Vincenzo Ruggiero

131

Drug Economics:
A Fordist Model of
Criminal Capital?
The description of 'crime as work' needs not sound too
provocative. Many of those who engage in crime on a regular
basis regard theirs as an occupational role. Concepts such as
specialisation, professionalism, apprenticeship and job
satisfaction may help understand the dynamics of illegal
behaviour (Letkenman 1973). The work perspective takes into
account the skills required in different criminal activities and may
offer important elements to identify the organisation of these
activities.
In a pioneering study of this type, for example, the relationship
between criminal organisation and the wider social organisation
is analysed against the backgtound ofa pivotal variable: criminal
technology (Mclntosh 1975). In this study an important variety
of urban crime is described as project crime, a definition which
refers to large scale thefts and frauds. These activities are said to
be more complicated and technically advanced, and less routinised.
'Each of these crimes, or short series of crimes, is z project m itself,
involving separate advance planning and organisation' (ibid: 42).
In adopting this line of analysis, I would like to start by
defining 'project crimes' as artisan work, where skills are slowly
learned through apprenticeship, and are often transmitted within
the family or the social group to which one belongs. I would also
like to stretch the parallel further. It is widely known that skilled

The author suggests

that there has been a
reorganisation ofthe
structure of criminal
business. This
features a greater
concentration of
power to those who
act as wholesalers
and importers from
those who distribute
drugs. This division
of lahour is gendered
and racially structured reflecting the
legal job market.

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Capital & Class55

industrial work inherited many characteristics of craftsmanship,
namely the knowledge of the work process in its entirety and a
degree of pride related to it.
In 1914, with the installation ofthe first assembly line at Ford,
a different type of labour became necessary. Briefly, the Fordist
model of work implied the segmentation of tasks, the displacement of knowledge from labour to management, repetitive and
alienating tasks, and consequendy a high degree of job disaffection
(Braverman 1974).
This simplified definition came to my mind when conducting
a recent research project on drug use in London (Ruggiero 1993c).
I was faced with assembly-line 'delinquents' who were devoid of
training, specific skills, and a detailed knowledge ofthe economy
which employed them. This knowledge belonged to the
'machinery' of which they formed a part, namely the system of
production and distribution of drugs. Many of those I contacted
were interchangeable and flexible workers, and almost all lacked
the work ethic which distinguishes professional labour. A long
term user said of his colleagues: 'They don't plan what they do,
they don't calculate the effects. The principle used to be: if you
can't do the time, don't do the crime. Now they can't do either'.
Are we witnessing a tendential de-skilling of the 'criminal work
force', and the establishment ofa Fordist model of illegal labour?
In the following pages an attempt is made to assess the validity
of this hypothesis. The analysis will focus on criminal organisations
operating in Italy and England in the field of drug distribution and
on drug related crime. While in the Italian context a number of
different towns will be examined, the examination ofthe English
context will be mainly centred on London. Insight in the respective
drugs economies was achieved through a series of research projects
starting back in 1985 and spanning to current times (Ruggiero
and South 1994). These, which were mainly focused on the
heroin market, were funded, among others, by Bologna University
in Italy and the Home Office in England.

Bureaucracy and enterprise

The spread of illicit drug consumption over the last two decades
altered significantly the profile of criminal business in most
European countries. New characteristics emerged within the
criminal economies which developed varying forms and degrees

