44. Jalosjos v. Comelec GR# 193314/Feb.

26, 2013 691 SCRA 391 These circumstances must be established by clear and positive
Erla
proof. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these
criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only
with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
FACTS:
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the
(CoC) for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May same time.
2010 elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and
residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental (Brgy. Tugas). Asserting otherwise, private respondents Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and
filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel positive proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or
the critical date, must also be established to be within at least
the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had
falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because she one year prior to the elections using the same standard of
evidence.
was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally
abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City. To support this
claim, they presented as evidence the certification from the
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear
Assessors Office of Baliangao that there was no tax declaration
and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis
covering any real property in the name of petitioner located at any Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
place in the municipality and the certification from the Civil
Registrar of Baliangao that petitioner had no record of birth in the
civil registry of the municipality. The Petition to Deny Due Course to
or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the Marriage
1. Classification of Marriages/ Relationships. Parties In
day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest
Interest; NCC;FC;AM 02-11-10 SC
number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as
the duly elected municipal mayor. On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Valid
disqualified petitioner from running for the position of mayor in the Voidable
Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental on the ground that
petitioner never acquired a new domicile in Baliangao, because she Void
failed to prove her bodily presence at that place, her intention to
Terminable
remain there, and her intention never to return to her domicile of
origin.
Others Classifications
Legal Separation
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is qualified to run for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental on the ground that petitioner is a resident and a
registered voter of the said place .
HELD:
The petitioner is disqualified to run as mayor because she failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials. Petitioners uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan
City. The question is whether she was able to establish, through
clear and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of choice
in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections.
The approval of the application for registration of petitioner as voter
only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency
requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from
that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of
running for public office. When it comes to the qualifications for
running for public office, residence is synonymous with
domicile. Accordingly,Nuval v. Guray held as follows:
The term residence as so used, is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.

Separation in Fact
Common Law Relationship

45. Lucas v. Lucas G.R. No. 190710 / Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA
667 Mai
Facts: On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition
to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in
1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao
and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a
prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany
Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got
pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner,
Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was not stated in
petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told
petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969,
petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay
City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and
petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of
Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents
offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While
petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce
petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.

There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile

by choice. First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality.
Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandonRespondent was not served with a copy of the petition.
the old domicile.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish
filiation. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try

and Hear the Case. The court also directed that the Order be
that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases.
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. On September We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
in nature; hence, he should be served with summons. Respondent party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
averred that the petition was not in due form and substance
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
because petitioner could not have personally known the matters
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be
which warrants issuance of a court order for blood
had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as
testing.371avvphi1
petitioners father.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction
Issue: W/N it was necessaryto serve summons on respondent for to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. W/N DNA testing can during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
be had on the mere allegation that respondent is petitioners father. must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
Held: No. An action in personam is lodged against a person based
on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing
itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a 2. F.C. Marriage Requirements; Civil Wedding v. Church
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's
Wedding; Cert of Civil Registrar;
interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition
directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the
status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of
marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action 46. Ty v. CA G.R. No. 127406 / Nov. 27, 2000 346 SCRA 86 in rem.
Joyce B
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective.

FACTS:
Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in
Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on
rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate
April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in
subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction Makati, Metro Manila.
over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to
petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no
established.24 Through publication, all interested parties are
marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the
deemed notified of the petition.
time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He
stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August
for satisfying the due process requirements.25 This is but proper in 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4,
order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his 1979.
interest if he so chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will
not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and
declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a
its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to
DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
the Courts attention.
affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in both the decision and resolution
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a in not considering the civil effects of the religious ratification which
court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various
used the same marriage license.
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which
are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found

HELD:

Respondent argued that petitioner only filed the annulment of their

marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in
fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the
No. We are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate
courts finding that despite private respondents "deceit and perfidy" Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.
in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her
silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the
RTC of Makati City dismissed the case for lack of merit. Court of
church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent
Appeals also dismissed the petitioners appeal and motion for
using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals held that the marriage
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private
petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a
presumption.
marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license,
though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in ISSUE: WON there was clearly an absence of a marriage license
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony which will render petitioner and respondents marriage void ab
was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the initio.
appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and
salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that
HELD: NO.
petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense
during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the
appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53
weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the
of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void
inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the
such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had same Code.19
complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid
marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the
the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
time of the marriage of the parties states:
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties
to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites
ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its are complied with:
reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant
below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but
Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we
are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not
Their consent, freely given;
inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his
own deceit and perfidy."
Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
47. Alcantara v. Alcantara G.R. No. 167746 / Aug. 28,2007 531
SCRA 446 - Joyce D
FACTS:

A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.21

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against

respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 It can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract,
who could arrange a marriage for them. They met Rev. Aquilino
or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and
this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this
Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued,
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating
as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. Petitioner submits that the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
license was
the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
27
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
marriage license number.
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted,
Respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor

of its lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by

counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in
Carmona, Cavite.29

appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the

trial court. Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner, for the
first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a
valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that,
according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the license are different and incongruous. The date of issue of the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is
contained in their marriage contract. The date of celebration of their
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30 An
marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, is on
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
November 15, 1973.
affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage
license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the
marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1,
such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to
the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration

HELD:

YES. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was
issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony
took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the license.
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture.
The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed Article 80 of the Civil Code31 (Art. 80. The following marriages shall
be void from the beginning:
a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any
showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not
duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been
issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law.38

xxx
Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;

x x x is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an

exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner
and private respondent could not be classified among those
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in enumerated in Articles 72-79.
favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every intendment of the law
or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are
look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which
48. Sy v. CA G.R. No. 127263 / Apr. 12, 2000 330 SCRA 550 shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial
Jille
court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity
and due execution.
FACTS:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. On September 15, 1983,
Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately.

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private

respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our
conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized.

49. Cario v. Cario G.R. No. 132529 / Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of
127 ilao
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
FACTS: SPO4 Santiago S. Cario married petitioner Susan Nicdao
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for Cario on June 20, 1969 whith whom he had two children Sahlee
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's
and Sandee Cario. He then married respondent Susan Yee Cario
infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of on November 10, 1992, with whom he cohabited since 1982. He
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
passed away on November 23, 1992 under the care of Susan Yee,
psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. Petitioner
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and

respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial

assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and
Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).

judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for

purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan
case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
one-half of the P146,000.00 collectively denominated as death
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
benefits which petitioner received. Susan Yee admitted that her
marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage marriage void.
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that
she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she
met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. She got a certification dated the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar, stating that there was exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void
no record of marriage license issued to petitioner and the deceased ab initio.
in the said register.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the nonexistence of marriage license is enough to prove non-issuance
thereof, thereby making the marriage void ab initio for not
complying with the requirements of contacting marriage.
Whether or not there is a need for judicial decree of nullity of
previous marriage before contacting subsequent marriage.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that

since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void
ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded
to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise,
the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the

previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
On the first issue, under the Civil Code, which was the law in force respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
renders the marriage void ab initio.
is, likewise, void ab initio.
HELD: Both yes on the first and second issues.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of

petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
Navarro v. Domogtoy A.M. 96-1088 / Jul. 19,1996 259 SCRA 129
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, krisha
was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Araes v. Occiano A.M. 02-1390 / April 11, 2002 380 SCRA 402
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In
Jo
Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license.
In 2001, Petitioner Mercedita Aranes filed a complaint charging
Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the Respondent Judge Salvador Occiano with Ignorance of the Law for
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, solemnizing in Feb 17, 2000, her marriage with her late groom
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
ouside his territorial jurisdiction. Judge Occiano is the presideng
judge in MCT Balatan, CamSur and he solemnized the said
On the second issue, under Article 40 of the Family Code, the
marriage in Nabua, CamSur.
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such Petitioner and her husband lived together as husband and wife until
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
the latters death. However, since their marriage was a nullity, her
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
right to inheritance to vast properties left by her husband was not
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for recognized. She also was deprived of receiving her husbands
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
pensions as a retired Commodore of the Phil. Navy.
In his Comment, Respondent Occiano averred that he was
requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the marriage on

Feb 17, 2000. Having been assured that all the required documents
are complied with, Respondent agreed to solemnize the marriage in
his sala in MTC Balatan, CamSur. However, Arroyo informed him

that Orobia (the Husband) has difficulty in walking and could not
In People vs. Lara, SC held that a marriage which preceded the
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan from his residence in
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
Nabua. Arroyo requested if respondent can solemnize the marriage issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
in Nabua. He acceded to the request.
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
Respondent further averred that on the day of the ceremony, when solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
he discovered that the requisite marriage license was not present, authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
he refused to solemnize the same and reset the date. However,
due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize
the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he 52. OCA vs. J. Necessario et al A.M. No. 07-1691/April 2, 2013
reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of
695 SCRA - G.
Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished
Facts:
the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they
would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day.
The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches
It appears that on Jan 5, 2000, Petitioner and Orobia applied for a of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial
marriage license but either of them did not claim it. There was also Court (RTC) in Cebu City
no record of said marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camsur therefore no Marriage Contract was not issued.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent
Occiano so the latter could communicate with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua for the issuance of her marriage
license. However the Clerk of said office informed respondent judge
that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure
of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor,

proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team created by
OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu
City.

In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum

dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a formal
The Office of the Court Administrator found respondent judge guilty administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S.
of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and
and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge should be held
administratively liable on the grounds that 1) He solemnized the
marriage of Petitioner and her husband outside his territorial
jurisdiction and 2) He solemnized said marriage without the
requisite marriage license.

HELD:
Yes. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage.

