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Version Dated 11116112

Office of Inspector General

Inspection of the

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of

Investigations and Counterintelligence,
Special Investigations, Criminal
Investigations, & Computer Investigations
And Forensics Divisions

Report Number ISP-I-XX-XXX, Month 2012

NOTICE - DISTRIBUTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS RESTRICTED

This draft report, prepared by the U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General,
is subject to revisions before its final form is released to the public. This draft is
provided to Department or Broadcasting Board of Governors officials solely for
their official review and comment. Recipients of this draft report are not
authorized to make further distribution or to release this information except for
official review and comment.

The final report will be posted on OIG's public Web site after it is reviewed
and redacted as appropriate in accordance with the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). Department and BBG officials are encouraged to provide input
for OIG's consideration concerning any information in this draft they
consider to be Sensitive But Unclassified that may adversely affect the foreign
policy or other interests of the United States and that should therefore be
withheld from public disclosure.

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PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection
and Evaluation, as issued in 2011 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for
the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of BBG, and
Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and
BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service
Act of 1980;

Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively
achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and
whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with
maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions
and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.

Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets

the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management
controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the
likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and
whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.
METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated,
reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and
reviewed tlie substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices,
individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.

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Table of Contents

Key Judgments

Context

J-lxecutivc Direction

The need for independence

Professional Standards

Other Topics - Addressed on a Division by Division Basis

Special Investigations Division (SID)
Criminal Investigations Division (CR)
Computer Investigations and Forensics Division (CIF)

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23

DS Information Technology Systems

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IJst of Recommendations

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List of Informal Recommendations

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Key Judgments
An immediate restructuring of the Special Investigations Division (SID) is necessary to
prevent senior Department and Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) officials from
influencing investigations in which subjects are DS Special Agents or are Department
officials at the GS-14/FS-02 level and above. Inspectors received several examples of
undue influence from within DS and from the top floor of the Department, raising serious
concerns about the quality and integrity of some internal investigations. Inspectors
forwarded specific information to OIG/INV for follow-up.

As SID is presently configured, the chiefs grade is too low, with an extended reporting
chain. That opens opportunities for influence, gossip, and the leak of sensitive
information, especially in cases involving DS agents. Increasing the SID chiefs grade to
FE-OC and establishing a direct reporting link to the A/S for Diplomatic Security would
improve the situation.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security lacks a comprehensive investigations manual with

approved policies and guidelines on how to conduct investigations. Instead, inspectors
found ad hoc templates, policies, and procedures. In SID, a lack of clear procedures for
opening and pursuing cases allegedly resulted in differences in approach, including a
more aggressive investigation of some DS personnel.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security reportedly has never sought a peer review of its
investigative divisions, though such reviews are common in the federal investigative
community and can provide valuable guidance for correcting flaws and adopting best
practices.

Id's Foreign Service (FS) Special Agent investigator contingent experiences frequent
turnover due to two-year assignments. That, combined with few GS-1811 investigator
positions and the complexity of many criminal investigations, negatively affects the
quality of investigations and the continuity of expertise. DS should establish three-year
FS tours, increase the number of GS-1811 positions, and consider a specialized
investigator career track.

The Criminal Investigations Division (CR) is too large and unwieldy. The Bureau of
Diplomatic Security should make the Criminal Fraud Investigations (CFI) portion a new
division within ICI.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs should complete
several long-pending Memoranda of Understanding.

The Computer Investigations and Forensic (CIF) Division has the personnel and logistics
to contribute more to cyber-crime investigations. DS should advertise that capability.
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In general, the inspectors found personnel in the three ICI divisions to be proudly
professional and dedicated to their important jobs. The recommended improvements will
help those personnel fulfill their expectations.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the onsite review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length
on areas where the OIG team did not identify problems that need to be corrected.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between October 1 and November 16, 2012.
Ambassador Larry M. Dinger (team leader), Christopher Mack (deputy team leader), Craig S.
Cheney, Aurelia Fedenisn, Andrea M. Leopold and Robert W. Mustain conducted the inspection.

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Context
This inspection addresses three divisions within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence (ICI): the Special Investigations Division (SID);
the Criminal Investigations Division (CR); and the Computer Investigations and Forensics
Division (CIF). ICI has two other divisions: Counterintelligence, inspected in 2011, and Field
Offices, which has the single largest number of ICI personnel.
SID's mission is to conduct administrative and criminal investigations of alleged
misconduct related to Department of State employees wherever they are located and to all other
personnel under Chief of Mission authority overseas. A memorandum of understanding between
SID and the Office of the Inspector General Office of Investigations (OIG/INV) roughly
apportions the two office's responsibilities, leaving areas of potential overlap. The range of SID
investigations is diverse, from substance abuse, to domestic violence, deaths, discharge of a
firearm, sex crimes, and other conduct that may merit criminal or administrative discipline. SID
has 29 personnel and a budget of $479,000.
The CR Division mandate relates to crimes involving the consular function. The Criminal
Fraud Investigation (CFI) branch investigates allegations of malfeasance involving visa and
passport fraud, complex visa and passport crimes spanning multiple jurisdictions, and human
trafficking. The Criminal Investigative Liaison (CIL) branch coordinates investigative requests
from federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies, facilitates fugitive returns, and
has liaison officers in several agencies plus INTERPOL. The Overseas Criminal Investigations
branch supports the Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator (A/RSO-I) program. The
Special Projects (SP) branch specifically targets H and L employment-visa fraud, working with
DHS/ICE Document and Benefits Task Forces and the Kentucky Consular Center. SP also
conducts training. The Criminal Intelligence and Research (CIR) branch conducts consular
fraud-related research and analysis including financial forensic efforts directed at asset forfeiture
and seizure, manages the DS evidence program, and oversees all DS database-access programs.
Significant CR funding comes from Machine Readable Visa fees and H&L visa funding. CR has
277 personnel and a total budget of $22,942,303.

CIF, established in 2004, provides DS and others in the State Department technical
assistance for computer-evidence recovery and analysis and for internet and network
investigations. Within CIF, the Computer Investigations Program looks into cyber crimes, carries
out related security functions, and provides support for collection of evidence from electronic
devices. The Digital Forensics Program provides laboratory support related to such evidence.
The Technical Surveillance Program provides equipment, operational support, and training to DS
investigators and staff. CIF has 57 personnel and a budget of $8,678,940.

Nearly 88 percent of staff in the three divisions filled out OIG personal questionnaires, a
remarkably high total. Most personnel were complimentary of their supervisors and expressed
satisfaction that they were endeavoring to accomplish important work. In interviews, the
inspection team was impressed by the candor, devotion to duty, and professionalism evident in
each division. Where criticisms arose as elaborated below, it was inevitably in the context of
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wanting to make the system better and to increase the ability of good people to do their jobs
more effectively.

Executive Direction
The SID and CR division chiefs transferred in the summer of 2012, and the former SID
chief moved up to become overall Director for ICI. The CIF chief, a GS-15 civil servant,

remained in place. Given the degree of supervisory turnover, the reality that the ICI director is
new in his job, and the diverse roles the three divisions play, supervisory issues are dealt with in
discussion of the various topics below.

The Need for Independence

Inspectors learned in conversations with Department employees who utilize SID Reports
of Investigation (ROIs) in disciplinary matters and in later interviews with agents inside SID who
undertake investigations that in some cases superiors in DS and in senior levels of the State
Department have prejudiced the commencement, course, and outcome of SID investigations.
Sources referred to DS sometimes circling the wagons to protect favored DS rising stars from
criminal charges or from embarrassing revelations that could harm a promising career. One case,
which triggered outraged comment from several SID sources, relates to allegations that a
Regional Security Officer engaged in serious criminal conduct including sexual abuse of local
embassy staff during a series of embassy postings. Sources also reported that a senior DS official
successfully protected some agents on the Secretary's Detail from investigations into
misbehavior while on official trips. Such DS interventions reportedly are not the norm, but they
apparently do take place often enough that several sources in the Department who regularly see
SID cases summed the situation up with almost identical words: DS should never investigate
DS. (The inspection team has referred all specific allegations to OIG/INV for follow-up.)

