Chapter 6 Remedies in Administrative Law PDF

CHAPTER 6
REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
6.1
Introduction
The importance of remedies generally is reflected in the maxim ubi ius ibi
remedium where there is a right, there is a remedy. It is axiomatic that a legal
right is of little, if any, use unless accompanied by an effective remedy.
Remedies should be effective in terms of both procedure and effect, ie the procedure for obtaining the remedy should be clear, simple and speedy and the
remedy once granted should be suitable to protect the legal right from infringement and/or to compensate the victim for such infringement. In the field of
administrative law, remedies can be obtained speedily. In particular, interlocutory remedies are available pending the outcome of the full hearing. However,
the rapid increase in applications for judicial review in recent years has
imposed further pressure on the courts time and delayed the hearing of applications. Once obtained, the remedies are generally effective in protecting from
continuing infringement of legal rights. However, it must again be remembered that the judicial power here is one of review. A decision challenged cannot be overturned on the merits and a fresh decision substituted. The decisionmaker is free to re-take the decision, provided he or she does so within the law.
Judicial review is an inherent power of the High Court. However, as the
principles for the judicial control of executive power have of necessity been
developed by the judges themselves, so the judges had to adopt existing remedies. These remedies took, in part, the form of the so-called prerogative writs,
developed originally to enable the Kings Bench to control the actions of inferior bodies and available only at the suit of the Crown. The courts also adopted private law remedies. It was inevitable that the manipulation of existing
remedies would not prove to be entirely satisfactory to serve new demands. In
particular, the existing remedies proved to be cumbersome in terms of procedure. Each remedy had its own requirements of locus standi. An applicant for a
remedy had to establish that he or she had standing to bring an action, ie a special interest which the courts would regard as sufficient to justify the individual challenging an executive decision. Further, the public law remedies (the
prerogative writs) and the private law remedies had developed independently of each other and had separate procedures for application. As a consequence, a complainant could not combine public and private law remedies in
the same proceedings. Despite procedural reforms of 1977, an applicant for
judicial review of an executive decision can still be confronted with significant
procedural difficulties (see below).
155
Principles of Administrative Law
6.2
History
Pre 1978 remedies in administrative law could be public or private law remedies. In public law, the prerogative remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (and habeas corpus); in private law, injunction, declaration and damages.
Also, statutory remedies, which might be exclusive, might have been provided. The public law and private law remedies had their own procedures.
Applications for the prerogative remedies were made in the Court of Queens
Bench exercising its inherent supervisory jurisdiction. The private law remedies were available through ordinary civil proceedings in the High Court,
either the Queens Bench or Chancery Divisions. Thus, whilst public law remedies could be combined with each other and private law remedies could also
be so combined, a public law remedy could not be combined with a private law
remedy. If the applicant sought both a public and private law remedy then he
or she had to initiate two sets of proceedings. Each of the remedies also had
individual requirements of standing (see below). Further, interlocutory procedures for discovery of documents or the serving of interrogatories were not
available in the context of the prerogative remedies.
6.3
The private law remedies
6.3.1
Injunction
The injunction is normally prohibitory in nature. It prohibits the commission or

the continuation of an unlawful act, eg one which is ultra vires or in breach of
natural justice. It even lies to prevent a minister acting in accordance with an
Act of Parliament which is itself potentially in conflict with EC law. (See R v
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) (1991), where the
House of Lords, after a reference under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome to the
European Court of Justice, held that an interim injunction lay to prevent the
implementation of provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 pending the
outcome of a challenge, by way of an application for judicial review, to the
validity of those provisions. It was claimed that the provisions were inconsistent with Community law and deprived the applicants of enforceable
Community rights.) Much less frequently, an injunction may be mandatory in
nature, ie to compel the performance of a certain act. (However, the use of mandamus is more commonly seen in administrative law to compel the fulfilment
of a public (normally statutory) duty.)
An injunction may be permanent or interim, ie temporary, maintaining the
status quo pending full trial. (For the principles to be applied on the grant of an
interlocutory injunction see American Cyanamid v Ethicon (1975).)
The injunction was once considered not to be available against officers of
the Crown or someone acting as an officer or representative of the Crown. (See
156
Remedies in Administrative Law

eg Merricks v Heathcote-Amery (1955), Factortame and also s 21 of the Crown
Proceedings Act 1947.) However, this is now subject to the House of Lords
decision in M v Home Office (1992).
M v Home Office (1992)
An application for political asylum in the UK was rejected by the Home
Secretary. An application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused. The
applicant was informed that he was to be returned to Zaire. A renewed application to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. The applicant then made a further application on allegedly new grounds to the High Court and Garland J
indicated that he wished the applicants departure to be postponed until that
application had been considered. Garland J understood counsel for the
Secretary of State to have given such an undertaking. However, counsel had no
such instructions and did not appreciate that he had in fact given such an
undertaking. The applicant was subsequently put on a plane bound for Zaire.
The judge made an order a mandatory injunction requiring the Secretary of
State to secure the applicants return and Home Office officials made such
arrangements. However, the Home Secretary, after receiving legal advice, cancelled the arrangements on the basis that the interim mandatory injunction
issued did not lie against an officer of the Crown. The injunctive order was subsequently set aside. The applicant instituted committal proceedings against the
Home Office and the Secretary of State. At first instance it was held that the
Crowns immunity from injunctive relief was preserved by s 21 of the Crown
Proceedings Act 1947. However, on appeal the Court of Appeal held that,
although the Crown and the Home Office could not be the subject of contempt
proceedings as they had no legal personality, individual officers of the Crown
were subject to the courts contempt jurisdiction for acts or omissions done personally by them in the discharge of their official duties. Breach constituted a
contempt of court and was punishable, at the courts discretion, by fine or
imprisonment. The House of Lords agreed unanimously that the disregard of
the injunction by the minister acting in his official capacity rendered him in
contempt of court. To hold otherwise would be to place the executive beyond
the law. As stated by Lord Templeman:
... the argument that there is no power to enforce the law by injunction or contempt proceedings against a minister in his official capacity would ... establish
the proposition that the executive obey the law as a matter of grace and not as
a matter of necessity ...
6.3.2
Declaration
The declaration simply declares the legal position of the parties. It is not enforceable per se but, once the legal position has been declared, other remedies may be
available if it proves necessary to enforce the rights declared. The declaration
157

cannot be used to answer hypothetical questions (see Blackburn v AG (1971),
where applications for declarations that, by signing the Treaty of Rome, the
government would irreversibly surrender sovereignty and was thus acting in
breach of the law were rejected. Not only were the treaty-making powers of the
Crown not subject to judicial challenge, ie non-justiciable, but the declaration
could not be used to challenge a hypothetical action. The Treaty had not yet
been signed. Even if it had been, the courts would take no notice of it until
embodied in an Act of Parliament. As stated by Salmon LJ:
The sole power of the courts is to decide and enforce what the law is and not
what it should be now, or in the future.
Of course, once enacted, the courts would not have been able to challenge the
validity of the European Communities Act. Mr Blackburn was in a Catch 22
position. It can be used to declare governmental action to be unlawful. It is
available against the Crown and so can be used in the context of, for example,
an exercise of the prerogative power (see CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service
(1985)). It is discretionary.
6.3.3
Damages
Damages are most relevant in the context of the tortious and contractual liability of public authorities (see Chapter 12).
6.4
The public law remedies
6.4.1
Nature and form
The public law remedies certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and habeas corpus
are granted at the suit of the Crown. Applications are, therefore, brought in the
name of the Crown on behalf of the applicant. As such, they cannot be brought
against the Crown but do lie against ministers and officials. They are all discretionary, except habeas corpus. Originally in the form of writs, in 1938 all
except habeas corpus became orders (s 7 of the Administration of Justice
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1938).
6.4.2
Certiorari/prohibition
Certiorari and prohibition are similar in effect and may be dealt with together.
The essential difference between them is one of timing. Certiorari lies to quash
a decision already made; prohibition to prevent the commission of a future act
which would be ultra vires or in breach of natural justice. The remedies are often
complementary, with certiorari quashing a decision already reached and prohibition controlling the legality of future decisions. They are discretionary.
158
6.4.3
Mandamus
Mandamus compels the performance of a public duty (which nowadays is most

usually a statutory duty). Whereas certiorari and prohibition serve to control
illegal acts, mandamus serves to compel a public authority to act where it has
failed in its duty to do so. A statutory duty must also be performed within a
reasonable time and mandamus lies to compel such performance (see R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Phansopkar and Begum (1976),
where the Court of Appeal held that the issue of certificates of patriality which
would have allowed the applicant wives from India and Bangladesh respectively to exercise their right to join their husbands in the United Kingdom
without let or hindrance could not be delayed without good cause. Since
applications made in India and Bangladesh were subject to considerable delay,
the Home Office could not refuse to consider the applications and mandamus
lay accordingly). Mandamus is often used in combination with certiorari. It is
discretionary.
As the prerogative remedies are historically the Crowns remedies and are
still brought in the name of the Crown, they cannot be used against the Crown
personally. They are clearly available against ministers and any other officer of
the Crown invested with a public power or duty.
6.4.4
Habeas corpus
The writ of habeas corpus requires an imprisoner to justify the imprisonment. It

is not subject to the application for judicial review procedure but is available as
of right by writ. It is not discretionary.
6.5
The introduction of the application for judicial

review
As far back as 1949, Lord Denning had commented on the unsuitability of the
prerogative orders (The Hamlyn Lecture, Freedom under the Law) as follows:
Just as the pick and shovel is no longer suitable for the winning of coal, so also
the procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions on the case are not suitable for
the winning of freedom in the new age. They must be replaced by new and up
to date machinery, by declarations, injunctions, and actions for negligence ... We
have in our time to deal with changes which are of equal constitutional significance to those which took place 300 years ago. Let us prove ourselves equal to
the challenge.
In a report published in 1976 (Remedies in Administrative Law) the Law