Answer at palusot ng mga judges: NO Duty daw to examine

the marriage license of the parties because of the presumption
of regularity eke k
1.Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of
regularity regarding the documents presented to him by contracting
parties.38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34
of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He
claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by
other judges even before he became a judge.39 He avers that he
ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the
existence of an impediment to marry
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of
regularity regarding the documents presented to him by contracting
parties.38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34
of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He
claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by
other judges even before he became a judge.39 He avers that he
ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the
existence of an impediment to marry
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the
OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during the
investigation an "entrapment".47 She also claims that there is
nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the
issuance of the marriage license and with the fact that the issued
marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the
parties resided.48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she
argues that she cannot be faulted for accepting it as genuine as
she and the other judges are not handwriting experts

4.Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on

marriage.54 He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who
evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he
presumes the regularity of the license issued.

Petitioner Syed Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met

Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married
in 1992 in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of
1992. On January 9, 1993, he was at his mother-in-laws residence
5. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on
in Manila and a marriage ceremony was conducted where he and
marriage.54 He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
presumes the regularity of the license issued.
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Issues: WON, the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
license are beyond the scope of duty of the solemnizing officer.
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil
WON, pro forma affidavits of cohabitation are sufficient to justify a Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July
marriage without a marriage licenses of the parties.
11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in
the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
Ruling:
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to
a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. Petitioner filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent
NO. The Court does not accept the arguments of the
respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the Gloria with the RTC of Pasay City. Petitioner alleged the absence of
a marriage license as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a
solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of Gloria.
evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by
the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage During the trial, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
license disappears the moment the marriage documents do
Reverend Mario Dauz who testified that he solemnized the
not appear regular on its face.
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of
the bride on January 9, 1993. Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo
124
and May Ann Ceriola also testified as witnesses to the ceremony.
In People v. Jansen, this Court held that:
After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.
or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the Atty. Sanchez testified he requested a certain Qualin to secure the
local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the
the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. He further
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
obtained.
fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,125 that "the
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The
visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have
alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.

The trial court held that no valid marriage license was issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed and hence the marriage between them was void ab initio. It
also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.

The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they On appeal, the CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and
solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal
the required qualifications and with the existence of legal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional for the marriage license of
character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
of a marriage license.126 Under the rules of statutory construction, Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA
exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
construed.127 The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued
and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that
the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.128 The
ISSUE:
parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during
the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage
W/N the marriage between Syed and Gloria contracted on 09
Nadismiss from service ang lahat ng judge sa final ruling ng court January 1993 remains valid and subsisting on the ground that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was conducted
53. Abbas v. Abbas G.R. No. 183896 / Jan. 30, 2013 689 SCRA
636 Erla

HELD:

As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the

marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who
took steps to procure the same.

Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters

estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is
currently pending before the intestate court.10

On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a

Manifestation11 before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis
be the daughter of Isabel
a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to
12
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
Isabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the
certification that no such license was issued. Such certification was latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, of Rodolfo.
which reads:
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.14 As it was,
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.15
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now
represented by Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however,
The certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of
the issuance of a marriage license.
Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the
petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and
subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a purportedly married to Rodolfo.
certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the In its Comment to the Manifestation,19 the respondent called
marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
born on 14 February 1946.20 As it turned out, the record of birth of
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not Desantis.21 The document also certifies the status of both Isabel
appear in the document.
and John Desantis as "married."22 The respondent posits that the
foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry,
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable constitute prima23 facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis.
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held,
"The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the
records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In
fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in
said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does
not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.
3. Marriage Certificate v. Presumption of Marriage; Torrens
Title Entry Single, Civil Status;

54. Aonuevo v. Estate of Jalandoni G.R. No. 178221 / Dec. 1,

2010 636 SCRA 420 Mai
Facts: Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20
December 1966.7 He died without issue.8
On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the
brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration9 with the Court of First Instance of Negros

According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the

absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent
marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.24
Issue: W/N the petitioners and their siblings should be allowed to
intervene in the settlement proceedings on the ground that there is
sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse
of Rodolfo
Held: No. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to
establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very
evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim
that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.Contrary to the position
taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established.
This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate
between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence
of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may
be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate.48 Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.49

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves

as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b)
that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50 In clear and categorical
language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.

respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their

clients.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful

solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two
financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise
his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his
51
allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of
Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are accorded
prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand by respondent on various dates and proofs of payment made to the
as proof of the facts attested.52 In the case at bench, the petitioners latter by their clients.
and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
Complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of
bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage
was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein
respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with
Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the
second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion
in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13
by any other evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the
entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do,
The charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious
simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude
therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted
the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by
respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to
they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful
the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were
statements in its vital entries.
submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for
resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their
siblings themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the
Issue: Whether or not the marriage contracts as certified by NSO
finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John
are competent and convincing evidence proving that respondent
Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
committed bigamy in a disbarment proceeding.
marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to
Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
Held:
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in
Sylvias birth certificate as untruthful statements made only in order
to "save face."53 They urge this Court to take note of a "typical"
practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of
marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is
legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.

55.Villatuya v. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622 / July 10, 201 676

SCRA 37 - joyce b

Yes. We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by

respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the
genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two
Facts: Complainant Manuel G. Villatuya charges Atty. Bede
Tabilangcos with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the Code other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to
complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
while respondents first marriage was subsisting.
member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a
(Commission) issued a Notice setting the mandatory conference of government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference,
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In
complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence
respondent.
to rebut those documents.
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by 4.Declaration Of Nullity; NCC v. FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; Civil Code
respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and Muslim Code [PD 1083]
and financial matters in the latters numerous petitions for corporate
rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that
they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P
50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they 56. Ablaza v. Republic G.R. No. 158298 / Aug. 11, 2010 628
would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by SCRA 27 - joyce d
their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002,
respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate FACTS:
rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant
also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court
18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with

(RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the

absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1
The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re:
Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no

sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized
without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.2
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be
a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
RTC dismissed the petition stating that petitioner is not a party to void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense
B. Calolot). CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC. Hence, this for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
appeal.
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of
action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the
action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
HELD: YES.
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
for purpose of remarriage.13
10
commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old
of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just
any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
wit:
marriage. According toCarlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be
the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of "proper interest" can file the action.16 Interest within the meaning of
the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Familythe rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished
Code prior to March 15, 2003.
from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the
old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,17 the case is dismissible on
the ground of lack of cause of action.
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos
brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he
no application to the petitioner.
claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in
the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity. The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Quezon City (in petition for review on certiorari) stating as one of
the reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both
the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate cases. A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
RTC rendered a judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen.
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the Tamano as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the
following articles.
Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants,
ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence, this petition. She
collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the
maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his
deceaseds estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the
marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the
petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal
whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or
standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner
Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to
was the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint
must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves
for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court
questions of fact.
Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the
issue presented in this case. We reverse their error, in order that
the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
ISSUE:
57. Juliano-Llave v. Republic G.R. No. 169766 / Mar. 30, 2011
646 SCRA 637 - jille

Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
Tamano was bigamous;

FACTS:

Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have

Estrellitas marriage declared void ab initio

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita

HELD:
twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27,
1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, a) YES. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was
late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD
indicated as divorced.
1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab
initio.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites9 The
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451
when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complainant averred that which was not availed of during its effectivity.
the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the
marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims,
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
desire to be thus covered by this law.
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines." But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss when she declared that Sen.
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under
rites.
the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment
complaint against Sen. Tamano. Estrellita argued that the RTC has Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977,
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under
and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano
Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
jurisdiction of sharia courts. The trial court denied Estrellitas

Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to
the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at
the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate
to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

58. Ilupa v. Abdullah AM SCC 11-16-P /Jun. 1, 2011 650 SCRA

28 - ilao

FACTS: Sultan Pandagaranao Ilupa married Nella Rocaya Mikunug

on May 19, 1959 based on Maranao culture. Clerk of Court II
Macalinog S. Abdullah of the Sharia Circuit Court in Marawi City
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article issued a certificate of divorce based on "Kapasadan" or Agreement
186(2) which states:
between the spouses Ilupa and Mikunug. Ilupa the filed a complaint
against Abdullah for issuing the divorce certificate knowing that
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity divorce is not recognized in the country and the "Kapasadan" or
separation agreement had already been revoked by Philippine civil
of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be
considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the law. He also claimed that the agreement was executed under
duress and intimidation;
spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the the certificate of divorce itself was defective and unreliable as there
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, were erroneous entries in the document and unfilled blanks. He
further claimed that the respondent took away his beautiful wife by
the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
force or had a personal interest in her.
Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their Abdullah argued that his issuance of a certificate of divorce was not
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration illegal, capricious or whimsical as he acted within the bounds of his
of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which
authority; as court registrar, it is his ministerial duty to accept and
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
register marriage contracts, conversions to Islam and divorce
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
certificates. He further argued that argues that there was a divorce
agreement, in the Maranao dialect, attached to the divorce
certificate. Ilupa even signed both pages of the agreement and
although the agreement was not labeled as such, its essence
indicated that the couple agreed to have a divorce and it was so
b) YES. Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal
understood also by their children and the witnesses who signed the
personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. agreement.
02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing
of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not
shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of divorce certificate is allowed
under the Muslim Code, and as such, Abdullah assume no liability
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
for he just performed a duty authorized by law.
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
HELD: Yes. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the
respondents duties, as defined by law. Articles 81 and 83 of the
Muslim Code of the Philippines provide:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of Court of the Sharia
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
District Court shall, in addition to his regular functions, act as
District Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces,
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son
from impugning the subsequent marriage. But in the case at bar, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the territorial
both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for jurisdiction of said court. The Clerk of
nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages
Court of the Sharia Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of
celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in
Muslim Marriages, Divorces,
application and does not apply to cases already commenced before Revocations of Divorces, and Conversations within his jurisdiction.
March 15, 2003.
Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. - Every Circuit Registrar shall:
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify the nature
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. and amount of the
No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which dower agreed upon), divorce or revocation of divorce and
no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights,
conversion and such other
any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally documents presented to him for registration;
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not b) Compile said certificates monthly, prepare and send any
apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has
information required of
him by
property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party the District Registrar;
in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Register conversions involving Islam;

annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or document
registered upon payment of the required fees.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of

marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the
ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions. The
State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The
alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
attributed to respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The
duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented State should have been given the opportunity to present
to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15
entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected
nor cancelled through an administrative complaint.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1)
59. Carlos v. Sandoval G.R. No. 179922 / Dec. 16, 2008 574
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of
SCRA 116 krisha
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage;
(b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
(e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to
annulment of voidable marriages
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition
cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and,
benefit of a trial.
hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
Whether or not the brother of one spouse may initiate an action to the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On
the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage
sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
effectivity of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:

HELD:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a

demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only
to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or successional rights.
annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The
significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against
March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct upon when the marriage took place.23
the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner
shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
the spouses.
Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
nullity of marriage?
(Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil

Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a

nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even
must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of Code).
the real party-in-interest.26
HELD:
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28
where the Court held:

No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time 11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is
the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration
"proper
of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interestand must be based on a cause of action. Thus,
in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.

The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during

the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.

60. Bolos v. Bolos G.R. No. 186400 / Oct. 20, 2010 634 SCRA
429 - jo

5. Arts. 15-17,50-5, NCC; Art.26, FC; Divorce [Filipino;

Foreigner; Parenting; Children, Property
Rights; Succession rights]; Declaratory Relief; Rule 108;; Art.
412 NCC

FACTS:

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition

for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo 61. Rep. v. Orbecido G.R. No. 154380 / Oct. 05, 2005 472 SCRA
114 - G.
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Facts:
On August 2, 2006, RTC granted the petition for annulment. The
decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Laman, Ozamis City.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its
August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Respondent Danilo went to the CA via petition for certiorari under

Rule 65. Danilo prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley.
and their children.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
CA granted reversed the RTC Decision. CA stated that the
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as
the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on
Arguments of OSG:
February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. Cynthia filed
for MR but was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to
ISSUE:
a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC RULE ON DECLARATION OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES is applicable to
legislation and not of judicial determination.6
marriages solemnized before the effectivity of Family Code.
(Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to

Respondents argument

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is

GRANTED.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he 62. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 186571/ Aug. 11, 2010 628
is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, SCRA 266 erla
Article II of the Constitution.
FACTS:
Issue: WON, a Filipino spouse of an alien, who is a Filipino at the
time of marriage, remarry after the latter acquires a foreign divorce Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
that allows her to remarry.
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Ruling:
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
Yes. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Canadian
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and court granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005.
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with
Reckoning point
the RTC. .Daisylyn did not present any objection to the petition. The
RTC denied Gerberts petition. It concluded that Gerbert was not
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the latter to remarry.
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
ISSUE:
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to W/N the petitioner, being a foreigner, is the proper party to file the
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce with the RTC on
2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
the ground that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction
for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
HELD:
Proof of naturalization and divorce
No, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. under this provision but this is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our Gerberts petition before the RTC. Petitioner has legal interest to
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Direct
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it
involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
and remarried, also to remarry
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
Dispositive part:
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the

copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must 63. Catalan v.Catalan G.R. No. 183622 / Feb. 08, 2012 665 SCRA
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic 487 mai
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the Facts: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After
allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife,
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss herein. On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines. Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. On 3 March 2005,
Canadian divorce law.
while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage,
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were
subsequently consolidated.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
covering the same estate was already pending. On the other hand,
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention,
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos,
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
Pangasinan. Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for
where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12
made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for
December 1959. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. Aspetitioner of bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that since the deceased
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
and petitioner was not valid. The trial court also found that, in the
first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Petitioner
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA held that the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
is in place.
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules
Issue: W/N petitioner, not being an interested party and a stranger
of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by
to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for
which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the letters of administration by the trial court is in place.
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Held: No. RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was
never married to Eusebio Bristol. By failing to take note of the
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between
petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was
in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order
as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in

Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that
under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce
must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A

divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.

Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing

or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners

personality disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting
from the family to peers, and that his experiences have made him
so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion
that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners
marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners psychological
incapacity.Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has sufficiently established the
existence of his psychological incapacity.
HELD:

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take

No. Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
judicial notice of foreign laws.1wphi1 Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
resolved in the negative.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
the validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter
is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce. Should
significance to the marriage he or she has contracted.
petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or discharged by the parties to the marriage.13
next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

6. Article 36, FC; AM 02-11-10 SC; See also Articles 48, 68-71,
220-221 & 225 FC
64. Marable v. Marable G.R. No. 178741 / Jan. 17, 2011 639
SCRA 557 - joyce b
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano
University. On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent
eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor
Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30,
1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their
marriage was blessed with five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal
and physical quarrels became common occurrences.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court laid down the guidelines

in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held,
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds.

On said date, he filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1
incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological
Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the
National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that
petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder,"
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and

The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or

decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.

It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of

their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the
country, she had illicit relations with other men. Rumors of Bonas
sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. During their
confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin
who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away
from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to
Basilan. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his
marriage.
psychological incapacity. The result of the examination and the
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition.

findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish

petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the
psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist
from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court
correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root
cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that
petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but
there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a
socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and
deceitful.

Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, testified that after conducting

several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was
suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she described
as personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention
seeking behavior. She believed with this extra marital affair is
respondents way of seeking attention and seeking emotions from
other person and not from the husband. And of course, this is not
fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition

to the petition on the ground that "the factual settings in the case at
bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,15 the presentation of expert required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA
proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
20 [1995]).
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
Trial court granted the petition and nullified the parties marriage on
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of the ground that he psychological incapacity of the respondent
psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls
exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to
declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling
baffled by Dr. Tayags evaluation which became the trial courts
to the Court of Appeals which sided with the OSGs contention that
basis for concluding that petitioner was psychologically
the trial court erred in granting the petition despite Joses abject
incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of
failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological
petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological
incapacity. More importantly, there was no established link between incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts
petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the decision. Hence, this Petition.
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.16
ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
65. Ochosa v. Alano G.R. No. 167459 / Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA
517 - joyce d
HELD: The petition is without merit.
FACTS:
Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in
the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college
drop-out. They eventually got married on 27 October 1973 before
the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. In 1976,
however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old
baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her
Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in

the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed

that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
Basilan. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it
Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
where they resided with their military aides. In 1987, Jose was
beyond the means of the party involved.
charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup

Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of

need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern
psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 the following guidelines in Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And,
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
decisions of church tribunals.14
nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.

We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the

evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several
occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse,
Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed
abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to
Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted
psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family
Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects"
were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In
other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."

Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations
emotional outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes.
between the parties. For a determination though of a partys
complete personality profile, information coming from persons with
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful.
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows
flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
opinion based
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert
23
entirely
on
doubtful
sources
of
information.
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal to Joses assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary,
the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that
certification,
those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any
doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the Bonifacio during the following decade.
petition.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements
arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really
dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction already then
existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted
party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.11

In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged

psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time
after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code
is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological

A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina

guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te,12 to wit:
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an
abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply
declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case that there is a

It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of

awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family

Code.28

of the Family Code states:

While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
truly appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
case.
only after its solemnization.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
66. Yambao v. REP G.R. No. 184063 / Jan. 24, 2011 640 SCRA Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
355 - jille
and significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be
annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically
FACTS:
incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady so grave
the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11, 2003, after 35
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason
of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from
the Family Code.
a psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his
obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents
In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the
efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an
beginning, her and respondents married life had been marred by understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not
bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by
comply with the essential obligations of married life. Petitioner
his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external
averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing
only one who earned a living and took care of the children.
an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings,
Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and does not suffer from psychological incapacity.
spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job, he
would not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
into several business ventures, which all failed. In addition,
and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty,
respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
money would come his way. When respondent started threatening will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to
separately from him.
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage:
the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
petition for lack of merit. The court said that, even as petitioner
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not
claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able to raise duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to
three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
problems. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, this
petition. Petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents
laziness and dependence could not be characterized as inability but
67. Rep. v. Galang G.R. No. 168335 / Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 524
just plain refusal. Petitioner contends that she has complied with
- ilao
the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the framers of the
Family Code never intended to give such a suppressed definition of BRION, J.:
psychological incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a restrictive
definition would limit the applicability of the provision. Moreover,
she asserts that she has proven that respondents unbearable
FACTS: On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy
jealousy and Dependent Personality Disorder manifested
themselves even before the marriage of the parties, although not in contracted marriage in Pampanga and lived in respondents fathers
house in Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while
the same degree as when they were already married.
Juvy stayed at home as a housewife. They have one child,
Christopher. On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
claimed that Juvy was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed
ISSUE:
that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often
asked money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that
Does the totality of petitioners evidence establish respondents
Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
respondent, Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate immaturity,
marriage?
distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection
towards him and their child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was
HELD:
extremely serious and appears to be incurable. Aside from his
The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied. Article 36 testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a

psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test

on the respondent. The psychological findings tended to confirm
that the defendant suffered from personality and behavioral
disorders which are manifested through her grave dependency on
gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of
responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be
incorrigible. The Regional Trial Court nullified the parties marriage
in its decision of January 22, 2001. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the regional trial court.

manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some

incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered
her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light,
the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity
and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than
the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,we
emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like
do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity,
as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect
to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to nullify the

marriage considering that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the defendant (Juvy) suffered from psychological
incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential
marital obligations and that the complainant successfully showed
the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys
condition.

