Criminal Procedure CASES - Digest

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
1 of 70
Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.........................3
INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN...........................................3
Marilyn Geduspan v. People............................................3
Rule 110, Sec. 1..............................................4

SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM,...................4
Rule 110, Sec. 4..............................................4

Leviste v Alameda...........................................................4
RULE 110, Section 5........................................5
Sps. Chua v. Ang...........................................................16
Rule 112, Sec. 3............................................16

People v. Emiliano Anonas.............................................16
Ladlad vs. Velasco.........................................................17
Rule 112, Sec. 4............................................18

DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ vs. WILFREDO R. CRUZ...............18
Adasa v Abalos..............................................................19
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo.................................20
JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO............................5
Jose Gonzales vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking

Corporation...................................................................20
Rule 110, Sec. 6..............................................5
Summerville v. Eugenio.................................................20
Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines.....................5
Rule 112, Sec. 5............................................21
Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9........................................6
JUDGE ESPAOL vs. JUDGE TOLEDO-MUPAS..................21
Michael Malto vs. People.................................................6
Rule 112, Sec. 6............................................22
Rule 110, Sec. 11............................................6
Manolo Adriano v. Judge Bercades;...............................22
People v. Zaldy Ibanez....................................................6
Rule 113, Sec. 3............................................22
Rule 110, Sec. 13............................................6
People vs. Nunez...........................................................22
Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines....................6
Rule 113, Sec. 5............................................23
Rule 110, Sec. 14............................................8
Pp vs. Carlos Dela Cruz.................................................23
Dino v. Olivarez...............................................................8
Rule 126, Sec. 2............................................23
Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan..............................8
Sps. Marimla vs. People and Judge Viola.......................23
Rule 110, Sec. 15............................................9
Rule 126, Sec. 4............................................23
Hector Trenas v. People...................................................9
Sony Music Entertainment vs. Hon. Espanol..................24
Rule 111, Sec. 1..............................................9
Andy Quelnan vs. PP.....................................................24
Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals. 9
COCA-COLA vs. GOMEZ.................................................24
Rule 111, Sec. 4............................................10
Rule 126, Sec. 13..........................................25
Asilo vs. People of the Philippines.................................10
People vs. Mariacos.......................................................25
Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7..................................10
Rule 126, Sec. 14..........................................25
Magestrado vs. People and Librojo................................10
MANLY SPORTWEAR vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES.....25
SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ...........................................11
Rule 114, Sec. 1............................................27
Dreamworks v. Janiola...................................................11
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia................................27
De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa..........................................12
Rule 114, Sec. 3............................................28
Rule 112, Sec. 1............................................13
P/Supt Orbe v. Digandgang...........................................28
De Chavez vs. OMB.......................................................13
Ambil vs. SB..................................................................28
Ricaforte vs. Jurado.......................................................13
Rule 114, Sec. 4 & 5......................................28
Rule 112, Sec. 2............................................14
Eduardo San Miguel v. Judge Maceda............................29
Turingan vs. Garfin........................................................14
Rufina Chua v. CA and Chiok.........................................29
Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar........................................14
People v. SB and Jinggoy Estrada..................................30
Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan..15
OCA v. Judge Lorenzo....................................................31
SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA................15
People v. Plaza..............................................................32
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
2 of 70

Leviste v. CA.................................................................33
Tan v. People.................................................................63
Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara........................................34
Rule 117, Sec. 8............................................64
Rule 114, Sec. 7............................................34
People v. Panfilo Lacson................................................64
Laarni Valerio v. CA.......................................................34
Rule 117, Sec. 9............................................65
Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante...........................................35
People v. Lamberto Rafon.............................................65
Rule 114, Sec. 15..........................................36

Rasmia Tabao v. Judge Barataman................................36
Rule 114, Sec. 16..........................................36

Judge Simbulan v. Judge Bartolome...............................36
Rule 114, Sec. 17..........................................37

Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint..................................37
Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao...........................................38
Rule 114, Sec. 17 and 19...............................39

Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines.........................................39
Rule 114, Sec. 8, 15, 18.................................39

Torrevillas v. Judge Navidad..........................................39
Rule 114, Sec. 21..........................................40

Mendoza v. Alarma........................................................40
WILFREDO TALAG v. JUDGE REYES................................41
Rule 114, Sec. 22 and 24...............................42

Bongcac v. SB...............................................................42
People v. Cawaling........................................................42
Rule 114, Sec. 26..........................................43

Borlongan v. Pena.........................................................43
Rule 116, Sec. 1[g]........................................55

People v. Alfredo Pangilinan..........................................55
Olbes v. Judge Buemio..................................................56
Rule 116, Sec. 3............................................56

People v. Rogelio Gumimba...........................................56
Rule 116, Sec. 9............................................57

Hubert Webb v. Judge de Leon......................................57
Rule 116, Sec. 11..........................................58

Spouses Trinidad v. Ang................................................58
Rule 117, Sec. 3............................................58

MELBAROSE SASOT v. PEOPLE......................................58
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo.................................59
Rule 117, Sec. 4, 5........................................60

Rafael Gonzalez v. Judge Salvador................................60
Rule 117, Sec. 7............................................63

People v. Nazareno........................................................63
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
3 of 70
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
City Councilor Ricardo Inding was charged
before the SB for violations of Sec. 3 (e) of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, he faked
buy-bust operations against alleged drug
pushers and users to enable him to collect
from the coffers of the local government as
reimbursement for the actual expenses
incurred, thereby causing undue injury to the
government.
Inding filed a motion for the dismissal of the

case for lack of jurisdiction. He contended that
the SB has jurisdiction to try cases only to
those officers who have a Salary Grade 27 or
higher; and not to him who as a member of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod is having only a
SG 25. Hence, the crime must be tried in the
RTC.
Issue: WON the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner

Inding?
Held:
- Positive. RA 7975 as amended by RA 8249;
expanded the jurisdiction of the SB. Sec. 4 (a);
Par. 1 (b) of the said act specifically
includes ; city mayors,
vice-mayors,
members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
department heads, fall within the jurisdiction
of the SB; without classification and regardless
of their salary grades.
-
In addition, when the legislature approved the

acts mentioned, it was fully aware that not all
positions specifically mentioned in Section 4
were classified as SG 27; and yet were
specifically included therein.
Therefore, petitioner fell under the jurisdiction
of the SB by express provision of a law.
Marilyn Geduspan v. People

G.R. No. 158187
February 11, 2005
Facts: On July 11, 2002, an information, for violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed
against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr.
Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance

Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi
Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. Both
accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29,
2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over them considering that the
principal accused Geduspan was a Regional
Director/Manager of Philhealth, Region VI, a position
classified under salary grade 26.
Geduspan cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA
8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758); specifically including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27" and higher under
the
Compensation
and
Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
a regional director/manager of government-owned or
controlled corporations organized and incorporated
under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? YES.
Held: Petitioner held the position of Department
Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission
of the offense and that position was among those
enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
4 of 70
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book

II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether
in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) xxx xxx xxx
(f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned and
controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations."
(Underscoring supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is
merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first
part of the abovequoted provision covers only
officials of the executive branch with the salary grade
27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically
includes" other executive officials whose positions
may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction
over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private
individual charged together with her. The position of
manager in a government-owned or controlled
corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the
jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that
petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 110, Sec. 1

SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM,
Facts:
Sanrio filed a complaint against Edgar Lim for
violation of the Intellectual Property Code.
Lim asserted that he did not violate the
provisions of the IPC since he was only a
retailer and that he obtained his merchandise
from authorized manufacturers of Sanrio
products.
After the case was elevated to the CA, the

appellate court dismissed it on the ground of
prescription since no complaint was filed in
court within 2 years after the commission of
the alleged violation.
Sanrio now contends that the pendency of a
preliminary investigation suspends the running
of the prescriptive period.
Issue:
W/N
the
pendency
of
a
preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.
Held:
Yes.
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the
prescriptive period for violation of special laws
starts on the day such an offense was
committed and is interrupted by the institution
of proceedings against the accused.
In the case at bar, Sanrio filed his complaint
with the Task Force on Anti-Intellectual
Property Piracy (TAPP) on April 4, 2002 or 1
year, 10 mos., and 4 days after the NBI
searched Lims premises and seized the Sanrio
merchandise
therefrom.
Although
no
information was immediately filed in court,
Lims alleged violation had not yet prescribed.
Rule 110, Sec. 4
Leviste v Alameda
This case involves Former Governor of Batangas
Antonio Leviste who shot dead his employee in 2007.
The pertinent facts to our subject are as follows:
Leviste was, by Information, charged with homicide
for the death of De las Alas. This was filed in the court
presided by Judge Alameda.
The heirs of de las Alas filed a motion for
reinvestigation. This was granted and the Information
was amended. The felony of homicide was replaced
with murder.
Leviste contended that the heirs did not have the
right to cause the reinvestigation when the criminal
information had already been filed with the lower
court.
Under
the
rules,
ONCE A
COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the ACCUSED is
given another opportunity to ask for a preliminary
investigation. In the case at bar, the heirs of de las
Alas or the private complainant is the party which
asked for reinvestigation and was subsequently
granted.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
5 of 70
The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are

silent, however, on whether de las Alas or A private
complainant could invoke a similar right to ask for a
reinvestigation.
Issue: Whether or not the information was validly
amended
Ruling: YES. The heirs of de las Alas can move for
reinvestigation provided that it shall be done with the
conformity of the public prosecutor.
(In case the conformity of the public prosecutor will

be asked.)
***There shall be another preliminary investigation. In
the case at bar, what was conducted was a
reinvestigation. The court ruled that There is no
substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same
objective of determining whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on
guard to defend himself from the charge of murder.
RULE 110, Section 5
JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO
Facts: Petitioner Go and respondent Looyuko were
business associates. Looyuko is the registered owner
of a sole proprietorship of the businesses which are
collectively known as the Noahs Ark Group of
Companies. Go was the business manager or chief
operating officer of the group of companies.
Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a
falling out that spawned numerous civil lawsuits.
Among these actions are Civil Case No. 67921 and
Criminal Case No. 98-1643 from which arose several
incidents which eventually became subject of these
consolidated petitions.
On May 21, 1998, petitioner filed People of the
Philippines v. Alberto T. Looyuko, an Affidavit
Complaint18 before the Makati City RTC, Branch 56,
charging Looyuko with Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-1643. Go
alleged that respondent misappropriated and
converted in his name petitioners 41,376 China
Banking Corporation (CBC) shares of stock. Petitioner
averred that he entrusted the stock certificates to

respondent for the latter to sell.
Petitioner
Go filed another petition for certiorari
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62296. It
sought to reverse the orders of the trial court
declaring petitioner to have waived his right to
formally offer his documentary evidence and allowing
respondent to file a demurrer to evidence.
The CA explained that the petition was initiated solely
by petitioner and was dismissible for it did not
implead nor have the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General. And, on the merits, the appellate
court ruled that the voluntary inhibition prayed by
petitioner had no legal and factual basis. The
appellate court found that three (3) alleged grounds
of partiality raised by petitioner were not badges of
partiality.
Issue: W/ N there is violation of Sec. 5, Rule 110 on
the part of petitioner Go.
Held: Petitioner Go filed the two petitions before the
CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58639 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 62296 involving incidents arising from the
proceedings in Crim. Case No. 98-1643. It can be
observed from the two petitions that they do not
reflect the conformity of the trial prosecutor assigned
to said criminal case. This is in breach of Sec. 5, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court that requires that all
criminal actions shall be prosecuted "under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor." Although
in rare occasions, the offended party as a "person
aggrieved" was allowed to file a petition under Rule
65 before the CA without the intervention of the
Solicitor General,55 the instant petitions before the CA,
as a general rule, should be filed by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the State and not solely by the
offended party.56
For non-compliance with the rules, the twin petitions
could have been rejected outright. However, in view
of the death of respondent Looyuko, these procedural
matters are now mooted and rendered insignificant.
Rule 110, Sec. 6

Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
Eugene Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent
of the NBI in Caraga Regional Office. He was issued
with a firearm and a mission order to gather and
report to the NBU such information as may be
relevant to the investigations undertaken by it.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
6 of 70
Firaza also served as a manager for RF

Communications in connection on which he dealt with
Christopher Rivas (Provincial Auditor of Surigao del
Sur), for the establishment of Public Calling Office in
the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
On August 11, 2000, while in Firaza and Rivas had
their meeting at the latters restaurant, a heated
argument commenced between them which opted
Rivas to point his gun at Rivas. Firazo was accosted
by P/Insp. Mullanida and PO2 Ronquillo by which they
discovered that Firazas permit to carry firearm
outside residence had expired more a month earlier
or on July 5, 2000.
A criminal complaint was filed against Firaza for
Unauthorized Carrying of License Firearm Outside
Residence. He was then convicted that offense.
Firaza now argued that the complaint charged against
him should be Illegal Possession of Firearms and not
Carrying Firearms Outside of Residence as the
phrase in the complaint reads with expired license or
permit to carry outside residence being merely
descriptive of the alleged unlicensed nature of the
firearm.
Issue:
WON the complaint was sufficient.
Held:
Yes. The allegations in a complaint on information
determine what the offense is charge. The allege acts
or omissions complained of constituting the offense
need not be in the terms of the statute determining
the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce its judgment.
Firaza cannot seriously claim that his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated. For the
transcript of Stenographic notes of the proceedings
before the trial court shows that he, through his
counsel, was duly informed of the nature of the cause
against him.
The mission order issued to Firaza authorized him to
carry firearms in connection with confidential cases
assigned to him. Admittedly, Firaza was at Rivas
restaurant in connection with a private business
transaction. Additionally, the mission order did not
authorize him to carry his duly issued firearm outside
of his residence.
Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9
Michael Malto vs. People
FACTS:
Information was filed against Michael for violation of

RA 7610, Section 5(a), par. 3, Article III (Those who
engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child
prostitution). However, it did not allege anything
pertaining to or connected with prostitution. What it
charged was that he had carnal knowledge or
committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
with AAA, which is Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
Despite such, the RTC in its dispositive portion
convicted Michael for violation of Section 5(a) of RA
7610 which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Is the information fatally defective?
HELD:
The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined
by Facts Alleged in the Information, Not By the
Designation
The designation in the information of the specific
statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute, or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. What controls is not
the title of the information or the designation of the
offense but the actual facts recited in the
information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of
the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature
of the offense, that determines the crime being
charged in the information.
The facts stated in the amended information against
Michael correctly made out a charge for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial
and appellate courts followed the wrong designation
of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the
offense on the basis of the facts recited in the
information and duly proven during trial.
Rule 110, Sec. 11
People v. Zaldy Ibanez
Facts:
Zaldy Ibanes w as charged with three counts of
rape of his own daughter. Lower courts
convicted him of the Rape.
Zaldy filed an appeal raising as issue that the
lower courts erred in not considering the
informations as insufficient to support a
judgment of conviction for failure of the
prosecution to state the precise dates of the
commission of the alleged rapes, it being an
essential element of the crime.
He avers that the formations are not explicit
and certain as to the dates of the rapes. He
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
7 of 70
argues that such uncertainties run afoul to his

Constitutional Right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Issue: Whether the dates of the alleged offense are
essential ingredient of the crime of rape and thus
must be indispensable in the information filed by the
prosecution.
Held: NO.
An information is as valid as long as it

distinctly states the elements of the
offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. In the prosecution
of rape, the material fact to be
considered is the occurrence of rape
not the time of its commission.
The gravamen of the offense is the
carnal knowlwdge of a woman. The
precise time of the crime has no
essential bearing on its commission.
Therefore it is not essential to be
alleged in the information.
Rule 110, Sec. 13
Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:
A letter was transmitted to the Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuno by the Office of Special Investigation
of the BSP. The letter was attached with five affidavits
that would serve as the bases for filing criminal
charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents, in relation to PD No. 1689, and for
violation of Section 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD
1795 against Hilario Soriano. It alleged that spouses
Enrico and Amalia Castro appeared to have an
outstanding loan of 8Million Pesos with the Rural Bank
of San Miguel, but they had never applied for nor
received such loan and that it was Soriano, the
president of RBSM who ordered, facilitated, and
received such loan without the authorization of RBSM
Board of Directors. The letter of the OSI, which was
not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that
a preliminary investigation be conducted and the
corresponding criminal charges be filed against
Soriano.
Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State
Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the
preliminary investigation. He issued a subpoena with
the witnesses affidavits and supporting documents
attached, and required petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit. In due course, the investigating officer

issued a Resolution finding probable cause and
correspondingly filed two separate informations
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
Soriano moved to quash the information. One of the
grounds for such motion was that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. he argued that
the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ
constituted the complaint and hence was defective
for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements
of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such
as the statement of address of petitioner and oath
and subscription. Moreover, Soriano argued that the
officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "lettercomplaint," were not authorized by the BSP Governor,
much less by the Monetary Board, to file the
complaint. According to Soriano, this alleged fatal
oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the
New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).
The RTC denied Sorianos Motion to Quash for lack of
Merit. He also filed a petition for Certiorari before the
CA, however, this was denied.
Issue:
WON the complaint complied with the mandatory
requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and
(d) of RA NO. 7653.
Held:
On March 5, 2007, the Court noted petitioner's
Manifestation and Motion for Partial Withdrawal of the
Petition36 dated February 7, 2007. In the said motion,
petitioner informed the Court of the promulgation of a
Decision entitled Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, which
also involved petitioner and similar BSP letters to the
DOJ. According to petitioner, the said Decision
allegedly ruled squarely on the nature of the BSP
letters and the validity of the sworn affidavits
attached thereto.
We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close
scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the
DOJ, that these were not intended to be the
complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did
not contain averments of personal knowledge of the
events and transactions constitutive of any offense.
The letters merely transmitted for preliminary
investigation the affidavits of people who had
personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled
that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting
them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since
these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
8 of 70
witnesses who executed them before a notary public,

then there was substantial compliance with Section
3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
We further held that since the offenses for which
Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority
holds that it can be initiated by "any competent
person" with personal knowledge of the acts
committed by the offender.
Furthermore the case of Santos-concio vs. DOJ it held
that: The Court is not unaware of the practice of
incorporating all allegations in one document
denominated as "complaint-affidavit." It does not
pronounce strict adherence to only one approach,
however, for there are cases where the extent of
ones personal knowledge may not cover the entire
gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The
private offended party or relative of the deceased
may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which
case the peace officer or law enforcer has to rely
chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in
fact preclude the attachment of a referral or
transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus,
in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held:
A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP
and
PDIC
to
the
DOJ
shows
that
these
were not intended to be the complaint envisioned
under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the
tenor of the letters that the officers merely intended
to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to
the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there
any averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers
of personal knowledge of the events and transactions
constitutive of the criminal violations alleged to have
been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly
stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the
PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal
knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These
affidavits were subscribed under oath by the
witnesses who executed them before a notary public.
Since the affidavits, not the letters transmitting
them, were intended to initiate the preliminary
investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court was substantially complied with.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito,
the Court of Appeals correctly held that a complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal
need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has
been that, unless the offense subject thereof is
one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
same may be filed, for preliminary investigation
purposes, by any competent person. The crime of
estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by "any
competent person." The witnesses who executed the
affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the
acts committed by the petitioner fall within the
purview of "any competent person" who may institute
the complaint for a public crime. x x x (Emphasis and

italics supplied)
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed
on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person,
without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR
Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as
the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a
needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v.
Judge Monserate does not appear to dent this
proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce
the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and
even raw information may justify the initiation of an
investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can
be held only after sufficient evidence has been
gathered and evaluated which may warrant the
eventual prosecution of the case in court.
Following the foregoing rulings in Soriano v. Hon.
Casanova and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,
we hold that the BSP letter, taken together with the
affidavits attached thereto, comply with the
requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and
(d) of RA 7653.
Rule 110, Sec. 14
Dino v. Olivarez
Facts: Bienvenido Dino and Renato Comparado
charged Pablito Olivarez of vote buying.
Two
informations were filed against Olivarez for violation
of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Art. 22 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Before arraignment, Olivarez moved to quash the two
criminal informations on the ground that more than
one offense was charged therein. The assistant
prosecutor opposed such motion and likewise moved
for the amendment of the information, this time only
charging Olivarez with violation of paragraph a, in
relation to paragraph b of Section 261, Article 22 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Olivarez opposed the motion for the amendment of
the information alleging that there was no resolution
to explain the changes therein, particularly the
deletion of paragraph k. He likewise posits that the
city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend
the informations since COMELEC had already directed
it to transmit all the records of the case.
When Olivarez failed to show up for his arraignment
the judge denied his petition to quash the
informations and likewise admitted the amended
complaint.
Subsequently, the COMELEC, upon Olivarez motion,
revoked the deputation of the prosecutor to
investigate and prosecute election offense cases.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases
9 of 70
Issue/s: WON the City the Amended Informations

should be admitted.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds that the
prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did
not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC.
The resolution which effectively revoked the
deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor was
issued on April 4, 2005, after the Amended
informations were filed on October 28, 2004.
Furthermore, the letter of the director of the Law
Department of COMELEC did not revoke the
continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor. It
merely directed the latter to forward the records of
the case to COMELEC. The filing of the amended
informations was not made in defiance to the order of
the Director, rather, it was an act necessitated by the
developments of the case.
Moreover, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules Criminal
Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint
or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x.
(Emphasis provided.)
Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that
would avert the dismissal of the informations on the
ground that more than one offense was charged, the
public prosecutor filed the Amended Informations.
The instructions of the COMELEC were clearly
intended to allow sufficient time to reconsider the
merit of the joint resolution, not to have the public
prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and
negligently allow its dismissal by not filing the
Amended Informations, thus leaving the COMELEC in
a quandary should it later dismiss the appeal before
it. by filing the Amended Informations, the public
prosecutor had avoided such undesirable situation,
which would have forced the COMELEC to re-file the
case, waste government resources, and delay the
administration of justice.
Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
An Information was filed charging both of

Mayor Saludaga and SPO2 Geni of violating Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the
government. A Motion to Quash filed by Saludaga was
granted for failure of the prosecution to allege and
prove the amount of actual damages caused to the
government. A new Information was filed charging
Saludaga and Genio for violation of Sec. 3(e), by
giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the
prejudice of the government. Saludaga contends that
the change from undue injury to the government to

giving unwarranted benefit would constitute as a
substitution or a substantial amendment.
Issue:
Whether or not the changes made in the new
Information filed is a substitution or a substantial
amendment.
Ruling:
There is no substitution because only the
mode of the commission of the crime was changed.
The nature of the offense charged is still the same.
Causing undue injury and giving unwarranted benefit
are modes of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The SC
also ruled that there was no substantial amendment
when there was a shift from giving undue injury to
giving unwarranted benefit. The Information is
founded on the same transaction as the first
Information.
Rule 110, Sec. 15
Hector Trenas v. People
Facts:
A complaint for estafa was file agains Trenas
with the RTC of Makati City.
Trenas contends that the trial court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Trenas asserts that nowhere in the evidence
presented by the prosecution does it show that
the money that was given to and received by
him took place in Makati; the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage prepared by him was
signed and notarized in Iloilo City; the only
time Makati was mentioned was with respect
to the time when the check provided by him
was dishonored by Equitable PCI Bank in
Makati.; and that the prosecution failed to
allege that any of the acts material to the
crime of estafa occurred in Makati.
Issue:
W/N the RTC of Makati failed to acquire jurisdiction
over his case.
Held:
Yes.
It is a fundamental principle that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial
jurisdiction
of
the
court.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court in a
criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information. And once it is
so show, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 10 of 70
committed somewhere else, the court should

dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence and during trial which
even mentions that any of the elements of the
offense were committed in Makati. There being
no showing that the offense was committed
within Makati, the RTC of that city has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Rule 111, Sec. 1
Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of

Appeals
Facts:
While everyone was asleep, the household of Sarah
Marie Palma Burgos were attacked by a number of
assailants killing Sarah herself and her uncle Erasmo
Palma while her another uncle Victor Palma and friend
Beningno Oquendo survived the attack.
Based on the theory of the police, the cause for such
attack is attributed to the land transaction that gone
sour between Sarahs live-in partner, David So and
Johnny Co.
Four months after the incident, the police arrested
Cresnencio Aman and Romeo Martin and both
executed confession allegedly admitting their part in
the attack.
They also admitted the participation of Artemio
Bergonia, Danilo Sy, and Co who allegedly to be the
mastermind. However, these three remained at large.
The RTC acquitted Aman and Martin.
Ten years after, Co surrendered to the NBI. He was
then charged with two counts of murder and two
counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty.
Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing,
the RTC granted the bail on the ground that the
evidence presented against Co was not strong.
The heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration but the
RTC denied such, hence the heirs of Sarah filed a
special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction
before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed it for the reason that
it was filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor
General, which is in violation of the jurisprudence and
the Law (Sec. 35 Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the

Administrative Code)
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
Special Civil Action of certiorari, which questioned the
RTCs grant of bail to Co, for having been filed in the
name of the offended parties and without Office of
the Solicitor General.
Held:
Yes. The civil action, in which the offended party is the
plaintiff and the accused is the defendant, is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action or reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil
actions to avoid multiplicity of suits. Thus, when the
state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the
offended party benefits from such result and is able to
collect the damages awarded to him.
But, when the trial court acquits the accused or
dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the civil action is not automatically
extinguished since liability under such an action can
be determined based on mere preponderance of
evidence. The offended party may peel off from the
terminated criminal action and appeal from the
implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense,
is to determine the penal liability of the accused for
having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be
found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the
parties
to
the
action
are
the
People
of
the Philippines and the accused. The offended party
is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in
this wise, only the state, through its appellate
counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to
institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme
Court.
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is
but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him
from
eluding
punishment
in the
event
of
conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no
impact on the civil liability of the accused that
depends on conviction by final judgment. Here,
respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and
judgment, with award for civil liability when
warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 11 of 70
Rule 111, Sec. 4

