Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
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Defendants.
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NO. CV12-00981-PHX-ROS
I.
DEFENDANT
IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS
ONE,1 TWO, THREE, AND FIVE REGARDING DISCRIMINATORY
TRAFFIC STOPS.
Before this Court can decide whether Melendres v. Arpaio has preclusive
effect on the Claims asserted in this case, [See Statement of Facts in Support of Defendant
Arpaios Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (SOF) 1] it must first decide if it has
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Claims. See Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles,
328 F.3d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 2003). Ironically, it is the Courts ruling in Melendres that
deprives this Court of an active case or controversy as well as Plaintiff of standing for its
claims involving discriminatory traffic stops in Counts One, Two, Three, and Five.2
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controversy under Article III of the Constitution. Public Utilities Com'n v. Federal
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Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir.1996) (quotations omitted). A
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case or controversy exists when one party demonstrates that it has suffered injury-in-fact
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which fairly can be traced to acts or omissions of the second party and when there is a
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substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed. Johnson v.
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Weinberger, 851 F.3d 233, 235 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Davis v. Federal Election
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Commission, 554 U.S. 724, 732-33 (2008) (To qualify as a case fit for federal-court
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A.
The only parts of Counts One, Two Three, and Five that Defendant is not moving
for summary judgment involves the alleged discriminatory conduct by Defendant during
worksite operations pursuant to a valid warrant targeting identity theft and fraud.
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As a threshold issue, although this Court stated that E.E.O.C. v. Goodyear
Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1987) may be dispositive on this issue during
its most recent status conference, Goodyear is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
First, the class action preceding Goodyear did not involve similar claims of injunctive
relief as this Court is faced with. Therefore, the issues Defendant raises with this Courts
subject matter jurisdiction and standing were not at issue in Goodyear. Furthermore,
Defendant is not asserting that the res judicata effects of Melendres bar plaintiffs claims
under Counts One, Two, Three and Five. Rather, Defendant is asserting that Melendres,
independent of its res judicata effects, deprives this Court of an active case or controversy
as well as Plaintiff of an actual injury for standing purposes. Paradoxically, it is Plaintiff
who asserts that the res judiciata effects of Melendres apply to this case by making an
issue preclusion argument. [SOF 1].
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adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at
the time the complaint is filed.) (emphasis added).
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Plaintiff alleged at the October 6, 2014 status conference hearing that the
Melendres Complaint did not involve Claims of discriminatory conduct for general
traffic stops by Defendant. This is not true. [SOF 5]
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Plaintiff has stipulated, and this court has recognized, that Plaintiff is not pursuing
crimes of sexual violence either in its Complaint or in this case. [SOF 6]
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Melendres Court fully decided this controversy. Following a 142 page findings of fact
and conclusions of law, it issued a 59 page supplemental permanent injunction on these
very issues, ordering an exceptional amount of oversight and reform over Defendants
training, policies, and procedures. The following provides a brief outline of the changes
required by the Melendres Order:
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[SOF 7-8]
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exists on these issues, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs
allegations in Counts One, Two, Three, and Five involving discriminatory traffic stops.5
B.
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here, Plaintiff also lacks standing to assert its discriminatory traffic stop claims. Oregon
v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)) (A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each
claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief sought.); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff had standing to
pursue damages, he lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief.). To satisfy Article III's
standing requirements a plaintiff must show: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992); Mayfield v. United States,
599 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing these elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
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A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief premised upon alleged past wrongs must
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The Melendres defendants appeal of the injunctive Order does not change the
effect of that Order on this Courts subject matter jurisdiction or Plaintiffs standing. See
State of California Dept. of Soc. Services v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2003)
(the bare act of taking an appeal does not defeat the res judicata effect of a federal
district court decision); Tripati v. Henman, 857 F.2d 1366, 1367 (9th Cir. 1988) (The
established rule in the federal courts is that a final judgment retains all of its res judicata
consequences pending decision of the appeal.). In addition, in moving for summary
judgment on Counts One, Two, Three and Five, Defendant Arpaio does not waive any
appellate rights in Melendres.
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fact prong of the standing test. Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir.
2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 (1983)); see also HodgersDurgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, Plaintiff must
show the existence of an official policy or its equivalent likely to cause future injury. See
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 10506 (stating that [i]n order to establish an actual controversy in
this case, Lyons would have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter
with the police but also to allege the existence of an official policy or its equivalent); see
also Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that Plaintiff lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief because he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of future
harm even if he were subjected to an official policy).