In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature

to encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM, and of
squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent
entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically
be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the
evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not
recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong
and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from
HELD: No, no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion
ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the
celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her
the Family Code.
marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted
that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the
respondent refers to as swindling) only 2 years after their
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents
cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties
at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code. the
(b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits which
of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity
(e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in
the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM
swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to
card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his
account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash change), and declared that psychological findings tend to confirm
that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders
a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from
and that she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and
their relatives; and
loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible. In the end,
the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for
(g) indulged in gambling.
her conclusion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the
defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.
The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused
to wake up early to prepare breakfast;

These acts do not per se rise to the level of psychological

incapacity that the law requires. The Court stressed that
The Court found this kind of conclusion and report grossly
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
inadequate. First, the Court noted that the psychologist did not
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
even identify the types of psychological tests which she
obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys
et al., the Court ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse psychological condition. The Court also stressed that the acts
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at
because of some psychological, not physical illness. In other words, the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not
complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be
even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder
shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys
of the psychological incapacity.
condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the
initiative to change and that her mental incapacity appears
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a incorrigible are insufficient to prove that her

mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the

cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was

present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the
petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state
a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the
Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations

contained in respondents petition are insufficient to support a
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court first declared declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply
(b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should
with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that
the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of
the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity may be dismiss for failure to
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos, the Court further clarified comply with the guidelines set forth in the Molina Ruling.
that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of
evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, HELD:
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of
Voidable Marriages) which provided that the complete facts should a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to
The Courts 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to
Gutierrez Yu-Te placed some cloud in the continued applicability of scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary
the time-tested Molina guidelines. The Court stated in this case that value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert
instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a witnesses presented by the parties.
straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity
to fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the
law, since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as
completely on "all fours" with another.
69. Kalaw v. Fernandez G.R. No. 166357 / Sept 19, 2011 657
SCRA 822 - jo

Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting and Jocelyn M. Suazo v.

Angelito Suazo, however, laid to rest any question regarding the
continued applicability of Molina. In these cases, the Court clarified
that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina. Far from abandoning Molina, FACTS:
Ngo Te simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. We also explained that Suazo that Ngo Te merely
Petitioner Tyrone Kalaw and respondent Malyn Fernandez met in
stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Rio, Ria,
incapacity.
Miggy, and Jay. Shortly after the birth of Jay, Tyrone had an
extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano who gave birth to a son in
68. Aurelio v. Aurelio G.R. No. 175367 / Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA March 1983.
561 - krisha

FACTS:

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children
with Tyrone. The latter started living with Jocelyn, who bore him
three more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the US with Jocelyn and their children. He

left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house
in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. The househelp
would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of
them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement,
In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner werethe children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with
their respective essential marital obligations. In addition,
Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were
married on March 23, 1988. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his
wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was
manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone
and their children during their co-habitation. He alleged the
following acts of Malyn:
she left the children without proper care and attention as she
played mahjong all day and all night;
she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the
early hours of the following day;

Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from

psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these
witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners
experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners
experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity
in the form of NPD.

2. NO. Petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits

to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for
and
attention from other men is unproven. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
discovered in flagrante delicto.
companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove
that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming
law expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity. arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for
playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a
attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). Malyns NPD is manifest in legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute
her utter neglect of her duties as a mother. Dr. Gates based her
psychological incapacity.
diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, his
sister-in-law, and their son. Fr. Healy characterized Malyns
70. Toring v. Toring G.R. No. 165321 / Aug. 03, 2010 626 SCRA
psychological incapacity as grave and incurable. He based his
389 - G.
opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as
the report of Dr. Dayan, Malyns expert witness. He clarified that he
did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding
Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts duty to do so. Facts:
RTC concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated Nainlab si Ricardo sa Hawaiian dance teacher, mukang
to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. nasayaw sayawan toh
CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by
the facts on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations
against each other do not support a finding of psychological
incapacity.

Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunts house in

Cebu. Teresita was then his cousins teacher in Hawaiian dance
and was conducting lessons at his aunts house
. He pursued Teresita and they became sweethearts after three
months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of
another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

ISSUE:

Kasalan

WON petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978
psychological incapacity
WON Infidelity constitute psychological incapacity

Nagfile ng annulment on PI

HELD:

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding,

Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed
that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and
subsequent to the celebration of their marriage

1. NO. Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or

inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party,
based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must
have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding,

Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed
that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and
subsequent to the celebration of their marriage

Allegation of Ricardo:
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that
Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer

NO. We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no

reversible error when it set aside the RTCs decision for lack of
legal and factual basis.

The leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held

Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales
(c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The
agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company.
psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
she was pregnant with another mans child.
discharged by the parties to the marriage."12

ON the existence of PI
Testimony of the expert witness was based only on the
evaluation of petitioner and his son

We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to

indicate that Teresita suffered from some psychological disorder as
far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic
the demise of the marriage was Teresitas Narcissistic Personality psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage
Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
her essential marital obligations

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the

failure of Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation to fully explain the
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her details i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when of
psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Teresitas eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not
personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a
Ricardos testimony merely established that Teresita was
personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric
irresponsible in managing the familys finances by not paying their
evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.
rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresitas spendthrift
attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the
house and lot intended to be their family residence
Arguments of the OSG:
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) contended that there was no basis to declare
Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the
psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son
Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on
these parties personality traits but not on Teresitas psychological
makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not
clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity.
Ruling of the courts:
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to
Teresita

Teresitas alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute

psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In
order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity,
the respondents unfaithfulness must be established as a
manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the
respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the
totality of the petitioners evidence to be insufficient to prove that
Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as
a wife
Expert testimony does not have sufficient basis for her
conclusion

The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial courts
findings did not satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the
statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more,
already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita
Issue: WON, the marriage should be declared null and void on the suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long
ground of PI
been negatively critical in considering psychological
Sub: WON, the expert testimony of dr.Albaran based only on the
statements of Ricardo and his son, Richardson, sufficient to show
PI on the part of Teresita.

evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided

sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the
marriage.

Ruling:

Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity

outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, testified that after conducting
allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was
although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she described
his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of
as personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention
marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential seeking behavior. She believed with this extra marital affair is
obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and
respondents way of seeking attention and seeking emotions from
incurability of the condition.
other person and not from the husband. And of course, this is not
fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from
persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends
or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses condition at or about the time of marriage,
or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the
incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses
who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresitas
psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses eldest son
who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36
case because he could not have been there when the spouses
were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and
AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71882. Costs against the petitioner.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition

to the petition on the ground that "the factual settings in the case at
bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA
20 [1995]).
Trial court granted the petition and nullified the parties marriage on
the ground that he psychological incapacity of the respondent
exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling
to the Court of Appeals which sided with the OSGs contention that
the trial court erred in granting the petition despite Joses abject
failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts
decision. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

71. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes G.R. No. 185286 / Aug. 18, 2010

628 SCRA 461- erla

FACTS:
Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in
the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college
drop-out. They eventually got married on 27 October 1973 before
the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. In 1976,
however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old
baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her
Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.

HELD: The petition is without merit.

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in
the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed

that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it
Basilan. Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with beyond the means of the party involved.
Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
where they resided with their military aides. In 1987, Jose was
charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in
detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of
their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the
country, she had illicit relations with other men. Rumors of Bonas The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. During their
confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away nullity.
from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to
Basilan. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
marriage.
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations

and/or symptoms may be physical.

The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.

other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."

We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent

level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest
that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds
that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While
such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations
between the parties. For a determination though of a partys
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
complete personality profile, information coming from persons with
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful.
emotional outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes.
This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows
flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as entirely on doubtful sources of information.23
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
to Joses assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
included in the text of the decision.
beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the
most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary,
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A
reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
Bonifacio during the following decade.
may be, to the petition.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements

arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really
dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction already then
existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted
party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.11

In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged

psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time
after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
marriage.

We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code
is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
Yu-Te,12 to wit:
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.28
abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply
declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case that there is a
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. truly appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound
Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each by judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, case.
to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.14
72. Baccay v. Baccay G.R. No 173138 / Dec, 1, 2010 636 SCRA
350 mai
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the
evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several
occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse,
Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed
Facts: Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of
abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Technology where both took up Electronics and Communications
Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted
Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual
psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but
Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects"
it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted
were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In Noels proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered

Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
attractive.
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the
most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring
Maribel to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately and significance to the marriage.
shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he
always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive
occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations.
Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noels invitations and
whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he
observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once
did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would
talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would
promise to change, but she never did.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court laid

down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
was already involved with another woman. He tried to break up with Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
their ties. Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, are to be protected by the state.
however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. solidarity.
Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she
was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
immediately wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
Quezon City.
must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage,
Noel filed a petition[7] for declaration of nullity of marriage with the may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the
proceedings. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
case. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
marriage of the parties hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan Trial Court in but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
Quezon City as NULL and VOID. On appeal by the OSG, the CA thereto.
reversed the decision of the RTC.
Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never
observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. Then, sometime in
January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she
came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a
miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital
where her sister worked as a nurse.

Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

Issue: W/N the marriage between the parties is null and void under permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
Article 36 of the Family Code.
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
Held: No. Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void evencapacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
essential obligation of marriage.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals[21] that the phrase
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
Article 68[22] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse

integral element in the personality structure that effectively

incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

FACTS:

The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse

where the latter worked. The petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the respondent
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
they eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
together at the respondents rented room, and soon entered into a
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence common-law relationship.
and included in the text of the decision.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family was apprehensive
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work
and because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the
petitioner and the respondent begot four (4) children, namely:
xxxx
Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that the
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child;
consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
Canon 1095.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not
sex with him since 1993 because she became "very close" to a
sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically
male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to
incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that Maribel
each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage,
and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her
about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that
the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically
of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly
identified and alleged in the petition. The RTC denied this motion in
observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded its order dated July 2, 2001.
that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish
Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified
how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly
true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation
assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the
report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac where he was found to be
same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of
entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to
marriage.
sustain one.[24] Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the
incapacity contemplated by law.
The RTC ruled nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the
respondent in its decision of April 26, 2002. It saw merit in the
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report,
refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital
and concluded that Respondent is indeed suffering from "Mixed
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
Personality Disorder" that render her incapable of complying with
marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
her marital obligations. However, CA, reversed and set aside the
RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.The CA held that Dr.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
respondents personality disorder was serious, grave and
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological permanent; it likewise did not mention the root cause of her
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
concluding that the respondents disorder had no definite treatment
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
because he did not subject her to a mental assessment.
bond one is about to assume. x x x.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioners
marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
73. Agraviador v. Agraviador G.R.No.170729 / Dec. 08, 2010 637
SCRA 519 - joyce b

HELD:
NO, there is no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage,

pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites
jurisprudence. The totality of evidence presented failed to establish solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.2 The
the respondents psychological incapacity.
couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy
following her second miscarriage.3
The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders existing at the time of the marriage clearly
demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is
about to assume.

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of

nullity of their marriage,4 citing Catalinas psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not
interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her
share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon,
Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public
prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between
Eduardo and Catalina.6

In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his
that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she
personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent
psychological condition that makes her completely unable to
most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner
household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she
merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker
that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in
sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7
defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the
petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation
neither did he mention that the respondents malady was incurable, conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Dr. Reyes
or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality
means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the
Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that
respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to change," Catalinas disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that
and "refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a psychological rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital
or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
obligations.9
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
Catalina, in her Answer/Manifestation,10 whereby she admitted her
The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and
psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home
appears to be without hope of reconciliation The remedy, however, without Eduardos consent and flirting with different men.
is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family
Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and RTC granted the petition. CA promulgated its decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC.
fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not
to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State,
declaration of the nullity of Catalinas marriage to Eduardo based
fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36
Code.
declaration of nullity be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
HELD: NO.
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
like. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
(and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his
or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it
is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological illness.16
74. Republic v. De Quintos / CA G.R. No. 159594/Nov. 12, 2012
685 SCRA 33 - JOYCE D
Pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the

FACTS:

precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the

psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared
the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based
strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations.20 Indeed, the incapacity should be
established by the totality of evidence presented during

trial,21making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove

the existence of the psychological incapacity.22

psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor

of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.36

We have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating: The

probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere 75. Mendoza v. Republic G.R. No. 157649/Nov 12, 2012 685
statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that SCRA 16 - JILE
he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a
basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.
FACTS:
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr.
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country
Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalinas
from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been nextpsychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence
door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were
showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality
disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. still in college she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda
College taking a business management course. After a month of
We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological
illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca.
They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites
by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.29
solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991, after which they
moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced for support.
was Catalinas immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her
marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute
psychological incapacity.30 To rule that such immaturity amounted to When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts funds from petitioners best friend to settle the hospital bills. He
remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he
were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the
spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various
jobs to meet the familys needs, first as a part-time aerobics
the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or
31
instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in
immaturity.
Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed
income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses (i.e., rental,
We held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of a natal or food, other bills and their childs educational needs).
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the
respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital
On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for three months
obligations, viz:
after his graduation from college before he started working as a car
salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994. In
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida,
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate
natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.
in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital
obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a
birthday present. She later found out that he did not pay for the car
the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the
itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost
spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00. To make
matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner
and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he
obligations of marriage.
had also swindled many clients some of whom were even
threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves.
The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her
Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with
another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode
nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things
over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her
separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other
hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed
from him.
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that
there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.33
declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his
Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence,
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the
basis.
RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a
psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites
Jimenez. The RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the

Dominic an absolute nullity. The RTC found that all the

characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity,
antecedence and incurability were attendant.

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it

is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of
incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as
to provide support to his wife and child.
decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of
a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of
or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be
respondents personality disorder and it was only after marriage
resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented
that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondents
behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. In fine, before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert
opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
his psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic
causes, faulty parenting and influence of the environment although adduced in the course of the proceedings.
its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.
Incurability Respondents personality disorder having existed in
him long before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there
appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary
means from such incapacity.
The Republic appealed to the CA. CA promulgated its assailed
decision reversing the judgment of the RTC. The CA held the
testimonies of petitioners witnesses insufficient to establish
Dominics psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious
nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Hence, this appeal
by petitioner.Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the
expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in
the trial of the case. She contends that the report on the psychiatric
evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the
requirements prescribed in Santos and Molina.

In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists

are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of
Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence
presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of
medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential,
we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the partys psychological condition,".

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not

physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render
help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
ISSUE:
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground
Whether or not the evidence presented and findings of the expert in for nullification of marriage, a persons psychological affliction must
this case are sufficient to establish psychological incapacity
be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to
(Whether or not expert's testimony are indispensable evidence in comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage,
determining the merits for psychological incapacity as a ground for including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The
declaration of nullity of marriage)
affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must
HELD:
be incurable.
NO. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his 76. Republic v. Encelan G.R. No. 170022 / Jan. 9, 2013 688
or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove SCRA 215 - ILAO
that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
BRION, J.:
Here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did
not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological
incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person
before completing her report but simply relied on other peoples
recollection and opinion for that purpose. Expert evidence
submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed
psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the
psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the
marriage.Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it
was not the absence of the medical experts testimony alone that
was crucial but rather petitioners failure to satisfactorily discharge
the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at
the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the
evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage was the crucial consideration.

FACTS: On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union
bore two children, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar
went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986,
Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been
having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with
Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June
16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas
psychological incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that
Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she

left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her

mother-in-law.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation

report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not
prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores observation on
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice as
any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to
a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital
marital relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the other
union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with
impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts.
marital and family relationship."
While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and
relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be
The regional trial court declared the marriage void while the Court compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another.
of Appeals initially set aside the decision of the lower court but later To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted
cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas
found that Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a
obligations to Cesar and Lolitas wilful and deliberate act of
good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by
abandoning the conjugal dwelling were two circumstances
indicative of Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that resulted facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot
support.
in her gross infidelity.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify
Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity7. Declaration Of Nullity; Prejudicial Question- Section 7, Rule
considering Lolitas unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
obligations to Cesar and Lolitas wilful and deliberate act of
abandoning the conjugal dwelling or Lolitas alleged infidelity; and 77. Pimentel v. Pimentel G.R. No. 172060 / Sept. 13, 2010 630
whether or not psychological fitness as a spouse can be equated to SCRA 437 - KRISHA
professional/work relationship.
HELD: No. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesars marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

FACTS:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private

respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a R. Pimentel. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a
appear before the RTC of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, the Court had repeatedly stressed that On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations"; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the
the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of RTC Quezon City.
the condition of the errant spouse.
ISSUE:
Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological
incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas
alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as
well as his continued financial support to her and their children
even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in
passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling.

Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of

marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD:

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal

dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal
Case for Parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To
prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered criminal action.
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record
exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas infidelity and
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue

which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action

City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz. On April 16,
may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew
is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the in a church wedding in Manila.
accused in the criminal case.
In 1999, Emmanuel filed against the appellant for annulment of
marriage before the RTC of Manila.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person
"who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide.
Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117.
On October 5, 2000, accused-appellant filed against Rafael , before
the RTC of Makati for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo found accused Victoria GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY. Her MR was
denied.

For her defense, Victoria insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article marriages to Rafael were null and void because the latter was
36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Rafael and
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this
Emmanuel were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license;
case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the
and (3) the action had prescribed, sinceEmmanuel knew about her
issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would marriage to Rafael as far back as 1978.
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners
will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner CA affirmed Victorias conviction CA held that petitioner committed
and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel because, at
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, that time, her marriage to Rafael had not yet been declared null
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner previous marriage to Rafael was still existing at the time of her
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
marriage to Emmanuel.
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
After the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the
Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners
on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of marriages to Rafael, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the question.
spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect
of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
Meanwhile, On March 28, 2003, the RTC of Makati City, declared
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Rafael null and void ab
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in
that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a initio on the ground of Rafaels psychological incapacity.
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the In her MR, Victoria invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground
Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the for the reversal of her conviction. However, the CA, citing Tenebro
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
v. Court of Appeals, denied reconsideration and ruled that [t]he
absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground
concerned.
of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy.
78. Jarillo v. People G.R. No. 164435 / Sept. 29, 2009 601 SCRA
236 JO
ISSUE:
FACTS:

WON Petitioner Victorias conviction of bigamy should be reversed

on the ground that her marriage to Rafael was subsequently
On May 24, 1974, Appellant Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Rafael were declared by the Court to be void ab initio.
married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C.
Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal. On May 4, 1975,
WON the criminal proceedings on the Bigamy case should be
Victoria and Rafael again celebrated marriage in a church wedding suspended on the ground of that the pendency of the petition for
ceremony in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Rafael involves a
prejudicial question.
On November 26, 1979, Victoria thereafter contracted a
subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Uy, at the City Court of Pasay

HELD:

respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.

No. petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the
marriages to Rafael cannot be considered a valid defense in the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared community of property. 4
null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was
petitioners marriage to Rafael, which had not yet been declared
denied on 30 October 1995.
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid
and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
Argument ng petitioner na gonggong
petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in
Tenebro, since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling: he argues
that:
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for
I
bigamy.
No. SC ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the

Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the
parties are psychologically incapacitated.
II

judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of

being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases
case for declaration of nullity.The reason is that, without a judicial where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the
subsisting.
spouses.
8. Declaration Of Nullity; Arts. 36, 40, 45; Section 19 (1) AM 02- Issue: WON, the property regime of a void marriage due to PI
10-11 SC; Arts. 147 & 148
should be governed by article 147 of the FC.
79. Valdes v. RTC Br. 102, Q, C G.R. No. 122749 / Jul. 31, 1996
260 SCRA 221 G

Ruling:

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,

regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Facts:
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January interpreted and so applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition,
dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
The trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
Argument of petitioner:d daw mag-apply ang 147 sa
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
dispositionng prop
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
Sabi ng RTC ulol mo, tarantado ka ba, eh yang marriage nyo family and of the household.
void eh d malamang 147 or 148 lang
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
family dwelling, the trial court said:
of their cohabitation.
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the
decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property
in "unions without marriage."

between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio,

pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the

share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in

favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.

Florencia, secured a loan from petitioner MBTC and she executed

a real estate mortgage covering the lot that was earlier mentioned.
Florencia constituted the mortgage a little less than two years after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, but before the
liquidation of the partnership. Florencia failed to pay her loan
obligation when it fell due, Petitioner, on November 29, 1999,
initiated foreclosure proceedings and emerged as the highest
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
bidder at the auction sale. Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
mortgage of the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the
marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his
consent. The RTC rendered a decision in favour of Nicholson and
Article not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and declared the real estate mortgage as invalid. The trial court found
129, 12 of the Family Code not applicable on Void marriages
the said lot to be conjugal, the same having been acquired during
due to PI
the existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. In so
ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the Family Code, providing that
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement "all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in contrary is proved." To the trial court, petitioner had not overcome
authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the
commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private RTC concluded that the disputed property may not be validly
respondent own the "family home" and all their common
encumbered by Florencia without Nicholsons consent. CA affirmed
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the the RTC decision.
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code,
ISSUE:
not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12
of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
W/N the real estate mortgage on the lot which was part of the
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for conjugal property of spouses Nicholson and Florencia is valid, even
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is if only Florencia executed the mortgage with petitioner MBTC
annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that without the consent of Nicholson, on the ground that the marriage
of Nicholson and Florencia, governed by the regime of conjugal
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
partnership of gains, was already dissolved when the said
Articles 50 of the
mortgage was executed
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article
43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages HELD:
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage The Real Estate Mortgage over the disputed lot in Makati City and
all proceedings thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property owned by Nicholson,
latter is judicially declared void.
but VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging
to Florencia.
Dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership,
October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until
and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
80. MBTC v. Pascual G.R. No. 163744 / Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA
246 ERLA
What governed the property relations of the former spouses when
the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it,
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent
FACTS:
of Nicholson. However, the rights of MBTC, as mortgagee, are
limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned.
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were
Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the
married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought a remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
located in Makati City. She was issued a new title under her name,
with the words "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson
MBTC may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights
Pascual. The marriage between Nicholson and Florencia was
dissolved in 1995 where the trial court declared the marriage null "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." This
Nicholson. In the same decision, the court ordered the dissolution disposition
and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways
without liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997,

is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of

a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do

soquando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.

either by

Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
81. Dio v. Dio G.R. No.178044 / Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178 marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in
MAI
the case before the Court.
Facts: Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
(respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of the household.
Las Pias City.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants.
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with
her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
and hurt him.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent
who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the must be present:
United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001.
Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
void.9
The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Petitioner
filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution
of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question
decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Decision was rendered by that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
RTC declaring that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.

Issue: W/N a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be

issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.

Held: The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of
City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio

or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or parent.
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition
may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of
the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in

Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all
good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code does not apply to respondent considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of
the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code

HELD:
82. Atienza v. Brillantes AM. No.MTJ 92-706 / Mar. 29, 1995 243
SCRA 32 - JOYCE B
No. Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs.
the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter
into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
FACTS:
declaring such previous marriage void.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40,
respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and case.
instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to
take care of his children.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
even alienated the affection of his children for him.
affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992,
after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's
office.
83. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes G.R. No. 185286 / Aug. 18, 2010
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married 628 SCRA 461 - JOYCE D
to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was
related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro.
FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in
that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. On December
Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers
death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest
was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the
complainant.
Population Center Foundation.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in
he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he
Mandaluyong City. When their first child was born on March 22,

1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio
expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of
on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided
P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Respondents game plan was in Article 36 of the Family Code.
to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and
restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. Thereafter, another Held: Court finds merit in the petition.
attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly
unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
and, this time, moved in with petitioners mother. But the new set up
did not end their marital difficulties.
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization." and
he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
newborn. In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond
business stopped operations. Respondent came up with another "The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed and
added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a
but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties marital partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of
deteriorated.
the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It
an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his
left the determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to
girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter case basis.
liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that
respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to
Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken
remain faithful to her and their family.
as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but
for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties
that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed
cyst. Respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive. After the so that these various circumstances are not applied so
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article
lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
the recovery room.
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse,
Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and
sponsored the parties to join the group. In 1997, Adolfo brought
respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent
resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time,
petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told
respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to
give space to petitioner.

Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation

of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1)
gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and
(3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.12

With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve.
Neither did respondents relationship with his children. Finally, in
2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations
reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2)
these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to
recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family;
Respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was
several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of
psychologically incapacitated.
unpaid money obligations.
The trial court ruled granted the petition on the ground of
psychological incapacity of both parties. Respondent appealed to
the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to
petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent,
reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and
subsisting.

It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses

that a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed
by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed,
a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and
subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both parties
psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions,

the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition
and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori

assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of
the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the
support.
petitioner.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial
personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be 9. RA 9262- Law on Violation against Women and their
Children; Support; Art. 213 FC
normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories,
however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying,
truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, 84. Go Tan v. Tan G.R. No. 168852 / Sept. 30, 2008 567 SCRA
and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as 231 - JILE
beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their
antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content FACTS:
reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of
irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense
of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal
intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, petitioner, and Steven L.
trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children
of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these
were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12,
actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.28
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an
inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support;
(2) extra-marital affairs;
(3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected
with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan
and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that
Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section
5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.

On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with
we agree with the CAs ruling thereon:
Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad
Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the
Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating
psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. Respondents
the essential marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3
thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno,
[petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her relationship.
best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric
report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their
marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a
hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing ISSUE:
evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert
witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically
Whether or not parents-in-law may be included in the petition for
incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
the issuance of a protective order in accordance with RA 9262
Code.29
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of
HELD:
Appeals and Molina:30

YES. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''Violence against

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may
women and their children'' as any act or a series of acts
be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former following reliefs:
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the
petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
the law, thus:
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC,

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to

promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children.

thus:

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio

unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It must be
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory
Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have
construction. It is not of universal application. Neither is it
suppletory application.
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is
silent on a particular matter.

85. Ang v. CA/ Sagud G.R. No.182835 / Apr. 20, 2010 618 SCRA
592 - ILAO
ABAD, J.:

FACTS: Complainant Irish Sagud and accused Rustan Ang were

classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan
courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards
the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had
taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly

recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and
tried to convince her to elope with him; Irish rejected the proposal.
Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used
crime of violence against
two cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to
his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxx
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
multimedia message service a picture of a naked woman with
personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the figure. The
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. Xxx senders cellphone number was one of the numbers that Rustan
used. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the
messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand,
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede
ring send sa lahat ng chatter."
of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her
child may include
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred
her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and

his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess
Resort and he did. After parking, Rustan walked towards Irish but
the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They
searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and
several SIM cards.

woman and child abuse and denied paternity of the child. He

argued that the signature appearing on the birth certificate is not
his. He claimed that the petition is only a harassment suit intended
to force him to acknowledge the child and give financial support.
RTC dismissed the petition since no prior judgment exists
establishing the filiation of Petitioners son and granting him the
right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such
support. Her MR was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending

of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of
ISSUE: WON an application for support for the child may be
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
included in a petition for temporary protection against woman and
child abuse.
HELD: Yes. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series HELD: No.
of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a
single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be
An action to obtain support for her child was wrongfully filed by
enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.
Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license Petitoner. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is
the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of
isolated ones.
abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order
against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal
support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are
Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to
entitled to a protection order and to legal support.
obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly
have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is
by them.
based on her claim that he is Respondents illegitimate child, the
latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give him, until Petitioner shall have proved his relation to him. The
their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against
who sent the obscene pictures of herself. It is doubtful if the woman Vallecera for compulsory recognition.
in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Petitioners remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish
The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly
on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition
youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of may be integrated and resolved.
course only be determined based on the circumstances of each
case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open
and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture
and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like
Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized
and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it
further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture
with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have
given her a nightmare.

RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on the
lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between the parties child
since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed
by Respondent against Dolina and her child and whether they are
entitled to protection. However, Petitioner failed to raise this error
on review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the
RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from
Respondent.

Ocampo v. Arcaya- Chua AM OCO. No. 07-2630 / Apr. 23, 2010

619 SCRA 59 KRISHA
Dolina v. Vallecera G.R. No. 182367/ Dec. 15, 2010 638 SCRA
707 JO
FACTS:
February 2008, Petitioner Dolina filed a TPO against respondent
Vallecera with the RTC Tacloban City for alleged woman and child
abuse under RA 9262. Petitioner also added a prayer for financial
support from the respondent for their supposed child. The petition
also asked PAL, respondents employer to withhold from his pay
such amount of support as the RTC may deem proper.

88. Dabalos v. RTC Br. 59, Angeles City G.R. No. 193960/Jan. 7,
2013 688 SCRA 64 G
Topic: dating or sexual relationship as element of violation of
ra 9262
Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262
before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information which
states:

Respondent opposed the petition, claiming that the petition is more That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
of a petition for financial support rather than protection against

above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of the

complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use personal violence on the complainant, by
pulling her hair, punching complainants back, shoulder and
left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainants
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of
Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4

Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence

against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
Wanted ka ngaun boi
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against
petitioner on November 19, 2009.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of
the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
Petitioner's argument:
d na daw cla nagdadate
The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July offended woman;
13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private
respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or
series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her
relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject
incident.

The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or

psychological distress to her.6

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical

injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262
because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship.
Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated

September 13, 2010 and October 5, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 095210 are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.
10. Art. 40, FC; AM -02-10-11 SC; March 15, 2003; NCC; Rule
108

The RTC Ruling

89. Ablaza v. Republic G.R. No. 158298 / Aug. 11, 2010 628
SCRA 27 ERLA

The RTC denied petitioners motion. It did not consider material

the fact that the parties dating relationship had ceased prior to the
incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior FACTS:
dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan,
constituted an act of violence against women and their
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner
alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had
Issue: WON, the existence of dating or sexual relationship at been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license
the time of the commission of the physical violence, is
being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
necessary to be covered by RA 9262.
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a
marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to oneRuling:
half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any
No. Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death
be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. RTC
dismissed the petition. CA affirmed.
such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should
ISSUE:
the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is W/N A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable in this case
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as
there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present
HELD:
existence of such relationship between the offender and the
victim when the physical harm was committed.
No.

by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during
was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
no application to the petitioner.
For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
commenced after March 15, 2003.
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, for purpose of remarriage.
2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is
prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.

90. Nial v. Bayadog G.R. No. 133778 / Mar. 14, 2000 328 SCRA
122 MAI

Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September

26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
wit:
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners
Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Familythat petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
Code prior to March 15, 2003.
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
in Nial v. Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition. The lower court ruled
of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their
that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time
distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and
and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far
as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
Issue: W/N the petitioners should have filed an action to declare
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
for annulment of marriage.
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering
such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent Held: No. The two marriages involved herein having been

solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the

nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.5 A valid
not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or
which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
lifetime commitment." 13
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void
provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, annulment are legitimate.
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to
persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
exempt them from that requirement.
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5- material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
year period should be the years immediately before the day of the parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. There should be no non-existent by the courts."
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Having
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family
determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage 91. Carlos v. Sandoval G.R. No. 179922 / Dec. 16, 2008 574
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file SCRA 116 - JOYCE B
an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of

the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in

Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what
is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code
is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first
92. Morigo v. People G.R. No. 145226 / Feb. 06, 2004 422 SCRA marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
376 - JOYCE D
bigamy case.
11. Arts. 40 (35 (4) & 41, FC; Art. 349 RPC; Civil & Criminal
Bigamy; Art. 83, NCC;

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts

decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15
allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith. On
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack
of merit.
period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to
petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia HELD: NO.
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy
thus:
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted the offender has been legally married;
by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17,
1992.
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha declared presumptively dead;
Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for
among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with the existence of the first.
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with
6
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date
motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
reconsideration by the prosecution.
the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the
eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal
RTC of Bohol ruled that accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho was guilty was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy. Following
6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a
valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused
Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
10
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
exempt him from the consequences thereof.
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
On October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime
void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
executory.
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
Appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 and stressed that In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was

performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and

Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance
to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an HELD:
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
NO. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
marriage to private complainant had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage,
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage
of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
academic.
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
93. Jarillo v. People G.R. No.164435 / Sept. 29, 2009 601 SCRA Without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
236 - JILE
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for
all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the
time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this
legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
FACTS:
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag. charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again
celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev.
Angel Resultay. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a
94. Tenebro v. CA G.R. No. 150758 / Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA
subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy on
November 26, 1979. On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel 272 ILAO
Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila.
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro and Hilda Villareyes were allegedly
married on November 10, 1986. Veronico Tenebro then contracted
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No.
99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court another marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Verenico
and Leticia lived together until the latter part of 1991 when Verenico
of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy
admitted to Leticia his being married previously. Invoking this
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Parenthetically,
previous marriage, petitioner Veronico thereafter left the conjugal
accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, for
declaration of nullity of their marriage. The RTC ruled that Jarillo is dwelling which he shared with Leticia, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Hilda. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas before
Judge German Lee, Jr.
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975
marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was
allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the Learning this third marriage, Leticia asked Hilda about the truth of
celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Hildas marriage to Veronico which Hilda confirmed. Leticia
Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against Veronico.
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978.
Veronico argued that there was indeed no marriage between him
and Hilda as there was no marriage ceremony. He signed the
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In marriage contract merely to enable Hilda to get the allotment from
the meantime, the declaration of nullity was granted on the ground his office in connection with his work as a seaman. As to his
defense regarding the third marriage, Veronico argued
of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision
became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction in the crime of Bigamy.

that after said third marriage, he filed a petition for declaration of

nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity which the court granted. Veronico further explained that
the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity,
retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not Veronico is still liable for the crime of
Whether or not the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio bigamy considering that the second marriage was subsequently
on the ground of psychological incapacity cure the criminal liability declared null by the court.
of bigamy since he said marriage is not without legal consequences
HELD: Yes. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a 37 and 38 may contract marriage.
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these Antone v. Beronilla G.R. No.183824 / Dec. 08, 2010 637 SCRA
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold 615 KRISHA
otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus Teves v. People G.R. No. 188775 / Aug 24, 2011 656 SCRA 307 escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while JO
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
FACTS:
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between

Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the
MetC of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila. After the marriage, Thelma
left to work abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that
her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
(Edita). On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma,
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City,
Bulacan a complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of committing
that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
bigamy. He was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy.
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, RTC

Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated 4 May 2006 declaring the
marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that
Regarding his liability as to the crime of bigamy as to the second Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marriage, a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
On 15 August 2007, the trial court found Petitioner guilty of Bigamy.
regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.
He appealed to the CA was denied. His MR was likewise denied.
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
In this petition, Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
thus, there is no bigamy to speak of.
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
ISSUE:
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate WON petitioner is guilty of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) on the ground
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or that his previous marriage was declared null and void.
a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated
on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. There is no
cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage
that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal
liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting
the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct
character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the
special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly
done.

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November
1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He
contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10
December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second
marriage with Edita, his marriage with Thelma was legally
subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision declaring the
nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006
or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally,
the second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all
the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not
disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December
2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality
the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date
of the bigamous marriage.
the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer,

97.. Nollora v. People G.R. No.191425 / Sept. 7, 2011 657 SCRA Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such
330 - G.
president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant
to the Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then
going abroad.
Facts:
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit

14) and after receiving the

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his
B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
obligations as a Muslim.
("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of
Bigamy.
However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it
is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective
secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no
testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:
necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages
2-12).
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was Palusot ni Rowena
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999,
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a
they got married at the
victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that
she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat
[IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed.
Bulacan (Exhibit A). While
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December
working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has 8, 2001
another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she
left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a
4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private
victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that
complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat
second marriage with co-accused Rowena P.
Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed.
She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she
Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since December
declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had 8, 2001
entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that
because of what happened to her, her mother died and she
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second
almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in marriage to Geraldino was in
their residence in Saudi Arabia.

Evidence for the Defense

lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the

Quran.
The Issue

The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein

assailed Decision, is as follows:

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.

"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted

two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa
Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however,
claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, Ruling:
1992, even before the contracted the first marriage with the
private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and
Islam belief.
Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a
date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of
Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told his second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and
this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the
Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was
due to hatred having learned of his second marriage with
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage
Rowena P. Geraldino.
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is
the founder and president of

Marriage not in accordance with muslim law

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim
religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him
to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed
of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages,20
Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not
conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
or Presidential Decree No. 1083

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission

duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC
of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos." The first criminal case was for bigamy
for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia
Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid. The other
criminal case charged respondent with having committed bigamy
for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states

that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a nonMuslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this On 27 February 2008, the Commission found respondent to be
Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of
No. 209, in lieu of the
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to
prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed
Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nolloras religious
bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latters first
affiliation is not an issue here.
marriage was subsisting.
Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized
according to Muslim law. Thus,
regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.

Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission

recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity Commissioner. Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
of his marriage to Nollora may not impugn his marriage to
resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the
Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability;
administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we
Marriage Contracts. On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed their
Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a disbarment.
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
ISSUE:
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
98. Villatuya v. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622 / July 10, 2012 676
SCRA 37 ERLA

W/N the respondent is guilty of gross immorality to justify his

disbarment on the ground that he committed bigamous acts by
entering into marriages with two other women while his first
marriage is still subsisting
HELD:
Yes. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of
Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its

focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue
membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
On December 6, 2004, a complaint for disbarment was filed against the case.
respondent Atty. Bede Tabalingcos before the Office or the Bar
Confidant. The complainant Manuel G. Villatuya charged
We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from
respondent of gross immorality for marrying two other women while this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a
respondents first marriage was subsisting. The complaint was
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of
endorsed to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
public interest because it involves service to the public. The
(Commission). Complainant submitted a Certification dated 13
admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General- NSO continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second,
certifying that respondent contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15
lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas,
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September
1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. In his
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
defense, respondent denied the charges against him but did not complainant.1wphi1For the court to exercise its disciplinary
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
marriages with two other women.
convincing and satisfactory proof. In this case, complainant
FACTS:

submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent

entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was still
subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and
the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to
a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the
NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two
other marriages.
The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official
repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage
and death of a person. Having been issued by a government
agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary
weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this
case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to
rebut those documents.

RTC denied the motion. Respondent filed a Motion for

Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976,
i.e., before the Family Code. RTC entered new ruling quashing the
information. Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition.
Issue: W/N the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage
justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.

Held: No. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second

marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet
been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the
second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
What has been clearly established here is the fact that
respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
was still subsisting.
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

99. Montanez v. Cipriano G.R. No. 181089 / Oct 22, 2012 684
SCRA 315 MAI

Facts: On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores

(Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V.
Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent
filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for the
Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for

themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. As far back as 1995, in Atienza
v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
"Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain,
thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1wphi1. He cannot have
his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5 has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003. On claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license
of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against
and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
respondent which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no
See also Atienza v. Brillantes
more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on
January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy,
i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that 12. Arts. 41- 44, 49 FC; Art.83 (2) NCC;
since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy
had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13
arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated 100. Armas v. Calisterio G.R. No.136467/ Apr. 06, 2000 330
when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the SCRA 201 - JOYCE B
law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which
appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and
has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
FACTS:

On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving

and void by a competent court.
several parcels of land. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein
respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph
been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at
(2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the
Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the
later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done
court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong it partakes of the
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances to be
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court
here extant.
("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the
Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the
sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between
the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being
allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her
son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without
bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be
adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have
been settled.

A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not

necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases
are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage.

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered
first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the
valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior
latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than
spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four
eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, however, CA reversed the ruling is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
of the lower court.
summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Marietta to
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in
Teodererico was valid.
Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
HELD:

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent

Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent
Yes. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and
or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered
respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico
force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during
took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in death of James Bounds.
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is
Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

101. Rep. v. Nolasco G.R. No. 94053 / Mar. 17, 1993 220 SCRA
20 - JOYCE D

FACTS: On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code.

The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. On 15 January
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null Cathedral of San Jose.

Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent

received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet
Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately
asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in
Antique in November 1983.

Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the

Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that
there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes
as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also
stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the Family Code:
bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him.
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had
expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given in Article 391, Civil Code;
birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. Alicia Nolasco also
said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as
she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when
she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for
her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England.
She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing
person's present whereabouts.

That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10

The trial court granted Nolasco's petition.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a

search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a
"well-founded belief" that she is dead.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the

trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent
had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent
spouse had already died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead.
HELD: NO.
Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:

United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence

required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant
Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up
the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died.
The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to
ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation
allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet
Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When
he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's
departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went
to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her
there.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son,
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the requirements of the law
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code
sufficient.
emphasizes that.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the . . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature,
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil
Code, which it superseded, 7 the following crucial differences
emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to
arise has been shortened to four
(4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also,

to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property

relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the wellfounded belief required by law that his absent wife was already
dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

102. Valdez v. Republic G.R. No.180863 / Sept. 08, 2009 598

SCRA 646 - JILE

FACTS:

the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent

spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.

According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because
the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In
March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Three years passed It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to
without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985,
Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they
respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect. That Code.
was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear
any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio
Reyes on June 20, 1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilios
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
application for naturalization filed with the United States
Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007,
petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seekingfrom its performance, unless:
the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

The RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the wellgrounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was already
The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee,
that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
marriage. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. She argued spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect.
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
Petitioner further argued that she had acquired a vested right under competent court.
the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter provisions of the
Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of
the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of
absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was
not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the stricter
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had
acquired under the Civil Code.
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
Whether or not Art 41 of the FC has a retroactive application in this five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
case
be opened.
ISSUE:

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by

law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise.
Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year
HELD:
of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the
holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of
"well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner could not have been
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and conclusion. The Family Code itself states:

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it

does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary

proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts
petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
The Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the
Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a
presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of
time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for
marriage is legal and valid.
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
103. Rep. v. Tango G.R. No.161062 / Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560 which are the proper subject of an appeal.
- ILAO
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural
lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals
instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving
FACTS: On March 9, 1987, Ferventino Tangco and Maria Villarba due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the
were married4 in a civil rite before then Mayor Ignacio Bunye of
records of the case to the appellate court. By no means did the
Muntinlupa City. None of Marias relatives witnessed the ceremony Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the
as they were opposed to her relationship with Ferventino. The two RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and
had only spent a night together and had been intimate once when executory.
Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving
for the United States of America. Maria assured Ferventino,
however, that she will file a petition so he can live with her in the
USA. In the event that said petition is denied, she promised to
return to the Philippines to live with him. On March 13, 1987, Maria 104. Navarro v. Domogtoy A.M. No.MTJ-96-1088 / Jul. 19, 1996
and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
259 SCRA 129 KRISHA
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she
FACTS:
stopped responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he burned all
the letters Maria wrote him. He claims to have forgotten her
This is an administrative case filed by the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
address since Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find
Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro against MTC Judge
Maria. Upon inquiry from the latters uncle, Antonio Ledesma, in
Hernando Domagtoy. Navarro contends that on two occasions
Las Pias, Ferventino learned that even Marias relatives were
unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited the assistance of a Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
friend in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no avail. and ignorance of the law, to wit:
Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia in Los
Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma On September 27, 1994, Respondent solemnized the wedding
though, their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
years went by without any news of Maria.
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a petition dated he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
October 1, 2001 before the regional trial court for the declaration of Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction
presumptive death of Maria within the contemplation of Article 41 of on October 27, 1994.
the Family Code. As there is no opposition, the petition was
granted. The Office of the Solicitor General appealed the case. On In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks
appeal,the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage
as the OSG did not dispute the adequacy of Ferventinos basis to between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife,
engender a well-founded belief that Maria is dead.
and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals should give due
course in the first place to the appeal of the Solicitor General
considering that declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding.
HELD: No. In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title
reads:

issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the

fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and
del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family
Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;"
and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court the marriage solemnize by a

person who exceeded or is without authority is considered void.

compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the

municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent
judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been principles of civil law.
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
HELD:
(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the 105. Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino G.R. No. 160258 / Jan. 19, 2005
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary 449 SCRA 57 JO
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect FACTS:
of reappearance of the absent spouse.
On June 12, 1987, Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino (Gloria)
The law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well- and her husband were married. Out of this marriage, she begot
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
three (3) children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima.
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Before their marriage, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a
Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being unable to
engage in any gainful work. Because of her husbands violent
is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to
provisions of law.
go back to her parents together with her 3 children. In order to
support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
On August 14, 2000, 9 years after she left her husband, Gloria filed
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
a verified petition with the RTC at San Mateo, Rizal under the rules
on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. She alleged
(2)
that she has absolutely no news about him and that she believes
that he is already dead. She seeks the Court declaration that her
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage
husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage.
ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and
8 of the Family Code, thus:
Court declared the presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino,
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family Code but subject to all
restrictions and conditions provided therein.
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under

the provisions of Article 247 of the Family Code, the SolGen filed a
Notice of Appeal with the CA but was denied.

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers ISSUE:

the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may WON CA has acquired jurisdiction to review a judgment which by
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on express provision of law, is immediately final and executory.
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29
of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer
HELD:
in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.

No. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that The judgment of
the court shall be immediately final and executor.

The elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of

the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for
of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
cases covered by these rules, to wit:
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non- requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided

in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end,
RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal
outright on that ground.
Although the result of the Court of Appeals denial of the appeal
would apparently be the same, there is a big difference between
having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is
immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal for
lack of merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately
ask for the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in the RTC, whereas,
in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to this Court on
petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until
this Court makes the final pronouncement.

Immediately executory na daw sabi ni Yolanda:

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA,
presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the
Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.

106. Rep. v. Granada G.R. No. 187512/ June 13, 2012 672 SCRA Issues:
432 - G.
1.WON, a judgment in a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under article 41 of the FC is immediately final and executor
Facts:
and, thus not appealable.
Nagkakilala si Yolanda at si Cyrus sa electronics company at
sa kaduluhan ay nagpakasal sila.

2.Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the

Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of
the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented

In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met

Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an
electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. Ruling:
The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March
1993.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Naglakbay sa abroad ang asawa ni Yolanda

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed

down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed
that from that time, she had not received any communication from
her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have

Cyrus declared presumptively dead.
Nag-grant naman ng rtc
RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)

Argument ng OSG:
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that
Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus
failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent

spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under
Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as
provided for" under the Family Code.
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules
in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided
in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

Petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a

diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives
x x xx x xx x x
were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her
executory.
husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought
information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
immediately final and executory.
absentee is dead; and
Pero pwede pa certiorari

That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary

proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
Ruling on the second issue:

absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse.

As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as
follows:

No no d na pwedeng ireverse yung ruling:

That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code;

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to

prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already
dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively
dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed

Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.