Asilo vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
This case involves the acts of the late Mayor
Comendador who authorized the demolition of the
stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order.
The said demolition was supervised by Asilo and
Angeles. The acts of the three mentioned Asilo,
Mayor Comendador and Angeles prompted the
Spouses Bombasi to file a civil action for damages
before the RTC and a separate criminal complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of
Section 3e of R.A. 3019. Upon arraignment the three
accused all pleaded not guilty. (Note: After the
arraignment the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution ordering the consolidation of the civil with
the criminal case. ) However during the pendency of
the case, Mayor Comendador died. Notwithstanding
the Manifestation of Mayor Comendadors counsel
informing the court of the Mayors death, the
Sandiganbayan
rendered
a
decision
finding
Comendador and Asilo guilty for violating Section 3e
of R.A. 3019 and also held them civilly liable to
Spouses Bombasi (No liability si Angeles as he died
ahead of Mayor Comendador, the difference is when
nag file ng motion to drop ang counsel ni Angeles,
there was no objection on the part of the public
prosecutor). The counsel for the late Mayor filed a
Motion for reconsideration alleging that the death of
Mayor Comendador extinguished both his criminal
and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion as to the extinction of the criminal liability but
upheld Mayor Comendadors civil liability.
Issue: WON the death of Mayor Comendador during
the pendency of the case also extinguished his civil
liability. No.
Ruling: The death of Mayor Comendador did not
extinguish his civil liability because his civil liability is
not predicated upon the violation of R.A. 3019 but
upon his violation as provided under Art. 32(6) of the
Civil Code. The Mayor, by authorizing the demolition
of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial
order is tantamount to depriving the Spouses
Bombasi of their property without due process.
Hence, his civil liability stands
Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7
Magestrado vs. People and Librojo
FACTS Elena Librojo filed 2 cases against Magestrado:
1. Criminal action for perjury in the MeTC

2. Civil action for collection of sum of money in
the RTC
On the other hand, Magestrado filed a civil action
against Librojo for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery
of title and Damages in the RTC.
Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of
proceedings based on a prejudicial question. He
alleged that the civil cases pending before the RTC of
Quezon City must be resolved first before the criminal
case may proceed since the issues in the said civil
cases are similar or intimately related to the issues
raised in the criminal action.
ISSUE WON there exists a prejudicial question.
HELD No. there is no prejudicial question.
Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by
reason of prejudicial question. A
petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall
be filed in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution
rests.
Sec. 7.
Elements of
prejudicial
question.
The
elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (b) the
resolution
of
such
issue
determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The
determination
of
whether
the
proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and
issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so
related with the issues raised in the criminal case
such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases
would also determine the judgment in the criminal
case.
The civil cases are principally for the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 12 of 70
determination of whether a loan was obtained by and

whether Magestrado executed a real estate mortgage
involving a property. On the other hand, Criminal Case
involves the determination of whether petitioner
committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to
support his request for issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT.
The civil cases and the criminal case can
proceed independently of each other. Regardless of
the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish
the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal
case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the
land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will
have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner
knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit
of loss.
SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ
[G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008]
FACTS: Spouses Suarez had availed of Carolina Joses
offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2%
which the latter increased to 5% and Spouses Suarez
were forced to accept due to their financial distress.
They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day fixing
claiming that the same were contrary to morals and
done under vitiated consent. Thereafter, the Spouses
Jose herein filed cases of violation of BP22 against
Sps. Suarez where the latter filed motions to suspend
the criminal proceedings on the ground of a
prejudicial question. Herein Sps. Suarez claimed that
if the 5%interest rates are nullified and loans are
computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the
checks which are objects of BP22 cases are not only
fully paid but in fact over paid.
Accordingly, the trial court as well as the appellate
court concluded that if the checks subject of the
criminal cases were later on declared null and void,
then said checks could not be made the bases of
criminal prosecutions under B.P. Blg. 22. In other
words, the outcome of the determination of the
validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or
innocence of Purita in the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial questions exists
such that the outcome of the validity of the interest is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
respondents in the criminal case. NO
HELD: Prejudicial questions have two elements: a)
The civil actions involve an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. The validity or
invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of
the guilt of the respondents in the criminal case. The

cause or reason for issuance of a check is immaterial
in determining criminal culpability under BP22. The
law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check and
not the purpose it was issued for.
The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the
criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared
that the cause or reason for the issuance of a check is
inconsequential in determining criminal culpability
under B.P. Blg. 22. In several instances, we have held
that what the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issued or the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance; and that the mere act
of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the
other elements of the offense are properly proved.
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by
petitioners is eventually declared void for being
contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the
B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be
penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In
fact, the primordial question posed before the court
hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has
been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been
issued.
Dreamworks v. Janiola
Facts: On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its
President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President
for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a
Complaint Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S.
Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent,
joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint
against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August
20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private
respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61,
alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved
facts and issues similar or intimately related such that
in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. In other words, private respondent
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings
in
the
criminal
cases
in
an
undated
Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend
Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 13 of 70
grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in

this case as the rescission of the contract upon which
the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and
distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that "the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is
missing in this case, the criminal case having
preceded the civil case.
Issue: W/N there is a prejudicial question in this case.
SC:
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal
Action
Ruling: It must be emphasized that the gravamen of
the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant
to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares
that the construction agreement between the parties
is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect
the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal
case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent
indeed issued checks which were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is
subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required
for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the
resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed,
is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to
the case before us.
NB:
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question
is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a
final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action
with which said question is closely connected. The
civil action must be instituted prior to the institution
of the criminal action. In this case, the Information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State
with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists.
De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa
This is regarding Bella Torress estate. When

she died, a compromise agreement was
entered into by Rosemary Torres (Bellas
daughter)
and
Krizia
Torres-de
Zuzuarregui(Bellas
granddaughter
and
Rosemarys niece) regarding the letters of
administration of Bellas estate. In said
compromise agreement, they both alleged that
they are the only leaving heirs of Bella, and
that they have reached an amicable
settlement regarding Bellas estate. The same
was approved by the RTC.
However, subsequently after the RTC decision,
three others claimed to be living heirs of Bella
(Peter, Catherine, and Fannie). These three
filed a petition to annul the said compromise
agreement as they are also legal and living
heirs of Bella.
While the case in the CA is still pending, Fannie
filed a criminal complaint against Rosemary
and Krizia for perjury and falsification in the
MeTC. She alleges that these two committed
these crimes when they falsified a sworn
statement claiming to be the only living heirs
of Bella in the compromise agreement, when
in truth and fact, three others are also living
heirs.
Rosemary and Krizia motioned to suspend
proceedings in the MeTC. They invoke
prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether or not there is prejudicial question in

the case at bar.
Ruling: Yes, there is aprejudicial question that would
warrant the suspension of the criminal case against
Rosemary and Krizia.
Requisites of Prejudicial question:
1.) The facts and issues raised in the previously
instituted civil action are intimately related
with the issues in the criminal case;
2.) The resolution of the issues in the civil case
would necessarily determine the innocence or
guilt of the accused in the criminal case.
It is evident, in the case at bar, that the result of the
civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the
accused in the criminal case for perjury and
falsification. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case
that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are not biological
children of the late Bella and consequently not
entitled to a share in the estate, then there is no
more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against
Rosemary and Krizia, who could not have committed
perjury and falsification in her pleadings filed before
the RTC, for the truth of her statements regarding
Peter, Catherine, and Fannie having been judicially
settled
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 14 of 70
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the

government service.
Rule 112, Sec. 1
De Chavez vs. OMB
Facts: On 7 November 2001, private respondent Nora
L. Magnaye (Magnaye), Professor IV of the Batangas
State University (BSU), filed with the public
respondent an administrative complaint for Grave
Misconduct, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interests of the Service, Falsification of Official
Documents, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and
Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713
otherwise known as "CODE OF CONDUCT AND
ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES" against petitioners.
Subsequently, on 13 November 2001, based on the
above imputed acts plus an additional one,7 private
respondent also filed with the public respondent
another Complaint imputing criminal liability to the
BSU officials above-named for Violation of Section
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT," Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No.
6713, Falsification of Official Documents and Estafa.
After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing14 and
upon submission of both parties of their respective
position papers, the public respondent, through Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. CasihanDumlao with Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy
Ombudsman
for
Luzon
Victor
C.
Fernandez
concurring, issued its Joint Resolution dated 14
February 2005 in OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-011083-K recommending the indictment of petitioners
De Chavez, Lontok, Sr., and Mendoza for violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019. It, however,
proposed the dismissal of the complaints against
petitioners Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., and other officials of
BSU namely, Lualhati, Zaraspe, and Montalbo for lack
of probable cause.
Upon review by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, he
issued a Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005
"partially approving" with modifications the Joint
Resolution dated 14 February 2005. Among other
findings, he found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr.,
Lontok, Jr., and Mendoza liable for violation of Section
3(e) and (h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for violation
of Article 315(2)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. He also
found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr.,
and Ligaya guilty of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct, and, thus, imposed on them the penalty
of Dismissal from the Service with the accessory
penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and
Issue: WON the OMB committed Grave Abuse of

Discretion in "convincting" De Chavez et. al.
Held: NO.
Petitioners make mountain on the use of the words
"liable for violation x x x" employed by the
Ombudsman. A review of the specific powers of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution, the laws and
jurisprudential pronouncements is in order. Both the
1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6770) empower the public
respondent to investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official or employee, office or agency when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.22 By virtue of this power,23 it
may conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere
purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and
it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no objective except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the respondent
is guilty thereof.25 In the conduct of preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor does not decide whether
there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the
guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely determines
the existence of probable cause, and to file the
corresponding information if he finds it to be
so.FOOTNOTE: simply put, the OMB merely found
probable cause against De Chavez, et.al. finding them
to be LIABLE for committing the said offenses and be
subjected to the appropriate penalties. No Conviction
was EVER MADE by the OMB.
Ricaforte vs. Jurado
Facts: Leon Jurado filed a complaint before the
prosecutor's office charging Alicia Ricaforte of
violation of BP 22 and estafa. Ricaforte alleged that
Aguilar who had lost her Metrobank checkbook
borrowed her checks to pay off Aguilars obligations
with Leon Jurado under the condition that Aguilar will
replace these checks with her own once Metrobank
issued her a new checkbook. Ricaforte likewise claime
that when Aguilar issued the replacement checks, the
former asked Jurado to return her checks but Jurado
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 15 of 70
refused and that's when Ricaforte asked her bank to

issue a stop payment order and that's why the checks
where dishonored.
arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and

determination of probable cause by the Secretary of
Justice in a preliminary investigation.
The Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for

estafa and BP 22 for insufficiency of evidence.Jurado's
motion for reconsideration was denied and so he
appealed before the Secretary of Justice. The Justice
Secretary modified the decision of the prosecutor's
office and ordered the filing of an information for
violation of BP 22 against Ricaforte.
Herein case is still in the preliminary investigation

stage which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal
to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty. It is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof.
The motion for reconsideration was denied and the CA

upheld the decision of the Justice Secretary. It ruled
that trial on the merits must ensue since it is on said
occasion that petitioner is granted opportunity for a
full and exhaustive presentation of her evidence and
not during the preliminary investigation phase where
the investigating officer acts upon probable cause and
reasonable belief; that in the preliminary investigation
phase, it is not yet clear whether petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the offense
charged and sought to be punished, although
petitioner is presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt; that the crux of the matter
rests upon the reasons for the drawing of the
postdated checks by petitioner; i.e., whether they
were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for
value" as required under B.P. Blg. 22 which will only
be determined during trial.Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON trial on the merits must ensue ensue for
violation of BP 22.
Ruling: Yes. The gravamen of the offense punished
by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor
merely determines whether there is probable cause or
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial. Probable cause implies probability of
guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less
than evidence which would justify a conviction. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspect. It does not call
for the application of rules and standards of proof that
a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the
merits. The complainant need not present at this
stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties evidence. It is enough
that in the absence of a clear showing of
Rule 112, Sec. 2

Turingan vs. Garfin
G.R. No. 153284
Facts:
An Information was filed against Apolinar
charging him for violation of relating sections in R.A.
8282 (Social Security Act) for non-remittance of social
security
and
employees
compensation.
The
Information was signed by state prosecutor Tolentino
accompanied by a certification also signed by
Tolentino. Apolinar contends that the state prosecutor
Tolentino lacked authority to sign the Information.
Respondent Judge Garfin (Branch 19 RTC, Naga)
dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the state prosecutor had the authority
to file the Information without a written authority or
approval of the provincial state prosecutor.
Ruling:
Toletino lacked authority to file the Information
because there was neither a directive from the
Secretary of Justice designating him as special
prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of
the Information by the city prosecutor. An information
field by an officer without authority to do so is a
jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. Judge
Garfin correctly dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
Note:
The special State Prosecutor is only authorized
to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution
of SSS cases and not to sign the information.
Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar
Facts:
Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino are the Legal
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 16 of 70
Division Chief and Attorney II, respectively, of the

Bureau of Internal Revenue in Quezon City.
Sometime in 1998, respondents were arrested by
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
an entrapment operation conducted upon petitioners
complaint.
After inquest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217,
an information for direct bribery against respondents.
The case was remanded to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation.
The DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause to
indict respondents for direct bribery. Aggrieved,
respondents filed in the DOJ a petition for review of
the said Resolution. The DOJ, however, endorsed the
petition to the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman treated the petition for review as a
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid DOJ
Resolution. It denied the petition for review for lack of
merit.
Respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and mandamus. The appellate court
found no probable cause against respondent
Saldevar, but upheld the finding of probable cause
against respondent Macalino.
Issue: WON the CA can substitute the findings of the
Ombudsman with regard to finding probable cause.
Ruling: No. The determination of probable cause is an
executive function lodged with the prosecutorial arm
of the government (Ombudsman), not with the
judiciary.
In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor
exercises wide latitude of discretion in determining
whether a criminal case should be filed in court.
Courts must respect the exercise of such discretion
when the information filed against the person charged
is valid on its face, and no manifest error or grave
abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public
prosecutor. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the
Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. In the determination of probable
cause, the Ombudsmans discretion prevails over
judicial discretion.
Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan
Facts:
In 1993, Tilendo was appointed as President of
the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College
(CCSPC).
In December 1998, the Concerned Faculty
Members of the CCSPC filed before the
Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo
for violation of RA 3019.
The complaint accused Tilendo of diverting

and misusing funds allocated for the
construction of CCSPC Agriculture Building.
The
Deputy-Ombudsman
Mindanao
also
endorsed the anonymous complaint to the NBI,
Region XII for the conduct of a fact-finding
investigation.
On 26 April 2002, the Deputy-Ombudsman
Mindanao received the NBI report charging
Tilendo with violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the
RPC.
Tilendo now contends that the cases against
him dragged for more than 3 yrs. in
preliminary investigation phase without his
fault. The inordinate delay in the termination
of the preliminary investigation violates his
right to speedy disposition of cases.
Issue:
W/N there was delay in the preliminary investigation
phase.
Held:
No.
There was no unreasonable delay to speak of
because the preliminary investigation stage
officially began when the NBI filed before the
Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo.
Contrary to Tilendos view, the preliminary
investigation did not automatically commence
upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the
Ombudsman.
In Raro v. Sandiganbayan, by referring the
complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not
thereby delegate the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of the case to the
NBI. What was delegated was only the factfinding function, preparatory to the preliminary
investigation still to be conducted by the
Ombudsman.
Further, the NBI is not among those authorized

under Section 3, Rule II of AO 7 to conduct
preliminary investigations for complaints
cognizable by the Ombudsman, to wit:
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
3) Deputized Prosecutors;
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to
conduct preliminary investigations; or
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 17 of 70
5) Lawyers in the government service, so

designated by the Ombudsman.
SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA
Special Prosecutor under Section 11of RA 6770. The

latter is merely a component of the former. And may
only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman and also limited to cases
within the jurisdiction of the SB.
Sps. Chua v. Ang
FACTS:
On May 31, 2000, Castro was charged by the
Ombudsman before the RTC Guimaras with
Malversaton of Public Funds. She pleaded NOT GUILTY.
On August 31, 2001, Castro filed a motion to quash on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of
authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary
investigation
and
file
the
Information. She argued that the Information failed
to allege her salary grade, a material fact upon which
depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy vs. SB
(August 9, 1999), she was a public employee with
salary grade of 27, the case filed against her was
cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and
prosecuted only by the public prosecutor and not by
the OMB whose prosecutorial power was limited
to cases cognizable by the SB.
RTC denied motion to quash stating that the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend
on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty
imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.
Moreover, the Uy case which was cited was set
aside on March 20,2001 expressly recognizing
the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of
the OMB in cases cognizable by the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the authority
to file and prosecute the case
HELD: YES. The Ombudsman has powers to
prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction
of the SB but also those cognizable by the regular
courts. The power to investigate and prosecute
granted b law is PLEANRY and UNQUALIFIED. It
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does
not make a distinction. Section 15 (1) of RA 6770
gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the SB. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
the government, the investigation of such cases. This
grant does not necessarily imply the exclusion from
its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and
employees cognizable by other courts. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should
not be equated with the limited authority of the
Facts: Spouses Leonardo and Milagro Chua and FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI) executed a Contract to
Sell a condominium unit
FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted
condominium
The Chuas filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office
of the City Prosecutor accusing the officers and
directors of FEPI of violating P.D. 957 (The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree)
Assistant City Prosecutor Pastrana and Pasig City
Prosecutor Ang issued and approved a resolution
dismissing the complaint for being premature
*the resolution said that it is the HLURB that has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate
business and practices
APPEAL
The Chuas argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminal
complaints is lodged with the city prosecutor and that
the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. 957 is limited
to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the
investigation of criminal complaints
The officers and directors of FEPI counter that the
petition should be dismissed outright because the
petitioners failed to avail of other remedies provided
by law
Issue: Whether or not Pastrana and Ang abdicated
their authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
when they dismissed the criminal complaint for being
premature. *abdicate fail to fulfill or undertake J
Held: YES! They committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the criminal complaints.
Nothing in P.D. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction
to impose Section 39 criminal penalties
Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of
law (in this case, no provision applies), the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 18 of 70
determination of the criminal liability lies within the

realm of Criminal Procedure as embodied in Section 2
Rule 112
The Chuas have expressly chosen to pursue the
criminal prosecution but the prosecutor dismissed
their complaint. The dismissal for prematurity was
apparently on the view that an administrative finding
of violation must first be obtained before recourse can
be made to criminal prosecution. But where the law is
silent on this matter(like in this case), administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions subject
only to the rules on forum shopping.
*(SC) The prosecutors should have made a
determination of probable cause in the complaint
instead of simply dismissing it for prematurity. Their
failure to do so and the dismissal they ordered
effectively constituted an evasion of a positive duty
and a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.
Petition granted complaint returned to Office of the
City Prosecutor for determination of probable cause.
Rule 112, Sec. 3

People v. Emiliano Anonas
Facts: SPO4 Anonas was charged with illegal
possession of shabu and also illegal possession of
firearms. The accused moved for reinvestigation on
the grounds that he was arrested without a warrant
and no preliminary investigation was conducted. The
motion for reinvestigation was granted. However, the
prosecutor assigned to reinvestigate the complaint
was appointed as RTC judge and did not inform the
prosecutor who took his place about the pending
reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained
in detention.
4years after the motion for reinvestigation was
granted, SPO4 Anonas moved for the dismissal of the
informations against him contending that the delay in
the reinvestigation violated his right to due process.
The trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned
out that the prosecutor who took over the case, was
not aware of the pending reinvestigation. The trial
court then directed him to terminate
the
reinvestigation within thirty (30) days.The prosecutor
manifested before the trial court that the
reinvestigation had been terminated and that
evidence exist to sustain the allegations in the
Informations against respondent.
On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order

denying respondents motion to dismiss the
Informations. His motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. When the case was elevated before
the CA, the CA ruled in favor of SPO4 Anonas. The
appellate court found that accused's right to due
process and speedy trial have been violated because
of the delay in the reinvestigation. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: WON the delay in the reinvestigation for almost
5 years constituted a violation of the right to due
process of accused SPO4 Anonas.
Ruling: Yes. Philippine organic and statutory law
expressly guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "All persons shall have the right to
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This is
reinforced by Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which requires
that "the investigating officer shall resolve the case
within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the
investigation." To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of
1998) was enacted on February 4, 1998. To
implement its provisions, the Court issued SC Circular
No. 38-98 dated September 15, 1998 setting a time
limit for arraignment and pre-trial for thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation of an accused violates his constitutional
right to due process.
The preliminary investigation of the respondent for
the offenses charged took more than four years. He
was apprehended for the offenses charged on
November 19, 1996. Having been arrested without a
warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a
formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of
the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated January
28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was
terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even
the Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for
the City Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the
reinvestigation.
There can be no question that respondent was
prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined for
more than four oppressive years for failure of the
investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 19 of 70
preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court

of Appeals, respondents right to due process had
been violated.
Ladlad vs. Velasco
Facts: This is a consolidation of 2 petitions wherein
the accused are members of the House of
representatives representing various party-list groups.
They are all charged with rebellion. By virtue of a PD
1017, declaring a state of emergency, issued by then
President GMA, Crispin Beltran was arrested without a
warrant. Beltran was subject to 2 inquests for
initiating sedition based on a speech he gave during a
rally which commemorated the 20th anniversary of
the EDSA revolution. The 2nd inquest was based on
the letters of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo
Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue who were officers of the
CIDG. Based also on these letters, Vicente Ladlad et.al
and Liza Maza et. Al were sent subpoenas by the DOJ
requiring them to appear before said department and
to get coppies of the complaint and its attachments.
During the PI, the DOJ panel of prosecutors presented
a masked man, who later was known as Jaime
Fuentes, who claimed to be an eye witness against
Ladlad and Maza. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit
before prosecutor VCelasco who then gave copies of
the affidavit to members of the media present during
the proceedings. The prosecutors gave Ladlad and
Maza 10 days to file their counter-affidavits. However,
the prosecution gave to Ladlad and Maza a copy of
the documents supporting the CIDGs letters only
after 4 days since the PI started. Ladlad and Maza
moved for the inhibition of the prosecutors for lack of
impartiality and independence considering the
manner in which they conducted the PIthat said PI
was attended with irregularities.
Issue: Whether or not the PI of Ladlad and Maza was
conducted in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Ruling: No. The manner in which the PI was conducted
violated the rule mandated by Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Instead of following
this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had
mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused
can be protected from any material damage,"38
respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it.
Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section
3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint
(which, with its attachment, must be of such number
as there are respondents) be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or,
in their absence or unavailability, before a notary

public.
Respondent
prosecutors
treated
the
unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the
CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and accepted the
affidavits attached to the letters even though some of
them were notarized by a notary public without any
showing that a prosecutor or qualified government
official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of
Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the
prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must
determine if there are grounds to continue with the
investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the
case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the
respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters,
respondent
prosecutors
peremptorily
issued
subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at
the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of
the complaints and its attachments." During the
investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the
CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to
an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco.
Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes
affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to
members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to
submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only
four days later, on 17 March 2006, that petitioners
received the complete copy of the attachments to the
CIDG letters.1a\^/phi1.net
These
uncontroverted
facts
belie
respondent
prosecutors statement in the Order of 22 March 2006
that the preliminary investigation "was done in
accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal
Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the
subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants
antics during the investigation, and distributing
copies of a witness affidavit to members of the media
knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity
to examine the charges against them, respondent
prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but
also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire
proceeding was a sham.
Rule 112, Sec. 4
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ vs. WILFREDO R. CRUZ
G.R. No. 154128, February 8, 2007
Wilfredo Cruz, (R), is a nephew by affinity of Dr.
Amanda Cruz (P). On June 5, 1996, respondent filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City a
complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against
petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. 96-10640. Respondent
alleged that petitioner issued to him an undated
check in the sum of P100,000.00. On December 29,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 20 of 70
1995, he placed this date on the check and deposited

the same, but it was dishonored by the drawee bank
due to "account closed." On January 5, 1996, he sent
the notice of dishonor to petitioner. Without his
knowledge, petitioner, on January 16, 1996, deposited
P100,000.00 in his savings account.
In her Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss,
petitioner declared that in 1986, she issued to
respondent BPI Check No. 349866 as a guarantee for
the loan of spouses Arturo and Malou Ventura
obtained from him. Later, they informed her that they
had paid the loan. However, she forgot to ask for the
return of the check. In 1987, she closed her account
and opened a new one with the drawee bank. For ten
(10) years, she forgot having issued the check. She
claimed that respondent filed the complaint against
her because her husband, Atty. Francisco Galman
Cruz, instituted criminal and civil complaints against
Carlos Cruz. Jr., respondents brother, involving a
parcel of land.
On January 16, 1996, or only after eleven (11) days
from January 5, 1996 when she learned that her check
was dishonored, she deposited P100,000.00 in the
account of respondent at the Westmont Bank, Sta.
Mesa Branch.
On August 7, 1996, the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Quezon City recommended the dismissal of
respondents complaint and was then approved by
the City Prosecutor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but in its
Resolution dated June 28, 2002, the Court of Appeals
denied the same. Hence, this recourse.
Issue: WON the dismissal of the respondents
complaint in the office of the prosecutor is proper.
Yes.
First, there is no dispute that when respondent filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
his complaint against petitioner, a preliminary
investigation was conducted. Section 1, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
defines preliminary investigation as "an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial."
recommendation. They all found that when

respondent filed his complaint with the Office of the
Quezon City Prosecutor, he knew that petitioner had
paid the amount of the check. In fact, in his pleading,
he admitted such payment. Thus, the prosecutors
were one in concluding that petitioner did not commit
the offense charged.
The preliminary investigation seeks to free a
respondent from the inconvenience, expense,
ignominy, and stress of a formal trial after the
reasonable probability of his guilt or innocence has
been passed upon by a competent officer designated
by law for that purpose.
As mentioned, the
prosecutors and also the Secretary of Justice found no
probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner
of an information for violation of B.P. 22. There is no
indication that their finding of lack of probable cause
was reached without any basis in fact and in law.
Under Section 4 of the same Rule, the investigating

prosecutor is vested with the duty of (a) preparing a
resolution holding the respondent for trial and filing
the corresponding information, or (b) dismissing the
case should he find that no probable cause exists
against respondent.
The investigating Assistant City Prosecutor found no
probable cause to charge petitioner with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, she recommended the dismissal
of the case. The City Prosecutor, the Chief State
Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice sustained the
Abalos then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said

resolution of DOJ argued that DOJ should have
dismissed Adasas petition outright. Stated in Section
7 of DOJ Circular 70 is that when an accused has
already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files
a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of
Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the
petition or even give due course thereto, but instead
deny it outright. In Section 12, arraignment is one of
the grounds for dismissing the petition outright.
Adasa v Abalos
Facts:
Abalos filed two complaints-affidavits against Adasa
for Estafa. She filed this on January 18, 2001 before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan CIty
On April 25, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iligan City issued a resolution finding probable cause
against Adasa and ordered the filing of two separate
informations Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial
Document by a Private Individual
Two separate criminal cases were filed, 8781 and
8782. This petition pertains only to 8782.
Upon Adasas motion, a reinvestigation was
conducted.
- The Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed
the finding of probable cause against Adala
Adasa was arraigned on October 1, 2001 she
entered an unconditional plea of not guilty
Adasa then filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ
on October 15, 2001
- DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution
of the Office of the City Prosecutor and
directed the said office to withdraw the
information for Estafa against Adasa
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 21 of 70
DOJ denied this Motion for Reconsideration,

said that under Section 12, in relation to
Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the
Secretary of Justice is not precluded from
entertaining any appeal taken to him even
where the accused has already been
arraigned in court. This is due to the
permissive language may utilized in
section 12 whereby the Secretary has the
discretion to entertain an appealed
resolution notwithstanding the fact that the
accused has been arraigned
The trial court issued an order granting Adasas

Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissed
Criminal Complaint 8782.
Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court
of Appeals
- CA granted Abalos petition and reversed
the resolutions of the DOJ
- CA relied heavily on Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 70 if an information has
been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not
be given due course if the accused had
already been arraigned. Should be read in
relation to Section 12.
- CA ruled that since Abalos had been
already arraigned before filing her petition
for review, DOJ should have dismissed such
petition
- CA added when petitioner pleaded to the
charge, she was deemed to have waived
her right to reinvestigation and right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it
Issue: Whether or not the DOJ can give due course to
an Appeal or Petition for Review despite its having
been filed after the accused had already been
arraigned. NO!
Held:
The all-too familiar rule in Statutory Construction is
that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous,
interpretation need not be resorted to. Since Section
7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically
directs the DOJ to dismiss outright and appeal or
petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to
interpretation is necessary.
Section 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable
with Section 12. Section 7 pertains to the action
which the DOJ must take, while Section 12
enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to
the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.
Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned,
the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for
review due course and must dismiss the same. This is
bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the accused
prior to the filing of the appeal or petition for review is

set forth as one of the ground for its dismissal.
***DOJ Circular No. 70
Section 7, Paragraph 2, First Sentence
If an information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due course if the
accused had already been arraigned
Section 12
The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify
the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio
or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review
on any of the following grounds:
xxx
(e) That the accused had
arraigned when the appeal was taken
already
been
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo

G.R. No. 150606
June 7, 2007
FACTS
In 2001, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed
an Information charging (private respondent) Tecklo,
the owner of Qualistronic Builders, of violation of
Republic Act No. 8282 for failing to remit the
premiums due for his employee to the Social Security
System despite demand. The Information contains a
certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino, stating
that, THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH
THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR. Teklo filed a
motion to quash on the sole ground that Tolentino, not
being the City Prosecutor nor the Provincial
Prosecutor, has no legal personality nor is he legally
clothed with the authority to file the Information.
Tolentino opposed the motion and contended that he
is authorized to investigate, file the necessary
Information and prosecute SSS cases since he was
designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by
Regional State Prosecutor Turingan by virtue of a
Regional Order; that the Regional State Prosecutor, as
alter ego of the Secretary of Justice, is vested with
authority to designate Special Prosecutors; and that
the Chief State Prosecutor in his letter said that the
information to be filed in court by prosecutorsdesignate do not need the approval of the Regional
State Prosecutor or the Provincial or City Prosecutor.
RTC Judge Paqueo ordered to quash the information
and dismissed the case.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 22 of 70
ISSUE
WON
petitioner
State
Prosecutor
Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject
Information without the approval of the City
Prosecutor.
HELD
NO. Sec. 4, Rule 112, third paragraph of
the RRCP, provides that, No complaint or information
may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy. Since the provision is couched in negative
terms importing that the act shall not be done
otherwise than designated, it is mandatory.
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included
among the law officers authorized to approve the
filing or dismissal of the Information of the
investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by
petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply
with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently,
the non-compliance was a ground to quash the
Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Jose Gonzales vs. Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation
Facts: A complaint was filed against Gonzales for
violation of PD 115(Trust Receipts Law) in relation to
Art. 315(1)(b) of RPC before the City Prosecutor of
Makati. In its Resolution the City prosecutor found
probable cause to hold Gonzales liable for 2 counts of
Violation of PD 115.
Gonzales appealed to the DOJ but was denied. He
went to the CA via a Petition for review but was
denied for lack of merit.
Issue: WON the City Prosecutor and the DOJ erred in
finding probable cause?
Held: No.
In
conducting
preliminary
investigation
the
investigating prosecutor is given sufficient latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for
the filing of information against the supposed
offender, courts can only review WON the executive
determination of PC was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction resulting from grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, the determination of PC by the City
Prosecutor was not done without or in excess of
jurisdiction resulting from grave abuse of discretion.
Similarly, there is no showing that the DOJ, in the
exercise of its power to review on appeal the findings
of the City Prosecutor acted in an arbitrary or despotic
manner that amounted to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
Summerville v. Eugenio
(August 07, 2007)
Facts:
A complaint for unfair competition was filed by
Summerville against Elidad Kho, Violeta Kho, and
Roger Kho, for disposing to the public facial cream
products using labeling and distribution which give
and depict the general appearance of the Chin Chun
Su facial cream products and likely influence the
purchasers to believe that the same are those of the
said Summerville.
The City Prosecutors Office of Manila came out with
its May 31, 2000 Resolution recommending the
prosecution of the Khos and dismissing their
counterclaim
against
Summerville
thus,
an
Information for unfair competition was filed against
Khos before the Manila RTC, Branch 24. On June 22 of
the same year, Khos filed a petition for review with
the DOJ, assailing the May 31, 2000 Resolution of the
City Prosecutors Office of Manila.
The RTC issued the first assailed Order, dated October
24, 2001 granting on the Motion to Withdraw
Information filed by the trial prosecutor dated October
22, 2001.
August 21, 2002, the trial court issued an Order
holding that there is no necessity to order the
dismissal of the case. The re-filing of the Information
would constitute double jeopardy. On April 2, 2003,
the trial court issued its last assailed Order holding
that the revival of the case is now barred by the
impregnable wall of double jeopardy. On July 17,
2003, then Secretary of Justice Datumanong finally
disposed of the petition for review by denying the
Motion
for
Reconsideration
filed
by
private
respondents Khos.
In its May 26, 2004 Decision, the CA held that double
jeopardy had set in and that Judge Eugenio cannot be
faulted for dismissing the case.
Issue:
Did Judge Eugenio of Manila RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the
Information against the Khos without making an
independent assessment of the evidence?
Held:
Yes, failure of Judge Eugenio to independently
evaluate and assess the merits of the case against
the accused violates the complainants right to due
process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The October 24,
2001 Order of Judge Eugenio, granting the withdrawal
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 23 of 70
of the Information, that the trial court glaringly failed

to conduct its own determination of a prima facie
case, and simply adopted the September 28, 2001
Resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice. Where
the prosecution is, as in this case, disappointingly
unsure, irresolute, and uncertain on whether it should
prosecute the accused, the court should have been
most circumspect and judicious in the resolution of
the Motion to Withdraw Information, and should have
conducted its own determination whether or not there
is probable cause to hold the accused for trial.
The courts should not blindly follow the resolutions
issued by the DOJ. On the contrary, it should
determine on its own whether there is probable cause
to hold the accused for trial.
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the
case and it may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance
alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. (Santos
v. Orda, Jr.)
Rule 112, Sec. 5

JUDGE ESPAOL vs. JUDGE TOLEDO-MUPAS
Facts: The OCA found that respondent failed to
forward to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(OPP) of Cavite the records of at least 370 cases
which she dismissed after preliminary investigation.
Respondent justified such omission on the pretext
that her clerk of court and othr court personnel
secured photocopies of the cases for their own file in
order to help litigants who made queries regarding
their cases. She even claimed that the expenses for
the photocopying were defrayed by the court
personnel.
Issue: W/N Toledo- Mupas committed grave ignorance
of the law
Held: Section 5, Rule 1123 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure explicitly states that within ten (10) days
after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation,
an investigating judge shall transmit to the provincial
or city prosecutor for appropriate action her resolution
of the case together with the records thereof. Hence,
an investigating judge, after conducting a preliminary
investigation, shall perform her ministerial duty which
is to transmit within ten days after the conclusion
thereof, the resolution of the case together with the
entire records to the Provincial Prosecutor, regardless
of her belief or opinion that the crime committed,

after conducting the preliminary investigation, falls
within the original jurisdiction of her court.
Most of the cases which respondent failed to transmit
to the OPP were found to be within the jurisdiction of
the RTC and were decided as early as January 2000. It
is difficult to believe that respondent was not aware of
these facts. Worse, some of these cases are drugrelated and were dismissed as early as July 2000.
Respondent should have been prompted by the
gravity of these offenses to forward the records of the
cases within the required period to the OPP for
appropriate
action.
Undoubtedly,
the
parties
adversely affected by the dismissal of the complaints
after preliminary investigation were denied the
statutory right of review that should have been
conducted by the provincial prosecutor.
Respondent judge claims that the failure to promptly
transmit the resolution and records of the cases which
she dismissed after preliminary investigation is not
her fault but that of her clerk of court. However, it
remains the duty of a judge to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in their courts to enable
them to monitor the flow of cases and to manage
their speedy and timely disposition.4 If respondent
was diligent in the performance of her obligations and
responsibilities, the records of cases which were not
forwarded to the OPP would not have reached an
alarming number. She should have taken corrective
measures to promptly address this problem.
Her unjustifiable failure to forward to the OPP the
cases which she dismissed after preliminary
investigation shows that there is more than meets the
eye than what she portrays as simple unawareness.
Her supposed omission or oversight which remained
uncorrected for a period which spanned as long as
seven years smacks of malice and bad faith rather
than pure and plain ignorance. Hence, she is liable for
gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Rule 112, Sec. 6
Manolo Adriano v. Judge Bercades;
Facts: An administrative case was filed by Adriano
and Austral against Judge Bercades for abuse of
authority. In their complaint, they alleged that
Bercades issued a warrant of arrest against them for
violation RA 8048 wherein Adriano and Austral were
cutting trees without permits. They alleged that there
was no showing of necessity by Bercades to order an
arrest so as not to frustrate the ends of justice.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 24 of 70
Bercades claims that his warrant was issued in

accordance with Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court, claiming also that he had nothing to
do with it since it was strictly a police matter
Issue: W/N the issuance of Judge Bercades
warrant of arrest was violative of Sec.6(b), Rule 112 of
the RoC?
Held: Yes, warrants of arrest in preliminary
investigations, the investigating judge must: (1) have
examined in writing and under oath the complainant
and his witnesses by searching questions and
answers; (b) be satisfied that probably cause exists;
and (3) that there is a need to place the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. In the case at bar, Bercades ordered
the issuance of the warrant solely on his finding of
probably cause and failed to consider that there must
be a need to place the accused under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
His hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Even if it is truly strictly a
police matter, warrants of arrest are implemented by
arresting officers. Judges are not arresting officers,
and therefore, they are not concerned with its
implementation.
Rule 113, Sec. 3

People vs. Nunez
*I believe this is a typo in Maam Suarez outline; I
think this case should be under Section 3 of Rule
126(not 113) because it has very little(or nothing) to
do with Section 3 of Rule 113 (Duty of Arresting
Officer), and the case expressly talks about Section 3
of Rule 126 (Personal Property to be Seized)
Facts:
Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los
Banos Police Station and IDD Mobile Force(with the
Barangay Captain and Chief Tanod) conducted a
search in the house of Raul Nunez. They were armed
with a search warrant. They found 31 packets of
shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and
aluminum foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet
containg P4,610 inside Nunez dresser.
*The group also confiscated a component,
camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw,
electric tester and assorted carpentry tools on
suspicion that they were acquired in exchange
for shabu.
RTC found Nunez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for

Violation of Republic Act 6425(Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) as amended
CA affirmed Nunez conviction
Issues:
1. Whether or not the police officers complied with
their duties as arresting officers (Sec. 3, Rule 113)
2. Whether or not the seizure of the personal property
of Nunez was valid (Sec.3, Rule 126)
Held:
1. Yes. The police officers followed their duties as
prescribed by law.
2. No.
Rule 126, Section 3:
Section 3. Personal Property to be seized. A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
a) subject of the offense
b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or
c) used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense
As a rule, only the personal properties described in
the search warrant may be seized by the authorities.
In this case, Search Warrant No. 42 specifically
authorized
the
taking
of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By
the principle of ejusdem generis, where a stature
describes things of a particular class or kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the
generic word will usually be limited to things of a
similar nature with those particularly enumerated,
unless there be something in the context of the
statement which would repel such interference.
There were irregularities in the search conducted. The
ladys wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component,
speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws,
hammer, drill and bolo were not encompassed by the
word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the
use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items
then, the police officers exercised their own discretion
and determined for themselves which items in Nunez
residence they believed were proceeds of the crime
or means of committing the offense.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that
the articles to be seized be particularly described in
the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those,
and only those particularly described in the search
warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A
search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence
or articles relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects
taken which were not specified in the search warrant
should be restored to Nunez.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 25 of 70
Rule 113, Sec. 5

Pp vs. Carlos Dela Cruz
Facts: Carlos was arrested during a buy-bust
operation which was organized to arrest Boy-Bicol at
the latters nipa hut hideout. He was charged for
illegal possession of firearms and drugs. He was
convicted only for possession of dangerous drugs. He
claimed he cannot be convicted because he was
illegally arrested.
Issue: WON his arrest was illegal?
Held: Yes.
His warrantless arrest was effected under section 5(a)
of Rule 113, arrest of a suspect in Flagrante Delicto.
For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, 2
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Carlos was not in possession of the illegal drugs in
Boy Bicols nipa hut, thus his subsequent arrest was
invalid. The said drugs were on top of a table inside
the room which he was apprehended. The target of
the buy-bust operation was Boy-Bicol. Carlos was
merely a guest.
Rule 126, Sec. 2
Sps. Marimla vs. People and Judge Viola
Facts:
Special Investigators of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime
Division filed two applications for search warrant
with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to
search Spouses Marimlas house located on
Angeles City and the Premises on Porac,
Pampanga both for Violation of R.A. 6425 (Shabu,
Marijuana and other paraphernalia were allegedly
hidden and being kept in the said house/premises.)
Judge Guaria III issued a search warrant. On the
strength of this warrant, members of the NBI
searched petitioners house and seized several items
(Marijuana) and an Information was subsequently filed
before the RTC of Angeles City for Violation of R.A.
6425.
The RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57 is presided by
herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola.
Sps. Marimla filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence illegally seized on the
ground that the search warrant issued is void as the
application and the issuance of such was made with
and by a court which has no territorial jurisdiction
over the judicial region where the alleged crime was

committed and consequently, the evidence seized by
virtue of such void warrant is therefore inadmissible in
evidence.
Judge Omar T. Viola denied the Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally
Seized for lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows:
The public prosecutor was able to point out that the
search warrant issued by Judge Mario Guaria III, the
Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is
in order considering that AM 99-10-09-SC allows or
authorizes executive judges and vice executive judges
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City
to issue warrants which may be served in places
outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases where the
same was filed and, among others, by the NBI.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the search warrant issued is in violation of
Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. No.
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that the application for search warrant shall
be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for
compelling reasons, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.
However, in the light of the guidelines provided in
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC which are reiterated in A.M. No.
03-8-02- Chapter V Section 12, it was explicitly
provided there that the guidelines in the issuance of
search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs
of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to
Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
As stated in the facts of the case A.M. No. 99-10-09SCallows or authorizes executive judges and vice
executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be
served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in
cases where the same was filed and, among others,
by the NBI.
Hence, the decision of the RTC is affirmed. Petition
dismissed.
Rule 126, Sec. 4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 26 of 70
Sony Music Entertainment vs. Hon. Espanol

FACTS: Judge Espan issued two(2) SW for the search
and seizure of vcds @ Solid Laguna Corp. premises.
The said corporation was engaged in the replication,
reproduction and distribution of videograms without
license and authority from VRB and in violation of
petitioners intellectual property rights.
The said warrants were quashed because the SLD
was actually licensed and due to lack of probable
cause.
Reason:
The SW was properly enforced because
nowhere in Sec. 4 of Rule 126s states that the search
warrant must name the person who occupies the
described premise. The failure to name the actual
occupant of the said building is not a fatal defect to
the SW. Even though Quelnan may not be the person
subject of the search, the fact that he was caught in
flagrante delicto so his arrest was valid.
COCA-COLA vs. GOMEZ
Facts:
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search

warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty
bottles in Pepsi's yard in Concepcion Grande,
Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair
competition under the IP Code.
Coca-Cola submitted the sworn statements of

three witnesses (security guards) who saw
empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or
cases. MTC Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga
City, after taking the joint deposition of the
witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01
to seize the Coke bottles. The local police
seized the particular items including some
Pepsi shells.
In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez
claimed that the bottles came from various
Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who included
them in their return to make up for shortages
of empty Pepsi bottles. The presence of the
bottles in their yard was neither intentional nor
deliberate; that there is no mention in the IP
Code of the crime of possession of empty
bottles; and that the ambiguity of the law,
which has a penal nature, must be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in their
favor. Also, Pepsi filed motions for the return
of their shells and to quash the search
warrant.
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells
were part of the evidence of the crime, arguing
that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the
bottles. It insisted that the issuance of warrant
was based on probable cause for unfair
competition under the IP Code, and that Pepsi
violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of
stamped or marked bottles, boxes, and other
similar containers.
ISSUE: w/n the sw was issued based on probable

casue.
HELD: No. Applicant agent Lavin and his 2 witnesses
alleged in their application that they were able to
enter the premises of SLD and there they saw stock of
infringing, pirated and unauthorized CDs. However,
when queried during the application hearing how they
knew that audio and video compact discs were
pirated, relied for the most part on what alleged
unnamed sources told them and/or on certifications or
lists made by persons who were never presented as
witnesses. In net defect, they testified under oath as
to the truth of facts they had no personal knowledge
of.
It cannot be overemphasized that not one of them

testified seeing the pirated discs being manufactured
at SLCs premises. what they stated instead was that
they were given copies of Kenny Rogers Videoke,
Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke and Andrew E.
Wholesome CD by two anonymous sources, while yet
another informant told them that the discs were
manufactured at said premises.
Andy Quelnan vs. PP
Facts: A team of policemen was formed to implement
a search warrant issued by RTC of Manila. The team
proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in Makati
and the proceeded to Units 615 which is controlled by
Bernard Kim. During the implementation of the said
SW the police found 3 pieces of transparent plastic
sachets containing shabu. Then the arrest report and
joint affidavit of apprehension were executed by the
police operatives leading to the arrest of Andy
Quelnan who was also present during the search. The
RTC found Quelnan, guilty. Quelnan seeks for the
reversal of the said judgment since according to him
the SW was invalid for the fact that the SW was not
named to him.
Issue: W/N the SW was properly enforced.
Held: Yes!
Issue: Whether the Naga MTC was correct in issuing

Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the
empty Coke bottles from Pepsi's yard for probable
violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code?
Held:
- Negative.
A search warrant may be
issued only if there is probable cause in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 27 of 70
connection with a specific offense alleged in

an application based on the personal
knowledge of the applicant and his or her
witnesses. Procedurally, the determination of
probable cause is a personal task of the judge
before whom the application for search
warrant is filed, as he has to examine under
oath or affirmation the applicant and his or her
witnesses in the form of "searching questions
and answers" in writing and under oath. The
warrant, if issued, must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. (Sec. 4&5, Rule 126)
The court conclude that the "hoarding" - as
defined and charged by Coke - does not fall
within the coverage of the IP Code and of
Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to
any patent, trademark, trade name or service
mark that the respondents have invaded,
intruded into or used without proper authority
from the petitioner.
In this light, hoarding for purposes of
destruction is closer to what another law R.A. No. 623 - covers, to wit:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to

engage in the manufacture, bottling or selling
of soda water, mineral or aerated waters,
cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in
bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and
other similar containers, with their names or
the names of their principals or products, or
other marks of ownership stamped or marked
thereon, may register with the Philippine
Patent Office a description of the names or are
used by them, under the same conditions,
rules, and regulations, made applicable by law
or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.
SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person,

without
the
written
consent
of
the
manufacturer, bottler or seller who has
successfully registered the marks of ownership
in accordance with the provisions of the next
preceding section, to fill such bottles,
boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar
containers so marked or stamped, for the
purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of,
buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the
same, whether filled or not, or to use the
same for drinking vessels or glasses or
for any other purpose than that
registered by the manufacturer, bottler
or seller. Any violation of this section shall be
punished by a fine or not more than one

hundred pesos or imprisonment of not more
than thirty days or both.
Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in
the present case and one that the parties did
not consider at all in the search warrant
application. The petitioner in fact could not
have cited it in its search warrant application
since the "one specific offense" that the law
allows and which the petitioner used was
Section 168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at all
in our discussions, it is to show that the
underlying factual situation of the present case
is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP
Code that the petitioner cites. Viewed in this
light, the lack of probable cause to support the
disputed search warrant at once becomes
apparent.
Rule 126, Sec. 13
People vs. Mariacos
FACTS
A Police Station of La Union conducted
a checkpoint to intercept a suspected transporation of
marijuana and when it did not yield any suspect, PO2
Pallayoc proceeded to the barangay where a secret
agent told him that a baggage of marijuana has been
loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to
leave and that the back pack bag was with an OK
marking. The police boarded the jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle
was in motion, he found the bag with an OK marking.
Inside were several bricks of marijuana. When he
alighted from the jeepney, the bags were taken by
two women. He caught up with them, introduced
himself as a police officer. He told them that they
were under arrest but one got away. He brought Belen
Mariacos and the bags to the police station.
Appellant contend that her right against unreasonable
search and seizure was violated when the police
searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without
asearch warrant and with no permission from her and
that there was no probable cause for the arrest.
ISSUE
WON the search and arrest was valid?
HELD
Yes, the search and arrest were valid.
The search was conducted on a moving vehicle so
that the search was justified. In addition, it is a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Sec 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and the prevailing jurisprudence.
Generally warrant of arrest is necessary for a valid
arrest, but the Rules of Court provides exception
under Sec 5 (a) where in his presence, the person to
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 28 of 70
be arrested has committed, is actually committing or

is attempting to commit and offense.
A search, substantially contemporaneous (happening
at the same time) with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the officer has probable cause to make the
arrest at the outset of the search. Probable cause
here is the information given by the special agent.
Here, actual conveyance is enough to support a
finding that the act of transporting a dangerous drug
was being committed.
Rule 126, Sec. 14
MANLY SPORTWEAR vs. DADODETTE
ENTERPRISES
Facts:
(NBI) applied for a search warrant before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
based on the information that Dadodette
Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center were
in possession of goods, the copyright of which
belonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc.
(MANLY).
Judge Estrella T. Estrada of RTC-Quezon City,
Branch 83, issued on March 17, 2003 Search
Warrant No. 4044(03).
Respondents thereafter moved to quash and
annul the search warrant contending that the
same is invalid since the requisites for its
issuance have not been complied with. They
insisted that the sporting goods manufactured
by and/or registered in the name of MANLY are
ordinary and common hence, not among the
classes of work protected under Section 172 of
RA 8293.
We deny the petition.
The power to issue search warrants is
exclusively vested with the trial judges in the
exercise of their judicial function.11 As such,
the power to quash the same also rests solely
with them. After the judge has issued a
warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently
quash the same, if he finds upon reevaluation
of the evidence that no probable cause exists.
Our ruling in Solid Triangle Sales Corp. v.
Sheriff, RTC, Q.C., Br. 9312 is instructive, thus:
Inherent in the courts power to issue
search warrants is the power to quash
warrants already issued. In this connection,
this Court has ruled that the motion to
quash should be filed in the court that
issued the warrant unless a criminal case
has already been instituted in another
court, in which case, the motion should be
filed with the latter. The ruling has since
been incorporated in Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]
In the instant case, we find that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion when it entertained
the motion to quash considering that no
criminal action has yet been instituted when it
was filed. The trial court also properly quashed
the search warrant it earlier issued after
finding upon reevaluation of the evidence that
no probable cause exists to justify its issuance
in the first place. As ruled by the trial court,
the copyrighted products do not appear to be
original creations of MANLY and are not among
the classes of work enumerated under Section
172 of RA 8293.
When the court, in determining probable cause
for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds
that no offense has been committed, it does
not interfere with or encroach upon the
proceedings in the preliminary investigation.
The court does not oblige the investigating
officer not to file an information for the courts
ruling that no crime exists is only for purposes
of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does
not, as petitioners would like to believe,
constitute a usurpation of the executive
function.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 29 of 70
Rule 114, Sec. 1

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia
GR 153675, 19 April 2007
En Banc: Sandoval Gutierrez, J
Facts:
The RP and Hong Kong signed an Agreement for
the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.
Juan Muoz was charged in HK for accepting an
advantage as agent, and conspiracy to defraud.
Sep 1999, DOJ received from HK, a request for
the provisional arrest of Muoz. DOJ forwarded the
request to NBI which, in turn, filed with the RTC, an
application for the provisional arrest of Muoz. RTC
issued an Order of Arrest against Muoz. NBI agents
arrested and detained him.
Nov 1999, HK filed with the RTC Manila a petition
for the extradition of Muoz. Muoz filed, in the
same case, a petition for bail, was opposed by HK.
Oct 2001, bail for Muoz was granted by Judge
Olalia and set at P75T.
Issue:
Does a person facing extradition have the right to
bail?
Held:
Yes.
In Government of USA v. Purganan, we held that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, only to criminal proceedings.
While Purganan limited the exercise of the right
to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of
the various international treaties giving recognition
and protection to human rights, particularly the right
to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts
ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, the exercise of the States power to deprive
an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal
proceedings.
Respondents
in
administrative
proceedings,
such
as
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been
detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings
would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. RP jurisprudence has not limited the exercise
of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. SC
has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in
criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed
in this jurisdiction to persons in detention
during
the
pendency
of
administrative
proceedings,
taking
into
cognizance
the
obligation of the RP under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we
see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies

to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. Both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Sec. 2(a) of PD 1069 (Philippine Extradition Law)
defines extradition as the removal of an accused
from the RP with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government.
Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal,
for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. It is not a trial
to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure
his return to the state from which he fled, for the
purpose of trial or punishment.
While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it
is characterized by the following:
1. it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extradite,
2. the means employed to attain the purpose
of extradition is also the machinery of
criminal law
This is shown by Sec. 6 of PD 1069 which
mandates the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused if such will best serve
the interest of justice. Sec. 20 allows the requesting
state in case of urgency to ask for the provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the
request for extradition; and that release from
provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition
is received subsequently.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while
ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding
state following the proceedings. Temporary
detention may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention
should be reasonable.
Muoz was arrested on Sep 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until Dec 20, 2001, when the
RTC ordered his admission to bail. In other words,
he had been detained for over 2 years without
having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 30 of 70
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty.