Drug Economics

of organisation. Let us concentrate on one particular aspect of

what is defined as organised crime.
There are recurrent features in the definition of organised
crime, among which is the notion that its members are endowed
with criminal skills acquired by means of long-term apprenticeship. The well known polemic between Donald Cressey and
Joseph Albini hides the fact that the above mentioned notion
belongs to both authors and many others after them. Cressey's
description of organised crime is based on a so-called bureaucratic
model, whereby different groups or families are said to coordinate
and direct, within a Commission formed by representatives of all
groups, all activities carried out on the national territory (Cressey
1969). Albini suggests instead that organised crime is not to be
viewed as a nationwide conspiracy, but should be described as a
series of local, relatively independent entities which are loosely
structured and only informally coordinated (Albini 1971). Now,
these interpretations describe networks and relationships which,
if diffetendy structured, nevertheless involve similar actors, namely
professional criminals or 'men of honour'. These actors are given
a central location in many definitions of organised crime, thus
conveying the idea that activities are only performed by criminals
who are extremely skilled, have undertaken an exclusive career,
and are often related either by familial or ethnic bonds. Other
definitions, which do not only focus on professionalism, can help
develop a more fruitful perspective when organised crime is
analysed vis-i-vis the drug economy.
According to Haller (1992), families constituting organised
crime are not to be regarded as centrally controlled business
enterprises. Rather, members independently conduct their activity:
'A family, then, is a group which is separate from a member's
economic ventures and to which members belong roughly in the
same way that legal businessmen might join a Rotary Club'
(ibid: 2). The author also argues that many members are not
involved in permanent structures nor engaged in long-term
partnerships. They may undertake one-off operations, make
temporary alliances with legal or illegal entrepreneurs, and often
recruit part-timers. We will see how these characteristics aptly
describe the drug economies in the two countries considered.
Employees of criminal organisations pose a serious threat to their
employers. 'The entrepreneur aims then to structure his relationship with employees so as to reduce the amount of information
available to them concerning his own participation and to ensure

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that they have minimal incentive to inform against him' (Reuter
1983: 115). This threat can be reduced if employees are recruited
among family members and close associates who guarantee a
degree of loyalty. However, this is not possible for all illegal
businesses, especially those presenting with large and ramified
distribution structures. The drugs economy, for instance, does not
lend itself to centralised control by entrepreneurs, whose capacity
to monitor the suitability and skills of dealers is very limited. The
fact that many dealers are also users, the precariousness of their
'job', and the high turnover in the economy in which they participate are an indication of this. In other words, the involvement
of organised groups in the drug economy may lead to their relative
'disorganisation'. It may also entail a shift in the way in which
profits are made and the occupational characteristics of those who
contribute to its creation. Individuals devoid of a previous
criminal career may constitute the majority of employees in the
drug economy, but paradoxically their 'non-professional' and
disorganised illegal acts end up benefitting their professional and
organised employers. Moreover, it is often the case that drug
selling is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, legitimate
employment, which explains the rudimentary skills of many users
and small distributors (Reuter et al 1990). Surely, the notion that
organised crime is a monolithic structure formed exclusively by
professional affiliates looses pertinence when its involvement in
the drug economy is observed. Here, organised groups are forced
to renounce the traditional regulatory function commonly
attributed to them. Petty, disorganised and opportunistic offences
can no longer be controlled or regulated, as they become an
important component of organised crime itself
This seems to have occurred both in Italy and Britain, whose
specific drug economies I will now briefly describe.

Italian narco-entrepreneurs
The involvement of Italian organised crime in the drug economy
dates back to the 1950s. One ofthe first large seizures occurred
in 1952, when 6 kg of heroin were found in the area between
Palermo and Trapani (Santino and La Fiura 1993). Among those
arrested were distributors residing both in Sicily and the USA.
Other traffickers and wholesale distributors operated in the North
of Italy, where some industrialists managed to divert quantities of

Drug Economics

heroin from the legal to the illegal market. According to the AntiMafia Commission set up by the Italian parliament, for a period
Lucky Luciano obtained drugs from these 'licit' dealers of
pharmaceuticals (Commissione Antimafia 1976; Pantaleone
1976). When a laboratory for the processing of heroin was
discovered near Milan, it was clear that Italian criminal groups also
purchased the substance in the producing countries and, after
refining it in Italy, exported it to the USA. This pattern of activity
was destined to remain unaltered until a proper heroin market
developed in Italy around the early 1970s.
It is during the course ofthe 1970s and the 1980s that the
participation of organised crime in the drug economy assumed
new characteristics. Judge Falcone's investigation proved that
decisions regarding the involvement in illegal drugs were never
taken centrally, but were the result of personal initiative (Falcone
1991). In other words, the drug business gave the old mafia
families the opportunity to claim independence from so-called
consortia, commissions or domes (the organ where members of
the different traditional mafia families allegedly plan and coordinate their exploits). All supergrasses ofthe mafia confirmed
that finances invested into drugs did neither come from the
common assets of the organisation nor from the collective
proceeds accumulated by members of a specific family. The
money invested was part of individually owned finance. Members
who resolved to enter the drug business, therefore, had the
opportunity to build partnerships with other investors who were
not part of their family or, for that matter, members ofthe mafia
(Arlacchi 1992; Gambetta 1992). The informant Antonino
Calderone tells ofthe way in which some men of honour could
sometimes become independent from their very family if their
attempt to build up a remunerative drug business was successful.
Among these was Pippo Bono, who 'never took side with any
precise group within the organisation, and would always be absent
in critical moments' (Arlacchi, op. eit: 136). Pippo Bono was
perhaps the first example ofa member ofthe mafia being able to
abstain from the war between families, while becoming a partner
with other legal or illegal entrepreneurs.
In some cases the members of traditional organised crime in
Italy performed the role of mediators, as they invested somebody
else's money in the drug economy. In other cases, both imported
drugs and drugs refined in Italian laboratories were sold to
wholesale distributors who did not belong to traditional groups