Unfortunately, the worry is still broader. Sources reported that a senior "7"^ Floor"
Department official ordered DS to stop the investigation of an ambassador accused of pedophilia,
and another such senior official had DS stop an investigation of an ambassador-designate.
Reportedly, such top-level intervention is rare, but it has taken place once or twice a year. (The
inspection team has referred all specific allegations to OIG/INV for follow-up.)
The specific allegations, the variety of sources, and the credibility of those sources raise
very serious concerns. Hindering such cases can result in counterintelligence vulnerabilities and
can allow exploitive criminals to continue their activities. From interviews in SID, it is apparent
that such interventions frustrate, even demoralize, agents who as dedicated law enforcement
officers aspire to investigate serious cases fully.

Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) standards and
principles make clear that "in all matters relating to investigative work, the investigative
organization must be free, both in fact and appearance, from impairments to independence; must
be organizationally independent; and must maintain an independent attitude." Such
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independence is essential "so that decisions used in obtaining evidence, conducting interviews,
and making recommendations will be impartial and will be viewed as impartial by
knowledgeable third parties." The credibility of the State Department's disciplinary system
depends on that independence, yet the perception clearly exists among knowledgeable parties
that external influences have negatively affected SID investigations in at least some particular
cases.

A key concern in considering SID's independence is what CIGIE refers to as

"organizational impairment," the investigative office's "position within the hierarchical structure
of the subject Government entity. To achieve maximum independence, the investigative function
should be positioned outside the staff or reporting line of the unit or employees under
investigation." Another key CIGIE concern regarding independence is any "external
impairment," including "influence on the extent and thoroughness of the investigative scope, the
way in which the investigation is conducted, the individual(s) who should be interviewed, the
evidence that should be obtained, and the content of the investigative report." In DS, SID is
positioned in the regular hierarchy, one of many offices that report up a regular chain to the

Director, Domestic Operations. FS special agents in SID, most of them rather junior in rank, FS04s and FS-03s, ordinarily serve only one tour as an investigator. Fairly often, subjects of their
investigations are more senior DS agents, and sometimes-hostile witnesses for interviews are
other senior DS agents. As noted, in some instances senior Department officials have reportedly
intervened with DS to stop investigations from proceeding. During inspection interviews, nearly
every SID special agent admitted being aware that one or more suspects or witnesses or senior
Department officials could one day serve on a promotion board or on a DS assignment panel that
will decide the investigator's career prospects. In the interviews, most investigators added that
they themselves had not yet experienced pressure from above in any particular cases; but some
had indeed felt such pressure (as reported above). Most had heard reports of such, and some
predicted that colleagues in SID who had gained a reputation for being firm appliers of proper
investigative standards would have difficult career paths ahead. Several special agents in SID

observed that Civil Service agents with sufficient rank are less susceptible to pressure, since their
careers do not depend on DS assignment panels or Foreign Service promotion boards.
In meetings with Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, and U.S. Secret
Service investigative offices, inspectors learned that various models exist for creating an
"independence" firewall to insulate sensitive internal investigations from high-level interference

and the perception thereof SID's current structure in which the vast majority of investigators are
relatively junior DS agents likely to have just one investigator experience and in which the
supervisors also are in the DS mainstream subject to regular "up or out" assignment and
promotion processes is at least unusual and may be unique. That structure does not foster
independence from career pressures. It does create significant potential for undue influence,
favoritism, and potential retribution. Various corrective mechanisms may be possible; but the
structure surely must at a minimum include removing from the normal DS reporting chain
investigations of employee malfeasance and criminal cases involving all DS special agents and
all Department employees at the GS-14/FS-02 level and above and placing responsibility for
such investigations in an entity independent from the mainstream Department of State hierarchy.
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Recommendation 1: The Secretary should empower senior U.S. Government investigative

experts from outside the Department to restructure the investigative responsibilities currently
assigned to the Special Investigations Division. At a minimum, the outcome of that restructuring
should build a firewall to keep senior Department and Diplomatic Security officials from having
the ability to influence the commencement, course, or outcome of any investigation in which the
subject is a Diplomatic Security Special Agents or a Department official at the GS-14/FS-02
level or above. (Action: S)

SID investigators repeatedly expressed concern that they and many of the DS employees
they investigate all work in the same Department annex, SA-20. Investigators noted that the
subjects of investigation, who receive administrative discipline, including DS agents with
firearms, often return to work. Some SID investigators pointedly carry their own firearms

constantly while in SA-20, fearing a nasty elevator confrontation. Several recommended that, so
long as SID includes in its portfolio DS Special Agents as suspects, SID's physical location
should be away from SA-20, both in the spirit of investigative independence and to remove the
threat of violent confrontations.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should locate any SID-like entity that
conducts investigations against DS agents to a site separate from the bulk of Diplomatic Security
Washington D.C. activities. (Action: DS)

The SID division chief is an FS-01 position, which a number of observers commented
leaves any hard-charging DS agent who aspires to reach the Senior Foreign Service vulnerable to
pressure from above. The inspectors received suggestions that the three current bureaucratic
layers between the SID chief and the DS Assistant Secretary open sensitive cases to multiple
possibilities of interference and the leaking of information.

Recommendation 3: At present (pending the restructuring of SID responsibilities recommended

above), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources
should increase the grade of the SID division chief position to FS/OC and have that position
report directly to the DS Assistant Secretary on all allegations regarding sensitive cases
involving DS agents and high-level Department officials. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Professional Standards
A second concern arising from the inspection is that DS lacks clearly stated professional
standards for investigative functions, with the result that DS agents often must make decisions
about procedures and cases in an ad hoc way.
A Diplomatic Security In vestigators' Man ual

Interviews made clear that DS currently has no manual of established procedures for
conducting investigations. A new agent taking on investigative duties has to seek on-the-job
guidance from colleagues, who presumably are already busy with their caseloads. CIGIE states
unequivocally that as a foundational standard "organizations should establish written
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investigative policies and procedures via handbook, manual, directives, or similar mechanisms
that are revised regularly according to evolving laws, regulations, and executive orders." SID
leadership appears to have recognized the need and is, on an ad hoc basis, compiling relevant
documents on an Intranet site. SID is also drafting proposed revisions to the Foreign Affairs
Manual for a few issues. CR created a handbook on passport and visa investigations for use in
the Basic Special Agent Course but that handbook appears to be at least eight years out of date
and reportedly is not readily available for DS agents to access once they eventually arrive in CR.
Especially in investigative entities like SID and CR/CFl in which most positions are currently
filled by inexperienced agents, a systematic, priority effort to create comprehensive written
guidelines is necessary. Other USG investigative entities, including OIG/INV, have such
manuals and handbooks, which DS could draw on to create its own manual.

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should create a comprehensive

investigators' manual of standard policies and procedures, with annexes or handbooks containing
specific nuances applicable to particular offices including the Special Investigations Division and
the Criminal Investigations Division's CFI Branch. (Action: DS)
Workmanship

Recipients of SID Reports of Investigation (ROIs) in HR expressed concern that too

many such reports contain flaws, which require follow-up corrective actions. Estimates of flawed
ROIs varied from just a few to up to 25 percent. SID management reportedly realized the
problem several years ago and has attempted to regularize the ROI process, including by
establishing regular dialogue with HR/CSD, HR/DG, and HR/G and by establishing informal
guidelines for ROI production which now include SID discussion of the "Douglas factors" used
in administrative discipline decisions, inclusion of SID judgments about whether the investigator
has found sufficient evidence to "substantiate" or "not substantiate" alleged facts, and discussion
of "venue" elements. Nonetheless, complaints from ROI users continue.
A partial explanation for flawed ROIs relates to supervisor oversight. SID has historically
not had a clear policy that supervisors will consult with each subordinate on pending cases on a
regular basis. In many cases, feedback on ROI preparation only took place after completion of
the case file; and feedback sometimes was cursory or targeted at spelling and grammar, not
substance. Reportedly, SID is now endeavoring to regularize supervisor feedback to agents on a
weekly basis.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should institutionalize in the Special

Investigations Division a practice of rigorous and frequent mentoring sessions, with the
supervisor in each unit discussing each pending case with each investigator, and should include
that requirement in all supervisor work requirement statements. (Action: DS)
Inspectors heard concerns that SID ROIs sometimes do not contain all relevant
information that an adjudicator might find helpful. In particular, ROIs do not always contain at
least a brief summary of each interview undertaken in a case. Absent such information,
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adjudicators may question if potentially relevant interviews, not evidenced in the file, ever took

place.

