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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 1 of 24

William R. Jones, Jr., Bar #001481


John T. Masterson, Bar #007447
Joseph J. Popolizio, Bar #017434
Justin M. Ackerman, Bar #030726
JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI, P.L.C.
2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 800
Phoenix, Arizona 85012
Telephone: (602) 263-1700
Fax: (602) 200-7801
wjones@jshfirm.com
jmasterson@jshfirm.com
jpopolizio@jshfirm.com
jackerman@jshfirm.com

Attorneys for Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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United States of America,


Plaintiff,

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v.

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Maricopa County, Arizona; Maricopa County


Sheriffs Office; and Joseph M. Arpaio, in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Maricopa
County, Arizona,

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DEFENDANT ARPAIOS MOTION


FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(Oral Argument Requested)

Defendants.

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NO. CV12-00981-PHX-ROS

Pursuant to Rule 56(a), Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio moves for Partial


Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Complaint. Summary Judgment is appropriate because:
(1) the District Courts injunction in Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-02513, removes the
case or controversy as to Counts One, Two, Three, and Five and deprives Plaintiff of
standing for those claims; (2) the record is devoid of any evidence that Limited English
Proficiency (LEP) Inmates lack meaningful access to information and services under
Counts Four and Five; (3) Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendant lacked probable cause for
his alleged retaliation against critics under Count Six; and (4) Plaintiffs prayer for
relief is an impermissible obey the law injunction. This Motion is supported by the
accompanying Statement of Facts.
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I.

DEFENDANT
IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS
ONE,1 TWO, THREE, AND FIVE REGARDING DISCRIMINATORY
TRAFFIC STOPS.

Before this Court can decide whether Melendres v. Arpaio has preclusive

effect on the Claims asserted in this case, [See Statement of Facts in Support of Defendant

Arpaios Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (SOF) 1] it must first decide if it has

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Claims. See Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles,

328 F.3d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 2003). Ironically, it is the Courts ruling in Melendres that

deprives this Court of an active case or controversy as well as Plaintiff of standing for its

claims involving discriminatory traffic stops in Counts One, Two, Three, and Five.2

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This Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims involving


discriminatory traffic stops because the Melendres order has eliminated
the case or controversy asserted by Plaintiffs claims.

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The jurisdiction of federal courts depends on the existence of a case or

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controversy under Article III of the Constitution. Public Utilities Com'n v. Federal

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Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir.1996) (quotations omitted). A

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case or controversy exists when one party demonstrates that it has suffered injury-in-fact

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which fairly can be traced to acts or omissions of the second party and when there is a

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substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed. Johnson v.

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Weinberger, 851 F.3d 233, 235 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Davis v. Federal Election

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Commission, 554 U.S. 724, 732-33 (2008) (To qualify as a case fit for federal-court

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A.

The only parts of Counts One, Two Three, and Five that Defendant is not moving
for summary judgment involves the alleged discriminatory conduct by Defendant during
worksite operations pursuant to a valid warrant targeting identity theft and fraud.
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As a threshold issue, although this Court stated that E.E.O.C. v. Goodyear
Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1987) may be dispositive on this issue during
its most recent status conference, Goodyear is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
First, the class action preceding Goodyear did not involve similar claims of injunctive
relief as this Court is faced with. Therefore, the issues Defendant raises with this Courts
subject matter jurisdiction and standing were not at issue in Goodyear. Furthermore,
Defendant is not asserting that the res judicata effects of Melendres bar plaintiffs claims
under Counts One, Two, Three and Five. Rather, Defendant is asserting that Melendres,
independent of its res judicata effects, deprives this Court of an active case or controversy
as well as Plaintiff of an actual injury for standing purposes. Paradoxically, it is Plaintiff
who asserts that the res judiciata effects of Melendres apply to this case by making an
issue preclusion argument. [SOF 1].
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adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at
the time the complaint is filed.) (emphasis added).

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Plaintiff cannot show a substantial likelihood that the injunction it requests


will redress the injury claimed, because the Melendres Order has already remedied the
wrongs Plaintiff claims. As shown below, the Melendres Complaint alleged the same
discriminatory traffic stop issues that Plaintiff now asserts:3

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Melendres Complaint [SOF 2]

Plaintiffs Complaint [SOF 3]

131. Defendants, acting under color of law


and in concert with one another, engaged,
and continued to engage, in profiling and
discriminatory treatment of Plaintiffs and
other Latino individuals based on their race,
color and/or ethnicity.

166. The Defendants . . . have engaged in


law enforcement practices, including traffic
stops . . . with the intent to discriminate
against Latino persons in Maricopa County
on the basis of their race, color, or national
origin.

132. Defendants have acted pretextually,


with racial motivation and without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
stop, detain, question, search and/or arrest
Plaintiffs or any of the other Latino
individuals referred to above.

169. The Defendants . . .


have
unreasonably searched, arrested, and
detained numerous persons in Maricopa
County, including searches and arrests
without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion.

135. By their conduct described above,


Defendants . . . have devised and
implemented a policy, custom and practice
of illegally stopping, detaining, questioning
or searching Latino individuals because of
their race, color and/or ethnicity.

174. The Defendants have engaged in law


enforcement practices with the intent to
discriminate against Latinos on the basis of
their race, color, or national origin.