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or families. In other words, due to the typical hierarchical
structure which distinguishes drug distribution, 'men of honour'
were forced to deal with 'ordinary men'. Among middle-range
distributors individuals emerged who had acquired skills and fijnds
in previous criminal activities on the one hand, and entrepreneurs
who were without those skills but only owned funds on the other.
In turn, small-scale distribution was also taken on by individuals
who had never been associated with organised crime (Ruggiero
1993a). In sum, the involvement in the drug economy started a
process whereby traditional organised crime such as the mafia
slowly lost its characteristic traits while becoming similar to other
organised groups. None of the prevailing groups managed to
establish a monopoly in the distribution of illegal drugs. Rather,
they shared an oligopoly with regard to both the national territory
and the specific local market which they supplied. It is their
common characteristics which render them comparable within the
national and the international context (Ruggiero and South 1994).
A look at the distribution structure in a number of major Italian
cities will help identify these characteristics.
The spread of the heroin and cocaine businesses in Naples, for
instance, was possible because of certain factors which typify the
history of the town. Among these are: firstly, the existence of
previous illegal markets and smuggling networks by which a
variety of both legal and illegal goods circulate. Secondly,
organised criminal groups exist which are already well rooted in
the local economy and in the regional political structure (Lamberti
1989; Sales 1989). Thirdly, tbere are available a large labour force
and a reserve of casual labour, recruited both in the hidden
economy and in the adjacent illegal economy. These factors are
connected, directly or otherwise, to the evolution ofthe Camorra
the Neapolitan organised crime syndicate whose history is
in many ways almost inseparable from the economic history ofthe
town (Ruggiero 1993b). First by smuggling agricultural products,
then by dealing with the illicit trade in foreign cigarettes, and later
by buying and selling untaxed commodities, the Camorra achieved
a substantive form of'primitive' accumulation of finance. The
explosion of the drug phenomenon in Naples encouraged local
criminal groups to invest capital which was previously earmarked
for smuggling. At the top of the distribution chain, the
entrepreneurial efficiency of these groups was transferred into the
drug economy. Here some 'legal' entrepreneurs also took a
chance, in particular those who were insolvent debtors to

Drug Economics

organised criminal groups from which they had previously

borrowed money. Other entrepreneurs started participating in
the drug economy after accepting a deal: they would be exempted
from the payment of protection money if they offered a loan to
be invested in business whose nature they officially ignored or
pretended to do so. Those involved in street distribution were
recruited from street sellers who were previously dealing with
other smuggled commodities, but also from the semi-official
labour market which characterises the economic structure ofthe
town. It has been shown that among user-distributors, in fact,
many do not have a previous criminal apprenticeship and cannot
be identified with a distinct criminal subculture (Feo 1989).
A similar pattern can be observed in Rome. Here, both heroin
and cocaine are distributed by a coalition of Neapolitan or Sicilian
groups and local groups of professional criminals. The former,
in a sense, are forced to set up alliances with the latter because they
would otherwise be unable to access the local distribution
network. 'Monthly consignments would be shipped to Italy and
passed on to elements ofthe Roman underworld for distribution
at intermediate level within the domestic market' (Lewis
1989: 40). Some independent distributors also operate who are
not connected with larger criminal groups. They do not rely on
sophisticated chains of distribution, but service the market
immediately after importation. Many neophytes are found both
within these groups and among the street sellers and userdistributors who are 'employed' by local professional criminals.
In Milan, which presents with broadly similar cbaracteristics,
groups previously engaged in armed robberies shifted to both
trafficking and wholesale distribution. As elsewhere, contacts were
made with members of traditional organised crime which initially
provided the consignments and, often, ended up engaging in
joint-ventures with them. Drugs reduced the entity of other
criminal activities and partially coopted those who were involved
in them. But this process does not seem to have taken place in
a mechanistic or smooth manner, especially at low distribution
level. An illuminating piece of research conducted a few years
back in the area of Milan, for example, recorded the opinions of
a number of petty property offenders (Bianchi 1986). Many of
those interviewed rejected a regular job but also refused the
prospect of being employed by organised criminal groups on a
regular basis. They likened organised crime to ordinary systems
of employment, both being regarded as 'brutal exploiters'. Like

