Consti Law I Review Notes (Montejo - 4

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
RIZADA, RESCI ANGELLI

JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

A. CONSTRUCTION
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
- a consti provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself.
- A provision which lays down only general principles (article 2) are NOT self-executing.
- Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a consti mandate, the
presumption is that all provisions of the consti are self-executing.
- National economy and patrimony: QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ARE PREFERRED.
- STATE ACTIONthe acts of a person distinct from the government are considered STATE
ACTION covered by the constitution (1) when the activity it engages is in a public function; (2)
when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action and (3) when the government has approved or authorized
the action.
DOMINO V. COMELEC
- The Constitution is not a document reserved only for scholarly disqualification by the most
eminent legal minds of the landits contents and words should be interpreted in the sense
understood by the ordinary men and women who place their lives on the line in its defense and
who pin their hopes for a better life on its fulfillment. [Domino vs. Commission on Elections, 310
SCRA 546(1999)]
PAMATONG V. COMELEC
- The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest
of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. [Pamatong
vs. Commission on Elections, 427 SCRA 96(2004)]
TONDO MEDICAL V. CA
- a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require
future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate
of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some
provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
- Examples of non-self-executing:
1. sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution
2. Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II;
3. Section 13 of Article XIII; and
4. Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.
5. Section 1 of Article XIII and
6. Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights.
These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other
constitutional provisions as non selfexecuting and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
constitutional provisions which are statements of principles and policies are mere directives
addressed to the executive and the legislative departmentsif unheeded, the remedy will not lie
with the courts but rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes.
SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME

-
The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II of the Constitution is limited in application
to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.The
prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective
operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in
existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. [Serrano vs.
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254(2009)]
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

- RESIDUAL POWERS;
- constitution is understood as providing for the LIMITATIONS OF state powers and NOT grant of
power.
KIDA V. SENATE
- president can appoint OICs based on his RESIDUAL POWERS; executive power to implement
and execute the law
- ra 10153 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
- synchronization is a recognized consti mandate. This can be gleaned from the transitory
provisions of the consti.
-
B.Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used
to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this
manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional
mandatessynchronization and regional autonomysuch that it is necessary to choose one
over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional
constructionut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole,81 and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the
primacy of one over the other is clear.8 [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270(2011)]
ARMM elections should be included among the term 'local election'. A basic rule in constitutional
construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common
use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails. [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA
270(2011)]
PRESIDENTS CERTIFICATION ON URGENCY OF RA 10153

o Presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also of
reading the bill on separate days.
o purpose of the rule dapat: (1) to inform legislators of matters they shall vote on and (2) to
give then notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process
RA9333 and RA 10153 DO NOT AMEND RA 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision
in the latter law; they merely filled the gap or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.
EVEN ASSUMING THEY AMENDED 9054, the supermajority voting required (2/3) has to be
struck down for giving 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
consti demands. (REMEMBER: under section 16 (2), article 6 of consti--'majority of each house
shall constitute a quorum to do business. as long as majority of the members of the house or
senate are present, these bodies have quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.)in
contrast, the provision in 9054 requiring 2/3 vote is HIGHER than what consti provides for
passage of bills and thereby SERVES TO RESTRAIN PLEANARY POWER OF CONGRESS to
amend/revise/repeal the laws passed.

- OPTIONS DAW TO SYNCHRONIZE ARMM ELECTIONS

(1) hold over
(2) call special elections and
(3) authorize president to appoint OICs
-
INTERIM MEASURES!i.e. those transitory measures involving transition from old constitution to
the new and for the introduction of new concepts; creation of LGUs
HOLDOVER OPTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Section 8, article 10 provides that the term of

office of elective local officials shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. since elective arrm officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by
the 3 year limit prescribed by the constitution. they cannot extend their term thru holdover.
principle: where the consti has itself made a determination or given its mandate--then such matter
should be respected. none of teh 3 branches can deviate from such only as teh consti itself may
allow.
further, to claim that the holdover is effectively another term mandated by congress-constitutionally infirm because congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. it cannot
act in way that would effectively extend the term of incumbents. congress CANNOT create a new
term and appoint the occupant. this is an act of appointment by congress and is thus an
UNCONSTI INTRUSION into the consti appointment power of present.
COMELEC HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER SPECIAL ELECTIONS

The power to fix date of elections is essentially LEGISLATIVE in nature.
when congress acted in postponing armm 2011 elections, it has made a POLICY DEICSION in
the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing armm elections. after it has so acted, neither executive nor judiciary
can act to the contrary by ordering special elections at the call of comelec. it cannot do so
because court has no power to declare act of congress null and void and to supplant the decision
of congress to mandate what it should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
further, comelec has NO POWER TO CALL FOR HOLDING of special elections unless pursuant
to a specific statutory grant.
COURT HAS NO POWER TO SHORTEN TERM OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

The power to fix term of office of elective officials (exercised only in case of barangay officials) is
given to congress as provided by the constitution. TERMS FIXED BY CONSTI cannot be
changed by mere statute. congress, court has NO AUTHORITY to fix terms of elective local
officials in the armm for less or more than the constitutionally mandated 3 years.
PRESIDENTS POWER TO APPOINT OICS

4 instances where president can appoint
o heads of exec departments, ambassadors, other public min and consuls, AFP
officers, other appointment are vested by consti
o all other officers whose apps not provided by law
o those whom PRESIDENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT
o lower in rank officers whose app the congress may by law vest in president alone.
pres authority to appoint OIC emanate from ra 101433 and so it falls on the 3rd group.
RA 10153 only provides for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in
the meanwhile PREVAIL. it is purely and simply an INTERIM MEASURE responding to the
adjustments that synchronization requires. synchronization may temporarily disrupt the election
process as well as community's choice of leaders but this will take place under a situation of
NECESSITY and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted

and used in the creation of LGU and the adjustments of sub provinces to the status of provinces.
besides, it is REASONABLE.
-
CA 588 and RAC of 1987 PROVIDES THT president is empowered to make temp apps in case
vacancy may occur. while this deal only with filling of vacancies in appointive positions, however,
in the ABSENCE OF ANY CONTRARY PROVISION in the LGC and in the interest of public
service, we see no cogent reason why procedure thus outlined by 2 laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case.
a vacancy creates an anomalous situation. By leaving the positions vacant for 21 months would
clearly cause DISRUPTIONS AND DELASY IN TEH DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES to the
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional govt, and in responding to critical
developments that may arise.
allowing president in the exercise of his consti-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is
a REASONABLE measure to take.
on construction of the law: provision must be construed not only to address problems of present
must also to address the uncertainties or vagaries of the future
TANADA V. ANGARA
- perfectionist provisions of the municipal statutes of all member states should give way to teh
globalization of trade. section 10 of art. 12 must be interpreted to mean not what is only required
in 1987 when it was enacted but also, it must be able to address the uncertainties of the future
(when it was raised in 2000)
JUDICIAL REVIEW
-
Based on SEPARATION OF POWERS, system of checks and balances and Interdependence

among government
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

- Supremacy of the constitution or JUDICIAL SUPREMEACY
- SC has the power or task to determine who between the EC or congress has power under the
constitution.
- when SC exercises judicial review, it is not acting supreme over the other branches but it is
performing a duty required of it under the constitution, it being the supreme authority in the land.
TAWANG MPC V. LA TRINIDAD
- The Supreme Courts power of review does not permit it to rewrite Presidential Decree (P.D.) 198
in a subsequent case and breathe life to its dead provisionsonly Congress can.Since the
Court, exercising itsConstitutional power of judicial review, has declared Section 47 of P.D. 198
void and unconstitutional, such section ceased to become law from the beginning
METROBANK V. TOBIAS
- under separation of powers, courts have no right to directly decide matters on which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to executive branch.
- Finding of the existence of probable cause is an EXECUTIVE FUNCTION which discretion
cannot be substituted by the court.
RE: COA OPINION
- By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful
service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during
their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. [Re: Coa Opinion on

the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 678 SCRA 1(2012)]
2 concepts: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY and CO-EQUALITY
PRESUMPTION--laws subjection of JR are presumed constitutional; double negative rule
COEQUALITY--Courts will initially refuse to exercise JR because it respects acts/exercise by co-equal
branches UNLESS 4 requisites are present
CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
4 REQUISITES: AREL
NOTE: NEVER ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW IF
THERE IS NO DECIDED CASE YET. discuss requisites and then DISMISS petition.
APPROPRIATE CASE OR CONTROVERSY, RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
- if there has been damage, prejudice, threatened violation or damage on the rights of the party
against an act or law
- SC no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief (but you can raise it on lower courts)
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
- -must not be raised too late as when issue already becomes moot or academic (court no need to
decide)
RAISED BY PROPER PART
1. CITIZEN SUIT--public right is violated or there is IMPENDING VIOLATION WHICH can be
addressed/assuaged by a favorable court decision or when court decides on the consti question;
injury must be PERSONAL, MATERIAL damage or injury/threatened violation.
2. TAXPAYERS SUIT--issue on constitutionality involves spending of public money (i.e. creation of
public office)
3. VOTERS SUIT--consti question involves right to suffrage
4. LEGISLATORS SUIT--member of congress has legal standing over consti questions involving a
law (i.e. as when law violates the constitution
5. TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE--requisites: (1) clear consti violation; (2) case involves
public expenditure and (3) there is NO OTHER PARTy to bring the consti question
6. INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY--present gen can bring case on public right violation
of the consti for benefit of future gen
RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC
- stock distribution was made instead of land distribution
- supervisory group, ambala and their leaders are real parties in interest;
- consti issue: not all the requirements are satisfied. while there is indeed an actual case, it was
only 14 years after approval of SDP that said plan and approving reso were sought revoked but
not by FARM or any of its members but by AMBALA. latter's petition did not question consti if ra
6657 sec 31. FARM only questioned it with SC WHEN ITS QUITE TOO LATE IN THE DAY. they

SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHTS and even accepted benefits without any complaint on alleged
unconstitutionality of section 31 upon which benefits were derived. the SC cannot now be goaded
into resolving a consti issue that FARM failed to assail after lapse of a long period of time.
court will not pass upon a question of consti unless it be properly raised and presented in an
appropriate case the 1st opportunity. FARM is remiss in belatedly questioning consti. the reqt that
consti question should be raised at earliest possible opp is WANTING.
further, the fact that it must be the VERY LIS MOTA--does NOT also obtain. the consti issue
tendered is NOT CRITICAL to the resolution of the case. the rule has been to avoid an issue
assailing consti of law. if some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without
touching consti of a law, such recourse is favored.
LIS MOTA--means that court will not pass upon question of unconsti if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as application of the statute or the general law. petitioner must show that case
cannot be legally resolved unless consti question raised is determined.
in this case, issues raised may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of ra 6657. the issue
is not that said section is invalid but rather it is the ALLEGED APPLICATION of said provision in the SDP
is FLAWED.
WHEN COURT RESOLVES CONSTI ISSUES OTHERWISE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
1. grave violation of consti
2. exceptional character of situation and paramount public interest is involved
3. consti issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guid bench, bar and public
4. case is capable of repetition yet evading review
CANDARI V. DONASCO
- NO actual case or controversy; AC means there is a justiciable issue reqd to be resolved by court
or + necessity of court resolution to afford parties relief based on law upon the issues raised. in
this case, there was already election by general membership. so no more issue.
RIPENESS/LOCUS STANDI
LAMP V. SEC OF DBM l
- RIPENESS: The possibility of consti violations in implementation of PDAF involves interplay of
legal rights susceptible of jud resolution. LAMP--has the right to recover pub funds misapplied by
members of congress. allegations of ILLEGAL EXPENDITURE OF PUB FUNDS reflect a
CONCRETE INJURY. this petition complains of ILLEGAL DISBURSEMENT OF PF derived from
taxation--definite, concrete , real or substantial controversy before the court
- LOCUS STANDI--rule: personal/substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained/will
sustain direct injury as result of its enforcement. ; TAXPAYERS--allowed to sue where pub funds
are illegally disbursed or pub money deflected to improper purpose or PF wasted thru
enforcement of an invalid/unconsti law. (i.e. PDAF SCAM)
- PARAMOUNT PUB INTEREST--ramification of issues re: unconsti spending of PDAF deserves
consideration of court
- ALLOWING DIRECT ALLOCATION AND RELEASE OF PDAF FUNDS TO CONGRESS based
on their own list of projects--NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION
- basis: PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY ACCORDED TO STATUTORY ACTS OF CONGRESS.
This rule can be overcome only by clearest showing of infraction of the constiution.
- in this case, there was no convincing proof that there were direct releases of funds to members of
congress who actually spend them accdg to their sole discretion. court cannot declare
unconstitutionality of the PDAF enforcement (at that time; with teh NAPOLES ISSUE now, i think
the legality of PDAF may be duly struck down!)
BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS

1. BUDGET PREPARATION--each agency submits agency budget estimates (consideration: general

ceilings set by DBCC, available revenues, borrowing limits)
2. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION--congress deliberates/acts on budget proposals of the president and
congress FORMULATES appropriation act
3. BUDGET EXECUTION--executive; covers various OPERATIONAL ASPECTS of budgeting;
establishment of obligation authority ceilings, evaluation of work/financial plans for indvl activities,
continuing review of govt fiscal position, regulation of funds releases, implementation of cash payment
skeds; ALLOCATION AND RELEASE OF FUNDS EARMARKED FOR VARIOUS PROJECTS
4. BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY--evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets,
obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are COMPARED with the targets set at the
time the agency budgets were approved.
POWER OF APPROPRIATION--vested in LEGISLATURE; appropriation bills originate EXCLUSIVE in
the HOUSE. senate to propose/concur with amendments
BUDGETARY PROCESS--commences from proposal submitted by PRESIDENT. CONGRESS-concludes the exercise by crafting and APPROPRIATION ACT based on its own
judgment/wisdom/purposes.
APPROPRIATION ACT--may be objected to by way of PRESIDENTIAL VETO.
EXECUTIVE JOB--from regulation of fund releases--implementation of payment skeds and up to
ACTUAL SPENDING OF FUNDS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
a. DBM--lays down guidelines for the disbursement of the fund.
b. congress requested by president to recommend projects which may be funded from PDAF
c. list submitted by congress is endorsed by Speaker to the DBM which reviews the same.
RULE: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MAY PROPOSE AND SELECT PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED BY
PDAF but there must be NO SHOWING OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF LEGISLATORS IN TEH
ACTUAL SPENDING OF BUDGET because to do otherwise will VIOLATE the constitutional
boundaries between the executive and legislative in the budgetary process.
the PROPOSALS/IDENTIFICATIONSmade by congress are MERELY RECOMMENDATORY and that
the president, after due examination shall implement them.
direct particiaption of members of congress in PDAF implementation RUNS AFOUL against the
principle fo SEPARATION OF POWERS because in receiving and thereafter, spending funds for
their chosen projects, congress INTRUDES INTO AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION. they cannot directly
spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. congress cannot dictate upon
executive how to spend taxpayers money. the authority to propose and select projects does not
pertain to legislation.
THERE IS NO CLEAR PROOF in this case that there was direct releases of funds to congress who
actually spent them accdg to their discretion. there was (as yet no) ILLEGAL MISUSE of the PDAF in the
form of kickbacks.
evidence: NAPOLES and the COA REPORT.
source of PDAF: SPECIAL PURPOSE FUND (PDAF of 25.240M is only 8% of the total)
rule: PDAF ALLOCATIONS ARE NOT ACTUALLY RELEASED TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS;
rather, it is coursed via implementing agencies of the govt for 'soft' and hard projects
DELA LLANA V. CHAIRPERSON

-
on lifting of pre-audit on govt transactions.

petitioner HAS LEGAL STANDING on a TAXPAYERS SUIT. discuss requisites.
issuance of COA CIRCULAR has led to dissipation of public funds through numerous
irregularities in govt financial transactions which has been LEFT UNCHECKED by the lifting of
the COA pre-audit which is supposed to be coa's consti duty. petitioner then has legal standing
since as taxpayer, he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.
CONDITIONS FOR PRE-AUDIT
(1) proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law
(2) sufficient funds available for the purpose
(3) prosed expenditure not unreasonable or extravagant; unexpended balance of appropriations
is sufficient to cover entire amount of expenditure
(4) transaction approved by proper authority; claim supported by authentic underlying evidence
HOWEVER, CONDUCT OF PRE-AUDIT IS NOT A MANDATORY DUTY OF COA. COA has

exclusive authority to define scope of its audit and examination. consti provides that post-audit is
mandated for certain govt or private entities with state subsidy or equity and ONLY when the
internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate.
in this case, COA MAY ADOPT MEASURES, including temporary or special pre-audit to correct
deficiencies. therefore, pre audit is only DISCRETIONARY. when language of law is clear and
explicit, there is NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION, only application. SCOPE OF PROVISION
CANNOT BE UNDLY ENLARGED.
GALICTO V. AQUINO
- on the EO controlling grant of excessive salaries/allowances to GOCC and GFI employees and
effect of enactment of RA 10149 (GOCC Governance act of 2011; section 11 thereof authorized
president to fix compensation framework of GOCC and GFI's)
GALICTO HAS NO LOCUS STANDI. (actual threatened injury; traceable to challenged action;
injury likely redressed by favorable action; 'real interest'--present substantial interest as
distinguished from mere expectancy)
in this case, he is NOT a real party in interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits
are merely contingent events or expectancies. he has NO VESTED RIGHTS to salary increases.
PETITION MOOTED BY SUPERVENING EVENTS. lapse of the suspension of allowances and
bonuses; enactment of RA 10149 amending the provision in the charters of GOCCs empowering
their board of directors to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of
authority to the PRESIDENT to perform this act. with enactmetn of the new law, president is now
authorized to fix teh compensation frameowrk of GOCCs aand GFIs. this means tat PRESIDENT
CAN NOW REISSUE AN EO CONTAINING THESE SAME PROVISIONS without any legal
constraints. to still rule on the supposed constitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic
exercise; issue is MOOT ON ITS FACE in light of enactment of RA 10149. there is no longer
FLESH AND BLOOD case for court to resolve.
MOOT CASE--one that ceases to present justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events
that a declaration thereon is of no practical use or value; dispute resolved
IDEALS VS. PSALM
- iSSUE ON WATER RIGHTS VIOLATION has NOT BECOME MOOT. if impending sale violates
the constitution, it is duty of court to ANNUL THE CONTRACT AWARD as well as its
implementation, supervening events cannot prevent the court from rendering a decision if there is
a grave violation of the constitution.

