I.

1948War
A. FirstWar
1. IsraelsDeclarationofIndependenceonMay14,1948
a) InitialconflictresidedwithIsraelPalestine
b) HostilityfromArabLiberationArmy(ALA)duetotheIsraeli
D.o.I.
2. ALAofficiallybecameinvolvedintheconflictduetoaliberationfor
Palestine
a) NumerousfactionsofArabstofighttheIsraeliforces
b) PoorCoordinationduetonumerousfactions
3. ALAfactionsallhaddifferentintentsandmeansforwarmostcommon
beingexpansionofthatfactionsnation.
4. UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)demandsceasefire
a) Israelrefusesandobtainsmoreweapons
b) Arabfactionsrefuse
5. ArmisticebeganduetotherealizationArabforcescannotwin.
a) IsraeliVictory:
(1) Betterequipment
(2) Bettertrainedtroops
(3) Highermorale
b) ArabDefeat:
(1) Lackofcoordination
(2) Lackofmorale/commoninterests
B. PalestinianRefugeeProblem
1. DeirYassinMassacre
a) SlaughterofPalestinians
2. MajorityofMiddleandUpperclassPalestiniansfledtheconflict
a) Wasmeanttobetemporaryandreturnwhentheconflictsubsides
3. PalestineseeksgreaterreinforcementsfromArabs

a) Slightlycommoninterests
b) Arabscangainterritory
c) ExaggerationofDeirYassin
4. Threedisputes:
a) NumberofPalestinianswhofled
(1) Israelisourcesunderestimate
(2) Arabsourcesoverestimate
(3) Agreearound150,000remained
b) NatureofExodus
(1) Israel:Arabscausedexodusduetoeasemobilizationof
armies
(2) Arab:Israeliethniccleansing
c) Solution:
(1) Israel:IntegratewithArabnationstheyleftvolunteeringly
(2) Arab:Returnhome,Israelexpelledthem
5. ActualSolution
a) Israeldidnotpermitareturnduetopossiblesocialandpolitical
instability
(1) Createdhardshipsforfurtherpeace
b) Problemwaslefttothehandsofreliefgroups
C. PeaceNegotiations
1. ArmisticeofEgyptIsrael24February1949.
2. U.N.Involvementtohelpthedilemma
3. Interpretationsofthepeacenegotiations:
a) First:ArabsdidnotrecognizeJewishstatesoIsraeldidnotcomply
topeace.
b) Second:Israelwasintransigentandunwillingtocompromise.

c) Thirdandstrongest:BothIsraelandArabstatesobtained
newfoundindependence,andthusnationandstatebuildingwere
higherprioritiesthanpeace.
4. Arabdefeatof1948Warcausesinstabilitiesanddrasticchangesinpower
amongsttheArabnations.
a) Furtherintensifiedcomplexitytofindpeace
5. IsraelintheenddisregardedPalestinianproblemandArabsonlyplayed
thatcardwhenconsolidatingpoliticalobjectivesandpower.
II.

1956SuezSinaiCampaign
A. 1952EgyptianCoup
1. EgyptianMonarchyisoverthrownbytheFreeOfficers
2. FreeOfficersimplementsixpointcharterforrevolution/goals:
a) Outsingking
b) EndofColonialism
c) Militarystrengthening
d) Socialequality
e) Economicdevelopment
f) Freeeducation
3. RevolutionsalsoincludedthatcolonialismdidnotallowforEgypttohave
thestrengthtobeatIsrael
4. KingFaroukiskickedoutunderadministrationofMohammedNaquib,
replacedsoonafterbyGamalAbdelNasser
5. NewadministrationislikedbyU.S.andIsrael(HoneymoonPhase)until
1956whenNasserdeclinesBaghdadPactandnegotiatedCzecharmsdeal
B. IsraeliEgyptianTensions
1. Secondroundthinking:
a) Arab:RedeemPalestineanddefeatIsrael
b) Israel:Securemoredefensiveborderandachievegreaterterritorial
expansion