Commission identified the procedural difficulties which might be encountered
by an applicant seeking to challenge administrative action as follows:
159

The five methods by which judicial review of the acts or omissions of public
authorities may be obtained (ie the prerogative orders of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus and actions for a declaration or an injunction) each have their
characteristic procedural advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of
the litigant. There is, however, no single procedure of review available which
preserves the advantages of some of these remedies, while eliminating, or at
least reducing, the disadvantages of the other remedies; furthermore, it is not
even possible to obtain in a single proceeding a declaration or injunction as an
alternative to a prerogative order. Nor is it possible to join with an application
for a prerogative order a claim for damages for loss arising from the illegal acts
or omissions in respect of which the prerogative order is being sought ...
The Law Commission recommended the introduction of a new procedure to be

called the application for judicial review under which the applicant would be
able to obtain any of the remedies or a combination as appropriate.
The introduction of the application for judicial review by the RSC Order 53
in 1977 (with effect from 1 January 1978) made all the remedies (except habeas
corpus) available in a single procedure. The new procedure was given statutory force by s 31 of the Supreme Court Act (SCA) 1981.
6.6
Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) Order 53
RSC Order 53 provides as follows:

1(1)
An application for:
(a) an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari; or

(b) an injunction ... restraining a person from acting in any office in which he
is not entitled to act,
shall be made by way of an application for judicial review in accordance with
the provisions of this Order.
(2) An application for a declaration or an injunction (not being an injunction
mentioned in para (1)(b)) may be made by way of an application for judicial
review, and on such an application the court may grant the declaration if it considers that, having regard to:
(a) the nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by
way of an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari;
(b) the nature of the persons and bodies against whom relief may be granted by way of such an order; and
(c) all the circumstances of the case,
it would be just and convenient for the declaration or injunction to be granted
on an application for judicial review.
160

2
On an application for judicial review any relief mentioned in rule 1(1) or
(2) may be claimed as an alternative or in addition to any other relief so mentioned if it arises out of or relates to or is connected with the same matter.
3(1)
No application for judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the
court has been obtained in accordance with this rule.
(2) An application for leave must be made ex parte ...
(7) The court shall not grant leave unless it considers that the applicant has
a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.
Under rule 4(1) as amended by SI 1980/2000:

An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event
within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose
unless the court considers that there is good reason for extending the period
within which the application shall be made (replacing the former rule that the
court could refuse leave or a remedy where there had been undue delay if, in
the courts opinion, granting the remedy would be likely to cause substantial
hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be
detrimental to good administration. However, the SCA 1981 appears to overlook this amendment see s 31(6) below.
4(3) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to any statutory provision which has
the effect of limiting the time within which an application for judicial review
may be made.
7(1) On an application for judicial review the court may, subject to para (2),
award damages to the applicant if:
(a) he has included in the statement in support of his application for leave
under rule 3 a claim for damages arising from any matter to which the
application relates; and
(b) the court is satisfied that, if the claim had been made in an action begun
by the applicant at the time of making his application, he could have
been awarded damages.
Under rule 8, an interlocutory application (for discovery, interrogatories, crossexamination) in proceedings on an application for judicial review may be
made.
6.7
Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981
Section 31 of the SCA 1981 states:

31(1) An application to the High Court for one or more of the following forms
of relief, namely:
(a) an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari;
(b) a declaration or injunction under subsection (2); or
161

(c) an injunction under s 30 restraining a person not entitled to do so from
acting in an office to which that section applies (any substantive office of
a public nature and permanent character which is held under the Crown
or which has been created by any statutory provision or royal charter),
shall be made in accordance with rules of court by a procedure to be known as
an application for judicial review.
(2) A declaration may be made or an injunction granted under this section
in any case where an application for judicial review, seeking that relief, has been
made and the High Court considers that, having regard to:
(a) the nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by
orders of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari;
(b) the nature of the persons and bodies against whom relief may be
granted by such orders; and
(c) all the circumstances of the case,
it would be just and convenient for the declaration to be made or the injunction
to be granted, as the case may be.
(3) No application for judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the
High Court has been obtained in accordance with the rules of court; and the
court shall not grant leave to make such an application unless it considers that
the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application
relates.
(4) On an application for judicial review the High Court may award damages to the applicant if:
(a) he has joined with his application a claim for damages arising from any
matter to which the application relates; and
(b) the court is satisfied that, if the claim had been made in an action begun
by the applicant at the time of making his application, he would have
been awarded damages.
(6) Where the High Court considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant:
(a) leave for the making of the application; or
(b) any relief sought on the application,
if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or
would be detrimental to good administration.
(7) Subsection (6) is without prejudice to any enactment or rule of court which
has the effect of limiting the time within which an application for judicial review
may be made. (A time limit of three months remains for certiorari under RSC
Order 53 rule 4 as amended by SI 1980/2000.)
162

A careful reading of Order 53 and s 31 of the SCA 1981 reveals some differences
of wording, in particular in relation to the operation of time limits. This is considered below, pp 16566.
Applications for an order of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or injunction
(to restrain a person from acting in a public office to which he is not entitled) in
an issue of public law must be made by an application for judicial review. The
High Court has a discretion to make a declaration or grant an injunction if just
and convenient where an application for judicial review has been so made. The
court may award damages if sought and the court is satisfied that they would
have been awarded in an action brought for this purpose.
The court may allow discovery, interrogatories and cross-examination.
If it appears that an action commenced by way of application for judicial
review should have been pursued through private law procedures, the court
can order that the proceedings continue as if begun by writ. Thus, it is not necessary to institute proceedings anew. There is, however, no equivalent facility
where proceedings are mistakenly started through private law procedures.
6.8
Procedure
The application for judicial review is a two-stage procedure. Leave to bring an

application must first be sought. If granted, the application will be heard on its
merits.
6.8.1
Leave stage
Application for leave is made ex parte (ie without hearing the other party)
before a single member of the Queens Bench Division. This is intended as a filter, to prevent applications being pursued by applicants who do not have a sufficient interest in the case and to prevent hopeless applications proceeding. It
would seem, therefore, that merits may be considered at this preliminary stage.
In R v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC ex parte People Before Profit Ltd (1983),
People Before Profit, then an unincorporated association, appeared as an objector at a public inquiry into a proposed development. The local planning authority resolved to grant outline planning permission before publication of the
inspectors report which, when published, substantially upheld People Before
Profits objections. The local planning authority rejected the inspectors recommendations and confirmed the grant of permission. People Before Profit then
formed itself into a company and sought leave to apply for judicial review of
the authoritys resolutions. Comyn J held that, although the applicant technically had locus standi and the fact that it had reconstituted itself in a different
form did not deprive it of standing, nevertheless it had no reasonable ground
(merits) for securing the quashing of the authoritys resolutions and leave to
apply for judicial review should be disallowed.
163

According to Lords Wilberforce and Diplock in R v IRC ex parte National
Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses (1982) (see below, pp 18183) an
arguable case is sufficient to establish locus standi at the filter stage. Lord
Diplock stated:
The whole purpose of requiring that leave should first be obtained to make the
application for judicial review would be defeated if the court were to go into the
matter in any depth at that stage. If, on a quick perusal of the material then
available, the court thinks that it discloses what might on further consideration
turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief
claimed, it ought, in the exercise of a judicial discretion, to give him leave to
apply for that relief.
According to Lord Scarman, the plaintiff must show a prima facie case, or reasonable grounds for believing that there has been a failure of public duty, so
to prevent abuse by busybodies, cranks, and other mischief-makers or vexatious applications.
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Swati (1986), Sir John
Donaldson MR stated that:
... an applicant must show more than that it is not impossible that grounds for
judicial review exist. To say that he must show a prima facie case that such
grounds do in fact exist may be putting it too high, but he must at least show
that it is a real, as opposed to a theoretical, possibility. In other words, he must
have an arguable case.
In any case, the applicant had not exhausted statutory appeal procedures.
An application may be refused if there has been undue delay. If refused, the
ex parte application can be renewed, again before a single judge, and then further renewed before the Court of Appeal. In the case of a hearing inter partes, a
right of appeal lies to the Court of Appeal (but not to the House of Lords). If
leave is granted, the substantive application is made to the Divisional Court.
Neither the requirement of leave nor the time limit applies to an application by
the Attorney General on the Crowns behalf. There is no leave requirement in
cases of statutory judicial review procedures.
The leave requirement is an additional hurdle in public law proceedings. It
has no counterpart in private law actions. Nor can it be dispensed with by
agreement of the parties.
6.8.2
Merits stage
As the title suggests, this involves a full consideration of the merits of the application. However, locus standi can also be reconsidered at this stage (see National
Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses (1982) below, pp 181 83).
164
6.9
Time limits
Time limits are strict. The nature of public decision-making is often such that
finality is necessary to enable the decision to be acted upon without any further
threat of challenge. As stated by Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v Mackman (1983):
The public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and
third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision
the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for
any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected
by the decision.
Order 53 (as amended in 1980) requires an application for judicial review to be