+ LEGAL STANDING AS CITIZENS AND TAXPAYERS. continued availability of potable water

might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with privatization of the hydroelec power plant-substantial interest.
FUNA V. VILLAR
- member of COA who was appointed as member then chairman during the 7 year term. when he
becomes chairman, is it Fresh 7 years or unexpired term? but during the transition, he
RESIGNED when Aquino assumed presidency. CASE IS MOOT but SC DECIDED ON THE
CASE. Discuss exceptions. -This case calls for promulgation of principles that will GUID THE
BENCH, BAR AND PUBLIC.
in this case, COA Chairman shall be appointed by president for term of 7 years and if + served
full term--no reappointment. but this rule does not prohibit a PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT
from commissioner to chairman as long as commissioner has not served the full term of 7 years
so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the COA.
in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner or a mix of both
positions, for aggregate term of more than 7 years. a contrary view would allow circumvention of
the aggregate 7 year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak
havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
in this case however, the PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT WAS NOT VALID. villar served 4 out
of 7 years as commissioner. he cannot be appointed as chair when such position became vacant
as a result of expiration of the 7 yr term of his predecessor. such appointment to a full term is
NOT VALID as appointee will be allowed to serve MORE than 7 years under the consti ban. BUT
if commissioner who resigned BEFORE his 7 year term can be extended an appointment to the
position of chairman for the unexpired period.
CAPALLA V. COMELEC--transcendental importance used.
CHAVEZ V. JBC--on JBC MEMBERS--1 member of HR and senate with 1 vote each or 1/2 vote?
CHAVEZ HAS LEGAL STANDING. the claim that composition of JBC is illegal is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post but for all citizens who have the right to seek jud intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.
HE SUES AS TAXPAYER. since JBC derives financial support for its operations from taxes paid, he
possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that JDBC proceedings are not tainted
with illegality and its composition and actions do not violate the consti.
COMPOSTION OF JBC
ex officio members:
1. Chief Justice of SC
2. Sec of justice
3. A rep of congress
Regular members
1. professor of law
2. IBP rep
3. private sector rep
4. retired SC justice.
ONLY A SINGULAR REPRESENTATIVE MAY ABE ALLOWED TO SIT IN TEH JBC. Besides,
JBC must be composed of 7 members only. to allow congress to have more quantitative
influence in the JBC would negate principle of equality among the 3 branches of govt.

OPERATIVE FACT doctrine applies. notwithstanding unconsti in the current JBC composition, all
its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
court cannot determine who should remain as sole representative of congress in the JBC. this
determination is best left to congress.
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
CHECKING/NEGATIVE-declaring law unconsti
LEGITIMATING/POSITIVE--exercise of JR; not unconsti
SYMBOLIC/TEACHING
ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW.
but lower courts, must avoid ruling so if it can be avoided. remember tripartite govt. SC LANG DAPAT
ULTIMATE MAG-RULE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW.
BROKENSHIRE V. MINISTER OF LABOR--quasi-judicial agencies do not have the power to declare
an act or law as unconstitutional. they do not have judicial power. DOLE or NLRC cannot declare
wage orders as unconstitutional.
EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
operative fact doctrine applies and traditional view:
TRADITIONAL VIEW--when the law was effective and there was violation committed and that law was
subsequently annulled--damage or violation corrected as law was never considered effective
OPERATIVE FACT--when law was effective and there was NO VIOLATION of rights--if law subsequently
annulled, operative fact doctrine applies.
COCOFED V. REPUBLIC--Operative fact doctrine not only applies to laws or statutes but also in
EXECUTIVE ORDERS. However, in this case, OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO THE
UCPB SHARES due to inequity. public funds which were supposed given utmost safeguard were
haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on EO that was found constitutionally infirm.
recipients of UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. to apply the
OFD would be INIQUITOUS and serve INJUSTICE to govt.
also discussed 2 tests of delegation of legis power:
COMPLETENESS TEST--when it sets forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
delegate
SUFFICIENT STANDARD--provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. to be sufficient-standard must specify the limits of delegates authority, announce legis policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC
- the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or
unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As We have
discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision: That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to
executive actsin this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distributionis
well-settled in our jurisprudence. Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-210an
executive actwas declared invalid in the instant case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly
applicable. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA
525(2011)]
- Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied
with because it has the force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under

the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have
produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP
of HLI. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA
525(2011)]
POLITICAL vs. JUSTICEABLE QUESTION
POLITICAL--question by which people in their sovereign capacity will have to decide or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to legis/exec branch. it is concerned with issues on
WISDOM of a particular measure (not its legality)
JUSTICEABLEquestion rightful for court to decide on
VINUYA V. ROMULO--mandamus case compelling govt to file claim against japan in the ICJ re: comfort
women case--> NOT COMPELLABLE BY MANDAMUS. The issue is POLITICAL in nature. the conduct
of foreign relations of our govt is committed to executive and legislative (politcal depts of govt) and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is NOT SUBJECT to judicial inquiry or
legislation. the issue is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed NOT
TO COURTS but to the EXECUTIVE DEPT who has already decided to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against japan in the treaty of peace in 1951. the wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question.
IDEALS VS. PSALM
- the political question doctrine applies when the question calls for a ruling on the wisdom, and not
the legality, of a particular governmental act or issuance.
- The political question doctrine has no application in the case here. In the privatization of AHEPP,
PSALMs discretion is circumscribed not only by the provisions of EPIRA and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR), but also by pertinent laws that are consequential and relevant to its
mandate of privatizing the power generation assets of NPC. Needless to stress, PSALM is duty
bound to abide by the parameters set by the Constitution. In case it violates any existing law or
the Constitution, it cannot hide behind the mantle of the political question doctrine, because such
violation inevitably calls for the exercise of judicial review by this Court. [Initiatives for Dialogue
and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) , 682 SCRA 602(2012)]
COMELEC V. CRUZ
- Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the
duration of the term of barangay officials but also the application to them of a consecutive term
limit. Whatever Congress in its wisdom decides on the term of office and term limitation are
political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
PHILIPPINE TERRITORY
Sabah claim falls within the phrase 'those territories which Philippines would exercise sovereignty and
jurisdiciton'. claim is not largely based on historic/legal title.
EEZ--first 12 nautical miles is part of PHIL TERRITORY; outside of 12 NM up to 200 NM--part of EEZ and
not phil territory
violations within 12 NM--violation of philippine laws
violation outside 12 NM and within 200--Violation fo UNCLOS

EEZ--reserved for EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND EXPLORATION.

PEOPLE AND CITIZENSHIP
-It was only during phil bill of 1902 (july 2, 1902) that the term 'citizens of phils' came about
-child born between April 11, 1899-july 1, 1902--citizens under principle of JUS SOLI
--jones law--citizens ung inhabitants of phils as of april 11, 1899 and continues to reside therein including
children born subsequent thereto; includes Spaniards who remained there
--1935 consti CITIZENS (fil citizens at time of adoption of PC, born of foreigner parents but who at
adoption of 1935 consti was ELECTED TO PUB OFFICE; those father are citizens, mothers are
citizens/foreigner father but elected fil cit at majority; naturalized citizens)
--same citizens under 1987 and 1973 (just memorize those in 1935)
8 POSITIONS REQUIRING NAT BORN CITIZENS (pres, VP, members of congress, justices of SC and
lowe courts; OMB and deputies; ConCom members; Monetary board; CHR)
--NATURAL BORN cits first defined in 1973 consti
--those children who had to elect fil cit under 1935 consti is NATURAL BORN (curative law applied
retroactively)
--FERNANDO POE CASE--born of filipino mother and foreigner father. since he was illegitimate, he
follows cit of mother during his minority. once he reaches majority, he has to ELECT what citizenship.
However, since in 1935, those born of Filipino fathers are considered natural born, that provision prevails.
So he follows the citizenship of his FATHER. Therefore, he is natural born.
HOW TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP (formal mode on CA 625)
1. execute SOWRN STATEMENT or affidavit of fact of election
2. oath of allegiance
3. registration of these documents with LCR
WHEN TO ELECT? upon REASONABLE time after attaining age of majority (i.e. 3 years)
IN RE: CHING
- legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines. [
- The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election
of Philippine citi-zenship should be made; The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority;
As held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
- based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority, Chings election
was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise
the privilege.In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirtyfive (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or
over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
REP V. LIM
- no need to elect cit if he was born of filipino mother and he was illegitimate; child follows cit of
mother
- he constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children.Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who

was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since
birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. [Republic
vs. Lim, 419 SCRA 123(2004)]
The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. [Republic vs. Lim, 419 SCRA 123(2004)]
MA V. FERNANDEZ
- failure to register in LCR of documents in election of cit DOES NOT AFFECT a valid election.
registration is not the fact of election.
- The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
- Same; Same; Same; The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the
elections should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
- The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and
second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the
documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. We rule that under the facts
peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they
should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.
- Where as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented
within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election
beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
consistently, and continuously been done
- It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth
Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners; Registration is only a means
of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. [Ma vs. Fernandez, Jr., 625 SCRA
566(2010)]
- The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly
negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. [Ma vs. Fernandez, Jr., 625 SCRA
566(2010)]
REP V. SAGUN
- There is NO PROCEEDING established by law for the jud declaration of citizenship fo an
individual.
- this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation
authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our
citizenry
- courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of
the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to
their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
- t is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.
Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,
unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship.
- in making a valid election of Philippine citizenship, follow the 3 requirements + compliance with
ALIEN REGISTRATION ACT. he must be required to register first as alien. file petition in bureau
of immigration for cancellation fo ACR. then same is elevated to DOJ for final determination and
review. thus, no specific rule on going to courts in this matter.

-
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the
direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The
special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for
cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of
citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set
aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected
Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to
comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed
a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence
submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly
pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of
majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A.
No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no
satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the
nearest local civil registry. [Republic vs. Sagun, 666 SCRA 321(2012)]
VILANDO V. HRET
- Limkaichong is QUALIFIED to sit as congressman. he is a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN. since his
father was conferred the status of naturalized Filipino, it follows that he was born a Filipino citizen
born to Filipino parents.
- An application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting
renunciation of Philippine citizenshipfor renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not
tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of
alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for,
and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs
mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter. [Vilando vs. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 656 SCRA 17(2011)]
INFORMAL MODE OF ELECTION
IN RE MALLARE and CO case--obiter dictum provided that even if no compliance with documentary
eivdinces, election can be had informally as shown in the CONDUCT of the person.
BUT ONLY FORMAL MODE IS ALLOWED TO ELECT FIL CIT.
NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION
NATURALIZATION PROCEDINGS--judicial (CA 473) and administrative (RA 9139)
Judicial naturalization (CA 473; June 17, 1939)--ARCPEN (substantive)
procedural reqts:
1. filing of declaration of intention at least 1 year before the filing of petition
2. hearing
3. decision (does not become effective until after 2 years waiting period)
4. ACR cancellation
5. issuance of cert of naturalization

DERIVATIVE CIT--wife and minor children will be fil cit too (must prove no disqualifications)
CHILDREN--if born and here during the grant (automatic); born here but outside during grant(must
execute document electing FC); not born here and outside during grant (must file documents before got
office that they want to become FC) ; Born AFTER grant--citizens; born BEFORE grant--NOT natural
born
ADMINISTRATIVE NAT (RA 9139 June 8, 2001)--covers those born in phils as foreigners
substantive: AR-18-CPEN
Procedural:
1. no declaration of intention needed
2. file petition with the special commission on naturalization in ODJ
3. payment of fees
IMPORTANT POINTS
- Who are qualified to be naturalized
- Declaration of intention
- Procedure
- When decision EXECUTORY:
-
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 AN ACT MAKING ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR

NATURALIZATION
Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by
the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision
granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on
proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that
during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a
lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government
announced policies.
Section 2. After the finding mentioned in section one, the order of the court granting citizenship shall be registered
and the oath provided by existing laws shall be taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not before, he will be entitled
to all the privileges of a Filipino citizen.
DENATURALIZATION
1. if person goes back to his country of origin and stays there for 1 year or 2 years if other country AND
2. acts done WITHIN the 5r period from grant of naturalization status
CO V. CIVIL REGISTER
- Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children
of thosenaturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those
naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case. [
- Requisites.It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of
naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the
following material allegations in their petition:
(a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
(b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,
(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
REPUBLIC V. ONG
- Granting of petition for naturalization DOES NOT PRECLUDE reopening of that case and giving
govt another opportunity to present new evidence. nat proceeding is so infused with pub interest
that a GRANT of citizenship does NOT constitute res judicata to any matter supporting a

subsequent judgmetn canceling the same i.e. illegally or fraudulently procured. in this case, there
is proof that ong has not proven his possession of known lucrative trade, profession,etc. (even if
not raised in the RTC, such questions may be entertained on appeal before SC)
FACT OF NAT BORN--refers to fact of citizenship and not to the fact of performing an act to
perfect/acquire cit
BASTA if 1 parent is filipino--NATURAL BORN (even if later he needs to elect)
if no Filipino parent--not natural born (even if subsequently, parents eventually became filipinos)
LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP
1. Naturalization in foreign country
a. REPUBLIC V. DELA ROSA
" Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru
naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the
procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for
himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or
merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant
who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does
not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her
Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. [
" Failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the
Revised Naturalization Law rendered null and void the proceedings conducted,
the decision rendered and oath of allegiance taken
" The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2
and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of
good moral character, (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at
least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the
principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and
(5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing,
the justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition
" A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation, counted from the date of receipt by the Solicitor General of his
copy of the decision.
" A decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall not be
executory until after two years from its promulgation. [Republic vs. De la Rosa,
232 SCRA 785(1994)]
2. express renunciation or EXPATRIATION
a. YU V. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
" Petitioners act of applying for a Portuguese passport despite his naturalization
as a Philippine citizen, and his act of declaring his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization. [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169
SCRA 364(1989)]
" hilippine citizenship is not a commodity or ware to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient. [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA
364(1989)]
b. AZNAR V. COMELEC
" In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes

provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in
a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea
did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove
or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. [Aznar vs. Commission on
Elections, 185 SCRA 703(1990)]
3. oath of allegiance to foreign country
REACQUISTION OF CITIZENSHIP
1. RA 8171)
-nat born fil women who married foreigners
-poltiical or economic necessity
2. RA 9225 (Dual citizenship)
AASJS V. DATUMANONG
- What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who has
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance; By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizen-ship
LOPEZ V. COMELEC
- R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines, i.e., that they make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. [Lopez vs. Commission on Elections, 559 SCRA
696(2008)]
JACOT V. DAL
- Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to
take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC
- Who may be allowed to re-acquire and retain Philippine Citizenship.R.A. No. 9225 was enacted
to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;
and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens
of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
- The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
BENGZON V. HRET--when repatriation under 8171 is made, he acquires his former status as natural
born.
CONDON V. COMELEC
- RA 9225 allows retention and reacquisition of fil cit for nat born cits who have lost their phil cit by
taking an oath of allegiance to the republic.
- in this case, when she took the oath, she reacquired her fil cit and became a DUAL CITIZEN.
- ON RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CIT WHEN SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE--but for renunciation
to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before officer of law authorized to