In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him
bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice. The prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he is not a
flight risk and should be granted bail.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of
his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In Purganan, Justice Puno, proposed that a new
standard which he termed clear and convincing
evidence should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and
will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
Here, there is no showing that Muoz presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the
RTC to determine whether Muoz may be granted bail
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.
Rule 114, Sec. 3
P/Supt Orbe v. Digandgang
AM P-09-2685; Sep 3, 2009
En Banc: Per Curiam
Facts:
On Feb 14, 2008, the operatives of the PDEAARMM arrested Indag and Manabilang for alleged
violation of RA 9165, and were thus committed to the
provincial jail.
On Feb 15, 2008, the accused were released from
the custody of the Jail Warden on the basis of the
Custody Receipt signed by Marcos Digandang,
Process Server of the RTC-14, Cotabato City.
In his complaint, Police Superintendent Orbe, RD
of PDEA-ARMM, alleges that the release was illegal
because the accused were charged with a nonbailable offense.
Digandang admits in his Comment that the
accused were his relatives and that he interceded for
their release because they allegedly needed medical
attention. After their medical check up, they were
immediately brought back to their detention cell. He

also claims that he did not file a motion for temporary
release, since he could not secure the services of a
lawyer, it being a Friday and it was already past 3pm.
Jail Warden, likewise admitted that he temporarily
relinquished custody over the accused to Digandang
for humanitarian reasons.
Issue:
Did Digandang have the authority to cause the

release of the accused?
Held:
No. It is undisputed that accused were charged
with a non-bailable offense; that they were released
from detention on the basis merely of the Custody
Receipt signed by the Digandang, which was a clear
violation of Sec. 3, Rule 114 which explicitly provides
that no person under detention by legal process shall
be released or transferred except upon order of the
court or when he is admitted to bail.
As a court employee, Digandang is cognizant of
this requirement as in fact he admitted in his
Comment that a motion for temporary release should
have been filed in court.
We cannot lend credence to Digandangs
allegation that he was unable to file the motion
because he could not immediately avail of the
services of a lawyer as it was a Friday and already
past 3pm. Assuming that he could not immediately
hire the services of a private lawyer, he could always
go to the PAO for legal assistance. At 3pm, it is
inconceivable that no PAO lawyer would be available.
The contention that Digandang interceded for the
release of his accused-relatives for humanitarian
reasons
is
self-serving
and
deserves
no
consideration.
Moreover, the fact that the accused were
returned to their detention cell soon after the medical
check up does not justify Digandangs culpability or
mitigate his liability. Neither could it be considered a
badge of good faith. An infraction had been
committed and the accuseds return to incarceration
does not extinguish the violation.
Ambil vs. SB
Facts: The controversy arose from a letter of Atty.
David Lorte to the office of the Ombudsman praying
for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then
Mayor Francisco Adalim (who was accused for
murder) from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to
the residence of then Governor Ambil Jr.
It appears that Ambil ordered provincial jail
warden Apelado to fetch Adalim at the provincial jail
and, unarmed with a court order, Apelado transported
Adalim to the house of Ambil.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 31 of 70
As a result, an information was filed charging

Ambil for violation of RA 3019.
considered withdrawn did not relieve the Judge

Maceda of any liability.
Issue:
Issue:
Was San Miguel deprived of his right to bail?
Whether or not the transfer of Adalim from the

provincial jail to the house of Ambil was valid.
Ruling:
Np. Although under the Administrative Code,
the provincial governor is considered as the jail
keeper, it does not empower him to tale personal
custody of prisoners or order for their transfer.
Under Section 3, Rule 114, a person under
detention may be transfered only upon order of the
court. The power to order the release or transfer of a
person under detention by legal process is vested in
the court, not in the provincial government, much less
the governor.
Rule 114, Sec. 4 & 5
Eduardo San Miguel v. Judge Maceda
AM RTJ-03-1749, 4 Apr 2007
3rd Division: Austria-Martinez
Facts:
Eduardo San Miguel was arrested for illegal sale,
dispensation, distribution and delivery of .50 grams of
shabu, punishable by PC. He jumped bail. On May 10,
2001, then Judge Alumbres issued a bench warrant
and canceled his bail bond in the amount of P60,000
and fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000.
Chronology of Events [2001]:
1. Sep 8 San Miguel was arrested
2. Sep 12 prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel
Recommended Bail on the ground of reasonable
belief to the probability of flight
3. Sep 17 San Miguel filed an Opposition to the
Motion; Judge Maceda issued an Order granting
the Motion.
4. Sep 19 Judge Maceda opted to consider San
Miguels Opposition as a MR and merely ordered
the prosecutor to file a reply thereto
5. Nov 21 Judge Maceda issued an Order clarifying
his Order of Sep 17
San Miguel argues that the offense charged is
neither a capital offense nor punishable by reclusion
perpetua. His right to bail is not a mere privilege but a
constitutionally guaranteed right that cannot be
defeated by any order. Clearly, the intendment of the
Sep 17 Order was to deny him of his constitutional
right to bail. The issuance of the Nov 21 Order that
only the bail recommended by the prosecutor was
Held:
Yes. San Miguel was charged with violation an
offense punishable by PC. Therefore, he is entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
The prosecutor's Motion to Cancel Recommended
Bail was very precise in its prayer, i.e., that the
allowance for bail granted to the accused to secure
his provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of
Arrest dated May 10 be canceled as there is
reasonable ground to believe and all indications point
to the probability that accused is seriously
considering flight from the prosecution of the case.
Two days before the scheduled date of hearing of
the prosecutors Motion, Judge Maceda issued the
Order granting the motion of the prosecution to
cancel bail.
However, Judge Maceda continued with the
hearing on Sep 19. He considered the Opposition to
the Motion as a MR of the assailed Order granting the
withdrawal by the prosecution of the recommended
bail. This may have rectified the mistake committed
by Judge Maceda as the latter took into consideration
that the accused has a right to due process as much
as the State; but then, no evidence was adduced to
prove that San Miguel was seriously considering flight
from prosecution, which was very critical to the
granting or denial of the motion of the prosecution to
cancel bail.
Judge Maceda clarified that the bail fixed by
Judge Alumbres was not affected by the withdrawal of
the prosecution's recommended bail; only the bail
recommended by the prosecutor in the amount of
P60,000 was considered withdrawn in the Order of
Sep 17. The bail in the amount of P60,000 was
already forfeited as a consequence of San Miguel's
jumping bail. How then can Judge Maceda claim that
he merely canceled the recommended bail of P60,000
when the same had already been forfeited? The only
recommended bail that remains subject of the Motion
of the prosecutor is the increased bail in the amount
of P120,000. Thus, there remains no other conclusion
except
that
Judge
Maceda
canceled
the
recommended bail in the increased amount of
P120,000 The Order of Sep 17 effectively deprived
San Miguel of his constitutional right to bail when it
was issued two days before the scheduled hearing on
Sep 19.
And even granting for the sake of argument that
San Miguel was also charged with the crime of murder
on Sep 14, or 3 days before the Order of cancellation
was issued, Judge Maceda failed to consider that what
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 32 of 70
was being prayed for by the prosecutor was the

cancellation of the recommended bail for violation of
RA 6425 and not for murder.
Judge
Maceda's
asseveration
that
the
cancellation of the bail without due hearing was
justified considering that San Miguel was already
detained for the non-bailable offense of murder 3
days before the cancellation was ordered, is
misplaced.
Where bail is a matter of right and prior
absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such
right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such
circumstance. The existence of a high degree of
probability that the defendant will abscond
confers upon the court no greater discretion
than to increase the bond to such an amount as
would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the
defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be
subject, of course, to the other provision that
excessive
bail
shall
not
be
required.
Rufina Chua v. CA and Chiok
GR 140842, April 12, 2007
1st Division: Sandoval-Gutierrez
Facts:
Rufina Chua filed a complaint for estafa against
Chiok. After PI an information for estafa with the RTC.
During arraignment, Chiok pleaded not guilty.
Trial ensued.
After the prosecution and the defense had
presented their respective evidence, the RTC set the
promulgation of judgment on Jan 26, 1999. However,
Chiok and his counsel failed to appear on said date
despite notice. The RTC reset the promulgation of
judgment on Feb 1, 1999, with notice to Chiok. Again,
Chiok failed to appear. The RTC then promulgated its
Decision convicting Chiok of estafa and sentencing
him to suffer 12 years of PM, as minimum, to 20 years
of RT, as maximum.
On the same day, Feb 1, 1999, the prosecution
filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground
that Chiok might flee or commit another crime.
On Feb 15, 1999, the motion for cancellation of
bail was set for hearing. The prosecution presented a
Record Check Routing Form issued by the BI showing
that Chiok has an ACR and ICR. During that hearing,
Chiok admitted using the names "Mark Tan" and Tong
Wai Fat" as aliases.
Consequently, on May 28, 1999, the RTC issued
an Omnibus Order:
1. denying Chioks MR of the conviction;
2. canceling his bail
Chiok filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
with application for a TRO assailing the RTCs Order
canceling his bail.
Meanwhile, RTC issued a warrant of arrest against

Chiok for his failure to appear despite the lapse of the
5-day period provided in the May 28, 1999 Order. The
warrant was returned unserved because he could not
be found at his given address.
Later, the CA issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the arrest of Chiok, holding that
Chiok should not be deprived of his liberty pending
resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he
was convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the
probability that he will flee during the pendency of his
appeal is merely conjectural.
Issue:
Was the RTC correct in canceling the bail of
Chiok?
Held:
Yes.
Chiok has no right to be freed on bail pending his
appeal from the RTCs judgment. His conviction
carries a penalty of imprisonment of 12 years of PM,
as minimum, to 20 years of RT, as maximum which
justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to Sec.
5[3] (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114. Therefore, bail is
discretionary on the part of the court.
Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice
during the promulgation of judgment on Jan 26, 1999.
His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the
condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the
court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules,
but also showed the probability that he might flee or
commit another crime while released on bail.
People v. SB and Jinggoy Estrada
G.R. No. 158754; August 10, 2007
EN BANC: Garcia J
Facts:
In Nov 2000, as an offshoot of the
impeachment proceedings against President Erap,
five [5] criminal complaints against Erap and
members of his family, his associates, friends and
conspirators were filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
On Apr 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a
Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the
filing with the SB of several criminal Informations
against Erap, et al. One of the Informations was for
plunder under RA 7080 and among the respondents
was Jinggoy, then mayor of San Juan.
On Apr 25, 2001, SB issued a warrant of arrest
for Jinggoy and his co-accused. On its basis, Jinggoy,
et al were placed in custody of the law.
Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion
alleging that he is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
He prayed that he be allowed to post bail.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 33 of 70
Eventually, the SB granted the omnibus

application for bail fixed at P500T.
The people argue that Jinggoy should not have
been granted bail. The people argue that since the
central figure in the overlapping conspiracies, i.e.,
Erap, is charged with a capital offense, all those
within the conspiracy loop would be considered
charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense.
The people cite People v. Castelo [GR L-10774,
May 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 193] which also involves
multiple levels of conspiracies where the prime
suspect was a former Judge who later rose to hold, in
a concurrent capacity, the positions of Secretary of
Justice and Secretary of National Defense. In Castelo,
charges and countercharges were initially hurled by
and between Castelo and Senator Claro Recto, who
was then planning to present Manuel Monroy as star
witness against Castelo in a scandal case. Castelo left
the Philippines for Korea. While away, someone shot
Monroy dead. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy led by
a certain Ben Ulo (who appears to be the
mastermind) and a group of confidential agents of the
DND,
one
of
whom
was
the
triggerman.
Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard of
Castelo. In the end, the SolGen tagged Ben Ulo (not
Castelo) as the central figure in the conspiracy. This
notwithstanding, the Court held Castelo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a
motive for desiring Monroys demise. The conspiracy
between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to
be overlapping with the conspiracy between Ben Ulo
and the confidential agents, one of whom was the
triggerman.
In People v. Ty Sui Wong [GR L-32529, May 12,
1978, 83 SCRA 125] featuring a love triangle involving
a certain Victor and Mariano, each out to win the
heart of Ruby. Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While
Victor was away, the dead body of Mariano was found
with multiple stab wounds in a dark alley in Pasay.
Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among Sampaloc
hoodlums who had no direct link with Victor.
However, one of the neighbors of the Sampaloc
hoodlums was a classmate of Victor. In the end, on
the basis of interlocking confessions, the Court found
Victor and his classmate together with all the
Sampaloc hoodlums guilty of murder.
Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui
Wong under the premises, the people presently
argue: It should be noted that this is the same
scenario of accused Erap conspiring with Chavit
Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes
(jueteng protection money); and of Singson involving
Jinggoy in yet another level of conspiracy in pursuit of
the first, i.e., the regular collection of jueteng
protection money for Erap; and, Jinggoy, aware of the
details of the conspiracy between Erap and Singson,
agreeing to remit the greater part of his collection of
bribes to Erap as its ultimate beneficiary. Thus,

Jinggoy reached an agreement with Singson, executed
the plan and participated in furtherance of the
conspiracy for the receipt and collection of jueteng
protection money; remitting P2M thereof to Singson
for delivery to Erap and retaining P1M thereof for
himself.
Similarly, therefore, Jinggoy should have been
denied bail since he is as guilty and liable as Erap for
the non-bailable offense of Plunder.
Issue:
Did the SB commit grave abuse of discretion
when it granted bail to Jinggoy?
Held:
No.
The rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on
all-fours applicable to and of governing sway to the
issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoys release on
bail.
The people erroneously equate the provisional
grant of bail to Jinggoy to his virtual acquittal in
Criminal Case 26558. The People is wrong. Castelo
and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of
culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the
evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this
proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the
evidence for or against the bail application, was not
an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the
present case, SB is still in the process of determining
the facts and merits of the main case. The SB is not
making any judgment as to the final outcome of this
case either with respect to Jinggoy or with respect to
Erap. The SB is simply called to determine whether, at
this stage, the evidence of Jinggoy's guilt is strong as
to warrant his temporary release on bail.
Revoking the bail thus granted to Jinggoy,
which necessarily implies that the evidence of his
guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting
SBs ongoing determination of the facts and merits of
the main case.
The SB did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because
the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its
preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in
the bail hearing to determine whether or not
deprivation of the right to bail is warranted. Needless
to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of
facts, the same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final
assessment of the evidence after full trial on the
merits.
Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this
time, there looms the possibility that, in case of
conviction, Jinggoys criminal liability would probably
not warrant the death penalty or reclusion perpetua.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 34 of 70
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable

owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the
probability of escape is great. Here, Jinggoy does not,
as determined by SB seem to be a flight risk. We
quote with approval what the SB wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that Jinggoy
has, in general, been consistently respectful of the
Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown,
by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that
would necessitate his continued incarceration.
Bearing in mind his conduct, social standing and his
other personal circumstances, the possibility of his
escape in this case seems remote if not nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual
respondent is now almost nil, given his election on
May 10, 2004, as Senator. The Court takes stock of
the fact that those who usually jump bail are shadowy
characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of
the people for as long as they can flee from the
retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a
reputation and a respectable name to protect and
preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to
be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that someone
who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is
harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in
exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice.
OCA v. Judge Lorenzo
AM RTJ-05-1911; Dec 23, 2008
En Banc: Velasco, J
Facts:
Judge Lorenzo is charged for releasing on bail of 3
Filipinos caught while in the act of sniffing shabu and
5 Chinese nationals arrested while manufacturing
shabu.
The apprehension was effected during a raid in
an illegal drugs laboratory in Pasig City.
The complaint was filed by Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuo. According to Zuno, Judge Lorenzo:
1. arbitrarily granted the petition for bail of 3
Filipinos, who were arrested while in the act of
sniffing shabu in a pot session;
2. granted bail without conducting a hearing or
giving the prosecution reasonable time and
chance to oppose the petition for bailan act
constituting gross and deliberate error, if not bad
faith.
As to those Chinese nationals who were caught in
the act of manufacturing shabu including various
manufacturing paraphernalia, Zuno contended they
were granted bail despite vigorous objection from the
prosecution which was still in the process of
presenting evidence on the petition for bail, and

despite strong evidence of guilt.
Judge Lorenzo stated that the charge against the
3 Filipinos, i.e., use and possession of 1.03 grams of
shabu, was, as a matter of right, a bailable offense.
Judge Lorenzo also pointed out that, during the
hearings on the petition for bail, the prosecutors
made no written or oral objection to said petition
which he granted in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 114.
Issue:
Did Judge Lorenzo err in granting the petition

for bail of the 3 Filipinos caught in possession of 1.03
grams of shabu?
Held:
No. The offense they were charged with was
bailable as a matter of right.
Issue:
Did Judge Lorenzo err in granting the petition
for bail of the 5 Chinese nationals caught
manufacturing shabu?
Held:
Yes. When he ordered the release on bail of the
accused Chinese nationals, committed several serious
lapses in disregard of legal and procedural rules.
To start off, he allowed the accused to post bail
supposedly because of the prosecutions inability to
prove their guilt with strong evidence. But Judge
Lorezos decision would have been correct, if only
[he] paid enough attention to the factors why the
prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of guilt is strong, referring to the non-appearance
during bail hearings of two key prosecution witnesses.
Said witnesses testimony would have proved not
only the amount of shabu seized, but more
importantly that the substance examined was shabu.
The records tend to show that 5 kilos of shabu were
confiscated.
Judge
Lorenzo
committed
the
following
inculpatory acts:
1. ordering a clerk to serve the subpoena;
2. ordering a prosecutor to serve the orders of
arrest/bench warrant;
3. failing to check if the subpoenas were
personally received by the police officers
indicated therein;
4. preterminating the hearings for the petition
for bail for the reason that counsel for the
accused submitted the same for resolution;
and
5. denying the prosecution the opportunity to
present its evidence necessary for its
opposition to the petition for bail, despite two
more hearings set for that purpose.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 35 of 70
People v. Plaza
GR 176933; Oct 2, 2009
Carpio-Morales, J
Facts:
Plaza was charged with murder.
After the prosecution rested its case, Plaza filed a
Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was denied by
Judge Buyser:
The evidence thus presented by the prosecution
is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of homicide
and not for murder, as charged. This is because the
qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the
information cannot be appreciated in this case.
Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond,
contending that in view of Judge Bs ruling that the
prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only
Homicide, he could be released on bail.
Prosecution contended that:
1. the case being Murder, it is non-bailable as the
imposable penalty is RP to D;
2. it is the prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction
to determine what crime the accused should be
charged with;
3. Plaza should have filed a motion/application to bail
and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail
bond;
4. Plaza had already waived his right to apply for bail
at that stage of the proceedings
During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of
Bail Bond, State Prosecutor Bagabuyo questioned
Judge Bs impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit
himself and to order the case transferred to Judge
Tan.
Judge Tan granted Palzas Motion reasoning that
since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide
which is punishable by RT and, therefore, bailable,
Plaza could no longer be denied bail. Plaza was
subsequently released after he posted bail.
Roberto, the victims brother faulted Judge Tan for
granting bail without an application for bail having
been filed by Plaza and without conducting the
mandatory hearing to determine whether or not the
prosecutions evidence is strong.
Issue:
Was the RTC correct in granting bail to Plaza?
Held:
Yes. The exercise by RTC of its discretionary

power to grant bail to accused charged with a capital
offense depends on whether evidence of guilt is
strong. . .
[W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether

summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
should first be conducted to determine the existence
of strong evidence or lack of it, to enable the judge to
make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties.
A summary hearing is defined as such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.
Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment
by Judge B of the prosecution evidence when he
denied the Demurrer and Judge Bs statement that
the evidence was sufficient to convict Plaza of
Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to
determine whether Plaza was entitled to bail would
have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was
already presented by the prosecution.
The Peoples recourse to Sec. 5, Rule 114 to
support its contention that Plaza should be denied
bail is unavailing, for Sec. 5 clearly speaks of an
application for bail filed by the accused after a
judgment of conviction has already been handed
down by the RTC.
Leviste v. CA
GR 189122; Mar 17, 2010
3rd Division: Corona, J
Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,
Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the RTC Makati
for homicide and sentenced to suffer a penalty of 6
years and 1 to 12 years and 1 day.
He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk
or possibility of flight on his part.
CA denied Levistes application for bail. It invoked
the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending
appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. CA ruled that
bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or
a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.
Leviste now questions the denial of his
application for bail, considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under Sec. 5[3],
Rule 114 was present. Levistes theory is that, where
the penalty imposed by the RTC is more than 6 years
but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the Sec. 5[3] are absent, bail must be
granted to appellant pending appeal.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 36 of 70
Issue:
Is Leviste correct?
Held:
No.
Sec. 5[3] Rule 114 applies to 2 scenarios where
the penalty imposed on appellant applying for bail is
imprisonment exceeding 6 years.
1. The 1st scenario deals with the circumstances
enumerated not present
2. The 2nd scenario contemplates the existence of at
least one of the said circumstances.
In the 1st situation, bail is a matter of sound
judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 is
present, the CA has the discretion to grant or deny
bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in Sec.
5[3], Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the CAs
denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.
In the 2nd situation, the CA exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option
except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely, if the CA grants bail pending appeal,
grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these 2 distinct scenarios, therefore, any
application for bail pending appeal should be viewed
from the perspective of two stages:
1. the determination of discretion stage, where the
CA must determine whether any of the
circumstances in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 is present;
this will establish whether or not the CA will
exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal,
and
2. the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming
the appellants case falls within the 1st scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the CA
may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in Sec. 5[3], Rule 114,
including the demands of equity and justice; on
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow
bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls
within the 2nd scenario, the CAs stringent discretion
requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused
on the determination of the proof of the presence of
any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the
allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of
any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to

deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result
in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize
the CA to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.
Leviste disregards the fine yet substantial
distinction between the 2 different situations that are
governed by Sec. 5[3], Rule 114. Instead, Leviste
insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes
the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending
appeal.
Leviste interprets Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 to cover all
situations where the penalty imposed by the RTC is
imprisonment exceeding 6 years.
For Leviste, in such a situation, the grant of bail
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion,
that is, one restricted to the determination of whether
any of the 5 bail-negating circumstances exists. The
implication of this position is that, if any such
circumstance is present, then bail will be denied.
Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Levistes theory therefore reduces the CA into a
mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to
determining whether any of the 5 circumstances
exists. This unduly constricts its discretion into
merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in
Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty
imposed by the RTC is imprisonment exceeding 6
years. In short, Levistes interpretation severely curbs
the discretion of the CA by requiring it to determine a
singular factual issue whether any of the 5 bailnegating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as
choice. Thus, by severely clipping the CAs
discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere factfinding body in applications for bail pending appeal in
all instances where the penalty imposed by RTC is
imprisonment exceeding 6 years, Levistes theory
effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon
conviction by RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, RP, or LI, admission to bail is discretionary.
Moreover,
to
limit
the
bail-negating
circumstances to the 5 situations mentioned in Sec.
5[3], Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bailnegating
circumstances
to
those
expressly
mentioned, Leviste applies the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius rule in statutory construction.
However, the very language of Sec. 5[3], Rule
114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the
5 situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The
provision categorically refers to the following or
other similar circumstances. Hence, under the rules,
similarly relevant situations other than those listed in
Sec. 5[3], Rule 114 may be considered in the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 37 of 70
allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending

appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted
in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting Levistes interpretation that, where the
penalty imposed by the RTC is imprisonment
exceeding 6 years, bail ought to be granted if none of
the
listed bail-negating
circumstances exists.
Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the
penalty imposed is more than 6 years of
imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6 years.
While denial or revocation of bail in cases where
the penalty imposed is more than 6 years
imprisonment must be made only if any of the 5 bailnegating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed 6
years imprisonment may be denied even without
those conditions.
Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara

AM RTJ-09-2190; Apr 23, 2010
3rd Division: Peralta, J
Facts:
In 2001, a criminal case for murder was filed
against Ishak Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan before the
RTC Marawi City.
In 2007, Judge Mangotara found both accused
Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and sentenced them to
imprisonment of RP.
Judge M, likewise, increased the accuseds bail
bond from P75,000 to P200,000.
Issue:
Did Judge M act correctly in increasing the bail
bond?
Held:
No. Rule 114 is very explicit as to when admission
to bail is discretionary on the part of the Judge. It is
imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal
principles and possessed sufficient proficiency in the
law.
In offenses punishable by RP or D, the accused
has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is
strong.
Thus, as the accused had been sentenced to RP,
the bail should have been cancelled, instead of
increasing it as respondent Judge did.
Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara
in increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of
cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the part of Judge, but a

patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law.
It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep
abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as
with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One
cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance
with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of
the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no
one not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD
QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.
Rule 114, Sec. 7
Laarni Valerio v. CA
GR 164911-12, 10 Oct 2007
2nd Division: Quisumbing
Facts:
On March 18, 2000, Jun Valerio, Chief of the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel, was shot and
killed in front of his house at Diliman.
An
information for murder was filed against Antonio
Cabador, Martin Jimenez, Samuel Baran, and
Geronimo Quintana; while an Information for parricide
was filed against the victims wife, Milagros Valerio.
Milagros filed an application for bail claiming that
the evidence of guilt against her was not strong. The
prosecution, on the other hand, moved to discharge
accused Samuel Baran and to have him as state
witness.
Meanwhile, Antonio Cabador was arrested. In his
sworn statement, he stated that it was Milagros who
planned the murder of Jun Valerio. Further, Antonio
pleaded guilty to the charge of murder.
The RTC granted Milagros application for bail, but
denied the motion to convert Samuel as state
witness. On Mar 5, 2002, Milagros posted a bailbond
and was ordered released.
Laarni Valerio, sister of the victim, and the
People, elevated the case to the CA ascribing grave
abuse of discretion to the RTC judge for granting
Milagros bail. Laarni, et al contend that Milagros is not
entitled to bail as the evidence of guilt against her is
strong.
They bank on the testimony of Modesto Cabador
that he heard Milagros impatiently ask Antonio about
their plot to kill Jun Valerio. They maintain that
Milagros unrestrained behavior in front of Modesto
was not unusual considering Milagros desperation
and the fact that Modesto is Antonios cousin. Laarni,
et al point out that Milagros high level of education,
social orientation, or breeding does not prevent her
from committing parricide. They also assert that
Antonios plea of guilty to the charge of conspiring
with Milagros in the murder of Jun Valerio
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 38 of 70
indicated strong evidence of guilt against Milagros.

Issue:
W/N Milagros is entitled to bail.
Held:
No. The RTC disregarded the glaring fact that the
killer himself has confessed to the crime and has
implicated Milagros as the mastermind. When taken
in conjunction with the other evidence on record,
these facts show very strongly that Milagros may
have participated as principal by inducement in the
murder of Jun Valerio. It was thus a grave error or a
grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC to
grant her application for bail.
Milagros, however, counters that she is entitled to
bail as a matter of right because the evidence of guilt
against her is not strong.
Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante
Facts: On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag,
Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of KiambaMaitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of
Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case.
Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who
had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arre
sted. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings
and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense
to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an
information for murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal
Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for
bail in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No.
1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infantes Branch.
On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin
orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another
releasing Ancheta from custody.
Atty. Gacal filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on such orders on the ground that no trial regarding
the bail was ever made and that the Judge did not
conduct an independent investigation as to the
veracity of the recommendation made the public
prosecutor.
The
Motion
was
denied.
Atty.
Gacal
subsequently filed an administrative case against the
Judge. The OCA found Judge Infante guilty.
Issue: WON the granting of Anchetas petition for bail,
despite the offense charged was a capital offense,
was valid despite the absence of a bail hearing.
Held: NO. Judge Infante specifically cited judicial
experience as sanctioning his adoption and approval
of the public prosecutors recommendation on the
fixing of bail. Yet, it was not concealed from him that

the public prosecutors recommendation had been
mainly based on the documentary evidence
adduced, and on the public prosecutors misguided
position that the evidence of guilt was weak because
only circumstantial evidence had been presented. As
such, Judge Infantes unquestioning echoing of the
public prosecutors conclusion about the evidence of
guilt not being sufficient to deny bail did not justify his
dispensing with the bail hearing.
Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement
for the bail hearing was a merely minor rule to be
dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function
of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused at
the time set for the arraignment and trial; and, in
practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing
the release of an accused who may be dangerous to
society or whom the judge may not want to release, a
hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of
bail, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion.With more reason is this true in criminal
prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense
punishable
by reclusion
perpetua or
life
imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, states that: No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of criminal action.
Rule 114, Sec. 15
Rasmia Tabao v. Judge Barataman
[AM MTJ-01-1384. April 11, 2002]
1st Division: PUNO, J.:
Facts:
Rasmia Tabao charged MTC Judge Acmad
Barataman, with gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of discretion.
Tabao is the private complainant in Criminal Case
9106 entitled "People v. Samsodin Tabao" for
abandonment of minor. It appears that Judge B
issued an Order granting the motion for bail on
recognizance filed by the father of the accused
pursuant to RA 6036.
Judge Barataman alleges that:
1. the crime of abandonment of a minor is covered
by the Summary Rules and hence bail on
recognizance is not required as the court can
immediately arraign and try the accused, pursuant
to Sec. 13 of Rule 114;
2. if he were the acting judge when the criminal case
was filed, he would not issue a warrant of arrest
but order the immediate arraignment and trial of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 39 of 70
the case and there would be no need to discuss

the matter of bail; and,
3. the court can appoint as custodian of the accused
his father, a former City Councilor of Marawi City,
who qualifies as a responsible person under Sec.
15, Rule 114
OCA Velasco found Judge B guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for releasing accused on
recognizance before it could acquire jurisdiction over
his person. Accused was at large when motion for bail
was filed.
Issue:
Is the OCA correct?
Held:
Yes. Judge B is liable in granting the motion for
bail on recognizance in clear violation of RA 6036,
because:
First. Sec. 1 of RA 6036 provides that " bail
shall not be required of a person charged with
violation of a criminal offense the prescribed penalty
for
which
is
not
higher
than
6
months
imprisonment" Instead of bail, Sec. 2 states that the
person charged "shall be required to sign in the
presence of two witnesses of good standing in the
community a sworn statement binding himself,
pending final decision of his case, to report to the
Clerk of Court hearing his case periodically every two
weeks..."
In the present case, it is not disputed that the
sworn statement supporting the motion for bail
filed before Judge Barataman was signed, not by the
accused but by his father. The failure of the accused
to sign the sworn statement is in clear contravention
of the express mandate of the law that the person
charged shall sign a sworn statement binding
himself to report to the Clerk of Court. This is a
personal obligation imposed by RA 6036 on the
accused and cannot be assumed by the custodian or
responsible citizen who may be appointed by the
court.
It is different from Sec. 15, Rule 114 which allows
the release of the accused on his own recognizance or
that of a responsible person.
RA 6036 applies to criminal cases where the
prescribed penalty is not higher than 6 months
imprisonment. In the case at bar, accused stands
charged with abandonment of a minor which carries
with it the imposable penalty of arresto mayor.
Hence, it was erroneous for Judge B to have granted
the motion for bail on the basis of the affidavit of the
father of the accused.
Moreover, RA 6036 allows the release of the
accused on his own recognizance only where it has
been established that he is unable to post the
required cash or bail bond. The accused in this case

is a CPA who is engaged in the transport business.
We reject the contention of Judge B that the law does
not distinguish whether the accused is rich or poor.
The distinction is all to clear for the law explicitly
provides that the accused can be released on his own
recognizance only if he is able to clearly establish that
he is unable to post cash or bail bond.
Second. Judge B does not deny that the accused
was at large when the motion for bail on recognizance
was filed and subsequently granted. Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in custody
of the law.
Sec. 15, Rule 114 provides that the court may
release a person in custody on his own recognizance
or that of a responsible person. It is a basic principle
that bail is intended to obtain provisional liberty and
cannot be granted before custody of an accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest
or voluntary surrender. It is self-evident that a court
cannot grant provisional liberty to one who is actually
in the enjoyment of his liberty for it would be
incongruous to give freedom to one who is free.
Thus, we have held that it is premature to file a
motion for bail for someone whose liberty has yet to
be curtailed.
In the case at bar, Judge B was fully cognizant
that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused who was still at large and
yet, he entertained and granted his motion for bail. In
doing so, Judge B violated a tenet in criminal
procedure which is too basic as to constitute gross
ignorance of the law. When the law violated is
elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action.
Rule 114, Sec. 16
Judge Simbulan v. Judge Bartolome
AM MTJ-05-1588; Jun 5, 2009
3rd Division: Peralta, J
Facts:
Criminal Case 13360 was originally raffled to the
RTC-41, San Fernando, Pampanga, where Judge
Simbulan presides. On Sep 18, 2003, said RTC-41
received an Indorsement from Warrant Officer PO3
Villacentino of the Sasmuan Police Station stating that
the accused Mercado voluntarily surrendered before
the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and posted her bail
bond through Summit Guaranty which was duly
approved by Judge Bartolome on Aug 21, 2003.
Issue:
Did Judge Bartolome act accordingly when he

approved the bail bond of accused Bartolome?
Held:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 40 of 70
No. There were indeed grave errors and

discrepancies committed by Judge B in processing the
surety bond for the accused in Criminal Case 13360.
Rule 114, Sec. 14 and 16, apply before an
accused can be released on bail.
Accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested. The
proper procedure, would have been to file her bail
bond with the RTC-41, San Fernando, Pampanga
where her case was pending.
Had Judge S been absent or was unavailable at
that time, the accused could file for bail with another
branch of the RTC in Pampanga or in San Fernando
City. However, the accused filed her surety bond with
the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where it was
approved by Judge B.
Not only did Judge B erroneously order the
release of the accused, but he also failed to require
submission of the supporting documents needed in
the application for a bond:
1. There was no Certificate of Detention or Warrant
of Arrest attached to the bond transmitted by the
MTC to the Judge S.
2. The other supporting documents were belatedly
filed. Judge B approved the bail bond on Aug 21,
2003, but:
a. the Undertaking was dated Nov 22, 2003,
b. the Certification from the OCA was dated Oct
29, 2003, and
c. the Certification from Summit Guaranty was
dated Nov 22, 2003.
Judge B violated Sec. 14 and 16 of Rule 114.
Rule 114, Sec. 17
Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint
AM 04-1558; Apr 27, 2010
En Banc: Per Curiam
Facts:
An anonymous letter sent to CJ Davide, dated Oct
22, 2003 requesting the investigation of Judge Marilou
Tamang, Presiding Judge of MTC Pateros and Acting
Presiding Judge of MTC San Juan.
The letter complained that Judge T, through the
connivance of the arresting officer and court
employees
of
MTC
San
Juan,
had
been
indiscriminately approving fake bonds for a fee of
P1,000.00 per count ng kaso.
Investigation revealed that Judge T had approved
bail bonds issued by Covenant Assurance, despite
Covenant having been blacklisted since Dec 20, 2002.
It also appears that the RTC-153 Pasig City on Oct
22, 2003 revoked the unethical Orders of Release
issued by Judge T in various criminal cases assigned
to that branch. The order stated that Judge T had
approved the bail bonds issued by a blacklisted

company without any showing of the unavailability of
all the RTC Judges in Pasig, considering that the
accused persons posting the bail bonds were charged
in criminal cases pending before the RTC in Pasig and
were detained in the Pasig City Jail.
There are also 3 cases where the bail bonds were
secured in San Juan and approved by Judge T, despite
the presence and availability of RTC Judges in
Mandaluyong before whose courts the cases are
pending. Such approval was made in contravention of
the provisions of Sec. 17(a), Rule 114.
There were rare cases when Judge T approved
bail bonds secured from legitimate surety companies.
However, even in such cases, approval was made
without compliance with the provisions of Rule 114
because the accused were all detained in Pasig where
their cases were pending.
Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only the
bail bonds issued by Covenant, a blacklisted bonding
company, but also the bail bonds in some instances
for accused charged in cases pending outside her
territorial jurisdiction.
Issue:
Did Judge Tamang commit neglect of duty?
Held:
Yes.
Judge Tamang approved bail bonds issued by
Covenant although they manifestly lacked clearance
from the SC indicating that Covenant was qualified to
transact business with the courts. Covenant was a
blacklisted company at the time of issuance of the
bail bonds. She was thereby guilty of a neglect of
duty, for, the judge is still bound to review the
supporting documents before approving the bail
bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court who has the
duty to ascertain that the bail bonds are in order, and
that all requisites for approval have been complied
with.
The SC expressly enjoins a judge to carefully pore
over all documents before signing the documents and
giving them official imprimatur. The judges signing of
orders must not be taken lightly, or be regarded as
the usual paper work that passes through the judges
hands for signature.
Judge Tamangs excuse of simply relying on the
representation
of
the
court
personnel
who
unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and
kindness betrayed a deficiency in that requisite
degree of circumspection demanded of all those who
don the judicial robe.
She cannot now thereby exculpate herself, or take
refuge behind that excuse, for, in fact, such reliance
was actually her admission of being neglectful and of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 41 of 70
lacking the diligent care in paying attention to the

judicial matters brought to her for signature.
Sec. 17 (a), Rule 114 governs the approval of bail
bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judges
territorial jurisdiction. Under Sec. 17[a], the bail bond
may be filed either with the court where the case is
pending, or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if
no RTC Judge is available, with any MTC of the place
of arrest.
The list of approved bail bonds shows 34 involved
accused detained in Pasig City, 7 in Taguig City, 6 in
San Juan, and 1 in Pateros.
The remaining 3 cases involved accused who
voluntarily surrendered to Judge T in the San Juan
MTC. However, all of the criminal cases were pending
in the Pasig RTC.
Issue:
Judge Tamang contends that under Sec. 17(a),
Rule 114, the accused who were detained and who
voluntarily surrendered in San Juan could file their
applications for bail in San Juan; that the accused
detained in Pateros could do the same; and that the
bail applications of those detained in Taguig City were
legally approved, because she was then the Pairing
Judge of the MTC in Taguig City. Is Judge T correct?
Held:
As a judge then on detail in San Juan, Judge T was
correct in approving the applications for bail of the
accused who had voluntarily surrendered and been
detained in San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig City,
because Sec. 7(a), Rule 114, granted her the
authority to approve applications for bail of accused
detained within her territorial jurisdiction, in the event
of the unavailability of any RTC Judge in the area.
It is worth noting that at the time of the subject
bail applications, there was still no RTC Judge
stationed in San Juan and Pateros.
However, Judge T did not substantiate her explanation
that she had approved the bail applications of the
accused detained in Pasig City and had issued the
corresponding release orders after office hours on
Fridays.
Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao
[AM MTJ-04-1556. Mar 31, 2005]
1st Division: Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
In June 5, 2003, Purita Lim charged Judge Cesar
Dumlao of the MTC of San Mateo, Isabela, with
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Authority.
Lim averred that she filed two [2] criminal cases
for carnapping and theft with the RTC of Santiago
City, Isabela, Branch 35, against Herman Medina.

On May 8, 2003, Medina was apprehended and
detained at the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, Santiago City Jail, by virtue of a Warrant of
Arrest issued by then Presiding Judge Fe Albano
Madrid of Branch 35.
On May 9, 2003, Judge Dumlao issued 3 separate
orders for the release of Medina on the ground that he
had posted bail with his court.
Issue:
Was Judge Dumlao correct in ordering the release
of Medina?
Held:
No.
The criminal cases filed by Lim against Herman
Medina were pending before the RTC of Santiago City,
Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was
issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of
the said court. The order of release therefore, on
account of the posting of the bail, should have been
issued by that court, or in the absence or
unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of
an RTC in Santiago City. In this case, however, there
is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or
unavailable at the time of the posting of the bail
bond. In fact, Lim avers that on the day Judge
Dumlao ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid
and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela
were at their respective posts.
It is elementary that a MTC judge has no
authority to grant bail to an accused arrested outside
of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Sec.
17(a), Rule 114 must be complied with before a judge
may grant bail.
Judge Dumlao undeniably erred in approving the
bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected
to know that certain requirements ought to be
complied with before he can approve Medinas bail
and issue an order for his release.
Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail
of accused whose cases were not only pending in
other courts but who were, likewise, arrested and
detained outside his territorial jurisdiction is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law. It must be emphasized
that the rules of procedure have been formulated and
promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by
these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and
diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure
strict compliance therewith at all times in their
respective jurisdictions.
WHEREFORE, Judge Dumlao of the MTC, San
Mateo, Isabela, is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of
the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority and is hereby
SUSPENDED from office for a period of six (6) months
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 42 of 70
without salary and other benefits with a WARNING

that a repetition of the same shall merit a more
serious penalty.
Rule 114, Sec. 17 and 19
Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines
AM MTJ-07-167, 3Apr 19, 2007
2nd Division: Tinga J
Facts:
A verified Letter-Complaint was filed by Virginia
Savella charging Iluminada MTC-Sinait Judge Ines with
Serious Misconduct.
The Complaint stemmed from a criminal
complaint for Falsification filed by Savella against
Isabel Ibaez, before MTC-Vigan.
A warrant of arrest was not immediately served
on Ibaez because she was residing in the U.S.A. at
that time. On 18 April 2006, NBI operatives tried to
serve an alias warrant of arrest on Ibaez, who
reportedly returned to the RP to visit her hometown in
Sinait, Ilocos Sur. Ibaez, however, was not found at
her residence. Instead, her daughter produced a copy
of the Order issued by Judge Ines directing the
provisional release of Ibaez upon posting of a
P12,000 bail bond.
Savella claims that the Clerk of Court of MTCSinait did not forward the bail bond papers to the
court where the case was pending. This failure,
according to Savella, is tantamount to serious
misconduct. She further alleges that the order of
Judge Ines was highly irregular for it gave undue favor
and illegal accommodation to Ibaez who is known to
be a close friend of Judge Ines.
Judge Ines countered that on Holy Tuesday, 13
Apr 2006, Ibaez, together with her daughters,
dropped by her house, voluntarily surrendered to her,
and posted bail. Judge Ines called her clerk to prepare
the corresponding receipt for the cash bond.
However, on account of the Holy Week celebration
and the heavy workload in her court, so Judge Ines
claims, she forgot to transmit the bail bond papers to
MTC-Vigan until she was reminded by her Clerk of
Court when the latter was ordered by Judge Ante of
MTC-Vigan to immediately forward the bail bond
papers of Ibaez.
The OCA found Judge Ines guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and recommended a fine of
P5,000 with warning that a repetition of a similar
infraction in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Held:
As correctly pointed out by the OCA, Judge Ines
failed to properly apply the rule regarding the bail
bond application. Sec. 17, Rule 114 explicitly
provides that (b)ail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or, in the

absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
any RTC, MTC judge of the province or city or
municipality.
The instant falsification case against Ibaez was
filed before the MTC-Vigan, presided by Judge Ante.
There was no showing of the unavailability of Judge
Ante at that time. Judge Ines clearly erred in
entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of
the pendency of the falsification case before the MTC
of Vigan.
Assuming arguendo that Judge Ines rightfully
granted bail to Ibaez, her failure to transmit the
order of release and other supporting papers to the
court where the case is pending constitutes another
violation of the rules, particularly Sec. 19 of Rule 114.
Judge Ines should have forwarded the records
pertaining to the bail bond immediately after she
received the same.
Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled
authoritative doctrines. They should strive for
excellence exceeded only by their passion for truth, to
the end that they be the personification of justice and
the Rule of Law. When the law is sufficiently basic,
judges owe it to their office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be gross ignorance of
the law. This blatant violation of the rules exhibited by
Judge Ines is tantamount to gross ignorance of law or
procedure classified as a serious charge.
Rule 114, Sec. 8, 15, 18
Torrevillas v. Judge Navidad
AM RTJ 06-1976; Apr 29, 2009
En Banc: Carpio-Morales, J
Facts:
The Provincial Prosecutor, on July 1, 2002,
received a copy of a Motion to Grant Accused
Provisional Liberty filed by the accused. On July 11,
2002, the prosecution then interposed its Opposition
thereto, not knowing that, on July 2, 2002, Judge N
had already issued an order granting the accused
provisional liberty and approving the bonds filed by
the accused.
Complainant claims that the accused had been
charged with murder which is a non-bailable offense.
Judge N granted bail without conducting a hearing
and without affording the prosecution the opportunity
to prove the strength of its evidence.
Judge N denies that the prosecution was not
given the opportunity to prove the strength of its
evidence and that the petition for bail was granted
without a hearing.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 43 of 70
Judge N claims that an oral petition for bail had

been presented in open court which was duly heard
and partially argued. In fact, the prosecution had
allegedly energetically argued and suggested that the
defense reduce its petition into writing so the matter
can be brought up to the Provincial Prosecutor.
Issue:
Did Judge N violate Rule 114?
Held:
Yes. Anent the charge that he granted the
accused bail without a hearing, the record shows that,
in reality, no hearing had been conducted by Judge N
before he issued the order granting accused
provisional liberty and approving the bonds filed.
Judge Ns claim that there had been an oral
petition for bail which was extensively heard and
argued during the pre-trial of the cases on June 20,
2002 is not supported by the record.
While Judge N maintains that the stenographer
failed to take down the discussion on the oral petition
for bail, this is unsubstantiated and totally selfserving. The record speaks for itself and the transcript
of the stenographic notes is wholly bereft of any
reference to the oral petition for bail...
The motion filed by the accused for the grant of
provisional liberty was dated June 27, 2002 and was
received by the prosecution on July 1, 2002. On July 2,
2002 Judge N had issued an order granting said
motion.
Judge N contends that the motion filed by the
accused was in compliance with an order by the court
for the accused to file a formal petition for bail.
However, no such order requiring the accused to file a
formal petition for bail can be found in the record.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in
cases involving offenses punishable by D, RP, or LI,
whether bail is a matter of discretion.
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory
in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail, in cases where bail is a matter of
discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains
with the judge. In order for the latter to properly
exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence, he must
first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases
where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should
still be held.
After the hearing, the courts order granting or

refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence
of the prosecution and, based thereon, the judge
should formulate his own conclusion as to whether
the evidence so presented is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused. However, the July 2,
2002 order of Judge N judge does not contain such
summary and conclusion.
Since Judge N did not conduct the requisite
hearing before he granted bail, he violated of Sec. 8
and 18, Rule 114.
Judge Navidad should also be sanctioned for
placing the accused who were charged with heinous
crimes under the custody of Atty. Fiel, pending reinvestigation of the cases. The grant of bail based on
recognizance in these cases are not among the
instance the accused may be released on
recognizance under Sec. 15, Rule 114. The accused
may be released on recognizance under RA 6036, PD
603, and PD 968, as amended. Also, Sec. 16 of Rule
114, explicitly provides, A person in custody for a
period equal to or more than the minimum of the
principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged,
without application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released
on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the
discretion of the court.
Rule 114, Sec. 21
Mendoza v. Alarma
GR 151970; May 7, 2008
1st Division: Carpio, J
Facts:
Spouses Alarma are the owners of a parcel of
land located in Iba, Zambales.
The land, was posted as a property bond for the
provisional liberty of Joselito Mayo, charged with
illegal possession of firearms.
When Mayo failed to appear in court, the RTC
ordered his arrest and the confiscation of his bail
bond in favor of the government. RTC also directed
the bondsmen to produce within a period of 30 days
the person of the accused and to show cause why
judgment should not be entered against the bail
bond.
However, without a judgment being rendered
against the bondsmen, the RTC issued a writ of
execution against the land. The land was eventually
sold at public auction and Winston Mendoza emerged
as the highest bidders. Thus, the land was awarded
to Mendoza and they immediately took possession of
the same.
Sometime thereafter, Alarma filed a complaint for
recovery of property against Mendoza with the RTC
grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings
relating to the property bond.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 44 of 70
Issue:
Was the RTC correct in issuing the order of
execution against the land of Alarma?
Held:
No. Rule 114, Sec. 21 clearly provides for the
procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be
forfeited and a judgment on the bond rendered
against the surety.
Here are the 2 occasions upon which the trial
court judge may rule adversely against the bondsmen
in cases when the accused fails to appear in court:
1. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause
for the judge to summarily declare the bond as
forfeited.
2. Second, the bondsmen, after the summary
forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within
which to produce the principal and to show cause
why a judgment should not be rendered against
them for the amount of the bond.
It is only after this 30-day period, during which the
bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard
by the RTC, that the RTC may render a judgment on
the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against
the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such
judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and
an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the
accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their
inability to do so.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the
accused failed to appear in person before the RTC and
that the RTC declared his bail forfeited. The RTC gave
the bondsmen, a 30-day period to produce the
accused or a reasonable explanation for their nonproduction. However, 2 years had passed from the
time the RTC ordered the forfeiture and still no
judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen
for the amount of the bail.
Instead, an order of execution was issued and the
property was put up for sale and awarded to
Mendoza, the highest bidders.
These turn of events distinctly show that there
was a failure of due process of law. The execution
was issued, not on a judgment, because there was
none, but simply and solely on the declaration of
forfeiture.
An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is
conditional and interlocutory, there being something
more to be done such as the production of the
accused within 30 days. This process is also called
confiscation of bond.
An order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely
requires appellant to show cause why judgment
should not be rendered against it for the amount of
the bond. Such order is different from a judgment on
the bond which is issued if the accused was not

