Oscar
Jereza, PALs Manager for Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights,
that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to
pay Pantejo P300.00 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter declined.
Pantejo filed a suit for damages against PAL with the RTC of Surigao City.
RTC- The trial court rendered judgment, ordering PAL to pay Pantejo P300.00 for actual damages,
Php 150K AS MORAL DAMAGES.
CA- affirmed the decision of the court a quo, but with the exclusion of the award of attorneys fees and
Litigation expenses.
The Supreme Court affirmed the challenged judgment of Court of Appeals, subject to the
modification regarding the computation of the 6% legal rate of interest on the monetary
Awards granted therein to Pantejo.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to provide hotel accommodations for
respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel expenses incurred by reason of the cancellation of its
connecting
flight
to
Surigao
City
due
to
force
majeur.
HELD:
YES.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation, and this is because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carriers employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
The discriminatory act of PAL against Pantejo ineludibly makes the former liable for moral damages under
Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code. As held in Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al., such
inattention to and lack of care by the airline for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the
passenger
to
the
award
of
moral
damages.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They
are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable action and must, perforce,
be proportional to the suffering inflicted. However, substantial damages do not translate into excessive
damages. Herein, except for attorneys fees and costs of suit, it will be noted that the Courts of Appeals
affirmed point by point the factual findings of the lower court upon which the award of damages had been
based.
The interest of 6% imposed by the court should be computed from the date of rendition of judgment and
Not from the filing of the complaint.
The rule has been laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. that when an
obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand
can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged. This is because at the time of the filling of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which
Pantejo may be entitled remains unliquidated and not known, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed
and determined by the court, and only after the presentation of proof thereon.

DOCTRINE/S:

SIMEX INTERNATIONAL (MANILA) INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 88013, MARCH 19, 1990

Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plainfiff for
injuries he may have suffered.
FACTS:
Simex International is a private corporation engaged in the exportation of food products. It buys these
products from various local suppliers and then sells them abroad to the Middle East and the United States.
Most of its exports are purchased by the petitioner on credit. Simex was a depositor of the Far East
Savings Bank and maintained a checking account in its branch in Cubao, Quezon City which issued several
checks against its deposit but was surprised to learn later that they had been dishonored for insufficient
funds.
As a consequence, several suppliers sent a letter of demand to the petitioner, threatening prosecution if
the dishonored check issued to it was not made good and also withheld delivery of the order made by the
petitioner. One supplier also cancelled the petitioners credit line and demanded that future payments be
made by it in cash or certified check. The petitioner complained to the respondent bank. Investigation
disclosed that the sum of P100,000.00 deposited by the petitioner on May 25, 1981, had not been credited
to it. The error was rectified only a month after, and the dishonored checks were paid after they were redeposited.
The petitioner then filed a complaint in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal against the bank for its
gross and wanton negligence.
CFI- rendered judgment holding that moral and exemplary damages were not called for under the
circumstances. However, observing that the plaintiffs right had been violated, he ordered the defendant to
pay nominal damages in the amount of 20k plus attorneys fees.
CA- AFFIRMED IN TOTO. The respondent court found with the trial court that the private respondent was
guilty of negligence but agreed that the petitioner was nevertheless not entitled to moral damages.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court is correct in affirming in toto the decision of the trial court in awarding nominal
and not moral damages.
HELD:
NO.
As the petitioner has indeed incurred loss through private respondents fault, the proper remedy is the
award of moral damages.
We shall recognize that the petitioner did suffer injury because of the private respondent's negligence that
caused the dishonor of the checks issued by it. The immediate consequence was that its prestige was
impaired because of the bouncing checks and confidence in it as a reliable debtor was diminished. The
private respondent makes much of the one instance when the petitioner was sued in a collection case, but
that did not prove that it did not have a good reputation that could not be marred, more so since that case

was ultimately settled. 10 It does not appear that, as the private respondent would portray it, the
petitioner is an unsavory and disreputable entity that has no good name to protect.
Considering all this, we feel that the award of nominal damages in the sum of P20,000.00 was not the
proper relief to which the petitioner was entitled. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, "nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him." As we have found that the petitioner has indeed incurred loss through the fault of the private
respondent, the proper remedy is the award to it of moral damages, which we impose, in our discretion, in
the same amount of P20,000.00.