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Similarly, Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief already afforded in


Melendres. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring the Court to address the following
areas: policies and training; non-discriminatory policing and jail operations; stops,
searches, and arrests; response to crimes of sexual violence4; posse operations; jail
operations; supervision; misconduct complaint intake, investigation, and adjudication;
retaliation; oversight and transparency; and community engagement. [SOF 4] The
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Plaintiff alleged at the October 6, 2014 status conference hearing that the
Melendres Complaint did not involve Claims of discriminatory conduct for general
traffic stops by Defendant. This is not true. [SOF 5]
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Plaintiff has stipulated, and this court has recognized, that Plaintiff is not pursuing
crimes of sexual violence either in its Complaint or in this case. [SOF 6]
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Melendres Court fully decided this controversy. Following a 142 page findings of fact
and conclusions of law, it issued a 59 page supplemental permanent injunction on these
very issues, ordering an exceptional amount of oversight and reform over Defendants
training, policies, and procedures. The following provides a brief outline of the changes
required by the Melendres Order:

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(1) establishing an independent monitor to screen Defendants


activity for discriminatory behavior;

(2) reform of Defendants policies and procedures to ensure


bias free policing;

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(3) adequate training to ensure compliance with reformed


policies;

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(4) reforms on the number of supervising officers in the field;

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(5) requirements to collect data sufficient to measure the


effect of any racial bias on Defendants traffic enforcement;

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(6) requirement that the independent monitor have access to


this information;

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(7) public meetings on Defendants reform initiatives which


include the ability to adopt or modify measures that take into
account public feedback;

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(8) sustained community outreach so that Defendant can hear


and appropriately respond to community concerns;

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(9) an implementation of an early identification system to


identify and respond to potentially problematic behaviors as
early as possible;

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(10) policies and procedures that encourage the reporting of


potential misconduct and to ensure that any misconduct is
appropriately investigated and addressed; and

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(11) reporting requirements to keep apprised the monitor, the


parties, the Court and the community on Defendants reform
efforts.

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[SOF 7-8]

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Given the similar claims and broad-ranging relief ordered in Melendres,


there is simply no substantial likelihood that this Court could grant Plaintiff any relief that
has not already been ordered in Melendres. Accordingly, since no remaining controversy

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exists on these issues, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs
allegations in Counts One, Two, Three, and Five involving discriminatory traffic stops.5

B.

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The Melendres injunction order deprives Plaintiff of Article III


standing to raise the discriminatory traffic stop claims in Counts One,
Two, Three and Five.
Because the Melendres Court already issued the injunction Plaintiff seeks

here, Plaintiff also lacks standing to assert its discriminatory traffic stop claims. Oregon
v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)) (A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each
claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought.); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff had standing to
pursue damages, he lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief.). To satisfy Article III's
standing requirements a plaintiff must show: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992); Mayfield v. United States,
599 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing these elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

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Plaintiff cannot demonstrate an immediate or future threat of


discriminatory traffic stops.

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A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief premised upon alleged past wrongs must

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demonstrate a real or immediate threat of an irreparable injury to satisfy the injury in

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The Melendres defendants appeal of the injunctive Order does not change the
effect of that Order on this Courts subject matter jurisdiction or Plaintiffs standing. See
State of California Dept. of Soc. Services v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2003)
(the bare act of taking an appeal does not defeat the res judicata effect of a federal
district court decision); Tripati v. Henman, 857 F.2d 1366, 1367 (9th Cir. 1988) (The
established rule in the federal courts is that a final judgment retains all of its res judicata
consequences pending decision of the appeal.). In addition, in moving for summary
judgment on Counts One, Two, Three and Five, Defendant Arpaio does not waive any
appellate rights in Melendres.
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fact prong of the standing test. Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir.
2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 (1983)); see also HodgersDurgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, Plaintiff must
show the existence of an official policy or its equivalent likely to cause future injury. See
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 10506 (stating that [i]n order to establish an actual controversy in
this case, Lyons would have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter
with the police but also to allege the existence of an official policy or its equivalent); see
also Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that Plaintiff lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief because he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of future
harm even if he were subjected to an official policy).

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Plaintiff cannot make this showing.

The Melendres injunction is

comprehensive in stamping out any possibility of discriminatory policies and future


behavior by Defendant. [See SOF 8] As set forth above, it broadly outlines and has
established intensive oversight by an independent monitor and that the Court, community,
and parties involved in the litigation will all be apprised of Defendants progress. [See
id.] The order ensures extensive training and supervision of Defendants employees and
heightened misconduct reporting systems. [See id.] It also requires increased community
outreach and communication with regard to Defendants policies and conduct. [See id.]
With these extensive safeguards in place, Plaintiff cannot meet its burden of showing a
real and immediate threat of repeated future harm by Defendant or the existence of an
official policy or its equivalent likely to cause future injury. Clark, 259 F.3d at 1007; see
also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 (Holding because the police conduct complained of was not
likely to occur to Plaintiff in the foreseeable future, the district court lacked standing to
enter injunctive relief.); Shain, 356 F.3d at 216 (holding same).6
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Plaintiffs failure to establish a likelihood of future injury similarly renders their


claims for declaratory relief unripe [SOF 9]. See Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199
F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (In suits seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief
against a defendant's continuing practices, the ripeness requirement serves the same
function in limiting declaratory relief as the imminent-harm requirement serves in limiting
injunctive relief.).
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2.

In addition to being unable to show the threat of future harm, Plaintiff

cannot meet its burden of showing the redressability element of Article III standing.