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self employed artisans, some showed a sense of pride in their illegal
professionalism and independence, and claimed to be unprepared
to relinquish both in exchange for a 'secure' job. Drug
distribution, in their view a secure job, was regarded by many as
highly dishonourable. That the responses of these property
offenders were sincere was partly proved by later criminal statistics
regarding the same city. Very few street distributors arrested in
Milan between 1987 and 1991 had a record of property offences
(ISTAT 1992).
In Verona, as judicial evidence shows, the drugs economy is
not sustained by a typical marginalised underworld or promoted
by long-term criminal entrepreneurs. An important role in the
development of the drugs economy here is played by the
dissemination of pure entrepreneurial spirit and by a 'strongly
market oriented mentality in every section ofthe local economy
and in large parts of the population' (Arlacchi and Lewis
1989: 152). In Verona drug use and distribution have spread
despite the absence of organised groups previously involved in
other illicit markets. Indeed, one could argue that the drug
economy pro.pered because no traditional mafia-type episodes of
violent competition occurred which would attract the attention
of institutional agencies. Transactions in the illicit drugs market
take place according to the shared rules of fair bargaining, and
disputes are rarely settled with violence. Research conducted in
the late 1970s proved that the drug users of Verona were so young
that few had acquired skills and competence in criminal activities.
Devoid of previous apprenticeship, they were mostly arrested 'in
the act', the charges brought against them being 'attempted theft',
'attempted robbery', etc. (Picotti 1979). More recent studies show
that users and small distributors are initiated in drugs via the
common channels of socialisation, and not through learning
processes associated with marginalisation or crime (Avico 1983;
Arlacchi and Lewis, op. eit.). Many are employed and become
unemployed only after developing a drug use career (70 per cent);
others start using and dealing while active in the licit economy,
and eventually continue to hold a position in it.
Finally, in Turin the first purchases of large quantities of drugs
were undertaken by 'adventurous' entrepreneurs who ran small licit
businesses. They did so after forming joint-ventures with excigarette smugglers, or other professional criminals who shifted
to the drug business such as bank robbers and bosses of illegal
gambling houses (Ruggiero 1992). My own informants in Turin

Drug Economics

claim that large-scale operations gathered momentum when the

small groups of users gave up self-supply, which they had
previously practised by means of independent trips to Amsterdam.
In the mid-1970s, the newly constituted groups of'professionals'
could buy larger quantities for each operation at a cheaper price.
They were both less 'visible' when crossing borders and more
reliable in the eyes of the larger distributors operating in
Amsterdam. Only eventually did traditional organised groups
such as the mafia enter the drug market of Turin. However, when
they managed to do so, they never achieved a monopolistic
position in it, and had to be contented with sbaring an oligopoly
with other groups. As for the user-distributors, official statistics
show that very few are able to develop a real career in the
economy of drugs, as they are intermittently arrested either aft:er
committing the same type of offence or while possessing the same
quantity of drug (ISTAT 1992). In other words, their career is
'blocked', for they prove incapable of ascending the distribution
hierarchy and acquiring the professionalism needed to do so.
The drug business in Italy both remodelled traditional
organised crime and shaped new organised groups which occupy,
along with the former, the leading positions in it. The material
I have provided so far suggests tbat the drug business fosters a
process whereby the creation of a number of 'expendable
labourers' servicing the market runs parallel with a drive towards
more structured and professionalised operations. These developments are not oppositional. On the contrary, it is the
employment of one which allows for the promotion ofthe other.

