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parties to said contract, the same cannot and does not

PIANSAY v DAVID
bind third persons, who are not parties to the
As it may be true that the parties who agreed to attach the
aforementioned contract or their privies. As a consequence,
house in a chattel mortgage may be bound thereto under the
the sale of the house in question in the proceedings for the
doctrine of estoppel, the same does not bind third persons.
extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and
void insofar as defendant Mangubat is concerned, and did not
FACTS:
confer upon Mrs. Uy Kim, as buyer in said sale, any dominical
Conrado S. David received a loan of P3,000 with interest at
right in and to said house, so that she could not have
12% per annum from Claudia B. Vda. de Uy Kim, one of the
transmitted to her assignee, plaintiff Piansay any such right
plaintiffs, and to secure the payment of the same, Conrado S.
as against defendant Mangubat. In short plaintiffs have no
David executed a chattel mortgage on a house situated at
cause of action against the defendants herein.
1259 Sande Street, Tondo, Manila. The mortgage was
foreclosed and was sold to Kim to satisfy the debt. 2 years
SIBAL v VALDEZ
later after the foreclosure, the house was sold by Kim to
Marcos Magubat. The latter then filed to collect the loan
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the
from David and to declare the sale issued by Kim in favour of
Piansay null and void. (It appears that Kim sold the house to
purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products"
two people, namely Piansay and Magubat)
have the nature of personal property.
The trial court approved of the collection of the loan from
David but dismissed the complaint regarding the questioned
sale between Kim and Piansay, declaring the latter as rightful
owner of the house and awarding damages to him.
CA reversed the decision making David the rightful owner and
allowing him and his co-defendant, Mangubat, to levy the
house.
Now Petitioners are trying to release the said property from
the aforementioned levy by claiming that Piansay is the
rightful owner of the house.
ISSUES: W/N the sale between Kim and Piansay was valid?
RULING:
Since it is a rule in our law that buildings and constructions
are regarded as mere accesories to the land (following the
Roman maxim omne quod solo inaedificatur solo credit) it is
logical that said accessories should partaked of the nature of
the principal thing, which is the land forming, as they do, but
a single object (res) with it in contemplation of law.
A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel
mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been
declared null and void with respect to said real properties
acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale
Thus, Mrs. Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the alleged
chattel mortgage constituted in her favor, because it was in
reality a mere contract of an unsecured loan. It follows that
the Sheriff was not authorized to sell the house as a result of
the foreclosure of such chattel mortgage. And as Mrs. Uy Kim
could not have acquired the house when the Sheriff sold it at
public auction, she could not, in the same token, it validly to
Salvador Piansay. Conceding that the contract of sale
between Mrs. Uy Kim and Salvador Piansay was of no effect,
we cannot nevertheless set it aside upon instance of
Mangubat because, as the court below opined, he is not a
party thereto nor has he any interest in the subject matter
therein, as it was never sold or mortgaged to him
At any rate, regardless of the validity of a contract
constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between the

FACTS:
(this case has a lot of confusing facts, just read the original
if this digest fails to compress everything)
The Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a
writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J.
Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants
on seven parcels of land. Included also in those attached
were real properties wherein 8mout of the 11 parcels of land,
house and camarin which was first acquired by Macondray &
Co and then later on bought by Valdez in an auction.
First Cause for petitioner: That Within one year from the date
of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem
said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the
amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the
interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may
have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest
corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the
money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.
Second Cause for petitioner: That Valdez was trying to
harvest palay from four out of seven parcels of land.
Petitioner filed for preliminary injunction to stop defendant
from 1) distributing the lands 2) harvesting and selling the
sugar canes, and 3) harvesting and selling the palay. The writ
was issued which prevented defendant from planting and
harvesting
the
lands.
Defendant later appealed claiming that he was the owner of
many of the alleged land thus he also owns the crops of it.
The court awarded the defendant 9,439.08 because the
petitioner unduly denied the defendant to plant in his land
thus preventing him to profit thereto.
ISSUE: Whether the sugar cane is personal o real property?
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P2,500 on January 4, 1915. The sale was registered

(The relevance of the issue is with regards to the sugar cane
in the Bureau of Customs over two months later on
of the Petitioner which came from the land that now belongs
March 17, 1915.
to the defendant)