Plaintiff must be able to show a likelihood that the alleged injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision. See Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982). The

focus for redressability is always upon the ability of the court to redress the injury

suffered by the plaintiff; if the wrong parties are before the court, or if the requested relief

would worsen the plaintiff's position, or if the court is unable to grant the relief that

relates to the harm, the plaintiff lacks standing. Id. (emphasis added).
As the following chart clearly demonstrates, Plaintiff cannot make this

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Plaintiff cannot meet the redressability element of standing.

showing because Melendres already granted the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks here:
Melendres Injunction [SOF 8]
Plaintiffs Proposed Injunction [SOF 4]
Reporting requirements to keep apprised
the monitor, the parties, the Court and the
community on Defendants reform efforts.
An independent monitor to screen
Defendants activity for discriminatory Oversight and transparency;
behavior;
Implementation of an early identification
system to identify and respond to
potentially problematic behaviors as early
as possible;
Reform of Defendants policies and
procedures to ensure bias free policing;
Adequate training to ensure compliance
with reformed policies;
Reforms on the number of supervising
officers in the field;
Sustained community outreach so that
Defendant can hear and appropriately
respond to community concerns;
Policies and procedures that encourage the
reporting of potential misconduct and
ensure that any misconduct is appropriately
investigated.

Non-discriminatory policing and stops,


searches, and arrests; Posse operations;
Policies and training;
Supervision;
Community engagement;

Misconduct complaint intake, investigation

In addition, Defendant has not only implemented the above mentioned changes, but has
gone above and beyond the Melendres Orders requirements. [See SOF 10-52]
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Therefore, because the Melendres injunction already provided the redress


Plaintiff seeks here, Plaintiff lacks standing because it cannot demonstrate that there is any
remaining remedy this Court can order to redress its claims.7 See e.g., Sharp v. United
Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404, 410 (10th Cir. 1992) (it is clear that . . . there is a risk of
duplicative recoveries or the necessity of apportioning damages if plaintiffs are allowed
standing.); 87th Street Owners Corp. v. Carnegie Hill87th Street Corp., 251 F.Supp.2d
1215 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (Summary Judgment appropriate because plaintiff was unable to
identify a single action that the court could order the defendant to take that had not yet
been undertaken by third parties).

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3.

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Another reason to grant Defendant summary judgment is that the claims are
moot, given that Melendres has already resolved the discriminatory traffic stop issue.
Generally, an action is mooted when the issues presented are no longer live and therefore
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest for which the courts can grant a remedy.
Alaska Ctr. For Env't v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1999). This occurs
when the requested relief has already been secured in another proceeding or when full
relief has been granted to another party on the same issue. See e.g., Kittel v. Thomas,
620 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (Petitioner sought habeas corpus petition mooted when
the regulation on which his petition rested held invalid in a different action); Hispanic
Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir.
2012) (ruling in one case that provisions of state statute were pre-empted mooted claims
by private plaintiffs to restrain parts of the same provisions on a different ground).

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Defendants compliance with the Melendres Order moots


Plaintiffs Counts One, Two, Three, and Five involving
discriminatory traffic stops.

Here, the Melendres Court has already made a determination that Defendant
unlawfully discriminated against Latinos during traffic stops and has put into place a

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See supra n.3, noting that the Melendres complaint did raise general
discriminatory traffic enforcement issues.
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comprehensive scheme to ensure discrimination no longer occurs. [See SOF 7-8]


Additionally, the independent monitor in Melendres is overseeing Defendant Arpaio to
ensure that Defendant is fully complying with the injunctive order.

[See SOF 8]

Further, the Sheriff and his command staff have personally seen to Maricopa County
Sheriffs Office (MCSO) continued cooperation with the Court appointed monitor and
his team of 13 people to ensure that the MCSO complies with the Melendres Order in
every respect. [See SOF 10-52] Accordingly, the conduct alleged by Plaintiff is
simply no longer occurring. Thus, Plaintiffs discriminatory traffic claims are moot.8
II.

THE RECORD LACKS EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANTS TREATMENT


OF LEP INMATES VIOLATES TITLE VI.

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Plaintiff alleges in Counts Four and Five that Defendant has excluded and

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denied LEP Latino prisoners from participating in and benefiting from Defendants

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programs and activities relating to the operation of Maricopa County Jails which has had

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an adverse and disparate impact on Latino LEP prisoners. [Complaint 178, 184] Title

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VI provides that [n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or

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national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

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subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial

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assistance. 42 U.S.C. 2000d. To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must show that

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Defendant receives federal funding and that he engages in intentional racial

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discrimination. Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th

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Cir.1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare

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Defendant also notes that given the Courts supervision and enforcement
mechanisms put in place by Melendres, traditional exceptions to the mootness doctrine do
not apply to save Plaintiffs claims under Counts One, Two, Three, and Five. See Native
Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that for the
capable of repetition yet evading review exception to apply a Plaintiff must allege a
type of injury which is of such inherently limited duration that it is likely always to
become moot prior to review.); see also Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d
960, 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the voluntary cessation exception to mootness
does not apply when complying with a court order) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not
alleged an injury inherently limited in duration nor can it overcome the issues of mootness
involved due to Defendants compliance with the Court Order issued in Melendres. [See
SOF 10-52]
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Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). The Defendant does not dispute that his office
receives federal funding, but Plaintiff cannot show that there has been intentional racial
discrimination as to LEP inmates in violation of Title VI.