made promptly and, in any case, it must be brought within three months of
when the grounds for the application arose, unless the court considers there are
good grounds for extending the period of application. Section 31 of the SCA
1981, however, speaks in terms of undue delay, where it can refuse to grant
leave for making the application or relief sought if it considers that to do so
would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the
rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration. There
are further discrepancies between the provisions. Rule 4(1) applies only to
applications for leave to apply for judicial review whereas s 31(6) of the SCA
1981 applies to both applications for leave and to applications for substantive
relief. Rule 4(1) looks to the existence of good reasons whereas s 31 looks to the
effects of the delay. (An attempt to repeal s 31(6) of the SCA 1981 by the
Administration of Justice Bill 1985 failed when the bill was abandoned.)
In R v Dairy Product Quotas Tribunal ex parte Caswell (1990), the applicants
applied for judicial review of a decision of the Dairy Produce Quotas Tribunal
two years after it had taken its decision. An appeal from a decision of the High
Court declining to grant relief despite a finding that the tribunal had erred in
its construction of statutory regulations was dismissed by the Court of Appeal
and the House of Lords. Application for judicial review in s 31(6) and (7) of
the SCA 1981 were to be read as including an application for leave to apply for
judicial review (ie the filter stage). Even where there was good reason for the
delay, the court could refuse leave or, where leave had been granted, refuse
substantive relief, where the grant of relief was likely to cause hardship or prejudice or would be detrimental to good administration. In the instant case, to
grant relief would so prejudice good administration. Decisions in the circumstances of the case needed to be given quickly so those affected could act
accordingly. A re-opening of the case would lead to other similar applications
and so to the re-opening of quota allocations over a number of years.
Lord Goff attempted to reconcile RSC Order 53 and s 31 of the SCA 1981 as
follows:
... when an application for leave to apply is not made promptly and in any event
within three months, the court may refuse leave on the ground of delay unless
165

it considers that there is good reason for extending the period; but, even if it considers that there is such good reason, it may still refuse leave (or, where leave
has been granted, substantive relief) if in its opinion the granting of the relief
sought would be likely to cause hardship or prejudice (as specified in s 31(6)
SCA 1981) or would be detrimental to good administration.
An application made outside the three month time limit was also rejected in
R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Furneaux (1994), where a practice of doctors challenged the ministers decision not to grant them permission to provide
pharmaceutical services six months after the refusal. In the meantime, a company had purchased a local pharmacy. The Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Popplewell J, dismissed the doctors application. Mann LJ stressed the
importance of adhering to the three month time limit where third parties were
concerned.
In contrast, in R v Stratford upon Avon DC ex parte Jackson (1985), the Court
of Appeal allowed an application for leave to apply for judicial review made
out of time. The applicants explanation that the delay included time taken in
obtaining legal aid and trying unsuccessfully to persuade the Secretary of State
for the Environment to intervene was accepted.
On an ex parte application, the judge would be most likely to consider
whether there was good reason to extend the period under rule 4(1). Whether
delay would cause hardship or detriment could arise on a contested application for leave or on the hearing of the substantive application. However, on an
inter partes application for leave, a finding that the application was made
promptly under rule 4 will not prevent the court on the hearing of the substantive application from finding that there has been undue delay under s 31(6)
of the SCA 1981 and exercising its discretion to refuse relief (see R v Swale
Borough Council ex parte RSPB (1991)). The fact that the point of delay is not
taken by the respondent does not preclude the court from exercising its discretion.
Statute may curtail the time limit in any given case. Nor does the fact that
an application has been made within the three month period necessarily mean
that it has been made promptly (see Re Friends of the Earth (1988); R v
Independent Television Commission ex parte TVNI Ltd; R v ITC ex parte TVS
Television Ltd (1991)). In the TNVI case, for example, the applicants sought judicial review after the Commission had confirmed the names of companies to
which it had previously announced it proposed to grant licences. The original
proposal was announced on 16 October and the confirmation made on 4
December. Lord Donaldson MR considered that the applicants had not been
sufficiently prompt, albeit that they had applied within the three month time
limit. After the 4 December confirmation, third parties (the companies granted
licences) would be affected. The applicants had not given clear and prompt
notice.
166
6.10 Limits on the application for judicial review the

public/private law dichotomy
The reforms of 1977 were intended to simplify the procedure for application in
cases of judicial review and to break down the barriers between the public law
and the private law remedies in the context of the application for judicial
review. It was not intended as a corollary of this that the application for judicial
review should become the exclusive remedy of public law. The Law
Commission in its 1976 Report on Remedies in Administrative Law expressly
stated that it was not recommending that the application for judicial review
should be exclusive in the sense that it would become the only way by which
public law issues relating to the legality of the acts or omissions of persons or
bodies could be decided. Where such issues arose in ordinary actions or criminal proceedings they would not have to be referred to the Divisional Court
but would continue to be dealt with as at present by the court seized of the
case.
After the introduction of the application for judicial review, however, the
House of Lords quickly established the exclusivity of remedies in public law
and a strict dichotomy between public and private law emerged. The exclusivity of the remedy was unequivocally declared by the House of Lords in O'Reilly
v Mackman (1983). To proceed by way of an ordinary action where an application for judicial review was the appropriate path would be an abuse of the
process of the court. The procedural simplification of the remedies which was
so much the basis for the introduction of the application for judicial review has
consequently been marred by arguments over whether proposed proceedings
are an issue of public or private law. This public/private dichotomy in the context of the exclusivity of the public law remedies has been described as a procedural minefield (per Lord Lowry in Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and
Westminster Family Practitioner Committee (1992), below, p 173).
Just as an ordinary action cannot be used where the application for judicial
review is the appropriate path, so the application for judicial review cannot be
used where a remedy in private law is appropriate against the public authority, eg for breach of contract or the commission of a tort. So, for example, dismissal from employment must normally be pursued through an action for
wrongful dismissal or for breach of the contract of employment (see, for a
recent example, Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for
Employment (1995), where the House of Lords considered it inappropriate to
join a second applicant to the proceedings where that individuals proper remedy lay in private law and she had, in fact, already commenced proceedings in
the industrial tribunal) unless the decision stems from an issue of public law
as in, for example, CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service.
167

O'Reilly v Mackman (1983)
Prisoners were charged with disciplinary offences before a Board of Visitors
arising out of riots in 1976 and 1979. In 1980, three plaintiffs brought private
law actions by writ in the Queens Bench Division of the High Court for a declaration that the Board had acted in breach of the Prison Rules and the rules of
natural justice. The fourth brought an action by originating summons in the
Chancery Division for a declaration alleging breach of natural justice. These
private law actions were chosen because the plaintiffs expected there to be disputed questions of fact for which the application for judicial review was not
suited. At first instance Peter Pain J considered this to be a rational choice. He
stated:
It might be thought that the plaintiffs have made their choice of procedural
route capriciously. This is not so. I was told by their counsel that they anticipate
that there will be a substantial dispute as to fact and they have therefore chosen
a route that provides for oral evidence as a matter of course rather than a route
in which the evidence is nearly always taken on affidavit. This is clearly a rational choice.
The Court of Appeal reversed that decision on the basis that the proceedings
were an abuse of the process of the court. The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, regarding the actions as being blatant attempts to
avoid the protection for the defendants for which RSC Order 53 provides. Both
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords agreed that the only proper remedy was by way of the application for judicial review. Lord Diplock noted in
particular the following points:
None of the applicants had any remedy in private law.
The disadvantages which previously existed with the prerogative orders
had been removed by the application for judicial review. Interlocutory
applications, discovery, interrogatories and cross-examination were all
now allowed. Damages, declaration and injunction were available in the
same proceedings.
If the application for judicial review was selected when a private law
remedy was appropriate, the court could order the proceedings to
continue as if begun by writ. There was no such converse power to allow
an action begun by writ to continue as if it were an application for judicial
review.
An action begun by writ instead of application for judicial review would
evade protection against groundless, unmeritorious or tardy harassment of
statutory tribunals and decision-making public authorities provided by
RSC Order 53. Also, it would defeat the public policy which underlies
those protections, ie the need for speedy certainty, in the interests of good
administration and of third parties who may be affected, as to whether the
decision challenged is valid.
168

Lord Diplock stated:
The position of applicants for judicial review has been drastically ameliorated
by the new RSC Order 53. It has removed all those disadvantages, particularly
in relation to discovery, that were manifestly unfair to them and had, in many
cases, made applications for prerogative orders an inadequate remedy if justice
was to be done. This it was that justified the courts in not treating as an abuse
of their powers resort to an alternative procedure by way of action for a declaration or injunction (not then obtainable on an application under RSC Order 53)
despite the fact that this procedure had the effect of depriving the defendants of
the protection to statutory tribunals and public authorities for which for public
policy reasons RSC Order 53 provided.
Now that those disadvantages to applicants have been removed and all remedies for infringements of rights protected by public law can be obtained upon
an application for judicial review, as can also remedies for infringements of
rights under private law if such infringements should also be involved, it would
in my view as a general rule be contrary to public policy, and as such an abuse
of the process of the court, to permit a person seeking to establish that a decision of a public authority infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection
under public law to proceed by way of an ordinary action and by this means to
evade the provisions of RSC Order 53 for the protection of such authorities.
Lord Diplock considered this to be a statement of the general rule. He conceded that there may be exceptions, especially where the invalidity of the decision
arises as a collateral issue in a claim for infringement of a right of the plaintiff
arising under private law, or where none of the parties objects to the adoption
of the procedure by writ or originating summons.
The judgments in O'Reilly v Mackman were very much based on the protection of public authorities rather than the advancement of the rights of the citizen. The decision has led to what Wade and Forsyth (Administrative Law, 7th
edn, 1994, Oxford University Press) describe as surgical operations to sever
public from private law.
This issue of the public/private law divide was further considered by the
House of Lords in Cocks v Thanet District Council (1983).
Cocks v Thanet District Council (1983)
This case was decided the same day as O'Reilly v Mackman (1983).
The plaintiff applied to the council for permanent accommodation. The
council provided temporary accommodation. The plaintiff applied for a declaration, mandatory injunction and damages in the county court (moved by consent into the High Court to determine the preliminary issue of whether the
plaintiff should proceed under RSC Order 53) that the council was in breach of
its statutory duty under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. Milmo J
held that the plaintiff was entitled to so proceed. On appeal direct to the House
of Lords, it was held unanimously that the plaintiff must proceed by way of
169