2. Borderclashesaremaindeterioratingfactor
a) Egyptwillattackandinfiltrate
b) Israelwillrespondasifnotmoreaggressively
3. LavonAffair1954
a) StartedwithIsraeliattempttodeteriorateEgyptWestrelationsby
sabotagingWestsupplies
b) Israelgetscaughtandcreatesscandal
c) HumiliationforIsraelandallowsBenGuriontocomebackto
powerfullfledgeddefensepolicyreenacted
4. GazaRaid1955
a) EgyptintelligencesquadinfiltratesIsraelandkillscyclistnear
Rehovot
b) IsraelrespondswithraidontheGazaStripkilling38Egyptian
soldiers.
c) Israel:Usedtodemonstratepowerandsendaclearmessage
d) Nasser:Seesactasunjustifiedbrutalityandunderstandsthe
message
(1) Important
:Nasserusesthisasmainreasontogotothe
sovietblocforassistance
5. NassersignsCzechArmsdealandclosesStraitsofTiranwhichputsIsrael
inamuchlessfavorableposition
6. MosheDayan
a) IsraeliMilitaryandPoliticalLeader
b) ClaimsthatifEgyptdidnotfurtherenmity,Israelwouldnothave
resortedtoarms.
C. IsraeliForeignandDefensePolicyDebate
1. Israelfirmlyestablishesitselfregionallyandinternationally
a) AbsorbsmanyJewsaroundtheworld
b) ConstructsgreaterJewishhomeland

2. BenGurionvs.MosheSharett(ForeignMinister)
a) Hawkvs.Dove
b) Hawk/BG:Largescaleinterventionsandresortingtocovert
operationstoinjectdisunity.KeepArabsoffbalanceandretard
efforts.BackedbybeliefArabswereincapableofpeaceful
coexistence
c) Dove/MS:Peaceasultimategoal,arguedthatArabdisunitywas
againstIsrael'sinterestsasArabconsensuswasneededinfurther
causeofpeace.
d) Hawkoperations>Doveoperationsduetopopularsupport
3. HistoriographicalDebate
a) Conventional:SinaiCampaignistheresultofinfluxofSoviet
ArmsandblockadeofStraitsofTiran
b) Revisionist:ArmsdealtemporarilyblockedIsraelswaraims
c) Historicalquestionsofdebate:
(1) WhendidIsraelplantogotowar?
(2) Waswarresultofbroaderinterventionistpolicy?
D. BritishFrenchIsraeliCollaboration
1. AllthreewantedtodeposeNasser
2. IsraelandFrance:Bestinternationalrelationship
E. Results
III.

1967SixDayWar
A. PLOCreation
1. Arableadersfocusedonthemselvesandtheirissuesandnotaliberationof
palestine
2. Lackofrespectandsolutionstotheproblemformedseveralgroupsthat
accumilativelyledtotheformationofthePLO
3. NassercreatedthePLOasanumbrellaforallPalestinianfactions,major
onesincludingtheFatah,PNC,PLA

B. BrinkofWar
1. Arabledactions
a) SyriarosetopowerwithBathistsinpower,extremists
b) NewpowerclashedwithIsraelviaborderrelations,muchlike
EgyptandIsrael.
c) FirstrealactofconflictwasabattleontheSeaofGalilee
d) EgyptthensignedamutualdefensepactwithSyria
(1) Increasesyrianandegyptianconfidenceinpossible
militaristicmanners
(2) IncreasedIsraelthreatperception
e) JordanjoinedtheArabgroupandmadeitatriplethreatopposition
toIsrael
f) Israel'sresponsewastoadoptmorehardlinesecuritymeasures,
whichledtoanextensivecampaignwheretheIDFraidedtheWest
Bank,andnumerousvillageskillingciviliansandmilitary
personnel,thusputtingtheregionbackintowartime
2. SovietInvolvement
a) USSRsubmittedafalseintelligencereporttoNasserindicating
IsraelimobilizationandintenttoinvadeSyria
b) ThiswasdeniedbyaUNinspectionteamhoweverNasserdecided
tomobilizetroopsintotheSinaiasadeterrentforanyIsraeliintent
ifanyexisted.
c) SpeculationonthefalseSovietreport:
(1) USSRwantedtotakepressureoffSyriaandthiswould
causeIsraelandArabstostopshortofwar
(2) Rawstupidity
(3) PurposefullymisleadIsrael,toeitherintimidateSyriaor
drawEgyptintowar