Recommendation 6:

:,

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the Special

Investigations Division to include in its standard operating procedures that investigators include
in the Report of Investigation at least a brief summary of each interview undertaken in a case.

(Action: DS)

Holding Diplomatic Security Agents to a Higher Standard

Sources perceive that SID investigations attempt to hold most DS agents to a higher
standard than is expected of the other Department employees. Reportedly, DS agents realize they
may one day have to work closely with other agents in pressure situations, and they want to weed
out problem performers before that day. In conversations with SID agents, many confirmed that
SID does believe the U.S. Government should hold DS agents to a higher ethical standard. Some
recalled supervisors digging relentlessly to try to build a case, even when initial charges could
not be proven. AFSA and some in HR who adjudicate DS cases respond that the Foreign Affairs
Manual does not establish a higher standard of conduct for DS agents. They argue that an
informal presumption of a higher standard does not provide sufficient warning to employees to
permit punishment. (Inspectors have forwarded specific complaints to OIG/INV for follow-up.)
Deciding the merits of that dispute is beyond the parameters of this inspection; however, a FAM
revision that would clearly establish the higher standard is reportedly in the works.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Human Resources, in conjunction with the

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should clearly establish if a higher ethical standard
applies to Diplomatic Security Special Agents. If such a standard exists, the Bureau of
Human Resources should publish it to provide fair notice.

Standard Operating Procedures

The Inspectors became aware that several DS investigative entities lack necessary

standard operating procedures (SOPs), hindering performance.

SID Case Opening and Pursuit

The inspectors heard reports that at times individual SID supervisors have pursued
investigations excessively against other DS agents. That possibility likely increases when SID
has not promulgated standard operating procedures for when to open and how to pursue cases.

Absent clear guidelines, individual preferences rule the day. That lack of clear standards
historically has allowed supervisors to open cases on everything that comes in the door, which
reportedly has resulted in caseloads clogged with issues like alleged work place violence that
Department managers, per 3FAM 4150 and 3FAM 4156.2, should ordinarily attempt to handle

via counseling or other informal means. A number of SID investigators reported that having to
deal regularly with such matters affected their morale. SID management reports an effort is
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under way to limit SID's caseload and push issues that managers elsewhere should handle back
to those managers.

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately promulgate a

threshold for when the Special Investigations Division should and should not open cases and
should lay out guidelines for how investigations should proceed, making clear that open-ended
expeditions are not acceptable. (Action: DS)
Standard Operating Procedures

The Inspectors became aware that several DS investigative entities lack necessary
standard operating procedures (SOPs), hindering performance.
Standards of Workmanship.... Mentoring; brief summary...
CR Branch SOPs

The Consular Integrity (CID) unit in the CR Division has two agents and one analyst who
work in the Consular Affairs Consular Integrity Division and who, within DS, report directly to
the CR division chief. CID monitors the passport application process and visa processing
worldwide. Through data mining, CID identifies anomalies and possible fraud indicators. The
DS agent in charge acts as a DS liaison with CA on a number of issues including DS access to
consular databases and works closely with other CR elements. Unfortunately, no SOPs currently
exist for the operations of the CID investigative unit, and that contributes to disagreement on
how the CA and DS elements will interact and divide the work. The current agent in charge has
made strides in resolving the conflicts.

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in conjunction with the Bureau of

Consular Affairs, should create standard operating procedures for the Consular Integrity Division
investigative unit. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)
Also, DS and CA have not signed the memorandum of understanding intended to govern
operations of the investigative unit of CID.

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should complete and sign the memorandum of understanding for the Consular Integrity Division.
(Action: DS in coordination with CA)
The Overseas Criminal Investigations Branch (OCI) of CR supports Assistant Regional
Security Officer-Investigators (A/RSO-Is) in embassies abroad. The A/RSO-I program operates
under a memorandum of understanding between DS and CA, last signed in 2004. The MOU is
outdated and has been under revision for three years. DS and CA should complete it as soon as
possible to give necessary clarity to the program and to resolve outstanding issues such as the
proper rating and reviewing officers and the A/RSO-Is' access rights to the Consular
Consolidated Database (CCD). (Action: DS in coordination with CA)
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Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
. should rapidly complete revisions to the A/RSO-I MOU and sign it. (Action: DS with CA)
Performance of the A/RSO-Is has been uneven. Some agents are extremely successful
and other less so. Many factors contribute including: the level of cooperation of the consular
section; the relationship with the RSO; the relationship with local law enforcement and host
government; and the experience and skills of the incumbent as a criminal investigator. An

updated MOU can resolve some of the problems regarding coordination of consular section and
RSO approaches to the program; but a clear set of operational guidelines is also important. DS
and CA have recommended that each post establish standard operating procedures. Many posts
have not done so. DS has made model SOPs available; but they are not satisfactory and were not
created in cooperation with CA.

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should collaborate on model standard operating procedures and require that all A/RSO-I posts
use the models to create post-specific procedures. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)
As noted, DS is actively seeking to create new A/RSO-I positions up to a total of 125.
No clear standards have been established to judge the effectiveness of an A/RSO-I position in
meeting the goals of the program, and to date, the Department has never abolished a position as
ineffective. Some consular sections resist establishing a position and some wish to have an
existing position abolished. At least a few A/RSO-Is believe that their positions are unnecessary
and should be abolished.

Recommendation 12: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards for judging
whether an A/RSO-1 position is important to meet program goals, distinct from the performance
of the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)
Embassy Baghdad and Kabul Investigative Units

Embassies Baghdad and Kabul have separate investigative units located within the
Regional Security Offices and reporting to the RSOs. The DS agents assigned to those offices

conduct a variety of investigations, including specialized cases for which SID provides support.
Some in SID expressed concern that those embassies' RSOs choose not to pursue some
politically sensitive cases or do not ensure proper procedures in such investigations. Examples
(referred to OIG/INV for follow up) reportedly include allegations of drug abuse by contract
security employees and reports of abuse of authority by some RSO personnel. The current
supervisory arrangement appears to leave SID without sufficient ability to oversee proper
handling of potentially criminal cases.

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should review the staffing,
procedures, and reporting chain of the investigative units at embassies Baghdad and Kabul and
correct any problems of expertise, independence, and integrity. (Action: DS)
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Human Resources Issues that Hinder Performance
Several aspects of the DS approach to investigative assignments do not promote day-to-day
professionalism and development of investigative personnel over the long haul.
FS-2501 Special Agents Tours of Duty and Proper Mixture versus GS-1811 's
The Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) sets as the first
general standard for investigative organizations: "individuals assigned to conduct the
investigative activities must collectively possess professional proficiency for the tasks required."
CIGIE elaborates that investigative agencies should ensure "all investigators, commensurate with
grade level, possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities." CIGIE adds that such basics
should be followed by a "systematic, progressive, and documented plan" to maintain requisite
knowledge, skills, and abilities. All three ICI divisions have a mixture of career Civil Service
(GS) and career Foreign Service (FS) positions. (CR and GIF also hire contractors.) DS hires GS
investigators, designated "GS-1811s," based at least in part on past investigative credentials. The
FS agents whom DS assigns to investigative positions are DS agent generalists, designated "FS2501 s." In some cases, the 2501s have significant investigative experience from pre-DS jobs. In
many cases, the 2501s lack such experience, though DS provides all agents basic training
(BSAC) which includes a small investigative element, and most agents did a smattering of
investigative work when serving a first tour in a domestic DS field office. Some bid for SID, CR,
and CIF jobs aspiring to build an investigative specialty or at least to gain a knowledge base that
could prove occasionally useful in future assignments. DS force-assigns some others.
Assignment panels reportedly utilize only general DS criteria in deciding which FS-25() Is to
assign to investigative positions, with timing rather than any special skills or experience being
key.