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2.
cannot meet its burden of showing the redressability element of Article III standing.
Plaintiff must be able to show a likelihood that the alleged injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. See Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982). The
focus for redressability is always upon the ability of the court to redress the injury
suffered by the plaintiff; if the wrong parties are before the court, or if the requested relief
would worsen the plaintiff's position, or if the court is unable to grant the relief that
relates to the harm, the plaintiff lacks standing. Id. (emphasis added).
As the following chart clearly demonstrates, Plaintiff cannot make this
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showing because Melendres already granted the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks here:
Melendres Injunction [SOF 8]
Plaintiffs Proposed Injunction [SOF 4]
Reporting requirements to keep apprised
the monitor, the parties, the Court and the
community on Defendants reform efforts.
An independent monitor to screen
Defendants activity for discriminatory Oversight and transparency;
behavior;
Implementation of an early identification
system to identify and respond to
potentially problematic behaviors as early
as possible;
Reform of Defendants policies and
procedures to ensure bias free policing;
Adequate training to ensure compliance
with reformed policies;
Reforms on the number of supervising
officers in the field;
Sustained community outreach so that
Defendant can hear and appropriately
respond to community concerns;
Policies and procedures that encourage the
reporting of potential misconduct and
ensure that any misconduct is appropriately
investigated.
In addition, Defendant has not only implemented the above mentioned changes, but has
gone above and beyond the Melendres Orders requirements. [See SOF 10-52]
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Another reason to grant Defendant summary judgment is that the claims are
moot, given that Melendres has already resolved the discriminatory traffic stop issue.
Generally, an action is mooted when the issues presented are no longer live and therefore
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest for which the courts can grant a remedy.
Alaska Ctr. For Env't v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1999). This occurs
when the requested relief has already been secured in another proceeding or when full
relief has been granted to another party on the same issue. See e.g., Kittel v. Thomas,
620 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (Petitioner sought habeas corpus petition mooted when
the regulation on which his petition rested held invalid in a different action); Hispanic
Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir.
2012) (ruling in one case that provisions of state statute were pre-empted mooted claims
by private plaintiffs to restrain parts of the same provisions on a different ground).
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Here, the Melendres Court has already made a determination that Defendant
unlawfully discriminated against Latinos during traffic stops and has put into place a
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See supra n.3, noting that the Melendres complaint did raise general
discriminatory traffic enforcement issues.
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[See SOF 8]
Further, the Sheriff and his command staff have personally seen to Maricopa County
Sheriffs Office (MCSO) continued cooperation with the Court appointed monitor and
his team of 13 people to ensure that the MCSO complies with the Melendres Order in
every respect. [See SOF 10-52] Accordingly, the conduct alleged by Plaintiff is
simply no longer occurring. Thus, Plaintiffs discriminatory traffic claims are moot.8
II.
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Plaintiff alleges in Counts Four and Five that Defendant has excluded and
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denied LEP Latino prisoners from participating in and benefiting from Defendants
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programs and activities relating to the operation of Maricopa County Jails which has had
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an adverse and disparate impact on Latino LEP prisoners. [Complaint 178, 184] Title
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VI provides that [n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
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national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
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assistance. 42 U.S.C. 2000d. To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must show that
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discrimination. Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th
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Defendant also notes that given the Courts supervision and enforcement
mechanisms put in place by Melendres, traditional exceptions to the mootness doctrine do
not apply to save Plaintiffs claims under Counts One, Two, Three, and Five. See Native
Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that for the
capable of repetition yet evading review exception to apply a Plaintiff must allege a
type of injury which is of such inherently limited duration that it is likely always to
become moot prior to review.); see also Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d
960, 965 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the voluntary cessation exception to mootness
does not apply when complying with a court order) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not
alleged an injury inherently limited in duration nor can it overcome the issues of mootness
involved due to Defendants compliance with the Court Order issued in Melendres. [See
SOF 10-52]
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Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). The Defendant does not dispute that his office
receives federal funding, but Plaintiff cannot show that there has been intentional racial
discrimination as to LEP inmates in violation of Title VI.
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To prove intentional discrimination under Title VI, Plaintiff must show that
a challenged action was motivated by an intent to discriminate. Elston v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993). This requires a showing that
the decision maker was not only aware of the complainants race, color, or national origin,
but that the recipient acted, at least in part, because of the complainants race, color, or
national origin. Id. In the absence of such evidence, claims of intentional discrimination
under Title VI are analyzed using the Title VII burden shifting analytic framework
established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Rashdan v. Geissberger, 12-16305, 2014 WL 4194090 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2014)
(We now join the other circuits in concluding that McDonnell Douglas also applies to
Title VI disparate treatment claims.).