(4) USSRwantedwar,wouldshowabilitytofightwithSoveit
weaponryandpoliticalbacking.
(5) USSRwantedtodrawattentionfromtheU.S.shifting
internationalattentionoftheU.S.fromVietnamtoweaken
theircontainmentforeignpolicy
3. WithdrawalofUNEFtroopsfromtheSinai
a) Nobuffer
4. ClosingoftheStraitsofTiran
C. SixDayWaryou
D.
1. Egyptgetsdestroyed
2. WarnsJordan,thenJordangetsdestroyed
3. Marchesonwardtosyria
E. Aftermath
1. Israel:emergedvictoriousandincreaseditsterritorythreefold
a) TheadditionalterritorygaveIsraelstrategicdepthandsecurity
b) Becamedominantpowerintheregion(Arabregimesfaced
domesticinstability)
2. ArabNations:PanArabismstartedtodeclineandcompetedwithpolitical
Israelandlocalnationalisms(Palestinebackoninternationalagenda)
a) Nasser
(1) Resoundinglydefeatedandnolongerconsideredamajor
threat
(2) SawhisclaimtoleadershipofArabworldreduced
b) Syria
(1) TheradicalBathiregimeemergedasIsraelsmain
regionalrival,resultinginaSyrianIsraeliarmsrace
(2) Providedopportunityforgreatersuperpowerinvolvement
(3) Militarycoup

3. InternationalCommunity
a) PrestigeoftheUSSRhadbeendamagedwhiletheUSsawIsrael
asavaluableassettocounterSovietinfluence
(1) USsupportbasedonIsraelsmilitarystrengthand
oppositiontoArabs
(2) Alsofromsharedmoralandpoliticalstandards
b) UnitedNationsgainedresponsibilitywiththedisagreementsb/tthe
USSRandUS
(1) ResultedinResolution242:emphasizedtheinadmissibility
ofterritorygainedthroughwar,acknowledgethe
sovereignty,territorialintegrityandpoliticalindependence
ofeverystateintheareaandtheirrighttoliveinpeace
withinsecureandrecognisedboundariesfreefromactsof
force
(2) CalledforajustandlastingpeacebasedontheIsraeli
withdrawalfromterritoriesoccupiedduringthewar,and
reaffirmedthenecessityofajustsettlementoftherefugee
problem
(3) ArabsandIsraelinterpretedthisdifferently
4. Initially,theIsraelisthoughtthattheconqueredterritorycouldbereturned
forpeacewithsomeexceptions
a) OpposedbyHerutandNationalReligiousPartyonly
b) However,astimepassed,Israelbecamemorereluctanttocede
territory
5. ThehardlinestatesintheArabsideadvocatedacontinuationofthe
conflict
a) Many,however,likeNasserandHussein,preferredadiplomatic
solution

b) theArabsummitinKhartouminSeptember1967decidedthe
debateinfavorofthehardliners:nopeace,norecognition,no
negotiationinregardstoIsrael
6. CauseofthefailuretoresolvetheconflictaftertheSixDayWarcanbe
foundinthecontinuingmutualdistrustandintheenormousasymmetryof
IsraelisandArabs,whichprecludedconditionsconducivetonegotiations
fromthebeginning,addedtoIsraelscircumventionofthePalestinian
question
IV.