Shorty after the sale to Rivera, a suit was brought

against Sy Qui to enforce payment of a certain sum
RULING:
of money. Valentina was placed at a public auction
It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification
and was purchased by Sy Quis creditor, Fausto
of real property as "ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of
Rubiso. He bought the vessel for P55.45. The sale
article 334 of the Civil Code. Said paragraph 2 of article 334
was registered in the Office of the Collector of
enumerates as real property the following: Trees, plants, and
Customs on January 27, 1915 and in the commercial
ungathered products, while they are annexed to the land or
registry on March 14, 1925.
form an integral part of any immovable property." That
article, however, has received in recent years an
The first buyer, Florentino Rivera, contends that he had lost
interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, which
the ship when it got stranded somewhere in Batangas. He
holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be
claims that Rubiso took possession of the vessel without his
considered as personal property.
knowledge or consent. Rivera seeks to be indemnified for the
profits he could have collected from the vessels voyages had
In some cases "standing crops" may be considered and dealt
Rivera not taken it. But, does he have the right to the vessel?
with as personal property. In the case of Lumber Co. vs.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the merchant vessel-Sheriff and Tax Collector (106 La., 418) the Supreme Court
Rivera or Rubiso?
said: "True, by article 465 of the Civil Code it is provided that
'standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees
RULING:
before they are cut down . . . are considered as part of the
Rubiso. It is true that the sale to Rivera had taken place prior
land to which they are attached, but the immovability
to the public auction where Rubiso bought the vessel, but the
provided for is only one in abstracto and without reference to
same was entered in the customs registry only on March 17,
rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of
1915. Rubiso, however, had acted more swiftly by registering
the property to which the crop is attached. . . . The
the property much earlier in the Office of the Collector
existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by
Customs and in the commercial registry in the same month.
anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering
Although the sale to Rivera had taken place first, the
the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein. Our
registration made by Rubiso was made earlier.
jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of the
growing crop."
Rubiso did the smart thing by registering the property at the
commercial registry. Pursuant to Article 573 of the Code of
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the
Commerce, the acquisition of a vessel must be registered at
purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products"
the commercial registry in order to bind third parties. Such
have the nature of personal property.
registration is necessary and indispensible in order that the
purchasers rights may be maintained against a claim filed by
SC lowered the award for damages to the defendant to
third persons.
8,900.80 by acknowledging the fact that some of the sugar
canes were owned by the petitioner and by reducing the
With respect to the rights of two purchasers, whichever of
calculated expected yield or profit that defendant would
them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one
have made if petitioner did not judicially prevent him from
entitled to enjoy the protection of the law. By first
planting and harvesting his lands.
registration, he becomes the absolute owner of the boat and
is freed from all encumbrances and claims by strangers.
RUBISO AND GELITO V. RIVERA
FACTS:
Gelito & Co. was owned by Bonifacio Gelito and Chinaman Sy
Qui. One of the properties of the company was a pilot
ship/merchant vessel called Valentina, whose ownership is at
question here.
A series of sales had taken place:

First, Gelito had sold is 2/3 share to Chinaman Sy

Qui.

When Sy Qui acquired full ownership of the

company, he sold Valentina to Florentino Rivera for

PHIL. REFINING COMPANY V. JARQUE

FACTS:
Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque
executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and
Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and
encumbrances of the vessels for the port of Cebu and each
was denominated a chattel mortgage.
The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good
faith. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque and Ramon
Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the
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Chattel Mortgage Registry on May 12, 1932, within the period

of 30 days prior to the foreclosure/institution of the
The right of ownership of electrical current was secured by
insolvency proceedings.
Art 517 and 518 of the Penal Code which applies to gas.
Analogically, electricity can be considered as gas which can
Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying
be stolen. However, the true test of what constitutes the
that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor. This
proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is
was granted and Jarques properties were then assigned to
corporeal or incorporeal, but whether is is capable of
Curaminas
appropriation by another other than the owner. It is a
valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought
A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to
under the control of science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with
order the foreclosure of the mortgages, and instead, ruled
intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used
that they were defective because they did not have affidavits
of good faith.
jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This
constitutes larceny.
ISSUE:
US V. TAMBUNTING
1) Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are
governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law
FACTS:
2) W/n an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce a
The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the
chattel mortgage on a vessel
transmission of gas in a house at Evangelista. After the
RULING:
original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the
Yes, Yes. Personal property includes vessels. They are
services discontinued.
subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage
includes an affidavit of good faith. The absence of such
affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against creditors and
subsequent encumbrances. The judge was correct.