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To prove intentional discrimination under Title VI, Plaintiff must show that
a challenged action was motivated by an intent to discriminate. Elston v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993). This requires a showing that
the decision maker was not only aware of the complainants race, color, or national origin,
but that the recipient acted, at least in part, because of the complainants race, color, or
national origin. Id. In the absence of such evidence, claims of intentional discrimination
under Title VI are analyzed using the Title VII burden shifting analytic framework
established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Rashdan v. Geissberger, 12-16305, 2014 WL 4194090 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2014)
(We now join the other circuits in concluding that McDonnell Douglas also applies to
Title VI disparate treatment claims.).

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The standard for Title VI LEP inmate discrimination focuses on


whether reasonable steps were taken by a recipient to provide LEP
inmates with meaningful access to information and services.

Under this analysis, to demonstrate a Title VI claim, Plaintiff must establish


more than the mere occurrence of isolated, accidental, or sporadic discriminatory acts
by Defendant. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336
(1977). Rather, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the failure to provide information and
services in a language other than English resulted in a significant number of LEP
beneficiaries being unable to fully realize the intended benefits of a federally assisted
program or activity. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (holding that the lack
of access to LEP beneficiaries denied them meaningful opportunity to participate in the
educational program all earmarks of the discrimination banned by [the Title VI
implementing regulations].). The Department of Justice has interpreted Lau to require
Title VI funding recipients to take reasonable steps to provide meaningful access to the

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recipients programs under the following four factor test:

What constitutes reasonable steps to ensure meaningful access


will be contingent on a number of factors. Among the factors
to be considered are the number or proportion of LEP persons
in the eligible service population, the frequency with which
LEP individuals come in contact with the program, the
importance of the service provided by the program, and the
resources available to the recipient.

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See 65 F.R. 50123-01, 50124 (Aug. 16, 2000) (emphasis added); see also Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulation is
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation).

B.

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As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot carry its burden to demonstrate that


Defendant has failed to reasonably provide LEP inmates with meaningful access to
information and services. The record, in fact, is quite to the contrary. Defendants DI-6
Policy for Limited English Proficiency (LEP) Inmates outlines the following extensive
measures taken at its jails9 to ensure LEP inmates receive meaningful access to
information and services:

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(1) Inmate Access to Programs: Inmates, including hearingimpaired inmates, shall not be denied access to any programs
or services based solely on their limited
ability to speak, read,
or understand the English language.10

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(2) Rights and Protections: LEP inmates shall be afforded


the same rights and protections mandated by the Prison Rape
Elimination Act (PREA) and all other associated and
applicable federal, state, and local laws and ordinances.

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The record is replete with evidence that Defendant took and continues
to take reasonable steps to provide LEP inmates with meaningful access
to information and services.

The Maricopa County Jail system consists of six jails: 4th Avenue Jail, Durango
Jail, Estrella Jail, Towers Jail, Lower Buckeye Jail, and the In-Tents Jail facilities. The
Maricopa County Jails are designed to hold, in the aggregate and at full capacity, 10,872
inmates. On average, approximately over the past two years, 32% of all inmates in the
jails have been Hispanic with 6.3% of those inmates being documented as LEP. [SOF
53-54]
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For example, Defendants jails offers bilingual classes for LEP inmates including
Anger Management, 12-Steps, Parenting, Cognitive, and AA. Furthermore, any inmates
requesting to take an English only class would never be refused entry due to their LEP
designation. Finally, religious services are also offered in English and Spanish. [SOF
70-72]
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(3) Identification and Records: LEP inmates are identified,


and recorded as such, during the intake and classification
process at Central Intake or the Self-Surrender
Center located
at the Lower Buckeye Jail (LBJ).11 Once identified as a LEP
inmate, a comment shall be placed in the Jail Management
System (JMS). The comment will then print on the housing
unit rosters.

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(4) Language Identification Signs: Language identification


signs shall be posted in Central Intake, the Self-Surrender
Center at LBJ, and all inmate housing units to assist
staff
members in identifying the language of a LEP inmate.12

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(5) Inmate Informational Postings: All inmate informational


postings in the jail housing units shall be in English and
Spanish, at a minimum.

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(6) Booklets and Forms: Booklets and forms issued for


inmate use, including, but not limited to, the Rules and
Regulations for Inmates booklet; the Inmate Request Form
(Tank Orders); the Inmate Grievance Form, including all
levels of appeals; the Inmate Legal Services Request (ILS)
form; and Health Needs Request Form (HNR) shall be
available in English and Spanish. Additional forms shall be
made available, as needed.

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(7) Training: The Training Division shall provide a LEP


training course during the Basic Academy, as well as
continuing training for detention staff. This course shall
include information regarding available resources to assist
staff members in communicating with LEP inmates.

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(8) Detention Language Roster: The Training Division shall


be responsible for maintaining a Detention Language Roster.13
11

At all steps during inmate intake, MCSO has put into place redundancies to ensure
that LEP inmates are properly identified and cared for. The first step during inmate intake
at either Central Intake or at LBJ is for inmates to go through a medical assessment to
determine if they are medically stable to be in the jail system. During the medical
assessment, an information officer meets and greets all incoming inmates and answers any
questions about the intake process. This officer also determines if an inmate should be
designated as LEP, and gives each inmate a bilingual information sheet which explains the
intake procedure. Additionally, the information officer is one step in the LEP
identification process as every officer that comes into contact with the inmate during the
intake procedure gathers information on whether the inmate is LEP (based on interactions
with the inmate and his or her ability to communicate with MCSO officers). Furthermore,
LEP identification training is provided to each officer. Finally, LEP designation can also
come from the IA Courts as inmates regularly request interpreters to fully understand the
questions posed by the court. [SOF 55-64]
12
Since 2007, a year before the Plaintiffs investigation began, MCSO has posted
extensive bilingual signs throughout MCSO Jails, which in total amount to more than
1850 signs. [SOF 75]
13
As of August 8, 2014, the roster contains over 240 names of voluntary bilingual or
multilingual officers, 172 of which speak Spanish. [SOF 91]
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 13 of 24