application for judicial review. The issue turned on whether the council could
conclude that the plaintiff had made himself intentionally homeless and was in
the realm of public law. Only once this was determined properly did rights in
private law emerge, ie to the provision of appropriate housing. This was
explained by Lord Bridge as follows:
On the one hand, the housing authority are charged with decision-making functions. It is for the housing authority to decide whether they have reason to
believe the matters which will give rise to the duty to inquire or to the temporary housing duty. It is for the housing authority, once the duty to inquire has
arisen, to make appropriate inquiries and to decide whether they are satisfied,
or not satisfied as the case may be, of the matters which will give rise to the limited housing duty or the full housing duty. These are essentially public law
functions ...
On the other hand, the housing authority are charged with executive functions.
Once a decision has been reached by the housing authority which gives rise to
the temporary, the limited or the full housing duty, rights and obligations are
immediately created in the field of private law. Each of the duties referred to,
once established, is capable of being enforced by injunction and the breach of it
will give rise to a liability in damages. But it is inherent in the scheme of the
[Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977] that an appropriate public law decision
of the housing authority is a condition precedent to the establishment of the private law duty.
The exclusivity of the public law remedies was thereby established. O'Reilly v
Mackman and Cocks v Thanet DC were, however, soon to be distinguished in
Davy v Spelthorne Borough Council (1984) and Wandsworth LBC v Winder (1985).
Davy v Spelthorne Borough Council (1984)
Here, the plaintiff owned premises used to produce pre-cast concrete. In 1979,
he agreed with the defendant council that he would not appeal against an
enforcement notice (requiring that such use of the property ceased and the
removal of all buildings and works) provided it was not enforced for three
years from service. The notice was served in 1980 as agreed and the plaintiff
did not appeal. The statutory period for appeal subsequently elapsed. In 1982,
the plaintiff brought an action by writ for:
(a) an injunction to prevent enforcement of the notice;
(b) damages for negligent advice in that he acted upon the councils advice
and did not appeal against the enforcement notice and, consequently, lost
his chance to establish a defence to that notice;
(c) an order that the notice be set aside.
The Court of Appeal struck out (a) and (c) in that they involved a challenge to
the validity of the notice and were matters of public law. However,
170

distinguishing OReilly v Mackman and Cocks v Thanet DC, (b) was for breach
of a duty owed in the private law of tort the negligence action depended on
the fact that the plaintiff had lost his chance to impugn the notice. The House
of Lords dismissed an appeal by the local authority to strike out the claim for
damages. Lord Fraser stated:
The present proceedings, so far as they consist of a claim for damages for negligence, appear to me to be simply an ordinary action for tort. They do not raise
any issue of public law as a live issue.
Cocks v Thanet was distinguished in that there the applicant had to challenge
the councils decision (that he was intentionally homeless) as a condition
precedent to enforcing his statutory private law right (to be provided with
accommodation); whereas in Davy v Spelthorne the applicant does not impugn
or wish to overturn the enforcement notice. His whole case on negligence
depends on the fact that he has lost his chance to impugn it.
Lord Wilberforce asserted that, even had the applicant been able to proceed
by way of application for judicial review in his claim for damages (which in the
circumstances he could not), he could still choose the court and the procedure
which suited him best. The onus would be on the defendant to show that the
choice selected was an abuse of process as in O'Reilly where it was possible to
show that the plaintiffs were improperly and flagrantly seeking to evade the
protection which the rule confers upon public authorities.
Similarly, if the plaintiff had waited to be prosecuted for breach of the
notice, he could presumably have argued invalidity of the notice as a defence
(see Winder below).
Wandsworth Borough Council v Winder (1985)
Here, Winder occupied a flat let by the council. He refused to pay increased
rents which he considered to be excessive though he continued to pay an
increased rent to the extent he considered reasonable. In proceedings by the
council for arrears and possession, Winder argued that the rent increases were
ultra vires and void as being unreasonable and counterclaimed for a declaration
to that effect. The council applied to strike out the defence as being an abuse of
the process of the court to challenge the conduct of a public authority other
than by way of application for judicial review. Judge White allowed the councils application. Winder was subsequently refused leave to apply for judicial
review out of time. He then appealed from Judge Whites decision to the Court
of Appeal. The Court of Appeal (by a majority) and the House of Lords (unanimously) refused to strike out his defence as an abuse of the process of the
court.
The issue here was whether any choice of action was available to Winder.
Was he obliged to challenge the decision by the council to increase rents by way
of judicial review and so act within the stipulated time limit for judicial review,
171

or could he stand by and wait for the council eventually to take proceedings
against him and then argue illegality of their decision? It is arguable that on
these facts Winder should have been required to challenge the councils decision by application for judicial review rather than wait to be evicted. A speedy
decision was required to establish whether the council was acting unreasonably. On the other hand, why should it be required that Winder challenge the
validity of the councils actions when they presumably could have applied for
a declaration as to the legality of their own conduct?
In the leading judgment, Lord Fraser considered that the case did not fall
within any of the exceptions to the general rule (that a challenge to a decision
of a public authority which infringed rights under public law was to be challenged by the application for judicial review only) as stated by Lord Diplock in
O'Reilly v Mackman since the invalidity of the councils decision was not a collateral issue in a claim for infringement of a right arising under private law;
rather, the issue of the invalidity of the decision was central to the defence. Lord
Fraser accepted that it would be of great advantage to the council and their
ratepayers if challenges to their decisions were limited exclusively to the procedure of application for judicial review. If the appellants decisions were held
to be invalid, the basis of their financial administration since 1981 would be
upset. However, there may be other ways of obtaining speedy decisions; for
example, the public authority itself might initiate judicial review proceedings.
In the instant case, Winder did not select the procedure to be followed and was
merely seeking to defend proceedings brought by another. It was impossible
to accept that the right to challenge the decision of a local authority in course
of defending an action for non-payment can have been swept away by RSC
Order 53, which was directed to introducing a procedural reform. Winders
complaint was of the infringement of a contractual right in private law and he
had not initiated the proceedings. Winder was, therefore, allowed to defend the
action by reference to the illegality of the rent increase, though his defence ultimately failed on its merits.
More surprisingly, in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority
(1986), the House of Lords allowed an action by writ for a declaration that guidance issued by the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) on contraceptive advice to children under the age of 16 was unlawful and a breach of
parental rights to proceed. The private law content of the claim the threat of
infringement to her private law rights as a parent was so great as to permit
the plaintiff to proceed down the private law path. According to Lord Scarman:
Mrs Gillicks action is essentially to protect what she alleges to be her rights as
a parent under private law.
Lord Bridge, however, disagreed:

If the claim is well-founded, it must surely lie in the field of public rather than
private law. Mrs Gillick has no private right which she is in a position to assert
against the DHSS.
172

It seemed here that the House of Lords was indeed willing to offer Mrs
Gillick the choice she could also, in the alternative, have proceeded by way of
the application for judicial review.
In the Credit Suisse (1996) actions against Allerdale and Waltham Forest
councils for the enforcement of guarantees (see above, p 86), the councils were
allowed to argue the illegality of their own conduct (entering contracts which
were in breach of s 111 of the Local Government Act 1972) in defence.
Winder was itself approved in Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster
Family Practitioner Committee (1992), where the plaintiff GP brought an action
against his Family Practitioner Committee for payment of part of his basic
practice allowance withheld on the ground that he had failed to devote a substantial amount of time to general practice as required by statute. The committee applied to strike out the claim as an abuse of process on the ground that
their decision was a public law decision and must be challenged by way of
application for judicial review. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff had
a contract for services with the Committee and, therefore, his proper remedy
did, in fact, lie in private law. The House of Lords dismissed an appeal, holding that a private law right could be enforced by ordinary action even though
the proceedings involved a challenge to a public law decision. Lord Lowry preferred what was labelled a broad approach whereby it would not be insisted
that a complainant pursue her or his complaint via an application for judicial
review unless private law rights were not at stake at all. A narrow approach,
on the other hand, would normally require a challenge to a decision of a public body to proceed by way of judicial review, even though the complaint
involved issues of both public and private law. However, that norm would be
subject to exceptions. Their Lordships did not express a clear preference for one
approach over the other. Nor is it entirely clear by reference to which approach
the case was decided. Lord Bridge stated:
It is appropriate that an issue which depends exclusively on the existence of a
purely public law right should be determined in judicial review proceedings
and not otherwise. But where a litigant asserts his entitlement to a subsisting
right in private law, whether by way of claim or defence, the circumstance that
the existence and extent of the private right asserted may incidentally involve
the examination of a public law issue cannot prevent the litigant from seeking
to establish his right by action commenced by writ or originating summons, any
more than it can prevent him from setting up his private law right in proceedings brought against him.
Lord Lowry advocated a substantial degree of flexibility to avoid lengthy

debate on the form the proceedings in any particular case should take. Unless
the procedure selected was ill suited to dispose of the question at issue, there
was much to be said in favour of the proposition that a court having jurisdiction ought to let a case be heard. This approach was later echoed in Mercury
Communications Ltd v Director General of Fair Trading (1996). In breaking the
173