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See 65 F.R. 50123-01, 50124 (Aug. 16, 2000) (emphasis added); see also Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulation is
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation).
B.
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(1) Inmate Access to Programs: Inmates, including hearingimpaired inmates, shall not be denied access to any programs
or services based solely on their limited
ability to speak, read,
or understand the English language.10
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The record is replete with evidence that Defendant took and continues
to take reasonable steps to provide LEP inmates with meaningful access
to information and services.
The Maricopa County Jail system consists of six jails: 4th Avenue Jail, Durango
Jail, Estrella Jail, Towers Jail, Lower Buckeye Jail, and the In-Tents Jail facilities. The
Maricopa County Jails are designed to hold, in the aggregate and at full capacity, 10,872
inmates. On average, approximately over the past two years, 32% of all inmates in the
jails have been Hispanic with 6.3% of those inmates being documented as LEP. [SOF
53-54]
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For example, Defendants jails offers bilingual classes for LEP inmates including
Anger Management, 12-Steps, Parenting, Cognitive, and AA. Furthermore, any inmates
requesting to take an English only class would never be refused entry due to their LEP
designation. Finally, religious services are also offered in English and Spanish. [SOF
70-72]
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At all steps during inmate intake, MCSO has put into place redundancies to ensure
that LEP inmates are properly identified and cared for. The first step during inmate intake
at either Central Intake or at LBJ is for inmates to go through a medical assessment to
determine if they are medically stable to be in the jail system. During the medical
assessment, an information officer meets and greets all incoming inmates and answers any
questions about the intake process. This officer also determines if an inmate should be
designated as LEP, and gives each inmate a bilingual information sheet which explains the
intake procedure. Additionally, the information officer is one step in the LEP
identification process as every officer that comes into contact with the inmate during the
intake procedure gathers information on whether the inmate is LEP (based on interactions
with the inmate and his or her ability to communicate with MCSO officers). Furthermore,
LEP identification training is provided to each officer. Finally, LEP designation can also
come from the IA Courts as inmates regularly request interpreters to fully understand the
questions posed by the court. [SOF 55-64]
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Since 2007, a year before the Plaintiffs investigation began, MCSO has posted
extensive bilingual signs throughout MCSO Jails, which in total amount to more than
1850 signs. [SOF 75]
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As of August 8, 2014, the roster contains over 240 names of voluntary bilingual or
multilingual officers, 172 of which speak Spanish. [SOF 91]
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The duties of the LEP Manager include, but are not limited to (1) maintaining a
LEP Manager Manual which includes current resources available to all detention staff that
assist them in communicating with LEP inmates; (2) maintaining and updating all LEP or
inmate informational postings in the intake areas and housing units, (3) ensuring the jail
maintains text telephone (TTY) machines in good working order and all detention officers
are aware of how to properly operate them; (4) ensuring all detention personnel are kept
up to date on all LEP-related information; (5) conduct random monthly interviews of two
LEP inmates and one officer regarding their LEP related experiences and concerns; (6)
compiling weekly statistics regarding the number of LEP inmates housed at the facility
and the languages they speak, which is captured in a JMS report each Monday and made
available on the Sheriffs Office Intranet. [SOF 68, 78-79]
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In addition to what is required pursuant to the DI-6 Policy, Defendant has
embarked on a multi-million dollar project, known as the Sierra Detention System, to
make bilingual jail announcements automatically with a mere selection and touch of
computer monitors in all jails. The Sierra Detention System is already running in 4th
Avenue Jail, and installation of the system is underway in the rest of the MCSO facilities,
which will be completed within the next year. Sierra has also informed MCSO that this
project is the largest of its kind ever attempted in the detention industry. [SOF 96-99]
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[Defendants] Office to provide for effective communication with inmates and the public
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and to be in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and all
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Defendants DI-6 policy is enforced within Defendants jails and that the current DI-6
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policy is only the most recent incarnation of a long standing effort by Defendant to ensure
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On the other hand, Plaintiffs experts have not opined that Defendants DI-6
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Policy does not provide LEP inmates with meaningful access to any program or services
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offered at Defendants jails. Neither could they point to a single, specific instance where
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an inmate was not classified as LEP nor that misclassification resulted in harm to any
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inmate. [SOF 100] It, therefore, comes as no surprise that there has not been a single
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Plaintiff complaining of LEP issues in the Maricopa County jails. [SOF 101] In fact,
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compliance with Title VI is that during Plaintiffs investigation of Defendants Jails the
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The DI-6 policy was originally enacted in 2013. However, even before the
establishment of a formal LEP policy, Defendant took reasonable steps to ensure that LEP
inmates had access to programs and services. [SOF 65-67] By way of example, prior
to DI-6, Defendant employed use of the language line for over two decades. [SOF 81]
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Accordingly, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, it has not and cannot meet its burden of showing Title VI violations. The
undisputed facts show that Defendant has gone well beyond taking reasonable steps to
ensure LEP inmates have meaningful access to the information and services provided by
Defendants Jails.17 Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Counts Four
and Five of Plaintiffs Complaint involving a Title VI violation.