-
administer oath stating in clear unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign
citizenship.
In this case, the renunciation was NOT UNDER OATH. such defect was as if no personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign cit was made. HENCE, CONDON CANNOT CURE THE DEFECT
OF HER CANDIDACY AS SUCH additional qualification for elec office is the operative act which
will restore her right to run for pub office.
ALTEREJOS V. COMELEC
- In addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of
the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a
prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen
- hile Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree No. 725, the Courts ruling
in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727 (1996), that repatriation retroacts to the
date of filing of ones application for repatriation subsists and applies to repatriation under R.A.
No. 8171. [
TABASA V. CA
- Republic Act No. 8171; Persons Entitled to Repatriation Under Republic Act No. 8171.The only
persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor
children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
- Same; Same; Same; The privilege of repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and
to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinosto claim the benefit of Republic Act No. 8171,
the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and
to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had
renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to
repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law.
This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a
naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of
jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are
natural-born Filipinos.
- To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the
legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the
election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or
naturalization separately from their parents.
- In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was
still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization,
petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to
automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his
repatriation on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of
minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a
natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost
his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It
was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to
apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation
under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they
acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended
indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation [Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA
9(2006)]

DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO NATIONAL INTEREST and NOT dual citizenship.

when dual citizenship may arise:
--application of laws of 2 states
--marriage to foreigner
--children born of that marriage
--child born of Filipino parents in country following jus soli
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Instances WHEN SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE:
--republic sued by name
--suit vs. unincorporated entity
--pub off sued in official capacity
TEST: when case makes government APPROPRIATE FUNDS from the public treasury
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO V. TESDA
- An unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both
express and implied powers.Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do not
believe that the role and status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated
instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the
Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functionsi.e., the
handling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills development. As an
unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express
and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.
-
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms.The
proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit
against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit
against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance of
governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the
ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued
against a government agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA performs
governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of
developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the
country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state
immunity appliesi.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental
function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and
disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
Even assuming that Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) entered into
a proprietary contract with Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) and thereby gave its implied consent
to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject
of a writ of garnishment or attachment; Public funds cannot be the object of garnishment
proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged
Absent any actual disbursement, these funds form part of and Technical Education and Skills
Development Authoritys (TESDAs) public funds, and TESDAs failure to pay Professional
Video, Inc. (PROVI) the amount stated in the Certificate cannot be construed as an act of
fraudulent misapplication or embezzlement.
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN V. ATO

- State Immunity; Where the Director General of Air Transportation Office had informed the
landowners that the funding for the initial payment for the acquisition of their property was already

earmarked in the General Appropriations Act, such earmarking may be considered as the
appropriation required by law in order that the landowners may be paid just compensation long
due them.
ATO V. RAMOS
- The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no
wrong. [Air Transportation Office vs. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36(2011)]
- An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty.. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing
proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its
function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter
whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a
business. [
- The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly appreciated the juridical character of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function. but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
- The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.
- The issue of whether or not the Air Transportation Office (ATO) could be sued without the States
consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as
the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008
CHINA NATIONAL V. SANTAMARIA--application of Doctrine of state immunity has been RESTRICTED
TO SOVEREIGN or govtl activities and cannot be extended to commercial/private and proprietary acts. in
this case, although CNMEG claims to be a GOCC, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented
to be sued under Chinese law. IT CANNOT CLAIM IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, ti is presumed a GOCC WITHOUT an original charter. as a result, it has the capacity to
sue and be sued under the corporation code.
HEIRS OF GAMBOA V. TEVES--view that govt, by concluding sale, has descended to the level of an
oridnary citizen and stripped itself of the vestiges of immuity that is availbe in teh performance of govtl
acts.the indirect sale of PLDT common shares to foreign investors partook of a PROPRIETARY
BUSINESS TRANSACITON of the govt which was not undertaken as incident to a govtl function.
accordingly, govt is vulnerable to estoppel . govt is PRECLUDED FFOM PENALIZEING these alien
investors for an act performed upon its guarantee, through its facilities and with its imprimartur.
CONSENT TO BE SUED
How given: express or implied
EXPRES CONSENT:
1. money claims arising from contract (CA 3039, 327 and PD 1415)
a. SAYSON V. SINGSON-- Action against the government auditors to approve payment to
petitioner is a suit against the State and may not prosper without the latters consent.
Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained
by the Court except with the consent of the State * * *. In other words, the respondent
should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com.

Act 327 * * * which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the
government may be filed * * * [Sayson vs. Singson, 54 SCRA 282(1973)]
--claims must be submitted to COA first and if it does not have money to pay, file case in
court
2. Incorporation of GOCC (with original charter)
a. NHA V. GUIVELONDO-- Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be
the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.38
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled
corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that
of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.39 This is so because
when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.40
In the case of petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties are exempt
from garnishment has already been resolved. Having a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled
corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not
exempt from garnishment.
the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution.
IMPLIED CONSENT
1. Govt enters into business contracts (proprietary acts i.e. public utilities; they are not necessary and
only for convenience)
2. inequitable to claim immunity (i.e. non payment of just compensation in expropriation cases; property
owner files INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION--DOES NOT PRESCRIBE)
3. govt initiates a complaint and thereby opens itself to counterclaim
WHEN GOVT ENTER INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS
PTA V. PGDEI--application of state immunity is proper only when proceedings arise out of sovereign
transactions cannot in cases of commercial activities or econ affairs. the state, in entering into a business
contract, descends to the level of individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.
since the intramural golf course expansion projects partakes of PROPRIETARY CHARacter entered by
PTA and philgolf, PTA CANNOT AVOID ITS FINANCIAL LIABILITY by merely invoking immunity from
suit.
ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF DISHONESTY--used when state erroneously claims immunity because it is
dishonest for it to claim the same. thus, when the court finds it inequitable, the court will rule that there
has been consent or waiver.
INEQUITABLE TO CLAIM IMMUNITY
EPG CONSTRUCTION V. VIGILAR
- To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitionerscontractors right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered,

-
where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from
said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors honest toil and labor
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen.Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the
Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the States cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True
enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstance. the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
The Supreme Courtas the staunch guardian of the citizen rights and welfare-cannot sanction
an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof
[EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566(2001)]
REPUBLIC V. UNIMEX
- Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondents demand will ultimately fall on the
government, and that, under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be held liable for
governmental acts (jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The
circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.
- Justice and equity now demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be
shredded. as the staunch guardian of the peoples rights and welfare, cannot sanction an
injustice so patent in its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over
time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and
contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Justice and equity now demand that the States cloak of
invincibility against suit and liability be shredded
GOVT INITIATES A COMPLAINT; OPEN TO COUTNERCLAIM
FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL
- The filing by the Government of a complaint in intervention is in effect a waiver of its right of
nonsuability. [Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905(1954)]
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
- When the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private
party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever
counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it.In a last-ditch attempt to escape
liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, the
order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government
agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. But, as
private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil
Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity
from suit cannot be effectively invoked. [Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 484
SCRA 119(2006)]
SCOPE OF CONSENT
UNDER ACT 3083
COMMISSIONER V. SAN DIEGO
- Doctrine of immunity from suit does not apply to expropriation proceedings.It is elementary that
in expropriation proceedings, the state precisely submits to the courts jurisdiction and asks the
court to affirm its lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for the public use or
purpose described in its complaint and to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid
therefore. The doctrine of immunity of the state from suit does not apply.

-
While the State has given its consent to be sued in compensation cases, the pauper-claimant
therein must look specifically to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmens
Compensation Act for the corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the State
in Act 3083, the general law waiving its immunity from suit upon any money claim involving
liability arising from contract express or implied, imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the
(Philippines) under the provisions of this Act; and that otherwise, the claimant would have to
prosecute his money claim against the State under Commonwealth Act 327. [Commissioner of
Public Highways vs. San Diego, 31 SCRA 616(1970)]
PNB V. CIR
UNDER A CHARTER
EXECUTION
it is only valid if strictly a suit against the state. if there was valid consent, it will be valid from initiation
only up to rendition of judgment and DOES NOT EXTEND TO EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT. judgment
must be presented to COA to determine if there is money. if none, the claim will be submitted to congress
for allocation in the appropriations bill. congress may fund or not fund it.
EXEUCTION MAY NOT ISSUE UPON SUCH JUDGMETN because statues waiving non-suability do not
authorize seizure of property so statisy jdugetns recored from such action. statutes only convey an
implication that congress will recognize such judgmetn as final and make provisions for its full
satisfaction.
DFA V. NLRC
- Except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase,
sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form.
The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their
official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and
privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government which must be respected. [Department of Foreign Affairs vs. NLRC, 262 SCRA
39(1996)]
REPUBLIC V. HIDALGO
- No costs shall be allowed against the government of the Philippine Islands where the government
is the unsuccessful party [Republic vs. Hidalgo, 477 SCRA 32(2005)]
- It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily
consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity,
all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a
liability. In Republic v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution
directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory
judgment, has explained, thus. . . The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
REPUBLIC V. NLRC
- Proclamation No. 50s provision that the APT, among other things, can sue and be sued
indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court

-
When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an
unrestrained execution against it
SUABILITY V. LIABILITY
--If there was waiver of consent by the state--YOU CAN SUE. but it does not mean that state is liable.
proof must be adduced still.
--SUABILITY--fact of having been opportunity to sue the state; dependent on presence of consent
--LIABILITY--dependent on facts/evidence applicable to the laws of the case
QUASI DELICT COMMITTED BY SPECIAL AGENT
MERTITT V. GOVT--a special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the govt for an alleged quasi
delict
MUNICIPALITY V. JUDGE--municipality CANNOT be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee engaged in the discharge of GOVTL functions. the death of the passenger imposed NO duty to
pay monetary compensation
MUN V. DUMDUM--Consent is IMPLIED when govt enters into business contracts or it may be
EMBODIED IN GEN/SPECIAL LAW i.e LCG which vests LGUs with certain corporate powers--to sue
and be sued. further, writ of attachment is useless since property of municipality MAY NOT BE
SUBJECTED TO WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN A
CORRESPONDING APPROPRIATION PROVIDED BY LAW.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATES
--There has to be consent first.
--officers--> personal capacity (allowed); official functions (consent required)
1963 VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS
--covers HEADS OF MISSION and ambassadors (ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY)
--Consuls (relative immunity only; if not related sa official functions--they can b sued)
IMMUNITY BY REASON OF AGREEMENT/TREATIES
UN (in re: WW II)--absolute immunity
NGO--relative
ADB--immune except when it relates to banking functions
IMMUNITY OF CERTAIN GOVT OFFICERS
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS--i.e. SC justice, president,
THEY ARE IMMUNE ONLY DURING THEIR INCUMBENCY
LEGISLATIVE
COMPOSITION/QUALIFICATIONS/TERM
--Know the principles in domicile
MITRA V. COMELEC--comelec determined fitness of a dwelling based on very personal/subjectvie
assessment standards when teh law is replete with standards that can be used; when dwelling qulifies as
residence, his capacity to decorate the place or lack of it is IMMATERIAL.
ASSISTIO V. AGUIRRE--to effect a NEW domicile: animus manendi coupled with animus non reertendi.
(3 requisites to effect a transfer)
TALAGA V. COMELEC--No local elec official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same
position. --to avoid the evil of a a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
juris as a result of a prolonged stay in the office.

SABILI V. COMELEC--To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. it is
not required that candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence in a place. it is
enough tht he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.
APPORTIONMETN/DISTRICTS
SEMA V. COMELEC
- The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative
districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself
enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable
membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of
Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
- An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body. [Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA
700(2008)]
- Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. [Sema vs. Commission on
Elections, 558 SCRA 700(2008)]
ALDABA V. COMELEC
- Under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 135, the population indicators Congress used to measure
Malolos Citys compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative
[Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]
- this fell short of EO 135s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be
based on a set of demographic projections and
- 566
- 566
- SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
- Aldaba vs.Commission on Election
- estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b)
certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c)
certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. [Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]
- The Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census much less during offcensus years. [Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]
NAVARRO V. ERMITA
- The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the
criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
[Navarro vs. Ermita, 612 SCRA 131(2010)]
- Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so
contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined gerrymandering as the formation of one
legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.
[Navarro vs. Ermita, 612 SCRA 131(2010)]
AQUINO V. COMELEC
- There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district
- While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to an additional district

PARTY LIST SYSTEM

LAYUG V. COMELEC--members of HR are 2 kinds (those elected from legis districts and those elected
thru a partylist system of registered national/regional and sectoral parties. brother mike, 5th nominee did
not get a seat in the partylist systema nd has not become member of HR. thus, HRET has no jurisdiction
over the issue of his qualifications. neither does HRET have juris over qualificaitons of buhay party list, as
it is vested by law upon the OCMELEC.
ANG ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC:
--party list system INCLUDES NON-SECTORAL parties.
--it is composed of 3 groups (national parties/orgs, regional parties and sectoral parties)
--POLITICAL PARTY--organized group of citizens acdvocating an ideolgoy or platform, principles and
policies for the gen conduct of govt
SECTORAL--org group of citizens belonging to any of teh sectors enumerated in section 3 whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interst and concerns of their sector.
--RA 7941 does not required national and regional parties to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. a political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent andy particular sector. it is sufficient that it consists of cits who advocate same ideology
REGARDLESS OF THERI ECONOMIC STATUS AS CITIZENS
--Marginialized/underrep--those who fall in the low income grup as classified by national stats coor board.
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, IP, handicapped, veterans, overseas) . It does not eman one must
wallow in poverty/destitution/infirmity; its sufficient that his sector is below the middle class
--NOMINEES of the sectoral party--either belongs to the sector or must have a TRACK RECORD OF
ADVOCACY for the sector represented.
--major political parties can participate in party list elections to encourage them to wok assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the marginalized/underrep and those who lack well-defined political
constituencies. they must organize a SECTORAL WING--independent sectoral party linked to a major
political party thru a coalition. must have its own consti and by laws, program of got,
officers/members,etc.
--partylist shall not be DQ if some of its nominees are disqualified, provided ast least one is qualified.
RESIDENCE REQT of partylist members--not required to be residents of the district but of the
PHILIPPINES.
YOUTH SECTOR REPS--Amores v. HRET--> Must be up to the age of 30 only. but Villanueva in this
case was allowed to finish his term.
BANAT V. COMELEC--know the new procedure for filling in party list seats. even those not reaching 2%
may be entitled to 1 seat.
ISSUE: in 2007, dili sila entitled; in 2009, they were entitled. in such case, is it covered na as '1 term' and
thereby falls on the 3-term limitation rule? for me YES. they are no longer entitled for another term as they
have already served a few years in that specific term.
ABAYON v. hret/ layug v. comelec--know jursidiction of comelec and hret. know the PENDING case of
reyes and velasco on that matter.
REYES V. VELASCO-- comelec had lost jurisdiction ot the HRET once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed winner in the congressional race. one DOES not become a member of the house on the first
day of session but on the day of PROCLAMATION. the SC and COMELEC should allow the HRET to
exercise it exclusive mandate to hear elec protest against members of congress. SC CANNOT
ENCROACH on the powers of the HRET. that is very clear in the consti which created Hret.