produced within the 30-day period.
The judgment on the bond is the one that
ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and
when it becomes final, execution may issue at once.
However, in this case, no such judgment was ever
issued and neither has an amount been fixed for
which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was
not strictly observed and this violated Alarma right to
procedural due process.
As a result, the basis for which title to the land had
been issued has no more leg to stand on. The
appellate court, therefore, was correct in ordering the
annulment of the title to the land as a matter of
course. There being no valid title nor any right to
possess the land, reconveyance to the Alarma is only
proper under the circumstances.
WILFREDO TALAG v. JUDGE REYES
AM RTJ-04-1852. June 3, 2004
1st Division: Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
Romeo Lacap filed a complaint against Wilfredo
Talag, for violation of BP 22 and Estafa.
Wilfredo Talag submitted his counter-affidavits
denying any participation in the transaction to
defraud Lacap.
Later, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an Information
for Estafa against Talag. The Information was filed
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, presided by Judge
Amor Reyes.
Talag filed a MR before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, praying for the dismissal of the complaint
against him for utter lack of merit. On even date, he
filed an Omnibus Motion before RTC:
1. to defer issuance of warrant of arrest and/or
to recall the same if already issued; and
2. to remand case to the Prosecutor pending
review of the MR.
According to Talag, on June 11, 2002, he
requested his counsel to determine whether the
hearing for the pending motions had already been
set. To his consternation, he was told by his counsel
that Judge Reyes ordered the issuance of a warrant of
arrest without first resolving the said motions.
Talag immediately filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA challenging the issuance of the warrant
of arrest. The CA issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from
enforcing the said warrant.
After the expiration of the TRO issued by the CA,
Judge Reyes issued another warrant of arrest against
Talag.
Talag filed a motion for Judge Reyess inhibition.
Meanwhile, Talag through counsel filed a Notice of
Change of Address.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 45 of 70
Judge Reyes denied the motion for inhibition and

set the case for arraignment on Dec 11, 2002. Talag
claims that said order never reached him or his
counsel since it was sent by registered mail to his
previous address inspite of the Notice of Change
Address which was filed as early as Aug 28, 2002.
Since Talag failed to attend his arraignment
allegedly due to lack of notice, Judge Reyes reset the
same to Jan 22, 2003. However, the second notice
was again sent to the wrong address at Makati City,
again resulting in Talags failure to attend his
arraignment. As a consequence, Judge Reyes issued a
bench warrant of arrest and confiscated the bond of
Talag.
Issue:
Did Judge Reyes act accordingly when she
confiscated the bond of Talag?
Held:
Yes. The issuance of a warrant of arrest and
confiscation of the bond of Talag on Jan 22, 2003 was
in accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114 in view of Talags
failure to appear despite notice to him and his
bondsman. The notice of change of address filed by
Talag pertains to the change of address of his counsel
and not to himself, hence, court processes were sent
to his alleged old address. Moreover, Produce
Orders of the Dec 11, 2002 and Jan 22, 2003 settings
were
sent
to
Talags
bondsman,
but
this
notwithstanding, Talags bondsman failed to produce
him in court and it even filed a motion of extension of
time to do so.
Talag blames the Judge Reyes for his failure to
appear at his arraignment because the notice was
sent to the wrong address despite a prior notice for
change of address. A cursory reading of the notice of
change of address will show that it pertains to the
counsels residence, not to Talags. In view of this, it
becomes reasonable for the court to assume that
court processes could be sent to Talags old and
unchanged residence. As correctly pointed out by
Judge Reyes, the Produce Order of the Dec 11, 2002
and Jan 22, 2003 settings were sent to Talags
bondsman.
Hence, in accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114, his
bondsman must produce him before the court on the
given date and failing to do so; the bond was forfeited
as it was.
Rule 114, Sec. 22 and 24
Bongcac v. SB
GR 156687-88 , May 21, 2009
1st Division: Carpio, J
Facts:
Panfilo Bongcac was the secretary of the mayor

of Tagbilaran City.
He was charged with Estafa defined and penalized
under Art. 315, 1(b) of the RPC before the SB. Upon
arraignment, Bongcac pleaded not guilty.
SB rendered judgment finding Bongcac guilty.
Bongcac filed a MR which was denied by the SB.
Bongcac filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the SC which sought the reversal of the Decision
of the SB.
SC issued a resolution denying the petition. No MR
was filed. Consequently, the Resolution of the SC
became final and executory.
SB issued a notice to Bongcac and counsel
directing them to be present for the execution of
judgment in the criminal case.
However, Bongcac filed a Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief with the SC which sought to
reverse and set aside the decision of the SB and to
declare that Bongcac is acquitted of the offense
charged.
Meanwhile, Bongcac filed with the SB, a
Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend
Further Proceedings praying that the execution of
judgment be held in abeyance to await the action of
this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for
Extraordinary Relief he filed with the SC
SB denied Bongcacs Manifestation and Very
Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings. SB
further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of
arrest against Bongcac to serve the sentence imposed
upon him. The cash bond posted by Bongcac for his
temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Bongcac
was given 5 days to voluntarily surrender.
Later, the SC denied the Very Urgent Petition
for Extraordinary Relief for lack of merit.
Issue:
Did the SB act correctly when it cancelled
Bongcacs cash bailbond?
Held:
No.
The cancellation of the bailbond was due to the
execution of the final judgment of conviction as
provided by Sec. 22 of Rule 114.
From this provision, it is clear that the
cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the
judgment of conviction.
The SB did not err in cancelling Bongcacs cash
bailbond after the judgment of conviction became
final and executory and its execution became
ministerial.
People v. Cawaling
GR 157147; Apr 17, 2009
3rd Division: Nachura, J
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 46 of 70
Facts:
Cawaling was charged with murder. The case
against him was dismissed [in] Feb 1991 because the
complainant, the wife of the victim, executed an
affidavit of waiver.
After the dismissal of the case, accused went to
Papua, New Guinea and upon his return in 1992 he
ran and was elected as barangay captain of Busay,
San Jose, Romblon.
In 1995 he ran for mayor but lost the election.
He then filed an election protest in this Court. On the
scheduled hearing of his protest, he was arrested and
upon inquiry with the arresting officer he was told
that the dismissed case was refiled, by the same
prosecutor who dismissed the original case.
On Dec 15, 1999, RTC found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice to the offense of
homicide.
RTC stated that accused, in case of appeal of the
Decision, may apply for bail pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule
114.
Cawaling took exception to the portion of the
RTC decision that convicted him as accomplice to
homicide, and appealed to the CA. But the CA
reversed the RTC decision, convicted Cawaling of
murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Held:
Lastly, we dispose of a corollary incident the
Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property bond
and post cash bond in lieu thereof filed by
bondsperson Margarita Cruz.
In this connection, Sec. 22 of Rule 114 is explicit.
With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and
the Courts consequent failure to execute the
judgment of conviction because of Cawalings flight,
the motion must be denied. The posted property bond
cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and
replaced with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless
Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate
proof of his death is presented.
We are not unmindful that Cruz posted the
property bond simply to accommodate Cawaling, a
relative, obtain provisional liberty.
However, under Sec. 1 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a
bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the
accused before any court as required under specified
conditions.
It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond
posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed temporary
liberty, which made it possible, quite easily, to flee
and evade punishment. As it stands now, Cawaling, a
convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the
property bond cannot be released.
Rule 114, Sec. 26

Borlongan v. Pena
GR 143591; May 5, 2010
2nd Division: Perez, J
Facts:
Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest,
accused immediately posted bail as they wanted to
avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of
Urban Bank.
On the scheduled date for the arraignment,
despite the accuseds refusal to enter a plea, the MTC
entered a plea of Not Guilty for them.
Issue:
Does the posting of bail constitute a waiver of

any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
Held:
No. The issues raised by accused have not been
mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and
were already arraigned.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting
of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been
superseded by Sec. 26, Rule 114.
The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of the arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his
plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto.
Sec. 26, Rule 114 is a new one, intended to
modify previous rulings of this Court that an
application for bail or the admission to bail by the
accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the
legalities or irregularities thereon.
The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this
Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in
nature because precisely, it was designed to supply
defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the
rules governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in
application. Besides, procedural rules as a general
rule operate retroactively, even without express
provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time
of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet
undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Issue:
Did the accused waive his right to question the
finding of probable cause after posting a bail bond?
Held:
No. Considering the conduct of the accused after
posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued
that she waived her right to question the finding of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 47 of 70
probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest

issued against her by the judge.
There must be clear and convincing proof that the
accused had an actual intention to relinquish her right
to question the 0existence of probable cause. When
the only proof of intention rests on what a party does,
his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Accused filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash,
Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation
on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail
bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that
they were not waiving their right to question the
validity of their arrest.
On the date of their arraignment, accused
refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the
issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with
the Court. Thus, when the MTC entered a plea of not
guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their
right to preclude them from raising the same with the
CA or SC.
The posting of bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it
should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to
assail their arrest.
Rule 114
BAIL
Sec. 1. Bail Defined

Bail
1 Definition:
The security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished
by him or a bondsman
2 Who furnishes the bail:
1 The person in custody whose release is
sought, or
2 A bondsman
3 Purpose:
To guarantee said persons appearance
before any court
4 Forms of bail:
1 Corporate surety,
2 Property bond,
3 Cash deposit, or
4 Recognizance
Constitutional provision on the right to bail
Art. III. Sec 13 All persons, except those charged

with offenses punishable by RP when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Comendador v. De Villa
GR 95020, Aug 20, 1991
Issue:
Does the right to bail apply to military
personnel under Court Martial?
Held:
The unique structure of the military should be
enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note
that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework
of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of
firearms by the government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other
insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of
and against the existing political system.
National security considerations should also
impress upon this Honorable Court that release on
bail of respondents constitutes a damaging
precedent.
Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the
assailed July 25, 1990 order were sustained, on
provisional bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting.
But, the truly disquieting thought is that they
could freely resume their heinous activity which could
very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted
authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with their
own concept of government and justice.
Issue:
Does this violate the equal protection clause?
Held:
No. This guaranty requires equal treatment only
of persons or a thing similarly situated and does not
apply where the subject of the treatment is
substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are
denied bail and other members of the military are not.
But they cannot say they have been discriminated
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 48 of 70
against because they are not allowed the same right

that is extended to civilians.
Purpose and Nature of Bail
The right to bail springs from the presumption
of innocence accorded every accused upon
whom should not be inflicted incarceration at
the outset since after the trial he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
established beyond reasonable doubt. [Go v.
Judge Benjamin A. Bongolan, Jul 26, 1999]
Person Applying for Bail must be in the Custody

of the Court
By its definition, bail requires that a person must
first be arrested or deprived of liberty before it can be
availed of. Thus, although the posting thereof is
tantamount to submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, it presupposes that the accused is under
detention or in the custody of law. Indeed, it would be
absurd and incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free. Hilario v. Ocampo, Dec 03, 2001
Theory of constructive custody
This is an exception to the General Rule that an
accused has to be arrested or has to voluntarily
surrender before he can admitted to bail
Paderanga v. CA
247 SCRA 741 (1995)
X, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the RTC during the
hearing for bail that he could personally appear as he
was then confined at the nearby General Hospital for
acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
medical clearance to leave the hospital.
The undeniable fact is that X was by then in the
constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the
RTC and the prosecutors agreed on that point since
they never attempted to have him physically
restrained.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person by:
1. 1st filing the application for bail with the trial
court;
2. 2nd furnishing true information of his actual
whereabouts;
3. 3rd unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of
the said court.
Moreover when it came to his knowledge that a
warrant for his arrest had been issued, X never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts
from the authorities since the day he was charged in

court, up to the submission of his application for bail,
and until the day of the hearing thereof.
*See also Santiago v. Vasquez 217 SCRA 633,
Jan 27, 1993
Types of Bail
Corporate Surety
Refers to the type of bail, similar to an insurance
contract whereby a bonding company will issue a
bond in the amount fixed by the court which will be
forfeited if the bonding company fails in its obligation
to warrant compliance with the conditions of bail.
Property Bond
Refers to a situation where property is put up by
the accused or somebody else to warrant compliance
with the conditions of bail. If such conditions are
violated, the said property will be sold at public
auction and the proceeds thereof, up to the amount of
bail fixed by the court will be forfeited in favor of the
government.
Cash Bond
Refers to the type of bail whereby the accused or
somebody else will actually deposit the amount fixed
by the court as bail to warrant compliance with the
conditions of bail. If these conditions are violated, the
money can be forfeited.
Recognizance
Refers to the type of bail where a person is
released in his own custody or to the custody of a
responsible person. This type of bail is allowable only
in the cases when specific provisions of the law or the
rules allow it.
Victory Liner v. Bellosillo
AM MTJ-00-1321, Mar 10, 2004
Requiring bail to be posted in cash and in the
amounts of P50T and P350T in cases of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide amounts to a denial
of the constitutional right to bail. The decision to post
a surety bond or cash as bail belongs to the accused
and the court cannot require him to post cash
Waiver of right to bail
1. Express waiver
2. Implied waiver failure to raise the issue at the
earliest opportune time, accused is deemed to
have waived the right to bail [People v. Manes,
303 SCRA 231, Feb 17, 1999]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 49 of 70
Bail in Extradition
1. US Government v. Puruganan No
2. HK Government v. Olalia Yes
Sec. 2.
Conditions
Requirements
of
the
Bail;
Conditions of the Bail

1 Effectivity:
1 The undertaking shall be effective upon approval
2 It shall remain in force at all stages of
the case until promulgation of the
judgment of the RTC irrespective of
whether the case was:
1 Originally filed in the RTC, or
2 Appealed to the RTC
3 It shall lose its effectivity if cancelled,
whether or not judgment has been
rendered by the RTC
2 Obligation of accused out on bail
He shall appear before the court
whenever required by the court or these
Rules
3 Effect of failure of accused to appear
at the trial without justification and
despite due notice:
1 It shall be deemed a waiver of his right
to be present thereat, and
2 The trial may proceed in absentia.
4 When the bondsman shall surrender
the accused to the court:
For execution of the final judgment
Contents
1 The original papers shall state:
1 the full name and address of the
accused,
2 the amount of the undertaking, and
3 the conditions required by Sec. 2
2 What must be attached to the bail
photographs of the accused:
1 passport size,
2 taken within the last 6 months,
3 showing his face, left and right profiles
The Court has the right to restrict the travel of
the Accused
1. Manotoc v. CA, May 30, 1986
2. Silverio v. CA, 195 SCRA 760 (1991)
3. Marcos v. SB, 247 SCRA 127 (1995)
When Presence of Accused Required
In certain stages of the proceedings, an accused

on bail or tried in absentia may be required to appear,
to wit:
1. during arraignment and plea, whether of
innocence or of guilt,
2. during trial whenever necessary for identification
purposes, and
3. at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a
light offense, in which case the accused may
appear by counsel or representative.
At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is
required and cannot be waived. [Lavides v. CA, 324
SCRA 321, Feb 1, 2000]
Note:
Arraignment is not a precondition for the granting
of bail. [Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321, Feb 1,
2000]
Sec. 3.
No Release or Transfer Except on
Court Order or Bail
A person under Detention by Legal Process shall NOT
be Released or Transferred Except:
1 Upon order of the court, or
2 When he is admitted to bail
Sec. 4.
Bail, a Matter of Right; Exception
When Bail is a Matter of Right

1 BEFORE conviction by the MTC;
2 AFTER conviction by the MTC pending
appeal;
3 BEFORE conviction by the RTC and
the imposable penalty for the offense
is NOT:
1 death,
2 reclusion perpetua, or
3 life imprisonment;
4 BEFORE conviction by the RTC:
1 for an offense punishable by:
1 death,
2 Reclusion perpetua, or
3 life imprisonment
2 But the evidence of guilt is NOT strong
Case:
1. San Miguel v. Judge Maceda [Apr 04, 2007]
Sec. 5.
Bail, When Discretionary
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 50 of 70
When Bail is Discretionary

1 Upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense NOT punishable by:
1 death,
3 life imprisonment,
2 Provided it is shown that:
1 The accused:
1 is NOT a recidivist,
2 is NOT a quasi-recidivist,
3 is NOT a habitual delinquent, or
4 has NOT committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
2 The accused has NOT:
1 escaped from legal confinement,
2 evaded sentence, or
3 violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
3 The accused did NOT commit the
offense while under:
1 Probation,
2 parole, or
3 conditional pardon;
4 The circumstances of the accuseds
case does NOT indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
5 There is NO undue risk that the
accused may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
Effect when Bail is Discretionary and the Accused files
a Notice of Appeal
1 The application for bail may be filed
and acted upon by the RTC:
If the original record has not yet been
transmitted to the appellate court
2 The application for bail can only be
filed and resolved by the appellate
court:
If the decision of the RTC convicting the
accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable
3 If the proper court grants the
application for bail:
1 The accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during
the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail,
2 However, this must be with the consent
of the bondsman
4 When it is the RTC which resolves the
application for bail:
1 The appellate court may review the
resolution of the RTC:
1 motu propio, or
2 on motion of any party, and
2 Notice must be given to the adverse
party
Note:
The conviction of the accused rebuts the
presumption of innocence. This shows that evidence
of guilt is strong.
Franciso Yap, Jr. v. CA
GR 141529, Jun 06, 2001
The importance attached to conviction is due to
underlying principle that bail should be granted only
where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is
removed by conviction it would, generally speaking,
be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tired and convicted the presumption of innocence
which may be relied upon in prior applications is
rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it
may be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction
that the accused is much more likely to attempt to
escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.
Case:
1. Chua v. CA and Chiok [Apr 12, 2007]
Sec. 6.
Capital Offense Defined
Definition of Capital Offense

An offense which may be punished with
Death:
1 At the time of its commission, and
2 At the time of the application for
admission to bail
Note:
1. Effect of mitigating circumstances The
criterion to determine whether the offense
charged is capital is the penalty provided by the
law regardless of the attendant circumstances.
The rationale of the provision lies in the difficulty
and impracticability of determining the nature of
the offense on the basis of the penalty actually
imposable. Otherwise, the test will require
consideration not only of evidence showing
commission of the crime but also evidence of the
aggravating
and
mitigating
circumstances.
[People v. IAC, Jan 10, 1987]
2. Evidence of minority [if established without
objection]
Where it has been established
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 51 of 70
without objection that accused is a minor, it

follows that, if convicted, he would be given "the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law,"
which effectively rules out the death penalty.
[Bravo v. Borja, Jr., Feb 18, 1985]
Sec. 7.
Capital offense or an
punishable by RP or LI, not bailable
offense
When bail shall be denied

1 BEFORE conviction by the RTC:
1 of an offense punishable by:
1 death,
3 life imprisonment, and
2 The evidence of guilt is strong;
2 AFTER conviction by the RTC, pending
appeal, of a offense punishable by:
1 death,
3 life imprisonment;
3 AFTER conviction by the RTC of an offense
with
an
imposable
penalty
of
imprisonment of more than 6 years but
not exceeding 20 years, and it is shown
that:
1 The accused:
1 is a recidivist,
2 is a quasi-recidivist,
3 is a habitual delinquent, or
4 has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
2 The accused has:
1 escaped from legal confinement,
2 evaded sentence, or
3 violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
3 The accused committed the offense
while under:
1 probation,
2 parole, or
3 conditional pardon;
4 The circumstances of the accuseds
case indicates the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
5 There is undue risk that the accused
may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
Case:
1. Laarni Valerio v. CA [Oct 10, 2007]
Sec. 8.
Burden of proof in bail application
Procedure and Requirements in the Application

for Bail:
1 An application for bail is filed by a person
who is in custody for the commission of an
offense punishable by death, RP, or LI;
2 There must be a hearing to determine as
to whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong;
3 The burden is on the prosecution to prove
that the evidence of guilt is strong;
4 The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but
5 The court may recall any witness for
additional examination:
1 upon motion of either party,
2 unless the witness to be called is:
1 dead,
2 outside the Philippines, or
3 otherwise unable to testify
Note:
1. A hearing to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong is mandatory. Absent
such hearing, the order granting bail is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. EVEN IF THE PETITION FOR BAIL HAS
THE PROSECUTORS CONFORMITY [Narciso v.
Cruz, Mar 17, 2000]
2. What is discretionary on the part of the court in a
hearing under Section 8 is only the determination
of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. Where the imposable penalty is death, RP or LI
and the accused files an application for bail, the
courts discretion is limited to determining
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
4. If the evidence of guilt is strong the court MUST
DENY bail. On the other hand if the evidence of
guilt is not strong the court MUST GRANT bail.
Steps to be taken by the judge when there is an
application for bail [Basco v. Rapatalo, 269
SCRA 220
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the evidence of the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 52 of 70
of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be

denied.
Duties of the Judge when Application for Bail is
Filed [Zuno v. Cabebe, Nov 26, 2004]
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation [Sec. 18, Rule 114];
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion [Sec. 7 and 8, Rule
114];
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bail bond
[Sec.19]; otherwise the petition should be denied.
Note:
1. Summary bail hearing cannot be joined with the

regular trial [Grageda v. Tresvalles, Feb 2,
2004]
2. Counsel for private complainant may appear in

court to oppose bail application even without
authority fro, the public prosecutor [Goodman v.
Dela Victoria, Feb 16, 2000]
3. The order granting or refusing bail must contain a

summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. [People v. Presiding Judge, Jun 8,
2004]
Character and reputation of the

accused;
5
Age and health of the accused;
6
Weight of the evidence against the
accused;
7
Probability of the accused appearing
at the trial;
8
Forfeiture of other bail;
9
The fact that the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested;
and
1
Pendency of other cases where the
0
accused is on bail.
2 Excessive bail shall not be required
Sec. 10.
Corporate Surety
Requisites for Providing a Bail Bond in the form

of a Corporate Security
1 It must be provided by a domestic or
foreign corporation which is:
1 licensed as a surety, and
2 authorized to act as a surety;
2 It must be:
1 Jointly subscribed by:
1 the accused, and
2 an officer of the corporation; and
2 Authorized by its board of directors
Sec. 11.
Property Bond, How Posted
4. The private complainant has the standing to

question the granting of bail to the accused on
certiorari without the approval of the SolGen
[People v. Calo, Jun 18, 1990]
Sec. 9.
Amount of Bail; Guidelines
Guidelines for the Judge in Fixing Amount of

Bail
1 The amount should be reasonable
considering primarily, but not limited
to, the following factors:
1
Financial ability of the accused to give
bail;
2
Nature and circumstances of the
offense;
3
Penalty for the offense charged;
Property Bond
1 Definition:
It is an undertaking constituted as lien
on the real property given as security
for the amount of the bail
2 Procedure Within ten (10) days
after the approval of the bond:
1 The accused shall cause the annotation
of the lien:
1 On the certificate of title on file:
1 if the land is registered with the
Registry of Deeds, or
2 if
unregistered
in
the
Registration Book on the space
provided therefor, in the Registry
of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies, and
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 53 of 70
2 On the corresponding tax declaration

in the office of the provincial, city
and municipal assessor concerned.
2 The accused shall submit to the court
his compliance and his failure to do so
shall be sufficient cause for:
1 The cancellation of the property
bond, and
2 His re-arrest and detention
Sec. 12.
Qualifications
Property Bond
of
Sureties
Sureties of Property Bond

1 Qualification:
Must be a resident owner of real estate
within the Philippines
2 Value of the property of surety:
1 If there is only one [1] surety his real
estate must be worth at least the
amount of the undertaking
2 If there are 2 or more sureties each
may justify in an amount less than that
expressed in the undertaking but the
aggregate of the justified sums must be
equivalent to the whole amount of the
bail demanded
3 Every surety must be worth the
amount
specified
in
his
own
undertaking over and above all:
1 just debts,
2 obligations, and
3 properties exempt from execution
Sec. 13.
Justification of sureties
Other Requirements:
1 Obligations of a surety:
1 He must justify by affidavit taken
before the judge that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed in Sec. 12
2 He must describe the property given as
security, stating:
1 the nature of his title,
2 its encumbrances
3 the number and amount of other
bails entered into by him and still
undischarged, and
4 his other liabilities.
2 The court may examine the sureties upon

oath concerning their sufficiency in such
manner as it may deem proper.
3 No bail shall be approved unless the
surety is qualified.
Sec. 14.
in
Deposit of Cash as Bail
Cash Bond as Bail