England: Indigenous entrepreneurs and their partners

The existence ofa heroin market in England can be traced back
to the mid-1960s. Until 1968 this market offered 100 per cent
pure heroin, which was legally bought with a medical prescription
but pardy ended up feeding a grey market. Legislation introduced
between the late 1960s and the early 1970s is said to have
modified this situation and indirectly caused the development of
a black market, where illegally imported heroin became available
(Whynes and Bean 1991). This legislation limited the doctors'
power to prescribe and marked tbe slow decline of the
maintenance model, a model allegedly abused by over-generous
practitioners.

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In England, many commentators indicate the early 1980s as

a turning point for drug distribution. Supply, which was locally
centred and poorly structured, became increasingly organised and
regularised (Stimson 1987). The explosion of the heroin
phenomenon is said to have favoured this shift, which is
commonly also described in relation to the variety of the
substances available on the market and the respective producing
countries. Chinese, Iranian and Pakistani illicit drugs successively
predominated in the markets of English cities, a circumstance
which leads many observers to investigate the trafficking routes
and the criminal enterprises connected to these producing
countries.
Two crucial features are usually regarded as necessary for an
efficient trafficking network. The first is impermeablity with
regard to police enquiries; the second is honesty in transactions
and compliance with verbal agreements. 'There are a couple of
institutions that measure up excellendy to such requirements.
One is the blood family, the other is the expatriate ethnic
community. Both have done well out of drugs trading' (Tyler
1986: 249). Due to their ancient custom of reciprocity and their
system of payment entirely based on trust, the Chinese illicit firms
are said to have carried out business undisturbed for years.
Allegedly, their sophisticated money laundering system allowed
for operations to be virtually undetected. Heroin, which was
bought in the Golden Triangle and routed through Hong Kong,
would reach England concealed among other products destined
for the Chinese immigrant community. Underground banking
would then guarantee the invisibility of profits (Nove 1991).
While charting the development of drug trafficking in
England, one may become entangled in the vexed questions
surrounding the relationship between race and crime. In
particular, there is a danger that the notion of drugs as an alien
conspiracy is unwittingly endorsed. This notion has been
adequately de-mythologised on a number of occasions (among
recent examples see: Kohn 1987; Arnao 1990; McCoy 1991;
Labrousse 1991; Ehrenberg and Mignon 1992; Pearce and
Woodiwiss 1993). However, it is important to add a number of
observations which are frequently lacking in the already existing
literature on this issue. The drug economy seems to mirror the
licit economies also with respect of its division of labour. In
countries with large ethnic minorities, the disadvantages based
on race, which are usually found within the official labour

Drug Economics

market, are in a sense reproduced within the criminal labour

market. Often, the most remunerative positions within criminal
economies are occupied by indigenous groups, whereas the most
poorly paid and dangerous tasks are entrusted to minorities
(Trimble, Boiek and Niemcryk 1992; Padilla 1992). In England,
for example, some groups or individuals engaged in the
importation of drugs may well belong to ethnic minorities, but
the 'added value' involved in their task may be much lower than
that involved in wholesale distribution. In turn, wholesale and
middle-range distribution are frequently controlled by indigenous
groups who have easier access to the market and to smaller
distributors who service it. In South London I came across
examples of this race-related division of labour. A street dealer
explained that black people find it difficult to climb the criminal
career echelon, due to their visibility and the lack of trust with
which they are regarded. In other words, in the criminal
economy they find the same obstacles they meet in the official
one (Ruggiero 1993c). These aspects should be borne in mind
while looking at the drug business in England.
Iranian groups are singled out as the major heroin importers
during the period 1982-84. It is presumed that drugs constituted
a currency for middle-class migrants who escaped the Ayatollah
regime and brought their assets to London, where they found
refuge (Burr 1984). The new settlers continued to feed limited
sectors ofthe market for about two years after the collapse ofthe
old Iranian regime. They would avail themselves of well
established connections with wholesale distributors in their
country of origin. The fact that they never developed a highly
remunerative economy is perhaps due to their lack of contacts
with locally established figures. White English drug distributors,
in fact, did business with other importers and dealt with higher
quality drugs that the Iranian 'brown' variety.
Their successors are purported to be Pakistani illegal entrepreneurs, who managed to reach a virtual monopoly on the
London market around the mid-1980s. These entrepreneurs are
said to be still in operation and to rely on partners who reside in
the producing country and act as mediators with local growers (di
Gennaro 1991; Labrousse 1991). From reports of major seizures
it appears that importers do not only include professional criminal
firms, but also 'clean' business people who may either indulge in
one-off operations or engage permanently in drug trading as a
sideline of their licit business.