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of
Human Resources, should have assignment panels take into account the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency standards, or their equivalent, including agents' histories as
investigators, in deciding which FS-2501 agents should receive assignments in investigative
offices. (Action: DS in coordination with HR) .
In SID, CR, and CIF, new FS-2501 agents receive some formal training within their first
six months on the job, including basic FLETC courses. For the longer term, corridor wisdom in
DS is that the brightest career paths are via protection and security assignments. Those who
aspire to specialize in an investigator career path with "systematic, progressive" follow-on
training have to scramble to achieve that goal, and few succeed in making a career of DS
investigative assignments. CIGIE notes: "the training of an investigator should be a continuing
process.... A continuous career development program should be established to provide the
proper preparation, training, and guidance to develop into professionally qualified investigators
and supervisors." Currently in SID and CR investigative offices, none of the FS-2501
supervisors have experienced such a continuous process, with the result that both supervisors and
staff usually face sharp learning curves on arrival.
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Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should recognize "investigator" as a
specialized career path for FS-2501s (or should establish a separate numerical designator) with

the result that FS supervisors in investigative offices in the future, at least up to the rank of FS01, will have significant investigative experience and will have systematic, progressive training
for that path. (Action: DS)

All FS-2501 agents in the three ICI divisions currently receive two-year assignments,
with the possibility to extend for a third year. Being a full-time DS investigator is an important

responsibility. The outcome of a case can dramatically affect a suspect's career and can result in
severe criminal penalties. Unfortunately, ICI supervisors currently can count on only 12 to 15
productive months from a newly arrived FS-2501. Initially, that agent-investigator requires
specialized training, a month or more in classroom and on-the-job. That is true for SID criminal
investigators, CR passport- and visa-fraud investigators, and CIF agents entering the world of
computer forensics. Apart from training, DS routinely calls on FS-2501s in ICI for temporary
duty in diplomatic-protection work, often during the UN General Assembly period but at other
times as well. Finally, when a FS-2501 receives an onward assignment, language training and
other preparation for that assignment can consume up to six months, subtracted from the twoyear tour. Those realities keep DS from reaping full benefit from training and experience. The
problem is particularly acute when an investigation involves a vulnerable victim or is moving
toward a federal prosecutor who values continuity. The solution in the three ICI divisions has
been to encourage FS-250rs to extend for a third year. Many in SID and CR/CFl did so in 2012;
some others did not. DS has created some three-year domestic positions, as allowed under
Standard Operating Procedure A-03, but has resisted doing so in ICI.

Recommendation 16: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should change the normal assignment
length for FS-2501 Special Agents in DS/ICI/SID, CR, and CIF to three years, recognizing the
specialized skills required of DS investigators and the unusual continuity requirements of the
positions. (Action: DS)

SID and CR investigative staffs are heavily weighted toward FS-2501s, with a small
minority of GS-1811 civil-service investigators. Out of SID's 24 currently filled investigator
positions, 21 are FS-2501s. Only one supervisor and two staff investigators are GS-1811s. For
CR/CFI, the numbers are: 21 FS-2501s and 2 GS-1811s. GS-1811 investigators can be a benefit.
They can stay indefinitely, in the best cases providing valuable continuity and high-quality
expertise; though reportedly they sometimes either burn out from endlessly dealing with stressful
cases or retire in place. On the positive side, many in ICI/SID, CR, and CIF report that assigning
FS-2501S to ICI investigative positions and then circulating those agents to the field, including to
Assistant Regional Security Officer (ARSO) positions in embassies, improves the ability of the
field to be first responders when incidents arise. On balance, the frequent turnover of FS-2501 s
in SID and CR investigative units currently is not sufficiently buffered by the number of GS1811s in place. Extending FS-2501 tours to three years, per above, would help with continuity;
but increasing the portion of GS-1811s would better guarantee long-term stability for sensitive
cases and specialized expertise during the inevitable FS-2501 transitions. Some in the ICI
leadership have urged a dramatic increase in the number of investigator positions, particularly in
SID. However, interviews at lower levels in ICI suggest that, while cases are sometimes
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unevenly distributed, the total caseloads are manageable with the current staffing levels. In that
light, increasing the number of GS-1811 investigators in ICI should be compensated by a
reduction in the number of FS-2501 investigators, bringing the net cost of that transition to near
zero.

Recommendation 17: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should increase the number of GS1811 investigators in the Special Investigations and Criminal Investigations Divisions to ensure
continuity and expertise are ever-present in both divisions. Having at least two GS-1811s in each
investigative work unit seems a reasonable initial goal. The bureau should convert current FS-

2501 positions in the tv/o divisions to create the added GS-1811 positions. (Action: DS)
Vance Memo and Admin Subpoena

The inspectors heard repeated complaints that two unresolved procedural issues, beyond
DS control, hinder investigators' ability to pursue cases effectively.
In 1977, Secretary of State Vance issued a memorandum requiring all Department
officials to obtain the advance written consent of all persons to be involved in any conversation
monitored or recorded. Any deviation requires approval by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary.
Several DS/ICI supervisors and agents believe the Vance requirement impedes investigations
involving serious criminal allegations. They argue that the Department is unusual if not unique in
continuing to impose such a consent requirement in federal investigations. DS is seeking
Department approval to allow the recording of investigative interviews without the subject's
permission. Judging the merits of the issue is beyond the scope of this inspection.
Administrative subpoena authority allows a federal law-enforcement agency to issue a
compulsory request for documents or testimony without prior approval from a grand jury, court,
or other judicial entity. Many agencies with the mandate to conduct criminal investigations have
that authority. DS does not. According to agents and senior managers, that lack of authority
significantly hampers agents' ability to conduct investigations quickly and efficiently. Sources in
DS advised that the Department has submitted a formal request for this authority to Congress,
which has yet to act.
Recommendation 18: When the appropriate authorities decide the Vance Memo and
administrative subpoena issues, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately
incorporate any new guidelines into standard operating procedures. (Action: DS)
Peer

Reviews

Many USG investigative organizations periodically invite a non-affiliated entity to

conduct a thorough review of policies, procedures, and activities. If DS has undertaken such
reviews in the past, it is not within the memory of current SID, CR, or CIF personnel. Such
reviews offer a fresh perspective on what works and what does not, based on generally accepted
standards such as those of CIGIE. Given the series of issues which the inspection has observed,
the time is ripe.
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Recommendation 19: The Bureau Of Diplomatic Security should on an urgent basis request
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to assign an independent and highly
respected entity to undertake reviews of the Special Investigations, Criminal Investigations, and
Computer Investigations and Forensics Divisions' investigative policies, procedures, and
activities. (Action: DS)

Other Topics - Addressed on a Division by Division Basis

Special Investigations Division (SID)
Personnel

The three SID branch chiefs are at the FS-02/GS-14 level. SID has no formal deputy
division chief position, although one branch chief is a de facto deputy without formal authority
over personnel outside his specific branch. With 20 investigators and three unit heads, SID needs
a formally designated deputy division chief position.

Recommendation 20: DS should create a deputy SID division Chief at the FS-01 level.
Violent Crimes and General Investigations Units: Expertise and Morale

Most SID investigators complained about the current sub-division of SID staff into one
Violent Crimes Unit (VCU) and two General Investigations Units (GIU). The portfolio of VCU,
with a chief and six subordinates, includes rape, child/spousal abuse, deaths, and sexual abuse
cases. The GIUs, each with a chief and seven subordinates, take on other SID cases. Nearly
everyone in SID perceives VCU to be the varsity, with GIUs the second string. Per above, all
SID agents in their first six months receive a portion of formal training, but VCU agents with
specific and technical portfolios like child sexual abuse or deaths receive special training. All
agents perceive that VCU agents are much more likely to receive foreign-travel opportunities
than GIU agents are. Many agents perceive that VCU investigators receive cases that are more
interesting in general and that GIU agents with less challenging cases often have their talents
underutilized. SID agents generally aspire to assignments as ARSOs in embassies abroad one
day; but GIU agents worry that lack of experience in handling specialized cases will leave them
unable to meet embassy front office expectations. Agents complain that SID choices of agents
for VCU are not transparent; yet the VCU combination of training, travel, and intriguing cases
allows those agents to document experience for more compelling employee evaluations than GIU
agents. In sum, most agents in SID believe the current VCU/GIU arrangement is deeply unfair
and has a hugely negative impact on agent morale.