Later Mr Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and

spliced the tubing to leech free gas for household use. Alas,
the crime was discovered by the gas company. The
prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court

Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel

mortgages. The only difference between a chattel mortgage
of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that
the first must be noted in the registry of the register of
deeds.

ISSUE: Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.

US V CARLOS
FACTS:
Mr Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909
pesos from Meralco. The court issued warrant for arrest. Mr.
Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that
what he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel
further asserted that the crime of larceny applied only to
tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into
possession and spirited away.
Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently
sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos contested
saying that electrical energy cant be stolen (how can one
steal an incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such
grounds and the court of first instance affirmed the decision.
The case reached the supreme court.

HELD:
Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious
appropriation. It is a valuable merchandise that can be
bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of
being siphoned from a larger mass and transported from
place to place. Articles 517 and 518 sets parameters for the
theft of gas and it is a valid ordinance.
INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER V.
RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26 September 1922)
FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was
mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on 10 March 1919, and
registered in due time in the registry of property, while
another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22
September 1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in
the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of
Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of
Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion
Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.

ISSUE: Whether or not larceny can be committed against an

intangible such as electricity.

ISSUE:
(in relation to our subject) W/N half-interest over a business
is a movable property

HELD:
Yes, larceny of incorporeal objects is possible.

RULING: Yes.
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1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage

Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public
With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
which is one-half interest in the business, such
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands
interest is a personal property capable of
of the public domain except by lease
appropriation and not included in the enumeration
of real properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code,
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
OTHER ISSUES:
2.
Description
of
mortgage
property
sufficient
The description contained in the document is sufficient. The
law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the
mortgaged property shall be such as to enable the parties to
the mortgage, or any other person, after reasonable inquiry
and investigation, to identify the same. In the case at bar,
his half interest in the drug business known as Antigua
Botica Ramirez, located at Calle Real Nos. 123 and 125,
District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient.
3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to
mortgage
property
in
possession
Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are
not applicable as neither the debtor, nor himself, is in
possession of the property mortgaged, which is, and since the
registration of the mortgage has been, legally in possession of
the surety company
4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon
property - In no way can the mortgage executed be given
effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as
there was a mere stipulation about personal security during
said date, but not a mortgage upon property, and much less
upon the property in question.
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
FACTS: (Historical Background: remember Consti 2)
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay
were being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public
Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation.)
Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA,
several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay
were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed
lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain

may lease these lands to private corporations but may not

sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to
law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are
inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
REPUBLIC V. CA
Private lands invaded by the action of the sea reverts to
public domain and remains to be of such character until
declared otherwise by the government.
FACTS
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel
of land, which was approved and issued an original certificate
of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate
that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5
years from the date of the issuance of the patent.
The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato
had encumbered the land and upon finding that the subject
land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide,
filed a complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion of
the parcel of land to the public domain.
RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
W/N respondent violated the free patent condition
prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-year period?
W/N the land is of public domain?
HELD
Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides thatlands acquired
under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of
approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grantThe
contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato
constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of
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accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the

the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use of
Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of Lands,
the property.
Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of
the public domain. The TC dismissed the application holding
Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is
that said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea moved
case at bar.
towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded
property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of
ISSUE: W/N the land forms part of the public domain
the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court
annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
HELD: YES
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore
The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the
land. In another case, the Court voided the registration
present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
decree of a trial court and held that said court had no
banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay,
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or
which is held to be part of the sea
entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land
Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands
should therefor be returned to the public domain.
added to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea
form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer
LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive
and the legislative departments have the authority and the
FACTS
power to make the declaration that any said land is no longer
Petitioner Ramon Lanzar filed an application for registration
necessary for public use. Until such declaration is made by
of title to a parcel of land, alleging that he is the owner in
said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public
fee simple of the lad in question and asking that the title
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
thereto be registered in his name.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition on the ground that
the land is a foreshore which forms a part of public domain.
RTC decided in favor of Lanzar holding that the property in
question has been possessed by the applicant publicly,
continuously and adversely for more that 30 years.
CA reversed, holding that the land, being an accretion formed
by the action of sea, is property of public domain and not
susceptible of appropriation.
ISSUE: W/N the title to the land may be registered on the
basis of adverse possession for over 30 years?
HELD:
No. The shores and lands reclaimed from the sea, while they
continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant whatever
has been made of any portion of them to private persons,
remain part of the public domain and are of public uses, and,
until they are converted to patrimonial property of the State,
such lands, thrown up by the action of the sea, and the
shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of prescription,
inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not
subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the
provisions of article 1936 of the civil code.
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO
108 SCRA 335

