REYES, J.

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San

This is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G.

Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the filing of

Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty.

the criminal information[5] against both Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat

Pablo

conduct

(Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,

unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a

Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable

lawyer.

under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

Bernardo

(Atty.

Bernardo)

for

deceit,

malpractice,

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint

The respondent was required to file his Comment. [6] On September

24, 2004, the respondent filed an undated Comment, [7] wherein he denied

are as follows:

the allegations against him and averred the following:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15,
1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the
help and in connivance and collusion with a certain
Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed
fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein
complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco
by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect
that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging
to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the
acquaintance of complainants herein and they
convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance
and deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as
advance money he would expedite the titling of the
subject land and further by means of other similar
deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William
Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land,
who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling
William Gatchalians business transaction and that he
has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and
REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well
knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to
induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said
amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said
amount, far from complying with his obligation to
expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
[wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount to his
personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him
to return the said amount, he failed and refused to do
so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of
Duties and Oath as a lawyer.[2]

2.
He had not deceived both complainants
between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997
for purposes of getting from them the amount of
[P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they
contacted and who in turn sought the legal services of
the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the
said money from them.
3.
There was no connivance made and entered
into by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement
for titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco
and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.
4.
The acceptance of the respondent to render his
legal service is legal and allowed in law practice.[8]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a

verified comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as
it appeared that the respondents undated comment filed with the Court was
not verified.[9]

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an

In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto
[3]

[4]

Resolutions dated December 7, 1998 and June 22, 1999 of the Third

additional fifteen (15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005,
within which to comply due to his medical confinement.[10]

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second

motion[11] for extension praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005,
alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.

[12]

The respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the

respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an answer
despite extensions granted. The case was then submitted for report and
recommendation.[13]

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner

Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July
1997, respondent with the help and in connivance and
collusion with a certain Andres Magat (Magat), by
using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and
illegally committed fraudulent acts to the effect that
respondent would expedite the titling of the land
belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who
were the acquaintance of complainants.
Respondent
and
Magat
convinced
complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the
amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they
would
expedite
the
titling
of
the
subject
land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer
of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located
at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was
allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it has been
titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that
they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and
the Register of Deeds which representation they knew
to be false, fraudulent and were only made to induce
complainants to give and deliver to them the amount of
[P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount,
far from complying with their obligation to expedite and
cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and
Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount to their
personal use and benefit and despite demand upon
them to return the said amount, they failed and refused
to do so.
In view of the deceit committed by
respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint

for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal

Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds
to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of
Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was
transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga
conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the reinvestigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to
complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00 because
according to him the amount of [P]295,000.00 should
be reimbursed by respondent considering that the said
amount was turned over to respondent for expenses
incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the
subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for
several extensions for time to pay back their obligations
to the complainants. However, despite extensions of
time granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to
fulfil their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence,
it was resolved that the offer of compromise was
construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no
reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge
and an Information for Estafa was filed against
respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several
occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set,
shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the
court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office
as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it could
not be denied that respondent committed a crime that
import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which
he was bound to obey the laws of the land. The
commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving
moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the
attorneys oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are
grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule
138, Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in
1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16 April
2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24
March 2004, A complaint for disbarment, suspension
or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years

from the date of the professional misconduct (Section

1, Rule VIII).[14]

declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the
third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount,
as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.

x
x
x
[R]espondent ATTY.
PABLO
A.
BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO
YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his
profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. [15]

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued

Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S.
Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of the
amount of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from
receipt of notice with Warning that if he does not return
the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order
then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.[16]

In an Order[19] dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant
was required to comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

In her Comment,[20] Fidela explained that it took them quite some time
in filing the administrative case because they took into consideration the
possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it
would stain the respondents reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent
went into hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG
agents from Camp Olivas in order to trace the respondents whereabouts;
that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be heard; and
finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has
yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation [21] stating that the RTC
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for

rendered a decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty.

Reconsideration[17] of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent

Bernardo and Magat guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under

averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules

Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to

considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2) years from the

suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve

alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2)

(12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.[22]

he did not commit any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him

money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through

In a Letter[23] dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela

Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of

sought the resolution of the present action as she was already 86 years of

Agreement[18] signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the

age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case [24] dated September 1,

Investigating Commissioner considered him as in default after having

2010 was filed by the complainants. In another Letter dated October 26,

ignored the representative he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005;

2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardos restitution of

and (5) he long restituted the amount of P225,000.00 not as an offer of

the amount of P200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy her medicine

compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresitas

and other needs.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit
to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of

prescription is untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases
against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit

the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative

complaint

will

not

erase

the

administrative

culpability

of

lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to

disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that
as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they
stand

chance

of

being

completely

exonerated

from

whatever

administrative liability they ought to answer for.[25]

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts

complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his legal services
were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported
titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his
position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he

himself pleaded for several extensions of time to file the same, the
respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as ordered

he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that
he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount
of P495,000.00.

by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an officer of the

court who is called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of
the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the courts
authority which can not be countenanced.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty

to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the

administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of

a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the

administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[27]

morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity for
any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.[26]

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and

distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved
the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it that a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, the respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively. [28]

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord

In Yu v. Palaa,[29] the Court held that:
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note
that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question
even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant
in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not
sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a
criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may
be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered
helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and
continuing membership in, the legal profession during
the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings
are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare and for preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
[30]
(Citations omitted)

him the punishment commensurate to all his acts and to accord the
complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice they utmost
deserve.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S.

Bernardo

is

found

guilty

of

violating

the

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Further,

the

Court ORDERS Atty.

Pablo

S.

Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and

Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2)
to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through the Office
of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN
WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the

suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

respondent for the crime of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of
sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondents
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides
that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without
authority to do so.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and

be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant,

CASTILLO, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ALFREDO

PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I.
Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral
Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two
became officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
[1]
Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while
representing himself to be single.[2] Soon they had an intimate relationship
that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. [3] During their affair,
respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On
May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. [4] It was
only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that
respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and
confronted her about her relationship with respondent. [5] On September 10,
1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting
his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she
was carrying as his.[6] On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a
baby girl, Aletha Jessa. [7] By this time however, respondent had started to
refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support.[8]
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what
transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never
represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was
already married and with children;[9] complainant is almost 10 years older
than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; [10] the child borne
by complainant is not his, because the complainant was seeing other men
at the time they were having an affair.[11] He admits that he signed the
affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save
complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that
complainant was seeing other men.[12]
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty.
Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be
meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
butgrossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.[13]
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before
a notary public, he declared explicitly:
1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;
2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my
child;
3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to
be my own;
4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her
personal and medical needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other
necessities for living, which I will give through his/her mother, Carmelita
Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal age and capable to live on his/her
own;
5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that
he/she is my child; however, my failure to sign does not negate the
recognition and acknowledgement already done herein;
6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and
being a lawyer, I have full knowledge of the consequence of such
acknowledgment and recognition.[14]

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxx

xxx
xxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx

xxx
xxx

More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998

which states in part:
Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g.,
Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your
daughter.
Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot
promise fix amount for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall
not be less than P500 but not more than P1,000.[15]

In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in
castigating a judge stated that:
...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict
standard of conduct demanded of members of the profession. Certainly,
fathering children by a woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these
standards.[16]
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer.[17]
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized
statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita
demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to
self-stultification.[18]
This Court has repeatedly held:
as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.[19]
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with
complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that men
by nature are polygamous,[20] and that what happened between them was
nothing but mutual lust and desire. [21] The Court is not convinced. In fact, it
is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

good standing in the profession;[24] it is a continuing requirement to the

practice of law[25] and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is
because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption
that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.
The Court held:
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We must
stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can
be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[26]
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to
the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law.[27]
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with
not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child
previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly
respondent violated the standards of morality required of
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

a woman
whom he
therefore,
the legal

We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not
feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out

if a lesser punishment could be given.[28] Records show that from the time
he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now
lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not
perceive this fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend his ways or
that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law.
Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances
that indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The
suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the
full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction
of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of
the profession.

In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari

delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant,
but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the
public and the courts.[22]

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for

any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.[29]

Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her
affection. Granting arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship
with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of
gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondents
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether
or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with
him.

The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was
preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is
unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar
must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
[23]
This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent

GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE
SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the
IBP and all courts throughout the country.

PHILIP
SIGFRID
A.
FORTUN, Petitioner,
vs.
PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO, DENNIS
AYON, NENITA OQUENDO, ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA,
MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS, REYNALDO HULOG, REDMOND
BATARIO, MALOU MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA NETWORK INC.,
through its new editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA
DEDACE, ABS-CBN CORPORATION, through the Head of its News
Group, Maria Ressa, CECILIA VICTORIA OREA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER, INC. represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez
Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES, PHILIPPINE STAR represented by its
Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and EDU PUNAY, Respondents.

In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint

against petitioner before this Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827.
The disbarment case is still pending.
Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet
website posted an article, written by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others
seek disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of which reads:
On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four
others filed a 33 page complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they
accused of "engaging in every conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly
delay the proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies available."5

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A.
Fortun (petitioner) against Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty.
Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma Oquendo (Gemma), Dennis Ayon (Ayon), Nenita
Oquendo (Nenita), Esmael Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose Pavia
(Pavia), Melinda Quintos De Jesus (De Jesus), Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog),
Redmond Batario (Batario), Malou Mangahas (Mangahas), and Danilo Gozo
(Gozo). Atty. Quinsayas and the other respondents, who are not from the
media, are referred to in this case as Atty. Quinsayas, et al. Petitioner also
named as respondents GMA Network, Inc. (GMA Network) through its news
editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace (Dedace), ABSCBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) through the Head of its News Group Maria
Ressa (Ressa), Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez
Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres), Philippine Star (PhilStar) represented by
its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu Punay (Punay). Respondents
Atty. Quinsayas, et al. and respondent media groups and personalities are
collectively referred to in this case as respondents.

On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article,

written by Torres, which according to petitioner also stated details of the
disbarment case, as follows:
"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to
obstruct, impede and degrade the administration of justice by filing
countless causes of action, all in the hope of burying the principal issue of
his clients participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people that ill-fated day
of November 23, 2009," the petitioners said.6
Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an
article, written by Punay, which gave details of the disbarment allegations,
thus:
"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed
under under the rules, muddled the issues and diverted the attention away
from the main subject matter of the cases, read the complaint.

The Antecedent Facts

***** ***** *****

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of

then Maguindanao vice-mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as
lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the Commission on Elections
office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatus Certificate of Candidacy 1 when
they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in
Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, some four to ten kilometers from their
destination.2The group was taken hostage and brought to a hilly and
sparsely-populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan,
Maguindanao.3 The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later
discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were systematically killed
by shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies
and vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a
backhoe.4 These gruesome killings became known as the Maguindanao
Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them journalists.
Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal
Cases No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and Q-10163766. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan,
Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases.

"Respondent Attorney Fortuns act of misleading the prosecution and trial

court is a dishonest/deceitful conduct violative of Code of Professional
Responsibility," read the complaint.
"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal
profession, rendering him unfit to be called a member of the Bar."7
Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on
national television a program entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the
Maguindanao Massacre." Drilon, the programs host, asked questions and
allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment case against petitioner,
including its principal points. Petitioner was allegedly singled out and
identified in the program as the lead counsel of the Ampatuan family.
Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the
details of the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities
conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential

materials on their respective media platforms. Petitioner pointed out that

Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in a
television program viewed nationwide

proceedings of the disbarment case. She further alleged that she honestly
believed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was
newsworthy and should be reported as news.

Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint

against him exposed this Court and its investigators to outside influence and
public interference. Petitioner alleged that opinion writers wrote about and
commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his professional and
personal reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of respondents in
publishing the disbarment complaint was to malign his personal and
professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the bases of the
charges were not new but were based on incidents that supposedly took
place in January 2010; (2) it was timed to coincide with the anniversary of
the Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn for
Ampatuan, Jr. and his counsel and violated the accuseds right to
presumption of innocence and due process; (3) it was published following
articles written about petitioners advocacy for the rights of an accused and
negated the impact of these articles on the public; and (4) respondents
knew that the charges were baseless as petitioner always opted for speedy
trial and protection of the accuseds rights at trial. Petitioner further alleged
that in announcing their "causes of action" in the disbarment case,
respondents were only seeking the approval and sympathy of the public
against him and Ampatuan, Jr.

PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net
website through a syndication but the latter has its own editors and publish
materials that are not found on the broadsheet. It alleged that Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Inc. and Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two different
corporations, with separate legal personalities, and one may not be held
responsible for the acts of the other.

In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any

publication where it could have printed the article. It alleged that it did not
broadcast the disbarment complaint on its television station. GMA Network
alleged that the publication had already been done and completed when
Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the
members of the media who reported the news and the media groups that
published it on their website, including GMA Network, did not violate the
confidentiality rule. GMA Network further alleged that Dedace, a field
reporter for the judiciary, acted in good faith and without malice when she
forwarded the news to the news desk. GMA News also acted in good faith in
posting the news on its website. GMA Network denied that it conspired with
the other respondents in publishing the news. GMA Network alleged that it
posted the disbarment complaint, without any unfair, critical, and untruthful
comment, and only after it was "published" by Atty. Quinsayas, et al. who
furnished copies of the disbarment complaint to the media reporters. GMA
Network alleged that it had no intention to malign petitioners personal and
professional reputation in posting the news about the disbarment complaint
on its website.
In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA
Network and not a writer of the GMA News TV website. Her beat includes
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Department of Justice.
Dedace alleged that on 22 November 2010, she received an advice from
fellow field reporter Mark Merueas that the lawyer of Mangudadatu would
be filing a disbarment case against petitioner. She waited at the Supreme
Court. At around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas arrived. Atty. Quinsayas gave
copies of the petition to news reporters and Dedace received one. Dedace
prepared and sent her news story to GMA Network where it went to the
editor. Dedace alleged that she did not breach the rule on confidentiality of
disbarment proceedings against lawyers when she reported the filing of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner. She alleged that she acted in good
faith and without malice in forwarding her news story to the news desk and
that she had no intention to, and could not, influence or interfere in the

Torres8 alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private

prosecutor told her and several other reporters that a disbarment case
would be filed against petitioner. The disbarment case was actually filed on
22 November 2010 when Torres received a copy of the complaint. Since the
lead of the story came from a lawyer, Torres did not consider that writing a
story about the filing of the disbarment complaint might amount to contempt
of court. Torres alleged that the writing of the story was an independent act
and she did not conspire with any of the other respondents. Torres
maintained that she acted in good faith in writing the news report because
the Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public concern and the
allegations in the disbarment complaint were in connection with petitioners
handling of the case. Torres further asserted that petitioner is a public figure
and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs and character.
In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABSCBNs News and Current Affairs Group and the former Managing Director of
ANC. However, she was on terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010 in
advance to the expiration of her contract on 3 January 2011. Ressa alleged
that she had no participation in the production and showing of the broadcast
on 23 November 2010. Ressa adopts the answer of her co-respondents
ABS-CBN and Drilon insofar as it was applicable to her case.
ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABSCBN News Channel, commonly known as ANC, is maintained and operated
by Sarimanok Network News (SNN) and not by ABS-CBN. SNN, which
produced the program "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao
Massacre," is a subsidiary of ABS-CBN but it has its own juridical
personality although SNN and ABS-CBN have interlocking directors. ABSCBN and Drilon alleged that the presentation and hosting of the program
were not malicious as there was no criminal intent to violate the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. They alleged that the
program was a commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not
a report solely on the disbarment complaint against petitioner which took
only a few minutes of the one-hour program. They alleged that the program
was not a publication intended to embarrass petitioner who was not even
identified as the respondent in the disbarment complaint. Drilon even
cautioned against the revelation of petitioners name in the program. ABSCBN and Drilon further alleged that prior to the broadcast of the program on
23 November 2010, the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner
was already the subject of widespread news and already of public
knowledge. They denied petitioners allegation that they conspired with the
other respondents in violating the confidentiality rule in disbarment
proceedings. Finally, they alleged that the contempt charge violates their
right to equal protection because there were other reports and publications
of the disbarment complaint but the publishers were not included in the

charge. They also assailed the penalty of imprisonment prayed for by

petitioner as too harsh.
In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and
Gemma alleged that petitioner failed to prove that they actively participated
in disseminating details of the disbarment complaint against him. They
alleged that while they were the ones who filed the disbarment complaint
against petitioner, it does not follow that they were also the ones who
caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged that petitioner did not
provide the name of any particular person, dates, days or places to show
the alleged confederation in the dissemination of the disbarment complaint.
Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as
members of the Board of Trustees of the Freedom Fund for Filipino
Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ) and Atty. Quinsayas, former counsel for FFFJ, also
filed a joint Comment claiming that the alleged posting and publication of
the articles were not established as a fact. Respondents alleged that
petitioner did not submit certified true copies of the articles and he only
offered to submit a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the televised program
where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly interviewed by Drilon. Respondents
alleged that, assuming the articles were published, petitioner failed to
support his allegations that they actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint.
In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November
2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. went to this Court to file the disbarment
complaint but they were not able to file it on that day. 9 Atty. Quinsayas, et al.
were able to file the disbarment complaint the following day, or on 23
November 2010. PhilStar and Punay alleged that their news article, which
was about the plan to file a disbarment complaint against petitioner, was
published on 23 November 2010. It came out before the disbarment
complaint was actually filed. They alleged that the news article on the
disbarment complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged
that the article was a true, fair, and accurate report on the disbarment
complaint. The article was straightforward, truthful, and accurate, without
any comments from the author. They alleged that Punay reported the plan
of Mangudadatu, et al. to file the disbarment complaint against petitioner as
it involved public interest and he perceived it to be a newsworthy subject.
They further alleged that assuming the news article is not a privileged
communication, it is covered by the protection of the freedom of expression,
speech, and of the press under the Constitution. They also alleged that the
case is a criminal contempt proceeding and intent to commit contempt of
court must be shown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. They further
alleged that they did not commit any contemptible act. They maintained that
the news article did not impede, interfere with, or embarrass the
administration of justice. They further claimed that it is improbable, if not
impossible, for the article to influence the outcome of the case or sway this
Court in making its decision. The article also did not violate petitioners right
to privacy because petitioner is a public figure and the public has a
legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and character.
Pavia died during the pendency of this case 10 and was no longer included in
the Comment filed for the FFFJ Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the
FFFJ Trustees and was no longer represented by the FFFJ counsel in filing
its comment.11 Gozo did not file a separate comment.

The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt
for indirect contempt of court.
The Ruling of this Court
First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal
contempt. In People v. Godoy,12 this Court made a distinction between
criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of
the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in
whose behalf the violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the
court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held
to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the
public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On
the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and
for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has
been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a
power of the court.
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless
the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the contrary,
there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt
proceedings is remedial, the defendants intent in committing the contempt
is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the
courts order is not a defense in civil contempt.13
The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner had been published and was the subject of a televised
broadcast by respondent media groups and personalities.
We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.
GMA Network, Inc.
GMA Networks defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication
where the article could be printed; it did not broadcast the disbarment
complaint in its television station; and that the publication was already
completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment
complaint to the media.

GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment
complaint on its website. It merely said that it has no publication where the
article could be printed and that the news was not televised. Online posting,
however, is already publication considering that it was done on GMA
Networks online news website.

In Drilons case, she further alleged that the television program was a
commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the
filing of the disbarment case against petitioner. Even as the disbarment
complaint was briefly discussed in her program, petitioners name was not
mentioned at all in the program.

Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups and

Personalities

PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a
syndication. PDI attached a photocopy of the syndication page stating that
"[d]ue to syndication agreements between PDI and Inquirer.net, some
articles published in PDI may not appear in Inquirer.net."14
A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Philippines most widely circulated
broadsheet, and a member of the Inquirer Group of Companies." 15 PDI was
not able to fully establish that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.
ABS-CBN Corporation
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have
interlocking directors, SNN has its own juridical personality separate from its
parent company. ABS-CBN alleged that SNN controls the line-up of shows
of ANC.
We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has
an independent and separate juridical personality distinct from that of its
parent company and that any suit against the the latter does not bind the
former and vice-versa.16 A corporation is an artificial being invested by law
with a personality separate and distinct from that of other corporations to
which it may be connected.17 Hence, SNN, not ABS-CBN, should have been
made respondent in this case.
Maria Ressa
Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the
program about the Maguindanao Massacre was aired on ANC and that she
had no hand in its production. Ressas defense was supported by a
certification from the Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN, stating
that Ressa went on terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010. 18 This was
not disputed by petitioner.
Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon,
and Edu Punay
Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay
was that the disbarment complaint was published without any comment, in
good faith and without malice; that petitioner is a public figure; that the
Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest; and that there was no
conspiracy on their part in publishing the disbarment complaint. They also
argued that the news reports were part of privileged communication.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private
and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be
published like its decisions in other cases.
The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:
x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its
investigations free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to
protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges
from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible
clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. We have ruled
that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of
administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or
reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a
contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the
discretion of the Court. x x x19
In People v. Castelo,20 the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that
the principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt
proceeding. The Court ruled:
While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to
a case of libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or
freedom of expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is
considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The
same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of
the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding
privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of appellant.21
The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of
public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech."22 As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in
nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this
case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself
a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao
Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but
primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the
Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment
complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao
Massacre case.

The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of

the massacre, 30 were journalists. It is understandable that any matter
related to the Maguindanao Massacre is considered a matter of public
interest and that the personalities involved, including petitioner, are
considered as public figure. The Court explained it, thus:
But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would
not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public
comment. For he could; for instance, if and when he would be involved in a
public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or
because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become
involved. The publics primary interest is in the event; the public focus
is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and
significance of the conduct, not the participants prior anonymity or
notoriety.23 (Boldface in the original)
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate
media had a right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. The
Court also recognizes that respondent media groups and personalities
merely acted on a news lead they received when they reported the filing of
the disbarment complaint.
The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment
complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility
for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a public
figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of
public concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of the
disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern, the media
has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It
would have been different if the disbarment case against petitioner was
about a private matter as the media would then be bound to respect the
confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the
freedom of the press.1wphi1 If there is a legitimate public interest, media is
not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a
disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a
disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency. Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers must still remain private and confidential until
their final determination.24 Only the final order of this Court shall be
published like its decisions in other cases.25
Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups
and personalities acted in bad faith and that they conspired with one
another in their postings and publications of the filing of a disbarment
complaint against him. Respondent media groups and personalities
reported the filing of the disbarment complaint without any comments or
remarks but merely as it was a news item. Petitioner failed to prove that
respondent media groups and personalities acted with malicious intent.
Respondent media groups and personalities made a fair and true news
report and appeared to have acted in good faith in publishing and posting
the details of the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of the
commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment

case was briefly discussed but petitioner was not named. There was also no
proof that respondent media groups and personalities posted and published
the news to influence this Court on its action on the disbarment case or to
deliberately destroy petitioners reputation. It should also be remembered
that the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner entered the public
domain without any act on the part of the media. As we will discuss later,
the members of the media were given copies of the disbarment complaint
by one of the complainants.
Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon, Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo
Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in
the disbarment complaint against petitioner, alleged that there was no proof
that they were the ones who disseminated the disbarment complaint.
Indeed, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Mangudadatu,
Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma were the ones who caused the publication of the
disbarment complaint against him. There was nothing in the records that
would show that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma distributed or
had a hand in the distribution of the disbarment complaint against petitioner.
Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog, Redmond Batario, Malou
Mangahas, and Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas
Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas
alleged that petitioner was not able to establish the posting and publication
of the articles about the disbarment complaint, and that assuming the
posting and publication had been established, petitioner failed to support his
allegation that they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment
complaint. They further alleged that they did not cause the publication of the
news articles and thus, they did not violate the rule on privacy and
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.
Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other
respondents, namely De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo,
who did not file his separate comment, had a hand in the dissemination and
publication of the disbarment complaint against him. It would appear that
only Atty. Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the
disbarment complaint. In its Comment, GMA Network stated that the
publication"had already been done and completed when copies of the
complaint for disbarment were distributed by one of the disbarment
complainants, Atty. Prima Quinsayas x x x." 26 Dedace also stated in her
Comment that "Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the disbarment complaint
against Atty. Fortun and she received one."27
Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
both as a complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a
lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar
with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of
preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media which act
constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo v. De Leon,28 the Court ruled that
the premature disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of
disbarment proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule. 29 In that
case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a disbarment case, caused the

publication in newspapers of statements regarding the filing and pendency

of the disbarment proceedings. The Court found him guilty of contempt.

EBUIZA, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan (NEVAL, et als.), in the Disbarment
Case for the purpose of impeaching their testimonies in the Civil Case.

Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or

higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment
not exceeding six months or both.30 Atty. Quinsayas acted wrongly in setting
aside the confidentiality rule which every lawyer and member of the legal
profession should know. Hence, we deem it proper to impose on her a fine
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

Private respondents filed a Motion to Strike from the records of the Civil
Case all matters relating to the proceedings in the Disbarment Case. Over
petitioners' opposition, on September 20, 1985, the Trial Court issued its
questioned Order granting the Motion to Strike. The dispositive portion of
said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect

contempt for distributing copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty.
Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media and we order her to pay a
FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be well-taken, and

as prayed for in the motion, all direct references to the
proceedings in the disbarment case against Atty.
Villalon, Jr. are hereby ordered striking (sic) out from
the records and henceforth, further references to such
matters are barred.

SO ORDERED.
ROMAN R. VILLALON, JR., ROMAN R.C. III, ROMAN F.C. IV, ROMAN
A.C. V., JOSE CLARO C. and ARSENIO ROY C., all surnamed
VILLALON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FOURTH SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION), HON. INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN (PRESIDING JUDGE OF
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXIX AT SAN FERNANDO, LA
UNION), CATALINA NEVAL VDA. DE EBUIZA, CHILDREN OF
PATROCINIO EBUIZA (JUSTINA, MARIANO, FELICIDAD, FRANCISCO,
EUGENIA, MARIA, MARCIANA, and SIMEON, all surnamed
EBUIZA), respondents.

On May 16, 1979, Civil Case No. 2799 for "Annulment of Deed of Absolute
Sale, Recovery of Possession and Damages" was filed by private
respondent Catalina NEVAL Vda. de Ebuiza, mother of the other private
respondents all surnamed Ebuiza, against petitioner Atty. Roman R.
Villalon, Jr. (briefly, petitioner Villalon) and his sons, before the then Court of
First Instance of La Union (the Trial Court), for the recovery of a parcel of
land located at Urbiztondo, San Juan. La Union.
The property involved was also the subject of a Disbarment Case (Adm.
Case No. 1488) previously filed on July 22, 1975 with this Court by private
respondent Francisco EBUIZA, charging petitioner Villalon with falsification
of a deed of absolute sale of that property in his and his sons' favor, but
which petitioner Villalon claimed to have been his contingent fee for the
professional services he had rendered to EBUIZA's parents for successfully
handling Civil Case No. 1418 entitled "Paulino Ebuiza, et all vs. Patrocinio
Ebuiza, et al." before the then Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch II.
The Disbarment Case was referred by this Court to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation where testimonial
evidence was received. The case still pends thereat.
In the course of the trial of the Civil Case, petitioners introduced in evidence
the testimonies of some of the private respondents, namely, NEVAL,

The Trial Court opined that the admission of the contested evidence would
violate Section 10, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court providing that
"proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential". It
maintained that petitioner Villalon "is not at liberty to waive the privilege of
confidentiality" of the proceedings in the Disbarment Case considering the
public interest involved "even if it would serve his interest," and that Section
10, Rule 139 provides no exception.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on October 17, 1985,
petitioners, resorted to a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus
before the respondent Appellate Court to nullify the Order of September 20,
1985 and to require the Trial Court to allow -the impeaching evidence to
remain in the records of the Civil Case.
On February 3, 1986, respondent Appellate Court denied due course and
dismissed the Petition holding that "rulings of the trial court on procedural
questions and admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of separate appeal or
review on certiorari." Moreover, it reasoned out that, assuming the Trial
Court erred in rejecting petitioners' proffered evidence, their recourse is to
make a formal offer of the evidence under Rule 132, Section 35 of the
Rules. The reconsideration of said ruling sought by petitioners was denied
for lack of merit on February 19,1986.
Petitioners now avail of this Petition for Review on certiorari praying among
others, for the annulment of respondent Appellate Court's Decision, which
sustained the Trial Court Orders of September 20, 1985 and October 17,
1985, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We find merit in the Petition.
Petitioners introduced the testimonies of private respondents' witnesses in
the Disbarment Case for purposes of impeaching their credibility in the Civil
Case. 1 Petitioners claim that private respondents' witnesses "have given
conflicting testimonies on important factual matters in the disbarment case,
which are inconsistent with their present testimony and which would
accordingly cast a doubt on their credibility." 2 That is a defense tool
sanctioned by Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 providing:

Sec. 15. Impeachment of adverse party's witness.-A

witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity
is bad or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but
not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that
it may be shown by the examination of the witnesses,
or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense.
Sec. 16. How witness impeached by evidence of
inconsistent statements. -Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with
the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so; allowed to explain
them If the statements be in writing they must be shown
to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them .
By issuing its Order to strike, the Trial Court deprived petitioners of their
right to impeach the credibility of their adverse parties' witnesses by proving
that on former occasions they had made statements inconsistent with the
statements made during the trial, despite the fact that such statements are
material to the issues in the Civil Case. The subject matter involved in the
disbarment proceedings i.e., the alleged falsification of the deed of absolute
sale in petitioners' favor, is the same issue raised in the Civil Case wherein
the annulment of the said deed of absolute sale is sought.

19, 1986, and directs the Regional Trial Court of La Union, at San
Fernando, to allow the testimonies of private respondents (plaintiffs below),
more specifically those of Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza
and Justina Ebuiza San Juan, given in Administrative Case No. 1488 and all
other references thereto to remain in the records of Civil Case No. 2799
entitled "Catalina Neval Vda. de Ebuiza, Plaintiff, versus Roman R. Villalon,
Jr., et al., Defendants; Children of Patrocinio Ebuiza: Justina, et al., all
surnamed Ebuiza Intervenors. "
The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby lifted.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The court and its premises shall be used exclusively for court or judicial
functions and not for any other purpose. As temples of justice, their dignity and
sanctity must be preserved at all times.

Factual Antecedents

On July 25, 2007, Ryan S. Plaza (Plaza), Clerk of Court II of the Municipal
Trial

Court

of Argao,

Cebu,

filed

complaint[1] against

Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio (Amamio), Clerk of Court; Genoveva R. Vasquez

Admittedly, said Order is interlocutory in character. However, since it was
issued in patent abuse of discretion, certiorari lies. certiorari may be availed
of to contest an interlocutory order to correct a patent abuse of discretion by
the lower Court in issuing the same. 3 It may also be applied for when the
broader interests of justice so require or when ordinary appeal is not an
adequate remedy, 4 as in this case. The offer of evidence, suggested by
respondent Appellate Court as a remedy open to petitioners, while
procedurally correct, would be inadequate and ineffective for purposes of
impeachment. The broader interests of justice would then require that
petitioners be given sufficient latitude to present and prove their impeaching
evidence for judicial appreciation.
While proceedings against attorneys should, indeed, be private and
confidential except for the final order which shall be made public, 5 that
confidentiality is a privileged/ right which may be waived by the very lawyer
in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional
reputation it is vested, pursuant to the general principle that rights may be
waived unless the waiver is contrary to public policy, among others. 6 In fact,
the Court also notes that even private respondents' counsel touched on
some matters testified to by NEVAL in the disbarment proceedings and
which were the subject of cross examination.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE respondent Appellate
Court's Decision dated February 3, 1986, and Resolution dated February

(Vasquez), Legal Researcher, and Floramay Patalinghug (Patalinghug), Court

Stenographer, all of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, for
intentional violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 [2], when they allowed Sara
Lee, a private company selling beauty and fashion products, to hold a party and raffle
draw inside the Argao Hall of Justice on July 14, 2007.

The facts as summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

are as follows:
The complainant alleges that sometime in the first
week of July 2007, he heard that some of the personnel of
RTC (Branch 26) were planning to hold a Sara Lee party in
the Argao Hall of Justice and that upon learning of the plan,
he informed the personnel of the said court about
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 prohibiting the use of the Halls
of Justice for residential or commercial purposes.

