CASES

Property
Bicerra vs Teneza ( 6 SCRA 649)
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil Code).
This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once
the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases. It
should be noted that the complaint here is for recovery of damages. This is the only positive relief prayed for by appellants. To be
sure, they also asked that they be declared owners of the dismantled house and/or of the materials. However, such declaration in no
wise constitutes the relief itself which if granted by final judgment could be enforceable by execution, but is only incidental to the
real cause of action to recover damages.

PUNSALAN, JR. V. VDA. DE LACSAMANA (121 SCRA 331),

The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property as provided in article 415(l) of the Civil Code. 6
Buildings are always immovable under the Code. 7 A building treated separately from the land on which it stood is immovable
property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it
stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property. 8
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for
annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the
law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an
action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and
nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action. 9

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS (153 SCRA 390)

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land
belonging to another. The answer is in the affirmative. In the enumeration of properties under Article 415 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, this Court ruled that, "it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of
law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property." (Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr., et al., L-10817-18, Feb. 28, 1958;
Associated Inc. and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Iya, et al., L-10837-38, May 30,1958). Thus, while it is true that a mortgage of land
necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be
mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building
would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land (Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery
Co., 37 Phil. 644). In the same manner, this Court has also established that possessory rights over said properties before title is
vested on the grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage (Vda. de Bautista vs. Marcos, 3 SCRA 438
[1961]).

Ladera v. Hodges (G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952)

The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following: lands, buildings, roads and
constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one
who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is
built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.