A rapid increase in SID agent numbers in recent years necessitated splitting the division
into three units, and the reality that some types of cases require specialized expertise means that
agents leading the investigation of such cases have particular training needs. However, given the
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extremely negative consequences on morale of the current VCU/GIU arrangement, SID is
reportedly rethinking its approach to achieving its requirements. A sensible alternative could be
to retain three units but remove the current prejudicial titling, spreading the variety of cases
across the entire division. Presuming that providing all agents training in all sub-specialties
would not be cost-effective, the SID chief should designate individual agents for such training.
Designating one GS 1811 civil servant to receive such training in each such specialty, thereby
provide long-term continuity, would seem sensible, with 2501s also receiving such training as
needs dictate. Allowing as many SID agents as possible to be back up on at least one such
specialized case during a tour would help meet the DS goal of preparing future RSOs for the
variety of investigative duties.

Recommendation 21: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the Special
Investigations Division to abolish the VCU/GIU distinction, replacing it with an apportionment
of responsibilities across units that ensure a sufficient cadre of agents always has the expertise
required for specialized cases and at least one GS 1811 agent has training for each such specialty
to assure continuity of expertise. To the extent possible, all agents should receive exposure to the
variety of SID cases, at least in a back up capacity. (Action: DS)

The Special Investigations Division Relationship with U.S. Attorneys

Many agents expressed unhappiness that Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) accept few
SID criminal cases for prosecution. "Venue" issues for suspects on assignment abroad play a
role, but reportedly, the content of the case files can also be an issue. SID has useful relationships
with some offices in the Department of Justice. It does not appear that SID has routine liaison
relationships with AUSAs, though one source reported that the Eastern District of Virginia
AUSAs have such relationships with other USG law-enforcement entities and have even
established one-year internships for investigators from some agencies. SID might explore
creating such an internship and sending a GS 1811 agent to fill it, thereby building a potentially
long-term relationship with those AUSAs who most often handle cases concerning Department
employees and adding particularly useful expertise to the division.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should explore a oneyear internship for a GS 1811 with the U.S. Attorney's office for the Eastern District of
Virginia.

The Special Investigations Division Relationship with the Bureau of Human

Resources/Conduct, Suitability and Discipline

Some HR/CSD personnel proposed addressing Report of Investigation (ROI)-related

issues via up-front training, requiring each new SID agent to have a day or two of orientation in
HR/CSD at the onset of the investigative assignment. Past quarterly meetings have fallen to the
wayside, perhaps because particular issues do not arise on a quarterly schedule but do need
immediate attention. Ad hoc conversations can address particular ROI problems but do not
prevent the problems from arising in the first place.
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Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should have the Special
Investigations Division, in conjunction with the Bureau of Human Resources/Conduct,
Suitability and Discipline implement an orientation for each new investigator that includes at
least one full day consulting with HR/CSD adjudicators. If helpful, HR/CSD staff should

undertake reciprocal orientation days in the SID office. (Action: DS in coordination with 1IR)
Administrative Support

SID currently has four support staff: an investigative assistant and three investigative
analysts. The inspectors heard repeated complaints that the incumbents are not at all overworked,
but they do not consider most day-to-day administrative tasks to be within their position
descriptions. As a result, supervisors assign investigator agents to handle such tasks as
overseeing vehicle usage, managing information systems issues, etc.
Recommendation 23: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of
Human Resources, should recalibrate the position descriptions of SID support staff to include the
variety of routine office-management responsibilities, freeing SID agents to focus on the
investigative responsibilities in their own position descriptions. (Action: DS)
Vehicle Policy

Inspectors received reports that some in SID had abused the DS Home to Work (HTW)

policy, routinely using official vehicles for home to office transport. The inspectors note that an
SID Standard Operating Procedure issued on October 10, 2012, now makes clear that SID
employees may use official vehicles for HTW only in the sort of limited circumstances that the
DS HTW policy permits.

Criminal Investigations Division (CR)

This division's focus on criminal activity involving the consular functions of the State

Department brings it into close relationships with the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA), the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and other agencies. CR funding is
sufficient and comes primarily from Machine Readable Visa (MRV) revenues and fees derived
from H and L work visas.

CR has expanded rapidly. Last year one branch, OCI, grew from one employee and two
contractors to eight employees. Another branch, CFI, is bigger than some divisions. DS has
located some functions in CR to serve the entire bureau, including the property and evidence
program and responsibility for the informant and monitoring programs. The size and diversity of
the division make it difficult to manage and restricts the rank of sub-unit managers. Two units
report directly to the division chief.

DS Representation on the FBI International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations

Center (IOC-2)
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DS has one agent and one analyst detailed to the OIOC-2. The center focuses entirely on
organized crime and coordinates the efforts of federal law enforcement agencies, deconflicting
tiicm when necessary. The presence of the DS agent gives State a voice and provides access to
valuable intelligence while improving cooperation with other agencies.

CR management has not clarified a telework policy for the division although at least one
employee teleworks full time and others have occasionally done so. Employees have expressed
the desire to telework and the Department encourages this.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should formulate and

disseminate a policy on teleworking for the Criminal Investigations Division.
CR has made relatively little use of the Department's awards program, and awards
nominations are unevenly spread among the several branches. This misses an opportunity to
encourage good performance, and uneven distribution of awards can hurt morale.

Informal Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should encourage

managers in the Criminal Investigations Division to make better use of the awards
program.

Criminal Fraud Investigations Branch (CFI)

CFI investigates cases of criminal fraud involving U.S. passports and visas, specifically
including allegations of employee malfeasance involving consular operations that would
otherwise go to SID. The visa and passport cases are typically complex fraud schemes involving
both overseas and domestic criminal activities crossing jurisdictional lines. The branch also
investigates cases of human trafficking, especially those involving diplomatic A and G visa
domestic servants.

The CFI branch now includes 29 positions, bigger than several divisions in DS. The
branch chief is an FS-02 and the unit chiefs are also FS-02s. The supervisor should be a more
senior.

Recommendation 24: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should split off the Criminal Fraud
Investigations responsibilities from the Criminal Investigations Division to create a new division.
(Action: DS)
The CFI branch has three units, each led by a supervisor. DS assigns agents to the branch,
including supervisors, without consideration of previous investigative experience, and even
supervisors typically spend a significant portion of their tour, 2 or 3 months, in training.
Currently only three of the twenty CFI investigator positions and none of the three unit chief
positions are designated as GS 1811s. Agents complain about the lack of continuity and note tlic
problems that this causes in working with AUSAs in prosecuting cases. The few 1811 agents
often serve at the continuity in cases but have no career path above their current positions. The
agents believe experienced 1811 unit chiefs would help them perform more effectively.
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Recommendation 25: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should designate at least one unit
chief position in the Criminal Fraud Investigations Branch as Civil Service. (Action: DS)

CFI shares the l^"" floor of SA-20 with the other branches of the Criminal Investigations
Division. That floor has no access control beyond general building access. Once on the floor,
agents, other employees, and visitors can move freely. The CFI agents have cubicles as work
spaces. CFI has active cases involving DS personnel, and on at least one occasion DS assigned

an employee under investigation to a job in another unit on the IZ"" floor. DS should restrict
access to CFI workspaces just as it has restricted access to SID spaces elsewhere in SA-20.
Recommendation 26: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should restrict access to CFI

workspace by reconfiguring the SA-20 12' floor or moving CFI elsewhere. (Action: DS)
CFI supervisors currently assign cases individually to an agent, while encouraging agents
to partner with other agents during investigations. Case loads and extensive travel, both
investigative and for TDY assignments, often mean that the lead agent is absent from
headquarters. Assigning cases to investigative teams would address this problem.
Informal Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should consider
realigning Criminal Fraud Investigations personnel into teams under the current unit
supervisors and assigning cases to those teams.

The operations assistant in CFI is responsible for coordinating and obtaining clearances
for ail undercover, surveillance, and monitoring operations for DS headquarters and field offices.
In his absence an agent fills the position.

Informal Recommendation 6: Criminal Fraud Investigations should designate and train

an employee to regularly be backup for the operations assistant position.
The Overseas Criminal Investigations Branch (OCI)

DS established what became the ARSO-I program in 1996 to put special agent
investigators in consular sections with a mandate to fight international terrorism, augment
consular efforts to combat visa and passport fraud, and assist international and domestic
prosecutions. DS created OCI to support the A/RSO-I program, which has expanded rapidly
from fewer than 20 positions to over 100 today and a projected 123 by 2014. A/RSO-Is are to
spend 80% of their time on consular fraud related activities. The RSO and consular chief at post
supervise the agents jointly. The agents have an independent budget. The program is generally
judged a success, though it has experienced growing pains as posts, DS, and CA have struggled
to clarify A/RSO-I roles.