(9) LEP Manager: The Custody Business Operations/Special


Projects Division shall be responsible
for assigning a LEP
Manager to each jail facility.14

2
3

(10) Available Resources: Resources available to


communicate with LEP inmates include, but are not limited to,
the following:

4
5

A. Voiance Language Services (1-866-533-4998,


Access Code 985692). Detention Officers in
assignments with regular inmate contact shall be
required to carry a wallet card listing the contact
information for Voiance Language Services.

B. Detention Language Roster.

C. During an emergency situation when the security of


a facility or the safety or health of an officer, staff
member, or inmate may be at risk, an officer may
request another inmate to provide interpretation for a
LEP inmate. Officers15 shall use discretion when
considering this option.

10
11
12

(11) Reasonable Accommodations: Accommodations shall


be considered if a LEP inmate requires special attention.
Every reasonable effort shall be made to provide a LEP inmate
with meaningful access to information, programs, and
services.

13
14
15

(12) Assisting the Public: The Sheriffs Information


Management Services (SIMS) shall request bilingual and
multilingual personnel, as well as Voiance Language Services,
to assist members of the public who are LEP individuals when
providing non-confidential information on the public jail
information telephone line or, in the Bonds and Fines lobby at

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

14

The duties of the LEP Manager include, but are not limited to (1) maintaining a
LEP Manager Manual which includes current resources available to all detention staff that
assist them in communicating with LEP inmates; (2) maintaining and updating all LEP or
inmate informational postings in the intake areas and housing units, (3) ensuring the jail
maintains text telephone (TTY) machines in good working order and all detention officers
are aware of how to properly operate them; (4) ensuring all detention personnel are kept
up to date on all LEP-related information; (5) conduct random monthly interviews of two
LEP inmates and one officer regarding their LEP related experiences and concerns; (6)
compiling weekly statistics regarding the number of LEP inmates housed at the facility
and the languages they speak, which is captured in a JMS report each Monday and made
available on the Sheriffs Office Intranet. [SOF 68, 78-79]
15
In addition to what is required pursuant to the DI-6 Policy, Defendant has
embarked on a multi-million dollar project, known as the Sierra Detention System, to
make bilingual jail announcements automatically with a mere selection and touch of
computer monitors in all jails. The Sierra Detention System is already running in 4th
Avenue Jail, and installation of the system is underway in the rest of the MCSO facilities,
which will be completed within the next year. Sierra has also informed MCSO that this
project is the largest of its kind ever attempted in the detention industry. [SOF 96-99]
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 14 of 24

the 4th Avenue Jail.

(13) Visitation: Detention personnel assigned to the Visitation


area of each jail facility shall take all reasonable steps to assist
LEP members of the public when requesting to visit an inmate
or requesting jail-related information, including utilizing
bilingual and multilingual detention personnel and Voiance
Language Services.

3
4
5

(14) Language Services: All Office language services, as


required or applicable when conducting detention-related
Office business, shall be provided free of charge to inmates,
their family members, or members of the general public.

6
7
8

[SOF 68]

Defendants DI-6 policy explicitly notes that [i]t is the policy of

10

[Defendants] Office to provide for effective communication with inmates and the public

11

with limited English language proficiency, regarding detention-related Office business,

12

and to be in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and all

13

other applicable laws. [SOF 73]

14

Defendants DI-6 policy is enforced within Defendants jails and that the current DI-6

15

policy is only the most recent incarnation of a long standing effort by Defendant to ensure

16

LEP inmates have meaningful access to information and services.16

Furthermore, the record is uncontested that

17

On the other hand, Plaintiffs experts have not opined that Defendants DI-6

18

Policy does not provide LEP inmates with meaningful access to any program or services

19

offered at Defendants jails. Neither could they point to a single, specific instance where

20

an inmate was not classified as LEP nor that misclassification resulted in harm to any

21

inmate. [SOF 100] It, therefore, comes as no surprise that there has not been a single

22

inmate grievance or complaint from a former inmates family or friends produced by

23

Plaintiff complaining of LEP issues in the Maricopa County jails. [SOF 101] In fact,

24

the most convincing piece of evidence in the record demonstrating Defendants

25

compliance with Title VI is that during Plaintiffs investigation of Defendants Jails the

26

16

27
28

The DI-6 policy was originally enacted in 2013. However, even before the
establishment of a formal LEP policy, Defendant took reasonable steps to ensure that LEP
inmates had access to programs and services. [SOF 65-67] By way of example, prior
to DI-6, Defendant employed use of the language line for over two decades. [SOF 81]
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 15 of 24

1
2
3
4
5
6

U.S. Department of Justice, Marshalls Service, certified all of Defendants jails as


compliant (the highest assessment possible) with the requirements that Detainees are
not discriminated against based on gender, race, religion, national origin, or disability
and that detainees are provided opportunities to communicate to staff, both written and
verbal and when necessary communications aids are provided (translations, translators,
hearing impaired aids, etc.). [SOF 102-104]

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Accordingly, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, it has not and cannot meet its burden of showing Title VI violations. The
undisputed facts show that Defendant has gone well beyond taking reasonable steps to
ensure LEP inmates have meaningful access to the information and services provided by
Defendants Jails.17 Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Counts Four
and Five of Plaintiffs Complaint involving a Title VI violation.