monopoly of British Telecom, the Telecommunications Act 1984 required BT to
enter into an agreement whereby Mercury could use its telephone lines. The
agreement was subject to renegotiation after five years. If no renegotiation
could be agreed, a determination could be made by the statutory regulator.
Mercury, however, considered that the Director General had misinterpreted
provisions in the licensing scheme and applied for a declaration by way of originating summons in private law. The House of Lords refused to strike out the
proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court. The issue was not solely
one of public law and the procedure of RSC Order 53 was not so well-suited to
the case that to allow the matter to be dealt with in private law would be an
abuse of process.
By contrast to Winder, in Avon County Council v Buscott (1988), in an action
by the local authority to recover possession of land, the defendant, while not
denying that he was a trespasser, asserted that he was a gypsy and that the
authority had failed to fulfil its duty under the Caravan Sites Act 1968 to provide accommodation for him. On this basis, he argued in defence that the
authority was acting unreasonably and ultra vires. The Court of Appeal held
that a defendant could challenge the reasonableness of a decision of a public
authority in an ordinary action (as opposed to by way of application for judicial review) only in support of a private right and where he had not selected the
forum of the proceedings. Buscott could not, therefore, defend the eviction proceedings on the ground that the council was acting unreasonably in instituting
such proceedings. Buscott admitted being a trespasser and, therefore, had no
rights in private law. The authoritys decision could be challenged only by way
of judicial review.
R v East Berkshire Health Authority ex parte Walsh (1985) provides an example
of proceeding by way of an application for judicial review when a private law
action was the appropriate forum. Here a senior nursing officer employed by
the health authority under a contract incorporating the Whitley Council agreement on conditions of service was dismissed by the district nursing officer for
misconduct. He applied for judicial review for certiorari on the basis that the
officer had no power of dismissal and also for breach of natural justice. At first
instance, it was held that application for judicial review was available on the
basis of public concern to ensure that a great public service acted lawfully and
fairly. The Court of Appeal, however, allowed an appeal. Sir John Donaldson
MR held that an applicant for judicial review had to show that a public law
right had been infringed. Public law was not to be equated with the interest of
the public unless the public through Parliament gives effect to that interest by
means of statutory provisions. Employment by a public authority did not per
se inject any element of public law. The existence of statutory provisions, for
example restricting powers of dismissal or otherwise underpinning the
employment, might do so. But here the applicants rights arose solely from his
contract of employment. Nor would the court in this instance order the
174

proceedings to continue as if begun by writ. The only remedy the applicant had
sought was certiorari which was not available in a civil action and there was no
indication of the form a declaration might take.
The main case law to date on the public/private dichotomy was recently
reviewed by Laws J in British Steel plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners (1996).
The plaintiff company used hydrocarbon oil in its manufacture of steel and was
assessed to excise tax on that oil under the Hydrocarbon Oil Duties Act 1979.
The Act provided for exemptions from the payment of such duty but the
Commissioners had refused to accept that British Steel fell within the stated
exemptions. Consequently, British Steel had paid the excise duty demanded of
it. The company then, however, instituted private law proceedings in restitution for recovery of the duty paid and argued the illegality of the past demands
on the part of the Commissioners. Laws J was of the view that the House of
Lords in cases from O'Reilly v Mackman to Mercury Communications had laid
down five propositions:
1
Where a complaint touches only a public law issue, there being no

question of a private right involved, the complainant must generally seek
his remedy by way of judicial review (O'Reilly). Otherwise there would be
abuse of process because public policy requires that the safeguards of RSC
Order 53 for the protection of public authorities (and, so, ultimately the
public) are not evaded.
Where a defendant to a private law suit has a defence which consists in

arguments against his plaintiff based on public law, he will not be nonsuited for being in the wrong court (Winder). It cannot be an abuse of
process or against public policy for a defendant to assert any defence
which legally arises when someone else takes him to court.
Where statute confers what is plainly a private law right, if on the Acts
true construction the right enures only after and in consequence of a
purely public law decision in favour of the claimant, any complaint
directed to the public decision-making must be brought by RSC Order 53
(Cocks v Thanet).
Where a claimant enjoys a private right whose existence is not contingent

upon the making of a prior public law decision in his favour, the claimant
may sue in private law even though he must assault an administrative or
discretionary decision on the way (Roy).
All said, there needs to be some procedural flexibility as the boundaries

between public and private law have not been fully worked out and
exceptions to the general rule should be developed on a case to case basis.
Laws J concluded that the British Steel case itself fell within 3:
... had the plaintiffs been able to establish by judicial review proceedings that
they were entitled to be accorded approval status, and that was duly granted to
175

them, then a private right would have enured in their hands ... Otherwise there
is no private right.
The harshness of the approach enunciated by the House of Lords in O'Reilly v

Mackman has, therefore, been diminished. However, it remains somewhat difficult to predict in which direction the court will jump in any particular case.
This being so, the court is, in a sense, exercising a yet further discretion in determining the applicants case. In any event, it can be difficult to forecast what the
courts response will be and the law has become something of a lottery for the
applicant.
6.11 Against whom is the application for judicial review

available?
A challenge by way of judicial review must be to the actions of a body which
performs public functions and not, for example, a trade union, company or
club engaging in a private relationship with its membership. In determining
whether a body is subject to judicial review, therefore, the source from which
the body derives its power is not determinative, but rather the nature of the
power being exercised. Hence, judicial review extends not only to public bodies established by statute or under the prerogative but to any body which exercises a public function. This principle was well-established in R v Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin (1987).
R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex parte Datafin (1987)
The applicants, Datafin, who were bidding in competition with company N to
take over another company, complained to the respondent that N had acted in
breach of the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers. The respondent dismissed
the complaint and the applicant applied for judicial review of that decision. The
Divisional Court refused the application on the basis that the Panels decision
was not susceptible to judicial review. On a renewed application before the
Court of Appeal, Sir John Donaldson MR found that the Panel was not set up
by statute but was a self-regulatory body in the sense that there existed a system whereby a group of people, acting in concert, use their collective power to
force themselves and others to comply with a code of conduct of their own
devising. It was an unincorporated association with no legal personality. It had
no statutory, common law or prerogative powers. It had no contractual relationship with the financial market it regulated. It had the power to impose
sanctions for breach of the code which were no less effective because they are
applied indirectly and lack a legally enforceable base. The applicants argued
that in deciding whether the court could exercise its supervisory jurisdiction
over the Panel regard has to be had not only to the source of the bodys power,
but also to whether it operates as an integral part of a system which has a
176

public law character, is supported by public law in that public law sanctions are
applied if its edicts are ignored and performs what might be described as public law functions. The Court of Appeal held that the Panel was subject to judicial review (but dismissed the application on the merits). No avenue lay in private law and it was unthinkable that, in the absence of legislation such as
affects trade unions, the panel should go on its way cocooned from the attention of the courts in defence of the citizenry ....
Lloyd LJ repeated the now well-established maxim that ... it is not just the
source of the power that matters, but also the nature of the duty .... Even if this
was not the case there was an implied devolution of power by government
which had deliberately abstained from exercising power.
However, the nature of the power being exercised may not only determine
whether the decision-maker is subject to judicial review as a public body, but
may also affect the level of review to which the decision-maker is to be subjected. So, in R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex parte Guinness plc (1990) the
Court of Appeal would intervene with a decision of the Panel which was taken
in the exercise of inquisitorial rather than disciplinary functions and in which
the applicant was a witness rather than a defendant only where satisfied that
the decision had led to injustice.
A contrasting decision to that in Datafin can be seen in R v Disciplinary
Committee of the Jockey Club ex parte The Aga Khan (1993). Here, the applicant
sought to challenge by judicial review a decision of the Jockey Club to disqualify his horse after a race and to fine his trainer 200. A sample of the horses
urine had been found to contain a prohibited substance. The applicant argued
that the disqualification damaged his reputation and that the breeding value of
the horse had been badly affected. The Divisional Court held that the decision
of the Jockey Club was not subject to judicial review. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal agreed. Although the Jockey Club regulated a significant national activity in the public interest and, had it not existed, the government would probably be driven to create a public body to do so, it was not in its origin, history,
constitution or membership a public body and its powers were not governmental. Further, the relationship between the Jockey Club and its members
gave rise to private rights enforceable by private law remedies. Hoffmann LJ
accepted that, since Datafin, the source of the power was not conclusive in
determining the public nature of a body. However:
... the mere fact of power, even over a substantial area of economic activity, is not
enough. In a mixed economy, power may be private as well as public. Private
power may affect the public interest and livelihood of many individuals. But
that does not subject it to the rules of public law.
To be subject to review in public law, the power needed to be governmental.

However, the court did state that in a situation where an applicant had no
recourse in private law against the Jockey Club then judicial review might be
available.
177

The fact that the source of the power originated from a contractual relationship appears to have been determinative in precluding a challenge via the
public law route in R v Lloyds ex parte Briggs (1993) and in R v Insurance
Ombudsman Bureau ex parte Aegon Life Assurance Ltd (1994). In Briggs, the court
concluded that Lloyds was not a public body susceptible to judicial review.
Leggatt LJ stated:
Even if the Corporation of Lloyds does perform public functions, for example
for the protection of policy holders, the rights relied on in these proceedings
relate exclusively to the contract governing the relationship between the Names
and their members agents and ... their managing agents. We do not consider
that involves public law ... All of the powers which are the subject of the complaint ... are exercised by Lloyds over its members solely by virtue of the contractual agreement of the members ... to be bound by the decisions and directions of the council.
In Aegon, Rose LJ considered that this statement applied equally to the

Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (IOB). The IOB, established in 1981 as a selfregulatory body to resolve complaints by customers in the insurance industry,
had subsequently been recognised by the Life Assurance and Unit Trust
Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO), which body had itself been recognised as
being subject to judicial review (see R v LAUTRO ex parte Ross (1993)). It was
argued that, just as LAUTRO controlled its members by a process of contracts
supported by the Financial Services Act 1986, so there trickled down to the
IOB a discharge of government functions coupled with controls through consent the IOB had been woven into a wider system of governmental control.
Rose LJ disagreed. In his view, the IOBs power was still solely derived from
contract and it simply cannot be said that it exercises governmental functions.
In a nutshell, even if it can be said that it has now been woven into a governmental system, the source of the IOBs power is still contractual, its decisions
are of an arbitrative nature in private law and these decisions are not, save very
remotely, supported by any public law sanction.
The requirement that the power be governmental in nature appears to
have been determinative in R v Chief Rabbi ex parte Wachmann (1993). According
to Simon Brown LJ, to be within the definition of a public body for the purposes
of public law, the body must be an integral part of a regulatory system which,
although itself non-statutory, is nevertheless supported by statutory powers
and penalties clearly indicative of governmental concern. It could not be said
that, had the regulatory powers of the Chief Rabbi not existed, government
would have felt impelled to introduce a system of statutory regulation.
It has been asserted that the governmental test as explained in the Chief
Rabbi case is a refinement and substantial narrowing of the Datafin test in that
it looks at the context of the power rather than focusing on the nature of the
power (see Black, Constitutionalising Self-Regulation (1996) 59 MLR 24 at
p 36)).
178
6.12 Standing locus standi