In 2012 OCI expanded from one agent and two contractors to five agents and three Civil
Service support personnel in response to the rapidly expanding ARSO-I program in the field.
Four desk officers now divide the world regionally to provide logistical and investigative
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support. The branch also periodically conducts a program review of each A/RSO-1 position.
Two administrative assistants and one investigative analyst add support, and the branch is hiring
a new program analyst.

Rapid expansion has brought problems. All but one of the four agents assigned as desk

officers lack overseas experience. They are at a disadvantage when conducting program reviews
which require interaction with senior embassy officials, and they are ill prepared to advise
A/RSOTs who are often on their first overseas assignment.

Recommendation 27: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign only agents with
overseas experience, preferably as A/RSO-Is, to be desk officers in OCI. (Action: DS in
coordination with HR)

The branch chief currently manages the overseas program, including the establishment of
new positions, while also supervising the new branch without a single experienced employee.
He has devoted much of his time to the overseas program and has traveled with each desk officer
on at least an initial site visit. He has not devoted equivalent attention to management of OCI
itself. The position descriptions for all positions in the office are inaccurate, and employees
expressed frustration at not having clearly defined roles. The distribution of work is uneven and,
at times, inequitable.

Recommendation 28: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish an accurate position
description for each position in OCI. (Action: DS)

A key OCI function is performing program reviews of each A/RSO-I position. DS

provides a report of this review to post management, CA, and DS. The stated goal is to review

each A/RSOT approximately midway through the assignment, about fifty trips each year. These
reviews are useful and should be performed, though the frequency may need revisiting as the
program matures. OCI may already be too small to meet the current ambitious program-review
goal.

Recommendation 29: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should determine whether OCI
requires an additional desk officer position. (Action: DS)

As noted, DS is actively seeking to create new A/RSO-I positions up to a total of 125.

No clear standards have been established to judge the effectiveness of an A/RSO-I position in

meeting the goals of the program, and to date, the Department has never abolished a position as
ineffective. Some consular sections resist establishing a position and some wish to have an
existing position abolished. At least a few A/RSO-Is believe that their positions are unnecessary
and should be abolished.

Recommendation 30: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards for judging
whether an A/RSO-1 position is important to meet program goals, distinct from the performance
of the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)
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DS and CA have not established clear criteria to determine where to establish additional

A/RSO-I positions. The only definite criterion offered is that DS wants to have an A/RSO-I at
every post where DHS has a visa security unit, although the nexus between the two is unclear.
Recommendation 31: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should establish clear criteria for creating new A/RSO-I positions and ensure that post requests
meet the criteria before seeking NSDD38 authority to create the positions. (Action: DS in
coordination with CA)

Currently, FSN investigators whom the A/RSO-Is employ do not have the same CCD
access as FSN investigators who work for fraud prevention managers in the consular section.
Both positions perform essentially the same functions and should have the same access.

Recommendation 32: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should grant A/RSO-I FSN investigators
the same Consular Consolidated Database access it grants to Consular FSN investigators.
(Action: CA)

Criminal Intelligence and Research Branch (CIR)

CIR is a collection of very different units all of which support the work of the other
branches of CR. CIR provides direct case support through the Visa and Passport Analysis Unit
(VPAU) and the Financial Analysis and Forfeiture Unit (FPAU). The "management and
program analyst" currently oversees the property and evidence management program for all of
DS. The database manager controls database access, logons, and permissions to many
government and private databases for all DS employees. CIR also deploys analysts to other
government agencies and to CA to provide access to State databases and help coordinate
investigations.

FPAU contracts for forensic accountants in field offices and at headquarters to provide
financial research and analysis to identify monies which the government can seize if the origin is
visa or passport fraud. FPAU is trying to convert some contract positions to Civil Service to
provide more continuity. It is important for DS to grade the positions properly to recruit trained
accountants.

Recommendation 33: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should complete the process of
converting three positions in the Financial Analysis and Forfeiture Unit to Civil Service in the
appropriate series at the appropriate grade. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)
VPAU supports CR agents primarily with database research and analysis. VPAU uses a
wide array of government and commercial databases to research the activities of targets and
uncover relationships to other persons possibly involved in consular fraud. The unit also
produces intelligence reports on fraud trends at a broader, less case-specific level. Agents in CFI
and the field want VPAU to focus more on specific case support. The branch manager
understands the conflicting demands on the VPAU and CIR in general. She has developed a
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plan to reorganize the branch better to satisfy the various requirements and reinforce elements of
the branch that are understaffed.

Recommendation 34: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should reorganize the Visa and
Passport Analysis Unit of the Criminal Intelligence and Research Branch to better meet the
demands on the unit. (Action: DS)

The management and program analyst oversees the DS evidence program and provides
training to all evidence custodians at headquarters and at DS field offices. The analyst also leads
efforts to develop and deploy new evidence management software. He has no backup or
subordinate.

,.

Recommendation 35: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should add a second position in the
property and evidence support unit. (Action: DS)

At the time of the inspection the CIR database manager position, with the critically
important responsibility to provide database access to all DS employees, was vacant.

Recommendation 36: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should fill the position and create a
plan to provide backup whenever the incumbent is absent. (Action: DS)
Criminal Investigative Liaison Branch (CIL)

This branch takes requests for assistance from other law enforcement agencies, federal,

state, local and foreign, and determines how to assist, if appropriate. Most of the requests come
to a DS online mailbox. The branch also puts DS agents in other agencies, primarily to field
requests for assistance. The current positions are with INTERPOL, DHS/ICE, the U.S. Marshalls
Service, and a new position with the FBI. CIL agents direct the requests to DS elements as
appropriate. All CIL agents are FS 2501s, and overseas experience is a key factor in their work.
DHS/ICE in particular reported its satisfaction with having a DS agent collocated at the National
Tracking Center-Passenger. Other agencies are similarly pleased.

CIL has an analyst located part time in CA/PPT evaluating hits in the passport name
check system. This is an expanding operation and the volume of the work threatens to
overwhelm a single analyst.

Recommendation 37: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should evaluate the workload of the CIL position in CA/PPT and determine whether a second
position is required. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

CIL operations provide a valuable link to other law enforcement entities and DS agents in
the field. CIL provides triage to requests for assistance and directs traffic so others can deal
efficiently with the requests.

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CIL has recently established a DS "Most Wanted" list similar to the FBI '"lO Most
Wanted" list, and DS will need to judge its value over time.

CA replaced front-channel telegrams with the ACS+ application in the CCD for

embassies to report all arrests and deaths of American citizens abroad. CIL routinely consults
the CCD but does not have access to the ACS+ application. As a result, CIL no longer sees
death and arrest notices. This information is valuable in identifying fugitives living abroad who
have outstanding domestic warrants and in closing warrants when the subject has died.

Recommendation 38: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should facilitate access for CIL personnel
to the ACS-i- application. (Action: CA in coordination with DS)
CIL also fulfills a public relations role for DS, attending law enforcement conferences
and explaining what DS can do to assist other agencies. All of the agents share this work. DS
has restricted conference travel in 2012 for budgetary reasons and in response to criticism
directed at other agencies concerning conference participation.
Informal Recommendation 7: DS should ensure that CIL participates in those
conferences which significantly further important Department goals.
Special Projects Branch (SP)

The Special Projects Branch leads the H and Lwork visas fraud investigation program.
SP has deployed 14 agents and 14 investigative analysts to 18 field offices where they further
deploy to DHS/ICE Document and Benefits Task Force offices. The special agent in charge
(SAC) at each field office directly supervises the agents and analysts, with the SP branch chief, a
GS 1811 position, adding oversight from long distance. SP also manages the investigative unit
at CA's Kentucky Consular Center that primarily investigates H and L fraud. SP has
investigative analysts at headquarters to support agents in the field, including A/RSO-Is who are
investigating H and L visa fraud.

The working relationship at each field office between the agent and the SAC and with the
DHS/ICE taskforce director determines the effectiveness of the program. The SACs have
considerable autonomy, and some do not provide effective support. Some SACs are not very
familiar with SP's program; but they still write evaluations of SP agents and analysts, sometimes
disadvantaging promotion opportunities.