The complainant claims that in the morning of July

14, 2007, a Saturday, the security guard on duty, Mr. Roger O.
Jimenez, telephoned him with the information that there were
persons from Sara Lee who wanted to enter the Argao Hall of
Justice to put up the decorations, sound system and catering
equipment for the Sara Lee party. The complainant states
that he directed Mr. Jimenez not to allow the persons to enter
the premises. He then called up Atty. Amamio to inform her
of the situation and of the infraction that would be committed
should the Sara Lee party push through. The complainant
alleges that Atty. Amamio insisted that she had authorized the
Sara Lee party and raffle draw.
The complainant then recounts the events that
transpired as recorded in the security logbook of
the Argao Hall of Justice x x x. In the logbook, Mr. Jimenez
wrote that at around 11:05 in the morning ofJuly 14, 2007, he
received a telephone call from Ms. Vasquez approving the use
of the entrance lobby for the raffle draw which she claimed
was authorized by Atty. Amamio. According to the entries in
the logbook, the raffle draw started at around 2:00 p.m. and
ended at 5:00 p.m., with fifty-one (51) participants attending
the event.
The complainant adds that even the security
guards on duty who recorded the Sara Lee event in the
logbook were later subjected to x x x harassment by the
respondents who questioned the guards [as to] why the said
event was recorded in the logbook. He claims that
Atty. Amamio even reprimanded the guards x x x, castigating
the latter for also jotting down in the logbook court personnel
who were not in uniform.
The complainant stresses that holding the party
and raffle draw inside the Argao Hall of Justice was a clear
violation of Administrative Circular 3-92 and had exposed the
properties and records contained within it to risk of damage
and loss.
The joint comment (denominated as Compliance)
dated August 21, 2007 of respondents Amamio, Vasquez
and Patalinghug vehemently and strongly RESIST the
charges against them for utter lack of both legal and factual
bases x x x.
The respondents do not deny that they allowed the
holding of the Sara Lee raffle draw on July 14, 2007 at the
ground floor lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice, but only after
respondents Amamio and Vasquez had fully discussed the
matter upon receipt of the letter dated June 4, 2007 of Mrs.
Virginia C. Tecson, business manager of the Fuller Life Direct
Selling and Personal Collection, requesting permission to hold
the raffle draw of Sara Lee at the Argao Hall of Justice.
The respondents argue that similar activities had
been held before at the Argao Hall of Justice. They said that
during the fiesta of Argao in September 2006, a stage for

beauty pageant was put up right at the entrance of

the Argao Hall of Justice. The contestants and other
participants used the ground floor lobby, the stairs and the
second floor lobby of the said building. On January 28, 2007,
the Municipality ofArgao held
a Sinulog parade
which
culminated in the town plaza. Since the Argao Hall of Justice
fronts the town plaza, some spectators entered the building
and went up the second floor to watch the performance in the
plaza. They add that on the ground floor lobby, several
persons, including the barangay tanods, were taking alcoholic
beverages.
The respondents also claim that at the Cebu City
Hall of Justice, raffle draws were being conducted regularly
and that the latest, which was held on March 30, 2007, was
sponsored by the very same people from Sara Lee. The
respondents contend that the prizes to this raffle draw, which
included a multicab, were displayed on the ground floor lobby
of the building for one week.
According to the respondents, these were all taken
into consideration when they decided to grant the request of
Mrs. Tecson. They insist that the proposed raffle draw was a
relatively minor event compared to the abovementioned
activities.
The respondents added that since the building
which houses the Argao Hall of Justice has been declared a
cultural heritage and is the centerpiece of the said municipality,
then the activity planned by Sara Lee was appropriate in
promoting the town of Argao. Respondents Amamio and
Vasquez maintain that it was their honest belief that the
building was not to be used exclusively for court purposes, but
also to be shown to visitors who wanted to visit and see the
historical building.
Thus, in her letter dated June 11, 2007,
respondent Amamio formally granted the request of
Mrs. Tecson with the specific instructions to use only the
ground floor lobby of the building, to conduct their activity
peacefully and orderly, to refrain from causing any damage to
the building and its premises and to clean the premises after
the raffle draw.
Since respondent Vasquez could not attend the
raffle draw, respondent Amamio claims that she requested
respondent Patalinghug to be at the Argao Hall of Justice on
the day of the raffle draw to make sure that her (Amamios)
instructions would be strictly observed.
Respondent Amamio denies the complainants
allegation that the latter informed the former about violating
Administrative Circular No. 3-92. The said respondent
declares that she need not be informed about the issuance [of
said circular] since she had practically read and studied
carefully all circulars that had been issued by the Supreme
Court not only as a dutiful Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, but as a lawyer herself.

The respondents deny that a party was held,

saying that only a raffle draw was conducted and that
only softdrinks and finger foods were served to the
participants. They also claim that there was no danger to the
building and the records since the raffle draw was merely held
at the ground floor lobby and that those who attended the raffle
draw were decent people, majority of them being
women. Neither was there any commercial activity or
transaction which involved the buying and selling of goods for
profit. According to the respondents, Mrs. Tecsons primary
reason for requesting the use of the ground floor lobby of
the Argao Hall of Justice was for her staff to experience and to
imbibe Argaos rich historical past.
The respondents also deny that they harassed and
intimidated the security guards who recorded the raffle draw in
the logbook. Respondents Vasquez and Patalinghug only
inspected the logbook to find out who attended the raffle draw
and respondent Amamio merely called the attention of the
guards as to why even the trivial non-wearing of the office
uniform of some employees were entered when Circular No.
49-2007 dated May 15, 2007 directed the optional wearing of
uniforms.

recommended that the respondents be sternly warned to be more circumspect in

complying with the guidelines for the use of the Hall of Justice.

Report and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Report and Recommendation,[7] the OCA did not agree with the
findings of Judge Perez. On the contrary, the OCA found that respondents violated
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 by allowing the holding of a raffle draw in the lobby of
the Argao Hall of Justice. Accordingly, the OCA recommended thatxxxx
2.
Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court (Branch 26), Argao, Cebu be
SUSPENDED for one month and one day for simple
misconduct with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Finally, the three respondents maintain that they

had performed their duties to the best of their abilities, acted
with absolute good faith devoid of malice, and had no intention
to prejudice the interests of the Court. They insist that they
have never violated any rule, regulation, or law in the
execution of their assigned tasks.[3]

3.
Ms. Genoveva R.
Vasquez,
Legal
Researcher
and
Ms. Floramay Patalinghug,
Court
Stenographer, both of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
26), Argao, Cebu be REPRIMANDED for violation of office
rules and regulations with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

On July 27, 2007, the matter was indorsed to Judge Maximo A. Perez,
RTC of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, for appropriate action and investigation.[4]

Our Ruling
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Judge
We adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
In his Report[5] dated August 30, 2007, Judge Perez recommended the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of substantial evidence to substantiate the

As

preliminary

matter,

we

note

that

on May

22,

charge. He found that respondents did not violate A.M No. 01-9-09-SC [6] which

2008, complainant Plaza manifested before the Court his intention to desist from

clarified Administrative Circular No. 3-92, for lack of showing that respondents have

pursuing the case. He wrote thus:

used the Argao Hall of Justice for residential, dwelling or sleeping purposes; for lack
of proof that respondents have utilized the Argao Hall of Justice for commercial
purposes because there was no buying and selling of goods for profit on July 14,
2007; and neither was there selling of tickets. Nonetheless, Judge Perez

xxxx
At this point in time, I am respectfully informing your
office that it is now my intention not to pursue the matter any
more for the reason that the attention of the respective
respondents has also been called x x x by the Executive
Judge and besides, the incident has already been heard

before the said judge and I was already satisfied with the
outcome/resolution of the said proceedings.

[13]

notwithstanding the fact that the said request was addressed to the Executive

Judge. In a letter[14] dated June 11, 2007, respondent Amamio granted the request

x x x x[8]

of Sara Lee. As correctly noted by the OCA, respondent Amamioexceeded her

At this point, we remind herein complainant that the discretion whether to

authority in taking it upon herself to grant the request of Sara Lees representative,

continue with the proceedings rests exclusively with the Court, notwithstanding the

instead of referring the letter to the Executive Judge to whom it was addressed

complainants intention to desist. Our ruling in Guray v. Judge Baustista[9] is

anyway.[15]

instructive:
Indeed, the holding of a raffle draw at the Argao Hall of Justice by the staff
This Court looks with disfavor at affidavits of
desistance filed by complainants, especially if done as an
afterthought. Contrary to what the parties might have
believed, withdrawal of the complaint does not have the legal
effect of exonerating respondent from any administrative
disciplinary sanction. It does not operate to divest this Court of
jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in
the complaint. The Courts disciplinary authority cannot be
dependent on or frustrated by private arrangements between
parties.
An administrative complaint against an official or
employee of the judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a
complainant who suddenly claims a change of
mind. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice,
as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. x x x [10]

Moreover, that the case has been heard by the Investigating Judge does not
mean that he may order its termination. As clearly stated in the Indorsement[11] of the
OCA dated July 27, 2007, Judge Perez was only directed to conduct an investigation
and to submit his report thereon to the OCA, for further evaluation by the
latter. Likewise, it is immaterial and irrelevant whether complainant was satisfied with

of Sara Lee degraded the honor and dignity of the court and exposed the premises,
as well as the judicial records to danger of loss or damage. In Administrative Circular
No. 3-92, we have already reminded all judges and court personnel that the Halls of
Justice may be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and
operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use x x x.

As correctly observed by the OCA:

A careful reading of the paragraph shows the
Courts categorical statement that the Halls of Justice are to be
used only for court purposes and for no other purpose, despite
the use of the word may, which the respondents and the
investigating judge argue as permissive and not
mandatory. The mention of residential and commercial
purposes are used as concrete examples since such
instances actually happened x x x and were in fact the subject
of administrative cases, and are thus enumerated, not to
exclude other acts (as clearly indicated by the word least of
all prior to the enumeration) but rather to illustrate the general
prohibition. Thus, the argument that the raffle draw event
was not residential nor commercial (despite the erudite
distinction made by the respondents as to what is commercial
and what is not) deserves scant consideration.[16]

the outcome of the case.

It is undisputed that on July 14, 2007, Sara Lee held a raffle draw at the
ground floor lobby of the Argao Hall of Justice. Ms. Virginia C. Tecson, Sara Lees
Business Manager, wrote a letter addressed to the Executive Judge of the RTC,
Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, requesting permission for the holding of a raffle draw at
the Argao Hall of Justice. In their Compliance,[12] respondents Amamio and Vasquez
admitted

that

they

discussed

the

said

request

between

themselves,

In fact, this reminder in Administrative Circular No. 3-92 was reiterated in

Administrative Circular No. 1-99[17] where we described courts as temples of justice
and as such, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times, be preserved and
enhanced. The Court thus exhorted its officials and employees to strive to inspire

public respect for the justice system by, among others, not using their offices as a
residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial functions.

ACCORDINGLY, we ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the

Office of the Court Administrator. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, is hereby found GUILTY of simple

On October 23, 2001, the Court also issued A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC,
Section 3, Part I of which provides

misconduct and is ordered SUSPENDED for one month and one day with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more

SEC. 3. USE OF HOJ.

severely. Ms. Genoveva R.

SEC. 3.1 The HOJ shall be for the exclusive

use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, Probation and
Parole Officers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of
Deeds, including their support personnel.

Ms. Floramay Patalinghug, Court Stenographer, both of the Regional Trial Court

SEC. 3.2 The HOJ shall be used only for court

and office purposes and shall not be used for residential, i.e.,
dwelling or sleeping, or commercial purposes.
SEC. 3.3 Cooking, except for boiling water for
coffee or similar beverage, shall not be allowed in the HOJ.

Finally, we agree with the OCA that the fact the Argao Hall of Justice had
been used for similar activities does not justify the holding of the raffle draw
thereat. Thus:
x x x The Argao Hall of Justice is not meant to be
used for festivities, and in fact should remain closed to the
public during such occasions. The contention that there was
no danger to the building and the records since the raffle draw
was merely held at the ground floor lobby and that those who
attended the raffle draw were decent people, majority of whom
are women, is untenable. Time and again, the Court has
always stressed in pertinent issuances and decisions that
courts are temples of justice, the honor and dignity of which
must be upheld and that their use shall not expose judicial
records to danger of loss or damage. So strict is the Court
about this that it has declared that the prohibition against the
use of Halls of Justice for purposes other than that for which
they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity
including their grounds.
If the building housing the Argao Hall of Justice is
such an important historical landmark, all the more reason why
activities, such as Sara Lee raffle draw, should not be held
within. At most, the said Hall of Justice could have been
made part of a regular local tour, to be viewed at designated
hours, which viewing shall be confined to certain areas not
intrusive to court operations and records.[18]

Vasquez,

Legal

Researcher

and

of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, are hereby found GUILTY of violation of office rules and
regulations and are REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNINGthat a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

N RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE

TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA.

May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted
as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine
Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a
Rule of Court provision covering this case's central issue. Up to this
juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled
case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,1 the District Court of Guam informed this
Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the
practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered
by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings
Case No. SP0075-94,2 a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics
Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maquera's suspension in Guam to the Bar
Confidant for comment in itsResolution dated November 19, 1996.3 Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where
he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his
disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign court's action is
by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's
oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty.
Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record
of Maquera's case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District
Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maquera's suspension

and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maquera's acts
or omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative
of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.4

On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by

paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name.16

Pursuant to this Court's directive in its Resolution dated March 18,

1997,5 the Bar Confidant sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the
District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the record of the
disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him. 6

On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C.
Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$320,000.00).17

The Court received certified copies of the record of Maquera's case from the
District Court of Guam on December 8, 1997.7
Thereafter, Maquera's case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and recommendation within
sixty (60) days from the IBP's receipt of the case records.8
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before
the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998.9 However, the
notice was returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from
his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding
address.10
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and
Recommendation and its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely
suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and
unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full.11
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February
28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in
the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam
for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal
services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high
fee for handling his client's case.12
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987,
Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment
against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castro's counsel in said
case. Castro's property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold
at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro,
however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year.
The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the
judgment debt within the aforesaid period.13
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro's property for Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged
to pay him.14
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera's legal
services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral
agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of
the latter.15

On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee)

conducted hearings regarding Maquera's alleged misconduct.18
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam
praying that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.519 and
1.8(a)20 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force
in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that
Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule
1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to
a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer's
acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are
fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing. 21
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the
practice of law in Guam for a period of two 2 years, however, with all but
thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to
Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs
and the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required
to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly
reprimanded. It also recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that
Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action by the Superior Court of
Guam.22
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property
in his favor as compensation for past legal services and that the transaction,
except for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior
written agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made
three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client
relationship between them, and that the property did not constitute an
exorbitant fee for his legal services to Castro.23
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered
its Decision24 suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for a
period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional
Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that
the attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet
completely terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer
Castro's right of redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held
that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of Castro's
property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more
than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered
to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to
take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case that he
was aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business

transactions between an attorney and his client "in a very general sort of
way."25

litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492,29 the prohibition

extends to sales in legal redemption.

On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP
concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct,
"there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of
ethics in the Philippines."26 However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP
since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A
of the Revised Rules of Court.27

The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is

founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may
easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client30 and
unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.

The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera's acts,
namely: acquiring by assignment Castro's right of redemption
over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera
appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of redemption;
and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate
Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of
the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension
or disbarment in this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client's
property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by
the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely
under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 149128 prohibits the lawyer's
acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the

The case of In re: Ruste31 illustrates the significance of the aforementioned

prohibition. In that case, the attorney acquired his clients' property subject of
a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed
by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the
instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his
services. The Court ruled that the lawyer's acquisition of the property of his
clients under the circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for
malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the
instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as
contended by the respondent, or at the latter's behest, as
contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case an
attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his
terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply
protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily
exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both".32
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera's acquisition of
Castro's right of redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his
act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits were tainted with deceit
and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant
fee for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the
right of redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and
since the property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00
as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption was
assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his
legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to
US$45,000.00.
Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from
the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his
suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are
violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They
are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically,
Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule
1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a
continuing requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal
profession.33
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering
Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines.
Under Section 27,34Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which

led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or

suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's
action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction.35 Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only
constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a
lawyer.36 More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the
opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary
evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance
with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a
respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him.
It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent
lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation
may be conducted ex parte.37
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on
his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him,
as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by
the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain
Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice,
this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring
him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those
grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be
suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership
dues from 1977 up to the present.38 Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6)
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in
such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.39
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of thisResolution, why he should not be
suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary
proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent
suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of
Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever
comes later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maquera's personal record
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 139
Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys

Section 1. Motion or complaint. Proceedings for the removal or

suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court on its own
motion or upon the complaint under oath of another in writing. The
complaint shall set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained
of, supported by affidavits, if any, of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts therein alleged and shall be accompanied with copies of such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
Section 2. Service or dismissal. If the complaint appears to merit action,
a copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, requiring him to
answer the same within ten (10) days from the date of service. If the
complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of
the Supreme Court that the complaint is not meritorious, the same shall be
dismissed.
Section 3. Investigation by Solicitor General. Upon the issues raised by
the complaint and answer, or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
case shall be referred to the Solicitor General for investigation to determine
if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the
respondent. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, the
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
Section 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme
Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the
respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
Section 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of respondent. If
the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all
the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and
the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a
copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen (15)
days.
Section 6. Evidence produced before Solicitor General available. The
evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be
considered by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the
respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the
respondent's answer no statement is made as to any intention of introducing
additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing
of such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same.
Section 7. Commissioner to investigate and recommend. Rules of
evidence. Upon receipt of the respondent's answer, wherein a statement
is made as to his desire to introduce additional evidence, the case shall be
referred to a commissioner who, in the discretion of the court, may be the
clerk of the Supreme Court, a judge of first instance, or an attorney-at-law
for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor General or his
representative shall appear before the commissioner to conduct the
prosecution. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend

himself, to produce additional evidence in his own behalf, and to be heard

by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The rules of
evidence shall be applicable to proceedings of this nature.

(a) at least one current identification document issued

by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual, such as but not limited to,
passport, drivers license, Professional Regulations
Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation
clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID,
Barangay certification, Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card,
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID,
OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
government office ID, certification from the National
Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) certification; or

Section 8. Report of commissioner and hearing. Upon receipt of the

report of the commissioner, copies of which shall be furnished the Solicitor
General and the respondent, the case shall be set down for hearing before
the court, following which the case shall be considered submitted to the
court for its final determination.
Section 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance. As
far as may be applicable, the procedure above outlined shall likewise
govern the filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys in the
Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance. In case of suspension of the
respondent, the judge of the court of first instance or Justice of the Court of
Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the
order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which same is
based.

(b) xxxx."
Quisumbing, J., on official leave. Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

Section 10. Confidential. Proceedings against attorneys shall be private

and confidential, except that the final order of the court shall be made public
as in other cases coming before the court.
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC

(adv127a)

February 19, 2008

Very truly yours.

RE: 2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Sub Committee on
the Revision of the Rules Governing Notaries Public, to AMEND Sec. 12 (a).
Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:

MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA (sgd)

Clerk of Court

Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc
dated February 19, 2008.
"A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC-Re: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The
Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Sub Committee
on the Revision of the Rules Governing Notaries Public, to
AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, to wit:
Rule II
DEFINITIONS
xxx
"Sec. 12. Component Evidence of Identity. The phrase
"competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an
individual based on:

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004, complainant
Victorina Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent
Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the
performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and
notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay3purportedly executed by Donato
Salonga and complainants mother, Basilia de la Cruz. 4 Both affiants
declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was
being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years.
Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the joint
affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28,
1961.5
In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na
Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilias death. He alleged

that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilias presence

and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of
Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on
top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no
forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilias name was the
signature of Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation7 attaching thereto the
affidavit of desistance8 of complainant which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng
naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga
sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay
Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa
Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD
CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon
ay pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng
kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa
katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado
CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay
ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan
nitong si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan
ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko
laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay
mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner9 recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice
of the legal profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as
notary public, be revoked; and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a
notarial commission for a period of one (1) year.10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and
that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the
joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondents alleged lack
of knowledge of Basilias death does not excuse him. It was his duty to
require the personal appearance of the affiant before affixing his notarial
seal and signature on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public
to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.11
Respondents act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence
of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01,12 Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.13 By affixing his signature
and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia
personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the
contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed
the document. Respondents conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities
considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our
courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has
clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function
as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the law.14
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in
behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what
are stated therein are facts of which they have personal knowledge. They
should swear to the document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representatives name should appear in the
said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time
the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the
notary public for notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or
parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the document.15
Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate
respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and

has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice.16
We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent
jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent lawyer was found guilty
of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the
signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was
disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he
was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 218 of complainants
affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized
her Sinumpaang Salaysay19 dated November 12, 2004 which was attached
to the complaint filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
without requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the
Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise be investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional
Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is
further WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of
this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin
notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November
12, 2004 without requiring the latters personal appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
BEN D. MARCES, SR., complainant, vs. JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL,
Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court Davao
City,respondent.
Respondent was, at the time material to this case, the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, at Davao City. [1] He is charged
with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment, and
immorality.

In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Caas moved into

complainants neighborhood. They became the nearest neighbors of the
complainant, their houses being only 45 meters apart. In that year, a
domestic helper of the Caases sought complainants help for alleged
maltreatment she had received from her employers. Complainant, who was
the incumbent Purok leader, referred the matter to the barangay
authorities. The dispute was resolved, but the relation of the Marces and
the Caas families became strained.
On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Caas had an exchange of
words with Mrs. Ruth Marces and the latters daughter, Lydia, during which
they hurled invectives at each other. The incident was triggered by a
relatively minor matter involving a fight between the turkeys owned by the
two families but which, because of the bad blood between them, became a
major issue.
The following day, September 28, Mrs. Caas, together with her sister
and a neighbor, boarded a passenger jeepney despite the fact that there
were no more seats available because complainant was riding on that
vehicle. It turned out that Mrs. Caas had intended to cause the
complainants arrest, because as the jeepney neared the police station,
Mrs. Caas asked the driver to stop the vehicle. Mrs. Caas then got off
and called a policeman and had the complainant Ben D. Marces arrested.
The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed
to the policeman by Mrs. Caas. The warrants had been issued by MTCC
Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases against the herein
complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Complainant was
detained for one night without the knowledge of his family, a fact of which
Mrs. Caas allegedly boasted in the neighborhood.
The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that
the criminal cases against him, in connection with which the alias warrants
were issued, had long been amicably settled. Judge Sarabia told the
complainant that he really did not know anything about the cases and that
he had only been requested by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue
the warrants.
(2)
As a result of the September 27, 1990 shouting incident,
Mrs. Caas also filed a complaint with the Barangay Captain against
complainants wife and daughter, Lydia. Mediation conferences between the
two families were conducted on October 27, 1990 and on November 3,
1990. Although he had not been asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel
attended the conferences. It is alleged that respondent judge
disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall
where the conferences were being held;
introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in
an obvious attempt to influence the Barangay Officials; and

The complaint alleges the following:

(1)
Complainant is a 61-year old retiree, married to Ruth
Jovellar, by whom he has five children, namely, Farley, Lydia, Ben Jr., Nikki
and Allan. Complainant and the members of his family are residents of the
BRC Village, Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City.

accompanied Mrs. Caas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latters

daughter.
During the October 27, 1990 conference, respondent judge allegedly
confronted the complainant, accusing him of sending the judge a death

threat by means of a letter which purported to have been sent by the New
Peoples Army.
The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute. It is
averred that Mrs. Caas showed arrogance and callousness at all times as
if to prove that she is protected by a hard rock and impregnable when she is
with the judge.
(3)
The feud between the Marces and Caas families
worsened. On December 29, 1990, there was a violent confrontation
between members of the two families. Some of the parties were injured as
a result of hacking. Investigations were conducted by the police during
which, according to complainant, he saw respondent Judge Arcangel talking
to the policemen.
(4)
On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in uniform
arrived in two military vehicles and arrested members of the complainants
family and took them to the Davao Metrodiscom Headquarters. The arrests
were made on orders of a certain Col. Nelson Estares. A summary inquest
was conducted which complainant laments to be irregular as the arrests
were pre-arranged and the complaint sheet was fabricated. Complainant
avers that the illegal issuance and service of the warrant (i.e., so-called
Arrest Orders) by the Commander of the Davao Metrodiscom can only be
done by a person with a strong connection, power and influence, such as
respondent judge, considering his high position in the government and close
relations with the Caas family.
(5)
In a resolution dated May 11, 1991 the investigating
prosecutor, Albert Axalan, found probable cause and filed charges of
attempted murder against complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife and his son,
Farley. Complainants countercharges were dropped. Three days after,
warrants of arrest were issued by the RTC against complainant, his wife
Ruth and son Farley respectively. Complainant alleges that respondent
Judge Arcangel, taking advantage of his position, influenced the conduct of
the preliminary investigation.
(6)
Subsequently,
complainants
son,
Farley,
was
arrested. He was handcuffed and taken to the Ma-a City Jail. It is alleged
that respondents Toyota car, with plate number LBT 555, followed the car
of the arresting policemen as if to make sure that the evil plan allegedly
authored by Judge Arcangel is well followed and executed. To add insult
to injury, it is alleged that while the applications for bail bond of
complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed at Branch 8 of RTC
of Davao City, respondent Judge Arcangel arrived and questioned the
validity of the bond posted, telling the representative of the bonding
company, Hindi puwede ito, who gave you the authority to issue? He then
removed the receipts and arrogantly left with the receipts.
(8)
Because of these events, complainant started asking why
a judge should have a special interest in his familys feud with the Caas
family. All he knew before was that the judges car was often parked in front
of the house of Mrs. Caas, especially when Mr. Caas was away working
overtime.
In his Comment submitted in compliance with the resolution of this
Court, respondent judge alleges (1) that the charges against him are not
only false and malicious but utterly baseless; (2) that the same were filed
merely to gratify complainants personal spite and animosity against him;
and (3) that the complaint was filed in anticipation of the cases which the
respondent intends to file against the complainant for slander and threats.

Respondent judge further avers:

Anent the charge of causing the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the complainant and the handing of the same to Mrs. Caas for
enforcement, it was Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Caas
who obtained the warrants. He only requested Judge Sarabia of the MTCC
of Davao City to issue them. [2] Respondent judge claims the warrants were
valid, having been issued in connection with pending cases and that there
were other warrants against complainant which could not be served
because of complainants close connections with the officers of the warrant
section.[3]
As to the allegation that he disturbed the barangay conciliation
proceedings in the case between the Marces and Caas families and
allegedly acted as an escort of Mrs. Caas and baby-sitter of her
daughter, respondent judge denies he acted as escort and baby-sitter and
claims that he could not have disturbed the proceedings because none
were held on November 3, 1990. He claims that he went to the barangay
hall because he filed his own complaint against Ruth Marces and her
daughter Lydia. Apparently, respondent judge is referring to the incident on
September 27, 1990 during which Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia
allegedly called Mrs. Caas kabit, kabit, kabit sa abogado (paramour,
paramour, paramour of a lawyer).[4] The judge probably felt alluded to.
Respondent judge likewise denies that he pressured the police
officers and the prosecutors to file charges in court as a result of the
December 29, 1990 hacking incident.
Respondent vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs. Caas
and that he went to the house of the Caas family whenever Mr. Wilfredo
Caas was away. Respondent claims that he has known the Caas family
since 1983, when he was still a City Judge. According to him, in 1989 he
used to go to the Caas residence on request by Mrs. Caas to mediate in
the latters family problem. After this was settled, he continued going there
because he and Mr. Caas had business interests in the manufacture of
appliance protectors.
Finally, it is alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from justice,
who has a string of criminal cases [5] and is notorious in the
community. Respondent further discusses the merits of the December 29,
1990 hacking incident pointing to complainant, his wife and son as the
felons and the guilty parties.
On February 27, 1992, the Court referred the case to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. A Reply
was subsequently filed by the complainant, alleging harassment by
respondent judge, as follows: (a) respondent judge wrote the Administrator
of the Social Security System, pretending to be interested in purchasing an
acquired asset consisting of a house and lot, which happens to be the
residence of the complainant; (b) the management of the Philippine Airlines
was asked by a fictitious person to revive the criminal cases against the
complainant; (c) the respondent judge, together with a certain Fiscal
Dumlao, had been visiting witnesses to the December 29, 1990 hacking
incident; (d) the respondent judge filed an administrative case with the
Professional Regulations Commission against Nikki Marces, daughter of the
complainant who had just passed the Nursing Board Examinations; and (e)
respondent still visited the house of Mr. and Mrs. Caas.
Complainant further avers that the criminal cases against him are all
business-related, being cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and

for estafa arising from the issuance of bouncing checks. He calls attention
to the fact that respondent judge discussed in his pleadings the merits of the
December 29, 1990 hacking incident and contends that this is improper and
unethical.
On May 26, 1992, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice
Luis Javellana of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. Unfortunately, Associate Justice Javellana suddenly died
on August 25, 1993. The case was thereafter reassigned to Associate
Justice Fidel P. Purisima, but the reception of the evidence was assigned to
Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of Branch XVI, RTC-Davao City. On
September 18, 1993, Judge Marasigan forwarded the records of the case,
together with the evidence adduced before him, to this Court. The records
were later transmitted to Justice Purisima.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 1994, Associate
Justice Purisima recommends dismissal of the charges against respondent
judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the charge that respondent judge
attended mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to
intervene. As to this charge the Investigating Justice finds that the evidence
establishes the same. Justice Purisima recommends that respondent judge
be admonished and sternly warned that repetition of the acts of impropriety
by respondent will be dealt with more severely. The pertinent portions of
Justice Purisimas report states:
The charge concerning the frequent visits by respondent Judge at the
residence of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas in Barangay Catalunan Pequeo, Davao
City, and allusion that the former has illicit relation with the latter are utterly
devoid of sufficient substantiation. The mere suspicion on the part of the
complainant and members of his family that the respondent Judge has an
affair with Mrs. Flordeliza Caas has been completely effaced and reduced
to nothing reprehensible or censurable by the unequivocal and
straightforward testimonies of Flordelizas husband and parents that the
respondent Judge is just a family friend whose visits did not have any
immoral implication. According to these knowledgeable witnesses, the
latter was their frequent visitor in 1990, when respondent Judge and Engr.
Wilfredo B. Caas, were engaged in the manufacture of appliance
protectors.
Obviously, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, the lifetime partner of Mrs. Flordeliza
Caas, day and night, should be in the best position to observe
her. Whether or not his wife is unfaithful to him is a matter within the sphere
of the husband to detect. Here, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas having given his
wife clean slate, We can do no less. A different conclusion and ruling could
ruin families, which society cherishes and protects (Article 215, New Civil
Code; Article 149, Family Code).
....
So also, respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable for the
handcapping [sic] of a son of complainant, who was allegedly handcapped
[sic] and brought to the Ma-a jail, while working at the Davao Light and
Power company. Absent any admissible evidence that the respondent
Judge was the one who caused such malfeasance to happen, he is not
answerable therefore

....
But the charge that the respondent Judge was present during the mediation
conference between the Marces family and Caas family on October 27 and
November 3, 1990, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan Pequeo,
Davao City, and that during such conference, respondent Judge was in and
out of the conference room, trying to interfere with the proceedings, and to
wield influence as Regional Trial Court Judge, is firmly anchored on
Complainants evidence, which has not been effectively traversed and
negated by respondents evidence.
From the evidence on hand, it is clear that on October 27, 1990, the
respondent Judge arrived at the Barangay Hall of Catalunan Pequeo,
Davao City, in the company of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, and the latters small
child. During the said mediation conference between the Marces family and
Caas family, respondent Judge entered the conference room and made it
known to all and sundry that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao. Such actuation was indiscreet and improper
because the disputes and controversies between the two warring families
could develop into a litigation before any of the courts of Davao.
All things studiedly considered, with due regard to the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced, pro and con, before Honorable Executive
Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; the
ineluctable conclusion is that on October 27, and November 3, 1990, the
respondent Judge intruded into the conference room, and interfered with a
mediation conference then being held between the family of the herein
complainant and the Caas family, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of
Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and while inside said room, tried to
influence barangay officials thereat, by identifying himself as the Presiding
Judge of Branch 12 of the Davao Regional Trial Court; a misbehavior and
an improper actuation under the premises.
Equally anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the respondent
Judge influenced the prosecutors and police authorities of Davao City to
harass the family of complainant.
The Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent
judge is guilty of improper conduct to be fully supported by the evidence in
the record. It only needs to be added that the claim of respondent judge
that he was at the mediation conference held on October 27, 1990 because
he had himself filed a complaint against Ruth Marces and the latters
daughter, Lydia, is belied by the fact that respondent judges complaint was
filed only on November 3, 1990.
The report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious
allegations in the complaint, of which there is also sufficient evidence in the
record, to wit:
(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias
warrants of arrest by requesting another judge, before
whom the case against the complainant was pending, to
issue the warrants; and

(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on

January 2, 1991 would not have been made without the
intervention of respondent judge.
These charges have not only been proven by substantial and
convincing evidence, but have actually been admitted by respondent
judge. Thus, complainant alleges that he was informed by Judge Sarabia
that the warrants had been issued by him upon the request of respondent
judge. This allegation is supported by a handwritten note (Exh. E) of
respondent judge, which reads:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia

To cap it all, respondent judge himself admitted in his Comment,

dated December 27, 1991, that Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs.
Flordeliza Caas requested him to have the warrants renewed, thus, he
requested Judge Sarabia for the issuance of the new warrants [8] against the
complainant.
Respondent judge justifies his intervention on the ground that
complainant Ben D. Marces had been able to evade service of the warrants
because of connections with the warrant officers of Davao City. Even if this
had been the case it would not excuse respondent judge in using his own
influence.
Indeed this is the same excuse given for respondent judges
interceding with the Metrodiscom authorities for the issuance of a so-called
order of arrest as a result of which complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife
Ruth and his children Farley, Lydia, Nikki and Allan were arrested on
January 2, 1991. Respondents own witness, Wilfredo Caas, stated that
he was accompanied by respondent to Col. Nelson Estares. It was Col.
Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of his
family. Thus, in his affidavit dated August 23, 1991, Wilfredo Caas stated:

Br. 3, City Trial Court

Davao City
Dear Ed:
If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending,
please issue another alias warrants as the accused is now in town.
Thanks,
(Sgd.) Paul Arcangel
In addition, complainant presented a certification by the Clerk of Court [6] of
the MTCC-Davao City, Branch 3, stating the following:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that according to the records of this Court, the three
(3) Estafa Cases against MR. BEN MARCES under Criminal Cases Nos. 9CM, 10-CM and 11-CM has been in archive since December 28, 1983 due
to non-arrest of the accused and an alias warrant of arrest was issued
against the accused.
That its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for
verification of its status and information by Judge Paul T. Arcangel that
accused is back in town and that ultimately resulted to the dismissal of the
three (3) cases on March 11, 1991, without which verification the said cases
would have remained pending to date.
Instead of being delivered to the warrant officer, the warrants were
actually given to Mrs. Caas. The entry in the Daily Record of Events of the
Ulas Police Substation[7] stated that [e]lements of this unit led by P/Cpl. VA
Secretaria arrested with alias warrant of arrest one BEN MARCES Y
DOMANILLO. . . who was charge[d] with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 with Criminal Case No[s]. 9-CM, 11CM, duly signed by Judge Edipolo
Sarabia this 28th of September 1990 at Davao City. The warrant was given
by one FLORDELIZA CAAS Y Pelegrino, 26 years old, married,
housewife. . . .

13. That when my wife and mother-in-law were attacked and hacked
by Ben Marces and his family within the premises of our house on
December 29, 1990, I called Judge Arcangel for assistance because Ben
Marces was trying to manipulate the case by making it appear that they
were the victims....
14. That when I followed up the case at the Talomo Police Station
and at the Tugbok Police Station, I was given a run around by the police
authorities and I sensed that a ranking police officer was interceding in
behalf of Ben Marces and his family;
15. That when the police authorities could not come up with a report
of the incident after more than three days, I sought the assistance of Judge
Arcangel, who accompanied me to Metrodiscom Chief Col. Nelson Estares,
to whom I explained the entire incident and treatment I received from the
police who was investigating the case;
In addition, Wilfredo Caas testified in the investigation and affirmed
that it was because of the help of respondent judge that he was able to talk
with Col. Estares, thus:[9]
[JUDGE ARCANGEL conducting examination:]
Q:

In connection with the hacking of your wife and mother-in-law,

what action did you take?

A:

I tried to follow up the complaint to the police station about the

hacking incident. I even went to the Tugbok police station.

Q:

What action was taken at the police station?