6.12.1 Rationale and application
The law does not allow just anyone to challenge a decision of a public authority simply because he or she disagrees with or disapproves of the decision.
There are good reasons for this. A free for all approach would open the floodgates to challenge, imposing an undue burden on the courts and aggravating
delay in judicial decision-making. It would unduly delay governmental decision-making. Judicial review would become an even greater weapon in the
hands of groups wanting to delay or deny the implementation of particular
decisions. In any case, why should a person or group which does not have a
particular interest or is not directly affected by a decision be allowed to challenge it when others with such an interest or so directly affected (assuming
such persons exist) have not felt inclined to mount a challenge. There are also
good countervailing arguments. It may be that no individual or group has an
interest in the decision over and above the rest of the population. Should such
a decision be rendered unchallengeable purely for that reason? Is it adequate to
have to rely on the Attorney General bringing an application or lending his
name to an applicant? (On so-called relator actions see below.) It might simply be argued that all citizens have an interest in securing that government does
not act beyond the law and, therefore, that all decisions in the public domain
should be subject to challenge by anyone.
The availability of a remedy in English law, however, is generally dependant upon the applicant having a right which has been affected a reflection of
the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium (where there is a right there is a remedy). Such
a principle is clearly appropriate in the private law arena, the very essence of
which is that a private right has been infringed. It is not, however, a principle
which can be applied with such a degree of precision and clarity in the field of
public law. Actions of public bodies may affect large sections of the population
and the effect may often be indirect in the sense that the objector does not suffer any personal physical or financial loss. On the other hand, such decisions
cannot be opened up to popular challenge. Government must be allowed to
govern without the threat of constant challenges to its decisions at the whim of
any individual or group in society which disagrees with those decisions.
The class of persons to whom an application for judicial review is available
is restricted, therefore, by reference to the principle of locus standi, ie an applicant must have sufficient standing (a sufficient interest in the matter to which
the application relates) in the eyes of the law to sustain a challenge to the particular decision made by the public authority. An individual who is the direct
object of a decision, eg the person refused planning permission or the person
against whom a deportation order is made, will clearly have locus standi. Such
179

a person is directly affected by the decision. Standing, however, is often not so
clear cut. For example, members of pressure groups such as Greenpeace have
a particular interest in a particular issue but can they be said to be affected by
relevant decisions any more than any other member of society simply because
they have a special interest in the subject matter of the decision? The courts
have effectively had to address the question whether and, if so, in what circumstances, membership of such a group confers standing to challenge governmental decisions upon individuals who, had they not been members of
such a group, would not have standing as individuals to challenge the relevant
decision. The balance between unduly restricting the ability of individuals or
groups to challenge and opening the floodgates to challenges of governmental
decision-making is a fine one.
Prior to the introduction of the application for judicial review, each of the
remedies had its own rules of standing. One would expect the requirements for
standing to differ as between the private and the public law remedies, with
more stringent requirements operating for the private law remedies. In fact,
standing was even more complex, with the rules for standing differing not only
as between the groups of remedies (ie private and public) but also within those
groups.
An injunction required interference with a private right or special damage
over and above that suffered by the rest of the community. Where such an interest was not present, then reliance had to be placed on the Attorney General
intervening in the public interest by way of a so-called relator action. In such
a case, the Attorney General could institute proceedings as guardian of the
public interest in his own right. More commonly, he would merely lend his
name enabling an application to be made but the costs would be borne by the
real applicant.
Since the essence of a declaration is to declare the parties legal rights (existing or future) the remedy clearly would not lie where no legal right existed. If
such a legal right did not exist, the applicant would again have to rely on the
Attorney General lending his name for a relator action (see Gouriet v Union of
Post Office Workers (1978)). There were inconsistencies in judicial attitude to
declaratory relief. For example, in Prescott v Birmingham Corporation (1955), a
ratepayer was allowed to challenge a local authoritys decision to allow free
travel for old age pensioners; in Blackburn v Attorney General (1971), the applicants standing to challenge accession to the Treaty of Rome went unchallenged.
Certiorari/prohibition lay where any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having a duty to
act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority ... (per Atkin LJ in R v
Electricity Commissioners (1924)). They lay ex debito justitiae where the applicant
had a particular grievance, ie the court would normally exercise its discretion
to grant the remedy in favour of the applicant. If there was no such grievance,
180

then they were discretionary (see R v Thames Magistrates Court ex parte
Greenbaum (1957)). For application by a stranger see R v GLC ex parte Blackburn
(1976).
A line of case law required the applicant for mandamus to establish a specific legal right. At the other extreme, an applicant was allowed to apply for an
order of mandamus to compel the police to enforce the law (see R v MPC ex parte
Blackburn (1968) and AG ex rel McWhirter v IBA (1973)).
As already noted, in 1977 the private and public law remedies were made
available in one proceeding, the application for judicial review, by RSC Order
53. Both RSC Order 53 and s 31 of the SCA 1981 require an applicant for judicial review to have a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.
It is now, therefore, the question of sufficiency of interest which must be
addressed. What was meant by a sufficient interest and whether a uniform
rule of standing to be applied to all applications for judicial review, regardless
of the particular remedy sought, had thereby been established was addressed
by the House of Lords in R v IRC ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and
Small Businesses (1982).
R v IRC ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses
(NFSESB) (1982)
Fleet Street casuals workers in the printing industry were called into work
as necessary. They gave false names and addresses when collecting pay dockets incurring a loss to the Revenue of 1,000,000 per annum. The
Commissioners agreed with the employers and unions that in future tax would
be deducted at source or properly assessed. In return, it was agreed that tax
owed from certain previous years would not be pursued.
The NFSESB was disgruntled that such an agreement had been reached and
that the Inland Revenue had not dealt with its members in such a lenient way
in the past. It applied for judicial review for a declaration that the Inland
Revenue had acted unlawfully and mandamus to compel them to fulfil their
public statutory duty of tax collection.
The initial question to be determined by the House of Lords was whether a
group of businessmen had sufficient standing to challenge the decision of the
Inland Revenue which did not affect its membership directly but about which
its membership felt aggrieved. The case is a stark illustration of the difficulty of
assessing sufficiency of interest and the gradations of approach (restrictive to
liberal) which might be taken.
It is clear from the decision of the House of Lords in NFSESB that the issue
of standing is to be considered both at the leave stage and the merits stage of the
application for judicial review. At the leave stage, applications which are hopeless or made by mere busybodies are to be excluded. At the merits stage, standing can be denied on the basis that the applicant does not have an arguable case
181

on the merits. The Divisional Court held at the leave stage that the Federation
had standing; at the hearing (merits) stage that it had no sufficient interest.
The Court of Appeal proceeded on the assumption that the IRC had no
power to grant a tax amnesty and were acting unlawfully. It held that the
Federation had a sufficient interest.
The House of Lords unanimously (though not all on the same grounds)
allowed the IRCs appeal.
According to Lord Wilberforce, the question of standing was not to be treated as a preliminary issue, ie to be decided before consideration of the merits, as
it had been treated by the Divisional Court. There may be simple cases where
it can be seen at the earliest stage that the person applying for judicial review
has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support the application.
However, in other cases it will be necessary to consider the powers or the
duties in law of those against whom the relief is asked, the position of the applicant in relation to those powers or duties, and to the breach of those said to
have been committed ... the question of sufficient interest cannot ... be considered in the abstract ... it must be taken together with the legal and factual context.
The test of sufficiency of interest under RSC Order 53 was not one of pure
discretion on the part of the court and the fact that the same words were used
to cover all the forms of remedy did not mean that the test was the same in all
cases. The test may well be stricter, for example, in cases of mandamus ... we
should be unwise in our enthusiasm for liberation from procedural fetters to
discard reasoned authorities ....
A good working rule in the context of mandamus was to inquire whether the
complainant was, expressly or impliedly, within the scope or ambit of the duty.
The position of taxpayers whose own assessments were not in question must
be judged according to whether they had a sufficient interest.
The framework of the legislation must be taken into account. Assessments
were confidential. No list or record of assessments was available for public
inspection. There was no common fund of the produce of income tax in which
taxpayers as a whole could be said to have an interest (as compared with
ratepayers). Tax collected was paid into the Consolidated Fund for any purpose that Parliament thought fit. Lord Wilberforce stated:
As a matter of general principle I would hold that one taxpayer has no sufficient
interest in asking the court to investigate the tax affairs of another taxpayer or
to complain that the latter has been under-assessed or over-assessed: indeed,
there is a strong public interest that he should not. And this principle applies
equally to groups of taxpayers: an aggregate of individuals each of whom has
no interest cannot of itself have an interest.
Lord Wilberforce, therefore, allowed the appeal on the basis that the applicant
had no sufficient interest.
182