Recommendation 39: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should revise oversight procedures
for SP agents in the field so that supervisors at DS headquarters are rater and reviewer. (Action:
DS)

The above recommendation would currently require the SP branch chief to rate 34
employees, too many. In any case, the branch chief already is over tasked, managing both agents
in Washington and the field and a vigorous training program that is popular, successful, and
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expanding. Supplementing the SP office with two mid-level GS 1811 positions would case the
current burden and provide additional continuity.

Recommendation 40: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should add two GS-1811 mid-level
supervisory positions to the Special Projects Branch. (Action: DS)

Computer Investigations and Forensics Division (GIF)

Acknowledging CIF Capabilities

DS/lCl/ GIF has a mixture of personnel. In addition to GS civil servants and FS-25()1

agents, CACl contractors make up half of the highly motivated workforce. ClF's forensic lab is
state-of-the-art, at least comparable to other federal law enforcement agencies. Personnel
numbers and logistics support are adequate. The training provided is more than sufficient to keep
contractor certifications current. Greater visibility and recognition within the bureau as a
computer investigations and forensic resource is CFI's main aspiration.

Informal Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should provide

greater publicity regarding the Computer Investigations and Forensic division's
capabilities to better inform potential customers of the available services. (Action: DS)
Arming ofGS-1801 Senior Technical Security Specialists
The CIF division chief wants to issue firearms to three GS-1801 Senior Technical

Security Specialists whose surveillance duties have repeatedly exposed them to danger, raising
concerns for their safety and well-being. Authority would be either for DS to rename the GS1801's as "Technical" Special Agents under 22 USC 2709, or as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals
under 28 CFR 0.112 (b). Since December 2010, CIF has forwarded twelve different memoranda
revisions through DS/ICI to the DS Firearm Policy Review Board (FPRB) requesting approval to
arm the specialists. In May 2012, FPRB postponed a decision pending clarification of a series of
questions. After CIF submitted a response, the FPRB has continued to review the matter before
making any recommendation to the Director, Diplomatic Security Service.
Recommendation 41: Given safety and security issues, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
should expedite a final decision on whether to arm the three Computer Investigations and
Forensics Division GS-1801 Senior Technical Security Specialists. (Action: DS)
Converting the Contract Lab Manager Position to a Team Leader

The Digital Forensics program within CIF currently consists of two Digital Evidence
Analysis (DEA) teams along with one Video/Audio team and one Hardware/Network Support
team. CACI holds the contract to supply personnel and manage day-to-day operations for these
teams. Two DEA leaders currently supervise 12 personnel. Supervising such large teams leaves

little time for the team leaders to conduct actual casework called for in the DOS/CACI contract.

Currently, CIF has a Contract Lab Manager position that sits atop the Digital Forensics program
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hierarchy and just below the GS-1811 supervisor. Having the two senior manager positions is
duplicative. CACI already has a formal representative to serve the needs of its contractors in
GIF. The inspection team proposes that DS convert the Contract Lab Manager position into a

third DEA supervisor position, allocating the DEA personnel into three five-person groups. With
that change, the team leaders would be more able to fulfill their CACI responsibilities to both
supervise and undertake digital evidence analysis.

Recommendation 42: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should convert the Contract Lab

Manager position to a Digital Evidence Analysis Team Leader, thus creating three teams each
with five members. (Action: DS)

Integration of the administrative and operational components of CIF

The administrative staff members of CIF perceive they are under-appreciated, which
affects morale. An element in play may be the configuration of CIF spaces separating the
administrative and operational components. Integration of all personnel would promote mission
unity.

Informal Recommendation 9: DS/ICI/CIF should consider integrating the

administrative and operational workforces in its upcoming renovation of the 12"' floor of
SA-14.

Lack of communication among CIF personnel

The Digital Forensics Programs consist mainly of contractors. CIF Operations consist ol'
FTE personnel. Currently little professional or personal communication takes place between
these two programs as mission requirements differ. At times, it appears some CIF personnel in
one program do not even recognize personnel in the other program as being in the same division.

Informal Recommendation 10: DS/ICI/CIF should hold periodic meetings for all
division personnel so those in each of the CIF programs can better appreciate other
colleagues. ,

DS Information Technology Systems

DS has developed the computerized Investigative Management System (IMS) to track
and document investigative cases worldwide. Nearly all ICI offices reportedly use the
unclassified IMS, but SID has judged that the sensitivity of some of its cases and the ability of
locally employed staff at embassies to access unclassified systems require SID use of the
classified IMS. Unfortunately, SID agents have found the classified IMS system's low
bandwidth, small font size, instability, and lack of editing features unwieldy. Almost all SID
agents use IMS only as a repository of closed case files. SID agents currently use Microsoft
Word templates, adapted to SID needs, for all casework. They then, at the very end, scan
sometimes-voluminous paper files and upload them into IMS. Several agents reported that, for

particularly large files, they do not scan and upload each document, only the ones they deem
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relevant. A disadvantage of the Word template is that, unlike the IMS, it does not have casetracking capabilities. SID has brought its IMS issues to the attention of the contractor responsible
for the program. Software updates and adjustments, including to add consular information and to
improve search capabilities by including outside law-enforcement entities thus far have focused
on the unclassified IMS program with its higher customer base; but classified-system upgrades
and increased bandwidth are due shortly. In addition, DS is introducing SharePoint websites and

applications to supplement IMS. SID plans to utilize the SharePoint option for managing cases as
soon as the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) authorizes storage of personally
identifiable information on SID-developed InfoPath forms.

Informal Recommendation 11: DS should monitor efforts to improve performance of

the classified IMS system. If such improvements remain problematic, SID should further
explore ways to adapt its Microsoft Word-based template and SharePoint options to
accomplish its information-management goals, including day-to-day case monitoring,
closed-case record keeping, and vetting of Bureau of Human Resources promotion lists.

In July 2010, the Bureau of Information Resources Management, Operations, Office of

Enterprise Network Management, Telecommunications, Wireless, and Data Services Division
(IRM/OPS/ENM/TWD) took over responsibility for all DS communications circuits. DS
network staff lost the ability to view configuration details and monitor performance. As a result,
network problems can linger. In one case, a configuration error in Kentucky Consular Center
circuits that originated in December 2011 took many months to spot and resolve.
Recommendation 43: Recommendation: The Bureau of Information Resources Management,
Operations, Office of Enterprise Network Management, Telecommunications, Wireless, and
Data Services Division should provide the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's network stall read
only access to DS circuit configuration details and allow DS to monitor its network. (Action:
IRM/OPS/RNM/TWD, in coordination with DS).

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List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Secretary should empower senior U.S. Government investigative

experts from outside the Department to restructure the investigative responsibilities currently
assigned to the Special Investigations Division. At a minimum, the outcome of that restructuring
should build a rircwall to keep senior Department and Diplomatic Security officials from having
the ability to influence the commencement, course, or outcome of any investigation in which the
subject is a Diplomatic Security Special Agents or a Department official at the GS-14/FS-02
level or above. (Action: S)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should locate any SID-like entity that
conducts investigations against DS agents to a site separate from the bulk of Diplomatic Security
Washington D.C. activities. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 3: At present (pending the restructuring of SID responsibilities

recommended above), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of
Human Resources should increase the grade of the SID division chief position to FS/OC and
have that position report directly to the DS Assistant Secretary on all allegations regarding
sensitive cases involving DS agents and high-level Department officials. DS should also create a
deputy SID division chief at the FS-01 level. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of

Human Resources, should have assignment panels take into account the Council of Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency standards, or their equivalent, including agents' histories as
investigators, in deciding which FS-2501 agents should receive assignments in investigative
offices. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should recognize "investigator" as a

specialized career path for FS-2501s (or should establish a separate numerical designator) with
the result that FS supervisors in investigative offices in the future, at least up to the rank of FS01, will have significant investigative experience and will have systematic, progressive training
for that path. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should change the normal assignment
length for FS-2501 Special Agents in DS/ICI/SID, CR, and GIF to three years, recognizing the
specialized skills required of DS investigators and the unusual continuity requirements of the
positions. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should increase the number of GS1811 investigators in the Special Investigations and Criminal Investigations Divisions lo ensure
continuity and expertise are ever-present in both divisions. Having at least two GS-18ris in each
investigative work unit seems a reasonable initial goal. The bureau should convert current FS2501 positions in the two divisions to create the added GS-1811 positions. (Action: DS)
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Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should create a comprehensive
investigators' manual of standard policies and procedures, with annexes or handbooks containing
specific nuances applicable to particular offices including the Special Investigations Division and
the Criminal Investigations Division's CFI Branch. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately promulgate a

threshold for when the Special Investigations Division should and should not open cases and
should lay out guidelines for how investigations should proceed, making clear that open-ended
expeditions are not acceptable. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should institutionalize in the Special
Investigations Division a practice of rigorous and frequent mentoring sessions, with the
supervisor in each unit discussing each pending case with each investigator, and should include
that requirement in all supervisor work requirement statements. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the Special
Investigations Division to include in its standard operating procedures that investigators include
in the Report of Investigation at least a brief summary of each interview undertaken in a cas.
(Action: DS) ,