A:

The police station did not entertain my complaint and they tried
to pass me around.

Q:

When no action was taken in your complaint by the police

station, what did you do?

A:

Sensing that there is no hope (to go to the) police, I asked Judge

Arcangel to accompany me to Col. Estares.

Q:

When Judge Arcangel accompanied you to the Office of Col.

Estares, what did you do?

A:

He introduced me to Col. Estares and I told Col. Estares that my

wife and my mother-in-law were attacked by the Marces family
and they were hacked and I requested Col. Estares to help me
because the police did not take any action and I even sensed
that somebody was supporting the Marces family.

With the above-cited charges having been duly proven, in addition to

the factual findings of Justice Purisima, it is clear that (1) respondent judge
intervened in the feud between the complainants family and the Caas
family and (2) such interference was not limited to the barangay mediation
proceedings but extended as well to the various stages of the
conflict. These acts of respondent judge must be viewed not as single,
isolated actuations but in their totality and in the context of the enmity
between the two feuding families. Thus viewed we find the actuations of
respondent judge improper and censurable.
Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of
the law,[10] the intermediary between conflicting interests,[11] and the
embodiment of the peoples sense of justice. [12] Unless it was a case filed
with his court, it was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or
controversy. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.[13]
He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any
person can unduly influence him or enjoy his favor.[14]
Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely
private matter between feuding families. In attending, at the request of Mrs.
Caas, the barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing himself there
as the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in an obvious
demonstration of support for Mrs. Caas, respondent lent the prestige of his
office to a party in a case.
Respondents request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants
of arrest against the complainant is no less censurable. As the Court had
occasion to state in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor:[15]
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all
activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by
members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing
the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence
of the judiciary but also undermines the peoples faith in its integrity and
impartiality.
Respondent judge also acted improperly in accompanying Wilfredo
Caas to Col. Nelson Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and
members of the latters family. It would have been impossible for the Caas
family to procure the arrest of complainant and of members of his family by
the Davao Metrodiscom were it not for the intervention of respondent judge.

Wilfredo Caas claim that he had to seek the help of respondent

judge because even after three days the police still had not made a report
on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot justify respondents
intervention in the quarrel. The possibility that the incident could become
the subject of litigation in his court should have deterred him from getting
involved in the feud.
Nothing can bring courts into disrepute more than the failure of the
occupants thereof to be ever scrupulous in their conduct. Canon 30 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges in pending or prospective
litigation before him [to] be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations
or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course. It
cannot be overemphasized that a judges official conduct should be free
from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of official duties but also in everyday life,
should be beyond reproach.[16]
For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent judge guilty of
improper conduct. We do not agree with complainant, however, that
respondents misconduct justifies his dismissal from the service. While in
some cases involving similar acts the penalties imposed on the erring
judges were dismissal, there were in those cases other grounds warranting
the imposition of such drastic disciplinary penalty. For example, in Ubarra
v. Mapalad,[17] respondent, aside from pressuring complainants to drop
criminal charges against the accused, likewise refused to inhibit herself
when she knew it was improper to decide the case, and was guilty of delay
in deciding the case. On the other hand, in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor[18] the
respondent was found guilty of attempting to influence another judge to
acquit the accused in a criminal case and, in addition, of making untruthful
statements in the certificate of service.
In the case at bar, there is no other charge against respondent
judge. This is his first administrative case. On the other hand his record as
City Judge of Davao City, from 1975 to 1983, and as Regional Trial Court
Judge in the same city since 1983 is otherwise exemplary. In the
circumstances of this case, the penalty of reprimand with warning that
commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely, should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring
member of the judiciary who has not shown himself to be beyond
correction. As the Book of Proverbs says, A single reprimand does more
for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool. (17:10)
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with
WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on his part in the
future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. 11-190-CA-J : April 24, 2012]
COMPLAINT OF EMIL MEDENILLA, PEDRO ANONUEVO, JERICHO
INOCENTES, CARLITO SALOMON AND ATTY. JESUS F. ACPAL
AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated APRIL
24, 2012, which reads as follows: cralaw
"A.M. No. 11-190-CA-J (Complaint of Emil Medenilla,[*] Pedro Anonuevo,
Jericho Inocentes, Carlito Salomon and Atty. Jesus F. Acpal against Justice
Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals).

d) Justice Inting and others in the Board of Trustees supposedly passed

Resolution 2011-21, entitledStrengthening the Internal Control and
Disbursement Policies of the Association,[9] when such matter did not
appear in the August 27, 20 U special meeting agenda or in its minutes.
Nobody proposed such a resolution and the board did not deliberate or vote
on it. Since only Justice Inting was the only lawyer in the group,
complainants conclude that she prepared that resolution and manipulated
her supporters in the board.

RESOLUTION
Complainant officers and trustees of Katarungan Village Homeowners
Association, Inc., (the Association) of Barangay Poblacion, Muntinlupa City,
namely, Emil Medenilla (PRO), Pedro Anonuevo (trustee), Jericho
Inocentes (trustee), Carlito Salomon (trustee), and Atty. Jesus F. Acpal
(village administrator), filed a complaint-affidavit[1] dated September 30,
2011 against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and conduct unbecoming of a
Court of Appeals Justice in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complaint-affidavit alleges in substance that two sets of candidates,
one from the Pagbabago Party and the other from the Balisado
Performance Team, competed in the June 19, 2011 elections of their
Association's officers and trustees. The Pagbabago group won the positions
of President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor, and PRO while the Balisado
group won only the seats of the Vice-President and Business Manager.
[2]
For the Board of Trustees, however, eight from the Balisado group,
including Justice Inting, won the majority of the 14 positions of trustees. The
Pagbabago group won the remaining six positions.[3]
Complainants further alleged that, soon after the winners took their oath of
office, Justice Inting committed the following wrongful acts:
a) During the July 9, 2011 monthly regular meeting of the Association's
board of trustees and officers, someone introduced a resolution that
authorized its President, Fiscal Leoncio D. Suarez, Jr. and Treasurer, Jose
A. Abundo, to transact business with its banks. Justice Inting opposed the
passage of the resolution, however, claiming that the newly elected officers
and trustees had not as yet properly assumed their offices in view of the
required 60-day turn-over transition from the outgoing officers provided in
Section 6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act 9904 (R.A. 9904)[4] although these rules did not suppose to
take effect yet.[5]
b) Justice Inting joined some members of the association in filing complaints
of grave abuse of authority, among others, against its newly elected officers
before, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)[6] where her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned should the case reach the CA
where she worked.[7]
c) Justice Inting and other trustees of the Association prodded Evangeline
Bersabe, its accountant, to disobey the President's order for her to
surrender the association documents and keys in her possession.[8]

e) Justice Inting used her title as justice of the CA to justify the supposed
board action.[10] When her group displayed tarpaulins announcing the
implementation of the challenged board resolution, the Association's
security personnel removed and seized the tarpaulins. Reacting to this,
Justice Inting went to the Association's office and, standing on the middle of
the street, questioned what the security personnel did. Complainants
alleged that she arrogantly said on that occasion that she was a CA Justice,
conveying the message that her action was proper and cannot be
questioned.[11]
f) Justice Inting and her cohorts usurped the general and management
powers of the Association's President to reassign or reshuffle its employees
to other positions or to perform other duties and responsibilities. [12]
g) She violated Rule 5.01 (d)[13] and Rule 5.10[14] of Canon 5 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct when she joined the political party of her group and
contributed to its party funds. Complainants point out that the elections for
the board of trustees and officers of the Association had become so
politicized that she, as a CA Justice, ought not to have taken part in them
since they detracted from the dignity of that court.[15]
In her December 2, 2011 comment,[16] Justice Inting assails the complaint as
motivated by ill will, malice, and a desire to prevent her from fulfilling her
duties as member of the Association's board of trustees.[17] It was
unavoidable, she says, that she and the others in the board had to institute
their action against complainants even if there was a chance that the matter
could go up to the CA where she worked. But, since she was involved in the
case in her personal capacity as a trustee of the Association, she simply
would have to inhibit herself voluntarily if such matter be assigned to her
Division.[18]
Justice Inting claims that the action they filed with the HLURB was not
altogether groundless since the HLURB even granted their application for a
cease and desist order against complainants' group.[19] She rejects as
baseless the charge that the Association's elections partake of political
activities. And, although she was active in the affairs of the Association, she
excelled in her work as Justice of the CA as borne by its records.[20]
In their reply of January 10, 2010,[21] complainants contend that Justice
Inting appeared before the HLURB in her personal capacity since she had
not been personally aggrieved by complainants' action nor had they violated
her rights.[22] They claim that the HLURB cease and desist order appeared
questionable, given a report that it was issued because Justice Inting used
her influence as a Justice of the appellate court and because her
schoolmates at that agency helped her.[23]

The issue before the Court is whether or not there is sufficient basis to
warrant further administrative investigation of the complaint against Justice
Inting.

While it is the Court's duty to investigate every allegation of wrong-doing

against judges and other court personnel, it is also its duty to protect them
from frivolous charges.[25]cralaw

Here, the main thrust of the complaint against Justice Inting is that, as
Justice of the CA, she should have desisted from joining the elections for
the officers and members of the Board of Trustees of her homeowners
association and gotten embroiled in the issues that animated the two groups
which shared the powers of the association, thus getting drawn into a bitter
litigation.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the present administrative complaint

against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals for want of
substance.

But joining the judiciary does not mean that a judge should live the life of a
hermit. The Code of Judicial Ethics does not bar him from joining
associations or institutions that promote the common good. To be sure, no
social or moral considerations prevent him from taking active part in
organizations that aim to promote the welfare of his family or community,
like a homeowners association.
Perchance, serious issues could develop even within socially desirable
organizations but it cannot be on account of such a risk that the judge
should stay off from all forms of human associations. He does not, by
becoming a judge, cease to be a human being cast off from the society of
men. Such society is his natural habitat. It is membership in questionable
organizations or actively engaging in the operation of business
organizations while serving as judge that he is enjoined to avoid.[24]
As a trustee of her village's homeowners association, Justice Inting has the
right to stand her ground on any legitimate issue that might arise in the
course of the discharge of her duties. She could of course be wrong on
those issues but it is not for this that she can be subjected to administrative
action. None of those issues are related to her work as Justice of the CA.
Essentially, complainants want the Court to resolve by their present action
some of the very issues that they raise against her in the HLURB case. But
this is not a function of this administrative case. Only when she purposely
uses her position as Justice of the CA to get an advantage over or cause
prejudice to others can she be administratively sanctioned. As it happens,
there is no clear allegation in the complaint in this case that establishes this.
The allegations about her using her judicial rank to her advantage in the
HLURB case are admittedly speculative.

SO ORDERED."

TOBIAS VS. LIMSIACO

This administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by
complainant Florenda V. Tobias against respondent Judge Manuel Q.
Limsiaco, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC)

of

Valladolid-San

Enrique-Pulupandan,

Negros

Occidental. Complainant charged respondent with corruption for allegedly

offering package deals to litigants who plan to file cases in his court.

In her verified Complaint[1] dated June 6, 2007, complainant

alleged that respondent Judge Limsiaco, Jr. offers package deals for
cases filed in the court where he presides. She stated that sometime in
June 2006, she requested her sister, Lorna V. Vollmer, to inquire from the
Fourth MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental
about the requirements needed in filing an ejectment case. Court
Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero [2] allegedly proposed to Vollmer that for

The closest to her invoking her judicial rank was when she stood on the
middle of the street to confront the village security personnel who removed
and seized the posters that the Board of Trustees put up to announce the
need for the Association to comply with its resolution enjoining compliance
with the internal controls and disbursement policies that it had enacted. It is
plain that those security personnel used raw force to silence the voice of the
Board of Trustees expressed through those posters. And, assuming that
Justice Inting mentioned the fact that she was a Justice of the CA when she
confronted the security personnel, she appears to have done so
spontaneously to show that she knew what she was talking about or to
discourage those security personnel from using physical force against her
that they seemed quite capable of.

the sum of P30,000.00, respondent would provide the lawyer, prepare the
necessary pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the ejectment case
which they contemplated to file against the spouses Raymundo and
Francisca Batalla. Fegidero allegedly required them to pay the initial amount
of P10,000.00 and the remaining balance would be paid in the course of the
proceedings. It was made clear that they would not get any judicial relief
from their squatter problem unless they accepted the package deal.

Further, complainant alleged that on June 23, 2006, Lorna

Respondent

also

attached

to

his

Comment

the

Vollmer, accompanied by Salvacion Fegidero, delivered the amount

Affidavit[9] dated September 29, 2007 of Court Stenographer Salvacion B.

of P10,000.00 to respondent at his residence. Subsequently, an ejectment

Fegidero, denying the allegation that she offered a package deal to

case was filed in respondents court, entitled Reynold V. Tobias,

complainants sister, Lorna Vollmer. She declared that the allegations of

represented by his Attorneyin-fact Lorna V. Vollmer v. Spouses Raymundo

complainant were malicious and unfair, and that complainant and her sister

Batalla and Francisca Batalla, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-007-V.

could have been misled by some people who lost cases in the said court.

[3]

Respondent allegedly assigned a certain Atty. Robert G. Juanillo to

represent the complainant in the ejectment case. Complainant stated that

Meanwhile, the

respondent, however, immediately demanded for an additional payment

ejectment case

was assigned

to

Judge

of P10,000.00. She allegedly refused to give the additional amount and

Herminigildo S. Octaviano, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City,

earned the ire of respondent. She asked her sister, Lorna Vollmer, to

Negros Occidental, in view of respondents inhibition on July 30, 2007.[10]

request Atty. Robert Juanillo to voluntarily withdraw as counsel, [4] which he

did on April 16, 2007. Complainant also asked Vollmer to withdraw the

On February 20, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution, [11] which

case.[5] Respondent granted the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on April

noted the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the

23, 2007 and the Motion to Withdraw Case on May 3, 2007.

complaint against respondent. Due to the conflicting allegations of the

[6]

parties, the OCA opined that a formal investigation was necessary to afford
[7]

In his Comment, respondent denounced the allegation that he

the parties opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and to

offers package deals to prospective litigants as malicious, baseless and a

determine

the

alleged

participation

lie. He denied that he demanded from complainant the additional payment

Fegidero. Upon

of P10,000.00. He alleged that he does not know complainant and she is a

the complaint to Executive Judge Frances V. Guanzon, Regional Trial

total stranger to him.

Court, Bago City,

recommendation

Negros

of

Occidental

of

court

the

OCA,

for

employee
the

Court

investigation,

Salvacion
referred

report

and

recommendation within 60 days from receipt thereof.

Respondent

attached

to

his

Comment

the

Affidavit dated September 29, 2007 of Atty. Robert G. Juanillo, who stated

On May 20, 2008, the parties were summoned for a formal

therein that he received as counsel of the complainant in the ejectment case

investigation before Investigating Judge Frances V. Guanzon. Those who

the sum of P10,000.00 from complainants sister, Lorna Vollmer. From

appeared before the Investigating Judge were complainant Florenda V.

the P10,000.00, he paid filing fees and miscellaneous fees in the amount

Tobias, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Court Stenographer

of P3,707.00, while the remaining balance of P6,293.00 was paid to him for

Salvacion Fegidero and respondents witness, Atty. Robert Juanillo.

his services, consisting of the preparation and filing of the complaint for

Complainants witness, Lorna Vollmer, did not attend the investigation,

ejectment, including acceptance fee.

because per information of complainant, Vollmer was inGermany and she

[8]

was expected to be back in the country in December 2008.

In his Report dated June 2, 2008, Investigating Judge Guanzon

stated that complainant testified that it was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who

Juanillo. Respondent denied that he received the amount of P10,000.00

from Vollmer.[18]

informed her about the alleged package deal through long distance
telephone call. Complainant testified that she met Salvacion Fegidero only

Further, respondent testified that he met with complainant after

after the filing of the instant administrative complaint and that she did not

the ejectment case was filed, when she went to his court and told him that

talk with her even once.

[12]

Complainant further claimed that she had no

she was withdrawing the services of Atty. Robert Juanillo. Respondent

personal dealings with respondent or with Salvacion Fegidero, and that she

admitted that he prepared the motion for the withdrawal of appearance of

met respondent only after the filing of the ejectment case.

[13]

Atty. Juanillo, since respondent wanted to help complainant as she said it

was urgent, but respondent did not charge her.[19]

Moreover,

complainant

testified

that

respondent

neither

personally received from her the initial payment of P10,000.00 for the

Atty. Robert Juanillo testified that he received the amount

alleged package deal nor personally asked from her for an additional

of P10,000.00 from Lorna Vollmer at the Municipal Court of Valladolid,

payment of P10,000.00.

[14]

It was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who told her

Negros Occidental. From the amount, he paid filing fees amounting

through telephone about the demand for an additional P10,000.00, but she

to P3,707.00 to the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Court of

(complainant) did not send the money.

[15]

Valladolid-Pulupandan and San Enrique, which payment was evidenced by

five

Complainant testified that she was the one who went to the house

official

receipts.

Atty.

Juanillo

testified

that

the

balance

of P6,293.00 was payment for his legal services.

of Atty. Robert Juanillo, bringing with her the Motion to Withdraw as

Counsel prepared by respondent for Atty. Juanillo to sign. [16]

Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero denied that she was

involved in the alleged package deal complained of by Florenda

Respondent

and

Court

Stenographer

Salvacion

Fegidero

Tobias. She testified that she met Lorna Vollmer for the first time when

categorically denied the accusation that they had a package deal with Lorna

Vollmer went to the court in Villadolid and asked if there was a lawyer

Vollmer. Respondent testified that he met and talked with Vollmer when she

in Valladolid, because she was intending to file an ejectment suit. She

went to his court to inquire about the filing of an ejectment case against the

referred Vollmer to respondent Judge Limsiaco, since there was no lawyer

spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Respondent advised Vollmer

in

that since there was no lawyer in Valladolid, Negros Occidental, she had to

ofValladolid, Negros Occidental consists only of one room where everybody

choose the nearest town lawyer as it would lessen expenses in

holds office, including respondent. She saw respondent talk with Vollmer

transportation and appearance fee, and respondent mentioned the name of

for 15 minutes, but she did not hear what they were talking about.[20]

the Municipality of Valladolid,

Negros

Occidental.

The

courtroom

Atty. Robert Juanillo.[17] Moreover, respondent testified that Vollmer,

Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the complainant did not

together with her husband and Salvacion Fegidero, went to his house once

have personal knowledge of the alleged package deals to litigants who file

to

cases in the court of respondent. The allegations in the Complaint were all

ask

him

for

the

direction

to

the

house

of

Atty.

Robert

based on the information relayed to complainant though telephone by her

sister, Lorna Vollmer. During the investigation, complainant admitted that

The OCA found respondents acts, consisting of (1) advising

respondent did not personally receive from her the amount of P10,000.00

Lorna Vollmer about the ejectment case she was about to file before his

as payment for the alleged package deal, and respondent did not ask from

court; (2) recommending Atty. Robert Juanillo as counsel of the complainant

her an additional P10,000.00.

in the ejectment case; and (3) helping complainant to prepare the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel, to be violative of the rules on integrity, [21] impartiality,

According to Investigating Judge Guanzon, the only person who

[22]

and propriety[23] contained in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the

could have shed light on the alleged offer of package deals to litigants was

Philippine Judiciary. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed

Lorna Vollmer, complainants sister. Unfortunately, Vollmer was not present

as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be found guilty of

during the investigation. Per manifestation of complainant, Vollmer was then

gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial

in Germany and she was expected to return to the Philippines in December

Conduct and be fined in the amount of P20,000.00.

2008. Hence, the complaint of corruption was unsubstantiated.

In a Resolution dated February 25, 2009, the Court required the
Nevertheless, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although

parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision,

the alleged offer of package deals by respondent to litigants was

on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted, within 10

unsubstantiated, it was improper for respondent to talk to prospective

days from notice.

litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle cases. Likewise,

Judge Guanzon found respondents act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo to be improper and unethical.

On August 18, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution resolving to

inform the parties that they are deemed to have submitted the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted,

Investigating Judge Guanzon recommended the dismissal of the

considering that they have not submitted their respective manifestations

administrative complaint against respondent as regards the alleged offer of

required in the Resolution dated February 25, 2009, despite receipt thereof

package deals to litigants who plan to file cases in his court. However,

on April 1, 2010.

Judge Guanzon recommended that respondent be reprimanded for talking

to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending the counsel to handle
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Judge

the case, and preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert
Juanillo, which pleading was filed in respondents court and was acted upon

Guanzon that complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence her

allegation that respondent offers package deals to prospective litigants in

by him.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court referred the

his court.

Report of Investigating Judge Guanzon to the OCA for evaluation, report

and recommendation within 30 days from notice.

However, the investigation revealed that respondent committed

acts unbecoming of a judge, in particular, talking to a prospective litigant in
his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and preparing the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was filed in his

court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be
beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as

The

aforementioned

acts

of

respondent

constitute

gross

stated by the OCA, the said acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2

misconduct. Misconduct means a transgression of some established and

(Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4

definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.

(Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
[24]

thus:

[25]

Gross has been defined as out of all measure, beyond allowance;

flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused. [26] Respondents

CANON 2

act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as

INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.

counsel of complainant is inexcusable. In so doing, respondent exhibited

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not

only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

upon by him.

xxxx

improper conduct that tarnished the integrity and impartiality of his court,
considering that the said motion was filed in his own sala and was acted

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct is a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper
discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the
decision is made.

Court.[27] Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the sanctions
against a respondent guilty of a serious charge may be any of the following:
1.

Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part

of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations; Provided, however,
That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;

2.

Suspension from office without salary and other

benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or

3.

A fine of more than P20,000.00

exceeding P40,000.00.

xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public
scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen
and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

but

not

In imposing the proper sanction against respondent, the Court

takes note that respondent had been found guilty of grave misconduct in
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1509[28] and was fined P20,000.00, with a warning against

repetition of the same or similar act. Moreover, per verification from court
The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) was the

records, respondent compulsorily retired from the service on May 17, 2009.

mortgagee in good faith and for value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,
former Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Valladolid-San

Enrique-Pulupandan,

Negros

Occidental,

located in Koronadal City. The mortgagors were Marvella Plaza Hotel,

Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. and/or Sps. Victoriano Sy
and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas.

is

found GUILTY of gross misconduct for which he is FINED in the amount of

Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and

Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). The Office of the Court

conditions of the mortgage agreement. At the public auction on August 31,

Administrator is DIRECTED to deduct the fine of P25,000.00 from the

1998, the mortgaged parcels of land were sold to Metrobank as the highest

retirement benefits due to Judge Limsiaco, Jr.

bidder. Metrobank was issued a certificate of sale which was registered on

September 18, 1998 with the Register of Deeds of South Cotabato. The
mortgagors failed to redeem the 23 parcels of land within the redemption

No costs.

period.
SO ORDERED.
SY vs DINOPOL

Thereafter, Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber,

Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal

PER CURIAM:

City, presided over by Judge Dinopol, a complaint against Metrobank

for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage,
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of Sale, with

We resolve in this Decision the Verified Complaint, dated March

Damages and Attorneys Fees and with prayer for the Issuance of a

11, 2008,[1] filed by Victoriano Sy against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, for

as Civil Case No. 1403-24.

Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for Gross Ignorance of

On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further

the Law, in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-24, entitled Sps. Victoriano Sy

acting on the case[3] on the ground that he received a call, on April 12,

and Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of

2004, from a ranking officer of the Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding

Real Estate Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-24, entitled Metrobank v.
Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.

in behalf of the defendant bank and an earlier call (July 2003) from a
ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs. He
claimed he wanted to avoid being charged with partiality either way he
acted on the case.

The Antecedents Facts

On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South
[2]

The facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009,

Cotabato, a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the

of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and are summarized

parcels of land subject of the foreclosed mortgage against Marvella Plaza

below.

Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc., and/or Sps.

Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas,
docketed as Misc. Case No. 1440-24, [4] and assigned to the RTC, Branch
24, Koronadal City, presided by Judge Dinopol.

Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 (in
which he and his wife sought the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure
proceedings against Metrobank) was pending before Judge Dinopols sala,

On July 13, 2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the

[5]

petition, and issued the writ of possession on July 21, 2006.

[6]

the judge inhibited himself from acting on the case. This notwithstanding,
and to Sys surprise, Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by Metrobank, a matter

Meanwhile, or on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and

closely intertwined with Civil Case No. 1403-24. Judge Dinopol then issued

Auto Parts, Inc. filed with the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition,

an order granting Metrobank the right to possess the foreclosed properties.

entitled In the Matter of: Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension

[12]

of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan, docketed as

Corp. Case No. 1585-06.[7]

Sy further alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch

8, Marawi City, of a stay order[13] and the approval of the rehabilitation plan,

On June 26, 2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an

as well as the pendency of Metrobanks petition before the Court of Appeals

Order[8] staying the enforcement of all claims against the debtor, its

(CA) Twenty-Third Division in Cagayan De Oro City (CA G.R. SP No.

guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor. The same court

01824) assailing the validity of the stay order, Judge Dinopol ordered that

subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.

the writ of possession be implemented.[14]

In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to

Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

implement the writ of possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was

returned unsatisfied in view of the stay order issued by the RTC, Branch 8,
Marawi City, in Corp. Case No. 1585-06.

[9]

Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No.
1403-24 was pending in Judge Dinopols sala, the judge asked him for
commodity loans in the form of construction materials to be used in the

Consequently, the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a

construction of the judges house. The transaction was evidenced by

Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to the issuance of the stay order and

delivery receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005),[15]and charge invoices no. 9817

the approval of the rehabilitation plan by the Rehabilitation Court, and a

(March 8, 2005) for P16,000.00,[16] no. 9826 (March 9, 2005) for P850.00,

motion for inhibition on grounds of bias and partiality on the part of Judge

[17]

and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005) for P780.00.[18]

Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions in an Order dated February 11,
2008, and directed Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico to re-implement the
writ of execution of July 31, 2006.

[10]

Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge

Dinopol obtained cash loans from him on various occasions between
December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in the total amount of P121,000.00, and

Shortly

thereafter,

Sy

filed

the

administrative

Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki Multi-cab and returned it after

complaint charging Judge Dinopol of gross ignorance of the law and

the judge was suspended in September 2007. Sy presented disbursement

conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.

vouchers, official receipts and an acknowledgement to prove his claim.[19]

[11]

Gross Ignorance of the Law

present

Judge Dinopols Comment

In a Resolution dated July 15, 2009, the Court resolved to: (1)
note Sys complaint and Judge Dinopols answer/comment; (2) re-docket

In a 1st indorsement dated March 18, 2008,[20] the OCA required

the complaint as a regular administrative matter; and (3) require the parties

Judge Dinopol to comment on the complaint, which he did on April 21,

to manifest whether they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on

[21]

2008.

the basis of the pleadings. The Court also noted the OCA Report dated
May 25, 2009,[22] which found no basis for the charge of ignorance of the law
Judge Dinopol denied Sys accusations. He stressed that he

inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had not

on the part of Judge Dinopol, but found him liable for conduct unbecoming a
judge.

acted on the case since then; nobody intervened and pleaded in behalf of
Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed. He was not aware nor

The Courts Ruling

had he been given notice that Metrobank filed a petition before the CA (CA
G.R. SP No. 01824), nor did he receive any order from the appellate

The OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge Dinopol cannot be

tribunal enjoining him to desist from performing or acting on the incidents

disciplined for ignorance of the law and of procedure in his handling of Civil

pending in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.

Case No. 1403-24 (for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real

Estate Mortgage) filed by Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy against Metrobank,

Judge Dinopol denied that he committed any breach of

as he inhibited himself from the case, nor in his handling of Misc. Case No.

procedural rules that could be characterized as gross ignorance of the basic

1440-24 (Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession) filed by

rules of civil procedures. He maintained that Sy did not allege any specific

Metrobank against Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., because of the essential

actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury to Sy, and that he had

nature of the proceeding itself.

acted fairly and objectively. He added that he observed the requirements of

the Code of Professional Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his handling
of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.

In issuing the writ of possession and in directing its reimplementation when it was returned unsatisfied the first time it was
enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in accordance with the rules and

With respect to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy

jurisprudence on the matter.

at the time his house was under construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that
when he obtained the commodity loans from Sy in March 2005, he had

As the Court held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of

already inhibited himself from handling Civil Case No. 1403-24; he did so on

Talavera, Inc.,[23] the proceeding in a petition for the issuance of a writ of

April 16, 2004. He explained that Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed only on

possession is ex-parteand summary in nature. It is brought for the benefit

September 15, 2005, and was assigned to his sala on September 22,

of one party only and may be granted even without notice to the mortgagor,

2005. He denied that he received from Sy cash loans in the amount

in this case, complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty of the court to grant a writ

of P121,000.00. He also denied borrowing Sys Suzuki Multi-cab and

of possession is a ministerial function. The court does not exercise its

claimed that it was Rogelio Villanueva who borrowed it.

official discretion or judgment.[24] Judge Dinopol, before whom the petition

Judge Dinopol countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister

for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed, had no discretion on

design and employed deceit and cunning to frustrate the administration of

whether to issue the writ of possession or not. It cannot be said, therefore,

justice in the cases he handled.

that Judge Dinopol exposed himself or exhibited bias in favor of Metrobank

when he issued the writ of possession.

wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005, regarding the purchase of materials for his
Further, regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the

house which was then under construction, although he claimed that it was

annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled

his wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to deliver

to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome

the materials to his residence.[31] Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence

of the annulment case. Once the writ of possession is issued, the trial court

regarding the commodity loans or even the cash loans saying that the

has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay.

[25]

transaction with Sy regarding the construction materials occurred when

there was no case pending in his sala where Sy was a party.

From another perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed

against the assets and properties belonging to a debtor. Properties that

The above disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to

have already been foreclosed, and those whose titles have already passed

have committed a serious impropriety in his or his familys financial or

on to the winning bidder are no longer considered properties of the debtor.

business dealings with Sy.

[26]

In such case, it is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to grant a

possessory writ over the foreclosed properties.[27]

Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a

judges impartiality provides, inter alia, as follows:

Clearly, Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and

committed no impropriety in directing the re-implementation of the writ of
execution in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.

On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to
Sys charge of conduct unbecoming against Judge Dinopol. The latters
denial of having committed the acts complained of flies in the face of

Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her

conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and the judiciary.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is
reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the
occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be
disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

indications in the records and documentary evidence that he obtained

commodity loans from Sy in the form of building materials for the
construction of his house in Koronadal City. There was also Sys claim of
cash loans to Judge Dinopol on various occasions, between December 2,
2005 and July 14, 2006, amounting to P121,000.00, as well as the loan of
Sys Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.

Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received

accommodations from Sy for the building materials he needed for the
construction

of

his

house. He

compromised

his

position

as

judge. Although at the time he and his family had business dealings with Sy
there was no pending case involving the businessman, he should have
been more circumspect in securing the construction materials. The sphere

The commodity loans were evidenced by receipts [28] indicating

delivery of construction materials to Judge Dinopols residence. The cash
loans appear to have been covered by disbursement vouchers, [29] and the
borrowed multicab is the subject of an acknowledgement [30] from Judge
Dinopols driver Rogelio Villanueva.

of Sys business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the

OCA aptly noted, it is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be
filed in his court with complainant as a party. In such a case, his
(respondent) business and financial dealings with complainant would create
a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in deciding the case and would
tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court. [32]

There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol

obtained the commodity loans from Sy. The judge himself admitted that he

In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of

Canon 1, Canon 2 and Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

actions no doubt created the inference that at some point, he acceded to

Sys requests to delay the proceedings. This conclusion, is in fact,
bolstered by Judge Dinopols knowledge that the counsel for Metrobank was

Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in

performing his official duties, thus:

instructed to immediately secure the order for the issuance of the writ of
possession.[35] Regardless of the representations allegedly made to him by
Sy, Judge Dinopol should have immediately issued the writ of possession in

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function

independently on the basis of their assessment of the
facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

Metrobanks favor.

From these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol

compromised not only his impartiality in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24
but also his independence and integrity as a judge. His actions no doubt

Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of

his official functions:
Integrity is essential not only in the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges
must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.

diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge. His actions
gave the public the impression and the appearance that he can be
influenced by extraneous factors - other than the legal arguments and the
court evidence in discharging his judicial functions.

In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in

talking with litigants outside court proceedings. His improper conduct was
further aggravated by the fact that these conversations took place in the
absence of the opposing litigants and/or the opposing counsel. In Agustin
v.

Mercado,[36] we

business meeting

declared

with

thatemployees of the

litigants

or

their

court have no

representatives

under

any

circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N. Calabines,[37] the Court minced

Moreover, Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain
proper decorum and its appearance in his public office:
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

By his own admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these

ethical standards. In his Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he
talked with Sy on several occasions to discuss Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
[33]

Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy, in at least two instances, requested

him to delay the resolution of the writ of possession.[34] Judge Dinopols

no words in explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes a brazen and

outrageous betrayal of public trust.[38] The Court further declared in the said
case:
x x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for
honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in
the service of the judiciary. x x x
The image of a court as a bastion of justice
depends to a large extent on the personal and official
conduct of its employees. Thus, from the judge to the
lowest clerk, judicial personnel have the sacred duty to
maintain the good name of the Judiciary.
All employees in the judiciary should be
examples
of
responsibility,
competence
and
efficiency. As officers of the court and agents of the law,
they must discharge their duties with due care and

utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to

diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary will not be
condoned.[39]

pursuing the complaint against the judge for gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of authority and discretion.[46]

Certainly, these responsibilities become more exacting when one

And more recently, in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March

occupies the position of a judge. Time and again, we have emphasized

30, 2009, Judge Dinopol had been reminded and warned against

that judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would

entertaining litigants outside court premises.[47]

enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system.

[40]

The

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross

judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality;

misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a

they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may

serious charge. Under Section 11 of the same Rule, the respondent found

erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary. [41] These standards apply not

guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the following sanctions:

only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the
decision is made.[42]

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the

benefits

Without a doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in

as

the

Court

may

determine,

and

disqualification

from

reinstatement or reappointment to any public office;

office and deserves to be sanctioned under the above findings. His track
record as a judge, in this regard, is far from exemplary. He is a repeat
offender, as demonstrated by the following cases where we penalized him

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for

more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months; or

for questionable conduct:

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided on June 15, 2006, Judge
Dinopol was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was
fined P20,000.00. [43]

Considering his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of

the standard ethical conduct demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol
unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. We impose upon him the

Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on September 20,

severest penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all

2006, he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of

retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and disqualification

authority, and was finedP20,000.00. [44]

from reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including

government-owned or controlled corporations.[48]

Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on August 23, 2007, he

was found liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order and for
violating the clear provisions of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC, and was
fined P11,000.00.[45]

Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on August 28,

2006, he was strongly admonished, even as the complainant desisted from

Lastly, as we sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of

the bench that:
[a]lthough every office in the government
service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the [J]udiciary. A magistrate of
the law must compose himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official and otherwise, can

bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks

up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.[49]

Act No. 3815[11] or the Revised Penal Code; and (3) violation of Sections
5(a),[12] (d),[13] and (e)[14] of RA 6713.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY OF
GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby DISMISSED from the service,

The Facts

with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, with
prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.