LOKIN V. COMELEC--issue on placing his name on the list of nominees--COMELEC has jurisdiction and
not hret because issue does not involve an election protest.
ELECTION
--There is a need to CALL for SPECIAL ELEC if there is vacancy (but not within 18 mos before regular
elections; in that case, isabay nalang xa sa regular elections)
--NO NEED FOR NOTICE in case there is special elections to fill vacancy for the SENATE (not HR)
because the special elec was conducted/simultaneously with teh regular elections. since regular elec is
already covered by law and the consti, there is NO NEED FOR PRIOR OTICE to the public.
SALARIES/PRIVILEGES AND DQ
SALARIES--there is no prohibition on the DECREASE of salaries DURING term; prohibited: INCREASE
DURING term. ; but a law increasing salaries is okay but prohibited if law will take effect during their term.
term of all the members of senate approving the increase will have to expire first before the increase of
their salaries will have to take effect.
PRIVILEGES
--Freedom from arrest--if NOT more than 6 years imprisonment lang ang immunity from arrest. if more
than 6 years, then he cannot claim parliamentary immunity.
--SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE--Osmena v. Pendatun: whie parliamentary immunity guarantees
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in crim/civil actions
before the courts or any other forum OUTSIDE congress, oit does NOT protect him from responsibility
before the congress itself whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof. for unparliametnary conduct, he can be censured/committed to prison/suspended or
even expelled.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
--Incompatible office--one whicha member of congress cannot take if he does not forfeit his seat in
congress
--forbidden office: one which cannot be taken even if he forfeits seat because such office was created
during his term or emoluments thereof was increased during his term
--LIBAN V. GORDON--PNRC case. gordon was allowed.; ex-officio positions are okay provided thereis
no additional remuneration given to the lawmaker.
OTHER PROHIBITIONS
- PUYAT V DE GUZMAN: An assemblyman cannot indirectly fail to follow the Constitutional
prohibition not to appear as counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying a
nominal amount of share of one of the shareholders after his appearance as counsel therein was
contested. [Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr., 113 SCRA 31(1982)]
- Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
appearance as counsel before x x x an administrative body and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The intervention was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose,
that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel
indirectly. [Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr., 113 SCRA 31(1982)]
DUTY TO DISCLOSE
--must disclose financial interest with any contract with govt or any action which requires his intervention
as member of congress.
--lawmakers who are lawyers must NOT appear as counsels in any court or elec tribunal
--disclose conflict of interest in proposed or internal legislation
--disclosure in SALN

INTERNAL GOVT OF CONGRESS

--ELECTION OF OFFICERS--in the case of santiago v. guingona, the plain and unambiguous words in
the consti mean that senate president must obtain the votes of more than 1/2 of ALL the senators and not
by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority much less the minority in the said
body. further, while consti mandates that senate president be elected by a number constituting MORE
HTAN 1/2 OF ALL MEMBERS therof, it does not provide that members who will NOT vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the minority who could thereby elect the minority leader. verily, no law states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
MAJORITY--refers to political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged
MINORITY--party with lesser number of members.
there is consti or statutory provision prescribed as to which of the many minority groups or the
independents or combi thereof has the right o select the minority leader. according to SC, the method of
choosing who will be 'such other officers as it may deem necessary' (by each house) is a DERIVATIVE
OF THE EXERCISE OF PREROGATIVE conferred by the consti.such method must be prescribed by the
senate itself and not the court.
QUORUM--in the case of avelino v. cuenco, when consti declares that a majority of 'each house' s hall
constitute a quorum, the house doe snot mean 'all' the members. there is a difference between a majority
of 'all members of each house' and a majority of 'the house'. the latter requires LESS number than the
first. therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the senate less one (23) constitutes consti
majority of the senate for the purpose of the quorum. (in this case, 1 was hospitalized but in the phils and
1 was abroad; so the one in the phils will be counted in determining the majority of the house; ) so instead
of 24, 23 nalang ang basis for determining quorum. of 23, 12 shall constitute majority.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS--even if there is no provision in the consti giving each house the authority to
promulgate is own rules, SC said that by NECESSITY, it has the power to do so.
GARCILLANO V. HOUSE
- Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure; The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process\
- The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of
the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.
- Same; Same; The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution; The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.
- The recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the
instant petitions.
DELA PAZ V. SENATE COMMITTEE
- The exercise of the power of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. [Dela Paz vs.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 579 SCRA 521(2009)]
- The Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government, its

branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its
own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its members. [Dela Paz vs. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 579 SCRA 521(2009)]
t is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired
PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia,
who had with him millions which may have been sourced from public funds. [Dela Paz vs. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 579 SCRA 521(2009)]
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS--in the case santiago v. SB, the order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019
is distinct form the power of congress to discipline its own ranks under the consti. the consti provides that
each house may punish its own members for disorderly behavior and with the concurrence of 2/3 of ALL
its members, suspend or expel a member. a penalty of suspension shall not exceed 60 days. the
suspension contemplated is a PUNITIVE MEASURE that is imposed upon an erring member. further, the
doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded congress from
RA 3019 nor from its sanctions.
IN DETERMING WHAT IS DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR, COURT WILL NOT INTERVENE--where the
question pertains to an affair internal to either of congress or exec, court subscribes to the view that
unless an infringement of aany specific consti proscription thereby exists, the court should not deign
substitute its own judgment over htat of any other 2 branches of govt. what is disorderly or not IS
DISCRETIONARY DETERMINATION by the congress alone (except on procedural limitations i.e.
voting,etc)
JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS
ARROYO V. DE VENECIA
--the cases all deny to the courts teh power to inquire into allegations that in enacting the law, house of
congress failed to comply with its own rules, in teh absence that there is a violaiton of consti provision.-the rpevailing view: rules of proceedings are subject to revocation/modificaiton/waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting they as they are primarily procedural.
--SC has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a house absent violation of constitution
--no rule of the HR requires that in cases involving APPROVAL OF CONFERENCE COMM REPORT,
thechair must restate the motiona nd conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
--consti does not require that the yeas and nays of the members be taken everytime a house has to vote
(except only upon last and 3rd readings of vill, at teh request of 1/5 of the members present and in re
passing a bill over the veto of the president)
--ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE--the signing of a bill by the speaker and senate pres and the certification
by the secretaries of both houses that it was passed are CONCLUSIVE OF ITS DUE ENACTMENT.
when there is no evidence to the contrary, the court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of
both houses that a bill has been duly passed.
--LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL--regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are reqd by consti to be
recorded therein and with respect to other matters, journal also accorded conclusive effect, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
--RIDERS-- the proscription in the consti rdquirng that every bill passed to embrace only 1 subject
expressed in teh title thereof is aimed against the evils of OMNIBUS BILLS and LOG-ROLLING
legislation as well as surretptitituouss enchroaches; consti provisions relating to subject matter and titles
of statues should not be so narroly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation
--an act having a single general subject, indicated in the tile,may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject (9006 comprehensive enough to repeal section 67 of OEC)
--PURPOSE OF SUBJECT IN TITLE PAGE-- to apprise legislators of the purposes/nature/scope of
provisiosn and rpevent enactment into law of matters which they have not received notice/action/study. in

this case, they cannot claim that they were not approsed of the repeal as the same was amply deliberated
upon by members of the HR
--ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE--in this case, court cnanot go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. (cite
meaning) court has no reason to deviate from the ruel where the irregularities in this case mostly involve
internal rules of congress i.e. creation of bicameral conference comm. court is NOT the proper forum for
the enforcement of these internal rules of congress. parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
tehir observance, teh courts have no concern whatever doubts they may be as to the formal validty of
9006 must be resolved in its favor. (cite arroyo v. de veneica and osmena v. pendatun)
ABAKADA V. PURISMA
--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT-Congressional oversight is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL per se,; it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the exec power to implement laws nor undermines
the consti separation of powers. BUT to forestall the danger of congressional encorachment beyond the
legis sphere, the consti imposes 2 BASIC Constraints on gress: (1) it may not vest itself with either exec
or judicial power and (2) when it exercises its legis power, it must follow the procedure for enactment of
laws and presentment. any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. any action or step byond that will undermine separation of powers.
--LEGISLATIVE VETO--statutory provision requiring the President or an admin agency to presnet the
proposed IRR of a law to congress, which, by itself or though a committee formed by it, retains a right or
power to approve/disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
congress has 2 option when enacting legislation --(1) formulate the details itself or (2) assign to the exec
branch the responsibility fo rmaking necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.
as such, it becomes an INWARD TURNING DELEGATION designed to attach a congressional leash to
an agency to which congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. it changes the structure of
consti's diagram of power.
--congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may NOT PASS UPON THEIR LEGALITY
by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing calculated balance of powers established
by consti. in exercising discretion to approve IRR, congress arrogated JUD POWER to itself,a power
exclusively vested in the courts.
--PRINCIPLE OF BICAMERALISM; PRESENTMENT CLAUSE--this act violates cardinal consti principles
of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. a valid exercise of legis power requires the act of both
chambers--it can be exercised neither solely by one of the 2 chambers nor by a committee of either or
both chambers. thus, single chamber legis veto and a congressional comm legis veto are INVALID.
--every bill passed by congress must be presented to the president for approval or veto and in the
absence of presentment to the president, no bill passed by congress can become a law
--from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers congress to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law VIOLATES separation of powers and is thus
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF JOURNAL --Conclusive as tot eh date of adjournment
MATTERS REQUIRED TO ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL (5 items)
1. yeas and nays on 3rd and final reading of bill
veto message of president
yeas and nays on repassing of a bill vetoed by president
yeas and nays on any quesiton at the request of 1/5 of members present
summary proceedings
JOURNAL ENTRY RULE V. ENROLLED BILL THEORY
--ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS--Enrolled bill theory is based on the respect due to co-equal dept which
requires the jud dept to accept, as having passed congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated
--certification of bill by presiding officers o congress does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. it is the approval of congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential

--journals of congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of the house bill signed by President
was teh same text passed by both houses. SC is not to incorporate the amendments but only to
DECLARE THAT BILL WAS NOT DULY ENACTED and threfore did not become law. (mali ang nasignan
ng president)
FIELD V. CLARK--it is not competent for the appellants to show from the journal that the Enrolled Bill
contained a section that does not appear in the enrolled act in the custody of the state department.
SESSIONS--adjournment of senate is considered an adjournment of congress. neither House can hold
session independently of the other in the same manner as neither can transact any legis business after
the adjournment of the other. (guevarra v. inocentes)
SPECIAL SESSION--when not in regular session because it is in recess or temporary adjournment (i.e.
vacancy in pres or VP or there is declaration of martial law and congress would receive report of the
president on such declaration)
JOINT SESSIONS
Voting separately:
--choosing the president
--determining president's temporary disability
--confirming the nomination of aVP--declaring a state of war
--amending the consti
voting Jointly
--to revoke or extend martial law or suspension of writ of HC
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
--JALOSJOS V. COMELEC--jurisdiction of HRET begins from the PROCLAMATION of a congressional
candidate; issues on election/returns/quali of proclaimed representative
COMPOSITION OF ELEC TRIBUNAL--In teh case piementel v. hret:
--constitution grants to HR the prerogative to choose from among its district and party list reps who may
occupy the seats allotted to hte house in the HRET and the CA.
--Composition is based on proportional representation of political parties. even if party list reps comprise a
sufficient number to be entitled seats to HRET and CA, their recourse lies with HR and not with the SC.
NATURE OF FUNCTION--quasi-judicial
INDEPENDENCE OF ELEC TRIBUNALS--In the case of Bondoc v. Pineda, a party member can be
removed from a party and consequently remove him in teh elec tribunal on acts of disloyalty for certain
causes EXCEPT voting against a party's interest.
LAYUG V. COMELEC--issue on party list qualification (COMELEC); if nominee not entitled to seat
(COMELEC still and not the HRET)
JALOSJOS V. COMELEC--since he was already proclaimed, HRET has jurisdiction
CODILLA V. DE VENECIA--comelec retained juris notwithstanding the proclamation because the
proclamation itself was a patent nullity
JUDIDICAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALs-In teh case of vilando v. hret, SC
said that the ONLY instance when it may intervene in teh exercise of HRET's EXTRAORDINARY JURIS
is upon a determination that the decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurs or with

grave abuse of discretion or upon clear showing of arbitrary use of its power to constitute denial of due
process of law, manifesting grave abuse of discretion.
Additional cases
bBARBERS V. COMELEC--The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. (Emphasis supplied)
The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) underscores the exclusivity of the SETs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and
complete. It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.19 Since
Barbers contests Biazons proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint.
The alleged invalidity of Biazons proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the election
returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole
jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against Biazon would
usurp the constitutional functions of the SET. In addition, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions affirming Biazons proclamation since the uncanvassed
returns and the results of the special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the
elections.
FERNANDEZ V. HRET--the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue
refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for
quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge,
ABAYON V. HRET
--It is for the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon
and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
--The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them
after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that
the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution
of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
--Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunals (HRETs) own jurisdiction beginS
--What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, theHRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications.
COMPOSITION OF THE ELEC TRIBUNAL

TANADA V. CUENCO--Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators
to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
--The main objective of the framers of the Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an
Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress was to insure the
exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking
body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest
number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in
each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or
Tribunal so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said
cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said
body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the
former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
--4.ID.; ID.; MOST VITAL FEATURE OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS.The most vital feature of the
Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the parties having the largest and the second largest
number of votes in each House therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of
the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals.
ABBAS V. SET
--It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the
Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those Judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
--Quorum; The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of
Senators and no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no
Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment
on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
PIMENTEL V. HRET
--The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and partylist representatives those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
--Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme Court may not interfere with the exercise by
the House of the constitutionally mandated duty to choose its members to the HRET and the CA, absent
a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute,
being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
--The HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.We likewise find no grave
abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator
Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the
HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
NATURE OF FUNCITON
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
--The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

BONDOC V. PINEDA--The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although twothirds of
its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians x x x To be able to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and
decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
POWERS
LIBANAN V. HRET
--power of the Electoral Commission is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process. The
Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. HRET, venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of
due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself
calls for remedial action.
GARCIA V. HRET
--The fact that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members does not bar the Supreme Court from entertaining petitions which charge
the HRET with grave abuse of discretion.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
MARTINEZ V. HRET
--We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference,
unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The power of
judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that
there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
VOTING IN CONGRESS
election of officers--majority
suspend/expel--qualified 2/3
discipline less suspension--simple majority
declare exist of war--2/3; joint session; voting separate
choosing of president in case of tie--simple majority; joint session; voting separate
president's temporary incapacity--2/3; joint session; voting separate
confirming choice of congress to be VP
tackle report of Pres when +exercise of commander in chief powers--majority in Join t session
concurrence in amnesty proclamation--simple majority and 2/3 vote of senate
(check!)
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

GUINGONA V. GONZALES
--Provision of section 18 on proportional representation is MANDATORY in character
--however, it is NOT mandatory to elect 12 senators and 12 HR. what consti requires is that there be at
least a majority of the entire membership.
--neither is presence of the 24 congress men required in order that CA may function. they perform their
functions so long as there is the required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. CA may perform
its functions and transact its business even if only 10 senators are elected thereto as long as QUORUM
exists.
--Constitutional Law; Commission on Appointments; Rule on Proportional Representation; Conversion
of fractional membership of a political party into a whole membership amounting to a reduction of the
other party's representation in the Commission on Appointments is a clear violation of the Constitutional
mandate requiring membership therein be based on proportional representation of the political parties.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement
that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing
the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
Same; Same; Same; The proportional representatives of each political party in the Commission on
Appointments is based on the actual number of members of each political party at the time of the
election of members therein in recognition of changing political alignments at the time of its
orgarnization. In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the
LakasNUCD upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, recognizing changes in alignments of
membership in the Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of
the Commission on Appointments.
Same; Same; Same; Commission can function even if not fully constituted provided that it has the
required quorum.Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform
its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full
complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact
its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Taada is
excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation,
the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of house members
from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
PIMENTEL V. HRET--CA is bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
POWER OF CONGRESS
GENERAL PLENARY powers--in the case of city of davao v. RTC, it is a basic precept that among the
implied substantive limitation on the legis power is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable
laws.
LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGIS POWER
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS--Bicameral conference committee when:
--there is conflict in the versions of the bills from both houses or even fi there is no conflict but there is a
need to fine tune the language of intended legislation
--BCC does not violate the no amendment rule because there is technically no nominal voting in BCC

ARROYO V. DE VENECIA
--In BCC, the practice is for the chair to simply ask if there are objections to the motion for approval of the
report. chair need not ask for the individual votes of the members.
SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
EXPRESS substantive Limitations:
--Article 3 on bill of rights
--article VI (taxing powers and limitation on the use of govt funs)
--article 14 (educational institutions)
--article 6, section 29-31
IMPLIED SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
--prohibition against delegaiton of legs power
--prohibition agains tpassage of irrepealable laws
Doctrine of NOn-delegation of powers applicable in all branches of government
--FLORES V. MONTEMAYOR--President's power ot investigatie and discipline a presidential appointee is
ORIGINAL and not appellate. such original power could not be delegated ot the subordinate PAGC, in the
absence of any law that expressly authorized the delegation. delegated power constituted not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru the instrumentality of his own judgment, not through the
intervening mind of another. thus, president should directly exercise its power, instead of simply adopting
the PAGCs entire findings and recommendation.
1. PROHIBITION AGIANST DELEGATION OF LEGIS POWER
REVIEW CETNER V. ERMITA
-- The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) under Republic Act (RA) 7722, since, legislative power,
which is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, is vested with the Congress. Legislative
power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the
Congress
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Higher Education (CHED); Administrative agencies exercise
their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulationsthe
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) may only exercise its rule-making power within the
confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722.Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or
rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its
rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers
and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degreegranting programs.
FORT BONIFACIO V. CIREVENEU
--An administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene the law on which it is based.RR 7-95 is
inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition of the term goods is concerned. This is a
legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and regulations
that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create
new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
--Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void.To be valid, an administrative rule
or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or
regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void.

