G.R. No.

170701

January 22, 2014

RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court,
Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant
other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and
ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by
a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court
to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence,
to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.

Facts
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition2 for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail,
for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband,
petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-05 and raffledoff to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from
petitioners abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the
children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that
she was actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that
she was threatened to be deprived of her and her childrens financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City.
They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse
Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In
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her Affidavit attached to the petition, respondent claimed, among others, that: there
was a time when petitioner went to her room and cocked his gun and pointed the
barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the
legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there
was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her
youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying,
petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt
unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the
house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner
got furious and threatened her of withholding his financial support and even held
her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while
she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and forcibly
took the children and refused to give them back to her.
Issue/s
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals with due respect seriously
erred in holding and finding in a manner contrary to established rules and
jurisprudence that public respondent committed no grave abuse of
discretion when the latter issued the Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
dated 23 May 2005 without observing due process of law and
considerations of justice and basic human rights.
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in refusing to rule on the
constitutionality of the provisions of RA 9262 has decided the case in a
manner not in accord with established laws and jurisprudence considering
that contrary to its findings the constitutionality of the said law is the lis
mota of the case.
Ruling
Petition is denied.

G.R. NO. 168852, September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
v. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general
provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation
of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

Facts
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra
Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C.
Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
Issue/s
Whether or not respondents-spouses Perfecto & Juanita, parents-in-law of
Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective
order, in accordance with Republic Act No. 9262, Otherwise Known As The
"Anti-Violence Against Women And Their Children Act Of 2004".

Ruling
Petition is granted.

G.R. No. 136921

April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner

vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the
use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting
form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases').
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."

Facts
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime
in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a
whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple
did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a
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seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month
after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in
Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where
they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of
the year that they could stay together - when respondent was on vacation. The
union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan,
and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" to perform his marital
covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker,
staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the
morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent
would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal
abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear
his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and
she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did
not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted
petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered
black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City
General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed
against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and
stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner
sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of
her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.

Issue/s

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its reversal of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis
of psychological incapacity.

Ruling
Petition is denied.
G.R. No. 146053

April 30, 2008

DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the

law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. The act of petitioner
of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless
inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a
case of simple misconduct.
Facts of the Case
Bacsin is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan,
Mambajao, Camiguin Province. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father
of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his
office to do an errand. Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the
cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his table. He then asked
her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and
fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times, and that
she felt afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have
witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen just as
AAA related it.
Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated
February 12, 1996 by Regional Director Vivencio N. Muego, Jr. of the CSC.

In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened

by accident, just as he was handing AAA a lesson book. He further stated that
the incident happened in about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his
office without any complaint.
Issue/s
1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment,
grave misconduct, which was different from or an offense not alleged in
the formal charge filed against him at the inception of the administrative
case.
2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and
misconduct as charged by complainant, whether or not the penalty of
dismissal from the service imposed by the Civil Service Commission and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23) of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and applicable rulings.
3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the
offense of Grave Misconduct; a greater offense.

Ruling
The petition is denied.
We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.
Petitioners second argument need not be discussed further, as he was
rightly found guilty of grave misconduct.
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims.

G.R. No. 123737 May 28, 1999

CARLOS C. LIBRES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION,
OSMUNDO G. WAGA, JR., ANTONIE D. SEVA, PETER J. LOQUILLANO, SATURNINO P.
MEJORADA and ISIDRO F. HYNSON, JR., respondent.

Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of
the act complained of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when
petitioner's case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when their
application will favor the accused. Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC
report and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally as
understood by the public.
Facts
Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial
position with National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager. On 3 August
1993 he received a Notice of Investigation from Assistant Vice president Isidro F.
Hynson Jr., his immediate superior, requesting him to submit a written explanation
relative to the charge of sexual harassment made by Susan D. Capiral, Hynson's
secretary, allegedly committed by Libres sometime in May 1992, and subsequently
to answer clarificatory questions on the matter. The notice also warned him that
failure to file his written explanation would be construed as a waiver of his right to
be heard. On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying
the accusation against him and offering to submit himself for clarificatory
interrogation.
Subsequently, Hynson Jr. conducted an internal investigation to which Libres
and Capiral were invited to ventilate their respective sides of the issue. They readily
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responded. Thereafter, Hynson Jr. submitted his report to the Management

Evaluation Committee (MEC).
Issue/s
1. Whether or not his alleged action committed is sexual harassment as laid
down in the Section 3 of the law.
2. Whether or not he was given due process.

Ruling
The petition is denied.
No grave abuse of discretion having been committed by public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission in upholding the suspension of petitioner
Carlos G. Libres as justified and in accordance with due process.
Petitioner assails the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. 7877 to the
instant case. We note however that petitioner never raised the applicability of the
law in his appeal to the NLRC nor in his motion for reconsideration.
On the question of due process, we find that the requirements thereof were
sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not always
and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1424

ROMULO G. MADREDIJO, MAMERTO J. CAUBE, MATILDE D. COROLLO, NOLIBELLE H.
PLAZA, MA. DESORA L. CASTONES, EDILBERTA C. SIANO, RICARDO B. QUISADO,
NORBERTO J. CAUBE, BILLY M. NOMBRADO, VIVIAN M. MONTANES, JONATHAN
MAMADO, NENA LIGUID, IMELDA B. CONATO, and VIOLETA HIPE, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE LEANDRO T. LOYAO JR., Regional Trial court of Maasin, Southern Leyte,
respondent.

Indeed, a judge more than of any other person ought to behave, in both the
performance of official duties and in private life, in a manner that is above
suspicion. We reiterate that [t]he judiciary as a whole and its ability to dispense
justice are inevitably measured in terms of the public and private acts of judges x x
x.
It is essential therefore, if the judiciary is to engage and retain the respect
and confidence of our nation, that this Court insist that municipal judges and all
other judges live up to the high standards demanded by our case law and the Code
of Judicial Conduct and by our polity. We are aware that he has twice been a finalist
in the Awards for Judicial Excellence. Sadly, however, the foregoing disquisition
reveals the indelible stains on his judicial robe. He is no longer a worthy member of
the bench.

Facts
In three separate letter-complaints dated June 9, 1997, July 8, 1997, and
September 7, 1997, respectively, Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 24, was charged with (1) grave
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abuse of authority, (2) ignorance of the law, (3) violation of constitutional rights, (4)
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, (5) conduct unbecoming a
judicial officer, (6) sexual harassment and (7) vindictiveness and harassment.
The charge of sexual harassment, on the other hand, stemmed from the
allegations of Violeta Hipe that respondent had made sexual advances at her. Her
insistent refusal became prompted the judge to carp at her work. When her
situation became unbearable because of respondents actions, she asked for a
transfer to the RTC of Baybay, Leyte, where she is now stationed.

Issue/s
1. Whether or not Judge Loyao is guilty of the charges.

Ruling
Leandro T. Loyao is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

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