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Another import route is believed to run overland through
Turkey and the Balkans. Importers are said to be working in
kilograms of drugs, which reach England either directly or through
other less 'suspect' countries (Royal College of Psychiatrists 1987).
Nigeria is deemed one ofthe most important staging posts for
drugs entering England (McCarthy and Kirby 1990). Heroin
following this route is often seized at British airports, and Nigerian
drug importers form the largest single group of foreign prisoners
in British institutions (ILPS 1990). Research conducted by Green
(1991) revealed that 72 per cent of persons imprisoned for illegal
importation of drugs were foreign nationals. 'Africans combined
account for 35 per cent of this population, with the largest
national category being Nigerian (30 per cent of the total)'
(ibid. 5). On June 1990, 26 per cent of women under sentence
were known to have been convicted of drug offences, compared
with 8 per cent of men on the same date. Almost 26 per cent of
women in prison were of minority ethnic origin, which compares
with 17 per cent on 30th June 1985. This unprecedented increase
is attributed to the growing drug-related offences committed by
women. 'Many of the women are drug couriers From other
countries, who will be deported after serving a prison sentence'
(Nacro 1991:2).
As already noted import operations and distribution are not
likely to be undertaken by the same groups. We have seen that
a large majority of apprehended importers and couriers are foreign
nationals. These are in no position to master the distribution
network in their host country. Therefore, they are forced to sell
consignments to local established figures with whom they end up
establishing business on a permanent basis. These local figures act
as wholesalers and, after buying from importers, pass over
quantities of drugs to a number of locally based middle-range
distributors. Some wholesalers are reported to have been
previously engaged in armed robberies. Presumably, they never
managed to invest the proceeds of their raids in legitimate
business, and their shift towards drugs was encouraged by the
increasing use of fire arms on the part ofthe police (Taylor 1984).
Drugs were welcomed as a long overdue chance to put guns away
Journalistic accounts also suggest that, after an initial resistance
to drug dealing, some professional criminals 'soon realised that
here was a new way of making money that required no getaway
car and ran less risk of informers. It had the added advantage that
there was no victim running to the police' (Campbell 1990: 5).

Drug Economics

Among this type of wholesale distributors, defined by Dorn

and South (1990) as 'criminal diversifier', groups are found which
were or are still active in the distribution of stolen goods. It is
assumed that a number of criminal diversifiers were formerly
owners of scrap metal businesses, a traditional activity among
organised gangs in London. Illegal entrepreneurs who shifted to
wholesale drug distribution capitalised on their knowledge of sale
networks and their awareness regarding the quantity and quality
of customers' demand. This knowledge and awareness mainly
belongs to traditional indigenous gangs, hence their crucial role
in drug supply (Dorn, Murji and South 1992).
Hobbs (1988) has studied the semi-legal entrepreneurial
culture prevailing in East London, whose peculiar economic
structure 'required generation upon generation of individuals to
acquire and internalise the essential characteristics ofthe business
entrepreneur' (ibid. 117). Here, an elite seems to be operating
which, after accumulating finance in traditional semi-legal trade,
performed an economic conversion to include the drug trade.
This shift may not have been traumatic, as 'the East End
entrepreneur deals and trades in commodities and services within
the parameters of a localised version of legitimate business practice
(ibid: 118).
Middle-range distributors are in contact with specific
communities where street dealers operate. Research suggests that
at this level of drug distribution individuals and groups are found
who are already involved in a variety of activities in the so-called
irregular economy. This economy provides those who inhabit it
with a 'facilitating subculture', but also with precise skills,
structures and roles. 'The irregular economy provides multiple
conduits for the distribution and exchange of drugs, and for a
variety of other goods and services, prostitution, the disposal of
stolen goods, and so on' (Auld et al 1986: 172). It also provides
a position within its structure which is modelled upon a more or
less strict division of labour. It is my contention that the
conversion of part of this irregular economy to the drug business
made its internal division of labour increasingly rigid. Research,
including my own, seem to prove that those who benefit from this
conversion are mainly individuals who already held an
entrepreneurial or managerial position in the irregular economy,
whereas those whose role was confined to the provision of 'pure
criminal labour' experience, with the shift to drugs, an
exacerbation of their economic dependence.