1 Who may deposit the cash bond:
1 The accused, or
2 Any person acting in his behalf
2 Where the cash bond may be
deposited:
1 The nearest collector of internal
revenue, or
2 Provincial, city, or municipal treasurer
3 How much shall be deposited:
1 The amount of bail fixed by the court,
or
2 The amount recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the
case
4 When accused shall be discharged
from custody Upon submission of:
1 a proper certificate of deposit, and
2 a
written
undertaking
showing
compliance with the requirements of
Sec. 2
5 What
happens
to
the
money
deposited:
1 It shall be considered as bail,
2 It shall be applied to the payment of
fine and costs,
3 The excess, if any, shall be returned:
1 to the accused [whether convicted or
acquitted], or
2 to whoever made the deposit
Note:
1. It is NOT the discretion of trial judges the question
of whether a bail should be posted in the form of
corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit or
personal
recognizance
[Victory
Liner
v.
Bellosillo, March 10, 2004]
2. The judge cannot personally accept the cash bond
of the accused [Lachica v. Tormis, Sep 20,
2005]
Sec. 15.
Recognizance
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 54 of 70
Recognizance
1 Definition:
An obligation of record, entered into
before some court or magistrate duly
authorized to take it, with the condition
to do some particular act, the most
usual condition in criminal cases being
the appearance of the accused for trial
2 When may a person in custody be
released on recognizance :
1 Whenever allowed by law, or
2 Whenever allowed by these rules
3 In whose recognizance may a person
be released:
1 on his own, or
2 on that of a responsible person
When
Recognizance
Allowed
[Espiritu
v.
Jovellanos, Oct 16, 1997]
1. when the offense charged is for violation of an
ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal offense, the
imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6
months imprisonment and/or P2,000 fine, under
the circumstances provided in RA 6036;
2. where a person has been in custody for a period
equal to or more than the minimum of the
imposable principal penalty, without application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, in which case the court, in its
discretion, may allow his release on his own
recognizance;
3. where the accused has applied for probation,
pending resolution of the case but no bail was
filed or the accused is incapable of filing one; and
4. in case of a youthful offender held for physical and
mental examination, trial, or appeal, if he is
unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances
envisaged in PD 603, as amended (Art. 191).
RA 7610, Sec. 25. Rights of Children Arrested
for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict
Any child who has been arrested for reasons
related to armed conflict, either as combatant,
courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following
rights:
1. Separate detention from adults except where
families are accommodated as family units;
2. Immediate free legal assistance;
3. Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or
guardians of the child; and
4. Release of the child on recognizance within 24
hours to the custody of the DSWD or any
responsible member of the community as
determined by the court.
PD 603, Art. 191. Care of Youthful Offender

Held for Examination or Trial
A youthful offender held for physical and mental
examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to
furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest be
committed to the care of the DSWD or the local
rehabilitation center or a detention home in the
province or city which shall be responsible for his
appearance in court whenever required: Provided,
that in the absence of any such center or agency
within a reasonable distance from the venue of the
trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall
provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from
other detainees.
The court may, in its discretion, upon
recommendation of the DSWD or other agency or
agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful
offender on recognizance, to the custody of his
parents or other suitable person who shall be
responsible for his appearance whenever required.
SC Circular 20-79, RA 6036
1. Sec. 1 Any provision of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be
required of a person charged with:
a. violation of a municipal or city
ordinance,
b. a light felony
c. a criminal offense the prescribed
penalty for which is not higher than 6
months imprisonment and/or a fine of
P2,000, or both,
where said person has established to the
satisfaction of the court or any other appropriate
authority hearing his case that he is unable to
post the required cash or bail bond, except,
xxx
2. Sec. 2 Instead of bail, the person charged with
an offense contemplated by Sec. 1 hereof shall be
required to sign in the presence of 2 witnesses
of good standing in the community a sworn
statement binding himself, pending final decision
of his case, to report to the Clerk of the Court
hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The
Court may, in its discretion and with the consent
of the person charged, require further that he be
placed under the custody and subject to the
authority of a responsible citizen in the community
who may be willing to accept the responsibility. In
such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall
include a statement of the person charged that he
binds himself to accept the authority of the citizen
so appointed by the Court. Xxx
Where a person is charged with any offense
contemplated by RA 6036, the Judge order the
release of the accused on recognizance instead
of requiring bail.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 55 of 70
Case:
1. Tabao v. Judge Barataman [Apr 11, 2002]
required;
3 Rule 112, Sec. 9 [b] If the judge is
satisfied that there is no necessity for
placing the accused under custody, he
may issue summons instead of a warrant
of arrest
Sec. 16.
Bail, When not Required;
Reduced Bail or Recognizance
Sec. 17.
When Bail Not Required
1 When provided by the law, or
2 When provided by these Rules
Sec. 16 Effects:
Situation
Effect
The accused has been in

custody equal to the
possible
maximum
imprisonment prescribed
for the offense charged
[without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or
the
proceedings
on
appeal]
He shall be
release
immediately
If accused is in custody
and the maximum penalty
to which he may be
sentenced is destierro
He shall be
released
after 30 days
of preventive
imprisonmen
t
If he has been in custody

for a period equal to or
more than the minimum
of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense
charged
[without
application
of
the
Indeterminate
Sentence
Law or any modifying
circumstance]
He shall be
released on
reduced bail
or on his own
recognizance
,
at
the
discretion of
the court
When the Accused is Exempt From Putting Up

Bail
1 RA 6036 When the offense has an
imposable penalty of 6 months or less
under the conditions mentioned therein;
2 Rule 114, Sec. 16 When a case is filed
under the Summary Rules, a mere notice
is sufficient, a warrant of arrest is not
Bail, Where Filed
Where Petition for Bail is Filed

1 General Rule
With the court where the case is
pending
2 Exceptions the petition may be
filed:
1 With any RTC or MTC judge in the
province, city or municipality when
the judge where the case is pending is
absent or unavailable
2 With the RTC of the place where the
accused is arrested if arrested in a
place other than where the case is
pending
3 With the MTC of the place where the
accused is arrested if RTC judge of the
place where is arrested is not available
3 When Bail can ONLY be Granted in
the court where the case is pending
[whether on trial or appeal]:
1 When the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion, and
2 When the accused seeks to be released
on recognizance
4 When the person in custody is NOT
yet charged in court:
The petition may be filed with any court
in the province, city or municipality
where he is held [This applies to
Inquest]
Exception to the Exception:

Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion,
or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance,
the application may only be filed in the court where
the case is pending
When accused is arrested Where he can File

Bail [Espanol v. Mupas, Nov 11, 2004]
1. If the accused is arrested in the same province,
city or municipality where his case is pending
where his case is pending or, in the absence or
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 56 of 70
unavailability of the judge thereof, with another

branch of the same court within the province or
city
2. If the accused is arrested in the province, city or
municipality other than where his case is pending:
a. in the court where his case is pending or,
b. with any RTC in the province, city or
municipality where he was arrested.
c. When no RTC judge is available, he may file
bail with any MTC judge therein.
Note:
A judge who approves applications for bail of
accused whose cases were not only pending in other
courts but who were, likewise, arrested and detained
outside his territorial jurisdiction is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Cases:
1. Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao [Mar 31, 2005]
2. Savella v. Judge Ines [Apr 19, 2007]
Sec. 18. Notice of Application to Prosecutor
What the Court must do when it Receives an
Application for Bail under Sec. 8
1 It must give reasonable notice of the
hearing to the prosecutor, or
2 It must require the prosecutor to submit
his recommendation
Note when Bail is a Matter of Right

1. Even if bail is a matter of right, the prosecutor
must still be notified of the application
2. A hearing must still be conducted to determine
the amount of bail [Ruiz v. Beldia, Feb 16,
2005]
Sec. 19.
Release on Bail
Procedure for Release on Bail

1 The accused can only be discharged upon
approval of the bail by the judge with
whom the petition was filed
2 When the motion for bail is filed with a
court other than where the case is
pending:
1 The judge who accepted the bail shall
forward it, to the court where the case
is pending,
2 He must include the order of release
and other supporting papers, and
3 The court where the case is pending

may, for good reason, require a
different bail to be filed.
Case:
1. Savella v. Judge Ines [Apr 19, 2007]
Sec. 20.
Increase or Reduction of Bail
Increase or Reduction of Bail

1 After the accused is admitted to bail, the
court may, upon good cause, either
increase or reduce its amount;
2 When increased the accused may be
committed to custody if he does not give
bail in the increased amount within a
reasonable period;
3 An accused held to answer a criminal
charge who is released without bail upon
filing of the complaint or information,
may:
1 at any subsequent stage of the
proceedings, and whenever a strong
showing of guilt appears to the court,
2 be required to give bail in the amount
fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to
custody
Sec. 21.
Forfeiture of Bail
Forfeiture of Bail
1 When the presence of the accused is
required by the court or these Rules:
His bondsmen shall be notified to
produce him before the court on a
given date and time.
2 If the accused fails to appear in
person as required:
1 His bail shall be declared forfeited, and
2 The bondsmen are given 30 days within
which:
1 to produce their principal, and
2 to show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against them for
the amount of their bail.
3 Within the 30 day period, the
bondsmen must:
1 Produce the body of their principal or
give the reason for his non-production;
and
2 Explain why the accused did not appear
before the court when first required to
do so.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 57 of 70
4 Effect of failure of bondsman to

comply with the above requisites:
1 A judgment shall be rendered against
the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for
the amount of the bail, and
2 The court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen,
unless the accused:
1 has been surrendered, or
2 is acquitted.
1. Judgment against bondsman
Reliance Surety v. Amante
462 SCRA 399
June 30, 2005
Second Division: Tinga, J.
Two [2] occasions upon which the may rule
adversely against the bondsman in cases when
the accused fails to appear in court:
1. First, the non-appearance by the accused is cause
for the judge to summarily declare the bond as
forfeited.
2. Second, the bondsman, after the summary
forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days within
which to produce the principal and to show cause
why a judgment should not be rendered against
them for the amount of the bond.
Note:
1. It is only after this 30-day period, during which the
bondsman is afforded the opportunity to be heard
by the trial court, that the trial court may render a
judgment on the bond against the bondsman.
2. Judgment against the bondsman cannot be
entered unless such judgment is preceded by the
order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the
bondsman to produce the accused or to adduce
satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.
[Reliance Surety v. Amante, Jun 30, 2005]
3. The judge CANNOT order the forfeiture of bail and
the detention of accused for the failure of his
counsel to appear during trial. The presence of
counsel is not a condition of the bail [Andres v.
Beltran, Aug 20, 2001]
Case:
1. Talag v. Judge Reyes [Jun 03, 2004]
Sec. 22.
Cancellation of Bail
Cancellation of Bail
1 Requisites:
1 An application for cancellation must be

filed by the bondsmen,
2 Due notice must be given to the
prosecutor, and
3 The bail may be cancelled upon:
1 surrender of the accused, or
2 proof of his death
2 When
bail
shall
be
deemed
automatically cancelled:
1 upon acquittal of the accused,
2 upon dismissal of the case, or
3 upon execution of the judgment of
conviction.
3 Effect of cancellation:
It shall be without prejudice to any
liability on the bail
Take Note:
1. Esteban v. Alhambra, Sep 7, 2004
2. People v. Caparas, Mar 9, 1988
Other Instances where Bail may be Cancelled:
Aside from the instances enumerated in Sec. 22
of Rule 114, the surety, upon application filed with the
court, may also be relieved from the non-appearance
of the bond where its performance is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee
[Government] or the act of the law. The exoneration
under the second category is predicated upon the
principle that the Government, as the obligee in the
bond, cannot by its own acts prevent the fulfillment of
the conditions of the bond by the sureties and at the
same time demand its forfeiture. [Philippine
Phoenix v. SB, Apr 29, 1987]
Sec. 23.
Arrest of Accused Out on Bail
Arrest of Accused Out on Bail

1 Who may execute the arrest for the
purpose of surrendering the accused:
1 The bondsmen, or
2 Upon written authority endorsed on a
certified copy of the undertaking, the
bondsmen may cause him to be
arrested by
1 a police officer, or
2 any other person of suitable age and
discretion.
2 When accused released on bail may
be re-arrested without the necessity
of a warrant:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 58 of 70
if he attempts to depart from the

Philippines without permission of the
court where the case is pending.
Note:
1. SB may prohibit a person out on bail from leaving
the country [Santiago v. Vasquez. Jan 27,
1993]
2. MTC has no authority to issue a hold departure
order. Circular No. 39-97 specifically provides that
hold-departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC [Mondejar v. Buban, Jul 12, 2001]
Sec. 24.
Exception
No
Bail
After
Final
Judgment;
Bail After Final Judgment of Conviction:

1 After Final Judgment of Conviction:
1 General Rule Bail is NOT allowed
2 Exceptions If before such finality,
the accused applies for probation:
1 He may be allowed temporary liberty
under his bail, or
2 The court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a
responsible
member
of
the
community:
1 when no bail was filed, or
2 when the accused is incapable of
filing one,
2 After the accused has commenced to
serve sentence:
Bail is NOT allowed
Note:
Vicente v. Majudcon [June 23, 2005]
Sec. 25.
Court Supervision of Detainees
Court Supervision of Detainees:

1 The court shall exercise supervision over
all persons in custody for the purpose of
eliminating unnecessary detention;
2 The executive judges of the RTCs shall:
1 conduct monthly personal inspections
of provincial, city, and municipal jails
and
the
prisoners
within
their
respective jurisdictions,
2 ascertain the number of detainees,
3 inquire
on
their
proper
accommodations and health,
4 examine the condition of the jail

facilities,
5 order the segregation of sexes and of
minors from adults,
6 ensure the observance of the right of
detainees to confer privately with
counsel, and
7 strive to eliminate conditions inimical to
the detainees;
3 In cities and municipalities to be specified
by the Supreme Court, the MTC judges
shall:
1 conduct monthly personal inspections
of the municipal jails in their respective
municipalities, and
2 submit a report to the executive judge
of the RTC having jurisdiction therein;
2 A monthly report of such visitation shall
be submitted by the executive judges to
the Court Administrator which shall state:
1 the total number of detainees,
2 the names of those held for more than
30 days,
3 the duration of detention,
4 the crime charged,
5 the status of the case,
6 the cause for detention, and
7 other pertinent information.
Sec. 26.
Bail not a Bar to Objections on
Illegal Arrest, Lack of or Irregular PI
Effect on illegal arrest
1 Effect of application or admission to
bail It shall not bar the accused
from:
1 Challenging:
1 the validity of his arrest, or
2 the legality of the warrant issued
therefor; or
2 Assailing
the
regularity
of
or
questioning the absence of a PI of the
charge against him [provided that he
raises them before entering his plea]
2 Requisite for accused to be entitled
to the above:
He must raise them before entering his
plea
3 When the court shall resolve the
matter on whether or not to grant
bail:
As early as practicable but not later
than the start of the trial of the case
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 59 of 70
Note:
This abandons the ruling in the case of People v.
Timon 281 SCRA 597 (1997) and similar cases that
an application for bail constitutes a waiver of right of
the accused to question whatever irregularities and
defects attended the arrest
This principle was reiterated as lately as the case
of People v. Carmen Lacson GR 126174, Aug 29,
2000.
Note:
1. Arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to
the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail.
[Serapio v. SB, Jan 28, 2003]
2. An application for or admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a PI, provided that he
raises them before entering his plea [Yusop v.
SB, Feb 22, 2001]
Rule 116, Sec. 1[g]
People v. Alfredo Pangilinan
GR 171020, 14 March 2007
EN BANC: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Two informations were filed charging Pangilinan
with raping AAA, his daughter.
1. 5 May 1997 P, who was arrested and detained
with no bail recommended, filed a petition for bail.
2. 23 April 1998 RTC, finding that the evidence
against P is strong, denied Ps petition for bail.
3. Defense presented its evidence with P as the sole
witness.
4. 9 June 1999 RTC, having discovered that P had
not
yet
been
arraigned,
scheduled
his
arraignment.
5. 17 June 1999, P, with the assistance of counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him.
6. 9 Sep 1999 RTC convicted Pangilinan of two
counts of rape.
P assails his conviction because he was not
properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after
the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity,
he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to
the Pangilinan and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation
against him.
He claims that his subsequent
arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial
proceedings because at the time the petition for bail
was heard, the RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction
over his person.
Issue:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person
on Pangilinan?
Held:
Yes. When the hearings for his petition for bail
were conducted, the RTC had already acquired
jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. In the case
at bar, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the Pangilinan when he was arrested on 19 Mar
1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on
the RTC jurisdiction over his person.
Issue:
Were Pangilinans rights and interests prejudiced
by the fact that he was arraigned only after the case
was submitted for decision?
Held:
No. Ps belated arraignment did not prejudice
him. This procedural defect was cured when his
counsel participated in the trial without raising any
objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.
In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the
prosecution
witnesses. His
counsels
active
participation in the hearings is a clear indication that
he was fully aware of the charges against him;
otherwise, his counsel would have objected and
informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no protest was made when Pangilinan
was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not
question the procedure undertaken by the RTC. It is
only now, after being convicted and sentenced to 2
death sentences, that P cries that his constitutional
right has been violated. It is already too late to raise
this procedural defect.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where
the
same
issue
was
raised
under
similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of
accused was conducted after the cases had been
submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and
has been fully cured.
Olbes v. Judge Buemio
(Note: This has nothing to do with Sec.1, Rule
117. It is more applicable in Rule 119)
Facts: June 28, 2002: Federico Miguel Olbes (Olbes)
was indicted for Grave Coercion before the MeTC of
Manila.
October 28, 2002: Olbes posted bail and was
released.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 60 of 70
February 12, 2003: Olbes pleaded not guilty to the

charge during his arraignment. This was after his
motion to defer or suspend arraignment was denied.
Pre-trial was set to May 28, 2003, however, because it
was declared a non-working holiday due to the
occurrence of typhoon, the pre-trial was reset to
October 23, 2003
At the scheduled date for pre-trial, Olbes failed to
appear prompting the trial court to issue a warrant of
arrest, however, such order was recalled because of
the fact that Olbes nor his counsel was notified for the
said rescheduled date, hence, a pre-trial was again
reset on January 21, 2004
November 23, 2003: Olbes filed a motion to dismiss
the information on the ground of violation of his right
to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
and the Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98.
Judge Danilo Buemio denied his motion holding that
Olbes played a big part in the delay of the case and
technical rules procedure were meant to secure, not
override, substantial justice.
Olbes filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by Judge Buemio.
Olbes draws attention to the time gap of 105 days
from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the
first pre-trial to May 28, 2003 and another gap of 148
days from the latter date up to the second pre-trial on
October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days a clear
contravention of the 80 day limit from arraignment to
trial.
Issue:
Whether there is violation of Olbes right to speedy
trial.
Held:
No. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How,
the Court stressed that the exceptions consisting of
the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle
that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily
involves a degree of flexibility.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do
not thus preclude justifiable postponements and
delays when so warranted by the situation.To the
Court, the reasons for the postponements and delays
attendant to the present case reflected above are not
unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither
petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the resetting
of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears
to have been occasioned by oversight or simple
negligence which, standing alone, does not prove
fatal to the prosecutions case. The faux pas was
acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled
the arrest warrant it had issued against petitioner
under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been

duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the
rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and
(d) prejudice to the defendant.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether
an accused has been denied his constitutional right to
a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case,
taking into account several factors such as the length
and reason of the delay, the accuseds assertion or
non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the
accused resulting from the delay,29 the Court does
not find petitioner to have been unduly and
excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
Rule 116, Sec. 3
People v. Rogelio Gumimba
GR 174056, 27 Feb 2007
En Banc: TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Gumimba was charged before the RTC, with rape
with homicide of an 8-year old child. G entered a plea
of not guilty on arraignment.
Later, G manifested though counsel that he would
like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of
guilty. RTC ordered Gumimbas re-arraignment and G
entered a plea of guilty. RTC conducted an inquiry to
ascertain the voluntariness of Gs plea and his full
comprehension of the consequences thereof.
Prosecution was charged to establish the guilt
and degree of culpability of G. On the basis of Gs
plea of guilty, RTC found him guilty.
Issue:
Was the RTC correct in allowing G to change his
plea to guilty?
Held:
No. RTC failed in its duty to conduct the
prescribed searching inquiry into the voluntariness
of Gs plea of guilty and full comprehension thereof.
Gs guilty plea was made improvidently and it is
rendered inefficacious.
The Information, to which G pleaded guilty,
alleged that homicide was committed by reason or on
the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would
warrant the penalty of death at that time.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 61 of 70
Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into

play Sec. 3, Rule 116.
When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered, 3 conditions must be observed by the RTC to
obviate an improvident guilty:
1. it must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the
accused of the consequences of his plea;
2. it must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and
3. it must ask the accused whether he desires to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to
do so if he so desires.
Here, when G entered a plea of guilty, the RTC did
not strictly observe Sec. 3, Rule 116. A mere warning
that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death
is insufficient. Such procedure falls short of the
exacting guidelines in the conduct of a searching
inquiry, viz:
1. Ascertain from G himself:
a. how he was brought into the custody of the
law;
b. whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and PI; and
c. under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations.
This is intended to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of
duress either by actual threats of physical harm
coming from malevolent quarters or simply because
of the judges intimidating robes.
2. Ask Gs counsel a series of questions as to
whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to G the meaning and consequences of
a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of
G, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform G of the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such sentence.
For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the
hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that
the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it
not only the admission of authorship of the crime
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which
he is charged and to fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his

indictment.
Failure of the court to do so would constitute a
violation of his fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation against him and
a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to G should be in a language
known and understood by him
7. RTC judge must satisfy himself that G, in pleading
guilty, is truly guilty. G must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.
Rule 116, Sec. 9
Hubert Webb v. Judge de Leon
GR 121234 August 23, 1995
2nd Division: Puno, J
Facts:
On June 19, 1994, NBI filed with the DOJ a lettercomplaint charging Hubert Webb with Rape with
Homicide. DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to
conduct PI of those charged with the rape & killing on
Jun 30, 1991 of Carmela Vizconde, et al.
During PI, NBI presented the sworn statement
dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Jessica
Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the
crime.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Webb filed
with the DOJ a Motion for Production and Examination
of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce:
1. Certification issued by FBI on admission and stay
of Hubert Webb in the U.S. from Mar 9, 1991 to
Oct 22, 1992.
2. Records of arrest, interview, investigation and
other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other
than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement)
conducted by NBI and other police agencies;
The motion was granted by DOJ and NBI submitted
photocopies of the documents. It alleged it lost the
original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of
Alfaro.
Webb failed to obtain from the NBI the copy of the
FBI Report despite his request.
Later, DOJ found probable cause to hold Webb for
trial" and filed an information for rape with homicide
against Webb with RTC.
Webb charges NBI with violating his right to
discovery during PI by suppressing the April 28, 1995
original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and FBI
Report.
Issue:
Is Webb entitled to discovery proceedings
during PI?
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 62 of 70
Held:
Yes. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and
as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of
persons under PI it deserves serious consideration.
To start with, our Rules on do not expressly
provide for discovery proceedings during the PI stage.
But Sec. 10 and 11 of Rule 117 [now Rule 116, Sec. 9]
do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of
particulars and for production or inspection of
material evidence in possession of the prosecution.
But these provisions apply after the filing of the
Information in court.
This failure to provide discovery procedure during
PI does not, however, negate its use by a person
under investigation when indispensable to protect his
constitutional right to life, liberty and property. PI is
not too early a stage to guard against any significant
erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a
potential accused. As discussed, the object of a PI is
to determine the probability that the suspect
committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life,
liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution.
Here, the risk to the liberty of Webb cannot be
understated for he is charged with rape with
homicide, a non-bailable offense when evidence of
guilt is strong.
The right to have a PI conducted before being
bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right.
A PI should therefore be scrupulously conducted
so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential
accused can be protected from any material damage.
We uphold the legal basis of the right of Webb to
demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original
copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro
and the FBI Report during their PI considering their
exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable
materiality to the issue of their probable guilt.
Rule 116, Sec. 11
Spouses Trinidad v. Ang
-- September 2007: Office of the City Prosecutor
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
Information for violation of BP 22 against spouses
Trinidad
--October 10, 2007: Sps Trinidad filed a petition for
review with the DOJ
--March 2009: Information was filed.
--Spouses filed a motion to defer arraignment in view
of the pendency of their petition before the DOJ
--This was granted. Instead of the set arraignment

date on Aug 10, 2009, this was moved to Sept 10,
2009
Issue (pertinent to Sec 11 Rule 116):
Whether the setting of the arraignment after
the lapse of 1 year and 10 months due to the pending
review of DOJ is valid
Held:
No. While the pendency of a petition for review
is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
provision
limits
the
deferment
of
the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to
deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their
petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007.
When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners
on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had
already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60day limit provided for by the Rules.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
v. How were all
decided prior to the amendment to Section 11
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time
these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit
on the suspension of arraignment.
Rule 117, Sec. 3
MELBAROSE SASOT v. PEOPLE
[GR 143193. June 29, 2005]
2nd Division: Austria-Martinez, J.:
Facts:
The NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a
complaint by NBA Properties against Sasot for
possible violation of Art.189 of the RPC on unfair
competition.
NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of the U.S.A. and is the
registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of
NBA basketball teams such as CHICAGO BULLS, LOS
ANGELES LAKERS, etc.
These names are used on hosiery, footwear, tshirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts,
and other garment products, which are allegedly
registered with the Bureau of Trademarks
NBI discovered that Sasot was engaged in the
manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of
counterfeit NBA garment products. Hence, it
recommended
Sasots
prosecution
for
unfair
competition.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 63 of 70
In an SPA, NBA Properties President then