VILLARICO V. COURT OF APPEALS 309 SCRA 193

FACTS
Sps. Teofilo and Maxima Villarico, filed an application for
confirmation of the title over a parcel of land which they
allege they bought from Teofilos father. Said application was
opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said
land forms part of the public domain as it is within the
unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not available for
private appropriation. The TC dismissed the case since the
property forms part of the public domain therefore the
certificate of title is void. The CA affirmed the findings of the
TC, thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: W/N the property still forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES
The SC held that both the TC and the appellate court
correctly adjudged the area to be within the unclassified
forest zone therefore incapable of private appropriation.
There has been no showing that a declassification has been
made declaring the said lands as disposable or alienable and
the spouses have not showed evidence to lead to the court to
rule otherwise.
Thus, if the land in question still forms part of the public
forest, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert
it into private property as it is beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens System.

FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of
land (mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of
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government of Caloocan in accordance with the decision of

VILLANUEVA v. CASTAEDA, JR.
the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in
the streets of Caloocan
FACTS
Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land
January 5, 1979 Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an
owned by the municipal government. They were allowed to
ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea
lease the said land through a municipal council resolution in
markets subject to several conditions
1961
The municipal government demolished the the stalls and
subsequently issued a new resolution revoking the right
previously granted to the vendor. Said resolution indicated
that the said area will be a parking space for the town plaza
Petitioners brought an action against the municipal
government alleging that they have the right to use the said
lang because the resolution allowing them to use the area
constitutes a contract between them (vendors) and the
municipal government
CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be
evicted from the area. But such eviction was not enforced
and the number of stall owners even grew.
After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish
the stalls
ISSUE:
1.

2.
HELD:
1.

2.

3.

W/N the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual

rights to the stall owners making them lawful lessees
of the land
W/N the said area are dedicated for public use

There was no dispute that the land occupied by the

petitioners was previously used as a town plaza and
being such it is considered as beyond the commerce
of man and cannot be the subject of lease or any
contractual undertaking. The petitioners had no
right in the first place to occupy the disputed
premises.
The proliferation of the stalls caused several
repercussions to the area such as

the makeshift and flammable materials has

made the area susceptible of fire
endangering public safety

said stalls have obstructed the way going to

the real public market

the filthy conditions of the stalls has

aggravated health and sanitation problems

the area has contributed to the obstruction

of the flow of traffic
Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that
the land is not for public use), the petitioners must
yield to the police power exercised by the municipal
government. It is a well settled rule that any valid
contract may be cancelled if it causes danger to the
public.

DACANAY v. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city

1987 Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea

markets and the stallowners filed a case against such action
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in
questions (Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public
dominion, hence outside the commerce of man
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city
administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the
action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the
streets as is
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition
for mandamus to remove the stalls in their street
ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market
stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of
Metropolitan Manila Commission?
HELD: NO
1. A public street is property for public use hence
outside the commerce of man. Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease
or other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for
the purpose they were intended to serve such as for
traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change
the nature of the public street because it is going to
be contrary to the general law
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE V. BERCILLES
(online digest, Consti I Medina case)
FACTS
The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a
portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On 23
September 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution
2193 (3 October 1968), declared the terminal portion of M.
Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the
same not being included in the City Development Plan.
Subsequently, on 19 December 1968, the City Council of Cebu
passed Resolution 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to
sell the land through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the
lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest
bidder and on 3 March 1969, the City of Cebu, through the
Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the
petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.
By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the
petitioner filed an application with the CFI Cebu to have its
title to the land registered. On 26 June 1974, the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the
application on the ground that the property sought to be
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registered being a public road intended for public use is

