VERA V.

AVELINO
77 Phil. 863
FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President
and the Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national
elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true
and free expression of the popular will.
During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a
pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included
among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes,
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor
seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the
protest lodged against their election.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues
responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and
compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to
exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the
Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election,
returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum
resolution.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine
whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon

Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision
on
the
protests
lodged
against
their
elections.
RULING:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of
powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent
right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its
membership.
Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts
to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo
that such suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect
are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83,
88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case,
we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member
thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset
the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our
institutional setup.
The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech or
debate" in congress, Senators and congressmen "shall not be questioned in
any other place."
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this privilege to
include the giving of a vote or the presentation of a resolution.
. . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it
towards spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its
application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to
resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in
speech, and to the act of voting, . . . (Kilbourn vs. thompson, 103 U.S., 204;
26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put to him by
the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, concerning the
business of a real estate partnership, was imprisoned for contempt by
resolution of the house. He sued to recover damages from the sergeant at
arms and the congressional members of the committee, who had caused

him to be brought before the house, where he was adjudged to be in

contempt. The Supreme Court of the United States found that the resolution
of the House was void for want of jurisdiction in that body, but the action
was dismissed as to the members of the committee upon the strength of the
herein above-mentioned congressional immunity. The court cited with
approval the following excerpts from an earlier decision of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts:
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the
members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the
rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the
functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I,
therefore, think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but
liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. . . (103 U.S., 203.)
(Emphasis ours.)
Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates apparently
as controlling, the following incident:
In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served with a writ of
mandamus in a civil action brought against them as members of the Joint
Committee on Printing and growing out a refusal of a bid of the Valley Paper
Company, for the furnishing of paper, the Senate resolved that the Justice
issuing the writ had "unlawfully invaded the constitutional privileges and
prerogatives of the Senate of the United States and of three Senators; and
was without jurisdiction to grant the rule, and Senators are directed to
make no appearance in response thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution
of the United States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their votes in
approving the Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to uphold the
Constitution, we must enforce the constitutional directive. We must not
question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here in connection with
their votes. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)
Case dismissed.