See Franklin v. D.C.,

960 F. Supp. 394, 432 (D.D.C. 1997) rev'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 163
F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding no Title VI violation because LEP Hispanic inmates
are not being barred from participation in prison programs because of their race, color or
national origin. While the programs are open to all inmates, limited-English proficient
inmates' participation is limited only by their English fluency.).
III.

THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFFS RETALIATION


CLAIMS UNDER COUNT SIX.

20

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. 14141 by retaliating

21

against persons in Maricopa County, thereby chilling future protected speech under the

22

First Amendment. [Complaint 187-88] The persons allegedly chilled are largely

23

unnamed attorneys, judges, and protestors who allegedly spoke out against MCSO and

24

Sheriff Arpaio. [Id. at 140-42, 148-50] Despite Plaintiffs characterizations, Summary

25

Judgment in favor of Defendant is appropriate on Count Six because (1) as a matter of law

26
27
28

17

Defendant also notes that by having a LEP policy in place, Plaintiff can only raise a
claim that Defendant has failed to implement that policy fully, and such a failure cannot,
as a matter of law, constitute intentional discrimination.
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 16 of 24

1
2
3
4

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a pattern and practice of discrimination and (2) injunctive
relief is inappropriate because it is not reasonably foreseeable that Defendant will
investigate, arrest, file judicial and/or bar complaints, or initiate lawsuits against any
alleged critic without reasonable suspicion or probable cause in the future.

A.

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a pattern and practice of retaliation under


42 U.S.C. 14141.

Section 14141 permits the Attorney General to bring a civil action to obtain

appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a pattern or practice of

unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officers. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

10

has engaged in a pattern or practice of retaliation against his critics by (1) filing judicial

11

and/or bar complaints and (2) investigating, arresting, and instituting lawsuits against

12

alleged critics of Defendants immigration policies.

13

However, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot carry its burden of showing a pattern and

14

practice of discrimination because an absolute privilege applies to any filing of

15

professional complaints in Arizona and Plaintiff has failed to prove the absence of

16

reasonable suspicion or probable cause for Defendants alleged retaliatory investigations,

17

arrests and prosecutions.

18

1.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

[See Complaint 140-50]

Defendant is protected by an absolute privilege for any alleged


retaliation by filing judicial and/or bar complaints.

Plaintiff first relies on Arizona Bar complaints and complaints to the


Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct to demonstrate Defendant engaged in a pattern
and practice of retaliation. [Complaint at 140-41] However, Arizona courts have held
that public policy and legal precedent compel us to adopt the position that there is an
absolute privilege extended to anyone who files a complaint with the State Bar alleging
unethical conduct by an attorney. Drummond v. Stahl, 127 Ariz. 122, 126, 618 P.2d 616,
620 (App.1980); see also Ledvina v. Cerasani, 213 Ariz. 569, 572, 8, 146 P.3d 70, 73
(App. 2006) (holding same for complaints given to law enforcement); In re Moore, 186
B.R. 962, 977 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying state law on privilege to hold that

28
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 17 of 24

1
2
3
4
5
6

summary judgment in Defendant's favor should be granted against Plaintiffs on the


grounds that Plaintiffs are barred, as a matter of law, from bringing an action against
Defendant for wrongful prosecution of administrative proceedings, based upon
Defendant's filing of the State Bar Complaint.). Therefore, any alleged retaliation by
Defendant involving filing judicial or bar complaints is absolutely privileged and cannot
serve as a basis to support a 14141 claim involving a pattern and practice of retaliation.

2.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

In Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2006), the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff who sues criminal investigators on a retaliatory prosecution claim alleging
a First Amendment violation must plead and prove the absence of probable cause as an
element of plaintiffs claim. In Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th
Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit interpreted Hartman to only apply in the context of
retaliatory prosecution claims and held that a Plaintiff does not need to allege the absence
of probable cause to support a claim for retaliatory arrests. Since publication of Skoog,
the Ninth Circuit has shifted away from this conclusion and returned to the general
principle announced in Hartman that a Plaintiff must establish the absence of probable
cause to prove retaliation.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Plaintiff must allege the absence of probable cause in order to


establish a retaliatory investigation, arrest or prosecution has
occurred.

This shift began in May 2008, when the Ninth Circuit noted, in contrast to
its statement in Skoog, that Hartman applies equally to First Amendment retaliatory arrest
and retaliatory prosecution cases. See Back v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir.
2008). In December 2008, the Ninth Circuit, in Dietrich v. Ascuagas Gold Nugget, 548
F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), clarified that the Hartman standard applies only to retaliatory
prosecution cases, but emphasized that the existence of probable cause has high
probative force even in ordinary retaliation cases not involving a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 901; see also Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the presence of probable cause is not irrelevant to an individuals claim that

28
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 18 of 24

he was booked and jailed in retaliation for his speech.).

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Despite the waxing and waning of the Ninth Circuit, in its most recent
opinion on this issue, it affirmatively stated that the existence of probable cause is
dispositive of a retaliatory arrest claim. In Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800,
825 (9th Cir. 2013), the Court noted that in the context of a First Amendment retaliation
arrest claim, resolution of the alleged retaliation turns on whether probable cause existed
to seize [the plaintiff].

25
26
27

The Acosta Court relied on Reichle v.

Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 182 (2012), where it noted that the Supreme Court held that it
had never recognized, nor was there a clearly established First Amendment right to be free
from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by probable cause. Acosta, 718 F.3d
at 825; see also Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2097 ([I]t was not clearly established that an arrest
supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment violation.).
Accordingly, relying on Reichle, the court in Acosta held that even assuming that Acosta
was arrested in retaliation for his remarks, because probable cause existed for a violation
of 2-61, the officers are still entitled to qualified immunity, not only for the removal of
Acosta from the chambers, but also for his subsequent arrest. Id. Accordingly, pursuant
to Acosta and Rechlie, a plaintiff bringing a claim for retaliatory investigation or arrest
must allege the absence of probable cause. See also Am. News & Info. Services, Inc. v.
Gore, 12-CV-2786 BEN KSC, 2014 WL 4681936 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014) (analyzing
Skoog, Rechlie, and Acosta and concluding that in light of Acostas statement about
Rechlie, the Court should dismiss plaintiffs claims involving retaliatory arrests due to the
failure to prove probable cause did not exist).

23
24

(Emphasis added).

The record in this case is devoid any of evidence that Defendants


investigations, arrests, and lawsuits lacked probable cause. Rather, as a smokescreen,
Plaintiff has attempted to bootstrap the Arizona bars investigation of former Maricopa
County Attorney Andrew Thomas and alleged retaliations against unnamed critics to
assert it has sufficient evidence of a pattern and practice of retaliation under 14141.

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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 19 of 24

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

However, Plaintiff cannot escape that it has failed to show that Defendants actions lacked
probable cause for any of the alleged instances of retaliation. Therefore, it comes as no
surprise that Plaintiff at least admitted that the existence of probable cause is not at issue
in many of the instances of retaliation challenged by the United States . . . . [SOF at
105] Thus, Plaintiffs baseless allegations of retaliation cannot remotely support a claim
that Defendant has engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct against his critics in
violation of 14141.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

In conclusion, as a matter of law, Defendant has not instituted a pattern and


practice of retaliation against his alleged critics because (1) any judicial and/or bar
complaints filed on his behalf are absolutely privileged and (2) Plaintiff has not
demonstrated the absence of probable cause for any alleged retaliatory investigations,
arrests or prosecutions. Accordingly, because the record does not support any of the
alleged instances of retaliation, Defendant could not have committed a pattern and
practice of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 14141.

Therefore, summary judgment is

appropriate on Plaintiffs claims under Count Six.

16

B.

17

Injunctive relief on Count Six is improper because Plaintiff cannot


prove potential for immediate and future retaliation by Defendant.

18

As previously stated, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief premised upon an

19

alleged past wrong must demonstrate a real and immediate threat of repeated future

20

harm to satisfy the injury in fact prong of the standing test. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105;

21

Clark, 259 F.3d at 1007. Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief in this case, and as such

22

cannot rely on any alleged past retaliation alone to establish standing, it must prove that

23

there is a real and immediate threat of repeated future retaliation by Defendant. Clark,

24

259 F.3d at 1007. However, notwithstanding the truth of Plaintiffs allegations, the

25

record is uncontested that Defendant has not authorized any investigations, arrests,

26

professional complaints or lawsuits against any alleged critic since 2010:

27

MR. MASTERSON: Well -- and this is a big assumption.


Let's assume that they could prove that the Sheriff's Office

28
3885779.1
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 20 of 24

retaliated against someone in the Maricopa County area


because of their opinions or criticisms of Sheriff Arpaio. Let's
assume that to be the case. What we don't have is that
occurring or even an allegation of that occurring since 2010.
Not a one.

2
3
4

THE COURT: Okay. Let me stop you. Mr. Caspar, is that


correct?

5
6
7

MR. CASPAR: None of the allegations in this case have


occurred since the Sheriff stopped this conduct in 2010.

[SOF 106-110 (emphasis added)] Moreover, the record is devoid of any facts or

evidence that there was or will be retaliatory efforts by Defendant against his critics

10

sufficient to demonstrate a real or immediate threat of repeated future harm.

11

While there may be a presumption of future injury when a defendant has

12

voluntarily ceased its alleged activity in response to the threat of litigation, see United

13

States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953), this presumption is inappropriate

14

when a plaintiff cannot prove the underlying allegation or when the challenged activity

15

could not reasonably be expected to recur. Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 794

16

(9th Cir. 1985). Further, where the defendant is a government actor and not a private

17

litigant there is less concern about the recurrence of objectionable behavior. D.C.

18

Prof'l Taxicab Drivers Ass'n v. D.C., 880 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75 (D.D.C. 2012); see also,

19

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir.2009); Ragsdale v.

20

Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir.1988); True the Vote, Inc. v. I.R.S., No. CV 13-

21

734, slip op. at 10. (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2014) (Order siding with Department of Justices

22

argument that deference should be given when the Government ceases a complained of

23

activity in the face of litigation).