960 F. Supp. 394, 432 (D.D.C. 1997) rev'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 163
F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding no Title VI violation because LEP Hispanic inmates
are not being barred from participation in prison programs because of their race, color or
national origin. While the programs are open to all inmates, limited-English proficient
inmates' participation is limited only by their English fluency.).
III.
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against persons in Maricopa County, thereby chilling future protected speech under the
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First Amendment. [Complaint 187-88] The persons allegedly chilled are largely
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unnamed attorneys, judges, and protestors who allegedly spoke out against MCSO and
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Judgment in favor of Defendant is appropriate on Count Six because (1) as a matter of law
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Defendant also notes that by having a LEP policy in place, Plaintiff can only raise a
claim that Defendant has failed to implement that policy fully, and such a failure cannot,
as a matter of law, constitute intentional discrimination.
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Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a pattern and practice of discrimination and (2) injunctive
relief is inappropriate because it is not reasonably foreseeable that Defendant will
investigate, arrest, file judicial and/or bar complaints, or initiate lawsuits against any
alleged critic without reasonable suspicion or probable cause in the future.
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Section 14141 permits the Attorney General to bring a civil action to obtain
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has engaged in a pattern or practice of retaliation against his critics by (1) filing judicial
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and/or bar complaints and (2) investigating, arresting, and instituting lawsuits against
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However, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot carry its burden of showing a pattern and
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professional complaints in Arizona and Plaintiff has failed to prove the absence of
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In Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2006), the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff who sues criminal investigators on a retaliatory prosecution claim alleging
a First Amendment violation must plead and prove the absence of probable cause as an
element of plaintiffs claim. In Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th
Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit interpreted Hartman to only apply in the context of
retaliatory prosecution claims and held that a Plaintiff does not need to allege the absence
of probable cause to support a claim for retaliatory arrests. Since publication of Skoog,
the Ninth Circuit has shifted away from this conclusion and returned to the general
principle announced in Hartman that a Plaintiff must establish the absence of probable
cause to prove retaliation.
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This shift began in May 2008, when the Ninth Circuit noted, in contrast to
its statement in Skoog, that Hartman applies equally to First Amendment retaliatory arrest
and retaliatory prosecution cases. See Back v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir.
2008). In December 2008, the Ninth Circuit, in Dietrich v. Ascuagas Gold Nugget, 548
F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), clarified that the Hartman standard applies only to retaliatory
prosecution cases, but emphasized that the existence of probable cause has high
probative force even in ordinary retaliation cases not involving a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 901; see also Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the presence of probable cause is not irrelevant to an individuals claim that
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Despite the waxing and waning of the Ninth Circuit, in its most recent
opinion on this issue, it affirmatively stated that the existence of probable cause is
dispositive of a retaliatory arrest claim. In Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800,
825 (9th Cir. 2013), the Court noted that in the context of a First Amendment retaliation
arrest claim, resolution of the alleged retaliation turns on whether probable cause existed
to seize [the plaintiff].
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Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 182 (2012), where it noted that the Supreme Court held that it
had never recognized, nor was there a clearly established First Amendment right to be free
from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by probable cause. Acosta, 718 F.3d
at 825; see also Reichle, 132 S.Ct. at 2097 ([I]t was not clearly established that an arrest
supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment violation.).
Accordingly, relying on Reichle, the court in Acosta held that even assuming that Acosta
was arrested in retaliation for his remarks, because probable cause existed for a violation
of 2-61, the officers are still entitled to qualified immunity, not only for the removal of
Acosta from the chambers, but also for his subsequent arrest. Id. Accordingly, pursuant
to Acosta and Rechlie, a plaintiff bringing a claim for retaliatory investigation or arrest
must allege the absence of probable cause. See also Am. News & Info. Services, Inc. v.