-- In case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic
law prevails.While administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than
what it provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions
of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act
of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
GUTIERREZ V. DBM--Delegated rule-making is a practical necessity in modern governance because of
the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. Congress has endowed administrative agencies
like respondent DBM with the power to make rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies. Such power is, however, necessarily limited to what the law provides. Implementing
rules and regulations cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute belongs to the legislature. Administrative agencies implement the broad policies laid down in a law
by filling in only its details. The regulations must be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law
and must conform to the standards prescribed by law.
--Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA), like Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), falls under the general rule
of integrationthe Department of Budget and Management (DBM) specifically identified it as an
allowance or additional compensation integrated into the standardized salary rates; The Insurance
Commission cannot, on its own, determine what allowances are necessary and then grant them to its
officials and employees without the approval of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
--Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
COMM. OF CUSTOMS V. HYPERMIX--rules and regulations, which are the product of delegated power
to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be IWTHIN SCOPE OF
STATUTORY AUTHORITY granted by legislature to the admin agency.
COCOFED V. REPUBLIC--2 tests to determine validity of delegation of legis power: COMPLETENESS
and SUFFICIENT STANDAR TEST. Complete--legis describes already what job must be done, who is to
dit, what is the scope of his authority; standard---standard defines legis poicy, marks it slmits, mapts out is
boundaries and specifies the pub agency to apply it. it indicate the circumstances under which the legis
command is to be efected.
COMPLETENESS--sets forth the policy to be executed/carried out/implemented
SUFFICIEnt standard--provides adequate guidlines/limitations on the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. to be sufficient, standard must
specify th limit of the delegate's authority, announce the legis policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.
EXCEPTION OT THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
--DELEGATION OT THE PRESIDENT
--PEOPLE
--LGUs
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION--rule making power of the admin agencies pursuant to a valid delegation
of legis power provided the IRR is not contrary to consti, law, and consistent with the intent of the
delegated power.
CONGRESS HASD 3 OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS
1. scrutiny
2. congressional investigaiton
3. legislative supervision (aka inward turning legislation--UNCONSTITUTIONAL)
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS/LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

--3 readings
--printed copies of the final draft before the 3rd reading; voting had
--333 may be dispensed with if the President CERTIFIES its urgency. even so, there must still be
deliberations, there is still reading only that all these can be done in 1 day. there must still be a printed
copy. otherwise, there is nothing upon which both house would affix their signatures with and there would
be nothing to present to the president for his signature because again, there is no enrolled/certified copy.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ANNOTATION
6) CERTIFIED BILLthis refers to a measure which the President attests to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or an emergency. Such bill may be voted on Third
Reading without need to wait for the 3-day period after its approval on Second Reading;5
7) CLEAN BILLthis refers to a measure that has been significantly reworded by a committee so as to
bear little resemblance to the original version that it in effect replaces the latter. In todays Congress, it
usually refers to a new draft where the corrections have already been incorporated and the proposed
provisions to be deleted have already been removed;
9) COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLEthis refers to the situation where the entire Chamber resolves itself
into a committee in order to debate and discuss legislation informally;7
10) CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONthis refers to a resolution passed by both houses of Congress but
does not have the power of law and does not require the Presidents signature;
11) CONFERENCE COMMITTEEthis refers to a committee composed of equal number of members
from both the House of Representatives and the Senate with the purpose of forging a compromise
between the disagreeing provisions between the Senate version and House version of a particular
legislative measure. The result of such compromise is contained in a Conference Committee Report or
colloquially called a Bicam Report which is then submitted to their respective chambers for approval;8
12) CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONthis refers to a mechanism or tool in which
Congress,through its committees conduct investigations or inquiries in aid of legislation;9
26) TABLE A BILLthis refers to a motion to either delay or kill a bill. It is not debatable in either
chamber. The Senate, however, employs a different language from that of the House. In the Senate, the
motion is worded to allow a bill to lie on the table, perhaps to be picked up at a later time;
27) VETO OVERRIDEthis refers to the mechanism that allows Congress to reverse a presidential
vetoand enact a bill into law. A veto override requires a two-thirds vote of those present and voting in the
Senate and the House of Representatives17; and
28) VETO POWERthis refers to the authority of the President of the Republic to disapprove a bill
passed by Congress.18
Simply put, the legislative life of a measure or a bill, as it is commonly called, begins with the filing of the
same by the lawmaker. Once filed, it is then calendared for First Reading.
First Reading is the process where the bills title is read in plenary session and referred to the appropriate
committee.19 Once in the committee level, the bill is scrutinized through public hearings where
arguments by advocates and those in opposition of the measure are heard.
After the public hearings are terminated a Committee Report is then prepared and transmitted to the floor
for Second Reading.
During Second Reading,20 the bill undergoes sponsorship, interpellation and amendments.
Sponsorship is where the essential and salient features of the bill are presented as well as to underscore
the rationale for the bills enactment.
The period of interpellations is where debate over the bill takes place.21 This is where arguments of
lawmakers in opposition to and those in favor of the bills passage are heard.
After the period of interpellations, the period of amendments come in. This period is divided into two
stagesthe period of committee amendments and the period of individual amendments.
Committee amendments are those formulated by the Committee or Committees that reported out the bill.
Said amendments are usually included in the committee report.22
Individual amendments on the other hand are amendments proposed by the individual legislators in
plenary session.
Such amendments may or may not be accepted by the sponsor of the bill. If a deadlock ensues, a

division of the house will be called.

After the conclusion of the period of individual amendments, the bill is again read on THIRD READING
and voted upon.23
Once passed, it is then transmitted to the other chamber and it will undergo the same procedure as it did
in the chamber that transmitted it.
In the event the other chamber has a similar bill and the two (2) measuresthe Senate version and
House version, have conflicting provisions, a Bicameral Conference will be constituted in order to thresh
out the conflicting provisions of both bills.
After its conclusion, a Bicameral Conference Committee Report will be transmitted to both houses of
Congress for its approval. The Bicameral Report will contain the reconciled version of the bill.24 Once
passed by Congress, the enrolled bill, enacted by both Houses of Congress and certified by its officials,
is then transmitted to the Office of the President for consideration. Note that the President of the Republic
of the Philippines may approve or reject the bill or allow the same to lapse into law.
QUESTION HOUR--part of congress' oversight function on 'legis scrutiny'. in scrutiny,, congress does it
through the budget hearings.
SENATE V. ERMITA--Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the exec branch and its
power of inquiry extends to exec officials who are the most familiar with and informed on exec operations.
this is grounded on necessity of information in the legis process. if the info is necesary for wise legislation
on that subject, congress has right to that info and the power to compel the disclosure therof.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE--power of teh govt to withold info from the public, courts and teh congress as
well as the right of the president and high level exec branch officers to withold info from congress, courts
and public.
TYPES:
--STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE--info is of such nature that its disclosure would subert crucial military or
diplomatci objectives.
--INFORMERS PRIVILEGE--privilege of govt not to disclose identity of perosns who furnish info of
violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law
--GENERIC PRIVILEGE OF INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS--has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which govt decisions and policies are formulated
executive privilege is recognized only to certain types of info of a sensitive character; the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against exec secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION--aim is to elicit info that may be used for legislation. appearance of
those called is MANDATORY. The only way for dept heads to exempt themselves is by a valid claim of
executive privilege.
QUESTION HOUR--objective is to obtain info in pursuit of congress' oversight function; congress merely
seeks to be informed on how dept heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued. congress
may only REQUEST the appearance of dept heads.
ONLY PERSON EXEMPT FROM THIS POWER IS THE PRESIDENT. he is beyond the reach of
congress except thru the power of impeachment. it is based on his being highest official of the exec
branch and the due respect accorded to coequal branch of govt.
MEMBERS OF SUPREME COURT ARE ALSO EXEMPT FROM POWER OF INQUIRY. each member is
exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the consti
independence of the judiciary.

the REQT TO SECURE PRESIDENTIAL CONSENT is limited only to appearances in QUESTION HOUR
for it is discretionary on their part. unlike inquiries in aid of legislation,congress is not bound by the refusal
of dept head.
EXEC PRIVILEGE is invoked in relation to specific CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION and NOT to
categories of persons. the person who is in possession of info which in teh judgment of head of office
concerned is privileged.
INFORMATION that is privileged: Presidential conversations, correspondences or discussions during
closed door cabinet meetings which like internal-deliberations of the SC and other collegiate courts, or
executive sessions of either house of congress are recognized confidential. this info cannot be pried open
by a coequal branch of govt.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MAY INVOKE THE EXECUTIVE IN PRESIDENT'S BEHALF by stating that
the authority was 'by order of the president' which means that he personally consulted with the president.
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
GUDANI V. SENGA--the president has consti autohroity to prevent a member of the AFP from testifying
before a legis inquirty, by virtue of her power as COMMANDER IN CHIEF and thas as a consequence, a
military officer who defies usch injunction is liable under militaryjustice; at the same time, any chamber of
congress which seeks teh apperance before it of a military officer against the consent of the president has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance--the president may be commanded by jduicial
order to compel the atendance of the mitliary officer. final judicial orders have the force of the law of the
land which the president has the duty to faithfully execute.
power of president on military officers--based on CHAIN OF COMMAND rule.
SENATE BLUE RIBBON V. MAJADUCON--the RTC or any court has not authority to prohibit the senate
blue ribbon committee from requiring a person to appear and testify before congress in inquiries in aid of
legislation
IN RE: SABIO--PCGG members and staff CANNOT be exempt from the congress power of inquiry.
congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or needed statutes. it even EXTENDS TO GOVT AGENCIES created
by congress and officers whose positions are within the power of congress to regulate or
even abolish. the law exempting them violates:
(1) congress power of inquiry;
(2) principle of public accountability
(3) policy of full disclosure and
(4) right to public information
POWER OF INQUIRY not only granted to senate and HR but also to any of their RESPECTIVE
COMMITTEES. there is DIRECT CONFERRAL OF POWER to them. it necessarily carries with it all the
powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge i.e. power to punish for contempt.
PHILCOMSAT V. SENATE--senate committees inquiry does not violate right to privacy and right against
self-incrimiantion.
in the right to privacy--board of directors had no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving
their offices in a corporation where the govt has interest. such matters are of public concern and over
which the people have the right to information. right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest.
in right against self incrimination--may only be invoked when the incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.

that this right may be POSSIBLY violated is no ground for denying senate committees their power of
inquiry.
STANDARD V. SENATE--FILING OF ANY PROSECUTION OF CRIM/ADMIN action should NOT STOP
or abate any inquiry to carry out a legis purpose. Exercise of sovereign legis authority cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or admin investigation
OBLIGATION OF EVERY CITIZEN--respond to subpoena, respect dignity of congress and its committees
and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
POWER TO PUNISH CONTEMPT BY CONGRESS--based on principle of self-preservation. it can assert
its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. such power attaches not to the discharge of legis
fxns per se but to the sovereign character of the legis as one fo the 3 independent and coordinate
branches of govt.
power of legis investigation includes the power to compel attendance of witnesses and corollary, the
power ot ensure that said witness would be available to testify in the legis investigation.
RATIONAL BASIS RELATIONSHIP TEST--While it is true that in inquiries in aid of legis, rights of persons
shall be respected, not every invocation of right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate
congressional inquiry. right to access info of public concern prevails over right to privacy of ordinary
financial transactions. under the rational basis rel test, there is NO infringement of the right to privacy
where the requirement to disclose info is for a valid purpose i.e. ensure that govt agencies involved in
regulating banking trans adequately protect public who invest in foreign securities.
the prosecution of offenders by prosecutorial agencies is for punishment of person who transgress the
law. intent of legis inquiries is to arrive at policy determination. while it may be conceded that the inquiry
will aid prosecution of pending suits, the inquiry is still not abridged as it is directed in respect of legis
action and not prosecution.
except when congress exercises power to punish for contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there is
overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. it can only recommend measure to address whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its report a
recommendation for the criminal indictment of person who may appear liable. at best, the
recommendation is PERSUASIVE. but prosecution is up to the DOJ and courts to determine the liabilities
of the offender.
NERI V. SENATE:
--elements of PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE: (1) Protected communication must
relate to quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; (2) communication must be authorized or
solicited and received by a close advisor of the president or the pres himself. the judicial test is that an
advisor must be in 'operational proximity' with president ; (3) PCP remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need (info likely contains impt evidence and by teh unavailability
of the info elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority)
right to info must be balanced with consti precepts.
OPERATIONAL PROXIMITY test v. ORGANIZATIONAL TEST--limit availability of exec privilege only to
officials who stand proximate to the president, not only by reaosn of their function but also by reason of
their positions in the exec org structure
VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE--in the absence of published rules of procedure on a matter which
is the subject of legis inquiry, any action which affects substantial rights of persons would be anathema
and risks unconsti and even if there is such a rule duly published, if it lacks comprehensible standards,
the rule would be repugnant to the consti.

PHILCOMSAT V. SENATE--Right to counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial

investigation. allegation that this right was violated during the public hearings as resource persons held
before the senate is specious. such right can only be invoked when suspected for the commission of
crime.
OTHER NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
1. act as board of canvassers for Pres and VP elections
2. call special elections for both
3. revoke/extend suspension of HC and declaration of martial law
approve presidential amnesties
confirm certain appointments
concur in treaties
declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers
be judge of president's physical fitness or capacity
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
--basic function: executive (serves as extension to appointing powers of the president)
--AD INTERIM: covers positions under section 16 and extended when congress is not in session (if wala
ka sa section 16, WON congress is in session, it is NOT ad interim)
--ACTING appointments: not submitted to CA because it can never become permanent. absent grave
abuse of discretion, acting appointments are VALID.
--if appointment was BYPASSED by CA--president can REAPPOINT the person
--if REJECTED ang nomination--can no longer be renominated to the same position. (but pwede
manominate sa ibang position)
POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
CORONA V. SENATE--impeachment refers to the power of congress to remove a pub official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the consti. by the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting
as impeachment court, senator-judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,
prosecutors and counsel during the trial.
WHO ARE SUBJECT TO IMPEACHMENT
President, VP,SC justices, ConCom, OMB
GROUNDS: TBGCBO
PROCEDURE:
FRANCISCO V. NMMP--a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a purely political
question which the consti has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. it is beyond SCs judicial
power.
INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT CASE
(1) FILING of verified compliant either by member of HR or by a private cit ENDORSED by a member of
the HR
(2) Processing of complaint by comitte on justice and good governance who may reject or uphold it
(3) resolution forwarded to the house for further processing
(4) there is processing of same complaint by teh HR which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
comitee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of 1/3 of all the members. if 1/3 votes--articles of
impeachment are prepared and transmitted to senate.
RECKONING OF THE 1 YEAR BAN ON ANOTHER IMPEACHMENT--FILING AND REFERRAL RULE.
initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral/endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
house comm on justice OR by the filing by at least 1/3 of the members of HR with the sec gen of the

house
GUTIERREZ V. HR COMM ON JUSTICE:
--it is only in the IMPEACDHMETN RULES where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of
impeachment complaint is made necessary to effectively carry out the impeachment process.
--ONE YEAR BAR RULE--the initiation starts in the filing of complaint which must be accompanied with
an action to set the complaint moving i.e . congress taking initial action which is REFERRAL of the
complaint to the comm on justice.
--quesiton as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated
rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to impeachment trial. it is the HOUSE OF
REP , in PUBLIC PLENARY SESSION which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation
by referring complaint.
--PURPOSE OF 1 YEAR BAN RULE: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment and to allow legis to
do its principal task of legislation.
--consti allows the indictment for MULTIPLE IMPEACHMENT OFFENSES, with each charge representing
an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the 'articles of impeachment'. impeachment
complaint need not allege only 1 impeachable offense.
--court CANNOT review the sufficiency of the substance of the impeachment complaints as doing so will
delve into the merits of teh impeachment complaints over which the court has no jurisdiction
CONSEQUENCES OF IMPEACHMENT
--Senate cannot impose penalty except for removal
--perpetual disqualification
--no imprisonment, damages, etc
--however, once impeached--respondent now liable for civil and criminal liability
POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
CORONA V. SENATE--impeachment refers to the power of congress to remove a pub official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the consti. by the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting
as impeachment court, senator-judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,
prosecutors and counsel during the trial.
WHO ARE SUBJECT TO IMPEACHMENT
President, VP,SC justices, ConCom, OMB
GONZALES V. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT--DEPUTY OMB and special prosecutors are NOT impeachable
officers. but the grounds for removing them are teh same grounds as for impeachment.
while the ombudsman act declares the OMBs disciplinary authority over all govt officials, the same law
grants the President express power of REMOVAL over a deputy ombudsman and a special prosecutor. in
this case, where the OP was first to initiate case against gonzales, prudence should have prompted the
OMB to desit from proceeding separately against gonzales thru its internal affairs board and to defer
instead to teh president's assumption of authority, esp when teh admin charge involved 'demanding and
soliciting sum of money' which constitutes either graft and ocrrupiton or briber, both of which are grounds
reserved for the pres' exercise of his authority to remove a deputy ombudsman.
further, power of president to remove deputy omb may only be under the same grounds that the oMB
may be removed thru impeachment (dapat same grounds lang sa grounds for impeachment)
GROUNDS: TBGCBO
PROCEDURE:
FRANCISCO V. NMMP--a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is a purely political
question which the consti has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. it is beyond SCs judicial
power.

INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT CASE

(1) FILING of verified compliant either by member of HR or by a private cit ENDORSED by a member of
the HR
(2) Processing of complaint by comitte on justice and good governance who may reject or uphold it
(3) resolution forwarded to the house for further processing
(4) there is processing of same complaint by teh HR which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
comitee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of 1/3 of all the members. if 1/3 votes--articles of
impeachment are prepared and transmitted to senate.
RECKONING OF THE 1 YEAR BAN ON ANOTHER IMPEACHMENT--FILING AND REFERRAL RULE.
initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral/endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
house comm on justice OR by the filing by at least 1/3 of the members of HR with the sec gen of the
house
GUTIERREZ V. HR COMM ON JUSTICE:
--it is only in the IMPEACDHMETN RULES where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of
impeachment complaint is made necessary to effectively carry out the impeachment process.
--ONE YEAR BAR RULE--the initiation starts in the filing of complaint which must be accompanied with
an action to set the complaint moving i.e . congress taking initial action which is REFERRAL of the
complaint to the comm on justice.
--quesiton as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated
rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to impeachment trial. it is the HOUSE OF
REP , in PUBLIC PLENARY SESSION which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation
by referring complaint.
--PURPOSE OF 1 YEAR BAN RULE: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment and to allow legis to
do its principal task of legislation.
--consti allows the indictment for MULTIPLE IMPEACHMENT OFFENSES, with each charge representing
an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the 'articles of impeachment'. impeachment
complaint need not allege only 1 impeachable offense.
--court CANNOT review the sufficiency of the substance of the impeachment complaints as doing so will
delve into the merits of teh impeachment complaints over which the court has no jurisdiction
CONSEQUENCES OF IMPEACHMENT
--ESTRADA V. DESIERTO--(1) it cannot extend further than REMOVAL from office and disqualification to
hold any officer under the republic of the phils; and (2) party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Requirements as to bills
(1) TITLES OF BILLS
--objective that every bill shall embrace only 1 subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof:
(a) prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
(b) prevent surprise or fraud upon the legis by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no info
(c) fairly apprise people of the subjects of legislation that are being considered
PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO
- Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of
the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. [Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado, 227 SCRA 703(1993)]
- The petitioners contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution.

-
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as
to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of
the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible.3 [
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC
- Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, the title is
comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve; In determining the
constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its validity.
- Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject
matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is The Voters Registration Act of 1996
with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING
REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE
APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR. Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of
election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity
of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the
reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the
conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that
the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details
therein. In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the
presumption is in favor of its validity. [De Guzman, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA
188(2000)]
BANAT V. COMELEC
- Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to
its purpose encouraging a trans-parent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act [Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Party-List vs. Commission on Elections, 595 SCRA 477(2009)]
- Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (BP 881),15 Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),16 and other related election laws to
achieve its purpose of promoting trans-parency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the
elections. [Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) PartyList vs. Commission on Elections, 595 SCRA 477(2009)]
WHAT SHOULD CONTROL? TITLE OR TEXT?
--CRUZ V. PARAS--Title prevailed; where title of a law empowers a local council to REGULATE places of
amusement, its amendment so as to include 'prohibit' int eh body of law without change in the title would
give rise to consti question on titling of bills
--FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE--an act having a single general subject indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are consistent to the general
subject and may be considered in furtherance thereof by providing the means and methods of carrying it
out.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO CERTAIN LAWS

ORIGIN OF BILLS
--In relation to bills which must originate form the lower house (appropriation, tariff,revenue, bills of local
app, private bills), the senate may make its anticipatory bill covering the same subject but it cannot act on
their own version pending receipt of the approved version of the lower house. the consti does not
preclude senate from modifying the entire bill and coming up with its own version--even if totally different
from the lower house.
APPROPRIATION LAWS --All provisions in the approp bill must refer to a particular item or appropriated
item
ATITIW V. ZAMORA
--in order that a provision or clause in Gen app bill may comply with test of germaneness, it must be
PARTICULAR(relates specifically to a distinct item of appropriation in the bill), UNAMBIGUOUS (apparent
on the face of the bill and does not necessitate reference to details outside the app bill) and
APPROPRIATE (when its subject matter does not have to be treated in a separate legislation
DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION--when the word or phrases in an app bill do not relate to
a particular item of approp, that provision/word/phrases are considered inappropriate (i.e. possible
requirement of reports to the president re: judicial devt fund. remember: money from JDF come from
docket fees and not from the public treasury. it does not form part of appropriations in the app bill)
APPROPRIATION PROCEDURE
(1) BUDGETARY HEARINGS--same deliberations for all (2) SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS--must state
the nature/purpose of the same and availability of funds
(3) AUTOMATIC RE-ENACTMENT PROVISION
(4) TRANSFER OF FUNDS-General rule: not allowed; otherwise--technical malversation.
exceptions: (conditions must concur)
(a) there is a special law allowing the transfer
(b) who may transfer: heads of exec depts, president, CJ, senate pres and speaker, con commissioners.
(c) provided there are savings in an appropriated item and
(d) savings spent for augmentation of another appropriated item.
PRESIDENT'S VETO POWER
--General rule: president must veto entire bill or none at all
--exception: LINE VETO (veto only particular items in the revenue/tarrif/approp bill. )
--exception to exception: line veto only allowed if they are separable from each other. otherwise, veto all if
portion is not separable from the rest.
INSTANCES WHEN BILL BECOMES LAW WITHOUT SIGNATURE OF PRESIDENT
(1) successful override of presidential veto by 2/3 vote of both houses
(2) by lapse of time (president does not act on Enrolled Bill within 30 days from receipt)
(3) when there is VACANCY of Pres and vp positions and what is involved is a special law calling for a
special elections.
LEGISLATIVE VETO--failure or refusal of congress to act on an intended/proposed legislation.
INWARD TURNING LEGISLATION--not valid. congress withholds efficacy of IRR made by admin
agencies
POCKET VETO--not present in the philippines but present in US; failure of president to return a bill
vetoed by him because congress is not in session. veto becomes effective when president fails to sign a
bill after congress has adjourned and is unable to override the veto. in that case, it is already an absolute

veto that cannot be overridden. (in the phils, WON congress is in session, president must return the same
within 30 calendar days)
GONZALES V. MACARAIG
- the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional
Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources
(Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because
the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department
(branch) to another.
- The power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same
item.
- Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although labelled as provisions are actually
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto
power
- The Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the
appropriation itself to stand
- Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in
a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures.
- ection 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) held to be inappropriate conditions. [
- When Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90), therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item
or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of
such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the Executive the
power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners contend, the leeway granted being delimited to
transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings.
BENGZON V. DRILON
- Veto; The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power; The veto power is not absolute [Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208 SCRA
133(1992)]
- The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to
veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. [Bengzon vs. Drilon,
208 SCRA 133(1992)]
- The President cannot set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through
the exercise of the veto power. [Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133(1992)]
PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ
- A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or any
other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress. Where the veto is claimed to
have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution,
the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises
- While the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto, said remedy is available only
when the presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations, not when the same is
claimed to be ultra vires
- Pork Barrel; The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity
to be funded under the appropriation law. xecutive function under the Countrywide Development
Fund involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law while the authority given
to members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented.
- The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or
activities under the General Appropriations Act of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
[Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506(1994)]
- Fund Transfers; Under the Special Provisions applicable to Congress, the members only
determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating

expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who
shall approve the realignment. [Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA
506(1994)]
T he veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
and the Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto. [Philippine
Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506(1994)]
Line Item Veto; Generally, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts, except in
regard to general appropriations bills where he may veto any particular item or items, in which
case he has to veto the entire item. [Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA
506(1994)]
General Appropriations Bill, explained.A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose
or a separate fiscal unit [Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506(1994)]
Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision; Any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered an
inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately from an item. [Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506(1994)]
Provisions which are intended to amend other laws are inappropriate provisions in a general
appropriations bill.
Provisos which are appropriate provisions cannot be vetoed separately.
Congress may add special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the
budgetary sense [Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506(1994)]
By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or
modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control in the
implementation of particular executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is requiring
disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This
device represents a significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to
shared administration [Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506(1994)]
Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.However the
case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto
as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on
other grounds
Power of Impoundment, defined.This is the first case before this Court where the power of the
President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are
proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see
that the laws are faithfully executed
LEGISLATIVE VETO
ABAKADA V. PURISIMA
- Legislative Veto; Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers, but to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment beyond the legislative sphere, the Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congressit may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power, and, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures specified under the Constitution,
including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment; Any post-enactment

congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and investigationany action or step beyond
that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. [Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251(2008)]
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny
based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President
or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law
to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a right or power to
approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect; Congress has two options when
enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative
competenceit can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.
[Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251(2008)]
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
--know his qualifications/term/election/oath

--privilege and salary
--executive privilege (presidential communications privilege and deliberative process privilege; requisites;
operational proximity rule,etc. )
PRESIDENTIAL COMM PRIVILEGE--pertains to communications, documents or other mateiral that
reflecdt presidential decision making and deliberations and that the president believes should remai
confidential
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS--includes adivsory opinions, recommendations and deliberations conspirting
parts ofa process by which govtl decisions and policies are formulated
DISTNCTIONS
1. PCP appleis to decision making of the rpesident; DPP to decision making of exec officials
2. PCP rooted on consti privilege of separation of powers ; DPP on common law prvilege
3. PCP applies to docu in their entirety and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as predeliberative ones;
MORE SPECIFIC CLASSIFICATIONS COVERED BY EP
1. military/state secrets
2. identity of govt informers in some circumstances
3. information regarding pending investigations
4. foreign relations
--official residence
--salary (cannot be increased or decreased during his term; pag congress- ang prohibited lang is
INCREASE during term)
PROHIBITIONS
--President and members of exec family not allowed to engage in any other office/employment except in
ex officio capacity (VP as member of cabinet; DOJ Sec as member of JBC and ex officio positions)
--prohibition on exercise of profession
--financial interest in contracts with govt

--disclosure of SALN
CLU V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
- The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President
and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned. [Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317(1991)]
- Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other
provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from
holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, (N)o Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . ..
Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, (N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at
any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. Even Section 7 (2),
Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides (U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government.
- Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.It is quite
notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. [Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317(1991)]
- The all-embracing prohibition imposed on the President and his official family are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class
stricter prohibitions. [Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317(1991)]
- While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself [Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary,
194 SCRA 317(1991)]
- In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be
the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. [Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317(1991)]
- In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. [Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary,
194 SCRA 317(1991)]
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMM V. COA
- While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. [National Amnesty Commission vs.
Commission on Audit, 437 SCRA 655(2004)]
- The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services
in the said position.The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-

officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials
office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise any other office within the contemplation
of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
said officials. . . . x x x x x x x x x [T]he prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned officials office. The
term ex-officio means from office; by virtue of office. It refers to an authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further warrant or appointment. [National Amnesty Commission vs.
Commission on Audit, 437 SCRA 655(2004)]
BITONIO V. COA
- The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services
in the said position. [Bitonio, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit, 425 SCRA 437(2004)]
- It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary
Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the
primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come
under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
PUBLIC INTEREST V. ELMA
- Following the commonlaw rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect,
vacated his first office as Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman
when he accepted the second office as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel.
- Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being
incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following the commonlaw rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as
PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC. [Public Interest Center, Inc. vs.
Elma, 517 SCRA 336(2007)]
SUCCESSION
--Differentiate if vacancy happened BEFORE, DURING term and in case of TEMPORARY DISABILITY
REMOVAL--only by impeachment
power and function of the president--merely limitations and not grants
POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
Control--reverse, reviese, amend alter deicisons
supervision--sedure that laws are faithfully executed
ANGELES V. GAITE--all exec and admin orgs are adjucnts of exec department. presidents act of
delegating authroity to the DOJ Sec via memo circular is well within the Doctrine of QPA which
recognizes establishmetn of signle executive; heads of various exec depts are assistants and agents of
president; and exdept in cases where hte latter is requried by consti or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious exec and admin functions of
the president are performed by and thru the exec depts and the acts of sec/undersec performed in the
regular course of business are presumptively acts of the president unless disapproved ore reprobated by
the latter.

in this case, MC 58 disallowed appeals from DOJ decisions relating to PI of criminal cases to the OP
unless punishable by RP to death. --LAW IS VALID. As there is no such remedy to OP, remedy is file
certiorir to the ca.
BUKLOD V. ZAMORA
- As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the Presidents
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain law
may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. [Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718(2001)]
SECRETARY V. MABALOT
- The Presidentthrough his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in
the present casemay legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department,
particularly the establishment of the DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera
Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and
responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB. [Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 128(2002)]
- Power of Control; Emphatically, the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not
merely authorize but directed, in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies of
government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in
the Cordillera Administrative Region. [Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 128(2002)]
- Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; Words and Phrases; Control, Defined; From the purely
legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the
President since they are merely his alter ego. [Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 128(2002)]
- The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB
in the Cordillera Administrative Region fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the
President to effectively reorganize the Department of Transportation and Communications.
[Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA
128(2002)]
DENR V. DENR EMPLOYEES
- Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the executive department, and the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the Executive
Departments. [Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. DENR Region 12
Employees, 409 SCRA 359(2003)]
- he trial court should have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429,
as legal basis of the Presidents power to reorganize the Executive Department, specifically those
administrative regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM. [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, 409 SCRA 359(2003)]
CONSTANTINO V. CUISIA
- There are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President [Constantino, Jr. vs. Cuisia, 472 SCRA
505(2005)]
- There are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena,
makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature,
cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be
exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of
any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of

-
habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of
the benign prerogative of mercy [Constantino, Jr. vs. Cuisia, 472 SCRA 505(2005)]
ection 1 of R.A. No. 245 empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President
and after consultation of the Monetary Board, to borrow from time to time on the credit of the
Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue
therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government. [Constantino, Jr. vs. Cuisia,
472 SCRA 505(2005)]
The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power subject to
such limitations as may be provided under law. Said presidential prerogative may be exercised
by the Presidents alter ego, who in this case is the Secretary of Finance. [Constantino, Jr. vs.
Cuisia, 472 SCRA 505(2005)]
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA
- Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officersthe first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution,
the second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, and
the third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law; Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [Rufino vs. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13(2006)]
- The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first
group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints
the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing
power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees
fall under the third group of officers. [Rufino vs. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13(2006)]
- The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one
conclusionthe officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may
appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint. [Rufino vs.
Endriga, 496 SCRA 13(2006)]
- The Chairman of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) board is the head of the CCP who
may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP; The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency
but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution [Rufino vs. Endriga,
496 SCRA 13(2006)]
- Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint only officers lower in rank than such heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boardsthis excludes a situation where the appointing officer
appoints an officer equal in rank as him; Insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional. [Rufino vs. Endriga, 496
SCRA 13(2006)]
- The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all
executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk, a constitutional power
that is self-executing and which does not require any implementing law; Congress cannot limit or
curtail the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch
- Since the CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government, and neither
is it also one of the independent constitutional bodies, nor a quasi-judicial body or a local
government unit, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch; Since the President exercises
control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, the President necessarily

exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. [Rufino vs. Endriga,
496 SCRA 13(2006)]
MMDA V. VIRON
- Since, under the law, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) is
authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that the
President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project,
which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the Presidents power of
control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the
laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution. [Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
vs. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., 530 SCRA 341(2007)]
ANAK MINDANAO V. EXECUTIVE- The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive departments,
bureaus and offices in the President alone; The Constitutions express grant of the power of
control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a
broad authority of law. [Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. The Executive Secretary, 531 SCRA
583(2007)]
- As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of
control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. [Anak Mindanao
Party-List Group vs. The Executive Secretary, 531 SCRA 583(2007)]
- The President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. [Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. The Executive Secretary, 531
SCRA 583(2007)]
BANDA V. ERMITA
- The National Printing Office, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary, is part
of the Office of the President [Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488(2010)]
- Pursuant to Section 20, of the Administrative Code of 1987, the power of the President to
reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may
be provided for under other laws. [Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488(2010)]
- The delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the
departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the
Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. [Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA
488(2010)]
- If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of
security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. [Banda vs. Ermita, 618
SCRA 488(2010)]
GENERAL SUPERVISION OF LGU and AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
GANZON V. CA
- supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. x x x Control has been defined as
the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter. Supervision on the other hand means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. [Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA
271(1991)]
- Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.It is the considered opinion of the Court
that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest
the legislature of its rightor the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation
to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. [Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 200
SCRA 271(1991)]
JOSON V. TORRES

-
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. [Joson vs. Torres, 290
SCRA 279(1998)]
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines,
whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating
Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special
Investigating Committee. [Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279(1998)]
Power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is
derived from his power of general supervision over local governments. [Joson vs. Torres, 290
SCRA 279(1998)]
Power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. [Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA
279(1998)]
PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
- In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties;
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
bodyit does not include any restraining authority over such body. [Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre,
336 SCRA 201(2000)]
- nder our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the
heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from
the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to
the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere
of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. [Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre, 336
SCRA 201(2000)]
- Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may
provide. [Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201(2000)]
- Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regionsmunicipal
governments are still agents of the national government. [Pimentel, Jr. vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA
201(2000)]
BITO-ONON V. FERNANDEZ
- The liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league
or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected
government officials; [Bito-Onon vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732(2001)]
- Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the
DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the
regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree
with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for
review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended
and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA
which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board.
The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is
an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. [Bito-Onon
vs. Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732(2001)]