24

demonstrate that Defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of retaliation, this court

25

cannot presume he will do so in the future. Furthermore, Defendant has not initiated any

26

new investigations, arrests, professional complaints or lawsuits against any alleged critic

27

for the past four years (and counting), a period longer than the alleged retaliation. Thus,

As previously discussed, because Plaintiff cannot

28
3885779.1
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 21 of 24

there is no evidence to reasonably expect Defendant will "retaliate in the future.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Finally, the voluntary cessation presumption only applies to prevent a case


from becoming moot. See Lovell v. Brennan, 728 F.2d 560, 563, 564 (1st Cir. 1984) (It
was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss an action claiming unconstitutional conditions in
a state prison, even though the district court suggested that conditions may have been
unconstitutional at the time suit was filed and was concerned that the improvements that
had been made were done in response to the litigation. The court was entitled to presume
that state authorities would continue to comply with the constitution, and the burden is on
the plaintiff to demonstrate the need for injunctive relief.); Ciampa v. Massachusetts
Rehabilitation Com'n, 718 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that a finding of mootness
was better understood as one resting on a lack of demonstrated remedial need rather than
mootness); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 1976) (Questions of
necessity and propriety of the relief sought, while jurisdictional, should not be confused
with the doctrine of mootness. Cessation and reassurance regarding future state action
may in practicality render an action for injunctive relief moot, in terms of the relief
sought, while leaving unaffected the actual underlying case or controversy for a
declaratory judgment.); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 1003-1009 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (The
court found that although discontinuance of the specific surveillance program that had
affected the plaintiffs did not establish Article III mootness, there was not a sufficiently
live controversy to warrant injunctive or declaratory relief). Even assuming Plaintiffs
claim is not moot, in the context of requesting injunctive relief, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate the possibility of future injury. Thus, Plaintiff still lacks standing for its
retaliation claims because it cannot demonstrate the likelihood of future harm.

24
25
26
27

Given Plaintiffs failure to prove a pattern and practice of retaliation and


Defendants uncontested compliance with the law for the past four years, summary
judgment is appropriate because there is no live controversy to warrant injunctive relief
under Count Six. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.

28
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 22 of 24

IV.

2
3

Finally, summary judgment is appropriate on Counts I-IV because Plaintiff


requests improper relief in the form of an obey the law injunction.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Blanket injunctions to obey the law are disfavored.

24
25
26
27

Metro-Goldwyn-

Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Such
injunctions are not specific in terms and fail to describe in reasonable detail the act or acts
sought to be restrained. Rule 65(d), Fed.R.Civ.P. Injunctive relief must be narrowly
tailored to fit specific legal violations. Id. Injunctions ordering Defendants to make only
lawful arrests and to not discriminate on the basis of race are invalid obey the law
injunctions. See e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 668-69 & n. 5 (10th
Cir.1990) (stating that provisions of injunction that prohibited defendants from
discriminating on the basis of race, color or ethnicity in the operation of the school
system and directing defendants to use their expertise and resources to comply with the
constitutional requirement of equal education opportunity for all who are entitled to the
benefits of public education in Denver, Colorado are obey the law injunctions); Payne v.
Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.1978) (prohibiting discriminating on the
basis of color, race, or sex in employment practices or conditions of employment is an
general obey the law injunction); see also Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175,
1200-01 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that, pursuant to Rule 65(d), an injunction must
contain an operative command capable of enforcement; court is not capable of
enforcing so broad and vague an injunction that simply requires that one obey the law.)

22
23

PLAINTIFFS PRAYER FOR RELIEF SEEKS AN IMPROPER OBEY THE


LAW INJUNCTION.

An order requiring Defendants to refrain from engaging in any of the


predicate discriminatory acts forming the basis of the pattern or practice of unlawful
conduct described herein would be an unenforceable obey the law injunction.
[Complaint 192] Such an order would not comply with Rule 65(d), in that it would lack
specificity as to the enjoined conduct. It would be little more than a direction to not
discriminate. Similarly inappropriate is Plaintiffs specific request that the court issue

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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 23 of 24

an injunction to do the following:

Order the Defendants, their officers, agents, and employees to


adopt and implement policies, procedures, and mechanisms to
remedy the pattern or practice of unlawful conduct described
herein, and by specifically addressing, inter alia, the following
areas: policies and training; non-discriminatory policing and
jail operations; stops, searches, and arrests; response to crimes
of sexual violence; posse operations; jail operations;
supervision; misconduct complaint intake, investigation, and
adjudication; retaliation; oversight and transparency; and
community engagement.

[Complaint 193] This request is so overbroad that neither the Court nor Defendant can

determine what the terms of such an injunction might be. Certainly Defendant would not

10

be able to determine from such an injunction what specific conduct is enjoined.

11

Furthermore, as previously demonstrated, if the Melendres related relief and crimes of

12

sexual violence stipulation were stricken from Plaintiffs prayer for injunctive relief, then

13

all that remains is a request that the Court issue an injunction involving jail operations

14

and retaliation. This fails to rise to the level of specificity required by Rule 65(d).

15

Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for relief is an improper obey the law injunction.

3
4
5
6

CONCLUSION

16
17

For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant Arpaio requests this Court to

18

grant summary judgment in his favor on Plaintiffs Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI of

19

Plaintiffs complaint, with the exception of Plaintiffs claims involving worksite

20

operations in Counts I, II and III.


DATED this 27th day of October, 2014.

21

JONES, SKELTON & HOCHULI, P.L.C.

22
23

By s/ Joseph J. Popolizio
William R. Jones, Jr.
John T. Masterson
Joseph J. Popolizio
Justin M. Ackerman
2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 800
Phoenix, Arizona 85012
Attorneys for Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio

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25
26
27
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Case 2:12-cv-00981-ROS Document 336 Filed 10/27/14 Page 24 of 24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 27th day of October, 2014, I caused the

foregoing document to be filed electronically with the Clerk of Court through the

CM/ECF System for filing; and served on counsel of record via the Courts CM/ECF

system.

6
7

s/ Mance Carroll

8
9
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