1973OctoberWar
A. Conditionsafter1967War
1. UnresolvedPalestinianquestion,continuingbordertension,changein
leadershipinEgyptandSyria,intensifiedsuperpowerinterestinthe
region,andthefailureoffurtherdiplomaticinitiatives
2. Conditionswerenotrightforpeace:Arabstateswereunabletomake
peacefromthepositionofutterdefeat,Israelwasunwillingtomake
concessionsafteritsspectacularvictory
3. Thesuperpowerslackedthewillandabilitytoimposepeace
B. WarofAttrition
1. March1969:IsraelandEgyptenteredtheprolongedconflictknownasthe
WarofAttrition(attempttobreakthedeadlock)
2. Sporadicbombardments,raids,andfirebetweenstrongholdsalongthe
SuezCanal
3. Nasserwantedtocreatesufficientinstabilitytoprovokesuperpower
involvementandpressuretheSovietUnionintosupplyingarms
a) EgyptreceivedSovietarms,techniciansandcombatpersonnel
b) NasseralsowantedtodestroytheBarLevLine(Israelsfortresses
alongSuezCanal)
4. FromJune1967toJuly1970,morethan1,000Israelisoldierswerekilled

5. Inresponse,Israelbombardedmilitaryandciviliantargetsalongthecanal,
makingEgyptsufferheavylossesandeventuallyacceptUSSecretaryof
StateRogersceasefireproposalonthegroundsthattheUSwouldmake
IsraelacceptResolution242
C. PalestinianRevivalandBlackSeptember
1. 1967revitalizedPalestiniancausewithgreatIsraelivictory(morelandand
665,000Palestiniansobtainedwithanadditional350400,000new
refugees)
2. ArafatemergedasthedecisivevoiceamongPalestinianleaders
3. In1967FatahstartedworkingundergroundintheWestBank,andthe
ArabIsraeliconflictbegantoincludeanelementofdistinct
IsraeliPalestinianconfrontation(BattleofKarameh,21March1968)
4. ThefedayeenofFatahaswellasotherorganisationsuchasthePopular
FrontfortheLiberationofPalestine(PFLP)swelledwithvolunteers
5. WestBankuprisingswereunsuccessful,forcingthePalestinianNational
Movement(PNM)tooperatefromJordan
6. Similarly,Fatahestablishedanetworkofprotostateinstitutionswithin
Jordanincludingapoliticaldepartment,newspapers,grassroots
committees,andclinics
7. YasserArafatbecamethechairmanoftheexecutivecommitteeandthe
headofthePLo
a) HeunifiedthePLOintoacohesiveandcomprehensivepolitical
front
b) PLOgrewintoafightingforceoffivetotenthousand
8. ThissetthePLOonacollisioncoursewiththeLebaneseandJordanian
governments,whobecametargetsofIsraeliretaliatorystrikes
9. By1970s,thePLOestablishedastatewithastateinJordan,challenging
KingHusseinsauthority
10. BlackSeptember

a) TwoassassinationattemptsbythePFLPonKingHusseinandfour
airlinehijackingswerethefinalstraw
b) On17September1970,theJordanianarmymovedagainst
Palestinianpositions
c) Thefedayeencouldnotmountagooddefense,andtendayslater
thefightingended
d) Palestiniancasualtiesrangedfrom1,500to30,000andInterArab
relationssufferedaseriousblow
e) ThePLOwasoustedfromJordan
D. SyroEgyptianPlansforWars
1. NewsuccessortoNasser:Sadat
a) WantedtodeNasserizeEgyptianpoliticsandimprovethe
economy
b) ExpelledSovietadvisorstogainUSfavor,thoughitwassawasan
indicationofEgyptianweaknessbyIsrael
c) Attemptedtopursuediplomaticinitiativestoresolvetheconflict
(1) MetwithUSandIsraeliofficials:offeredtoopentheSuez
CanalifIsraeldrewbackfromit,andtodeclareaceasefire
andsignapeacetreatywithIsraelbasedonResolution24
(2) GoldaMeirwouldntbudge:IsraelrefusedSadatsplans,
believingitsnewboundarieswerevitalfornationalsecurity
d) ConvincedSadattogotowartopersuadeIsraeltomakean
acceptablepeace
(1) AnattackonIsraelwouldbreakthedefeatistattitudeofthe
population
(2) Itwouldboosthisregionalstandingandpotentiallybecome
abasisforfuturenegotiationswithIsrael
(3) SadatwantedtoreclaimtheSinaiandtheSuezCanal