In her Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 submitted to the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Tabisula stated that she was the

SO ORDERED.

plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6840 entitled Caridad S. Tabisula v. Rang-ay

CARPIO, J.:

Rural
The Case

Bank,

Inc.

for

specific

performance

with

accounting

and

damages. This case was raffled to the RTC of San Fernando City, La
Union, Branch 26 presided by Judge Tabora. Tabisula narrated that due to
the prolonged absence of Judge Tabora caused by a serious illness, Judge

This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated 17

Antonio A. Carbonell (Judge Carbonell), now retired but then pairing/vice-

October 2006 filed by Caridad S. Tabisula (Tabisula) against Judge Mona

executive judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27,

Lisa T. Tabora (Judge Tabora), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court

took over and heard the case from the beginning up to its termination.

(RTC), San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, and Alfredo V.

Lacsamana, Jr. (Lacsamana), Officer-in-Charge, Branch Clerk of Court

Later, Tabisula found out that a decision had already been rendered

(OIC-BCOC) of the same court. Tabisula charged Judge Tabora

by Judge Carbonell so she requested from Lacsamana a copy of the

(1) violation of Section 3(e)[1] of Republic Act No. 3019[2](RA 3019)

decision. However, despite several requests, Lacsamana allegedly refused

or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; (2) violation of Section 1, Canon

to furnish Tabisula with a copy of the decision upon the instruction of Judge

3[3] and Section 2, Canon 5[4] of A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC[5] or the New Code of

Tabora, who at that time had already reported back to work. Tabisula sent

Judicial Conduct; (3) violation of Republic Act No. 6713 [6] (RA 6713) or the

a Letter-Request dated 24 August 2006 addressed to the RTC asking

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;

Judge Tabora to direct Lacsamana to give a copy of the decision rendered

and (4) gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, oppression,

by Judge Carbonell. However, instead of granting the request, Judge

serious neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

Tabora issued an Order dated 30 August 2006, informing Tabisula that an

service. Further, Tabisula charged Lacsamana with (1) violation of Sections

Order dated 8 August 2006 was issued by the RTC requiring the parties to

3(e)[7] and (f)[8] of RA 3019; (2) violation of Articles 226 [9] and 315(3)(c)[10] of

submit their respective memorandum within 15 days from receipt of the

with

Order. Also, Judge Tabora informed Tabisula that even if the pairing judge

was the one who heard the case from beginning to end, the prerogative of
rendering the decision still rests entirely on the presiding judge.

Lacsamana added that he was the one who received Tabisulas

Letter dated 24 August 2006 addressed to Judge Tabora. Lacsamana

On 18 September 2006, Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the

reasoned that he was not the person in charge of releasing decisions,

case adverse to Tabisula. Tabisula then wrote a Letter dated 2 October

orders, and other documents relative to a pending case and it was not

2006 to Judge Carbonell requesting for a copy of his decision. On 9

within his functions to release a decision without the presiding judges

October 2006, Judge Carbonell replied to Tabisulas letter and attached a

authority.

copy of his decision which favored Tabisula.

Judge Tabora then filed her Comment dated 26 February 2007 with
Tabisula then filed this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and

the OCA. Judge Tabora indicated that she underwent surgery on 15 May

deliberately changing, altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a

2006 and was later diagnosed with a serious illness. Prior to her surgery,

court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction. Tabisula added that this has

she conducted a hearing in Civil Case No. 6840 on 21 April

caused her undue injury since the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840, Rang-

2006. However, the same had been reset due to the absence of Tabisulas

Ay Rural Bank Inc., represented by its President, Ives Q. Nisce, was

counsel.

allegedly a relative of Judge Taboras husband.

On 18 May 2006, Tabisula filed a Motion for the pairing judge to hear
Tabisula also charged Lacsamana for alleged manifest partiality,

Civil Case No. 6840 on the basis of Judge Taboras absence. On 26 May

evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence for refusing to furnish a

2006, while Judge Tabora was on leave, Judge Carbonell proceeded to

copy of the decision rendered by Judge Carbonell despite several verbal

hear the testimony of the lone witness for the defendant in the case without

and written demands.

first issuing an order granting the motion filed by Tabisula.

In an undated Comment submitted to the OCA, Lacsamana clarified

On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work. However, on

that his official designation is Sheriff IV and he was only designated as OIC-

19 June 2006, Judge Carbonell still acted on the formal offer of evidence by

BCOC by Judge Tabora on 1 August 2006. Lacsamana explained that

the defendants and issued an Order submitting the case for resolution.

Judge Carbonell handed him a copy of his decision in Civil Case No. 6840
on 11 August 2006. However, that day being a Friday, Lacsamana was

On 8 August 2006, in the course of her inventory of court records,

able to submit the decision to Judge Tabora only on the next working day,

Judge Tabora noticed that Civil Case No. 6840 had been submitted for

14 August 2006. Judge Tabora informed him to just leave a copy of the

decision on 19 June 2006 by Judge Carbonell. Since the 90-day period for

decision at her table. From then on, Lacsamana had no more knowledge of

rendering a decision was soon to expire, she immediately issued an Order

what happened to the decision.

dated 8 August 2006 directing the parties to submit their respective

memorandum.

Judge Tabora also clarified that the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840
was a bank, a corporate entity with a distinct personality. She was not
disqualified from sitting in the case since under Section 1, Rule 137 [15] of the

Three days later, on 11 August 2006, Judge Carbonell issued in Civil

Rules of Court her husbands relation with the banks representative

Case No. 6840 a decision which was received by Lacsamana. On 14

was remote or way beyond the 6thdegree. Thus, the relationship has

August 2006, Lacsamana turned over a copy of the decision to Judge

absolutely no bearing on the outcome of the case. Judge Tabora prayed

Tabora.

that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

After receipt of the decision, Judge Tabora immediately went to

On 14 August 2007, the OCA submitted its Report finding no

Judge Carbonell and informed him that she issued an Order dated 8 August

sufficient and factual legal basis to hold Judge Tabora and Lacsamana

2006 requiring the parties to submit their respective memorandum. Judge

liable for any of the charges filed by Tabisula. The OCA stated that Judge

Carbonell immediately cut her off and told her to just recall her earlier order.

Tabora, in rendering her own decision in Civil Case No. 6840, was well
within her power to decide the case since she had full authority over all

Judge Tabora then carefully studied the entire records of the case

cases pending in her official station. As for Lacsamana, the OCA found that

and found out that Judge Carbonells decision was not in accordance with

he could not be faulted for his failure to comply with Tabisulas request since

the facts of the case and the applicable law and appeared to have unjustly

he was only obeying the lawful order of Judge Tabora, his superior. Also,

favored Tabisula.

Judge Carbonells decision in Civil Case No. 6840 was not even
promulgated and did not form part of the official records of the case. Thus,

Judge Tabora also wondered how Tabisula came to know of the

there was no prior existing valid decision.

unpromulgated decision of Judge Carbonell. Judge Carbonells decision

was never officially released to any of the parties and did not form part of
the records of the case.

The OCA also found that there is a need to scrutinize the actuations
of Judge Carbonell since he overstepped the bounds of his authority as
pairing judge for Branch 26 and has shown unusual interest in the

Judge Tabora pointed out that it was Judge Carbonell who directly

disposition of Civil Case No. 6840.

furnished Tabisula with a copy of his decision a month after the decision of
Judge Tabora had already been released to the parties. Also, Tabisulas

The OCA recommended that:

insistence for the release of Judge Carbonells decision made her

determined to exercise her judicial independence since such decision would
result in a miscarriage of justice.

(1)
that the instant complaint be DISMISSED as
against respondents Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora and
OIC Branch Clerk of Court Alfredo V. Lacsamana for
lack of merit;

(2)
that the COMMENT of respondent Judge
be considered as a complaint against Judge Antonio A.
Carbonell, and that Judge Carbonell be furnished with
a copy of such comment and, be in turn REQUIRED to
COMMENT thereon.

Thereafter, Tabisula filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 27

November 2007 on the Courts Resolution dated 1 October 2007. Tabisula
stated that the Court erred in dismissing the complaint she filed against
Judge Tabora and Lacsamana.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2007, the Court resolved to (1)

dismiss the administrative complaint against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana
for lack of merit; and (2) consider the Comment dated 26 February 2007 of
Judge Tabora as a complaint against Judge Carbonell and require Judge
Carbonell to file his Comment within 10 days from notice.

In a Letter dated 5 March 2008, Lacsamana and seven other

employees of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, wrote
the

OCA

and

narrated

their

negative

experience

toward

co-

employee, Olympia Elena O. Dacanay-Queddeng (Queddeng), Legal

Researcher II of the same court. In the same letter, they also gave their

In his Comment dated 29 October 2007, Judge Carbonell admitted

the facts of the case as stated by Judge Tabora in her Comment dated 26

support in an unrelated administrative complaint filed by Judge Tabora

against Queddeng.

February 2007 from the time he took over Civil Case No. 6840 until he
submitted his decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana. However, he disagreed
with Judge Taboras contention that the decision he rendered in Civil Case

In a Resolution dated 25 June 2008, the Court referred the case to

the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

No. 6840 was not validly promulgated and released to the parties. Judge
Carbonell maintained that the act of filing the decision with the clerk of court

The OCAs Report and Recommendation

already constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation and not its

pronouncement in open court or release to the parties.

On 18 September 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding Judge

Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the

Judge Carbonell added that he was not aware of what subsequently

transpired after he turned over the records of the case but admitted that
after receipt of the letter-request of Tabisula asking for a copy of his
decision, he immediately responded by furnishing Tabisula with a copy.
Judge Carbonell further stated that the instant administrative matter
does not involve him. The dispute was originally between Tabisula against
Judge Tabora and Lacsamana. The only issue between him and Judge
Tabora was a divergence of legal opinion.

New Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA reiterated that Judge Carbonell
overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge of Branch 26 when
he prepared the decision in Civil Case No. 6840 and furnished Tabisula with
a copy of such decision. As a result, Judge Carbonell created the
impression that he had taken a special interest in the case.
The OCA recommended that:
(1)
the Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 27, 2007 of Mrs. Caridad S. Tabisula on the
Resolution dated October 1, 2007, be DENIED for lack
of merit;

(2)
this case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter and Judge Antonio A. Carbonell
be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) to be deducted from the retirement
benefits that he may receive; and
(3)
the Letter dated March 5, 2008 of Alfredo
Lacsamana, Jr., Court Sheriff, and seven (7) other
employees of RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando City, La
Union, against Mrs. Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng,
Legal Researcher, same court, be DETACHED from
the records of this administrative matter and the same
be included in A.M. No. P-07-2371 (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng,
Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union).

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds the report of the OCA well-taken.

Clearly, Judge Carbonell fell short of the exacting standards set in

Section 2, Canon 3[18] of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the
judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision
is made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)

Lower court judges play a pivotal role in the promotion of the peoples
faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the

The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters

of another branch in case the presiding judge is absent can be found in two
circulars issued by the Court: (1) Circular No. 7[16] effective 23 September
1974 and (2) Circular No. 19-98[17] effective 18 February 1998.

judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and
those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges
must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is
more sternly applied to them.[19]

Judge Carbonell, as the pairing judge of the RTC of San Fernando

City, La Union, Branch 26, assumed cognizance of Civil Case No. 6840
upon Judge Taboras leave of absence in May 2006 due to a serious
illness. Judge Carbonell fulfilled his duties by conducting hearings in the
said case from May until June 2006. On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora
reported back to work as presiding judge of Branch 26. However, even
though Judge Carbonell knew that Judge Tabora had already re-assumed
her duties, he still issued an Order submitting the case for resolution on 19
June 2006 and even submitted a written decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana
on 11 August 2006.

As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should have

sought the conformity of Judge Tabora in rendering his own decision to the
case as a matter of judicial courtesy and respect. Judge Carbonell tried
justifying his act by reasoning that the act of filing a decision with the clerk of
court already constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation. We find
this explanation unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had no authority to render
a decision on the subject civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 1998, the pairing judge shall take cognizance of all cases until the assumption
to duty of the regular judge. Since Judge Tabora was already present and
performing her functions in court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to

have rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the

Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court

regular presiding judge.

Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union.

Also, Judge Carbonell should have extended the same judicial

WHEREFORE, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27

deference in referring the letter of Tabisula requesting for a copy of his

November 2007 filed by Caridad S. Tabisula for lack of merit. We find

decision to Branch 26 for appropriate action. Instead, Judge Carbonell

respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, former Presiding Judge, Regional

directly furnished Tabisula with a copy knowing fully well that she was the

Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, GUILTY of simple

plaintiff in the subject case. Judge Carbonell not only disregarded the

misconduct and FINE himP10,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement

functions of the clerk of court as custodian of court records but also

benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated

undermined the integrity and confidentiality of the court.

24 September 2008.

For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct,

simple

records of this administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of

misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable

Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. and seven other employees of the Regional Trial

behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public

Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, against Olympia Dacanay-

[20]

officers.

we

find

Judge

Carbonell

guilty

of

We DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to detach from the

We adhere to the OCAs recommendation of a fine ofP10,000.00

Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same court and include the Letter in

to be deducted from Judge Carbonells retirement benefits which have been

A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms.

withheld pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated 24 September 2008,

Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26,

which granted the payment of his disability retirement benefits subject to the

San Fernando, La Union.

withholding of P200,000.00 pending final resolution of the administrative

cases against him.

Further, we adopt the other recommendations of the OCA in its

SO ORDERED.
BRION, J.:

Report dated 18 September 2008. We deny for lack of merit the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 filed by Tabisula on this Courts

In a verified complaint, dated June 14, 2003,[1] filed before the

Resolution dated 1 October 2007. We also direct the OCA to detach from

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Mansueta T. Rubin (complainant)

the records of this administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008

charged Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. [2] of Graft and Corruption, Betrayal of

of Lacsamana and seven other employees of the RTC of San Fernando

Public Trust, Grave Abuse of Authority of a Judge, Manifest Bias and

City, La Union, Branch 26, against Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the

same court. The Letter is to be included in A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled

Partiality, and Violation of Judicial Conduct. In her verified complaint, the

complainant alleged:

II
That Complainant is the widow of the late
Feliciano Rubin who was appointed as the Judicial
Administrator of the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro
Rubin and Emperatriz Rubin;
III
That Complainant, during the lifetime of her
husband, Feliciano Rubin, who is the aforesaid
Judicial Administrator, had witnessed and experienced
that her husband and their family were victims of Graft
and Corruption, Grave Injustice amounting to Violation
of the Constitution, Betrayal of Public Trust, Grave
Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross
Ignorance of Law, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge or
Judicial Magistrate, Manifest Bias and Partiality, and
Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the part
of the respondent Judge committed during the conduct
of the proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 28,
Intestate Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro Rubin and
Emperatriz Rubin, and in Civil Case No. 184, an
Annulment of Adoption pending before him, as follows:
A
The respondent Judge, by way of devious
schemes and clever machinations extorted money
from the aforesaid Estate by lending expertise in
connivance with other lawyer in pursuing an alleged
claim against the Estate allegedly intended for
workers wages as money claims against the Estate, in
a labor case entitled Constancia Amar, et.(sic) al.
versus Hacienda Fanny and Dioscoro Rubin, RAB
Case Nos. 1092-81 and A-593-81, both consolidated
and numbered as 0104-82, which was then pending
and decided by Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio;
B
That the aforesaid consolidated labor cases
were decided and became final and executory and the
judgment was already satisfied and paid for personally
by Dioscoro Rubin when he was still alive in the
amount of P44,000.00 in the form of check which was
given to Atty. Corral, counsel for the claimants,
through Atty. Rogelio Necessario, counsel for
Hacienda Fanny and Dioscoro Rubin x x x.
C

That respondent Judge acted with grave abuse

of discretion and grave abuse of authority by ordering
the aforesaid Estate to pay P205,125.00 upon a
Motion based on a non-existing final or executory
decision, which order was illegal and improper and
without any notice and/or hearing accorded to the
Estate through its then Judicial [Administrator]
Feliciano Rubin. x x x x
D
The labor case decided by Labor Arbiter Oscar
Uy awarded the claimants in the amount of
P205,125.00, which decision was appealed by Judicial
Administrator Feliciano Rubin and was ordered
rema[n]ded and decided by Labor Arbiter Octavio in
the consolidated cases with the reduction of the award
in the amount of P62,437.50. The judgment
amount was further reduced after an audit in the
amount of P44,000.00. x x x x
E
That respondent Judge had threatened the
Judicial Administrator and threatened to be cited for
contempt if he will not pay the said labor claims,
further threatened to sell the properties if he will not
pay the said labor claims, and likewise threatened that
he would order the x x x properties of the Estate to be
sold at public auction if the said claim will not be paid.
x x x x The evident purpose of the respondent Judge
was to cause harassment and anxiety against the then
Judicial Administrator which made his health condition
deteriorate so fast that facilitated his death.
F
That Complainants deceased husband who
was the Administrator of the said Estate was forced to
pay the amount ordered by the respondent Judge
which was deposited in court but which was ordered
released
by
the
same
respondent
Judge
[b]ecause the money claim ordered to be paid by
respondent Judge had already been paid and satisfied
by Administrator Feliciano Rubin, naturally no recipient
would claim the amount nor anybody can be found
from the records of the case or that no laborer came
forward to claim that he had not been paid of his
money claim;
G
The respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of
the law when he ordered the change of Administrator
after the then Judicial Administrator Feliciano Rubin
refused to follow the invalid and unlawful orders of the
respondent Judge, as he ordered his Clerk of Court,

Atty. Gregorio A. Lanaria to act as Special

Administrator of the Estate with orders to sell the
properties of the Estate to satisfy the outstanding
claim or obligations of the Estate, which was part of
the clever scheme of respondent Judge to extort
money from the Estate x x x.

appointment of Aileen Rubin as Special Administratrix was affirmed by the

Court of Appeals[5] (CA) and by the Supreme Court.[6]

H
That respondent Judge had extended
unwarranted benefit, advantage and preference to the
newly appointed Judicial Administratrix of the Estate,
Aileen Rubin, through his manifest bias and partiality
and evident bad faith towards the late Administrators
wife, complainant herein, and the surviving heirs,
especially in his conduct of the proceedings involving
the Estate and the Annulment of Adoption case.
Respondent Judge even appointed Aileen Rubin as
Administratrix of the Estate whose legal personality is
still the subject of the Annulment of Adoption case,
and even pronounced that under the eyes of the law
Aileen Rubin is the sole and legal heir of the aforesaid
Estate thus prejudging the cases before him even if
the proceedings are still pending;

He also asserted that the complainant had confused two labor cases.
[7]

Only the amount of P44,000.00 was paid as separation pay in RAB Case

No. VI-0104-82. In RAB Case No. A-593-81, Judge Aguirre issued orders to
compel Mr. Feliciano Rubin, the former Administrator of the Estate of the
late Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin, to pay lawful and valid claims
against the estate. Judge Aguirre emphasized that he had already been
penalized by the Supreme Court for delaying the enforcement of the final
and executory decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

I
That respondent Judge ordered his appointed
Administratrix, Aileen Rubin, to enter into the Estate,
and having entered therein, she and her cohorts
ransacked the premises, took out records, personal
belongings of the deceased Feliciano Rubin, then
Administrator of the Estate, and his wife, the
complainant herein x x x.[3]

against the estate of the late spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin.

Judge Aguirre submitted his own documentary evidence to

corroborate his allegations.[8]

In its report, the OCA recommended that the case be docketed as a

The complainant submitted documentary evidence to support the
above allegations.[4]

regular administrative case considering the varying positions taken by the

parties, and considering, too, the failure of Judge Aguirre to explain in his
Comment why he invited Mr. Feliciano Rubin to see him personally in court.

In his Comment, Judge Aguirre claimed that the complaint contained

malicious and scurrilous allegations that smacked of harassment. The
complaint was filed by the disgruntled complainant who mistakenly believed
that she should be appointed as the Judicial Administratrix of the Estate of
the late Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin, instead of Aileen Rubin,
the adopted child of the deceased spouses. Judge Aguirre asserted that his

In the Resolution dated March 17, 2004,[9] the Court referred the
case to Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga (Investigating Justice) for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The Investigating Justice found that except for the charge of

First, the complainants claims of alleged devious schemes,

Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge and Violation of Judicial Conduct, the

clever machinations, and connivance employed by Judge Aguirre to extort

other charges against Judge Aguirre were bereft of factual and legal

money from the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin are

basis.[10] The Investigating Justice found that Judge Aguirre committed an

unsupported by evidence. A perusal of the documents submitted by both

impropriety when he sent a letter to Mr. Feliciano Rubin to discuss and to

parties shows that the orders issued by Judge Aguirre to compel Mr.

expedite a possible extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased

Feliciano Rubin to settle the money claims filed against the Estate of the

Spouses Rubin.[11] The Investigating Justice explained:

[H]is act of sending a letter to a party litigant for a
personal conference, however motivated, does not
validate his action and the damning implications it may
generate to the [J]udiciary this is especially so since
the content of said letter can constitute as an act of
fraternizing with party-litigants. It must be emphasized
that in-chambers sessions without the presence of the
other party and his counsel must be avoided. The
prohibition is to maintain impartiality. Being a judicial
front-liner who has a direct contact with the litigating
parties, the respondent judge should conduct himself
beyond reproach.[12]

Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin in RAB Case No. A-593-81 were
lawful. The orders were issued to enforce a final and executory decision of
the NLRC in the case; we even previously penalized Judge Aguirre for his
failure to promptly act on the motions filed by the laborers in RAB Case No.
A-593-81, for the enforcement of the final NLRC decision. [13]

In addition, the evidence on record also refutes the complainants

The Investigating Justice ruled that Judge Aguirre violated Canon 2 of

claim that the money claims in RAB Case No. A-593-81 had been

the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should avoid

previously settled. The records show that what Mr. Feliciano Rubin actually

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The

paid was a claim for separation pay in RAB Case No. VI-0104-82 an

Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Aguirre be reprimanded with

illegal dismissal case; the money claims in RAB Case No. A-593-81

a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt

pertained to the payment of wage differentials.

more severely.
Second, we find no evidence supporting the allegation of bias and
The Courts Ruling

partiality when Judge Aguirre appointed Ms. Aileen Rubin as Judicial

Administratrix of the estate of her adopting parents. Notably, the propriety of

We find the findings of the Investigating Justice to be well-taken.

the order of her appointment by Judge Aguirre was upheld, on appeal, by

the CA in its Decision dated July 19, 2002[14] and its Resolution

dated September 26, 2002,[15] and by this Court in its Resolution

against Judge Aguirre for his failure to rule on the laborers motion in RAB

of December 11, 2002.[16]

Case No. A-593-81.

Third, in Guerrero v. Villamor,[17] we held that a judge cannot be

Despite these findings, we find that Judge Aguirre committed an

held liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful

impropriety when he sent a letter, in his official letterhead, to Mr. Feliciano

conduct in rendering it. We also held that for liability to attach for ignorance

Rubin to discuss a matter pending before his own court.

of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be erroneous but must be

In Agustin v. Mercado,[21] we declared that employees of the court

established to have been motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or

have no business meeting with litigants or their representatives

under

some other like motive.[18] The complainant failed to prove any of these

any circumstance. This prohibition is more compelling when it involves

circumstances in this case. We find no evidence of corruption or unlawful

a judge who, because of his position, must strictly adhere to the

motive on the part of Judge Aguirre when he made the said appointment.

highest tenets of judicial conduct;[22] a judge must be the embodiment of

competence, integrity and independence.[23] As we explained in Yu-Asensi

Although the appointment by Judge Aguirre of his branch clerk of

v. Villanueva:[24]

court as Special Administrator for the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro and
Emperatriz Rubin was erroneous for having violated a standing Court
circular and for being contrary to existing jurisprudence, [19] we find that the
appointment was made in good faith. Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. [20] In
this regard, Judge Aguirres good faith is strengthened by evidence showing
that the appointment of his branch clerk of court was prompted by the

...[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as

an important and visible symbol of government
especially considering that as opposed to appellate
courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with
the parties, their counsel and the communities which
the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does
an exalted position in the administration of justice,
a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed
upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all
times in such manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the
public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity
and justice. x x x it is essential that judges,
like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.

continued refusal of Mr. Feliciano Rubin to settle the money claims filed
against the estate in RAB Case No. A-593-81. The records show that Mr.

Under the circumstances, Judge Aguirres act was improper

Feliciano Rubin did not obey the several orders issued by Judge Aguirre to

considering that he opened himself to suspicions in handling the case. His

settle the money claims, and that an administrative case was even filed

action also raised doubts about his impartiality and about his integrity in

impose a fine ofP5,000.00 instead. Jurisprudence holds that the death of

performing his judicial function.

the respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a

finding of administrative liability, save for recognized exceptions. [28] None of

We take note that the complained act was committed before

the exceptions applies to the present case.[29]

the New Code of Judicial Conduct took effect on June 1, 2004. Under the
circumstances, Judge Aguirre is liable under the provisions of the Code

The P5,000.00 fine shall be taken from the amount of P50,000.00

of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. [25] Canon 2 of the

which we previously retained/withheld from Judge Aguirres retirement

Code of Judicial Conduct provides that [a] judge should avoid impropriety

benefits due to the administrative cases filed against him.[30]

and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Carrying the same

guiding principle is Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which states,

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. guilty of

[a] judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of

impropriety, in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and

impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the

Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We hereby impose a fine

performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be

of P5,000.00 which shall be deducted from the P50,000.00 withheld from

beyond reproach.

his retirement benefits.

In Rosauro v. Kallos,[26] we ruled that impropriety constitutes a

SO ORDERED.

light charge. Section 11(C) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court [27] provides the
CARPIO, J.:
following sanctions if the respondent is found guilty of a light charge:
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge,
any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00 and/or;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.

The Facts

In her Verified Complaint, Susan O. Reyes (Reyes) charged

respondent Judge Manuel N. Duque (Judge Duque) of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 197, Las Pias City (RTC-Branch 197), with Impropriety,
Corruption and Gross Misconduct. Reyes alleged that she was a party-in-

The Investigating Justice recommended the penalty of reprimand

with stern warning. In light of Judge Aguirres death, however, we resolve to

intervention in Land Registration Case No. 06-005 entitled In re: Petition of

Philippine Savings Bank for Issuance of a Writ of Possession under Act No.

3135 over Properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172 and T-84847 filed by

with P18,000 on hand. Judge Duque allegedly scolded her for not bringing

the Philippine Savings Bank (bank) against the spouses Carolyn Choi and

the whole amount ofP80,000. Reyes explained that she had difficulty raising

Nak San Choi (spouses Choi). In a Decision dated 6 November 2006,

the amount. Judge Duque locked the main door of his house and asked

Judge Duque granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in

Reyes to step into his office. Judge Duque pointed to a calendar posted on

favor of the bank and ordered the spouses Choi and all those claiming

the wall and pointed to December 26 as the date when she should complete

rights under them to vacate the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172,

the amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of Reyes,

T-84848, and T-84847 situated in BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las Pias. On

embraced and kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free herself. Judge

13 August 2007, Reyes filed an Urgent Petition for Lifting and Setting

Duque raised her skirt, opened her blouse and sucked her breasts. He

Aside of Writ of Possession and Quashal of Notice to Vacate claiming that

touched her private parts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with

she bought the subject property covered by TCT No. T-85172 from the

Reyes. Reyes shouted for help but the TV was too loud. As a desperate

spouses Choi and that she was in actual possession of the property with full

move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: kung gusto mo, huwag

knowledge of the bank.

dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako sayo. Judge Duque suddenly stopped his
sexual advances and ordered Reyes to fix her hair.

At the hearing of Reyes petition, Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr., (Atty.

Ubana) the lawyer of Reyes, introduced her to Judge Duque who allegedly

In his Comment,[1] Judge Duque averred that since the complaint of

gave Reyes 30 days to settle matters with the bank. Reyes was unable to

Reyes was filed after he retired on 21 February 2008, he was no longer

re-negotiate with the bank. On the first week of December 2007, Reyes

under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He

allegedly received a phone call from Judge Duque and the latter instructed

denied the charges hurled against him and claimed the allegations were

Reyes to go to his house and bring some money in order that he can deny

fabricated, false and malicious.

the pending motion to break open. As she did not have the money yet,
Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she would see him the following day

In its Report dated 26 June 2008, [2] the OCA found that Reyes

as her allotment might arrive by that time. The following day, when her

actually filed four identical complaints. First, Reyes filed a complaint dated

allotment arrived, Reyes went to the PNB Cubao Branch in Quezon City to

16 January 2008 duly subscribed on 23 January 2008. Reyes was directed

withdraw P20,000. She, her secretary, and driver went to the house of

to comply with the requirement of verification and she complied by filing on

Judge Duque at No. 9 CRM Corazon, BF Almanza, Las Pias. The son of

20 February 2008 verified complaints with the Office of the Chief Justice

Judge

Duque

and the OCA. On 12 March 2008, Reyes filed for the third time another

demanded P100,000. Reyes gave him P20,000 and she asked for time to

verified complaint with the OCA which was a mere reiteration of her

give him the balance. After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes telling her that

previous complaints. The OCA opined that the jurisdiction of the Court at

Judge Duque was asking for her and waiting for the balance he demanded.

the time of the filing of the complaint was not lost by the mere fact that

On 21 December 2007, Reyes went to the house of Judge Duque

Judge Duque had ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case.

Duque

opened

the

gate.

At

his

house,

Judge

Thus, as recommended by the OCA, the case was referred to a Court of

Appeals

[3]

Justice for investigation, report and

recommendation

per

Resolution dated 6 August 2008.[4]

opined that the conduct of Judge Duque bore the marks of impropriety and
immorality. The actions of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards
for members of the judiciary. Judge Duque failed to behave in a manner that
would promote confidence in the judiciary. The Court Administrator

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

recommended that a P40,000 fine be imposed on Judge Duque which

should be deducted from his retirement benefits.

On the charge of graft and corruption, Reyes presented photocopies

of P1,000 bills to prove that Judge Duque demanded and received money

The Courts Ruling

from her in consideration of a favorable ruling. The Investigating Justice,

however, found no compelling evidence to corroborate Reyes accusation
as it was doubtful whether these were the same bills used to pay off Judge

We agree with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice

and the OCA for the imposition of a fine of P40,000 on Judge Duque.

[5]

Duque.

First, on the question of jurisdiction as Judge Duque is no longer a

On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, the Investigating

member of the judiciary having retired from the service on 21 February

Justice opined that the act of Judge Duque in embracing and kissing Reyes,

2008, the records show that Reyes filed four similar complaints against

sucking her breasts and touching her most intimate parts were certainly acts

Judge Duque. A complaint dated 18 January 2008 addressed to then Chief

of lewdness that were downright obscene, detestable, and unwelcome.

Justice Reynato S. Puno and subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received

These acts were established by substantial evidence. The Investigating

by the OCA on 20 February 2008 [9] and by the Office of the Chief Justice

Justice, however, stated that Reyes description of the sexual assault could

also on 20 February 2008,[10] or one day before the date of retirement of

not be deemed as attempted rape.[6]

Judge Duque. A similar complaint subscribed on 19 February 2008 was

received by the OCA on 12 March 2008. [11] An identical complaint

The Investigating Justice found Judge Duque guilty of impropriety and

addressed to the OCA and subscribed on 23 January 2008 was filed and

gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and

received by the OCA on 25 January 2008.[12] As pointed out by the OCA,

recommended the imposition of fine of P40,000 which should be deducted

Judge Duque was inadvertently sent a copy of the complaint that was filed

from the retirement benefits of Judge Duque.

and received on 12 March 2008.[13] The filing of similar and identical

complaints on different dates was due to the directive of the OCA requiring

Report of the Court Administrator

that the complaint be verified or that the original copy of the verified
complaint be filed.[14] Nonetheless, it is clear from the records that Reyes

In his Memorandum,[7] the Court Administrator[8] confirmed that Judge

Duque compulsorily retired from the judiciary on 21 February 2008. He

filed her intended complaint before Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the
Court no doubt has jurisdiction over this administrative case.

moral integrity for the people look up to him as a

virtuous and upright man.
On the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and
the OCA found insufficient evidence to sustain Reyes allegation that Judge
Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of a
favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be dismissed for being
unsubstantiated.

Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all of their activities.[19] Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. [20] Judges, like any other
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and

On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, and after a

thorough investigation conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was
established, and Judge Duque admitted, that Reyes went to his house.
[15]

themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office

and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.[21]

Substantial evidence also pointed to Judge Duques liability for

impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes.

[16]

assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always conduct

There is no need to detail again the lewd acts of Judge Duque. The

Investigating Justices narration was sufficient and thorough. The

Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque merely attempted
to destroy the credibility of Reyes when he insinuated that she could be a
woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute or one whose moral value is
at its lowest level. However, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors
from a party litigant even from a woman of loose morals. [17] In Tan v.
Pacuribot,[18] this Court further stressed:
We have repeatedly reminded members of the
Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond
reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any
appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior,
not only in the discharge of their official duties but also
in their everyday lives. For no position exacts a greater
demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are
mandated to maintain good moral character and are at
all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior
so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered
to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and
decency, which every member of the judiciary must
observe. A magistrate is judged not only by his official
acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that
such private morals are externalized. He should not only
possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess

The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for
members of the judiciary. He failed to behave in a manner that would
promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a judge is a visible
representation of the law and of justice,[22] he is naturally expected to be the
epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duques
conduct indubitably bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. He failed
to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and even transgressed
the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his
misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE,

we

find

respondent

Duque GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and GROSS

Judge

Manuel

N.

MISCONDUCT.

We FINE him P40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By Complaint-Affidavit of April 25, 2007[1] filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (Judge Capco-

Umali) charged Judge Paulita Acosta-Villarante [2] (Judge Acosta-Villarante)

It is therefore moved that the holding of monthly

meeting of judges be suspended. (Underscoring
supplied)

with violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary[3] (New Code of Judicial Conduct), Canon 2, Section 2 [4] and
Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2.[5]

On account of the underlined statements of Judge Acosta-Villarante

The facts which spawned the filing of Judge Capco-Umalis complaint

in her above-quoted Memorandum, Judge Capco-Umali filed a complaint for

libel docketed as I.S. No. 07-7732-D,[7] before the Office of the City

are not disputed.

Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City.

Judge

Acosta-Villarante

wrote

Memorandum

of March

27,
Judge Acosta-Villarante countered by also filing an Administrative

2007[6] addressed to Executive Judge Maria Cancino-Erum of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) ofMandaluyong City. The Memorandum, copies of which
were furnished the Offices of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Judicial and Bar Council, Representative Benhur
Abalos, Mayor Neptali Gonzales II, the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, the
Clerk

of

Court

of

Mandaluyong

RTCs,

and

the

other

judges

Complaint of April 26, 2007 charging Judge Capco-Umali with violation of

Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2[8] of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and a
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation and Grave Threats, docketed as I.S.
No.

07-71846-E,[9] before

the

Office

of

the

City

Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City.

of Mandaluyong City, reads:

This refers to that unfortunate incident which
occurred during the first meeting of RTC Judges ever
[sic] held on March 23, 2007 (Friday) under
your executive judgeship where the newly appointed
vice executive Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali marred the
event by conduct very unbecoming of a judge by
uttering unsavory remarks and epithets or words of the
same import designed to humiliate the undersigned in
the presence of fellow judges and assistant clerk of
court Atty. Leynard Dumlao, coupled with her attempt to
inflict physical harm to the undersignedwhich you, as
the newly appointed executive Judge, miserably failed
to control and dominate and opted to take a passive
stance.
The conduct of the newly appointed vice
executive judge does not speak well of her being a
judge who is expected to conduct herself in a way that
is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
While the meeting of the judges is an ideal
forum for the exchange of ideals and information, and
to promote camaraderie among judges in the interest of
public service, there is no assurance that the uncalled
for incident on March 23, 2007 will not be repeated.

By 1st Indorsement of August 1, 2007,[10] the administrative

complaints were referred to the OCA.

The details of Judge Capco-Umalis complaint are contained in her

Complaint-Affidavit for Libel as follows:
After having been designated by the Supreme
Court a[s] the new Executive Judge and Vice-Executive
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Judge
Maria A. Cancino-Erum and the Vice Executive Judge
(complainant) together with Executive Judge Ofelia
Colo of the Metropolitant [sic] Trial Court Br. 59 agreed
to pay a courtesy call/visit to May[o]r Neptali Boyet
Gonzales II, City Mayor of Mandaluyong City. The visit
took place at noontime of March 15, 2007 (Thursday).
After briefing the Mayor [about] the purpose of our visit,
he warmly and graciously entertained us. Until the
conversation was shifted to the topic of local allowance.
Such being the topic, Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum
showed to the Mayor the payroll for the month of April
2007 for early approval considering that most judges
would take their vacation. Perusing intently the

payroll Mayor Gonzales noticed the disparity in figures

(amount) as to the allowance received by each Judges.
He noticed that respondent Villarante was receiving
additional three thousand pesos
(P3,000) on top of
her regular allowance as Executive Judge; and
additional five thousand pesos (Php5,000) on top of her
allowance as Acting Judge of Br. 209. He also noticed
that I [Judge Capco-Umali] and Executive Judge Maria
A. Cancino-Erum received additional two thousand
pesos (P2,000) each on top of our regular allowances.
Asking us as to why and as to where those additional
allowances come from, complainant told the mayor that
TERRE, the one preparing the payroll told us (I and
Executive Judge Erum)[ about the P2,000 allowance.]
xxxx
Executive Judge Maria A.
Cancino-Erum for her part informed
the Mayor, thus: Sabi po ni Judge
Villarante nirequest daw niya po
iyon sa inyo approved nyo, at
pinirmahan niya ang payroll.
Tinanggap naman po naming [sic]
nitong February.
But as regards the additional P3,000 (as
Executive Judge) and P5,000 (as Acting Judge) of
Judge Villarante, we told the Mayor that we have no
knowledge as to how they come about
Wala akong alam na
request, wala akong inaprove, at
lalong
wala
akong
pangdagdag. Walang pondo. Iyon
ngang mga tao ko, hindi ko
maincreasan. E, kayo mga judges
kayo, syempre pirma na lang ako
pag prisinta sa akin an[g] payroll.
The Mayor summoned
LOIDA, her staff and directed the
latter to retrieve the previous
payrolls
including
the
2006
payrolls. He also said that ang
laki naman ng increase ng
Executive Judge, lalo na ang sa
Acting, hindi naman ganyan yan
ah. Pero in case na naaprove ko
yan, ibibigay na natin yan sa
bagong Executive Judge at iyong
dating Executive Judge, balik sa
dati
niyang
tinatanggap.

xxxx

Come, March 23, 2007 (Friday) Monthly Judges

Meeting hosted by the newly designated Executive
Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum. The meeting was going
smoothly until the topic of local allowance had been
touched. Reporting to the body what transpired during
the courtesy call at the Mayors Office on March 15,
2007, when the matter of giving to the new executive
judge the increased allowances of Executive Judge
Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante and that the latter would
revert back [sic] to the authorized amount for Executive
Judges was discussed, respondent Villarante was
angered and blurted out addressing the new Executive
Judge, thus:
Kayo, simula ng maupo sa
pwesto, wala ng ginawa kundi
kutkutin at maghanap ng evidencia
para ako masira, nagsusumbong,
nagmamanman.
Wala
naman
pakialaman sa allowance kanya
kanya yan dapat.[]
Having personal knowledge of the conversation
that transpired at the Mayors Office on March 15, 2007,
and much aware that respondents accusations were
baseless, complainant felt obliged to come to the
rescue of the embattled Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum
and to refute respondents misplaced tirade by stating
matter of fact the truth and what I saw and heard.
For his part, Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela who
admitted his presence during the courtesy call
confirmed the truthfulness of complainants report and
also confirmed the transfer of Executive Judges
allowance to the new Executive Judge thus: Totoo
ang sinabi ni Judge Umali nandoon ako, ililipat nga
allowance sa bagong Executive Judge at ang dating
Executive Judge will receive former amount.
While complainant is still enlightening her fellow
Judges of the real facts that transpired at the Mayors
Office, the respondent kept talking too and even
shouting at the top [of] her voice towards complainant
visibly irked by complainants revelation on the matter.
Respondent
even
called
complainant
a
liar (sinungaling) repeatedly[;]
when
complainant
demanded from respondent her basis for saying that
complainant is a liar, respondent was not able to
answer
it
but
continued
calling
her sinungaling. Even telling her to stop talking
because her (complainant) voice is so sharp to her ear
(nakakahiwa boses mo). Respondent continued
verbally attacking complainant with words connoting
malicious imputations of being an incorrigible liar and of
being in cahoots with Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum in
peddling lies [that] the complainant got upset by the
verbal aggression made by Judge Villarante that she
told the latter, thus:Matanda ka na, halos malapit ka

na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan,

madadamay pa kami. Judge Villarante fought back:
Bog, sana mangyari sa iyo, bog!.
Complainant welcomed the challenge, thus:
handa akong mamatay kahit anong oras dahil wala
akong ginagawang masama.
At said instance complainant once more
prompted Judge Villarante as to her authority or basis
in the increase in the payroll, and Judge Villarante
answered: May nag-oofer nga!.
More heated exchanges ensued because Judge
Villarante
kept
o[n]
saying sinungaling to
the
complainant.
Thereafter, cooler heads intervened. Judge
Edwin Sorongon brought respondent out of the room
while Atty. Leynard Dumlao [was] pacifying the
complainant.[11] (Emphasis partly in the original and
partly supplied; underscoring supplied; italics in the
original)

By Comment of May 28, 2007,[12] Judge Acosta-Villarante denied that

she wrote the Memorandum to maliciously impute a crime, vice or defect on
Judge Capco-Umali as she merely requested for the suspension of the
holding of the monthly meeting of judges to avoid a repetition of the incident
and to afford the parties an opportunity to cool off.

In causing the circulation of the Memorandum, Judge AcostaVillarante explained that she had an obligation to bring to the attention of
concerned officials the personal demeanor of another member that would
put the Judiciary in constant public scrutiny and disrespect. Her version of
the incident goes:
After taking up the first agenda of the meeting x x
x, the agenda on allowances of Judges was called to be
taken up.
Whereupon, Complainant requested to take the
floor and manifested as follows:
Judge P.A. Villarante:
mga kapwa kong Hukom,
bago natin talakayin ang agenda

ng allowances, maari bang ipaabot

ko sa kaalaman ng lahat na may
tumawag ng aking kaalaman at
pansin na mayroon di-umanong
Hukom ng RTC na nagpahiwatig
sa Tanggapan ng City Mayor na diumano hindi ko hini-hearing o
dinidinig ang mga asunto ng RTC,
Br. 209, na sakup ng aking
designasyon
bilang
Acting
Presiding
Judge,
na
may
kaugnayan sa ating pag-uusapan
na allowances. Pinatunayan ko na
hindi
tutoo
at
pawang
kasinungalingan ang bintang sa
pamamagitan ng Minutes of Court
Hearings at
Certification
ng
Branch
Clerk
of
Court
ng RTC, Br.209. Mga kasama sa
Judiciary, nakikiusap ako na
iwasan natin ang nakakasirang
bagay na hindi totoo
x x x[.]
x
x
x
Ugnay
sa
representation sa pagtaas ng
allowance ng Judges sa local
Government
ay
napagbigyan
naman. Pakiusap ko, huwag
naman siraan ang kapwa x x x, at
iba pa.
On the matter, a Judge in the group made a
comment to wit:
x x x upang maiwasan ang
hindi pagkakaunawaan ng isat isa
sa atin, hinihiling ko sa bawat isa
sa atin na kung ano ang
tinatanggap ng sino man sa atin,
huwag ng questionin x x x at iba
pa.
at that juncture Judge Capco-Umali stood up and in a
mode of anger pointing a finger against herein
Complainant, she repeatedly said in a loud voice:
Matanda
ka
na!
Mamamatay ka na!... at iba pa na
may kahalintulad.
On the impropriety of the unruly and disrespect
behavior and conduct of Judge Capco-Umali in the
presence of fellow-judges and others, a Judge tried to
say something in an effort to appease her unruliness,
but she kept on unkindly berating herein Complainant
who was then speechless out of her shock on her
unexpected behavior.

Regaining a bit of composure and wit,

Complainant appealed to the respondent in this
manner:

In

her

June

8,

2007

Reply, [15] Judge

Acosta-

Villarante, admitting calling Judge Capco-Umali sinungaling, explained

x x x Judge Umali
magpakatao at makinig ka naman
para
makapagunawaan
tayo,
nakakahiya na ito
x x x

that she was only constrained by the situation, adding that Judge CapcoUmali is a pathological liar.

to which she became more angry and shouted

In its March 5, 2008 Report and Recommendation,[16] the OCA made

x x x Judge ako! Judge ako x x x!.

the following evaluation:

as she was pounding her breast continuously with her

fist; because of the shock and fright generated by the
unruly behavior of respondent, complainant did not
clearly comprehend the rest of her berating statements
made against her in the process.

xxxx
The admissions made by the concerned
Judges anent the allegations they hurled against each
other provide for the strongest evidence to establish
their individual liability.

When respondent Judge Umali already

appeared to be more uncontrollable in her decorum,
complainant then in fear took steps to get out of the
place with Judge Sorongon then tending her on her
shoulder assisted her in haste towards the exit door;
and when about to step out of the exit door,
complainant turning her face on the then commotion at
her back she saw Respondent Judge Umali still
berating her and in the act of catching her at the back
but on the then timely intervention of Atty. Leynard
Dumlao who then was close at complainants back,
prevented respondent to reach her who then hastily
moved to the safety of her courtroom still with the
assistance of Judge Sorongon, thus complainant got
out of the wrath of respondent Judge Umali.[13] (Italics
and underscoring in the original)

In

her May

22,

2007 Comment,[14] Judge

Time and again, the Court has constantly

reminded Judges that as magistrates of the law, they
must comport themselves at all times in such a manner
that their conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
them as epitome of integrity and justice. They must be
the first to abide by the law and weave an example for
others to follow. They must studiously avoid even the
slightest infraction of the law (Alumbres vs. Caoibes,
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1431, January 23, 2002). The actions
of the respondent Judges fell short of this exacting
ethical standard demanded from the members of the
Judiciary.

Capco-

Umali, admitting having uttered the remarks matanda ka na, halos malapit
ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami to
Judge Acosta-Villarante, explained that it was due to exasperation as
Judge Acosta-Villarante called her an incorrigible liar or sinungaling.
Also admitting having uttered Judge ako! Judge ako!, she explained that
it was to remind Judge Acosta-Villarante that she deserved respect and
courtesy, for while she was speaking on the topic of allowances, Judge
Acosta-Villarante kept interrupting her by making interjections and
unnecessary comments.

Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. [No.] 03-0501-SC, [effective] 01 June 2004) enunciates the rule
that [J]udges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Judge Capco-Umali failed to live up to the
standard of propriety entrenched in the aforequoted
code of conduct. While, she might have been provoked
by Judge Acosta-Villarantes referral to her as a
liar, she should have maintained her composure
instead of shouting back at a fellow judge. She
should have exercised self-restraint instead of reacting
in such a very inappropriate manner considering that
she is in the presence of fellow Judges and other
employees of RTC, Mandaluyong City. She should
have put more consideration and effort on preserving
the solemnity of the said meeting, and on giving those
who are present the courtesy and respect they
deserved. It was held in Quiroz vs. Orfila (272 SCRA
324 [1997]) that [f]ighting between court employees
during office hours is disgraceful behavior reflecting
adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It

displays a cavalier attitude towards the seriousness and

dignity with which court business should be
treated. Shouting at one another in the workplace and
during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect
not only towards co-workers, but to the court as
well. The behavior of the parties was totally
unbecoming members of the judicial service.

Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Under Section
11(B) in relation to Section 9 (A) of Rule 140, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, violation of
Supreme Court rules constitutes a less serious
charge. Respondents, therefore, may be sanctioned
with: [1] suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or [2] a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.

Judge Capco-Umali, however, does not bear

this
responsibility
alone. Judge
AcostaVillarante should also be required to answer for her
failure to observe the basic norm of propriety
demanded from a judge in relation with the
aforementioned 23 March 2007 incident. At the outset,
it was Judge Acosta-Villarantes unseemly behavior,
calling Judge Capco-Umali sinungaling in front of their
fellow Judges that initiated the altercation between the
two Judges. Judge Acosta-Villarante should have
been more cautious in choosing the words to
address the already volatile situation with Judge CapcoUmali.
Judge Acosta-Villarante also repeated the
uncalled for conduct when she wrote the memorandum
dated 27 March 2007 and caused its circulation. If
indeed the memorandum was produced strictly to allow
the parties to cool off and avoid a repetition of the
incident, on this ground alone, there was no need to
mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali
during the meeting. The memorandum was thus
written as a medium for retaliation against Judge
Capco-Umali.
Judge Acosta-Villarante cannot also use as
justification in writing and circulating of the
memorandum the claim that she has an obligation to
bring to the attention of concerned officials the personal
demeanor of another member that would put the
Judiciary in constant public scrutiny and disrespect
pursuant to her oath of office. As a Judge, respondent
Acosta-Villarante is aware that there are proper
avenues for ventilation of grievance against anyone in
government service. Moreover, the termination of the
conflict between her and Judge Capco-Umali (through
the suggestion of giving the parties opportunity for
cooling off) is clearly not what she is up to for what
she did only worsened the situation (with the filing of
several complaints and counter-complaints).
An act complained of anchored on a violation of
Code of Judicial Conduct, may only constitute a serious
charge under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court if the same amounts to gross misconduct. The
respective acts for which the herein respondents have
been charged do not amount to gross misconduct.
Thus, the charges against them cannot be
considered serious. Nevertheless, respondents
should be held administratively liable for violation of

In the case of Judge Capco-Umali, however, the

imposable penalty should be tempered because it is
clear from the record that she was dragged into the tiff
by an act of provocation.[17] (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, for violating Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct which is a less serious charge under Section 11(B) in relation to
Section 9 (A) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, the OCA
recommended that Judges Capco-Umali and Acosta-Villarante be fined in
the amount of P11,000 andP16,000, respectively.

The Court finds the evaluation of the complaints by the OCA

well-taken.

Courts

are

looked

upon

by

the

people

with

high

respect. Misbehavior by judges and employees necessarily diminishes

their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding is a disgraceful
occurrence reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary.
[18]

By fighting within the court premises, respondent judges failed to

observe

the

proper

decorum

expected

of

members

of

the

Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a
mere allowance coming from the local government.

Under

Rule

140,

as

amended

by

A.M.

No.

01-8-10-

SC[19] (September 11, 2001), a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is

classified as a serious charge only if it amounts to gross misconduct. Since,

SO ORDERED.

as correctly found by the OCA, the same does not constitute gross
misconduct, it should be considered only as aviolation of Supreme Court

NACHURA, J.:

rules, directives and circulars, which is classified as a less serious charge,

in which case, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: (1)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceedingP20,000.

The Court finds, however, that Judges Capco-Umali and AcostaVillarante should each be fined P11,000.

Before us is a Verified-Complaint dated February 20, 2009 filed by

complainant Atty. Raul L. Correa charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo
B. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, Laguna of
Misconduct.

Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators

appointed

by

the

court

in

Special

Proceedings

No.

660-01C,

entitled Intestate Estate of Hector Tan. He revealed that during the

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judges Rizalina T. Capco-Umali and
Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante GUILTY of violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which they
are each FINED in the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000) Pesos.

hearing of the case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with various items
in the Administrators Report, including the audited Financial Report
covering the said estate, and immediately ruled that they should be
disallowed. Complainant added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their
accountant, branded her as an incompetent, and threatened to sue her

In view of the retirement of Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, the

before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants.

Fiscal Management and Budget Office, Office of the Court Administrator is

ordered to DEDUCT the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000) from
her retirement benefits.

Complainant further claimed that, in the course of the proceedings, he

was asked by respondent Judge Belen to stand up while the latter dictated
his order on their Administrators Report. Respondent Judge Belen even
rebuked him for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate, adding
that it is regrettable because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate
and a Bar Topnotcher at that. Complainant regrets the actuations and

Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, who is still in the service,

statements of respondent Judge Belen, especially because the remark was

is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with

uncalled for, a left-handed compliment, and a grave insult to his Alma

more severely. The same stern warning applies to retired Judge Paulita B.

Mater. Worse, respondent Judge Belen ousted complainant as co-

Acosta-Villarante in her capacity as a member of the Bar.

administrator of the estate of Hector Tan.

On June 18, 2008, respondent Judge Belen issued an Order citing

complainant for indirect contempt, allegedly with administrator Rose Ang

the Ongkiko Law Office, the counsel of the opposing party in the settlement
proceedings.

Tee, for surreptitiously and unlawfully withdrawing from and emptying the
account of the estate of Hector Tan. The June 18, 2008 Order contained
snide remarks, viz

Respondent Judge Belen further alleged that complainant, in

connivance with Rose Ang Tee, surreptitiously released millions of pesos for
the now deceased Purification Tee Tan and to themselves, in clear violation

x x x. The action of Rose Tee and Atty. Raul

Correa is contumacious and direct challenge to lawful
orders, and judicial process of this [c]ourt and malicious
assault to the orderly administration of justice, more
specifically abhorrent the act and deed of Atty. Raul
Correa, a U.P. Law alumnus and Bar Topnotcher,
who as a lawyer knows very well and fully understands
that such action violates his oath of office which the
Court cannot countenance. x x x

of complainants legal and fiduciary relationship and responsibilities as

court-appointed co-administrator.

Both the Verified-Complaint and the Comment were referred to the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.

Lastly, complainant insisted that he should not have been cited for
indirect contempt because he had fully explained to the court that he had
done his part as co-administrator in good faith, and that, through his efforts,
the estate was able to meet the deadline for the latest Tax Amnesty
Program of the government, consequently saving the estate the amount of
no less than P35 Million.

In its Report dated March 10, 2010, the OCA found respondent Judge
Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for his use of intemperate
language and inappropriate actions in dealing with counsels, such as
complainant, appearing in his sala. The OCA said that respondent Judge
Belen should have just ruled on the motion filed by complainant instead of
opting for a conceited display of arrogance. The OCA also noted that the

In his Comment dated August 18, 2009, respondent Judge Belen

argued that a judge, having the heavy burden to always conduct himself in
accordance with the ethical tenets of honesty, probity and integrity, is duty
bound to remind counsel of their duties to the court, to their clients, to the
adverse party, and to the opposing counsel.

Respondent Judge Belen claimed that the conduct of complainant in

handling the settlement of the estate of Hector Tan violated and breached
the tenets and standards of the legal profession and of the Lawyers
Oath. He alleged that, despite the clear tenor of a lawyer-client relationship,
complainant associated himself as corresponding counsel and member of

incidents subject of this administrative matter were not the first time that
respondent Judge Belen had uttered intemperate remarks towards lawyers
appearing before him. It noted that in Mane v. Belen,[1] the Court found
respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and was
reprimanded for engaging in a supercilious legal and personal discourse.

Based on its evaluation, the OCA recommended that (a) the

administrative case against respondent Judge Belen be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter; and (b) respondent Judge Belen be fined in
the amount of P10,000.00 for conduct unbecoming of a judge, with a stern

warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

We join the OCA in noting that the incidents narrated by complainant

were never denied by respondent Judge Belen, who merely offered his
justification and asserted counter accusations against complainant.

The findings and the recommendations of the OCA are well taken
and, thus, should be upheld.

Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more

circumspect in his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary

visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such

exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be

a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most

models of propriety at all times. Canon 4 mandates

searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a

judge are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial

CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
xxx
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to

all before the courts. More specifically, Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality
provides
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties
with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as
the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such
duties.

system.[2]

A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in

actions. Respondent Judge Belens insulting statements, tending to project
complainants ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his
inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is
obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse
of power and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from
the public. Patience is one virtue that members of the bench should
practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always called for.

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under

Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under
Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less
than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand;
and (4) Admonition with warning. Inasmuch as this is not respondent Judge
Belens first offense, the penalty of fine of P10,000.00 is deemed
appropriate.

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of

By Decision[3] of August 8, 2003, respondent dismissed the

Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him P10,000.00, with a stern

election protest and declared Mancio as the duly elected municipal mayor of

warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more

Madridejos, Cebu with total votes of 5,214.[4]

severely.
On appeal, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution [5]of March
SO ORDERED.

25, 2004, reversed and set aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of
respondent and declared complainants wife Zenaida Salazar as the duly

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

elected mayor.[6]

By Complaint[1] dated November 10, 2004, Doroteo M. Salazar

(complainant)

charged

Judge

Antonio

Thus, spawned the filing of the complaint at bar.

D. Marigomen (respondent),

Presiding Judge of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu, with gross
ignorance of the law, bias, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service
and rendering a decision violative of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution in connection with

By complainants claim, respondent admitted in evidence

uncertified photocopies of the contested ballots, [7] the original copies of
which were in the custody of the HRET, contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court[8] which provides:

Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789.

Zenaida F. Salazar, wife of complainant, and a mayoralty

candidate in the Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu in the May 2001 elections,
filed on July 4, 2001 an election protest against the proclaimed winner

SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original

document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved
by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied);

Lety[2] Mancio (Mancio) before the Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu where
it was docketed as Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789.
and respondent considered the uncertified photocopies-exhibits for Mancio
The election case was first heard by then Acting Presiding Judge

in deciding the case. Hence, the charge of gross ignorance of the law.[9]

Jesus S. dela Pea who, on April 1, 2002, issued an order directing the
revision of the contested ballots in the premises of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where the ballot boxes were
being kept. Respondent took over and started presiding over the election
case on June 3, 2002.

Respondents partiality was, by complainants claim, shown in

several instances, viz: When protestant Zenaida Salazar objected to the
presentation of the plain photocopies of the contested ballots, respondent
ordered his Clerk of Court to coordinate with counsel for protestee and to

testify for her; and respondent allowed Atty. Reinerio Roeles, the co-

In his Comment,[17] respondent proffers that complainant is not the

counsel for the protestee, to testify despite the protestants objection on the

real party in interest and, in any event, the complaint is moot and academic

ground that his testifying would be a violation of professional ethics [10] and

as the election protest had been decided on appeal by the COMELEC; and

despite respondents citation of authorities on the matter.

[11]

if errors were committed, they pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative

functions

Complainant further claims that respondent was acting as if he

[which]

proceedings.

cannot

be

corrected

through

administrative

[18]

were the counsel for the protestee, demonstrated during the testimony of
the Clerk of Court when protestees counsel had difficulty explaining the
nature of the clerks testimony and respondent laid the basis thereof.[12]

As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law, respondent cites

Section 5,[19] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as his legal basis for the
admission of the uncertified photocopies.

Complainant additionally claims that respondent was too liberal

and

tolerant

of

the

maneuverings

and

manipulations

of

the

Denying complainants claim that he was biased in favor of the

protestee,[13] thereby dragging the proceedings which started on July 4,

protestee relative to the presentation of her counsel Atty. Roeles as a

2001 (when it was filed) up to August 8, 2003 (when it was decided), in

witness, respondent claims that despite the counsel for the protestants

violation of the period provided by the Omnibus Election Code.

commitment to submit a memorandum of authorities to support his objection

to Atty. Roeles presentation, no memorandum was submitted.[20]

Furthermore, complainant claims that despite the parties

agreement to follow the Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12,

Respecting his having propounded questions in the course of the

2002 executed between the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and the

testimony of the witnesses, respondent claims that he did so in good faith

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

[14]

allowing the submission of

in order to ascertain the falsity or truth of the subject matter.[21]

affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their testifying in court, subject to cross

examination, respondent allowed protestee to present witnesses to give oral
testimonies.[15]

On the charge of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service,

respondent disclaims any intentional delay of the proceedings on his
part. As for the non-observance of the Memorandum on Policy Guidelines,

Finally,

complainant

claims

that

respondent

violated

the

he argues that if the protestant had agreed to observe the memorandum, he

COMELEC Rules of Procedure as well as the Constitution for not clearly

could not compel the protestee to also observe the same as the policy

and distinctly stating the facts and the law on which his decision was based.

guidelines are merely recommendatory and not compulsory. [22]

[16]

Finally, respondent maintains that his decision clearly stated the

facts and the law on which it was based, and if there are errors therein, they

are correctible by judicial remedies and not by administrative proceedings.

[23]

The OCA, by Report[24] of April 4, 2006, found the complaint

meritorious in light of the following evaluation:
. . . Administrative matter involves the
exercise of the Courts power to discipline judges. It is
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare, that is, to maintain the faith and confidence of
the people in the government. Thus, unlike in ordinary
cases, there is no private offended party in
administrative proceedings who may be entitled to
judicial relief. The complainant need not be a real party
in interest, as anyone may file an administrative
complaint against a judge, the only requirement being
that the complaint be verified and it be in writing and
shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
The admission of the uncertified or plain
photocopies of the contested ballots by respondent
Judge in favor of Mancio betrays his ignorance of
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The Rule,
otherwise known as the Best Evidence Rule, simply
provides that as long as the original evidence can be
had, the court should not receive in evidence that which
is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of any clear showing that the original writing
has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court. In this case, the original copies of the contested
ballots have neither been lost nor destroyed. They are
in the custody of the HRET, and had respondent judge
wanted to examine them, he could have easily ordered
the transfer of their custody to the court.
His invocation of Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court to justify his admission of the plain
copies of the contested ballots is misplaced. The Rule
allows the admission of secondary evidence when the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be found. However, the offeror is burdened to prove
the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the
original was without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy;
and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona

fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the

document in the proper place or places.
Verily, as the original copies of the contested
ballots are in the custody of the HRET, which fact was
known to respondent judge, there was no occasion to
apply Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. When
the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge took special interest in the
presentation of Atty. Caayon as a witness for
Mancio. The purpose of Atty. Caayons testimony was
to show that the photocopies of the ballots were the
same as the original ballots in the custody of the HRET.
When the counsel for Salazar, Atty. Manuel S.
Paradela, refused to stipulate on the faithful
reproduction of the original ballots, the counsel for
Mancio declared that they could request HRET to bring
the
original
ballots
to
the
court
for
comparison. Respondent judge, however, ignored the
manifestation, and proceeded to ask Atty. Paradela if
the latter was represented during the photocopying of
the original ballots. Nonetheless, the counsel for
Mancio, Atty. Nathaniel Clarus, requested for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum to bring the original ballots to the
court. Despite that manifestation, respondent judge
allowed Atty. Caayon to affirm the veracity of the
photocopies in his possession, thus:
xxxx
[Judge Marigomen]: We will present the Clerk of Court
(Atty. Caayon) to affirm the veracity of
those ballots in his possession of the
tribunal copy and now existence (sic) in the
possession of the Clerk of Court. x x x
Clearly, respondent judge was more interested
in presenting Atty. Caayon as a witness than the party
(Mancio) who would have benefited from the
testimony. His actuations did not speak well of the cold
neutrality required of an impartial judge, as he showed
his manifest bias for one party over the other.
The bias of respondent judge for Mancio was
further demonstrated when Atty. Caayon was being
qualified as a witness. After every objection raised by
Atty. Paradela to the questions propounded by Atty.
Clarus to Atty. Caayon, respondent judge would always
propound questions himself to Atty. Caayon, instead of
ruling on the objections . . .
xxxx
Respondent judges bias for Mancio was further
shown by respondent judge when he allowed one of the
counsels for Mancio, Atty. Reinerio Roiles, to testify

despite the vigorous objection of Salazar through his

counsel, as the testimony was in violation of Rule
12.08, Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility. The Rule prohibits a lawyer from
testifying in behalf of his client, except on formal
matters such as the mailing, authentication or custody
of an instrument, or on substantial matters, in cases
where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice. In this case, Atty. Roeles was allowed to testify
on matters not contemplated by the exceptions. As
admitted by respondent judge, he allowed Atty. Roeles
to testify to prove that he is one of the legal panel (sic)
of the protestee; that he was at the Municipality of
Madridejos last May 12, 2001 to May [1]5, 2001; and
that there was (sic) no goons, terrorism and other
election
activities
as
alleged
by
the
protestant. Surely, the matters testified to by Atty.
Roeles are neither formal matters nor essential to the
ends of justice; rather, they were self-serving
declarations intended to strengthen Mancios cause.
In his attempt at justifying his act in allowing
Atty. Roeles to testify, respondent judge committed
falsehood when he declared in his comment that he
allowed Atty. Roeles to testify over the objection of
Salazar after the latter, through counsel, failed to
submit a memorandum in support of her
objection. However, the records of this case belie that
claim. It appears that Salazar through Atty. Paradela
filed a Manifestation dated February 24, 2003, calling
attention to the unethical presentation of Atty. Roeles
as a witness for his own client, Mancio. The
manifestation was filed with, and received by, the court
on the same day, as evidenced by the stamp
RECEIVED appearing on the upper right hand corner
of the first page of the Manifestation.
There is also merit in the complaint that
respondent judge failed to abide by the express
mandate of the COMELEC Rules and Procedure and
the Constitution to state clearly and distinctly in every
decision the facts and the law on which it is based.

stray votes in her favor as she has

not formally offered the claimed
stray votes or ballots. The court
shall only consider ballots which
are presented and formally offered.
After a thorough examination of the questioned
decision, it became obvious that the invalidation of the
90 votes against Salazar was made without indicating
in the decision the factual and legal bases
therefor. Expectedly, the COMELEC First Division, in
its Resolution promulgated on March 25, 2004,
reversed and set aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of
respondent judge, and declared Salazar as the duly
elected mayor of Madridejos, Cebu.
Time and again, the Court had instructed judges
to exert effort to ensure the decisions would present a
comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and
legal findings that would substantially address the
issues raised by the parties. Respondent failed in this
respect.
xxxx
In fine, respondent judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, manifest bias and
deliberate falsehood or dishonesty. Under Section
8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of
the law is considered a serious charge. Similarly,
bias and deliberate falsehood, which are tantamount
to grave misconduct, are considered serious charges
under the same Rule. The penalty imposable for
serious charges ranges from fine to dismissal.
[25]
(Italics in the original, emphasis supplied; and
underscoring partly in the original and partly
supplied)

The OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of (a) gross

The questioned decision dismissing for lack of

merit the election protest filed by Salazar against
Mancio, and declaring the latter to be the duly elected
municipal mayor of Madridejos, Cebu, with a total votes
of 5,214 as against the 5,144 votes garnered by
Salazar, or a difference of 70 votes. The final
tabulation of votes came about after the respondent
judge declared on the penultimate page of the 22-page
decision, thus:

ignorance of the law and fined in the amount of P20,000, and (b) bias and

After reviewing or reappreciating the ballots of the

contested precincts, the Court
invalidated ninety (90) votes of the
protestant and has not validated

2006 requiring them to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case

dishonesty, amounting to grave misconduct and suspended for six months

without pay.[26]

In

compliance

with

this

Courts

Resolution[27] of June

19,

for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and

submitted, complainant and respondent manifested in the affirmative.

In Re: Compliance of Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, Municipal Trial

The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA in
order. Respondents questioned acts do not conform to the following
pertinent canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which took effect on June 1, 2004.
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge
of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision is
made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their
judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary.

Court in Cities (MTCC), Santiago City, Isabela,[28] this Court observed:

. . . [T]he lack of candor he has shown by the
misrepresentation which he made before the Court is
incongruent with the primordial character which a
magistrate must possess, especially so in this case
where the act of dishonesty was committed against the
Court. A member of the bar owes candor, fairness, and
good faith to the Court. He must not do any falsehood
or consent to the doing of any in court; neither shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice. The moral standard of honesty is equally, if
not much more, expected from members of the
Judiciary, as they are the agents through which the
Court ensures that the end of justice is served.
Dishonesty is anathema to the very nature of
functions which a magistrate performs. [29] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Respondent also indeed failed to state in his decision why he
invalidated 90 ballots in favor of the protestant and to specify the ballots
being set aside, thereby violating the Constitution.[30]

xxxx
CANON 5
EQUALITY
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance
of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias
or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant
grounds.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

This Court modifies the recommendation of the OCA, however,

given the number of infractions committed by respondent. Instead of
suspension, it imposes on respondent a fine of Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000) Pesos for manifest bias and dishonesty. And it increases the
recommended fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000) Pesos for gross
ignorance of law or procedure to Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent, JUDGE ANTONIO D.