NATIONAL LIGA V. PAREDES

- Presidents power of general supervision, as exercised by the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. [National
Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130(2004)]
- When respondent judge appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the
affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and
vested control of the Liga on the DILG [National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA
130(2004)]
- Acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct
interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as
an institution; What the DILG wielded was the power of control which even the President does not
have [National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130(2004)]
- The DILGs authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it
cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them
[National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130(2004)]
- The Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
[National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130(2004)]
POWER OF PRESIDENT TO APPOINT
--executive in character and is discretionary on appointing authority
--those needing CA appointment are under section 16. if wala ka didto, i.e. PNP and NLRC, coastguard
officials and JBC recommended people i.e. SC members and other lower courts, OMB and his deputies,
VP as member of cabinet--no need to pass nomination to CA. legislation cannot amend what consti only
requires.
--DISTINGUISH AD INTERIM AND REGULAR APPOINTMENTS
--MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS: 2 months before the end of term (2mos before noon of june 30) president
cannot extend appointmetns except temp apps on exec positions when continued vacancies would
prejudice public service r safety
--midnight apps do not cover the judiciary (because of that 90 day rule)
MANALO V. SISTOZA
- It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who
are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As
held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of
other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. [Manalo vs. Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239(1999)]
- epublic Act 6975; Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on
Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required
by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. [Manalo vs. Sistoza, 312 SCRA
239(1999)]
- The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
It is petitioners submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officers whose rank is equal to that of
colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This
contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. [Manalo vs.
Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239(1999)]
- Directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. [Manalo vs. Sistoza,
312 SCRA 239(1999)]
- The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the
military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief

superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the
first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. [Manalo vs. Sistoza, 312 SCRA 239(1999)]
MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
- An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into officethe
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character [Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49(2002)]
- The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress. [Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49(2002)]
- The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an
ad interim appointment takes effect immediately; In case of an appointment made by the
President when Congress is in session, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of
the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office, while with
reference to an ad interim appointment, it takes effect at once, and the individual chosen may
thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. [Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA
49(2002)]
- he term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President,
means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in
recess. [Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49(2002)]
- An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified
into office, and the withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is
communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation
thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. [Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49(2002)]
- An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitutionfirst,
by the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and,
second, by the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his
appointment. [Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49(2002)]
- An appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity is the kind of appointment that
the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional
commissions.While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee
does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that
the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional
commissions, including the COMELEC. [Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49(2002)]\
SORIANO V. LISTA
- Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or
any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by
the CA. [Soriano III vs. Lista, 399 SCRA 437(2003)]
- Enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. [Soriano III vs. Lista, 399 SCRA 437(2003)]
PIMENTEL V. ERMITA
- The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with
the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere. [Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587(2005)]
- Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically
the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications

-
to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. [Pimentel, Jr. vs.
Ermita, 472 SCRA 587(2005)]
[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any
other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. [Pimentel,
Jr. vs. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587(2005)]
Ad interim appointments are extended only during recess of Congress and are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection, whereas appointments in an acting
capacity may be extended any time there is a vacancy and are not submitted to the Commission
on Appointments. [Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587(2005)]
POSITISN REQUREING CONSENT OF CA

1. Heads of departnmetns
2. Abassodrs/public min/consuls
3. Officers of AFP from rank of colonel and naval captain
4. Ciariman and members of concom
5. REGULAR members of JBC
6. Sectora reps
a. QUINTOS DELES V. CA-- Appointments for sectoral representatives are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; Reason.Since the seats reserved
for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII
whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
[Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on Constitutional Commission, 177 SCRA 259(1989)]
b. Appointments vested in the President by express mandate of the Constitution which
require no confirmation.Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President
in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution,
c. _______________
d.
e. * EN BANC.
f. 260
g.
h. 260
i. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
j. Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on Constitutional Commission
k. require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9,
Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of
sectoral representatives in the Constitution. [Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on
Constitutional Commission, 177 SCRA 259(1989)]
BERMUDEZ V. TORRES
- The President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore
their recommendation. [Bermudez vs. Torres, 311 SCRA 733(1999)]
- The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, should be interpreted as it is normally so
understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, who is essentially persuasive in
character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. [Bermudez vs. Torres,
311 SCRA 733(1999)]
- The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President, being
the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the
departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting,

he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. [Bermudez vs. Torres, 311
SCRA 733(1999)]
POWER TO REMOVE
GONZALES V. OFFICE
- While the Ombuds-mans authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsmans
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
[Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, 679 SCRA 614(2012)
LIMITATIONS ON PRES POWER TO APPOINT
IN RE: MATEO VALENZUELA
- Section 15, Article VII of the Constitutiontwo months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his termthe President is neither required to make appointments
to the courts nor allowed to do so. [In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta, 298 SCRA 408(1998)]
- Midnight Appointments; Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1)
those made for buying votes; and (2) those made for partisan considerations
- Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some case [In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta, 298 SCRA 408(1998)]
- Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments to the Judiciaryfrom the highest to the
lowest courtsto be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the
appointments being addressed to the appointees Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court,
Manila, and it is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in the Chief Justices behalf, who
thereafter advises the individual appointees of their appointments and also of the date of
commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial
Academy for new Judges. [In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta, 298
SCRA 408(1998)]
- It is obviously not advisable, to say the least, for a Judge to take his oath of office and enter upon
the performance of his duties on the basis alone of a document purporting to be a copy of his
appointment coming from Malacaang, the authenticity of which has not been verified from the
latter or the Office of the Court Administrator; or otherwise to begin performing his duties as
Judge without the Court Administrator knowing of that fact. [In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta, 298 SCRA 408(1998)]
DE RAMA V. CA
- In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his or her tenure [De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 94(2001)]
- Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees assumption of the position in the civil
service, he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the
appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing; It is wellsettled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment
acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position
- This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be
taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid cause to
do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing. [De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, 353
SCRA 94(2001)]

- I t is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such
appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil
service law and regulations [De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 94(2001)]
PUBLIC INTEREST V. ELMA

- Incompatible Offices; The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary,
undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the
latter positions.Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in general to all elective
and appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII, thereof applies in particular to Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. In the Resolution in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991), this Court already clarified the scope of the prohibition provided
in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Citing the case of US v. Mouat, 124 US 303
(1999), it specifically identified the persons who are affected by this prohibition as secretaries,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; and categorically excluded public officers who merely
have the rank of secretary, undersecretary or assistant secretary. Another point of clarification
raised by the Solicitor General refers to the persons affected by the constitutional prohibition. The
persons cited in the constitutional provision are the Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants. These terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to the
heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. Public
officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not
covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby. (Italics supplied.) It is
clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a
secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank
as the latter positions. [Public Interest Center, Inc. vs. Elma, 494 SCRA 53(2006)]
LIBAN V. GORDON
- he Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution; Not being a government official or employee, the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. [Liban vs.
Gordon, 593 SCRA 68(2009)]
DE CASTRO V. JBC
- the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. [De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC), 618 SCRA 639(2010)]
BETOY V. BOARD OF DIRECTORS
- The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the National Power Board of Directors
(NPB) does not violate the prohibition contained in the Constitution as the privatization and
restructuring of the electric power industry involves the close coordination and policy
determination of various government agencies. [Betoy vs. The Board of Directors, National
Power Corporation, 658 SCRA 420(2011)]
- this Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary function of said officials offic [Betoy vs. The Board of Directors, National Power
Corporation, 658 SCRA 420(2011)]
- Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in
the public service by virtue of an earlier appointmentit does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the
position; The legal basis of an employees right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly

-
issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation. [Betoy vs. The
Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, 658 SCRA 420(2011)]
Considering the constitutional prohibition, it is clear that the emoluments or additional
compensation to be received by the members of the National Power Board of Directors (NPB) do
not apply and should not be received by those covered by the constitutional prohibition, i.e., the
Cabinet secretaries. [Betoy vs. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, 658 SCRA
420(2011)]
The cabinet officials designated to the National Power Board of Directors (NPB) cannot receive
any form of additional compensation by way of per diems and allowances; It is a fundamental rule
of statutory construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it,
rather than defeat it. [Betoy vs. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, 658 SCRA
420(2011)]
INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENTS

CONCEPCION BAUTISTA V. SALONG
- The appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is to be
made without the review and participation of the Commission on Appointments. To be more
precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is
not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. [Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160(1989)]
- Petitioners appointment on December 17, 1988 as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights was a completed act on the part of the President. All that remained for Bautista to do was
to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath
of office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming
immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights. Bautistas appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President. [Bautista vs. Salonga, 172
SCRA 160(1989)]
- No new or further appointment can be made to a position already filled by a previously completed
appointment which had been accepted by the appointee through a valid qualification and
assumption of duty [Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160(1989)]
- When the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to make without
the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the Executives act of submitting such
appointment to the Commission on Appointments, and the latters act of confirming or rejecting
the same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction. [Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA
160(1989)]
- Ad Interim Appointments; Appointments that are for the President solely to make, without the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments-- Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments
where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make,
that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim
appointments. [Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160(1989)]
- An independent office like the CHR cannot truly function with independence and effectiveness, if
the tenure in office of its Chairman and its members is made dependent on the pleasure of the
President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of
independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.
[Bautista vs. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160(1989)]
TEMPORARY DESIGNATION
- SEee page 17

-
Officer regularly appointed is UNABLE to perform d/t illness, absence or any other coause or
There is a VACANCY.
Temp designation shall not exceed 1 year.
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
DRILON V. CA
- he pardoning power of the President so with the commutation of sentence is final and
unappealable [Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378(1991)]
- The court cannot consider Ganzon's house arrest because in no way is arrest a penalty and his
(Ganzon's) record as far as his house arrest is concerned no longer exists
- Hence, the view of the Court is that irrespective of the "pardon," Ganzon has served his sentence
and to reiterate, he can no longer be reinvestigated for the same offense, much more undergo
further imprisonment to complete his service. [Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378(1991)]
PEOPLE V. SALLE
- Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any
time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal, but where the requirement is final
judgment, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. [People
vs. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA 581(1995)]
- Where the President is not so prevented by the Constitution from granting pardon before final
conviction, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidential folly [People
vs. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA 581(1995)]
- Before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his
appealthe appealed conviction must first be brought to finality. [People vs. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA
581(1995)]
IN RE: TORRES
- A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal. [In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709(1995)]
- The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive. [In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709(1995)]
- Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. [In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709(1995)]
PEOPLE V. CASIDO
- Pardon and Amnesty, Distinguished.Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is
a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from
the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives
the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense. (italics supplied) [People vs. Casido, 269 SCRA 360(1997)]
PEOPLE V. PATRIARCA

-
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. [People vs. Pariarca, Jr., 341 SCRA 464(2000)]
Criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty
and all its effects. [People vs. Pariarca, Jr., 341 SCRA 464(2000)]
MAGDALO V. COMELEC
- Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. [Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago
vs. Commission on Elections, 673 SCRA 651(2012)]
POWERS OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF
IBP V. ZAMORA
- CALLING OUT POWER-- Even as the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the
President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power
involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare. [Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)]
- In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis; In the performance of the Supreme Courts
duty of purposeful hesitation before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Presidents judgmentto doubt is to sustain. [Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 338
SCRA 81(2000)]
- The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call
was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitu- 86
- 86
- SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
- tional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. [Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs.
Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)]
- Unlike in the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the power to proclaim
martial law in relation to which the Constitution has empowered Congress to revoke such
suspension or proclamation and the Supreme Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
Presidents action to call out the armed forces, a distinction which places the calling out power in
a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. [Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)]
SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE
- he Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as
chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
[Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656(2004)]
DAVID V. GMA
- Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP
1017, is totally bereft of factual basis [David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160(2006)]
GUDANI V. SENGA

-
It has to be acknowledged as a general principle that AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable
under military law for violating a direct order of an officer superior in rank [Gudani vs. Senga, 498
SCRA 671(2006)]
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing
before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority
the commander-in-chief powers of the Presidentwhich, by tradition and jurisprudence, are not
encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or
executive control. [Gudani vs. Senga, 498 SCRA 671(2006)]
FORTUN V. GMA
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to
Congress;
520
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation
or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow
their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising
the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the
power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation
or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation
on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in
fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and
the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.2
[Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 668 SCRA 504(2012)]
VACACY IN JUDICIARY
--if vacancy in SC--appoint within 90 day from occurrence of VACANCY
--IF LOWER COURTS--WITHIN 90 DAYS from submission of list by JBC.
OTHER POWERS:
- Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
- Power over foreign affrairs, treaty making, executive agreemetns
- Deporation of undesirable aliens
POWER OVER CONGRESS
1. Message to congress
2. Preprationa nd submission of budge
3. Veto power

4. Emergency powers
5. Fixing of tariff rates
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
GLORIA V. CA
- The doctrine of presidential immunity has no application where the petition for prohibition is
directed not against the President himself but against his subordinates; Presidential decisions
may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the
President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.Petitioners theorize that the present petition
for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the
doctrine of presi dential immunity from suit. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple
reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The
questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that
the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. [Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA
5(2000)]
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
- Presidential Immunity; Section 3(7) of Article XI of the Constitution conveys two uncomplicated
ideasfirst, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited reach, i.e., it cannot
extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in
impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable
and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law [Estrada vs. Desierto, 356
SCRA 108(2001)]
- he intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure and not his term.Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure.
[Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108(2001)]
RUBRICO V. ARROYO
- Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of
the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs
the operation of the Government. [Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233(2010)]
LOZADA V. GMA
--the presidential privilege of imunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed
during his tenure. rule: president only enjoys immunity during actual incumbency.
--in this caes, the events that gave rise to this action occurred during incumbency of arroyo. in that
respect, it ws proper for court ot have dropped her as respondent on account of her presidential
immunity from suit. however, since her tenure has ended, he can no longer evade judicial determination
of her responsibility/accountability for the alleged crime.
--but in WRIT OF AMPARO CASES--what is established is only responsibility and nto liabiltiy. thus,
immunity may not be invoked by sitting president.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

SUPREME COURT
Composition
--in the case of PUBLIC INTEREST V. ELMA, Supreme Court; The mere application of constitutional
provisions does not require a case to be heard and decided en banc.There also is no merit in the
respondents motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in question in the present case is the
constitutionality of respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty,
law or agreement. The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be heard
and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the respondent, the decision of the Court in this case
does not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that
Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 289, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the Court en
banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.
CITY OF TAGAYTAY V. GUERRERO
Constitutional Law; No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court en banc or its
Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.Section 4, sub-paragraph
(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Supreme Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en
banc. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy, judicial time, and interests of litigants, as
well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final
judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons
apply with greater force to final judgments of the highest Court of the land.
APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATIONS
DE CASTRO V. JBC--The prohibition against presidential appointments does not extend to appointments
in the judiciary because the CONSTI mandates that vacancy must be filled within 90 days. to do
otherwise is a clear disobedience of the constitution.
RE: SENIORITY AMONG FOUD APPOINTMENTS
--Where the power of appointment is absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further
consent or approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment (commission) may issue at
once. the appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the app authority has been
complied with.
--the date the commission has been SIGNED by president (date appearing on the docu) is the date of
appointment . that date will determine the seniority of the members of the court. it is only when the
appointments of 2 or more appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance of the appointments
by the president becomes material. (THE EARLIER THE DATE OF COMMISSION, TEH MORE SENIOR
HE IS)
SALARY
NITAFAN V. CIR--DISCARDED ruling in endencia. the salaries of justices and judges are PROPER
SUBJECTS OF INCOME TAX and does not fall within the cosnti protection against decrease of their
salaries during continuance in office. it is a strained construction of the consti to read it as an exemption
from taxation.
SECURITY OF TENURE
DE LA LLANA V. ALBA
--abolition of an office if done in good faith s VALID.
--removal from office is diff. from termination by abolition of an office. there can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. after aboliton, threre is in law no occupant. in removal, there is an office with an occupant

who would thereby lose his position. it is in that sense, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise.
FISCAL AUTONOMY
RE: CO OPINION
--judicial independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to
resolve justiciable disputes while the jud branch, as a whole should work to discharge its consti functions
free of restraints save only those imposed by the consti.
--2 types of independence: DECISIONAL and INSTITUTIONAL independence
--DECISION--refer to judges ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based
solely on the individual facts and applicable law
--INSTITUTIONAL--separaiton of the jud branch from the 2 other branches; collective independence of
the judiciary as a body.
--FISCAL AUTONOMY --One of the most impt aspects of jud independence; courts may NOT be
obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions.
in this case, by way of long standing tradition and intentions of rewarding long and faithful service, SALE
to the retired justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has
been recognized both as PRIVILEGE AND BENEFIT. It is also an exercise of ADMIN SUPERVISION-power to administer jud's internal affairs and that includes authority to handle and manage the retirement
applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.
--the Chief Justice and court en banc determine and decide who, what where, etc. the privileges and
benefits they extend to justices within the parameters of the court's granted power.
RE: CLARIFYING
--fiscal aut means freedom from outside control. in downgrading the positions and salary of jud officers,
the DBM OVERSTEPPED its authority and encroached upon teh court's fiscal autonomy and supervision
of court personnel and in fine, a violation of the consti itself. those with FA must be given full flex to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
CSC V. DBM
--'automatic release' of approved annual appropriations to teh CSC should be construed to mean that no
condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
--SC prohibited teh enforcement of 'no report no release' poliy against the judiciary which has also been
granted FA by the consti
--assuming there is a shortfall in revenues, that does not justify non-compliance with automatic release. to
subject it to witholding or reduction of funds would be to place it on equal footing with other entities
without FA
--entities with FA should be given PRIORITY in th release of their approved appropriations over all other
agencies not similarly vested when there is arevenue shortall.
--Congress is NOT prohibited from reducing the appropriations of CONCOM below the amount
appropriated for them in the previous year (unlike in judiciary)
JUDICIAL POWER
ONGSUCO V. MALONES--SC recognized teh appellate juris of SC and orig juris of lower courts over
cases involving consti/validity of an ORDINANCE.
HENRY PANAY V. NLRC--SC is imbued with sufficietn authority and discretion to review matters, not
otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideraiton is necessary at arriviign at a
complete and just resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice application of the rules (in this case, NLRC awarded backwages etc. for a limited period
only. the award must be computed from date of illegal dismissal until decision attains finality)
CMU V. EXECUTIVE