constituted the law firm of Ortega as NBAs attorneyin-fact, and to act for and on its behalf, in the filing of
the proper complaints. The SPA was notarized by
Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by
Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the
Supreme Court of NY. Consul Rebong of the Consulate
General of the RP, New York, authenticated the
certification. Welts also executed a ComplaintAffidavit, before Notary Public Nicole Brown of New
York State.
Prosecutor Gutierrez filed an Information against
Sasot for unfair competition with the RTC. Before
arraignment, Sasot filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over his
person.
Sasot argue that the fiscal should have dismissed
NBAs complaint because under the rules, the
complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor
and the copy on record appears to be only a fax
transmittal. The prosecutor filed his Opposition to
the motion to quash, stating that he has the original
copy of the complaint, and that complainant has an
attorney-in-fact to represent it. He also contended
that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense
even without the participation of the private offended
party, as the crime charged is a public crime.
Held:
While Sasot raise in the motion to quash the
grounds that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense and that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or the person of the accused, Sasots
arguments focused on an alleged defect in the
complaint filed before the fiscal, NBAs capacity to
sue and Sasot exculpatory defenses against the
crime of unfair competition.
Nowhere in Rule 117 Sec. 3 is there any mention
of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal
and the complainants capacity to sue as grounds for
a motion to quash.
For another, under Sec. 3, Rule 112, a complaint
is substantially sufficient if it states the known
address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainants affidavit and his witnesses and
supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to
before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public who must
certify that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
All these have been duly satisfied in the
complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez.
Even the absence of an oath in the complaint does
not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a
mere defect of form, which does not affect the

substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.
In this case, Weltss Complaint-Affidavit contains
an acknowledgement by Notary Public Brown of New
York State that the same has been subscribed and
sworn to before her and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the
complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy
thereof, Prosecutor Gutierrez stated that NBAs
representative
will present the
authenticated
notarized original in court, and Prosecutor Guray
manifested that the original copy is already on hand.
It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties and functions, which in turn
gives his report the presumption of accuracy.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its
face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public
prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court
should respect such determination.
Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo
G.R. No. 150606: June 7, 2007
1st Division: AZCUNA, J.:
Facts:
On June 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Romulo
Tolentino filed an Information charging Benedict
Tecklo of violation of RA 8282 for failing to remit the
premiums due for his employee to the Social Security
System despite demand.
The Information contains a certification by State
Prosecutor Tolentino, thus: I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE HAS
BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT
THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT
THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE
ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY THEREOF AND THAT
THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH THE
PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR.
The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City,
Branch 23, presided by Judge Pablo Paqueo. It was
set for arraignment on Aug 7, 2001. On said date,
Tecklo moved for the deferment of the arraignment
and requested time to file a motion to quash, which
request was granted by the court.
On Aug 10, 2001, Tecklo filed a Motion to Quash,
thus: Accused, through counsel, most respectfully
moves to quash the Information x x x upon the sole
ground that State Prosecutor Tolentino, not being the
CP nor the PP, has no legal personality nor is he
legally clothed with the authority to commence
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 64 of 70
prosecution by the filing of the Information and thus

prosecute the case.
On Aug 16, 2001, Prosecutor Tolentino filed an
Opposition to Motion to Quash on such grounds:
1. He is authorized to investigate, file the necessary
Information and prosecute SSS cases since he was
designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by
RSP Turingan by virtue of RO 97-024A dated July
14, 1997;
2. In a letter dated Oct 24, 2000, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo confirmed such
authority and that Informations to be filed in court
by prosecutors-designate do not need the
approval of the RSP or PP or CP;
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the RSP, as
alter ego of the SOJ, is vested with authority to
designate Special Prosecutors
RTC Ruling:
The motion is based on the lack of legal
personality of State Prosecutor Tolentino, [not being]
legally clothed with the authority to commence
prosecution by the filing of the information and, thus,
prosecute the case.
One of the grounds provided by the rules to
quash an Information is Sec. 3[c] of Rule 117: that
the officer who filed the information had no authority
to do so.
A glance on the face of the information would
glaringly show that it was filed by State Prosecutor
Tolentino, without the approval of the CP of Naga City,
the situs of the crime, a blatant violation of Sec. 4[3]
of Rule 112.
An information filed by a qualified and authorized
officer is required for the jurisdiction of the court over
the case.
A justification put up by Prosecutor Tolentino is a
RO07-024-A subject of which is the Designation of
Personnel issued by the RSP which in effect
designated him as the special prosecutor to handle
the investigation of all SSS cases filed before the
Offices of the CP and if evidence warrants to file the
necessary information and prosecute the same in the
court of [appropriate] jurisdiction.
The designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino to
investigate, file this information if the evidence
warrants, and to prosecute SSS cases in court does
not exempt him from complying with the provision of
Sec. 4 [3] of Rule 112, that no complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the PP, CP or Chief State
Prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. The
designation given to Prosecutor Tolentino came from
the RSP [who] is not one of those mentioned
exclusively by the Rules to approve in writing the
filing or the dismissal of an information.
Also, as ruled by this court in a similar case which

was dismissed, the second attached document
supporting the opposition to the motion, is but an
opinion of the Chief State prosecutor which has no
force and effect to set aside the mandatory
requirement of the Rules in the filing of an information
in court.
RTC granted the motion and dismissed the
information.
Issue:
W/N State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized
to file the subject Information without the approval of
the City Prosecutor?
Held:
No.
Judge Paqueo quashed the Information based on
Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 in relation to Sec. 4[3], Rule 112.
Notably, changes in Sec. 4[3], Rule 112 were
introduced in the year 2000. It is noted that the letter
dated Oct 24, 2000 of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo,
upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino relies to
support his authority to file the subject Information
without the approval of the CP, was issued before the
changes in Sec. 4[3], Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules.
While the old 1985 Rules stated that [no]
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by
an investigating fiscal without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal of
chief state prosecutor, the 2000 Revised Rules
states that [n]o complaint or information may be
filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor
or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Since the
provision is couched in negative terms importing that
the act shall not be done otherwise than designated,
it is mandatory.
An examination of the functions of the Regional
State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of PD 1275 showed
that they do not include that of approving the
Information filed or dismissed by the investigating
prosecutor.
It is a rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Since the RSP is not included among the law
officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of
the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the
Information filed by Prosecutor Tolentino did not
comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112.
Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to
quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117.
Issue:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 65 of 70
Prosecutor Tolentino also contend that the

accused must move to quash at any time before
entering his plea and the trial court is barred from
granting further time to the accused to do so; and
that there is no evidence in support of the motion to
quash.
Held:
There is substantial compliance by Tecklo with the
rule above quoted, as it was satisfactorily explained in
his Memorandum that his counsel orally moved to
quash the Information before the arraignment on Aug
7, 2001. In an Order issued on the same date, Judge
Paqueo required Tecklos counsel to file a motion to
quash within five days from the issuance of the Order.
Accordingly, the motion was filed on Aug 10, 2001.
Moreover, there was no need to submit any
evidence to support the ground for quashing the
Information, since it was apparent and within judicial
notice that Prosecutor Tolentino was not the CP or the
PP.
As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of
the ground for quashing the Information, the Court
finds that Judge Paqueo failed to cite in his Order the
correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court where the ground relied upon for quashing the
Information is enumerated. What is important,
however, is that he correctly cited the ground for
quashing the Information.
Rule 117, Sec. 4, 5
Rafael Gonzalez v. Judge Salvador
GR 168340: Dec 5, 2006
3rd Division: Carpio-Morales, J.:
Facts:
Rafael Gonzalez filed before the Makati City
Prosecutors Office a complaint against Glen Dale
arising from the publication in the January 7, 1999
issue of Today of his article, entitled Glad Tidings for
Manila Polo Club members in the Bizz N Fizz
column, under the nom de plume Rene Martel.
The Prosecutors Office found probable cause to
hale Dale into court for Libel. An Information was
thus filed before the Makati RTC against Dale.
The case was raffled to Branch 63 of the Makati
RTC.
After posting the necessary cash bond for his
provisional liberty, Dale filed with the DOJ a Petition
for Review challenging the Resolution of the City
Prosecutors Office.
The DOJ dismissed Dales Petition for Review and
denied his MR.
Dale elevated the DOJ Resolutions to the CA via
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of preliminary injunction and TRO
As no preliminary injunction or TRO was issued by

the CA, Dale was arraigned before the RTC and
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Dale later filed a Motion to Quash on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, there
being no allegation in the Information that Gonzalez
actually resides in Makati or that the allegedly
libelous article was printed or first published in
Makati. Dale cited Art. 360 of the RPC as prescribing
a specific venue for libel.
After the parties ventilated their respective
positions, the trial court, by Order of May 29, 2002,
granted Dales Motion to Quash, holding that the
Information was defective for failure to allege that the
newspaper article was printed and first published in
Makati or that Gonzalez actually resided in Makati at
the time of the commission of the act complained of.
On June 25, 2002, 26 days after receiving the May
29, 2002 Order, Gonzalez filed a Motion (to Order the
Public Prosecutor to Amend the Information and to
Admit said Amended Information), invoking Sec 4 and
5 of Rule 117. Dale opposed the motion on the
ground that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC
to reconsider or recall its May 29, 2002 Order which
became final after the lapse of 15 days. Dale added
that there was nothing to consider for admission since
the supposed amended information was not attached
to the motion.
Replying, Gonzalez argued that the motion was
timely filed since the Rules allow the filing of a new
information within such further time as the court
may allow for good cause and the May 29, 2002
Order failed to provide a period within which the
prosecution could file an amended information.
Gonzalez further argued that a defective or deficient
information cannot be the proper subject of a motion
for reconsideration or appeal under the Rules, hence,
not subject to the reglementary periods provided
therein; and that the Amended Information would be
filed once the court directed the amendment of the
Information.
By Order of Dec 26, 2002, the RTC granted
Gonzalezs Motion and directed the public prosecutor
to amend the Information within ten (10) days from
notice, and to forthwith file the same before the
court.
In compliance with the RTCs order, the public
prosecutor filed an Amended Information.
Dale filed a MR on the ground that under Sec. 4 of
Rule 117 the amendment of a defective information
may be made only before a motion to quash is
granted and, once quashed, especially in a case
where the unqualified quashal had become final, the
information can no longer be amended. Dale added
that under Sec. 5 of Rule 117, the order to file another
information must be contained in the same order
sustaining the motion to quash since the accused
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 66 of 70
would have been discharged by the time the new

information is filed.
The RTC granted Dales MR and accordingly set
aside its Dec 26, 2002 Order.
Held:
Sec. 4 covers the amendment of an information.
Sec. 5 deals with the filing of a new information.
The amendment of an information under Sec. 4 of
Rule 117 applies if the trial court finds that there is a
defect in the information and the defect can be cured
by amendment, in which case the court shall order
the prosecution to amend the information. Once the
court issues an order granting the motion to quash
the information and such order becomes final and
executory, however, there is nothing more to amend.
In cases falling under Sec. 5 of Rule 117, where
the motion to quash is sustained on grounds other
than those stated in Section 6 of the same Rule, the
trial court has the discretion to order the filing of
another information within a specified period which is
extendible to such further time as the court may allow
for good cause. The order to file another information,
if determined to be warranted by the circumstances
of the case, must be contained in the same order
granting the motion to quash. If the order sustaining
the motion to quash does not order the filing of
another information, and said order becomes final
and executory, then the court may no longer direct
the filing of another information.
It is gathered that Gonzalez never asserted the
propriety of amending the Information, he having
maintained that the allegations in the Information
provided sufficient and adequate bases to confer
jurisdiction. When the RTC granted the motion to
quash, Gonzalez did not assail the same within the
reglementary period.
The order quashing the
Information thus became final and executory.
Issue:
Gonzalez posits, however, that the order to file
another information may be separately issued at any
time after the quashal of the information. He anchors
his argument on the clause within such further time
as the court may allow for good cause contained in
Sec. 5 of Rule 117.
Held:
Gonzalezs position does not lie. The clause
denotes no other construction than a plain extension
of time. The allowance of additional time qualifies the
period of filing a new information pursuant to an
order, and not the period of issuing an order to file a
new information. It presupposes that an order has
been previously issued, as signified by the prior
phrase if having been made. As earlier stated, this
order to file another information, if the trial court finds

that circumstances warrant its issuance, must be
included in the order granting the motion to quash.
The time limitation in the rule was intended to
prevent the accused from being unnecessarily
detained at the whim of the prosecution. Since the
order granting the motion to quash had attained
finality, it had become immutable.
Clutching at straws, Gonzalez implores a relaxation of
the application of the Rules to promote substantial
justice.
Not all defects in an information can be cured by
amendment, however. In Agustin v. Pamintuan, this
Court held that the absence of any allegation in the
information that the therein offended party was
actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense or that the alleged
libelous articles were printed and first published in
Baguio City is a substantial defect, which cannot be
amended after
the accused enters his plea.
Amendments of the information to vest jurisdiction
upon a court is not permissible.
At all events, the prosecution is not, under the
circumstances attendant to the case, precluded from
refiling an information against Dale as long as
prescription has not set in.
Rule 117, Sec, 17 Double Jeopardy
Oscar Z. Benares v. Josephine Lim
G.R. No. 173421, 14 Dec 2006
1st Division: Ynares-Santiago, J
Facts:
Oscar Beares was accused of estafa arising from
two contracts of sale executed in 1976 where he sold
two parcels of land to Josephine Lim. Records show
that after Lim had fully paid the amortizations and
after the deed of absolute sale was issued, Benares
mortgaged the same parcels of land to the BPI. Thus,
when Lim demanded delivery of the properties,
Benares failed to comply, thus Lim was compelled to
file a case for estafa against Benares.
Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution
presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to
formally offer its evidence. However, the prosecution
did not make any formal offer of evidence, hence
Benares filed a motion praying that the prosecutions
submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed
waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence.
Despite receipt of notice of Benares motion, Lim and
her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the motion
set on Dec. 4, 2001.
On Jan 28, 2002, the MTC issued an Order giving
the prosecution another 15 days within which to
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 67 of 70
formally offer its evidence which Benares opposed.

On Feb 27, 2002, the MT dismissed the case, for
failure of the prosecution to prosecute.
Lim moved to reconsider the order of dismissal
and prayed for the admission of Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits, claiming that she had difficulty
securing documents from the court which were
marked during trial. Benares opposed the motion
invoking his right against double jeopardy.
Benares argued that the six months delay by the
prosecution to formally offer its evidence is vexatious,
capricious and oppressive; that the private
prosecutors claim that the documents could not be
found is untrue considering that no manifestation was
filed in court stating that fact; that the documents
were available as early as Jan 2002 but the
prosecution never asked for extension, nor explained
the delay in filing its formal offer despite two orders to
do so. Benares further argued that under Sec.3, Rule
17, failure to comply with a court order without
justifiable reason may cause the dismissal of the
case, which shall have the effect of an adjudication on
the merits unless otherwise stated by the court.
Lim refuted Benaress invocation of double
jeopardy because the case was dismissed with his
express consent.
Issue:
W/N the order of the MTC dismissing the case for
failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which
gave Benares the right to invoke double jeopardy.
Held:
No.
Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid
indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
there is no question as to the presence of the first
four elements. As to the last element, there was yet
no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that
Benaress guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of the case was
based on failure to prosecute.
A dismissal with the express consent or upon
motion of the accused does not result in double
jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit: (1) the
dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or (2)
the case is dismissed for violation of the accuseds
right to speedy trial.
Benaress claim that the prosecutions delay in
filing its formal offer of evidence violated his right to
speedy trial is not well taken.
The prosecutions delay in the filing of its formal

offer of evidence in this case cannot be considered
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. It appears that
there was justifiable reason for the prosecutions
failure to formally offer its evidence on time, i.e., the
documents which were previously marked in court
were misplaced.
The MTC exceeded its authority when it dismissed
the case without giving the prosecution a right to be
heard, hence there was a violation of due process.
Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer
its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case.
Even without any documentary exhibits, the
prosecution could still prove its case through
the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find
that when the MTC reconsidered its order of
dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
Rule 117, Sec. 7
People v. Nazareno
GR 168982; Aug 5, 2009
En Banc: Brion, J
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan acquitted the Nazareno of
the charge of violating Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The People appealed the acquittal to the SC.
Nazareno objected to the petition mainly because
the review sought violates hisconstitutional right
against double jeopardy. He asserts that the petition
is essentially an appeal from a judgment of acquittal
or a review of alleged errors in judgment that throws
the case wide open, placing the respondents in
danger of being punished twice for the same offense.
He also posits that a judgment of acquittal can
only be challenged through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The present petition is a Rule 45
appeal that raises errors of judgment, not errors of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Did the appeal put Nazareno in double jeopardy?
Held:
Yes.
Double jeopardy exists when the following
requisites are present:
1. a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
2. the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
3. a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only:
1. after a valid indictment;
2. before a competent court;
3. after arraignment;
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 68 of 70
4. when a valid plea has been entered; and

5. when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer
reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the
State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double
jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials,
thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial
would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has
been confirmed by a previous final judgment.
Further prosecution via an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal is barred because the
government has already been afforded a complete
opportunity to prove the criminal defendants
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter
a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials
applies and becomes compelling.
An instance when the State can challenge a
judgment of acquittal is pursuant to the exercise of
our judicial power to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
Tan v. People
GR 173637; Apr 21, 2009
3rd Division: Chico-Nazario
Facts:
On 21 Dec 2000 Criminal Cases against Dante
Tan were raffled to RTC-153, presided by Judge Ygana.
Tan was arraigned on 16 Jan 2001. On 6 Feb 2001,
pre-trial was concluded. First date of trial was on 27
Feb 2001.
Trial ensued. On 18 Sep 2001, prosecution
completed presentation of evidence and was ordered
by RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within 30
days.
Prosecution was able to file said formal offer
for on 25 Nov 2003.
On 2 Dec 2003, Tan moved to dismiss due to the
Peoples alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming
violation of his right to speedy trial, Tan faults People
for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
length of time and without giving any excuse or
justification for the delay.
RTC ordered the dismissal of the case.
RTCs order of dismissal was elevated to CA via a
petition for certiorari, with People contending that:
Judge Y committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that the people violated Tans right to speedy trial.
CA granted the petition for certiorari, reinstated

the case and ordered RTC to conduct further
proceedings immediately.
Issue:
W/N the petition for certiorari violated Tans right
against double jeopardy.
Held:
No. There is clearly insufficient ground to
conclude that the prosecution is guilty of violating
Tans right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion
defies exact definition, but generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Any capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a
criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This
is true in the instant case.
There is also no merit to Tans claim that a
reversal of RTCs Order dismissing the case is a
violation of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged
violation of his right to speedy trial.
For double jeopardy to attach then, the
following elements in the first criminal case must be
present:
1. The complaint or information or other formal
charge was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction;
2. The court had jurisdiction;
3. The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and
4. He was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.
The 4th element is crucial since, as a general rule,
the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal,
made with the express consent of the accused or
upon his own motion, will not place the accused in
double jeopardy.
This rule, however, admits of two exceptions,
namely:
1. insufficiency of evidence and
2. denial of the right to speedy trial.
While indeed Tan was in fact the one who filed the
Motion to Dismiss, the dismissal thereof was due to
an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which
would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should
the same charges be revived.
Tans situation is different. Double jeopardy has
not attached, considering that the dismissal of the
case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 69 of 70
Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has

not been violated, there is no reason to support the
initial order of dismissal.
As Tans right to speedy trial was not
transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of
double jeopardy that the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused was not met. Where the dismissal of the
case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such
order of dismissal and does not involve double
jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal;
such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of
jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from
attaching.
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we
have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the
same offense. It must be stressed, however, that
these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of
the accused to speedy trial.
Such cases are not applicable here considering
that the right of the Tan to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State.
Rule 117, Sec. 8
People v. Panfilo Lacson
Facts:
Panfilo Lacson was charged with multiple

murders for the shooting and killing of 11 persons
who were members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
after SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the
killing of the 11 gang members was a rub-out or
summary execution and not a shootout. On March 29,
1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing the
criminal cases against Lacson. On June 2001, 11
Informations for murder involving the killing of the
same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were
again filed against Lacson.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Sec. 8, Rule 117 should be
applied retroactively.
2. Whether or not Lacson complied with the
essential pre-requisites of Section 8.
Ruling:
1.
Section 8 was approved with the intention that
it should be applied prospectively for the reason
that applying it retroactively would defeat its
purpose; to give the State a period of two years
from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal
cases with the express consent of the accused.
Applying it retroactively in the case at bar, the
State would only be given one year and three

months to revive the criminal cases which do not
conform to the intendment of Section 8.
2.
Lacson through his counsel admitted that he
did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the
cases. He only asked before Judge Agnir, Jr. that
warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a
finding of probable cause. The trial court may
provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no
probable cause but when the express consent of
the accused to such provisional dismissal is
absent, Lacson cannot invoke Section 8 to bar a
revival of the criminal cases. Neither may the
accused do so simply because the public
prosecutor did not object to a motion of the
accused for a judicial determination of probable
cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of
the order of dismissal of the case.
Requisites:
1. the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both
the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(Not present in the present case)
2. the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a
copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.
Rule 117, Sec. 9
People v. Lamberto Rafon
G.R. No. 169059, Sep 5, 2007
EN BANC:TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Lamberto Rafon was found guilty of raping his
minor daughter and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death.
Rafon challenges the two Informations filed
against him for being ambiguous as they did not
specify the date or at the very least the month as to
when the rape incidents allegedly took place. This, so
he stresses, is a denial of due process as no less than
the Constitution guarantees that the accused must be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The allegations that he committed two
counts of rape, one in 1994 and another in 1998,
deprived him of the chance to interpose the defense
of alibi, he concludes.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Compendium
of Cases 70 of 70
Issue:
Were the
sufficient?
informations
filed
against
Rafon
Held:
Yes.
It is unnecessary to state in the information the
precise date that the offense was committed, except
when it is an essential element of the offense. The
date of commission is not an element of the offense
of rape. The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the circumstances provided by
law.
When the time given in the complaint is not of
the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as
alleged and x x x the complaint will be sustained if
the proof shows that the offense was committed at
any time within the period of the statute of limitations
and before the commencement of the action.
In said case, Rafon was charged with raping his
stepdaughter several times before and until 15
October 1994 but was convicted of his dastardly acts
committed in 1993. The Court therein held that the
victims Sworn Statement which categorically stated
that she had been raped by the accused in 1993
when she was in grade three substantially cured the
vagueness in the information and considered accused
to have been sufficiently informed thereby. Thus, a
statement of the year of the commission of the
offense, as in the instant case, would suffice.
Furthermore, it is too late in the day for Rafon to
raise this issue. He should have made his objection
before he was arraigned. Sec. 9, Rule 117 provides,
to wit: The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads
to the complaint or information, either because
he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in par
(a), (b), (g), and (i) of Sec. 3 of this Rule.
Rafon cannot be said to have been deprived of
his right to be informed. He did not timely object to
the alleged defects in the Informations and he
actively participated in the trial, defending himself
and confronting the witnesses against him. Hence,
there was no denial of due process.

Criminal Procedure CASES - Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Criminal Procedure CASES - Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana

Rule 110, Sec. 1..............................................4

Rule 110, Sec. 4..............................................4

RULE 110, Section 5........................................5

Sps. Chua v. Ang...........................................................16

Rule 112, Sec. 3............................................16

Rule 112, Sec. 4............................................18

JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO............................5

Jose Gonzales vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking

Rule 110, Sec. 6..............................................5

Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines.....................5

Rule 112, Sec. 5............................................21

Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9........................................6

JUDGE ESPAOL vs. JUDGE TOLEDO-MUPAS..................21

Michael Malto vs. People.................................................6

Rule 112, Sec. 6............................................22

Rule 110, Sec. 11............................................6

Manolo Adriano v. Judge Bercades;...............................22

People v. Zaldy Ibanez....................................................6

Rule 113, Sec. 3............................................22

Rule 110, Sec. 13............................................6

People vs. Nunez...........................................................22

Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines....................6

Rule 113, Sec. 5............................................23

Rule 110, Sec. 14............................................8

Pp vs. Carlos Dela Cruz.................................................23

Rule 126, Sec. 2............................................23

Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan..............................8

Sps. Marimla vs. People and Judge Viola.......................23

Rule 110, Sec. 15............................................9

Rule 126, Sec. 4............................................23

Hector Trenas v. People...................................................9

Sony Music Entertainment vs. Hon. Espanol..................24

Rule 111, Sec. 1..............................................9

Andy Quelnan vs. PP.....................................................24

Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals. 9

COCA-COLA vs. GOMEZ.................................................24

Rule 111, Sec. 4............................................10

Rule 126, Sec. 13..........................................25

Asilo vs. People of the Philippines.................................10

People vs. Mariacos.......................................................25

Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7..................................10

Rule 126, Sec. 14..........................................25

Magestrado vs. People and Librojo................................10

MANLY SPORTWEAR vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES.....25

SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ...........................................11

Rule 114, Sec. 1............................................27

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia................................27

Rule 114, Sec. 3............................................28

Rule 112, Sec. 1............................................13

P/Supt Orbe v. Digandgang...........................................28

De Chavez vs. OMB.......................................................13

Ambil vs. SB..................................................................28

Ricaforte vs. Jurado.......................................................13

Rule 114, Sec. 4 & 5......................................28

Rule 112, Sec. 2............................................14

Eduardo San Miguel v. Judge Maceda............................29

Turingan vs. Garfin........................................................14

Rufina Chua v. CA and Chiok.........................................29

Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar........................................14

People v. SB and Jinggoy Estrada..................................30

Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan..15