This approach may be contrasted with that of Lord Diplock. Lord Diplock
agreed with Lord Wilberforce that the question of sufficiency of interest could
not be separated from the merits of the application. However, while he found
that, on the merits, the IRC were acting within the law, he was alone in finding
that the Federation had standing. In his view:
It would ... be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group,
like the Federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by
outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention
of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.
The Attorney General, although he occasionally applies for prerogative orders
against public authorities that do not form part of central government, in practice never does against government departments. It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments
of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to
Parliament ... they are responsible to a court of justice for the lawfulness of what
they do, and of that the court is the only judge.
Lord Diplock, therefore, considered that the Federation had sufficient standing
but that it failed on the merits of the application.
Lord Fraser was of the opinion that the NFSESB did not have standing. He
said:
The new RSC Order 53 ... no doubt had the effect of removing technical and procedural differences between the prerogative orders ... but I do not think it can
have the effect of throwing over all the older law and of leaving the grant of
judicial review in the uncontrolled discretion of the court.
... a direct financial or legal interest is not now required ... there is also general
agreement that a mere busybody does not have a sufficient interest. The difficulty is ... to distinguish between the desire of the busybody to interfere in other
peoples affairs and the interests of the person affected by or having a reasonable concern with the matter to which the application relates ... The correct
approach in such a case is ... to look at the statute under which the duty arises,
and to see whether it gives any express or implied right to persons in the position of the applicant to complain of the alleged unlawful act or omission.
Lord Scarman concluded that the Federation had no standing because they had
not shown that the IRC had failed in their duties, ie interest and merits were
one.
Lord Roskill, like Lords Wilberforce and Fraser, found that the Federation,
merely as a body of taxpayers, had no sufficient interest.
While the House of Lords was of the view that the NFSESB as a group of
taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the tax assessments of other taxpayers,
they did not rule out all possibility that a taxpayer could have sufficient
standing to challenge others assessments, though this would be exceptional.
In R v AG ex parte Imperial Chemical Industries Plc (1987), ICI was held to have
183

standing to challenge the manner in which ethane was valued for the calculation of Petroleum Revenue Tax. ICI manufactured ethylene from naphtha but
ethylene could be produced more cheaply from ethane. The valuation method
adopted, it was alleged, therefore unduly favoured ICIs rivals. Further, the
actions of the Inland Revenue amounted to state aid within Article 93 EC and
was unlawful.
In general, the decisions of the courts subsequent to NFSESB have reflected
a liberal view of standing.
In R v HM Treasury ex parte Smedley (1985), Slade LJ noted the relaxation of
the rules of locus standi by the House of Lords in National Federation of SelfEmployed and Small Businesses. He concluded that the taxpayers application in
the instant case (to challenge the governments proposal to designate as a
Community treaty a treaty providing extra funds to the Community) was not
frivolous and that the applicant if only in his capacity as a taxpayer, has sufficient locus standi to raise this question .... The application ultimately failed on
the merits.
More recently, in R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
ex parte Rees-Mogg (1994), in an application for certiorari, prohibition and a declaration that any purported ratification of the Treaty on European Union would
be unlawful, locus standi was accepted on the basis of the applicants sincere
concern for constitutional issues. Lloyd LJ, referring to Smedley, concluded
that:
There is no dispute as to the applicants locus standi, and in the circumstances it
is not appropriate to say any more about it ...
In R v Felixstowe JJ ex parte Leigh (1987), a journalist not involved in the court

proceedings themselves had locus standi, as guardian of the public interest in
open justice, for a declaration (but not mandamus) that justices were not entitled
to withhold their names.
6.12.2
Pressure groups
As in the NFSESB case itself, an application may be made by an association on

behalf of its membership. This is especially common in the case of pressure
groups whose very raison detre is to persuade government to promote its particular interest or to refrain from conduct which would jeopardise that interest.
Such pressure groups have commonly been afforded standing.
In R v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte CPAG (1990), the Child
Poverty Action Group (CPAG), Islington and Hackney London Borough
Councils and the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux applied for
judicial review that a regulation under s 98 of the Social Security Act 1975 had
not been properly construed resulting in the determination of claims for benefit being unduly delayed. Woolf LJ stated:
184

If the appellants contentions are correct, it is the individual claimants for supplementary benefit whose claims have been delayed who were directly affected
as a result of the Secretary of State and the chief adjudication officer misinterpreting their responsibilities. However, the application for judicial review has
been made by the appellants because the issues are agreed to be important in
the field of social welfare and not ones which individual claimants for supplementary benefit could be expected to raise. Furthermore, the Child Poverty
Action Group and the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux play a
prominent role in giving advice, guidance and assistance to such claimants.
The CPAG was held to have standing.

By contrast, in R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Rose Theatre
Trust Co (1990), Schiemann J denied locus standi to a group formed after the
event which had cemented them together had occurred. The Rose Theatre
Trust, a non-profit making company, was formed after a Shakespearean theatre
had been discovered during the course of an office building development. The
purpose of the Trust was to protect the newly discovered site. However, the
Trust was held not to have locus standi to challenge the ministers decision not
to schedule the site as a historic monument even though the minister had
accepted that the site was one of national importance. Schiemann J formulated
the following propositions which he asserted were not inconsistent with
National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses:
Once leave has been given to move for judicial review, the court which
hears the application ought still to examine whether the applicant has a
sufficient interest.
Whether an applicant has a sufficient interest is not purely a matter of
discretion in the court.
Not every member of the public can complain of every breach of statutory
duty by a person empowered to come to a decision by that statute. To rule
otherwise would be to deprive the phrase a sufficient interest of all
meaning.
However, a direct financial or legal interest is not required.
Where one is examining an alleged failure to perform a duty imposed by
statute it is useful to look at the statute and see whether it gives an
applicant a right enabling him to have that duty performed.
Merely to assert that one has an interest does not give one an interest.
The fact that some thousands of people join together and assert that they
have an interest does not create an interest if the individuals did not have
an interest.
The fact that those without an interest incorporate themselves and give the
company in its memorandum power to pursue a particular object does not
give the company an interest.
185

A company could have no more standing than its individual members. Nor
could an agglomeration of individuals have a greater standing than any one of
the individuals which comprised it. So, the issue was whether any of the
individual members had locus standi as an individual. The membership
included people of distinction in the fields of archaeology, the theatre,
literature, local residents and the local MP. Schiemann J held there to be no
sufficient interest. On the argument that, if the Trust was not allowed to
challenge, the minister s conduct would go unchallenged, Schiemann
responded:
This submission is clearly right. The answer to it is that the law does not see it
as the function of the courts to be there for every individual who is interested in
having the legality of an administrative action litigated. Parliament could have
given such a wide right of access to the court but it has not done so. The challenger must show that he has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the
application relates. The court will look at the matter to which the application
relates ... and the statute under which the decision was taken ... and decide
whether that statute gives that individual expressly or impliedly a greater right
or expectation than any other citizen of this country to have that decision taken
lawfully. We all expect our decision-makers to act lawfully. We are not all given
by Parliament the right to apply for judicial review.
The application also failed on the merits. The decision of Schiemann J on the
point of locus standi has been criticised as over-restrictive. It has been said of the
decision that: The practical result ... is to create that pariah of modern administrative law, the unreviewable decision (see Clive Lewis, No Standing in the
Theatre: Unreviewable Decision (1990) CLJ 189 at 191). It is especially unsatisfactory that a decision of the executive should be essentially non reviewable
and that such a principle should be acceptable, or at the least accepted, by a
court of law. Indeed, Schiemann J has himself identified the undesirability of
putting certain actions beyond legal challenge in the following terms:
The politically, financially or socially strong can oppress the weak, safe in the
knowledge that the courts cannot interfere. This is undesirable not only because
oppression is undesirable, but also because if the law is openly flouted without
redress in the courts the law is brought into contempt as being a dream without
substance.
Lewis (above) also argues that there are some governmental decisions in which
all members of the public have an interest: Where the decision is one of major
national importance affecting the public generally, then any member of the
public should be able to challenge it.
It also seems somewhat unsatisfactory that a pressure group should be
denied standing because it is formed ad hoc to meet a particular exigency as was
the case in Rose Theatre. Clearly the pressure group would not have been established before discovery of the site. It was hardly an event to be anticipated! (For
an account of locus standi by Sir Konrad Schiemann himself, see (1990) PL
34253.)
186

In R v Poole Borough Council ex parte Beebee (1991), however, Schiemann J
found that the Worldwide Fund for Nature (UK) and the British Herpetological
Society had sufficient interest to challenge a grant of planning permission over
an area of special scientific interest. Although those representing the
Worldwide Fund for Nature would not alone have had sufficient locus standi,
the British Herpetological Society had by reason of its financial input into the
site and its connection with the planning permission and a condition attached
relating to the protection of species. Schiemann J distinguished his own decision in the Rose Theatre case.
The courts have looked to various factors in determining whether a group
has standing. In R v Inspectorate of Pollution ex parte Greenpeace (No 2) (1994), the
Court of Appeal noted as relevant the nature of the applicant, the extent of the
applicants interest in the issues raised and the nature of the relief sought. In R
v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte World Development Movement Ltd
(1995), relevant standing factors were said to include vindication of the rule of
law, the importance of the issue raised, the absence of any other responsible
challenger, the nature of the breach, the role of applicants in tendering advice,
guidance and assistance re aid and the applicants national and international
expertise and interest.
6.12.3 Waiver of standing

The question here is whether the parties can agree that the issue of standing
will not be argued in an application for judicial review. The answer would
appear to be negative. In ex parte CPAG (above), the respondent agreed not to
dispute the issue of locus standi because of the importance of the issue.
However, the court concluded that for the parties not to raise the issue of locus
standi did not confer a jurisdiction on the court which was otherwise absent.
Woolf LJ stated:
... the question of locus standi goes to jurisdiction of the court ... The parties are
not entitled to confer jurisdiction, which the court does not have, on the court
by consent ...
6.12.4 Relator actions