And respondent indeed committed falsehood, as found by the
OCA. Respondents claim that he allowed the protestees counsel, Atty.
Roeles, to testify over the objection of the protestants counsel because the
latter failed to submit a memorandum in support of the objection, is belied by

MARIGOMEN, GUILTY of 1) gross ignorance of the law or procedure and is

FINED in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos, and 2)
manifest bias and dishonesty amounting to grave misconduct and is FINED
in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos.

the records of the case. Thus, in a pleading captioned Manifestation, the

protestants counsel submitted a memorandum of authorities on the matter.
SO ORDERED.

In the meantime, complainant filed a letter before the OCA on September 8,

2010, requesting action on her administrative complaint given that
respondent has still not decided Civil Case No. 20191.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fe D. Valdez
against respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, for delay in the
disposition of Civil Case No. 20191.
Civil Case No. 20191 was an action for damages and attorneys fees
instituted on October 25, 2005 by complainant against Prudential Guarantee
& Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) and Charlie Tan (Tan), which was raffled to the
Mandaluyong MeTC-Branch 60, presided over by respondent.[1]
Complainant alleged that she bought comprehensive insurance policy for
her motor vehicle from PGAI, through broker Tan; that she had fully paid her
premium; that during the validity of her insurance, the insured motor vehicle
was damaged; that the repair of the motor vehicle cost P167,278.56; and
that PGAI and Tan refused to pay her claim despite several demands.
Complainant prayed for judgment awarding in her favor P167,278.56 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P50,000.00 attorneys fees, plus P2,000.00 appearance fees.
Respondent proceeded to hear Civil Case No. 20191 in accordance with the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. After the parties had filed their
respective position papers, respondent submitted Civil Case No. 20191 for
decision on July 19, 2006.[2]
Almost a year had passed but Civil Case No. 20191 remained unresolved,
prompting complainant to file a motion for immediate resolution of Civil Case
No. 20191 on June 27, 2007.[3] Complainant followed-up with a second
motion for immediate resolution filed on October 19, 2007,[4] third motion
for immediate resolution filed on December 11, 2007,[5] fourth motion for
immediate resolution filed on April 15, 2008,[6] fifth motion for immediate
resolution filed on June 11, 2008,[7] sixth motion for immediate resolution
filed on July 7, 2008,[8] seventh motion to resolve filed on April 21, 2009,[9]
and eighth motion to resolve filed on January 17, 2010.[10]
Frustrated by the long wait for the resolution of Civil Case No. 20191,
complainant filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010
against respondent, alleging unreasonable delay by the latter in the
disposition of said case to the damage and prejudice of the former.
Through a 1st Indorsement dated June 10, 2010, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) informed respondent of the administrative complaint
against her and required her to submit her comment thereon within 10 days
from receipt of said indorsement.[11] The Registry Return Receipt showed
that respondent received the 1st Indorsement on July 5, 2010 but she failed
to file her comment within the period prescribed.
The OCA sent a 1st Tracer dated September 15, 2010 reiterating the order
for respondent to submit her comment to the administrative complaint
against her within 10 days from receipt of said tracer, otherwise, the
complaint shall be submitted for resolution without her comment.[12] The
Registry Return Receipt established that respondent received the 1st Tracer
on October 22, 2010, yet she still did not comply with the same.

On November 23, 2010, this Court promulgated its Decision in three other
consolidated administrative cases against respondent, Lugares v. GutierrezTorres,[13] already dismissing her from service.
In its report[14] dated August 25, 2011, the OCA made the following
recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION: Premises considered, it is most respectfully
recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1.
The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter against respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres,
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60,
Mandaluyong City;
2.
Respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres be found GUILTY of
INSUBORDINATION, GROSS INEFFICIENCY, and GRAVE and SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT;
3.
In view of her previous dismissal from the service, a FINE OF
P20,000.00 instead be imposed upon her, to be deducted from her accrued
leave credits;
4.
To effect the same, the Employees Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services-OCA be DIRECTED to compute respondent
Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres earned leave credits; and
5.
The Leave Division, thereafter, be DIRECTED to forward
respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres total accrued leave credits to the
Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, for the latter to compute
the monetary value of the said leave credits and deduct therefrom the
amount of the fine herein imposed, without prejudice to whatever penalty
the Court may impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative
cases, if any.[15]
The Court then issued a Resolution[16] dated October 3, 2011 redocketing the administrative complaint against respondent as a regular
administrative matter and requiring the parties to manifest within 10 days
from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on
the pleadings filed. Following the failure of both parties to submit their
respective manifestations despite notice, the Court deemed the instant case
submitted for decision.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample
opportunity to address the complaint against her. The OCA had sent and
respondent received the 1st Indorsement dated June 10, 2010 and 1st
Tracer dated September 15, 2010, both of which explicitly required her to
file her comment on the complaint. However, up until the resolution of the
present case, respondent has not complied with the OCA directives.
Moreover, respondent had also failed to comply, despite due notice, with
the Resolution dated October 3, 2011 of the Court itself requiring the parties

to manifest whether they were willing to submit the present administrative

matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
It is true that respondents failure to submit her comment and manifestation
as required by the OCA and this Court, respectively, may be tantamount to
insubordination,[17] gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty.[18] It is
respondents duty, not only to obey the lawful orders of her superiors, but
also to defend herself against complainants charges and prove her fitness
to remain on the Bench.[19] As a result of her non-compliance with the
directives of the OCA and the resolution of this Court, respondent had
completely lost the opportunity to defend herself against complainants
charges.
As for the merits of the instant administrative complaint, the pleadings and
evidence on record satisfactorily establish respondents guilt for the undue
delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or
matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three
months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. With
respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level
courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within
which to render judgment.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.[20]
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and
matters pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in
the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their
courts, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing
that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the
judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and
tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all
magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and

dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the
disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly,
judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice.[21]
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty
and responsibility that her position requires. Civil Case No. 20191 was
submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending when
complainant filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and
remained unresolved per complainants manifestation filed on September 8,
2010. More than four years after being submitted for resolution, Civil Case
No. 20191 was still awaiting decision by respondent.
Respondent irrefragably failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the 30day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Her
inaction in Civil Case No. 20191 is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule
on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.[22]
Indeed, respondent even failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the
three-month period mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts
to decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made
any previous attempt to report and request for extension of time to resolve
Civil Case No. 20191.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-810-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision as a less serious
charge for which the penalty is suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00 to
P20,000.00.
The Court is well-aware of the previous administrative cases against
respondent for failure to act with dispatch on cases and incidents pending
before her. In Del Mundo v. Gutierrez-Torres,[23] respondent was found
guilty of gross inefficiency for undue delay in resolving the motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 18756, for which she was fined P20,000.00. In Gonzalez v.
Torres,[24] respondent was sanctioned for unreasonable delay in resolving
the Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 and meted the
penalty of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00. In Plata v. Torres,[25]
respondent was fined P10,000.00 for undue delay in resolving the Motion to
Withdraw Information in Criminal Case No. 6679, and another P10,000.00
for her repeated failure to comply with Court directives to file her comment
on the administrative complaint against her. In Winternitz v. GutierrezTorres,[26] the Court held respondent guilty of undue delay in acting upon
the Motion to Withdraw Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 84382, 84383,
and 84384, and suspended her from office without salary and other benefits
for one month. In Soluren v. Torres,[27] respondent was once again
adjudged guilty of undue delay in acting upon repeated motions to withdraw
the information in Criminal Case No. 100833 for which she was fined
P20,000.00. In Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres,[28] promulgated on November
23, 2010, the Court already dismissed respondent from the service for gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, and violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, in relation to Civil Case Nos. 19887, 19063,
17765, and 18425; as well as for insubordination because she defied Court
orders by failing to file her comment on the charges against her. Finally, in
Pancubila v. Torres,[29] the Court imposed another fine of P20,000.00 upon
respondent for undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of a

directive in connection with Civil Case No. 20700. In all the foregoing
administrative cases, respondent was sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the
penalty of suspension is already inapplicable herein. Instead, the Court
imposes upon respondent, for her undue delay in resolving Civil Case No.
20191, a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from
her accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found GUILTY of
the less serious charge of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191,
for which she is FINED the amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her
accrued leave credits, since she had already been dismissed from the
service. To effect the penalty imposed, the Employees Leave Division,
Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is DIRECTED to ascertain
respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torress total earned leave credits.
Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, is
DIRECTED to compute the monetary value of respondent Lizabeth
Gutierrez-Torress total accrued leave credits and deduct therefrom the
amount of fine herein imposed without prejudice to whatever penalty the
Court may impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases,
if any.

SO ORDERED.

4) Twenty-nine (29) criminal cases[4] submitted for decision, the earliest

in 2001, were undecided.
5) Of the 227 civil cases lodged in the court, no setting for hearing and no
further action was taken on 46 cases.[5]
6) Twenty-four (24) civil cases[6] have pending motions/incidents
awaiting resolution, the earliest since 2002.
7) Fifty-seven (57) civil cases[7] submitted for decision from 2000 to 2009
were undecided at the time of the audit.
8) In the course of the audit in Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, several records of
criminal cases were found to be incomplete. The records were not
paginated. Certificates of arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of
hearing were missing from the files.
9) The record of one case, Criminal Case No. 12178,[8] an appealed case
submitted for resolution, is missing and is in the possession of Judge
Leonida as per certification issued by Atty. Bernadette Platon, the Branch
Clerk of Court.[9]
Regarding Branch 74, Malabon City, the OCA also looked into the Monthly
Report of Cases submitted by said branch for August-October 2008 and
January-March 2008 and noted that 95 criminal cases and 18 civil cases
were submitted for decision.[10] Considering that Judge Leonida applied
for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008, he should have decided 91 of
the 95 submitted criminal cases and 16 of the 18 submitted civil cases.

Per Curiam:

In sum, Judge Leonida failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil
cases both in Branch 27 and Branch 74, and failed to resolve motions in ten
(10) civil cases in Branch 27.

This administrative case at bench stemmed from a judicial audit and

inventory of pending cases conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), in Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna
(Branch 27, Sta. Cruz), and in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon
City (Branch 74, Malabon).

The same report bears the recommendations of the OCA that were
eventually adopted by the Court in a Resolution dated July 29, 2009,[11] to
wit:

The audits were conducted because respondent Judge Leonardo L.

Leonida (Judge Leonida) applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5,
2008. Judge Leonida was the presiding judge of Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, from
October 1997 until his retirement and was detailed as assisting judge of
Branch 74, Malabon.
On May 21, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez issued a
Memorandum[1] on the audit teams findings, among which are:
1) As of audit date, March 5 and 6, 2009, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz had a
total caseload of 507 cases consisting of 280 criminal cases and 227 civil
cases based on the records actually presented to, and examined by, the
audit team.
2) Out of the total number of pending criminal cases, no further action
was taken after varying considerable periods of time in 14 cases.[2]
3) Pending incidents and motions filed by parties in 8 criminal cases[3]
were left unresolved for more than one (1) year in 3 cases, and three
months in 2 cases.

(1)
RE-DOCKET the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint
against former Judge Leonardo L. Leonida for gross incompetence and
inefficiency;
(2)
REQUIRE Judge Leonida to MANIFEST whether he is willing to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already
filed and submitted, within ten (10) days from notice;
(3)

DIRECT:

(a) Hon. Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna to:
(1) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on Criminal Case Nos. xxx which are
without further action for a considerable length of time;
(2) RESOLVE with dispatch the pending incidents/motions in Criminal Case
Nos. xxx and furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of the
resolution/order within ten (10) days from issuance/resolution thereof; and

(3) DECIDE with dispatch Criminal Case Nos. xxx and Furnish the Court,
through the OCA, a copy of the decision within ten (10) days from its
promulgation; and

inefficiency, and fined the amount of P50,000.00 pesos to be deducted from

his retirement benefits.
The recommendations of the OCA are well-taken.

(b) Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, to:

(1) APPRISE the Acting Presiding Judge, from time to time, of cases
submitted for resolution/decision and those cases that require immediate
action;
(2) ORDER the stitching of all orders issued, minutes taken, notices of
hearing issued, certificates of arraignment in all appropriate case folders
especially those jointly tried, including their chronological arrangement and
pagination as well as the proofreading of all orders and notices; and
(3) SUBMIT report of compliance therewith to this Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice.
On October 4, 2009, Judge Leonida filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Manifest and Memorandum.[12] He cited the short period
compounded by the typhoons and floods which ravaged Manila as his
reason for requesting an additional period of twenty (20) days within which
to file the same. In its October 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court noted Judge
Leonidas motion.
On October 22, 2009, Judge Leonida filed a Manifest and Memorandum[13]
expressing his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the
pleadings. He explained that he failed to finalize and promulgate cases
pending in his sala because of the severely clogged docket of Branch 74.
With an overwhelming number of more than 1,000 cases, he calendared an
average of 30 cases daily in order to keep all the cases moving.
According to Judge Leonida, the court sessions together with the
preparation/correction/review of the orders in the cases set for hearing
almost ate up his time as a judge. The fact that Branch 74, a commercial
court, was still included in the raffle of regular cases exacerbated the
situation. Voluminous pleadings requiring extensive dissection and
research, and cases involving numerous intervenors who raised different
and complex issues, made matters much more difficult that he even had to
conduct hearings on applications for search and seizures until nighttime.
Judge Leonida further claimed that his work encroached upon the time he
had to devote to his wife and eight children. Finally, the reconstruction and
review of case records submerged in flood waters added up to his struggle
to expedite the disposition of cases assigned to his court.
Anent the missing record in Branch 27, Judge Leonida alleged that the case
was raffled to said branch long after he assumed the position of Assisting
Judge of Branch 74; that he neither saw nor had possession of the said
record; and that there was no reason for him to take the record anywhere.
He pleaded for compassion and leniency from the Court, invoking his
unblemished record in government service for twenty-three (23) years. He
likewise offered his sincere apologies to those who were prejudiced.
In its evaluation of the charges against Judge Leonida, the OCA
recommended that for his failure to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases;
decide eleven (11) criminal cases, and twenty-seven (27) civil cases in
Branch 27, and to decide ninety-one (91) criminal cases and sixteen (16)
civil cases in Branch 74, he be found guilty of gross incompetency and

Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within
the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats
such cases with utmost rigor for any delay in the administration of justice; no
matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of
his case.[14] Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute.[15]
No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that
all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved
within three (3) months from the date of submission. The prescribed period
is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient administration of justice and not
merely one for indulgent tweaking.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.[16] In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer
justice without delay by disposing of the courts business promptly and
deciding cases within the period prescribed by law.
Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999,
requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution for deciding cases, because failure to comply therewith violates
the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of the cases.[17]
Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions
of law or complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed
but only upon proper application for extension of the period has been made
by the concerned judge.[18]
Judge Leonida was clearly remiss in his duties as a judge for he did not
take the above constitutional command to heart. Neither did he observe the
above rules which have encapsulated the Courts strict message: the need
and the imperative for judges to promptly and expeditiously decide cases
including all incidents therein.[19] In this case, the findings of the OCA
showed that Judge Leonida failed to decide a considerable number of
cases: (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases. Judge Leonida
openly admitted his culpability in the delay of disposition of cases.
His proffered explanation is unacceptable given the ample period that he
had. He cannot take refuge behind the common excuse of heavy caseload
to justify his failure to decide and resolve cases promptly. He could have
asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dipose of the cases
but did not.
Due to his inefficiency, the constitutional right of parties to a speedy trial
was violated out of neglect. Instead of justice wrought by efficient and
competent handling of judicial business, the lower courts handled and
assisted by Judge Leonida produced unnecessary financial strain, not to
mention physical and emotional anxiety, to litigants. Delay derails the
administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the

vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts,

increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts,
interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those cases in
which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the
entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. More than
these, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly between the
original fact and its judicial determination as time elapses. If the facts are
not fully and accurately determined, even the wisest judge cannot
distinguish between merit and demerit. If courts do not get the facts right,
there is little chance for their judgment to be right.[20]
The Court has always considered a judges delay in deciding cases within
the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency.[21] Undue
delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court
dockets is still the bane of the judiciary. The raison d' etre of courts lies not
only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so
seasonably.[22]
Aside from the delay in deciding the reported cases, the audit findings
likewise show that the case records/rollo in Branch 27 were not
chronologically arranged. Certificates of arraignment, minutes of hearings
and notices of hearing were unsigned by the accused and his/her counsel,
or worse, missing from the files. Judge Leonida was asked to explain the
whereabouts of the case records of Criminal Case No. 12178. His bare
denial however, does not overcome the fair conclusion that Section 14 of
Rule 136 of the Rules of Court[23] was not observed. The expectation
directed at judges to exercise utmost diligence and care in handling the
records of cases was certainly not met, or at least approximated.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Leonardo Leonida, former

Presiding Judge of Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and
Assisting Judge in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY
of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency for failure to decide one
hundred two (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases for which
he is FINED P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity
benefits.
Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, and Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, are
hereby ordered to report on their respective compliance with the orders of
the Court contained in its July 29, 2009 Order, within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. The Court notes that, in its February 10, 2010 Resolution,
Judge Blancaflor was granted a non-extendible period of sixty (60) to
comply with its July 29, 2009 Order.
Judge Blancaflor is hereby ordered to cause the reconstitution of Criminal
Case No. 12178 within three (3) months from receipt hereof and to report
his compliance thereon within ten (10) days from completion.
Atty. Bernadette Platon is hereby ordered to include the status of said case
in her Monthly Report of Cases.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives."
Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran 1
THE CASES

The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be
able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them.[24] As
frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with
efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to
the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can
do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them
and the institution they represent. [25]
Therefore, as recommended by the OCA after a thorough judicial audit and
considering the unrebutted audit reports on record, proper sanctions must
be imposed. The penalty imposed for undue delay in deciding cases varies
in each case: from fine, suspension, suspension and fine, and even
dismissal, depending mainly on the number of cases left undecided within
the reglementary period, and other factors, such as the damage suffered by
the parties as a result of the delay, the health and the age of the judge.[26]
The Court agrees with the OCA that the total number of cases which Judge
Leonida failed to timely decide or act on warrants a fine higher than that
prescribed by the rules. In Lugares v. Judge Gutierrez-Torres,[27] the
defaulting judge who was found guilty of gross inefficiency for her undue
delay in resolving cases submitted for decision for a number of years was
dismissed from the service.
In view of Judge Leonidas retirement on July 5, 2008, the only penalty that
the Court can impose against him is a fine, pursuant to the rule that the
retirement of a judge does not release him from liability incurred while in the
active service.

The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A
pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court
Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and
"developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his
application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required
psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings,
confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness,
and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty.
Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way
to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch
73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted
by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane DacarraBuenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo
L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among
other things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint
against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate

psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo

recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive
suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.
In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the
recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-991460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as
reported by the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
regarding qualifications and for announcing in open court during court
session his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of
Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36,
Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is
pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial
Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending
before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of
Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge
from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme
Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in
the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor;

Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was
directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to
subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be
conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court
resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension "for the duration
of the investigation of the administrative charges against him." He was
barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he
set forth both affirmative and negative defenses6 while he filed his
"Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of
his case for failure to prosecute.7 However, on 21 March 2000, he
presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice
Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for
Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which
was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge
Floros motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July
2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs
inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled
against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to
comment on Judge Floros motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the
same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after,
Justice Ramirez came out with a "Partial Report" recommending the
dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders
him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro
Manila, Branch 73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him
and even after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and
recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately
filing cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of
office.

(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the
ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";

A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999
preventive suspension follows:

(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he
issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated
homicide;

1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane DacarraBuenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court
Administrator 18

(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he
openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;

2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional
Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19

(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings;

3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and

Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20

(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.

4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management

Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management
Office, both of the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G.
Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon21

No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated
January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:

5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator

Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator22

xxxx

6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23

7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now
totaling seven, be dismissed.25 On 14 February 2006, the Court granted
the motion to dismiss.26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino
V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-991460: "(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in
the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother
of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn
Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her
Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August
2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty.
Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001,
Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May
1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by
Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In
Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei,
Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of
Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty.
David S. Narvasa, the petitioners counsel.28 The OCA, through Court
Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition
and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the
case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng
Nei, will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges
through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have
continued hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him
to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this violates Administrative Circular

"8. Raffle of Cases:

8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of

the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only
upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is
conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala
station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special
raffle of a case since such is only allowed upon a verified application of the
interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive
Judges finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will
suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to
the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in
his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in
his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks
highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such remark even if
made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating
a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting
and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A
judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the
motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no
authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative.29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of
ordering the raffle of the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1;
and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice
Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding
his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the
recommendations of the OCA.30 Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his
Comment on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7
December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred
to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and
recommendation in this case as well as in the second case (i.e., A.M. No.
RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court
directed Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to
inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988
and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed
and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On 20 February 2006, the

OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its

willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the
pleadings and the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28
February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the
pleadings already submitted and on the evidence previously offered and
marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his
preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-061988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are
consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding
Judge Floros alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of
a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is
indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the
investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of
competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will
have to depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who
interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the
evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine
once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If
the evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to
determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil
mind or because of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the
resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h"
and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly
discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat
them separately will be superfluous.

Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34

"the use of professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title,
his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title" should be
broad enough to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly
earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their
calling cards their former/present titles/positions like President of the
Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally,
Judge Floro argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given
merely as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to other callers
considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to
seek other professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his
qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was his branch clerk of court,
Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court
session, she would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of
his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed
as the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption
into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain
terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A
parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services." This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the
exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting
as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading
authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x
using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement
regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited
from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or
actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35

DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the
supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications AND for announcing in open court
during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02,
Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards
bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City,
and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with
"full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B.32
The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the start of court session,
Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo
de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the
1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a
reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of Revelation according to
Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the
opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions
were asked; hence the session commenced."33

The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his

professional card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and
simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card "may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced." In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot be considered
as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his
law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the
norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these
were just given by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the
same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals
otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge
Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a
researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one
of these cards. 39

As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should

be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140,
before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious
charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious
charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct
which is a light charge.
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross"
connotes something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be
excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial
act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 41
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating
calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple
misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt
motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and
unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is
an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning
the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges
seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard
as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had
been announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise
violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks
of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform
for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and
litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity.
Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice confident,
competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge
appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and
their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a
week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only.
(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a
folding bed with cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who
was later identified as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon
seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The
man the audit team saw "sleeping" on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was
Judge Floros aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in
between periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian
reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team
was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in
Judge Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short
periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the

room. The situation would have been different if there had been any
allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as
in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found
guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service when he and his family used his chambers as residential
quarters, with the provincial government paying for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such
familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had
apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of
and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably
uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide
easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of
Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of
the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the
following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled "People vs.
Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena
Camino", and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing
of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of direct
examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being
sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered
the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the
start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the
aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused
had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence,
Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are
qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct
his staff to draft the application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for
release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be consequently
granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as
Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay
kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa.
Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on recognizance
is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor
circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the
motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the
session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN are hereto attached as
Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN,
Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing a written order.
Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44

In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule
of procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team,
asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers
only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments
are promulgated, rendered and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar,
herein respondent faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D.
968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance,
thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as
MOTION FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by
Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken
cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber
stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts),
especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent
practiced from 1985-1998 almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of
former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to
interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his being a responsible
member of the community where the accused reside/resides; the questions
propounded are in the form of direct and even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since
there is no such requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused
regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was
sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had previous cases,
etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on
application for release on recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of
the applications, included the interview/hearing on the applications for
release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial
prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in the
chambers.45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of
the rules on probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law),
as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on
recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the
applicant. Under the Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v.
Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to
ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting
the discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more
time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he
completely did away with the requirement for an investigation report by the
probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty
is warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the

investigation report on the application for probation and the resolution

thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to
conduct case study prior to action on application for release on
recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character
of the provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated
differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no
longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report
and the resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than
sixty (60) days to finish the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the
application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused
even before the order to submit the case study and report, respondent
Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to
the detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis
supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an
accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected
in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of
Appeals 50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or
interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing,
signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court
for filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge
Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing
his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases
No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran,"
"People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People
v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written orders are
not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to
inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of
probation cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the
accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of
any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the
release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study
and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the
release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on
recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was already a done deal
even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the
cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for
probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the
observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had
been approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without
observing the requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having
nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this
is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein
case, however, we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as "the
unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the
prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due process." 52
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be
reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his

failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of

the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the
law fully and uphold it conscientiously. 54 When the law is sufficiently basic,
a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing
short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of
rendering infallible judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an
exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within
the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues
are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond
permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith
but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is
pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial
Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof
that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning
detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for
the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart
upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his
predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused
whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor
assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the
sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail
whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from
February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that
there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private
complainant that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically
stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her
and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he
commiserated with them especially those under detention as he, himself,
had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded
offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible
especially since it is corroborated by independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge
Floros unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on
recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply
the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and
honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent
and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure
but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the

PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion

regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge
should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir
up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His
language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest
the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an
independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the
accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for
objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his
ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial
to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is
not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the attimes human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from
reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if
he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to
facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and
predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he
follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides
with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust
decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked
proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What
is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on
his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics.
It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle
and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading
the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without
the presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that
which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for
frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN
entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of
the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not
being represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and
influence to convince the private complainant to settle and eventually cause
the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making
the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the
signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex "8").
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for
frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the "manifestations" of
the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle
the civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his
ruling on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his

comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the
aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original
order given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already
settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement
was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but
the criminal liability as well. It was further reported that the private
complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or
persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the
stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed).
Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached
as Annexes "8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed
by the parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro
docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint 67
dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced
them to settle her daughters case against the accused therein despite the
absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the
amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by
complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to
study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the
case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover,
Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by
the accused against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed,
so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by
respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties
in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint
filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only
in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants
concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their
differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties
suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course,
Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could
be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between
Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under
Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in
criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases.
With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was
superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has
no power to revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend
or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu
proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68
wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical
existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated,
i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the
parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it
does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on
them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or
judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties,

or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read
or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with
the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order
or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall
and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even
motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the
same has not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open
court ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement which
was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the
written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling
regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise
agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments
thereto. 69
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to
revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation
for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of
dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in
the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis.
The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially
approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs.
Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand,
complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached during
the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached
under duress at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the
ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal
Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio ordered the physical and
mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina
ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues -In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the
accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel
de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the
trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a
plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he
appeared trembling and stammering;

c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that

accused is "nauutal", has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very
nervous;

the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered.
x x x.
xxxx

d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind
regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the
Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28
(Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of
Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to
justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER
OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is wellsettled that "the court may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a
party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues
involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro.
He testified that he moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the
accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for
trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted
by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested
that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the
arraignment motu proprio and "over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took
place in February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be
suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made
pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of
the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the
suspension be made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well
within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the
arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In
fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the
proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel,
cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde
75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an
accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is
within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of
such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative
obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him
to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial.
While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on
the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings,
the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial
with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the
accuseds mental fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred,
he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case,
is not an actionable wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in
violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a
judge from engaging in the private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from
the Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for
leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases
pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty.
Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the
pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel.
When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he
does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a
pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a
criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported
that in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as
party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is
the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr.
indeed has a pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In
the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty.
Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V.
Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he
signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court
stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed
this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking
and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid
pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".

Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office,
Office of the Court Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating
counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending
before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client."
Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand,
provides that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired
lawyers to attend to his personal cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any
concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal
cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a
pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With
Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in
connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the
custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however,
that he prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not
accept the judgment of dismissal in that case.78 He likewise explained that
the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had
rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit.
79 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed
the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on
sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-atlaw are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties,
powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that
judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them
from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote
the public interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is
envisioned by "private practice" is more than an isolated court appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a
lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it
does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or
appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal
cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the
motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any
wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact
that Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he
himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized
practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a
pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch

73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a
picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for
such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is
thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least,
put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge
Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for
leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as
untrue, it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again
we have held that although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound
by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement
of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine
justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the
way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the
court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding
conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings
(Annex "15"). The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted
along with this report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty.
Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was
appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels
for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the
trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court,
to wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi
nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of
California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila maraming
nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming eh ako wala akong
pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang yon Sabi ko si Judge nagkocomplain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin
except na hindi papayag kasi marami diyang "
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr.,
instead of holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case involving his
brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested
his disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:

"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok

ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera."

Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan

diyan."

He continued:

To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he
is now serving? Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the
bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not
believe in the justice system?

"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung
kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So,
ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun
ganun Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang
nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang
ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong
nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko
naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado
niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto (laughs) baka
ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that
these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon,
and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to
allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and
gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized
the Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was
done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
(Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by
cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation
took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question
were submitted to the OCA sans the "yellow notes" and the official
transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and
does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court
proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that
they were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against
Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a private conversation is
inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus
left with only Judge Floros word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of
Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to
criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these
particular charges would therefore depend upon which party is more
credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial
Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine
Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch
73 the alleged "kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of
Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of law are very
different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not
only the justice system did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He
told us . . . and I quote "Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na

xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of
highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me,
the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always
discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time one
Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan"
and then he would call even not during court session, but during office
hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it
did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil
Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he
uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of
this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was
the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for
consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open
Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the
lawyer and the defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not
to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages
against the justice system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of
Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact,
instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable
settlement between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as
a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record
because it contained offensive languages highly improper and intemperate
languages like for example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng
kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward
and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming
proofs from Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject
utterances are consistent with Judge Floros claims of intellectual superiority
for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law
and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances
against the judicial system on account of his perception of injustice in the
disposition of his brothers case are not far removed from his reactions to
what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and
by the persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had
some sort of participation therein. Consequently, although there is no direct
proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless,
evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence
of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more
likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system
and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the
quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or

such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent proof of
violation on Judge Floros part.

3) Charge "d" unbecoming conduct

(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987

5) Charges "k" and "l" unbecoming conduct

The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule

140 as amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from
the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P
20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances
of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed
his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative
inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And, considering further that there is
no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives, we
hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the
maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple
misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91

[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters

involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a]
judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly
judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous
reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court.
When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is
orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted
formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with honor
and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called
to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere
must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is
therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1,
1987 provides that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and
expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that
waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance
and movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible
representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with
psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is
the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations
of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to
carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to
subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to
ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as
its title would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of
justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that
the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological
illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the
functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation
that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that
he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and
that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of
his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty
to be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To
recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of
seven of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" gross ignorance of the law

4) Charge "e" unbecoming conduct

Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon

Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him
unfit to discharge the functions of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly
unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental
illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo
an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated
his suspension pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true,
renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding the
fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of
dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when
the latter applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily
withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as
prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services)
and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the
interview. He was argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked,
giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his
academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law,
rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive
and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of
whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time
and graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and selforganization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a
perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind
and analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been
experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest secret of
the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because
of "power in psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be

released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the 13th place. He
has been practicing "parapsychology" seeing plenty of "dwendes" around
him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration
are prominent findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological
test results. (unconscious level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented
himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship,
this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P.
Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and
evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes
pride in this. During the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal
information about his family background and would rather talk about his
work and academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate his
knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the various
tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a
tendency to vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem
and prone to mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his
personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However,
he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has
poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social contacts.
Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as perceptual
distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation
(68) which is below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his
impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in
judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits
such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a
lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and
emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may
decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden
situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it
allowed Judge Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and
psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the
Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to
"appropriate psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court
clarified that the "appropriate psychological or mental examination" being
adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC
Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC
Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10) days from
notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the
Court on 22 February 2000. 96

The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC

Clinic was reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition
that Judge Floros failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary
sanctions. 97
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October
2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo
psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental
institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the
inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors 100 and
psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for
revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for
alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of
Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court
Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious
contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October
2000 resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of
administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an
indication of the latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders
of the Court. 104 The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice
Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to psychological and
mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be
ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December
2000. 106 He likewise sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr.
Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on
3 January 2001. 107
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in
December 2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460.
Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff
Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder
with movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part,
stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically
a cautious, and suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and
observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and
impressive educational background, his current functioning is gauged along
the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations.
However, his test protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is
impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He
is unable to make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu.
Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to
perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such
that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and
divine gifts of healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and
unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and tainted his

occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in

performing his court duties as a judge. 108
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro,
Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported
to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that

Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony
here and on every available records of the proceedings, has been claiming
that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in
the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic
Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx

The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially

supported by evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests and
evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other
recourse but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to
discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the
patient?

Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro
submitted earlier psychological evaluations conducted by several mental
health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three
evaluations were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of
Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having "failed" the examination
given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by
staff psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma.
Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation
(MPC), states in part:

A: Yes, Sir.

I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS

xxxx

SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS

A: Yes, Sir.

1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with
everyday demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract
requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a logical approach in
evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.

Q: Fatal [flaw]?

2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider

solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he
can organize procedures and details so as to get things done correctly and
on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine personal
progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept others ideas and
contributions especially if these oppose his own.

xxxx
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and
you were here when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard
that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you
consider his failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal
[flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is
capable of being in a trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.

3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ.

Generally, he prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the
way of his judgment and decisions.

xxxx

II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be
pronouncing or making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is
this not correct?

FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his

undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal standards and
tends to judge himself and others according to these standards. When
things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless and
impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be
expected to comply with conventional social demands. 109
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on
cross-examination that "psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit
to be a judge. Thus:

xxxx
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable
of having trances in the course of his private activities and even in the
course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree
with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.

JUDGE AQUINO:

Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person.

Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako
ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa
ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa
pagiging reality oriented?

xxxx
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information
about his claim to be the number five psychic in the country?
xxxx

A: Yes, Sir.
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
xxxx

Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic
phenomena?

Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.

A: He did not.

xxxx

xxxx

A: Yes, Sir. 110

Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at
least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it
is, horse?

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant

Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3
September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro

A: Not during our interview.

[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues,

able to discuss a wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His
thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented,
intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no
previous history of any psychological disturbances. 111

xxxx

This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated

September 1998, who stated in his report that

Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that
Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your
opinion of the patient would be altered a little?

Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled

person with graying hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious,
elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented,
conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any
perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed.
There was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or
defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of
associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad
and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal
involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact.
Judgment, insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal
abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty.
Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination and appointment to
the post he is seeking. 112
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr.
Jurilla clarified that the interview had its limitations 113 and he might have
missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following
exchange is thus instructive:

A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might
have missed some information or it is possible that our clients or patients
might not [have] told us everything.

xxxx
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered.
Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any corroborative contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the
interview, would that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are
confirmed by events that transpired after the interview, would you not say
you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro
has been proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country
[where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx

JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has
little unseen, unheard friends known as duwendes?

Q: Would it be really more altered?

DR. JURILLA: He did not.

A: I would say so.

xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which
are confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview,
would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you
that he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?

Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an

Above Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessivecompulsive person who is meticulous to details and strive for perfection in
tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed capable of
making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional
decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further
observed.

xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros
mental and psychological x x x?

Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly
intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major
psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of
utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His belief in
supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.

A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.

Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that
there was abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have
your evaluation favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that
based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is
capable of typing a letter?

On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated

that Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge. 117 The relevant exchanges
between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge
who shall claim that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2)
places at one time.

xxxx
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably
drastically altered. 115
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T.
Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which
state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of
thought did not reveal delusional thought. He was proud of his
achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and
dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his pending
administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not
suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation,
with respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and
decision-making capacity were adequately functioning.

A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming
in the course of his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so
testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen
who is with him at the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me
is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some
delusion?

xxxx

xxxx

An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December

26, 2000. He talked about his family and academic achievements. He
claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also
talked about a "covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf
friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the first part of his
ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and
alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.

A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your

Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?

A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on

December 28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the following: (1) OtisLennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue NonLanguage Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A

A: Both are on the same footing.

Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a

witness about hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a
judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major
psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this
individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge,
however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness
and the hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in
duration.

is created by the so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded

Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense
that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the
hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the
person. But in my case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the
lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at
this very moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong
oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are
they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but ATTY. DIZON: No, can
you see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you
have read and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that
in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you
still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person?

Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?

A: No.
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing
with psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasijudicial or administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his
testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal.

Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings

also and I will show to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have
claimed that he had, always had and still had a socalled counter part, his
other side, other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the
claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit
as judge?

xxxx
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the
Philippines as part of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an
indication Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of
organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and
the effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or
situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose]
concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as
well as arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the
prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of
attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience
trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of
lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as
well as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding,
he was in a trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim
you will call that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the
proceedings in these cases held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session,
page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness,
can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE
FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the
trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats a trance that

A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma.
Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro
Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case
that President Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual
and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo
de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and
include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was
involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his
alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his
court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other
judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he
is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been
appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda.
One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing,
irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination
is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the
hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in
such circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to
continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and
property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands.

Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity

and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity
which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be
REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC
Judge because of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to
perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither
the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane"
as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said
so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from
the service due to "insanity," he was apparently using the term in its loose
sense. Insanity is a general laymans term, a catchall word referring to
various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical
term 120 as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme
Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological
evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and
happiness of the people. 121 An honorable, competent and independent
judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the
weight in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the
judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted
the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will
only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly
honorable men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man.
And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not
found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the
findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his
case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic
visions," of foreseeing the future because of his power in "psychic
phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf
friends Luis, Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write while on
trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two
places at the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who
can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt
officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court
sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that
Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to
recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing
sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the
findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs
and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.

Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However,

such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds
with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial
system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary
duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules
and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to
psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v.
Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro
discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He
then went to state that "psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with
the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness. The
pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness
of the incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies
(major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due
to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court),
his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the
same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a
FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable
only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the
foregoing conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were
"sinalubong" by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley
Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the "nagpambuno" between
Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO
LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE
IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P.
Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big
Lie, having been asked to submit false testimony); for how could have he
witnessed the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following
day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN
was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer
III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so
that the word DAY should have been corrected to another word SUITABLE
to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had synthesized the entire
NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming
error DAY should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining conclusion is
that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC
PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be
FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p.
3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent
judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as
they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the
explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. 128

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate
at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and
unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by
tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to
the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his
competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the
Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has
lapses in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His
character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not
detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his
primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months
that he served as RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government.
Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified
himself with large components of the judges role. Especially if he has
aspired to a judges status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or
less unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial
temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior that the
judges role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench
develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of
investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even
the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to emphasize the
demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former
ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political
organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him
as a judge. 131
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those
expected of other public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law
and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater
degree than legislators or executives. 132
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according
to some abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid
down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The
function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft
but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not, which
requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice
Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no
doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism,
incertitude that ones own views are incontestable and alert tolerance

toward views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our
judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to
expect from those entrusted with judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of
justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal
judgment. 134
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental
requirements of competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He
cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a
serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic
benefits for a period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined
the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the
history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such
major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application
for judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and
he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic
achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by
the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC
upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by
mental health professionals from the private sector and which were
favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than
honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic
for a second opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing
its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which
prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other
requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated
JBC-009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down
in writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining "if one
seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule
6 thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound
mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play a critical
role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of
administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to
psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court
Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the
Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the
evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the
JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological

evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme

Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait
accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding
the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost
seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed
herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. 137 The
Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in
administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the
steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended
pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its
power of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in
only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot,
among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive
suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges
against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired
Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for
investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.
for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the
proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective
immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the
investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros
suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the
13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of
receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as
amended, now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall
terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its
commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant"
141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation,
the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively
suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation which would be

90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days
that it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his
report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such
time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or
her. 143 This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are
charged with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not
automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final
decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a
strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the
measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by
the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts image as temples
of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice
solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of
occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a
class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are
beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the
present because of the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by
the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much
longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part,
can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would
seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the
hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order
to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental examination.
Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10 cases
which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law.
145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had
connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he
filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in
this case considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not
having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at
best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was
placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to
the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for
the entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine
as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in
which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court "until
further orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months,
during which period he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other
benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake
pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other
source of income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for his familys
basic needs.

It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries,

allowances and other economic benefits for the entire period that he was
preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a
measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample
time to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety
(90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for
purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other
benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive
suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v.
Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend
beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be entirely unjustified.
Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to
withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of
the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case
was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative
charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period
actually becomes without basis and would indeed be nothing short of
punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely
removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place.
Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable
grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is
likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges
who find themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further
orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the investigation." Judge
Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even pales in comparison to Judge
Floros suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire
excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession,
thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. And, though
he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously,
these could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period
of suspension exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of
back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to
back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period
corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot
apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must
be compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros
propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the indiscriminate
filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived to oust
him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation was not
delayed through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was
ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
his suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty
which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he
cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already
discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of his cases.
Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged
innocent of all the 13 charges against him.

These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge

Floro beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity
does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules
and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the
delay in the resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to
award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a
period corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floros
separation from the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the
word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due
to a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at
least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the
circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give him more than three years
of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his
role in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he
filed which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding).
On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years
then the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years
suspension he had to live through with Damocles sword hanging over his
head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his profession.
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him
docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders
moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most
favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Courts
decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is
dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-991460 and considering that charge "h" is without basis, this particular
complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of
merit.
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of
all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to
any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a
penalty, such separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of

his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other

public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock
of the finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to
disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do not
require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in
Judge Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they
deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work
environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and selforganization." 149

3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back

salaries, allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to three (3)
years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11
May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 137

b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his

personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150

Disqualification of Judicial Officers

c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with

paranormal and psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a
lawyer." 151
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate
proficiency . His concern for the details that make up a total field
represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because
of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in other
areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge
Floros current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his
making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for
now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice
not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but
clearly due to a medically disabling condition.
Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154
and/or adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential
information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty
genes and/or adverse environment factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY
THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him
in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him
SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition of the
mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective
immediately;

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit

in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Section 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. If it be
claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the
party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his
objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be
forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no
appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of
his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the September 30, 2005 Decision[1] and the March 1, 2006
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 79156, which
dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction[3] dated July 9, 2003 issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, Branch 34
(RTC).
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On April 29, 2003, Gregorio D. Calo, Zoilito L. Cepeda, Victorioso D.

Udarbe, Tita B. Udarbe, Edgar B. Palarca, Louie Libarios, Anna Mae
Pelegrino, Cirilia A. Sanchez, Anita V. Carloto and Eduardo Andit, the
incorporators of Mindanao Institute Inc. (MI Incorporators), represented by
Engineer Victorioso D. Udarbe (Engr. Udarbe),[4] filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and Preliminary Injunction[5] against the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines (UCCP), acting through the Agusan District Conference of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines and represented by Reverend
Rodolfo Baslot (Rev. Baslot), before the RTC, which was docketed as
Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02. The incorporators prayed that
Mindanao Institute, Inc. (MI) be declared the sole owner of the assets and
properties of MI and to prevent the impending takeover by UCCP of MIs
properties. They averred that UCCP was unlawfully claiming ownership of
MIs properties.
On June 5, 2003, UCCP filed its Answer with Counterclaim,[6] asserting its
ownership of MIs properties based on certain documents.[7] It claimed that
the question of ownership in this case was a settled issue and required no
further discourse because they constitute a majority of the Board of
Trustees and, therefore, in complete control thereof x x x.[8]
On June 10, 2003, the RTC issued a TRO[9] against UCCP reasoning out
that MI would suffer grave and irreparable damages if the ownership and
possession of its assets and properties would be transferred to UCCP. The
RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that petitioners will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury, let a temporary restraining order against respondents be
issued restraining respondents, their representatives, attorneys, agents or
any other person acting in their behalf from seizing control and
management of the assets and properties of Mindanao Institute.
IT IS ORDERED.[10]
Meanwhile, UCCP received copies of MIs Amended Articles of
Incorporation[11] (2003 Amended AOI) which was adopted by the MI
Incorporators on May 9, 2003 and approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003.
On June 11, 2003, UCCP, represented by Rev. Baslot, and MI, represented
by its President Dr. Edgardo R. Batitang (Dr. Batitang), lodged a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of the 2003 Amended Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws of Mindanao Institute with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and/or Damages[12] before
the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-2003. UCCP and MI
asserted that the Amendment of MIs Articles of Incorporation effected by
signatories in a reckless and hasty fashion was accomplished without the
required majority vote in clear violation of Section 16[13] of Corporation
Code.[14] Of the ten (10) signatures appearing in the 2003 Amended AOI
constituting 2/3 of the Board of Trustees of MI, five (5) were affixed by mere
representatives who were not duly authorized to vote. Further, UCCP and
MI, as represented by Dr. Batitang, stressed that the procedure in the
acceptance of corporate members as embodied in the Amended By-Laws
contains discriminatory provisions, wherein certain members maybe
subjected to confirmation and acceptance or rejection, but aimed
specifically at members to be nominated by UCCP.

On June 17, 2003, the signatories moved to dismiss[15] the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the 2003 Amended AOI. They contended that the
SEC, in approving the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and ByLaws, was exercising its quasi-judicial function and, therefore, a co-equal
body of the RTC. Thus, the RTC could not grant any of the reliefs prayed for
by UCCP.
At the scheduled joint hearing of Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02 and
Civil Case No. 09-2003 to determine the propriety of the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, the Law Office of Bernabe, Doyon, Bringas and
Partners entered its appearance[16] as collaborating counsel for UCCP.
Incidentally, Atty. Roy Doyon (Atty. Doyon), the son of Executive Judge
Orlando F. Doyon (Judge Doyon), was one of the partners in the said law
firm. This prompted Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, UCCPs lead counsel, to move
for the inhibition of Judge Doyon from the case. On the other hand, Atty.
Rolando F. Carlota, MI Incorporators counsel, expressed no objection to
the continued participation of Judge Doyon in the proceedings of the case
despite the said development.
Subsequently, Judge Doyon proceeded with the joint hearing. Thereafter,
the RTC granted the MI incorporators prayer for preliminary injunction
against UCCP in its Omnibus Order[17] dated July 4, 2003, the decretal
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order in
Civil Case No. 09-2003 is hereby denied with finality.
As prayed for in Special Civil Case No. 03-02, let a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be issued, restraining, prohibiting, and enjoining respondents,
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES (UCCP) acting thru
AGUSAN DISTRICT CONFERENCE (ADC-UCCP), represented by Rev.
Rodolfo Baslot, their agents, representatives, attorneys, and any other
persons acting for and in their behalf from taking over, seizing control,
managing, or administering MINDANAO INSTITUTE and preventing
plaintiffs in discharging their functions and duties in the management,
control and administration of the school, its premises and assets, upon
plaintiffs putting up a bond in the amount of 200,000.00 duly approved by
the Court, which bond shall be executed in favour of the defendants to
answer for whatever damages they may sustain by reason of or arising from
the issuance of the writ in the event that the Court will finally rule that the
plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In issuing the preliminary injunction against UCCP, the RTC explained:
The prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, hereinafter
known as TRO, in Civil Case No. 09-2003, is anchored on the assumption
that the Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-Laws of
Mindanao Institute adopted on May 26, 2003, is null and void for being ultra
vires. However, at this stage of the proceedings where the action of the
Court is generally based on initial and incomplete evidence, the Court
cannot just precipitately rule that the amendments were ultra vires acts of
the respondents.
It should be stressed that the questioned Amended Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws is duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
hereinafter referred to as SEC. As such, there being no evidence thus far

presented to the contrary, the presumption is that the official duty of the
SEC has been regularly performed.
Thus, the actuations of respondents in Civil Case No. 09-2003 based on
those documents are presumptively valid unless declared void by this Court
after a full-blown trial. In other words, plaintiffs at this stage, have not shown
the existence of a clear legal right which has been violated warranting the
issuance of a TRO, because before a TRO or injunction is issued, it is
essential that there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected and that the act against which the injunction is issued is a
violation of such right.

actions for declaratory relief, the court was only called upon to determine
the parties rights and obligations. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[22] it
reasoned out that the RTC could not issue injunction in an action for
declaratory relief in as much as the right of the MI incorporators had not yet
been violated. Moreover, it stated that the subsequent inhibition of Judge
Doyon in the cases was pursuant to the rules on compulsory disqualification
of a judge under Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[23]
The MI incorporators, represented by Engr. Udarbe, moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
March 1, 2006.
Hence, this petition.

On the other hand, plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 have shown
that they have the legal right in the management and administration of
Mindanao Institute because their actuations are based in an Amended
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws duly approved by the SEC. The
allegation that it was approved by the SEC in record time cannot be taken
as evidence that per se the approval was against any law, rule or regulation.
It is precisely for this reason that the Court issued a TRO because from the
amendments, plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 and respondents in
Civil Case No. 09-2003 have clear legal rights over the management and
administration of Mindanao Institute and that the acts of plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 09-2003 and respondents in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 are in
violation of those rights. Pending determination, therefore, of the principal
action in Special Civil Case No. 03-02, the Court is inclined to issue a
preliminary injunction to protect and preserve the rights of plaintiffs.[18]
UCCP moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in
its Resolution[19] dated August 15, 2003.
In its Omnibus Order[20] dated August 20, 2003, Judge Doyon inhibited
himself from the cases citing the fact that his sons law firm entered its
appearance as collaborating counsel for UCCP.
Disappointed with the unfavorable ruling, UCCP and MI, as represented by
Dr. Batitang, sought relief with the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC in issuing the assailed order.
The CA granted the petition in its September 30, 2005 Decision, the fallo of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the instant Petition is

GRANTED. The writ of preliminary injunction issued against the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) in Special Civil Case No. 02-03
is hereby DISSOLVED. No pronouncement as to costs.

THE ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL
TWENTY THIRD DIVISION, IN AN ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND RULING ON FACTUAL
ISSUES NOT YET HEARD AND TRIED IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN AND
BASED ITS DECISION THEREON.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL
TWENTY THIRD DIVISION ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF RULE
3.12(D) OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS UNDER THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS CASE.[24]
In their Memorandum,[25] the petitioners argue that the CA went beyond
the province of a writ of certiorari by resolving factual questions, which
should appropriately be threshed out in the trial. On the inhibition, they
pointed out that it was solely the law partner of Judge Doyons son, Atty. J.
Ma. James L. Bringas (Atty. Bringas), who personally entered his
appearance as collaborating counsel, and not the law firm. Furthermore,
they claim that Atty. Doyon, Judge Doyons son, was neither present in
court on the day Atty. Bringas entered his appearance nor was he present
in any of the previous hearings of the subject cases. Hence, petitioners
claim that Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct[26] is not applicable
in this case because Atty. Doyon never represented any party in any of the
subject cases being heard by Judge Doyon.

In its Memorandum,[27] respondent claims that the petition for review on

certiorari filed by the petitioners was not properly verified as to authorize
Engr. Udarbe to file the same - a fatal procedural infirmity. Further, it points
out that petitioners are raising questions of fact in their petition not
cognizable by this Court.

SO ORDERED.[21]
THE COURTS RULING
The CA reasoned, among others, that the petition for certiorari (Civil Case
No. 09-2003) having been jointly filed by UCCP and MI, as represented by
Dr. Batitang, was adequate evidence to support the conclusion that MI did
not require any injunctive relief from UCCP. The CA also stated that in

The petition lacks merit.

The Court is called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not the CA erred
in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued against UCCP. The writ
of preliminary injunction enjoined UCCP from taking control and
management of MI and preventing petitioners from discharging their
functions in its management. Thus, the Court shall confine itself only with
the concerned writ and not the merits of the cases, which are still pending
with the RTC. A preliminary injunction, being a preservative remedy for the
protection of substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself
but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.[28]
A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
person to refrain from a particular act or acts. x x x

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in

order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the
pendency of an action.[29] The objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be fully heard.
Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy.[30]
Significantly, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or
acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.[32] [Underscoring supplied]
It bears stressing that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be
protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.[33]
When the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not
proper.[34]
In the present case, the records fail to reveal any clear and unmistakable
right on the part of petitioners. They posit that they are suing in behalf of
MIs interests by preventing UCCP from unlawfully wresting control of MIs
properties. Their claimed derivative interest, however, has been disputed by
UCCP in both its Answer with Counterclaim in Special Civil Action Case No.
03-02 and its Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-2003, wherein MI itself,
represented by Dr. Batitang himself, is its co-petitioner. Evidently, the
conflicting claims of the parties regarding the issue of ownership over MIs
property create the impression that the petitioners derivative right, used as
basis for the issuance of the preliminary injunction, is far from clear.
Petitioners claimed right is still indefinite, at least until it is properly threshed
out in a trial, negating the presence of a right in esse that requires the
protection of an injunctive writ. Verily, petitioners cannot lay claim to a clear
and positive right based on the 2003 Amended AOI, the provisions of which
are strongly disputed and alleged to be invalidly obtained.
As regards the issue of Judge Doyons disqualification to sit as judge
in the subject cases, the Court agrees with the CA. The pertinent rule on the
mandatory disqualification of judicial officers is laid down in Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit
in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniary interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record. [Underscoring supplied]
x x x.

Based on the foregoing provision, the Court in St. James College of

Paraaque v. Equitable PCI Bank[31] ruled that the following requisites
must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is, a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

Moreover, Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which took
effect from October 20 1989 until May 31, 2004, the applicable rule then,
reads as follows:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others,
proceedings where:
xxx

(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within

the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree. [Underscoring
supplied]
The prohibitions under the afore-quoted provisions of the Rules are clear.
The disqualification is mandatory and gives the judicial officer concerned no
discretion but to inhibit himself from trying or sitting in a case. The rationale,
therefore, is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary's
fairness and objectivity.[35]
While the Court finds it ludicrous that it was the counsel of UCCP, Atty.
Poculan, who sought the inhibition of Judge Doyon, considering that the law
firm of the latters son is his collaborating counsel, still the mandatory
prohibition applies. Judge Doyon should have immediately inhibited himself
from the case upon learning of the entry of appearance of his sons law firm.
Where the disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to the case make
no waiver of such disqualification, as in the case at bench, Section 1, Rule
137 of the Rules of Court forthwith completely strips the judge of authority to
proceed.[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed September 30, 2005
Decision and March 1, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79156, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
T
he Rules on voluntary inhibition do not give judges the unfettered discretion
to desist from hearing a case. The motion for inhibition must be grounded
on just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not
enough basis for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is groundless.
The Case

[Petitioner] claimed that [respondents] Familys Brand Sardines is

confusingly similar with [petitioners] Family Brand Sardines. [Petitioner]
insisted that it has superior right to use the trademark Family than
[respondent].
[Respondent] filed an Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim and
Motion to Dismiss and Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.
[Respondent] prayed that [petitioner] be enjoined from using the
trademark Family and to pay damages. [Respondent] further asked [Judge
Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr.] to set the hearing for its motion to dismiss the
action on the grounds of lack of authority of the affiant of the complaint to
institute the action, insufficient verification and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
After hearing, [Judge Eugenio] issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining [petitioner] to use the trademark Family.
On March 21, 2003, [Judge Eugenio] dismissed without prejudice,
[petitioners] complaint on the ground of insufficient verification as invoked
by [respondent].
[Respondent] filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
dismissing [petitioners] complaint, claiming that the defect in the verification
has been rendered moot and academic by subsequent rulings respective to
the application for preliminary injunction and that the attending
circumstances of the case warrant liberal compliance [with] the rule.
[Petitioner] filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, requesting [Judge
Eugenio] to inhibit himself from proceeding to hear, try and decide the
pending incidents of the case to afford [petitioner] an impartial trial.
[Respondent] opposed [petitioners] Motion for Voluntary Inhibition.
On May 22, 2003, [Judge Eugenio] issued an Order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from further hearing the case.

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, challenging the August 14, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 77514 and the November 24, 2003 Resolution[3]
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The decretal portion or
fallo of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

Hence, [the] petition [filed with the CA] by [respondent] for

mandamus to compel [Judge Eugenio] to continue to hear the pending
incidents of the case.[4]

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition for mandamus is

hereby GRANTED. Public respondents Order dated May 22, 2003,
voluntarily inhibiting himself from the case is hereby SET ASIDE. Public
respondent is DIRECTED to continue hearing the case and dispose of the
same with utmost dispatch.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Finding no valid and just reason for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Eugenio, the CA issued the writ of mandamus. It ruled that the present case
fell within the exception that mandamus would lie in instances of gross
abuse of discretion.

The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:
[Petitioner] filed a civil complaint against [respondent] for Trademark
Infringement, False Representation and Unfair Competition with Damages
and Injunction. The case was docketed as Civil Case [N]o. 02-102988.

Hence, this Petition.[5]

Issue
The issue was worded by petitioner in this wise:
The principal issue raised by the petitioner for this Honorable Court
to resolve is whether or not a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to

assail a purely discretionary act of Judge Antonio Eugenio, Jr. of voluntarily

inhibiting himself from hearing Civil Case No. 02-102988 and corollary
thereto, whether Judge Eugenio, Jr. who inhibited himself in accordance
with the law and the Rules, can be compelled to perform an act he had
already decided not to do with the intention of assuring the litigants of an
impartial trial.[6]
The Court believes that there are actually two issues to be settled in
this case: first, whether mandamus is the proper remedy to assail an order
of voluntary inhibition; and second, whether there was a valid and just
reason for the voluntary inhibition of the trial court judge.

heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party

within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Remedy Against the
Order of Voluntary Inhibition

At the outset, we note that petitioner, in an effort to cover its bases,

filed the present Petition as both a petition for review under Rule 45 and a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The applicable
rule is Rule 45, which clearly provides that decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the CA in any case -- regardless of the nature of the action or
proceeding involved -- may be appealed to this Court through a petition for
review. This remedy is a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case.[7] It is basic that where Rule 45 is available, and in fact
availed of as a remedy -- as in this case -- recourse under Rule 65 cannot
be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal.[8]
The procedural infirmity notwithstanding, this Court shall deal with this
Petition as one filed under Rule 45 only and shall treat the alleged grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CA as an allegation of reversible error.
Petitioner claims that respondent erred when the latter questioned the
trial judges Order of Voluntary Inhibition --supposedly a purely discretionary
act -- through a Petition for Mandamus filed with the CA.
While, ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a
discretionary act, the writ shall issue in instances of gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, equivalent to
denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled; and when there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[9] This Court has recognized
that [a] judges decision to refuse to act on account of some disqualification
is not conclusive, and his competency may be determined on an application
for mandamus to compel him to act.[10]
Second Issue:
Inhibition
Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and

voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively
presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances
mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition,
leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a
case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
[11]
In Umale v. Villaluz,[12] the Court traced the history of the second
paragraph of the above-quoted provision, which had been added only as an
amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to that year, the question
on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend upon the
discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If
those concerned were not disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed
with the case or else risk being called upon to account for their dereliction.
They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of prejudice or
bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an
active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos[13] and Del Castillo
v. Javelona[14] paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for
disqualification --those that depended upon the exercise of discretion of the
judges concerned.
The judges right, however, must be weighed against their duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. Verily, the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to
decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just
and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This
Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. [15]
A perusal of the records of the case fails to reveal that any bias or
prejudice motivated Judge Eugenio in issuing the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in favor of respondent or in dismissing petitioners Complaint.
Neither did this Court find any questionable or suspicious circumstances
leading to the issuance of those Orders, as suggested by petitioner.
This Court has repeatedly held that for bias and prejudice to be
considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere
suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption
that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to
law and evidence and without fear or favor. [16]

In his questioned Order of Inhibition, Judge Eugenio himself

satisfactorily clarified his actuations and the circumstances leading to the
issuance of the questioned injunction and Order of dismissal. Obviously not
believing that he had been motivated by bias or prejudice, he nonetheless
granted petitioners Motion to Inhibit. Understandably, he did so with the
intention to uphold the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of
public trust and confidence. Under the circumstances, however, to affirm his
Order of Inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping,
in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to
their cause.[17] Such action would be antithetical to the speedy and fair
administration of justice.

were more imaginary than real; that the records bore no suspicious
circumstances that would create doubt on the impartiality, fairness and
objectivity of the trial judge; that no extrinsic evidence appeared on the
records to establish that the trial judge acted with bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose all throughout the proceedings; and that there was no just
and valid cause for the disqualification of the trial judge from presiding over
the case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
NACHURA, J.:

The Court denies the petition.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court are the June 28, 2007 Decision[1] and the September 18,
2007 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94016.
The relevant antecedent facts and proceedings follow.
In 1999, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 215 a complaint for specific performance with
damages docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37219. On motion of
respondents, the complaint was dismissed. The appellate court later
affirmed the dismissal in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573. This Court, however, in its
decision in G.R. No. 160753 on September 30, 2004, reversed and set
aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court with
the instruction that the same be heard and tried with deliberate dispatch.[3]
On June 28, 2005, the Court denied with finality the motion for the
reconsideration of the said decision.[4]
RTC, Branch 215, of Quezon City, thus, proceeded to hear Civil Case
No. Q-99-37219. On February 23, 2006, however, petitioner filed his motion
for the inhibition[5] of the presiding judge, Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla,
allegedly to preclude doubts or apprehensions of partiality and to give the
parties breathing space and peace of mind in the course of the adjudication
of the proceedings.
After respondents filed their opposition, the RTC judge issued the
March 7, 2006 Order[6] declaring that she was voluntarily inhibiting herself
from hearing the case and that she was granting the motion in order to
dispel any doubt and perception of bias, and so that the faith and
confidence in the justice system would not be eroded.
Disagreeing with the trial judge, respondents, on April 10, 2006, filed before
the CA their Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[7]
Respondents contended in the main that there was no sufficient ground for
the trial judge to inhibit herself from hearing the case.
On June 28, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed Decision[8] granting the
petition for mandamus, reversing and setting aside the inhibitory order
issued by the trial court, and directing the said court to hear and decide the
civil case with deliberate dispatch. It ruled, among others, that the
allegations of preconceived bias and partiality thrown against the trial judge

The appellate court, in the further assailed September 18, 2007 Resolution,
[9] denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner
brought the matter to this Court via the instant Rule 45 petition.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides that

Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officers shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The first paragraph of the section relates to the mandatory inhibition of
judges; the second, to their voluntary inhibition.
The discretion referred to in the second paragraph is a matter of conscience
and is addressed primarily to the judges sense of fairness and justice.[10]
Indeed, as this Court has held in Pimentel v. Salanga,[11] judges may not
be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. However, when suggestion is
made of record that they might be induced to act with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, they should conduct a careful self-examination.
Magistrates should exercise their discretion in a way that the peoples faith
in the courts of justice is not impaired. They should, therefore, exercise
great care and caution before making up their minds to act or withdraw from
a suit. If, after reflection, they resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a
case in which their motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, their
action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.[12]
Nonetheless, while the rule allows judges, in the exercise of sound
discretion, to voluntarily inhibit themselves from hearing a case, it provides
that the inhibition must be based on just or valid reasons. In prior cases
interpreting this rule, the most recent of which is Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi, etc., et al.,[13] the Court
noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown. Extrinsic
evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.[14] Stated differently, the bare allegations of the
judges partiality will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing

evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his
noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and
without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid
reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not
enough.[15] Let it be further noted that the option given to a judge to choose
whether or not to handle a particular case should be counterbalanced by the
judges sworn duty to administer justice without fear of repression.[16]
In the case at bar, petitioner, aside from his bare allegations, has not shown
that Judge Quijano-Padilla had been biased and partial against a particular
party in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-99-37219. The judge even
acknowledged in the inhibitory order that the motion for her disqualification
contained no statement of specific act or acts that would show her partiality
or bias in the treatment of the case. Her voluntary inhibition was only on
account of dispelling any doubt and perception of bias on the part of
petitioner. Clearly, therefore, no just and valid reason supports the inhibition
of Judge Quijano-Padilla.
The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against petitioner in the
resolution of the motion to dismiss, which this Court later reversed in G.R.
No. 160753, is not enough reason, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice
or bad faith, to conclude that the judge was biased and partial against
petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People,[17] the remedy
of erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not the outright
disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come a judge with the
omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts will close
shop if we disqualify judges who err, for we all err.
Finally, the Court notes that if it were to affirm the inhibitory order in this
case, then it would be opening the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping,
in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to
their causes.[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 28,
2007 Decision and the September 18, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94016 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CRESENCIO MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
LEOPODO B. GIRONELLA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Abra, Branch II, respondent.
Petitioner in his own behalf.
Respondent for and his own behalf.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
In Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch II,
Cresencio Martinez, as principal, and Viernes Duclan and Arnold Bayongan,
as accessories after the fact, were charged with the murder of one Alfredo
Batoon. As the first two were not apprehended, trial proceeded with respect
to the third, Arnold Bayongan. Thereafter, decision was rendered, the
pertinent and dispositive portions of which are as follows
xxx xxx xxx
It is worthy to state, however, that the offense of murder
was clearly established and was committed by
Cresencio Martinez, from the evidence on record, there
is no showing that Arnold Bayongan is an accessory

after the fact. The evidence as a whole, however, tends

to allude Gregorio Banawa, the then incumbent Mayor
of Sallapadan to have knowledge of the perpetrator and
commission of the crime but did not take any action. It
is further informed that Gregorio Banawa to date is
hiding the principal accused Cresencio Martinez.
In view of the foregoing consideration, the Court hereby
dismisses the charge against Arnold Bayongan and is
therefore ordered ACQUITTED.
The Provincial Fiscal is hereby directed to investigate
this case further to avoid miscarriage of justice and the
possibility of including Gregorio Banawa and for the
prompt apprehension of the principal accused
Cresencio Martinez. (pp. 10-11, rollo).
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequent to the acquittal of Arnold Bayongan, Cresencio Martinez
surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary and later was arraigned before
Branch II of the same Court of First instance. After having pleaded "not
guilty" to the charge, and before the prosecution started to present its
evidence, counsel for accused Cresencio Martinez moved that the trial
Judge inhibit himself from hearing the case on its merits on the grounds "(1)
that the respondent had the chance to pass upon the issue and has formed
an opinion as to who committed the crime of murder; (2) that it would not be
fair that he would sit, hear and pass judgment; and (3) that the respondent
is no longer impartial," and prayed that the case be transferred to Branch I
of the same Court.
Respondent denied the oral motion. Petitioner did not move for a
reconsideration of the denial of the motion so the trial proceeded. When the
trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the government, this Petition for
Prohibition was filed. In his petition, Cresencio Martinez asks for a writ of
prohibition commanding respondent Judge to desist from hearing and
deciding Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra;
declaring the hearing heretofore had as a mistrial; and ordering that said
criminal case be heard anew by the presiding Judge of Branch I of the said
Court or any other Court within the Judicial District.
On being required to comment, the Solicitor General did so, and, citing the
cases of Dais vs. Torres, et al., 57 Phil. 897, 903; Luque vs. Kayanan, 29
SCRA 165; and Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66, opined "that it would
be in the best interest of justice and in keeping with the clear intendment
and pronouncements of the Honorable Court that the case should be tried
anew by another judge and that the respondent Judge should desist from
further taking cognizance of the case."
On the other hand, respondent Judge maintains that the trial was fair,
impartial and liberal to the herein accused-petitioner as can be gleaned from
the records of Criminal Case No. 21. Respondent explains that the
statement that the "crime was committed by Cresencio Martinez" appearing
in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan after a separate trial "was based
merely on the prosecution evidence where petitioner was not on trial,
therefore did not confront witnesses, did not submit his defense evidence
and surely will not in any way affect or apply to him. The decision to be
rendered shall be based upon the evidence adduced and submitted by both
parties."
The trial of the case has already been terminated and the Case submitted
for decision.
Two issues are presented before us first, whether or not to order a new
trial for petitioner; and second, whether or not respondent judge should be
allowed to decide petitioner's case.

It cannot be denied that elementary due process requires that a case be

heard by a tribunal that is impartial and disinterested. And if an accused has
been the victim of an unfair and partial trial, this court will certainly not
hesitate to order a new trial in the interest of justice. 1 In asking that the case
be tried by another Judge, petitioner alleges in general that respondent
should not be impartial as contemplated in the New Constitution. No specific
resolution, order, or ruling of respondent is cited in particular as one of
partiality. It should be noted that after petitioner was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty, and after respondent had denied petitioner's motion for the former
to inhibit himself from trying the case, petitioner did not move for a
reconsideration of the denial of the motion. Instead the trial proceeded.
Petitioner took no further action towards the disqualification of respondent
until the trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the government at which
time the present Petition for Prohibition was filed. The only conclusion we
can draw from these circumstances is that the trial was fair and impartial.
We are, therefore, not inclined to order a new trial for petitioner.
As to the second issue: A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and
impartial decision, but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's
integrity. 2 While we grant respondent's capacity to render a just and
impartial decision, his statement in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan
to the effect that the "crime was committed by Cresencio Martinez" renders
it impossible for respondent to be free from the suspicion that in deciding
petitioner's case, respondent will be biased and prejudiced. We therefore
hold that under these circumstances petitioner has the right to have his
case decided by another Judge.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted. Respondent is ordered
to transmit the records of Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance
of Abra to Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and the
Judge presiding the said court will decide the same. Without
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 140

Section 4. Report - After the hearing, the Justice or judge shall file with the
Supreme Court a report of his findings of fact and conclusions of law,
accompanied by the evidence presented by the parties and the other
papers in he case.