residential lot). The properties and the capital goods and
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside
services procured from the Japanese government for national
the commerce of man. After hearing the parties, on 11
development projects are part of the indemnification to the
October 1914 the trial court issued an order dismissing the
Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their
petitioner's application for registration of title. Hence, the
suffering during World War II. The Reparations Agreement
instant petition for review.
provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be
payable in 20 years in accordance with annual schedules of
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the lower court,
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
and the ordered said court to proceed with the hearing of the
governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). RA 1789,
petitioner's application for registration of title.
the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and development
ISSUE: w/n the sale is valid
loans; those which belong to the government and which may
be availed of by private entities. The Roppongi property was
RULING: Yes it is.
acquired from the Japanese government under the Second
1. City is empowered to close city road or street and
Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government
withdraw
the
same
from
public
use.
Sector", through Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June
Section 31 of the Revised Charter of Cebu City (Legislative
1958. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building
Powers) provides that any provision of law and executive
"for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy." As intended, it
order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
have the following legislative powers xxx to close any city
was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the
road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square.
Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used
our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi
or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
property has remained undeveloped since that time.
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." It is
undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to
During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was
close a city road or street.
made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J.
Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation,
2. Discretion of the city council cannot ordinarily be
a Japanese firm, in exchange of the construction of 2
interfered with by the court. The city council is the
buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the
authority competent to determine whether or not a certain
renovation of the Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
property is still necessary for public use. The power to vacate
Government did not act favorably to said proposal, but
a street or alley is discretionary, and the discretion will not
instead, on 11 August 1986, President Aquino created a
ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts,
committee to study the disposition or utilization of Philippine
absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion.
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3, and
Faithfulness to the public trust will he presumed. So the fact
AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO 296
that some private interests may be served incidentally will
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
not invalidate the vacation ordinance.
reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale,
lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including
the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first
3. Street withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial
"Whereas" clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the
property; Subsequent sale valid. When a portion of the city
Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with
street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn
great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
starting with the Roppongi lot.
object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by
Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of public dominion,
Two petitions for prohibition were filed seeking to enjoin
when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
respondents, their representatives and agents from
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m.
Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear
of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
and unequivocal terms, states that "property thus withdrawn
scheduled on 21 February 1990; the temporary restaining
from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
order of which was granted by the court on 20 February 1990.
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City
In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamus was prayed for to
may be lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of
compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the
the property in question from public use and its subsequent
basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the
sale to the petitioner is valid.
Roppongi property inspite of strong public opposition and to
explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the
LAUREL v. GARCIA (online digest, Consti I Medina case)
participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding
process.
FACTS
The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in
After multiple motions for extension to file comment by the
Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
respondents, the Supreme Court resolved to decide the 2
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May
cases; thereby granting the petitions and enjoining the
1956, the other lots being the Nampeidai Property (site of
respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi
Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property
property in Tokyo, Japan. The Court also made permanent
(Commercial lot used as warehouse and parking lot of
the 20 February 1990 temporary restaining order.
consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant
7

PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(ATTY.AMPIL)2NDweek|BeduralBlezaCimagalaDelosSantosImperialSiaPlazo2D2012|

and conditions of government properties in Japan were

merely directives for investigation but did not in any way
ISSUE: Can the Roponggi property be sold?
signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Further
EO 296 does not declare that the properties lost their public
HELD: NO.
character, but merely intends to make the properties
1. Roponggi lot is a property of public dominion
available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service
sale, lease or other disposition.
is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
5. RA 6657 does not authorize the disposition of Roppongi
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and
property as it is outside the commerce of man; EO 296
the Japanese government, that these were assigned to the
amended nationality provision for the sale of procurements
government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was
for the private sector, not the procurements for the
specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to
government (the latter which includes Roppongi property)
house the Philippine Embassy. There can be no doubt that it
is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
EO 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the
property has become patrimonial; which respondents have
Roppongi and the three other properties were earlier
failed to show.
converted into alienable real properties. RA 1789
differentiates the procurements for the government sector
2. Property of public dominion outside the commerce of
and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, RA 1789). Only the
man
private sector properties can be sold to end-users who must
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside
be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this
the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership
nationality provision which was amended by EO 296. Further,
is a special collective ownership for general use and
Section 63 (c) of RA 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective
one of the sources of funds for its implementation, the
needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to
proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the
serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be
Roppongi property from being classified as one of public
the object of appropriation.
dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad.
Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and
3.
Pertinent
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code
not to those reserved for public use or service. RA 6657,
therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to
Article 419 provides that property is either of public
sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 provides that
sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed)
property of public dominion includes (1) those intended for
the Agrarian Reform Fund created under EO 299. Obviously
public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
tapped as a source of funds.
and others of similar character; (2) those which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. Article 421 provides that all other property of the
State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property." In the present case, the
Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of
Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service.
4. Conversion to patrimonial property happen if property is
withdrawn from public use; Abandonment must be certain
and positive act based on correct legal premises
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership "until there
is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such. An abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and
to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from
the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable
not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will
but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act
based on correct legal premises. In the present case, the
recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status
8