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Many users experiment with drugs while inhabiting the
irregular economy, where drugs add to other illicit goods already
circulating. Those who develop habitual use, and in particular
those who resort to property crime as a result of this, become
increasingly dependent on that economy which provides them
with both the doses and the market where their stolen goods are
circulated. Often, they are forced to give up their 'wage', as
transactions take on a non-monetary nature. The exchange
therefore may not entail the trinomial 'good-money-drug', but
simply the binomial 'good-drug'.
The illegal activities conducted by this type of user imply an
immutable pattern of tasks within a career which is virtually
stagnant. Users who have been followed up in their career show
how tbeir frenetic activities do not translate into upward mobility
(Ruggiero 1993c). A revolving-door situation prevents them from
improving their skills. This also applies to users who were not
'working' in the irregular economy prior to their drug using career:
their lack of apprenticeship keeps them at the bottom of the drug
hierarchy. Jarvis and Parker (1989) attempted an economic
evaluation of the illicit activities carried out by users, who were
found to receive only a small fraction of the value of the
commodities handled. While moving considerable wealth from
one place to another and from one person to another, the wealth
retained by them consisted primarily of drug doses. Moreover
'despite the glamour of the setting and the considerable sums of
money involved, many subjects described repetitive life-styles of
dull uniformity' (ibid: 182).
The number of seizures of drugs such as heroin decreased
between 1986 and 1990 from 323 to 272. At the same time, the
quantities of the same drug seized leaped from 179kg to 575kg
(Home Office 1992). Of course, statistics should be taken with
precaution. Nevertheless, I believe that these figures indicate
changes in the structure of drug supply whicb can be tentatively
summarised as follows. Wholesale operations are increasingly
conducted by well organised groups who have access to large
quantities ofdrugs and are in a position to invest large quantities
of money. In order to minimise risk, but also thanks to the
increasing finance at their disposal, these groups undertake a
reduced number of operations involving larger amounts ofdrugs.
Wholesalers, in other words, experienced a selective process
whereby only those endowed with effectiveness, professionalism
and larger funds were left in operation. On the other hand, the

Drug Economics

number of people stopped and searched for drugs by tbe police

rose from 32,500 to 97,800 (ibid). Tbis tripling in drug seizure
opportunities at street level did not result in more drugs being
found. Street dealers and user-distributors, in other words, did
not show an increased level of participation in the drug economy
over a period of five years. The age composition of drug offenders
may also yield interesting information. In 1990 well over half the
drug ofiisnders were aged 17-24, and very few had a criminal
record prior to involvement in drug use and petty distribution.
Young and clumsy, many did not bave the time to accomplish
criminal skills, a circumstance which exposed them to bigh hazard
in their day-to-day activity.
Also in England, we therefore witness the creation of an
inexperienced 'army' of users and small dealers who service tbe
drug market. This, on the other hand, shows a drive towards
more structured and professional operations at tbe top of the
distribution hierarchy.