2. November30,1972,SadatandDefenceMinisterGeneralAhmadIsmail
Alidecidedtogotowarontheassumptionthatthesuperpowerswould
preventacompletemilitaryvictorybyeitherside
3. SadatinitiatedprivatemeetingswithHafezalAsadinordertohavea
doublefrontagainstIsrael
4. On31January1973,SyriasandEgyptsarmedforceswereplacedunder
jointcommandandreadiedforwar
E. SurpriseAttack
1. 2pmonOct.6,1973:EgyptandSyriasimultaneouslyattackedtheSinai
andGolanHeights
2. Israeliintelligencefailedtopredicttheconfrontationdespiteevidence
theyunderestimatedArabfrustrationoverIsraelioccupationoftheGolan
Heights,Sinai,WestBank,andtheGazaStripperceivedtheArabsas
weakSadatsboastsin1971convincedIsraelhewasgivingemptythreats
3. MinisterDayanandGoldaMeirhesitatedtostrike,afraidofbeingseenas
theaggressor
4. EgyptlaunchedamassiveairstrikeandartilleryassaultonIsrael,and
SyriainvadedtheGolanHeights
a) EgyptcrossedtheSuezCanalandpushedbackIsraelitroops
b) SyriatookMountHermon
c) IDFoutnumbertwelvetoonewhenfightingbegan
5. Israelmobilized,madeeasybyYomKippur,butwereforcedbackinthe
firstfewdays
6. Eventually,theIDFcontainedthethreat
a) MassiveAmericanairliftofmilitaryequipmentcombinedwith
Israelicounteroffensivesturnedthetide
b) Washingtonwasinitiallyreluctanttosendaid
7. Syrianforceswererepelledby11OctoberandIsraeliforcescrossedthe
SuezCanalby18October

a) USandUSSRdecidedtoimposeaceasefirethen
b) KissingermetwithBrezhnevon20October,andtheceasefirewas
acceptedby22October
8. OilWeapon:ArabmembersofOPECstoppedoilexportstotheUSand
Netherlands
a) Meanttopunishnationstheythoughtwereovertlysupportiveof
Israel
b) Usedmanytimesinthefuture
F. Consequences
1. Arabs:
a) Politicallytheywonthewar
b) Egyptianconfidencehadgrowndramatically:theybelievedIsrael
hadonlybeensavedbytheUnitedStates
c) Sadatgainedthereputationofanaccomplishedpoliticalstrategist
(1) OvendalesaidthatSadatemergedfromthewaraworld
statesman,somethingNasseraspiredtobutneverachieved
d) 8,500killedandalmost20,000Syrianswounded
e) SadatmadeitclearthatEgyptwasreadyforasettlementwith
Israel,andSyriawaswillingnowtoacceptUNresolution242
f) Kissingerwasconvincedthattheywerereadyforcompromise,as
wellasIsrael
2. Israel:
a) ThebeliefinIsraelsinvincibilityhadbeendestroyedand
confidencewasseriouslyshaken,resultinginpublicangeragainst
PMGoldaMeirandDefenceMinisterMosheDayan
b) AgranatCommission:highcriticalofmilitaryintelligence,
disciplineandtraining
c) 3,000killedand8,000wounded:firstwarwhereIsraelsuffereda
highcasualtyrate

d) ThisledtotheemergenceofanIsraelipeacemovement
e) Italsogaverisetothereligiousright
(1) RevivedthenotionofagreaterEretzYisrael
(2) GroupssuchasGushEmunimgainedprominence
3. UnitedNations:
a) AttheforefrontofattemptstorestartnegotiationswithUN
Resolution338,passedon22October
b) Calledfortheimmediateendofmilitaryactivityand
implementationofResolution242
c) InDecember,SovietandAmericanforeignministersconveneda
MiddleEastpeaceconferenceinGeneva
(1) Theinitiativeaccomplishedlittle
(2) KissingermighthaveonlybackedtheGenevaconference
togivetheSovietstheimpressionofcooperation,before
pursuingdirecttalkswiththeSadatandMeirgovernments
(Smith,1996)
V.

EgyptianIsraeliPeaceProcess(Optional)
A. Disengagement
B. 1977LikudVictory
C. CampDavidAccords
D. ImplicationsofPeace