Gore, 12-CV-2786 BEN KSC, 2014 WL 4681936 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014) (analyzing
Skoog, Rechlie, and Acosta and concluding that in light of Acostas statement about
Rechlie, the Court should dismiss plaintiffs claims involving retaliatory arrests due to the
failure to prove probable cause did not exist).
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However, Plaintiff cannot escape that it has failed to show that Defendants actions lacked
probable cause for any of the alleged instances of retaliation. Therefore, it comes as no
surprise that Plaintiff at least admitted that the existence of probable cause is not at issue
in many of the instances of retaliation challenged by the United States . . . . [SOF at
105] Thus, Plaintiffs baseless allegations of retaliation cannot remotely support a claim
that Defendant has engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct against his critics in
violation of 14141.
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B.
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alleged past wrong must demonstrate a real and immediate threat of repeated future
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harm to satisfy the injury in fact prong of the standing test. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105;
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Clark, 259 F.3d at 1007. Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief in this case, and as such
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cannot rely on any alleged past retaliation alone to establish standing, it must prove that
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there is a real and immediate threat of repeated future retaliation by Defendant. Clark,
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259 F.3d at 1007. However, notwithstanding the truth of Plaintiffs allegations, the
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[SOF 106-110 (emphasis added)] Moreover, the record is devoid of any facts or
evidence that there was or will be retaliatory efforts by Defendant against his critics
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voluntarily ceased its alleged activity in response to the threat of litigation, see United
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States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953), this presumption is inappropriate
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when a plaintiff cannot prove the underlying allegation or when the challenged activity
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could not reasonably be expected to recur. Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 794
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(9th Cir. 1985). Further, where the defendant is a government actor and not a private
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litigant there is less concern about the recurrence of objectionable behavior. D.C.
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Prof'l Taxicab Drivers Ass'n v. D.C., 880 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75 (D.D.C. 2012); see also,
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Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir.2009); Ragsdale v.
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Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir.1988); True the Vote, Inc. v. I.R.S., No. CV 13-
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734, slip op. at 10. (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2014) (Order siding with Department of Justices
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argument that deference should be given when the Government ceases a complained of
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demonstrate that Defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of retaliation, this court
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cannot presume he will do so in the future. Furthermore, Defendant has not initiated any
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new investigations, arrests, professional complaints or lawsuits against any alleged critic
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for the past four years (and counting), a period longer than the alleged retaliation. Thus,
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IV.
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Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Such
injunctions are not specific in terms and fail to describe in reasonable detail the act or acts
sought to be restrained. Rule 65(d), Fed.R.Civ.P. Injunctive relief must be narrowly
tailored to fit specific legal violations. Id. Injunctions ordering Defendants to make only
lawful arrests and to not discriminate on the basis of race are invalid obey the law
injunctions. See e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 668-69 & n. 5 (10th
Cir.1990) (stating that provisions of injunction that prohibited defendants from
discriminating on the basis of race, color or ethnicity in the operation of the school
system and directing defendants to use their expertise and resources to comply with the
constitutional requirement of equal education opportunity for all who are entitled to the
benefits of public education in Denver, Colorado are obey the law injunctions); Payne v.
Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.1978) (prohibiting discriminating on the
basis of color, race, or sex in employment practices or conditions of employment is an
general obey the law injunction); see also Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175,
1200-01 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that, pursuant to Rule 65(d), an injunction must
contain an operative command capable of enforcement; court is not capable of
enforcing so broad and vague an injunction that simply requires that one obey the law.)
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[Complaint 193] This request is so overbroad that neither the Court nor Defendant can
determine what the terms of such an injunction might be. Certainly Defendant would not
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sexual violence stipulation were stricken from Plaintiffs prayer for injunctive relief, then
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all that remains is a request that the Court issue an injunction involving jail operations
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and retaliation. This fails to rise to the level of specificity required by Rule 65(d).
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs request for relief is an improper obey the law injunction.
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CONCLUSION
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grant summary judgment in his favor on Plaintiffs Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI of
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By s/ Joseph J. Popolizio
William R. Jones, Jr.
John T. Masterson
Joseph J. Popolizio
Justin M. Ackerman
2901 North Central Avenue, Suite 800
Phoenix, Arizona 85012
Attorneys for Defendant Joseph M. Arpaio
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of October, 2014, I caused the
foregoing document to be filed electronically with the Clerk of Court through the
CM/ECF System for filing; and served on counsel of record via the Courts CM/ECF
system.
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s/ Mance Carroll
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