Charges Against Judges of First Instance

1.1
All presiding judges of trial courts must, upon assumption of
office, and every semester thereafter on June 30th and December 31st of
every year conduct a physical inventory of their dockets for the purpose of
determining the actual number of cases pending in their salas.

Section 1. Complaint - All Charges against judges of first instance shall be

in writing and shall set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts
complained of as constituting the alleged serious misconduct or inefficiency
of the respondent, and shall be sworn to and supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged, and
shall be accompanied with copies of documents which may substantiate
said facts.
Section 2. Service or dismissal. - If the charges appear to merit action, a
copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer
within ten (10) days from the date service. If the charges do not merit action,
or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the charges are
not meritorious, the same shall be dismissed.
Section 3. Answer; hearing. - Upon the filing of respondents answer or upon
the expiration of the time for its filing, the court shall assign one of its
members, a Justice of the Court of Appeals or a judge of first instance to
conduct the hearing of the charges. The Justice or judge so assigned shall
set a day for the hearing, and notice thereof shall be served on both parties.
At such hearing the parties may present oral or written evidence.

Section 5. Action - After the filing of the report, the court will take such
action as the facts and the law may warrant.

Section 6. Confidential. - Proceedings against judges of first

instance shall be private and confidential.
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1 JANUARY 28, 1988
SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS
TO:
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS
SUBJECT:
IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC. 12, ART. XVIII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
Pursuant to Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating the
adoption of a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases
or matters pending in the Supreme Court and the lower courts prior to the
effectivity of the Constitution on February 2, 1987, the following directives
must be complied with strictly by all concerned.
1.

Effective Docket Control:

1.2
An inventory shall be prepared to indicate the cases pending trial,
the cases submitted for decision and the cases that have been archived.
Copy of such inventory shall be submitted to the Supreme Court through the
Court Administrator within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Circular and
the Inventory Form.
1.3
The Presiding Judge and the Clerk of Court shall initial the
Records or Rollos of each case to indicate the date of actual inventory. The
inventory shall include a list of cases submitted for decision, indicating the
title and case number and the date of filing of said case. An updated
inventory be submitted to the Supreme Court every six (6) months thereafter
as required in Paragraph 1.1 hereof.
1.4
Preference in Disposition. - All cases of matters submitted for
decision or resolution before the effectivity of the Constitution shall be given
preference by the presiding judge in his disposition of his docket.
2.

Maximum Use of Judge Time and Effective Court Management:

2.1
All Presiding Judges are directed to comply strictly with the
guidelines established in Circular No. 13, July 1, 1987, on punctuality and
observance of office hours, effective use of pretrial and discovery
procedures, effective management of trials, the availment of annual
conferences.
2.2
A strict policy on postponement should be observed to avoid
unnecessary delays in court proceedings. Faithful adherence to Secs. 3, 4
and 5 of Rule 22, Rules of Court should be observed.
2.3
The preparation of the court calendar should not be left entirely in
the hands of the clerk of court, must be closely supervised by the Presiding
Judge. A rational calendar plan should be followed so that each case in the
calendar is assured of a hearing on the scheduled day of trial.

5.2
All judges are reminded that the Supreme Court has applied the
"Res Ipsa Loquitur" rule in the removal of judges even without any formal
investigation whenever a decision, on its face, indicates gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct. (See
People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712; Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Romillo,
Jr., 142 SCRA 262; In re Laureta, 149 SCRA 570).
5.3
Judges should make complete findings of facts in their decision,
and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the
evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to "generalize and to
form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced." (See People vs. Alvero, G.R. No. 69564, Jan. 29, 1988; Pengson
vs. IAC, 130 SCRA 289).
6.

2.4
The Presiding Judge must have a calendar of cases submitted for
decision, noting the exact day, month and year when the 90-day period is to
expire. As soon as a case is submitted for decision, this must be noted in
the calendar of the Judge, the records duly collated with the Exhibits and
trial notes of the judge, and placed in the judge's chambers.
3.
Prompt Action on Dilatory Petitions to Delay Enforcement of
Executory Judgments:
3.1
It has become a common practice for litigants to file dilatory
petitions for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction in order to delay or thwart enforcement of final
an executory judgments of both the regional trial court or of other inferior
trial courts.
3.2
Where such petitions are filed, the court concerned should
exercise the greatest restraint to avoid delay in the enforcement of final and
executory judgments. Attention is called to Sec. 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which provides that such petition may be given due course only if
"sufficient in form and substance." Hence, summons should not immediately
be issued until the Court finds the petition sufficient in form and substance.
Only then should the order issue requiring defendant or defendants to
answer. Restraining orders or preliminary injunction should not be issued
without prior notice and hearing and showing of a clear right thereto.
4.

6.1
All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions
and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
6.2
Unless authorized by the Rule, and only in situations of extreme
urgency, no motions or other applications for relief should be acted upon ex
parte. Delays in court proceedings have often times been due to such ex
parte applications, resulting in the aggrieved party having to seek relief from
higher courts.
6.3
All courts from the Court of Appeals down are reminded of the
injunction in Habaluyas vs. Judge Japzon, and subsequent cases, G.R. No.
70895, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 209 (reiterated in Circular No. 10, August
28, 1986) that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration of judgment or final order shall be allowed. The granting of
such prohibited motion for extension shall not preserve the judgment or
order from becoming final and executory for lapse of the period to appeal.
Such motions for extension may be filed only in the Supreme Court which
reserves the right in its discretion to grant or deny the same.
7.

Inhibitions and Disqualifications:

7.1
All judges are reminded that as already pointed out in Circular No.
7, dated November 10, 1980, inhibitions and disqualifications are judicial
actions which do not require prior administrative approval.

Redistribution of Pending Cases in Multi-Sala Station:

4.1
In multi-sala stations where former incumbents have either retired
or were promoted leaving undecided pending cases such volume that the
present incumbent finds extreme difficulty in attending thereto, the
Executive Judge should promptly make a report and recommendation on
the equitable redistribution of these cases to the other salas.
4.2
As much as practicable, the incumbent judges should arrive at an
agreement on the matter; otherwise, the matter should be brought to the
attention of the Court Administrator for prompt action.
5.

Motions and Other Interlocutory Matters:

7.2
Administrative intervention is necessary only when the inhibitions
is by a judge of a single sala court, and the case has to be transferred to
another judge of another station.
7.3
Administrative intervention is also warranted in case of conflict of
opinions among the judges as to the proprietary of the inhibition.
8.

Raffle of Cases:

8.1
Raffle of cases should be done in open session in the presence of
lawyers and spectators, immediately after the court opens its sessions:

Decision-Writing:

5.1
All Presiding Judges must observe scrupulously the periods
prescribed in Art. VIII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution.

8.2
The minutes of the Raffle should be distributed within 24 hours
after completion thereof to the judges of the other salas, and a copy sent to
the Office of the Court Administrator.

8.3
Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified
application of the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional
remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the
special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the
applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a
multiple-sala station.

Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.

8.4
There must be strict compliance with Administrative Order No. 6,
dated June 30, 1975 and Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974
requiring that no case may be assigned in multi-sala courts without raffle; a
raffle committee composed of the Executive Judge and two other judges
shall be constituted where practicable, raffle proceedings should be
stenographically recorded, and the results signed by the Judges or their
representatives and the Clerk of Court, and the branch assignment shall be
recorded in words and figures on the Rollo.

(3)
Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to
this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith
be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter,
and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

9.

Bar Relations:

9.1
All Executive Judges shall conduct dialogues and conferences at
least once every semester with the officers of the Integrated Bar Chapter in
their respective jurisdictional areas.
9.2
At this conference, the Executive Judge shall discuss with the IBP
Officers problems confronting the lawyers, and examine approaches and
solutions to enable both the court and the bar to assist each other in the
speedy resolution of pending cases.
10.

(2)
A case or matter should be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(4)
Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the
court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted
thereto for determination, without further delay.
12.

Publication:

12.1

Let the Clerk of Court distribute this Circular

among all courts and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and cause the publication

Maintaining Public Confidence in the Courts:

10.1
All judicial efforts should be addressed towards maintaining public
confidence in the courts.

thereof in the Official Gazette, as well as

10.2
As we enjoined in Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, "all trial
judges should endeavor to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with
the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Ethics that they be
exemplars in their communities and the living personification of justice and
the Rule of Law."

distribute copies thereof to the media for their

10.3
The reduction of case loads would be an efficacious design to
strengthen public confidence in the Courts. All efforts should be exerted so
that case disposals should exceed case inputs. Whenever obstacles
present themselves which delay case disposition, the Presiding Judge
should immediately call the attention of the Supreme Court through the
Court Administrator when the situation requires remedies beyond the
control or capability of the judges.
11.

Deadlines for Decisions for all Cases filed after February 2, 1987.

11.1
All courts are reminded of the mandatory provisions of Article VIII,
Section 15 of the Constitution setting deadlines for determination and
adjudication of cases filed thereunder and for issuance of a Certification by
the Presiding Judge stating the reason why a decision or resolution has not
been rendered or issued within the deadline period. The provisions are here
in below reproduced for ready reference:
Sec. 15. (1)
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the

dissemination.

Per Curiam:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a
public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
In her complaint,[1] complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent
Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary
for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence[2], and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for
judgeship with a pending administrative case.[3]
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews,
deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges
against him.
She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva
Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave

abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the
Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain
improprieties[4] and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of
Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges.[5] It also
denied the complainants motion for reconsideration.[6]
Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review[7] on October 28,
2004 in the Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision[8] dated November 25,
2005, the appellate court held that it could not take cognizance of the
criminal charges against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases
should be taken to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari.[9]
As to the administrative aspect, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against
respondent. The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the
administrative charges against respondent.
While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was
interviewed several times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for
the position of RTC judge. On August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the
RTC, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The complainant charged
that respondent never informed the JBC of his pending cases. This, she
said, made it possible for him to be nominated and, subsequently,
appointed.
In his comment,[10] respondent admitted that complainant had lodged
criminal and administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He,
however, insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of the
immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the
Ombudsman. Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him
during his interviews in the JBC from February to August 2005. Accordingly,
there was no impediment to his nomination to and assumption of the
position of judge. However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said
cases.
The complainant filed a reply,[11] stating that the March 24, 2004 decision
of the Ombudsman was not yet final and executory as it was timely
appealed by way of a petition for review filed on October 28, 2004 in the
CA. In fact, the petition was even granted.
To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent,
complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent
on March 21, 2006 in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the
Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division.[12] According to
her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally
with any infraction.

We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of

dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information
from the JBC, as both he and complainant never backed their respective
allegations with concrete evidence.[13] Thus, no probative value can be
given either to the charges or to the defenses.
However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing
alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his
interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked
the box indicating No to the question Have you ever been formally
charged? in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC
Personnel.[14]
Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was
reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part
when he answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS. He
knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that he
was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To
make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his
predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already
dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not
the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology
of the question Have you ever been formally charged?, meaning, charged
at anytime in the past or present.
In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,[15] we held that the making of untruthful
statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official
document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the
making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This
Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being
a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all
the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge
makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity,
the most fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary.
Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct himself
in a manner which merits the respect and confidence of the people at all
times, for he is the visible representation of the law.[16] Regrettably, we are
convinced of respondents capacity to lie and evade the truth. His
dishonesty misled the JBC and tarnished the image of the judiciary. He
does not even seem remorseful for what he did as he sees nothing wrong
with it.
He deserves the harsh penalty of dismissal from the service.

On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the
OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification
of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended
respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the
government service.

This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a

disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance
with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.[17] This resolution, entitled Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts;
and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against

Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar,

provides:

dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor

consent to the doing of any in court.

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section

27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from
committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred.
Thus:

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be

considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or
court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he
should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment
cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court
were treated separately.[18] However, pursuant to the new rule, an
administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds
which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the
Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against
such judge as a member of the Bar.[19]
This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct
embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a
breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR):[20]
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful act.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in
the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a
lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also
violates his oath as a lawyer.[21] In this particular case, respondents

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in
a plethora of cases.[22] Of particular importance to this case is our decision
in Caada v. Suerte[23] where we applied the rule to its fullest extent:
automatic disbarment.
In Caada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge Suerte with
grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty,
harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint alleged,
among others, that respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck
and Daewoo car to complainant. The latter refused. Their friendship later on
turned sour when they failed to reach an agreement on the commission
respondent was supposed to receive as agent-broker for the contemplated
sale of complainants beach lot. The complainant voiced out his fear that
respondent would use his judicial power to persecute him for what
respondent may have perceived as complainants infractions against him.
In his comment, respondent denied offering to sell the vehicles to
complainant since, according to him, he never owned a dilapidated cargo
pick-up truck nor could he recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998.
However, a perusal of respondents Statements of Assets and Liabilities for
the years 1998-2001 revealed that among his personal properties were a
Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998.
Accordingly, we found respondent guilty of dishonesty for having falsely
denied that he ever owned the aforementioned vehicles. For his infraction,
respondent judge was fined in the amount of P40,000. He would have been
dismissed from the service were it not for the fact that he had already been
dismissed therefrom because of an earlier case.[24]
Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed respondent
Judge Suertes administrative case as disciplinary proceedings for
disbarment as well, and proceeded to strip him of his membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment
on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,

disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." The

rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a
member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show
cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately
from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held
administratively liable as a member of the bench.[25] In other words, an
order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on
why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of
the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable
meaning of automatic conversion of administrative cases against justices
and judges[26] to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This
will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication
or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint
filed against a member of the bench[27] also as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary
proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an
administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of
Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level
court.[28]
It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the
image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and
rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.[29] If the practice of law is to
remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted
within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should
also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[30]
A parting word.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the Courts
relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and
personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on
judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the
visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the
bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on
them is and should be higher than that of the average person for it is
their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty
and falsification of an official document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave
credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and
Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondents records in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified letter complaint dated May 15, 2002,[1] Gabriel dela Paz,
Officer-in-Charge of Fund for Assistance to Private Education (FAPE),[2]
charged Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marawi City, Branch 8 of gross ignorance of the law and/or abuse of
authority.
Pacasum College, Inc., represented by Saripada Ali Pacasum, filed with the
RTC, a petition for mandamus with application for a preliminary mandatory
injunction, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 813-02, against FAPE,
represented by Roberto T. Borromeo, Secretary Raul S. Roco, Ramon C.
Bacani and Carolina C. Porio.
On March 4, 2002, respondent judge issued an Order, to wit:
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION
Considering that the petition herein is sufficient in form and substance, a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby issued requiring the
respondents, specifically FAPE and its officials, including its Chairman
respondent RAUL S. ROCO, to prepare and issue a check in the amount of
P4,000,000.00 representing the entitlement of the petitioner for School Year
2001-2002, payable to its President/Chairman DATU SARIPADA ALI
PACASUM, under pain of arrest and contempt.[3]
The following day, March 5, 2002, respondent issued another Order, thus:
Finding the ex-parte motion of the petitioner to be impressed with merit, it is
hereby approved.
WHEREFORE, the appropriate Sheriffs of Makati and Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, are hereby ordered to serve the attached Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction upon the respondents, and make a return on their
actions taken thereon. [4]
On March 12, 2002, FAPE, through counsel, filed an omnibus motion set
aside orders of March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case.[5] In its
motion, FAPE claimed that it was not served with summons but received
copies of the questioned orders on March 8, 2002; that the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which was intended to be enforced in
Makati is outside the jurisdiction of the Twelfth Judicial Region of RTC
Marawi City; that Section 21 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the RTC has jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction
which may be enforced in any part of its respective regions; that the writ
was granted without hearing and notice; neither was there a showing of an
affidavit that would establish that great or irreparable injury would result to
the applicant before the matter can be heard nor was there a showing that a
bond had been filed.
On May 6, 2002, another Order was issued by the respondent, thus:
It appears on record that despite service to the respondents copies of the
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by this Court on March 4,
2002 and until date respondents failed to obey or comply (sic) the Writ as

directed and considering that funds due to the petitioner has been deposited
in the bank, the assigned Sheriff of Makati City is ordered to take custody of
the said funds/check in the name of PACASUM COLLEGE INC., in the
amount of 4 million pesos. Collectible for the school year 2001-2002 and
release the same to SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, President/Chairman of the
said school thru garnishment proceedings at the (BPI), Bank of Philippine
Islands, Benavidez St., Legaspi Village, Makati City or BPI main at Ayala
Ave., Makati City and/or any other banks including LANDBANK of the
Philippines, Ortigas Center Branch which is the official depositary bank of
the DECS out of the deposit of Funds for Assistance for (sic) Private
Education (FAPE) in order not to defeat the purpose of the said Writ. [6]
On May 8, 2002, Makati Sheriff Melchor C. Gaspar issued notices of
garnishment to Land Bank Head Office in Ortigas Center Branch and BPIFar East Bank in Pasay Road Branch, Makati.[7] Subsequently, FAPE,
through counsel, wrote Sheriff Gaspar a letter asking the latter to rectify his
act of issuing notices of garnishment considering that the same was made
pursuant to a patently illegal and void order of the respondent.[8]
In his letter-complaint, dela Paz claims as follows: Respondents issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated March 4, 2002 was in
glaring disregard and defiance of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129 which limits
the authority of RTCs to issue writs of mandamus within their respective
regions. The issuance of the writ was in disregard of the notice and hearing
requirements under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Respondent continues
to issue orders directing FAPE to release the amount of P4,000,000.00 to
Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum even in a case where it was not a party thereto
as in Corporate Case No. 010 filed by Sultan Sabdullah Ali Pacasum
against Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum,[9] et al., respondent issued an Order
dated April 22, 2002, wherein he stated the following:
In view of this order there exists no legal impediment to the enforcement of
the previous orders of this Court particularly a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction issued in Special Civil Action No. 813-02 dated March 4, 2002
directing the respondent FAPE to release to the petitioner the sum of
P4,000,000.00 representing the petitioners entitlement for the School Year
2001-2002 and the order of the Court in Special Civil Case No. 878 dated
March 4, 2002 directing the defendant DR. CARMEN DOMMITORIO to
immediately release to the plaintiff SARIPADA PACASUM the sum of
P1,000,000.00 under pain of arrest and contempt.[10]
Respondent explains in his second indorsement dated July 29, 2002 that he
had ordered the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 813-02 per his
resolution dated June 21, 2002 and that he had recalled and set aside his
questioned orders dated March 4 and 5, 2002. He submits that with the
dismissal of the said case, the herein complaint has become moot and
academic and should no longer be given due course.[11]
Complainant, in a letter dated August 23, 2002,[12] informed us that FAPEs
counsel was not furnished with a copy of the respondents resolution
dismissing the case; and that there is still a pending motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the said case and FAPEs manifestation
with comment and opposition thereto. Complainant claims that aside from
the Orders dated March 4 and 5, 2002 ignorantly issued by respondent
judge, his order dated May 6, 2002 which directed the garnishment of the
funds of their office and followed by a writ of garnishment issued by a
Makati sheriff really paralyzed FAPEs operations until a temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals.[13] Complainant

prays that their complaint be treated better than just being dismissed for
being moot and academic as respondent would want it to be.
Both parties manifested that they are submitting the case for resolution
based on the pleadings filed.[14]
The Court Administrator submitted his Report finding respondent judge
guilty of gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority and
recommending that he be meted with the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of six (6) months without pay with a warning that the
commission of a similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the
service. In arriving at his findings and recommendations, the Court
Administrator stated:
As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent judge had indeed
issued the two (2) orders of March 4 & 5, 2002 without complying with the
mandatory requirement of notice and hearing under Section 5, Rule 58 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that: No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined x x x. Because of his total disregard of the
rules, respondent judge is clearly ignorant of the rules. The subsequent
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 813-02 per order dated 21 June 2002,
which also recalled and set aside the orders of March 4 and 5, 2002, does
not render the instant administrative complaint moot and academic
considering that the issue involved in the instant case is administrative and
not judicial in character. Specifically, the issue is with regard to respondent
judges violation of the law or procedure which is tantamount to ignorance of
the law or procedure. Undoubtedly, respondent judge violated the abovecited rules because the records are bare that prior to the issuance of the
subject writ, he notified the respondent FAPE and conducted a hearing. For
this reason, there is no doubt that respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of
the rules.
Concerning respondent judges issuance of an order dated 22 April 2002 in
Corporate Case No. 010 directing FAPE to issue a check in the sum of P4
million pesos pursuant to the order dated 04 March 2002 in Special Civil
Action No. 813-02, such an act is tantamount to an abuse of his authority.
Records revealed that FAPE was not a party to Corporate Case No. 010.
Nonetheless, respondent judge still directed FAPE to comply with an order
in a case, which they have nothing to do.
Aside from the fact that respondent judge issued an order against a nonparty to Corporate Case No. 010, he also had no authority to issue said
order because he already inhibited himself from trying the case. Records
revealed that on 21 November 2001 respondent judge inhibited himself from
trying and hearing Corporate Case No. 010 (SEC Case No. 10-99-6437).
Respondent judge even caused the forwarding of the records of the said
case to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the court in Iligan City,
which was designated as special court to try and decide corporate cases
(SEC-related cases) would be designated in lieu of respondent judge.
Acting on the said request, the Court, per Resolution of 10 June 2002 in
A.M. No. 02-4-207-RTC, designated Judge Amer R. Ibrahim, Pairing Judge,
RTC, Marawi City to try and decide Corporate Case No. 010.
Despite said inhibition and the subsequent designation of another judge,
respondent judge still issued the order of 22 April 2002. Respondent
judges justification for the issuance of the said order was because the
Office of the Court Administrator returned the records of Corporate Case

No. 010 to his sala for further proceedings. While it is true that the records
were indeed returned to his sala, there is no showing that respondent judge
was given the authority to handle the case. The Courts directive was for
Judge Ibrahim, the pairing judge of Branch 8, to continue the trial and
hearing of Corporate Case No. 010. Thus, respondent judge was fully
aware of his lack of authority to handle the case. For lack of authority to do
so, respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

1. FINED in the sum of P20,000.00 pesos (sic) for Ignorance of the Law in
A.M. No. RTJ-98-1407 per Resolution of 20 July 1998;
2. FINED in the sum of P5,000.00 pesos (sic) for Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581 per
Resolution of 02 July 2002.

Worse, respondent judge issued the subject extraordinary writ to be

enforced outside his judicial region, in gross violation of Section 21 of B.P.
Blg. 129 which provides that Regional Trial Courts exercise original
jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective judicial regions.

In determining the penalty to be imposed, it is important to note that this is

respondent judges 3rd offense involving the same act, which is gross
ignorance of the law, hence he may be meted with a severe penalty of
either DISMISSAL from the service or SUSPENSION from office without
pay for more than 3 months but not exceeding 6 months, at the discretion of
the Court.[15]

The Honorable Court in the case of PNB versus Pineda, 197 SCRA 1
(1991), held that: Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of
injunction within their respective designated territories. Likewise, in the
case of Embassy Farms, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (1990), it was held that:
Generally, an injunction under Section 21 of the Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 is enforceable within the region. The reason is that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being
performed or about to be performed outside its territorial boundaries.

The OCAs findings and recommendations are well-taken.

Similarly, the Court, in the case of Martin vs. Guerrero, 317 SCRA 166
(1999), penalized then Assisting Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero, RTC, Branch
18, Tagaytay City with a fine of P1,000 pesos and admonition with warning
for issuing a writ against a party who is a resident of Paraaque City, an
area which is outside of his judicial jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court held
that: Under the foregoing clear provisions of B.P. 129 and the Rules of
Court, regional trial courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
only when such writs can be enforced within their respective judicial
districts, as extraordinary writs issued by them are limited to and operative
only within such areas. Clearly then, respondent judge had no authority to
issue writ of habeas corpus against herein complainant, who was a resident
of Paraaque, an area outside his judicial jurisdiction.
Thus, consistent with the aforesaid rulings of the court, it follows then that
respondent judge, being a presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no
authority to enforce the subject preliminary mandatory injunction in Makati
City. The subject writ of preliminary mandatory injunction just like the
subject writ of habeas corpus in the aforesaid case of Judge Guerrero
cannot be enforced by respondent judge against a party who is in Makati
City, an area outside of his judicial jurisdiction. Clearly, respondent judge
had grossly violated the provisions of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129.
From all the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and grave abuse of authority.

The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court

provides that the same can only be granted upon a verified application
showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded and upon the
filing of a bond executed to the party or person enjoined.[16] It is also
provided that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and
prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that
great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can
be heard on notice; that a temporary restraining order may be issued
effective for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party sought to
be enjoined.[17]
A perusal of the Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that respondent
conducted a hearing before the injunction was granted or that complainant
was given prior notice thereof. In fact, complainant stressed that FAPE was
not at all served with summons before the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued. It was not also shown whether the applicant posted a
bond and the same was approved before the order granting the preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued. A bond is required unless exempted by
the court. The Order merely stated that the petition was sufficient in form
and substance without even stating the facts which would support the
granting of the injunction. This is a clear violation of the rule.
Moreover, Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129, provides:
SEC. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective regions;
...

Under Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated 11 September

2001, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is considered a serious
charge with the following sanctions: (a) dismissal from the service; or (b)
suspension from office without pay for more than 3 months but not
exceeding six months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 pesos but not
exceeding P40,000.00 pesos.
Record in the Docket and Clearance Division, OCA shows that respondent
judge had been previously penalized in the following cases:

...

...

Respondents court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial
region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent
requiring FAPE, which is holding office in Makati City, and its officials who
have their residences in Metro Manila, to issue a check in the amount of
P4,000,000.00 payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the
territorial jurisdiction of respondents court. Thus, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the respondent is void considering that his

authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and operative only within his
respective provinces or districts.[18]
Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati
and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent can only enforce
his orders within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.[19]
Likewise, respondent has also shown abuse of his authority in issuing his
Order dated April 22, 2002 in Corporate Case No. 010 requiring FAPE, a
non-party to the case, to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued in Special Civil Action No. 813-02. Notably, respondent in
his Order dated November 21, 2001 inhibited himself from hearing the
corporate case and forwarded the entire records to the OCA for further
assignment to other designated corporate courts of the RTC in Lanao and
Cagayan de Oro City. Despite this pending matter, respondent acted on a
motion to set aside his Order of inhibition citing the fact that the records of
the case which he forwarded to the OCA were returned to his court for
further proceedings. He then concluded that there exists no legal
impediment to the enforcement of the previous orders of this Court
particularly a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in Special Civil
Action No. 813-02 dated March 4, 2002 directing the respondent FAPE to
release to the petitioner the sum of P4,000,000.00 representing the
petitioners entitlement for the School Year 2001-2002. Although the
respondent in Corporate Case No. 010 is the petitioner in Special Civil
Action No. 813-02, (where the subject preliminary mandatory injunction was
issued and now the basis of this administrative complaint) FAPE, however,
was not a party in the Corporate Case.
Moreover, respondent has no authority to issue the Order in Corporate
Case No. 010 since the matter of his inhibition was still pending with the
OCA. In fact, because of respondents Order of inhibition with further
assignment to other corporate courts of RTC, Lanao and Cagayan de Oro
City, the plaintiff in Corporate Case No. 010 filed with OCA a motion to
retain the corporate case with the RTC of Marawi City, which we granted in
our Resolution dated June 10, 2002. In the same resolution, we authorized
Judge Amer R. Ibrahim,[20] Pairing Judge, RTC of Marawi City, Lanao del
Sur, Branch 9, to try and decide Corporate Case No. 010; and reminded
respondent of Supreme Court Circular No. 10.
Circular No. 10[21] provides that with respect to single sala courts, only the
order of inhibition shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action; the records of the case shall be kept in the docket of the court
concerned while awaiting the instruction and/or action of the Supreme Court
thereon. This aims to avoid needless moving of the records in order to
prevent the possibility of the records being lost in transit. Thus, the return of
the records of Corporate Case No. 010 to respondents court is not an
authority for respondent to proceed with the case.
It has been held that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
erroneous acts of a judge in his juridical capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, for no magistrate is infallible. The lack of malicious intent
however, cannot completely free the respondent from liability specially so
when the law is so elementary, thus not to know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[22] We reiterate what we said in a case[23] which also
involved the herein respondent, thus:

A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes
the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of
laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.
In his Comment, respondent contends that Special Civil Action No. 813-02
had already been dismissed per his Resolution dated June 21, 2002, thus
the instant administrative complaint has become moot and academic. In
dismissing the case, respondent explained that in the course of the
inventory of all his pending cases, he found an unresolved omnibus motion
to set aside the orders dated March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case
filed by FAPEs counsel and since the allegations were found to be welltaken, he granted the motion by setting aside his earlier orders and
dismissed the case.
We are not persuaded. We find the belated action on complainants
omnibus motion as a mere afterthought because the same was filed as
early as March 12, 2002. Respondent could have easily reconsidered his
previous Orders dated March 4 and 5, 2002. In fact, the Order dated April
22, 2002 in Corporate Case No. 010, which we found to have been issued
when respondent had no authority to do so because of his Order of
inhibition, had even reiterated his previous order for FAPE to release the
P4,000,000.00 to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum. Moreover, the issuance of
respondents Order dated May 6, 2002, directing the sheriff of Makati City to
take custody of the funds/check in the name of PACASUM COLLEGE, INC.,
in the amount of 4 million pesos for release to SARIPADA ALI PACASUM,
President/Chairman of the said school through garnishment proceedings,
was already tantamount to a denial of the omnibus motion. Thus, the fact
that the omnibus motion was subsequently granted by respondent and
Special Civil Action No. 813-02 was dismissed, would not absolve
respondent from administrative liability.
Finally, this is respondents third offense. He had previously been fined and
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with most severely. We find the penalty recommended by OCA to
be reasonable for respondents offense.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and abuse of authority and is hereby suspended for a period of six
(6) months without pay, effective immediately, with a warning that the
commission of a similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the
service.

SO ORDERED.

GARCIA, J.:
In the petition of January 31, 2006 filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Atty. Elly V. Pamatong, representing the International
Militia of People against Corruption and Terrorism, seeks the disbarment of
retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.

Upon receipt of the petition, docketed at the IBP as CBD Case No.
06-1646, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director
Rogelio A. Vinluan, issued on February 2, 2006 an Order directing the
respondent to submit an answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
Order. The Order was apparently not sent to the correct address of the
respondent, for the CBD subsequently directed the petitioner to furnish the
Commission with the respondents appropriate address.
On August 2, 2006, Director Vinluan forwarded to the Court the
records of CBD Case No. 06-1646.
Records show that respondent Davide came to know of the existence
of the petition to disbar only after being served a copy of the Courts
Resolution dated July 18, 2006, noting (a) the May 29, 2006 1st
Indorsement of then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban referring to the
Court a copy of the Order of February 2, 2006, supra, of the IBP Director
on Bar Discipline, and b) the said Order.
Shortly after obtaining a copy of the petition in question, respondent
filed on November 6, 2006, a MOTION TO DISMISS with a prayer that, in
relation to his Order of February 2, 2006 adverted to, Director Vinluan be
ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for
usurpation of power.
A perusal of the petition readily shows that the causes of action
enumerated therein, namely:
1.
Overthrow of a duly elected president;
2.
Abandonment of impeachment proceedings against President
Estrada;
3.
Usurpation of the revenue-raising power of Congress;
4.
Failure to cooperate in giving due course to impeachment
proceedings against him;
5.
Negligence in handling the election-related case of the
petitioner; and
6.
Persecution of the petitioner,
are not grounds for disbarment. They are, as the respondent correctly
observed, all related to incidents or proceedings while he was Chief Justice
and are related to or connected with the exercise of his authority or the
performance of his official duties. It cannot be over-emphasized that the
bona fides of such discharge of duty and authority are presumed.
Not lost to the Court is the fact that the petition is summary in form
and consists, for the most part, of self-serving and gratuitous conclusions
and offensive innuendoes, when the Rules of Court requires that a
complaint for disbarment shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents
as may substantiate such facts.[1] The Court also notes that the petitioner
filed this case out of ignorance of the authority of the Court and how it
operates, as typified by his condemnation of the respondent and a group of
justices for imposing what he perceives to be exorbitant filing fees when,
according to him, the revenue raising power of the government is
exclusively vested upon the legislative branch.

In both form and substance, the instant petition deserves to be

dismissed outright.
On the matter of citing CBD Director Rogelio A. Vinluan for contempt,
we note that the petition, as pointed out by the respondent, was filed with
the Court, albeit through the IBP. In effect, the petition was directly invoking
the primary jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, the CBD should have
immediately referred the petition to the Court for such action it may deem
appropriate to take, instead of assuming initial jurisdiction thereon by
ordering the respondent to submit an answer.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court loathes to initiate contempt
proceedings against Director Vinluan on account alone of his having issued
the Order of February 2, 2006. As it were, there is no indication that he
harbored ill-will toward the respondent or was moved by a malicious desire
to undermine the authority and jurisdiction of the Court. Far from it. For
Director Vinluan, doubtless after realizing his mistake or being apprised of
extant rules relating to disbarment proceedings, issued, on June 6, 2006, an
Order recalling his earlier Order of February 2, 2006 and required Atty.
Pamatong to file his petition to disbar directly with the Court pursuant to its
existing rules and guidelines relating to retired justices and judges. Indeed,
as an immediate off-shoot of the matter at hand, the Court, by Resolution
dated September 5, 2006, approved in principle the amendment of SC
Circular No. 3-89 such that the IBP is henceforth required to forward to the
Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment and discipline
filed with the IBP against all justices and judges, sitting or retired, for acts
and/or omissions committed during their tenure in the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:
1.
The instant petition for disbarment against retired Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit; and
2.
The motion to cite IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Director
Rogelio A. Vinluan for contempt is DENIED. He or his successor, as the
case may be, is admonished, however, to be more circumspect in disposing
of similar petition or complaint to disbar in the future.

SO ORDERED.