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in conjunction with the Bureau of
Consular Affairs, should create standard operating procedures for the Consular Integrity Division
investigative unit. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should complete and sign the memorandum of understanding for the Consular Integrity Division.
(Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should rapidly complete revisions to the A/RSO-I MOU and sign it. (Action: DS with CA)
Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should collaborate on model standard operating procedures and require that all A/RSO-1 posts
use the models to create post-specific procedures. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)
Recommendation 16: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards for
judging whether an A/RSO-I position is important to meet program goals, distinct from the
performance of the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 17: When the appropriate authorities decide the above two issues, the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security should immediately incorporate any new guidelines into standard
operating procedures. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 18: Given the series of issues which the inspection has observed (as
described throughout this report). The Bureau Of Diplomatic Security should on an urgent basis
request Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to assign an independent and
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highly respected entity to undertake reviews of the Special Investigations, Criminal
Investigations, and Computer Investigations and Forensics Divisions' investigative policies,
procedures, and activities. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 19:

DS should create a deputy SID division Chief at the FS-01 level.

Recommendation 20: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should instruct the Special
Investigations Division to abolish the VCU/GIU distinction, replacing it with an apportionment
of responsibilities across units that ensure a sufficient cadre of agents always has the expertise
required for specialized cases and at least one GS 1811 agent has training for each such specialty
to assure continuity of expertise. To the extent possible, all agents should receive exposure to the
variety of SID cases, at least in a back up capacity. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 21: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should have the Special
Investigations Division, in conjunction with the Bureau of Human Resources/Conduct,
Suitability and Discipline implement an orientation for each new investigator that includes at
least one full day consulting with HR/CSD adjudicators. If helpful, HR/CSD staff should
undertake reciprocal orientation days in the SID office. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should review the staffing,
procedures, and reporting chain of the investigative units at embassies Baghdad and Kabul and
correct any problems of expertise, independence, and integrity. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 23: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of
Human Resources, should recalibrate the position descriptions of SID support staff to include the
variety of routine office-management responsibilities, freeing SID agents to focus on the
investigative responsibilities in their own position descriptions. (Action: DS)
Recommendation 24: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should split off the Criminal Fraud
Investigations responsibilities from the Criminal Investigations Division to create a new division.
(Action: DS)

Recommendation 25: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should designate at least one unit
chief position in the Criminal Fraud Investigations Branch as Civil Service. (Action: DS)
Recommendation 26:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should restrict access to CFl

workspace by reconfiguring the SA-20 12' floor or moving CFI elsewhere. (Action: DS)
Recommendation 27: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign only agents with
overseas experience, preferably as A/RSO-Is, to be desk officers in OCI. (Action: DS in
coordination with HR)

Recommendation 28: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish an accurate

position description for each position in OCI. (Action: DS)

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Recommendation 29:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should determine whether OCl

requires an additional desk officer position. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 30: DS, in conjunction with CA, should establish clear standards for
judging whether an A/RSO-1 position is important to meet program goals, distinct from the
performance of the incumbent. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 31: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should establish clear criteria for creating new A/RSO-I positions and ensure that post requests
meet the criteria before seeking NSDD38 authority to create the positions. (Action: DS in
coordination with CA)

Recommendation 32: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should grant A/RSO-I FSN
investigators the same Consular Consolidated Database access it grants to Consular FSN
investigators. (Action: CA)

Recommendation 33:

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should complete the process of

converting three positions in the Financial Analysis and Forfeiture Unit to Civil Service in the
appropriate series at the appropriate grade. (Action: DS in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 34: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should reorganize the Visa and
Passport Analysis Unit of the Criminal Intelligence and Research Branch to better meet tlie
demands on the unit. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 35: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should add a second position in the
property and evidence support unit. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 36: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should fill the position and create a
plan to provide backup whenever the incumbent is absent. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 37: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs
should evaluate the workload of the CIL position in CA/PPT and determine whether a second
position is required. (Action: DS in coordination with CA)
Recommendation 38:

The Bureau of Consular Affairs should facilitate access for CIL

personnel to the ACS+ application. (Action: CA in coordination with DS)

Recommendation 39: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should revise oversight procedures
i'or SP agents in the field so that supervisors at DS headquarters are rater and reviewer. (Action:
DS)

Recommendation 40: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should add two GS-1811 mid-level
supervisory positions to the Special Projects Branch. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 41: Given safety and security issues, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
should expedite a final decision on whether to arm the three Computer Investigations and
Forensics Division GS-1801 Senior Technical Security Specialists. (Action: DS)
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Recommendation 42: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should convert the Contract Lab
Manager position to a Digital Evidence Analysis Team Leader, thus creating three teams each
with five members. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 43: Recommendation: The Bureau of Information Resources Management,

Operations, Office of Enterprise Network Management, Telecommunications, Wireless, and
Data Services Division should provide the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's network staff read
only access to DS circuit configuration details and allow DS to monitor its network. (Action:
IRM/OPS/ENM/TWD, in coordination with DS).

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List of Informal Recommendations

Informal Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Human Resources, in conjunction vv'ilh the

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should clearly establish if a higher ethical standard applies to
Diplomatic Security Special Agents. If such a standard exists, the Bureau of Human Resources
should publish it to provide fair notice.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should explore a one-year

internship for a GS 1811 with the U.S. Attorney's office for the Eastern District ofVirginia.
Informal Recommendation 3:

The Special Investigations Division should institute a

"preliminary inquiry" mechanism that is minimally burdensome but still documents activity and
accounts for time spent. i

Informal Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should formulate and

disseminate a policy on teleworking for the Criminal Investigations Division.
Informal Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should encourage managers
in the Criminal Investigations Division to make better use of the awards program.
Informal Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should consider realigning
Criminal Fraud Investigations personnel into teams under the current unit supervisors and
assigning cases to those teams.

Informal Recommendation 7:

Criminal Fraud Investigations should designate and train an

Informal Recommendation 8:

DS should ensure that CIL participates in those conferences

employee to regularly be backup for the operations assistant position.

which significantly further important Department goals.

Informal Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should provide greater

publicity regarding the Computer Investigations and Forensic division's capabilities to better
inform potential customers of the available services. (Action: DS)

Informal Recommendation 10:

DS/ICI/CIF should consider integrating the administrative and

operational workforces in its upcoming renovation of the 12' floor of SA-14.

Informal Recommendation 11: DS/ICI/CIF should hold periodic meetings for all division
personnel so those in each of the CIF programs can better appreciate other colleagues.
Informal Recommendation 12: DS should monitor efforts to improve performance of the
classified IMS system. If such improvements remain problematic, SID should further explore
ways to adapt its Microsoft Word-based template and SharePoint options to accomplish its
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information-management goals, including day-to-day case monitoring, closed-case record
keeping, and vetting of Bureau of Human Resources promotion lists.

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Abbreviations

A/RSO-I

Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator

AUSA

Assistant U.S. Attorney

CFI

Criminal Fraud Investigation

CIGIE

Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

CIL

Criminal Investigative Liaison

CR

Criminal Investigations Division

DBA

Digital Evidence Analysis

Department

U.S. Department of State

DS

Bureau of Diplomatic Security

FPRB

Firearm Policy Review Board

GIU

General Investigations Unit

HR/CSD

Bureau of Human Resources/Conduct, Suitability and Discipline

ICI

Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence

IMS

Investigative Management System

OIG

Office of Inspector General

ROI

Reports of Investigation

SID

Special Investigations Division

vcu

Violent Crimes Unit

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