-
Where an appeal from the Regional Trial Court raises purely questions of law, recourse should be
by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court. [Central Mindanao
University vs. Honorable Executive Secretary, 631 SCRA 30(2010)]
Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the
Presidential Proclamation, resulting in the denial of petitioners right to be heard on the same, is a
factual issue that was proper for the Court of Appeals to hear and ascertain from the parties.
Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of
law. [Central Mindanao University vs. Honorable Executive Secretary, 631 SCRA 30(2010)]
CUA V. PEOPLE--In petitions fro review under rule 45, only questions of law may be raised.--when it is
capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence.
LORZANO V. TABAYAG--question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts; question of fact if there is doubt that arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
CHAVEZ V. JBC
--notwithstanding the fact that only QOL are raised in teh petition, an action for declaratory relief is not
amont those within the orig juris of the SC. (in this case, the declaration of rights under the docu lies with
the RTC)
--claim that composition of JBC is illegal is object of concern not only for a nominee to a judicial post but
for all citizens who have right to seek jud intervention for rectification of legal blunders
TECSON V. COMELEC--Decisions of teh COMELEC on disqualificaiton cases may be reviewd by SC
under rule 64 in an action for certiorari under rule 65. comelec's decision on a DQ case involving a
presidential candiate could be elevated to the SC. (BASIS: provision statign that decisions of COMELEC
are appealabel to SC and the Judicial power of SC vesting in it the power to settle actual controversies
inolving rights..)
POST-ELECTION SCENARIO--consists of election protest or quo warranto. quo warranto is the action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. the juris of SC
does NOT include cases questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the Pres/VP BEFORE the
elections are held. the law only contemplates POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS. (EP those filed by 2nd or
3rd candidate; mga natalo na candidates)
--in the case of FPJ, whiel teh law states that IL children follow cit of its mother (alien ang mom nya), teh
1935 consti then was explicitly that those who are cits of phils ARE those 'whose fathers are citz of the
phils". there are no other conditions or distinctions provided. since his father was a filipino father even if
alien ang mom, he is a FILIPINO CITIZEN.
--1935 Consti confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are filipino citizens regardless whether
such children are legit or IL.
LEGARDA V. DE CASTRO
--in this case, the PET adopted the recommendations of its Hearing commissioner after thorough
deliberation and consideration of the issues in that case
MAKALINTAL V. PET
--the absence of a specific wording in the consti providing for establishment of PE will not render it
unconstitutional
--under the doctrine of NECESSARY IMPLICATION, teh additional juris to decide pres and VP election
contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. jud power granted to SC is plenary.
CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER JURIS OF THE SC
FIRST LEPANTO V. CA--Omnibus investments code was enacted granting appeals from BOI decision to
the SC--UNCONSTITUTIONAL. no law can be passed increasing the appellate juris of SC without its
advice and concurrence. the indiscriminate enactmetn of legislation enlarged juris of SC and unnecesarily

burdened essential functions of the court. (CA has appellate juris)

FABIAN V. DESIERTO--admin liability of a pub official could fall under juris of CSC and Ombudsman. al
adjudications by the CS in admin disciplinary cases are appealable to CA while those of the OMB are
appealable to the SC. under omb law, it is involved only where there is an appeal by certiorari under rule
45 taken from decision of admin agency and not when it is an original action for certio under rule 65
--all decision of QJ agencies are appealable to CA first
--section 27 of omb law providing direct appeal to SC is VIOLATIVE of the consti which in effect increases
its appellate juris without its advice and concurrence.
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
FUENTES V. OMB--omb may not initiate nor investigate a crim complaint against judge. he must indorse
the case to SC for appropriate action. it ist he SC that is tasked to oversee judges and court personnel
and take proper admin action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land.
CAOIBES--(CASE: 2 members of judiciary entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office
furniture); from the presiding justice of the CA down to lowest MTC Clerk, it is only the SC that can
oversee their compliance with all laws and take proper admin action against them. no other branch of
govt may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
--even if case is pending already with the omb, he must still refer the case to the SC.
--SC has EXCLUSIVE ADMIN supervision over all courts and its personnel. OMB cannot determine for
itself whether a crim complaint against a judge, court employee involves an admin matter.
ADAJAR V. DEVELOS--reiterate previous rulings, AC 1-99 expressly prohibits use of court offices for any
purpose other than for court or judicial functions. selling and buying in court premises is not allowed. case
is under juris of SC and not omb.
RULE MAKING POWER
ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY--power to promulgate rules of pleading/practice/procedure was granted
by consti to SC to enhance its independence.
NO QUASI JUDICIAL AND ADMIN WORK OF JUDGES
IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO--members of teh SC and other courts shall not be designated to
any agency performing QJ or admin functions. considering that embership of manzano in the ilocos norte
prov comm on justice which discharges admin functions, it is in violation of the consti. however, this
declaraiton doe snto mean that RTC judges may act as nonmembers who should still render assistance
to said committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such may
be reasonably INCIDENTAL to the fulfillment of the jud duties.
CHAVEZ V. JBC--but if sa PET, okay lang.
MANNER OF SITTING AND VOTES REQUIRED
LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC--3 instances where SC en banc may be equally divided in opinon or
majority votes not had
(1) in actions instituted originally in teh SC--if there is a tie vote, deliberate again; after such redeliberation
and equal parin, this means that NO DECISION had been reached. original actions is DIMISSED.
(2) In appealed cases--if after redeliberation, tie parin, judgment appealed from shall stand affirmed; a tie
vote en banc cannot amend or reverse a prior majority action of a lower court whose dcision stands
affirmed
(3) on all incidental matters--which includes MR; MR is denied.

TIE VOTE IN AN MR
--MR may be granted-upon vote of majority of members en banc or division who actually took part in the
deliberation of the motion
--if TIE--the MFR is denied. tie vote on MR cannot supersede the prior majority vote on the main decision.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO DECISIONS
MANGELEN V. CA--Decision was compliant with the law. it must state clearly and distinctly the facts of
the law on which it is based. if upon filing MR, a resolution or modified deciison thereon must also state
the factual and legal foundation relied upon.
GERMAN MAHCINERIES V. ENDAYA--The mandate of the law on decisions is applicable only in cases
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION (i.e. given due course and after the filing of the last brief/memo) and NOT
where a resolution is issued DENYING due course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof. thus,
when court, after deliberating on a petition decides to deny due course to the petition and states that
questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the court's decision, there is already
SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE with the law.
PEOPLE V. SB--A decision is deemed adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors
against it. the party appealing must be given a decision where he will know how the decision was reached
after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of applicable laws.
LUMANOG V. PEOPLE--MEMORANDUM DECISIONS are valid. though it is not a good practice, there is
nothing illegal in trial court's act of completely copying the memo submitted by teh party, provided that the
decision clearly and distinctly states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are based.
MANDATORY PERIOD FOR DECIDING CASES
DUQUE V. GARRIDO--lower court judges must decide case within 3 months ; 12 months on all lower
collegiate courts; 2 years for SC.
--rules prescribing time to decide are INDISPENSABLE to prevent needless delays in the orderly
disposition of cases. period is MANDATORY.
--90day period shall run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda or in case court
requires, case considered submitted upon filing of the last memo or upon expiration of period to do so,
whichever is earlier.
--failure to comply: warrants disciplinary action; suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than 1 nore more than 3 months; or by a fine of more than 10K but not more than 20K
OCA V. MANTUA--JUDICIAL AUDITY. there are no promulgated rules on teh conduct of JA. however,s
uch absence should not serve as license to recommend impostition of penalties to retired judges who,
during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of
the JA.
--JA reports and memo which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of
action for the violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due.
--manual jud audits may be conducted at least 6 months before a judge's compulsory retirement.
--observance of these time limits in disposition of cases should not be used to violate a judge's right to
due process.
HIPE V. LITERATO--if the caseload of the judge prevents disposition of cases within the reglementary
periods, he should ask the SC for a REASONABLE EXTENSION OF TIME to dispose of the cases
involved. this is to avoid suspicion that something sinister is going on.
OCA V. SANTOS--The court has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to
decide cases but such request is obviously a subterfuge to both the consti edict and code of jud conduct.
heavy caseload and demanding workload are NOT valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for

disposition of cases. further, his full compliance on the SCs directive will not exculpate him from admin
sanctions.
HEBRON V. GARCIA--reiterates previous rulings.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISISON
RULE AGAINST REAPPOINTMENT
NP V. BAUTISTA
--the membership of COMELEC is for a fixed period of9 years, except as to the first members appointed
who were to hold office for 9,6,3 years so that there will be 1 position vacant every 3 years; so that no
president can appoint more than 1 commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the independence
and impartiality of the commission.
--president may appoint a commissioner for an unexpired term only if there exists a vacancy d/t
death/resignation/retirement or removal by impeachment
--temporary designation or acting capacity in the concom is ILLEGAL. By the very nature of their
functions, they must be independent, made to feel secured in the tenure of office and entitled to fixed
emoluments during incumbency so as to make them impartial in the performance of their functions. that
independence will be destroyed by temporary designations.
BRILLANTES V. YORAC
--concoms, although executive in nature are NOT under teh control of the president in the discharge of
functions . each comssion conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and
in exercise of its own discretion
--APPOINTMENTS--choice of temporary chairman is within the discretion of the commission itself and
such discretion cannot be exercised for it bythe president
--appointment as comelec acting chairman is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. consti safeguards the
independence of concoms and one of which is SECURITY OF TENURE.
REP V. IMPERIAL
--ROTATIONAL PLAN--2 conditions:
(1) terms of the 1st 3 commissioners should start on a common date MERTITT V. GOVT--a special law
may be passed to enable a person to sue the govt for an alleged quasi delict
(2) any vacancy d/t death, resignation/disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled for
the UNEXPIRED balance of the term.
--without satisfying these conditions, the regularity of the intervals between appointments would be
destroyed and the evident purpose of the rotation would be frustrated.
GAMINDE V. COA--The terms of the first chairmen and comm under the 1987 consti must start on a
COMMON DATE, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the
appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of 7, 5,3 yrs should lead to the regular recurrence
of teh 2yr interval between the expiration of the terms.
--starting point is feb 2, 1987
APPEAL IN CSC
CAPABLANCA V. CSC--Appellate power of CSC will only apply when the subject of the admin cases filed
against erring employees is in connection with the duties of their office and not in cases where the acts of
complainant arose from cheating in the CSC. in this case, the complaint can be instituted in teh CSC
Directly; intended to protect CSC integrity
JUCO V. NLRC

--NASECO, is not under CSC. it is under the NLRC; it has no original charter
--NHA is under the juris of DOLE
hdmf v. coa
--HDMF is covered by CSC; it is a GOCC performing proprietary functions with original charter
PNB V. TEJANO
--CSC at that time still has juris over PNB as it was still then a GOCC. New law cannot divest it of
jurisdiction over disciplinary case involving employees of the govt
COMELEC
BARRO V. COMELEC--while only final decisions of the Comelec en banc may be brought to the SC, said
rule should not apply when a division of the comelec arrogates unto itself and deprives the en banc of the
authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration.
CAGAS V. COMELEC--SC has no power to review an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued
by division of comelec. only review decisions of com en banc.
JALOSJOS V. COMELEC-reiterates juris of HRET; beings from the proclamation of the candidate. it was
error for comelec to have claimed jurisdiction over the case. further, court cannot usurp the power vested
by the consti solely on the HRET.
GARCES V. CA--The decision/rulings/order of comelec that may be brought to the SC on certiorari ar
ethose that relate to the comelec's exercise of adjudicator/qj powers involving ELECTIVE
regional/provincial/city officials. in tis case, what is assailed is comelec's choice of an APPOINTEE to
copy the gutalac post which is clearly an ADMINISTRATIVE duty done for the operational setup of an
agency. thus, such controversy is outside the juris of the SC.
LOKIN V. COMELEC --COMELEC has juris over intra party disputes as a necessary tributary of its
constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties.
COA
POWERS OF COA
VELOSO V. COA
--COA's audit juris extends to govt, its subdivisions, agencies/instrumentalities, including GOCC WITH
ORIGINAL charters.
--POST-AUDIT covers: consti bodies, commissions/offices with fiscal autonomy, autonomous state
colleges and univ, other GOCC AND NGO's receiving subsidy or equity from or through the govt
--COA has BROAD powers over all accounts pertaining to govt revenue and expenditures and the uses of
pubic funds and property.
--in this case, COAs assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in
judicious exercise of its general audit power. govt funds should be fully protected and that irregular
expenditures of such funds should be prevented.
AGRA V. COA
--COA has exclusive juris to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the
implementation of RA 6758
--In this case, the continuous grant of allowances and fringe benefits on top of the standardized salary
rates for employees of GOCCs and GFIs have requirements to follow: (1) employee must be an
INCUMBENT as of july 1, 1989 and the (2) allowance or benefit was not consolidated in the standardized
salary rate prescribed by RA 6758.

VERSOZA V. COA
--COA is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of the national government on
a POST-AUDIT basis. as such, agency's decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its use is
subject to COAs auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular
expenditures.
FUNA V. VILLAR
--REAPPOINTMENT--means a 2nd appointment to one and the same office;
THE AMENDING PROCESS
GONZALES V. COMELEC--power to amend the consti or to propose amendments thereto is NOT
included in the general grant of legis powers to congress as it is a part of the inherent powers of the
people. congress may propose amendment to consti as competent elements of a constituent assembly.
they derive their authority from teh consti unlike teh people, who are the very source of all powers of govt.
A. PROPOSAL
--by congress
--by constitutional convention
--by people through initiatives --system of initiative under the consti is NOT self-excutory. RA 6735 is now
sufficient for the exercise of initiative by the people on amendments to the consti.
--petition for initiative in the consti must be signed by at least 12% of total number of RV of which every
legis district is 3%.
B. RATIFICATION
--in case amendments proposed by congress or convention
--in case of amendments proposed through initiative
--plebiscite to b called by congress and supervised by comelec but the initiative on constitution will be
called by comelec.
THEORIES REGARDING CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
TOLENTINO V. COMELEC
--a consti convention is supreme within the domain of its legitimate authority but the acts of the
convention, its offices and members are no immune from attack on consti grounds. as to matters not
related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to
the consti, teh convention and its members are all subject to the provisions of the constitution.
--the people must have ample time to reflect proposed consti amendment

Consti Law I Review Notes (Montejo - 4

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Consti Law I Review Notes (Montejo - 4

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

RIZADA, RESCI ANGELLI

JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS

B.Autonomy in the ARMM

PRESIDENTS CERTIFICATION ON URGENCY OF RA 10153

- OPTIONS DAW TO SYNCHRONIZE ARMM ELECTIONS

HOLDOVER OPTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Section 8, article 10 provides that the term of

COMELEC HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER SPECIAL ELECTIONS

COURT HAS NO POWER TO SHORTEN TERM OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

PRESIDENTS POWER TO APPOINT OICS

Based on SEPARATION OF POWERS, system of checks and balances and Interdependence

ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

1. BUDGET PREPARATION--each agency submits agency budget estimates (consideration: general

on lifting of pre-audit on govt transactions.

HOWEVER, CONDUCT OF PRE-AUDIT IS NOT A MANDATORY DUTY OF COA. COA has

+ LEGAL STANDING AS CITIZENS AND TAXPAYERS. continued availability of potable water

EEZ--reserved for EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND EXPLORATION.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 AN ACT MAKING ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR

DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO NATIONAL INTEREST and NOT dual citizenship.

HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN V. ATO

PARTY LIST SYSTEM

INTERNAL GOVT OF CONGRESS

INDEPENDENCE OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

division of the house will be called.

PHILCOMSAT V. SENATE--Right to counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial

INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT CASE

--know his qualifications/term/election/oath

NATIONAL LIGA V. PAREDES

POSITISN REQUREING CONSENT OF CA

RIZADA, RESCI ANGELLI

PUBLIC INTEREST V. ELMA

INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENTS

burdened essential functions of the court. (CA has appellate juris)

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