Conclusion
The drug business modelled tbe organisation of crime to the point
that patterns of illegal activity in diverse contexts are becoming
increasingly uniform. Drug-related activities are assuming a
Fordist-type model, whereby the skills required to perform tasks
are visibly declining. Skills, one might say, are concentrated at tbe
managerial level of the drug economy, and are engrained in the
organisation oflabour, which is independent of tbose who play
a part in it. In this organisation, criminal labour becomes
increasingly 'abstract', as it is fragmented in a number of repetitive
operations whose purpose is lost. Gramsci's formulation of
Fordism comes here very useful (Gramsci 1951). This model of
work, be explains, includes both technical and social aspects,
therefore 'colonising' both the productive and the reproductive
sphere of labour. Many wbo work in tbe drug economy are
similarly trapped in a highly productive system, of which they
never share the profits, and in a social self reproduction also
dictated by that system.
As we have seen, in Italy the involvement in tbe drug business
of traditional organised crime led to its partial 'disorganisation'.
'Men of honour' were forced to form alliances and set up
partnerships with ordinary men, sometimes even witb neopbytes.

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Capital & Class*55

On the other hand, an atmy of unskilled criminal labour was
mobilised whose lack of apprenticeship makes it all the mote
vulnerable. Similarly, in England the development of the dtug
economy was accompanied by the partial decline of independent
groups and their subjection to mote organised structures.
Simultaneously, a mass of'delinquent-wotkets' without criminal
expertise was recruited. What is striking in both contexts is the
degree of conformity rather than of deviancy displayed by the
respective drug economies. Traits that one would associate with
the official society are paradoxically reproduced in the non-official
one. Like many licit industries, the drug industry entails a vertical
structure, a low degree of co-opetation among its members, or
rather an abstract, 'Fotdist' kind of co-operation among them.
Planning and execution are strictly separated. Moreover, like in
licit industries and society at large, the division of roles and tasks
is frequently based on race and gender. See for example the
recruitment of Arab immigrants in the lower echelon ofthe heroin
economy in Italy, and the consequent upward mobility of Italianborn drug dealers. Sec also the distribution of tasks in many parts
of the drug market in London. Here, impoverished areas are not
only prevented from establishing licit businesses, but they also fail
to set up prosperous illegal ones. Constant police control hampers
the development of a wealthy illegal economy. An example of this
was provided by a number of dealers I interviewed in the London
borough of Lambeth. Their prevailing feeling was that little
money is accumulated in the area through drug selling. The
relative poverty of the drug economy, vis-h-vis the number of
estimated users, was interpreted as a sign that profits go to other
city areas where police control is not as strict. In other words,
investors and large distributors were said to reside elsewhere. If
they operated in Lambeth, this would result in more money
circulation being visible there. This would also be apparent in
more licit businesses being set up with the proceeds of drug selling.
Examples of a gender-based division of labour in the drug
economy are also numerous. 'Some partners exploit the women's
ability to earn money through prostitution, giving up their own
earning efforts to live off those of their female partner' (Taylor
1993: 156). Others take advantage of women's skills and relative
inconspicuousness in shoplifting. We have seen the role of female
couriers in England, where the worst paid and most dangerous
task of importing is left to women. Research also suggests that
when women involved in the drug economy do acquire skills and

Drug Economics

status, they are met with a higher degree of stigmatisation than

their male counterparts (Rosenbaum and Murphy 1990; Connor
1990; Taylor 1993). Theit involvement in drugs is penalised also
because it signals the abandonment of their domestic role. When
they deal drugs, they are looked down upon not because they are
dealers, but because they are female dealers.
A fmal consideration should be given to the type of Fordism
operating in the drug economy. When Ford applied the first
assembly line to his car factory, a substantial incentive was given
to the work force in terms of salary. This pay rise was defined
with hindsight as the best cost-cutting measure ever applied by
the car industry (Btavcrman, op. cit.). The Fordist model in the
licit economy established itself within the sphere of what is termed
'monopoly sector' (O'Connor 1973). Here, a relative work
stability made up for the brutal rhythm of work and exploitation.
Those employed in the monopoly sector could at least temporarily
avoid the fear of unemployment, as production seemed assured
for ever. Conversely, the drug economy seems to adopt a Fordist
model of labour within the sphere of the 'competitive sector',
where markets are irregular and unstable, and work is often
seasonal. 'Working conditions in competitive industries tend to
be poor and unemployment and underemployment high.
Normally, workers do not earn enough to save for times of
unemployment, indebtedness, sickness, or death. Weak and
corrupt labour organisations do not secure adequate companypaid health, retirement, and other fringe benefits' (ibid: 15). But
this further aspect ofthe drug economy remains to be thoroughly
studied in future research.

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