In certain circumstances, an absence of standing on the part of an individual or
group can be overcome by what is known as a relator action. In his or her
capacity as protector of public rights, the Attorney General always has standing ex officio (ie flowing from the nature of his or her office) to bring an application for an injunction or a declaration (though in this context the injunction
is more commonly sought). Thus, the private law remedies could be used in a
public law context even before the reforms of 1977. It is rare that the Attorney
General exercises this ex officio power. In addition, however, a person or group
might persuade the Attorney General in effect to lend the name of the office to
187

enable the bringing of an application for an injunction. The Attorney General
stands behind the real applicants with the application being brought in the
Attorney Generals name but the real applicants paying the costs. Such an
application is called a relator action because it is brought at the relation of the
Attorney General. Such applications are identifiable by the use of the words ex
rel in the case citation.
Consent to a relator action is in the Attorney Generals discretion. In AG ex
rel McWhirter v IBA (1973), Lord Denning MR had suggested that, where the
Attorney General refuses leave in a proper case, or improperly or unreasonably delays in giving leave, or his machinery works too slowly then the individual could apply for an injunction despite the otherwise absence of standing.
However, in Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers (1978), the House of Lords
asserted that the discretion of the Attorney General whether or not to lend his
name was unreviewable (though Gouriet was concerned with an attempt to use
judicial review to enforce the criminal law an attempt to prevent a trade
union boycotting the sending of mail to South Africa as a protest against
apartheid).
The Attorney General never lent his name where the proceedings were
against a minister or government department.
The relator action is of less importance now with the courts more liberal
attitude towards standing.
A local authority has a power under s 222 of the Local Government Act 1972
to, inter alia, institute proceedings where they consider it expedient for the promotion or protection of the inhabitants of their area.
Parliament also on occasions confers power on a particular body to supervise the application of and, where necessary, to enforce legislation; for example
the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality
established under the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts respectively.
6.13 Discretionary nature of the remedies

Both the public law and the private law remedies are discretionary on the part
of the court (with the exception of the prerogative writ of habeas corpus; see R v
Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Azam (1974)). The court may require that
an applicant exhausts all available statutory remedies before accessing judicial
review. A remedy may not be granted when other satisfactory remedies are
available, for example, where provided by the statute under which the power
is exercised (see further Chapter 7). The court might exercise its discretion to
refuse a remedy where it considers there has been undue delay (quite apart
from the time limits imposed under the Supreme Court Act 1981). In R v
Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte Argyll Group plc (1986), the court
refused relief where reliance had been placed on the decision challenged by
third parties. In R v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte Association of
188

Metropolitan Authorities (1986), a declaration was allowed but certiorari refused
where the decision challenged had been acted upon and a successful challenge
would result in administrative chaos. Webster J stated:
The regulations have been in force for about six months ... If [they] were to be
[quashed] all applicants who had been refused benefit would be entitled to
make fresh claims and all authorities would be required to consider each such
claim.
The court therefore considers the effect on the public of providing a remedy to
the applicant, the applicants conduct as being unreasonable (see ex parte Fry
(1954)) or unmeritorious (see Ward v Bradford Corporation (1971)), and even that
the court considers that the penalty was deserved or that the decision-maker
would reach the same decision on reconsideration and so there is no point in
affording an opportunity to challenge (see Cinnamond v British Airports
Authority (1980)).
(See further Sir Thomas Bingham, Should Public Law Remedies be
Discretionary? (1991) PL 6475.)
189
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6
REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A legal right is of little, if any, value if there is no effective remedy. In the field
of administrative law remedies can be obtained speedily. Once obtained, remedies are generally effective in protecting from continuing infringements of legal
rights. It must be remembered, however, that the judicial power here is one of
review only so that a challenged decision cannot be overturned on its merits
and a fresh decision substituted. The decision-maker is free to retake the decision providing he or she does so lawfully.
The private law remedies

Injunction
An injunction is normally prohibitory in nature. It prohibits the commission or
continuation of an unlawful act, for example one which is ultra vires or in
breach of natural justice. An injunction may be permanent or temporary.
Injunctions are now available against officers and representatives of the Crown
(M v Home Office (1992)).
Declaration
A declaration stipulates the legal position of the parties. It is not in itself
enforceable but, once the legal position has been declared, other remedies may
be available to enforce the rights declared.
Damages
Damages are most relevant in the context of the tortious and contractual liability of public authorities.
The public law remedies

The public law remedies are certiorari, prohibition, mandamus (the prerogative
orders) and habeas corpus (the surviving prerogative writ). They are granted at
the suit of the Crown. Applications are, therefore, brought in the name of the
Crown on behalf of the applicant. They cannot be brought against the Crown
itself although they do lie against ministers and officials. All, except habeas corpus, are discretionary.
191
Certiorari/prohibition
These are similar in effect and may be dealt with together. The essential difference is one of timing. Certiorari quashes a decision already made whilst prohibition prevents the commission of a future act which would be ultra vires or in
breach of natural justice/fairness.
Mandamus
This compels the performance of a public duty.
Habeas corpus
This writ is available as of right and requires the imprisoner to justify the applicants imprisonment. It is not discretionary.
The introduction of the application for judicial review

In 1976, the Law Commission recommended the introduction of a new procedure to be called the application for judicial review. Under this procedure, an
applicant would be able to obtain any of the remedies or a combination as
appropriate. The procedure was introduced by the RSC Order 53 in 1977. It was
given statutory force by s 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1931.
Rules of the Supreme Court Order 53

Any matter which is an issue of public law must be pursued by way of an application for judicial review. The court has a discretion to make a declaration or
grant an injunction if just and convenient where an application for judicial
review has been made. The court may also award damages where they would
have been available as a matter of private law. Where a matter has been commenced by way of an application for judicial review and should have been pursued through private law procedures, the court has the power to order that the
proceedings continue as if begun by writ.
Procedure
An application for judicial review is a two-stage procedure:
Leave stage
Application for leave is made ex parte and operates as a filter to prevent
hopeless applications proceeding. An applicant must show that he or she
has an arguable or prima facie case (R v IRC ex parte National Federation of
Self-Employed and Small Businesses (1982)).
192
Summary: Remedies in Administrative Law

Merits stage
The merits stage is an additional hurdle in public law proceedings and has
no counterpart in a private law action. This stage requires a full
consideration of the merits of the application.
Time limits
Order 53 requires that any application is brought within three months of the
grounds arising. Exceptionally, the court may extend this period. The time limit
is strict with the aim of providing legal certainty.
Limits on the application for judicial review the public/private law dichotomy
In OReilly v Mackman (1983), the House of Lords made clear that, where a matter is one of public law, the Order 53 procedure for judicial review must now be
used. The use of a private law action would, in such circumstances, amount to
an abuse of the process of the court. This principle has not always been strictly
applied (eg Wandsworth Borough Council v Winder (1985)).
Against whom is the application for judicial review

available?
The decision-maker being challenged by way of judicial review must perform
a public function. In determining whether a body is performing a public function, both the source and the nature of the power being exercised is examined
(R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex parte Datafin (1987)). Where the relationship between the applicant and the decision-maker arises in private law (eg
contract) the decision-maker will not be subject to the courts supervisory jurisdiction (R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club ex parte The Aga Khan
(1994)).
Standing locus standi

This requirement seeks to ensure that not just anyone can bring an application
for judicial review. An applicant must show that he or she has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. In R v IRC ex parte National
Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses (1982), the House of Lords (Lord
Diplock dissenting) determined that one taxpayer did not have standing to
challenge the tax affairs of another. Subsequent cases have displayed a more
liberal view of standing (eg R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs ex parte Rees Mogg (1994)).
193
Pressure groups
An application may be made by an association on behalf of its membership (R
v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte CPAG (1990)). A group formed after
the event, however, will not be allowed standing unless individual members
have standing in their own right (R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex
parte Rose Theatre Trust Co (1990)).
Waiver of standing
Parties to an application cannot agree to waive the requirement of standing.
Relator actions
The absence of standing may be overcome by a relator action. The Attorney
General in his or her capacity as protector of public rights always has standing
ex officio. It is, however, rare for the Attorney General to exercise this power and
it is of less significance since the relaxation of the requirement of standing. In
addition, an applicant may persuade the Attorney General to lend his or her
name to an application.
Discretionary nature of the remedies

In the context of an application for judicial review, the public and private law
remedies, with the exception of the writ of habeas corpus, are discretionary. As
such, a remedy may not be granted, for example, when other satisfactory remedies are available or the where the applicant has unduly delayed bringing his
or her application.
194

Chapter 6 Remedies in Administrative Law PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chapter 6 Remedies in Administrative Law PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CHAPTER 6

REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Principles of Administrative Law

The private law remedies

The injunction is normally prohibitory in nature. It prohibits the commission or

Remedies in Administrative Law

Principles of Administrative Law

The public law remedies

Nature and form

Remedies in Administrative Law

Mandamus compels the performance of a public duty (which nowadays is most

The writ of habeas corpus requires an imprisoner to justify the imprisonment. It

The introduction of the application for judicial

In a report published in 1976 (Remedies in Administrative Law) the Law

Principles of Administrative Law

The Law Commission recommended the introduction of a new procedure to be

Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) Order 53

RSC Order 53 provides as follows:

(a) an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari; or

Remedies in Administrative Law

Under rule 4(1) as amended by SI 1980/2000:

Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981

Section 31 of the SCA 1981 states:

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

The application for judicial review is a two-stage procedure. Leave to bring an

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

Order 53 (as amended in 1980) requires an application for judicial review to be

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

6.10 Limits on the application for judicial review the

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

Principles of Administrative Law

Lord Bridge, however, disagreed:

Remedies in Administrative Law

Lord Lowry advocated a substantial degree of flexibility to avoid lengthy

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

Where a complaint touches only a public law issue, there being no

Where a defendant to a private law suit has a defence which consists in

Where a claimant enjoys a private right whose existence is not contingent

All said, there needs to be some procedural flexibility as the boundaries

Principles of Administrative Law

The harshness of the approach enunciated by the House of Lords in O'Reilly v

6.11 Against whom is the application for judicial review

Remedies in Administrative Law

To be subject to review in public law, the power needed to be governmental.

Principles of Administrative Law

In Aegon, Rose LJ considered that this statement applied equally to the

Remedies in Administrative Law

6.12 Standing locus standi

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

Principles of Administrative Law

Remedies in Administrative Law

Principles of Administrative Law

In R v Felixstowe JJ ex parte Leigh (1987), a journalist not involved in the court

As in the NFSESB case itself, an application may be made by an association on