Error and Truth: Classical Indian Theories

Author(s): Bimal Matilal

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 215-224
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399141
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BimalMatilal Errorandtruth-Classical Indiantheories

Dr. Samuel Johnson attemptedto demonstratethe existenceof a stone by

kickingit. G. E. Moore, in his Cambridgelectures,raisedhis handsand said,
"Hereis one humanhand, and here is another.Thereforetwo humanhands
exist. And therefore,two physical objects exist." Both Johnson and Moore
wereconcernedwith a very persistentphilosophicproblem:Whenwe are said
to be seeing an external thing, do we perceivewhat it is that we think we
perceive?One may ask furtherwhetherthe externalthings are at all what we
tend to believethat they are, and furtherwhetherthereare any externalthings
at all. These problems exhibit themselvesembarrassinglyin almost every
discussionwhichis philosophicin nature.My purposehere is to discusssome
theoriesof Indianphilosophyconcerningthem.
Modern philosophicalstudies of perceptionhave often centeredarounda
controversyoverwhat are called"sense-data."The sense-datumtheoryhad its
heydayin the past decades,although,muchlike logicalpositivism,it is now on
the decline. But a referenceto it can hardly be left out in any modern
discussionof perception,and what I will have to say about the viewsof Indian
philosophershere may, from time to time, be reminiscentof points made by
both the sense-datumtheoristsand their critics.This happensbecausesensedatum theory, like positivism, reacted against a form of idealism. The
positivist, for example, has tried to imagine an ideal "protocol language"
which is evidentiallyprior and hence forms the basis of scientificempricism.
Most Indian theoriesof perceptionwere also attempts to combat a radical
form of idealismwhich the Maitreya-Asafiga-Vasubandhu
school presented.
The fact that the two versionsof idealismdiffer,as I have noted elsewhere,1
does not always cause a correspondingdifferencein the philosophiesof the
anti-Idealists.Moreover, perception, illusion, and hallucinationare global
enough to form a common ground on which philosophers of different
persuasionsand traditionsmay converseand debate.
It is difficultto find an exact counterpartof the term "sense-datum"in
Sanskrit,althoughit is true that Indian philosophicreflectionon perception
and knowledgebeganas it did in the West, with questionsabout the reliability
of the senses.The main problemthese questionslead to is that of justification
of our belief in the existence of the externalworld, although in the Indian
contextit takes on a slightlydifferentshapewith some differentunderpinning.
But firstlet us see how the notion of sense-datawas introducedin the Western
tradition.
From the basic idea that perceivinginvolves sense-experience,using many
complexand involvedarguments,of whichthe "argumentfromillusion"is the
most importantone, it is shown that there exist disparitiesbetweenthe way
thingsappearand the way they are. In this way it has beenclaimedthat we do
Bimal Matilal is Spaulding Professor of Eastern Religions at Oxford University.
Philosophy East and West, volume 31, no. 2 (April, 1981). ? by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

216 Matilal

not perceive a physical object, like a table, but that what we perceive is a
different sort of "thing" altogether (for example, on various occasions, various
sizes and shapes of a table), which they call sense-data. With the introduction
of this new term the sense-datum philosophers introduced a way of approaching problems of perception which has generated a good deal of modern
philosophic literature.
The meaning or connotation of the term "sense-datum" has not remained
unchanged in the hands of modern philosophers. What is generally agreed is
that a sense-datum is "not a physical reality." But while for G. E. Moore and
his followers a sense-datum is the immediate object of perception which may
or may not be identical to a part of the physical object, for C. D. Broad and
others it is the immediate object in perception, taken to be nonphysical.4 The
denotation of the term, however, includes, in any case, such items as the
elliptical appearance and the circular appearance of a penny, as well as such
things as mirage-appearancein the desert or the double-moon appearance.
What the Sanskrit philosophers call pratibhdsa (appearance) is not strictly a
sense-datum in many respects, for they did not pay much attention to the
variability of the shapes or appearances or components in the perception of
the same physical object, although they felt that the problem of explaining
nonveridical perceptions, hallucination, and error was one of the central
focuses of their philosophy. In a perceptual illusion, say a mirage-illusion, they
noted the duality or disparity between what appears in a perceptual experience
(that is, a pratibhdsa) of water, and what we are confronted with in the
situation, the interplay of hot air and the sunray.5 This appearance of water in
a mirage-illusion may be a sense-datum, but the perceptual consciousness here
already involves a judgment, an interpretation of the datum. The philosophic
motivation for introducing the sense-datum or even the "appearance" language was the Cartesian search for certainty, for the data are supposed to be
incorrigible and indubitable. They are also called "the given" because they are
felt to be independent of our judgments. They are self-evident and our beliefs,
to fulfill their claims to be knowledge, must be based upon them in some way
or other. But the pratibhdsa (appearance) is not an indubitable datum, for the
Indian epistemologists argue that as long as it is describable in language it
becomes the datum interpreted, or taken to be something F (for example,
water). So our "F-appearance" in a state of (perceptual) consciousness implies
that something is being identified as an F, or the property of being an F is
attributedsomewhere. If what we seem to cognize on a particular occasion is
expressible in language as "this is F" or "this is an F" then the cognition in
question is said to have an "F-appearance." The dispute among the Indian
philosophers centered, to a great extent, on the exact (ontological) status of
the "F-appearance," mainly the "F-appearance" of what we call a nonveridical perceptual experience (such as a mirage-illusion of water).
The word "alambana" is a flexible term in Sanskrit. It is not the sense-

217

datum, but ratherthe "foundation"or "support"of a (perceptual)sensory

experience.The Buddhistscall it a pratyaya(causal condition)on which the
arisingof a state of perceptualconsciousnessdepends.For example,a visual
perceptiondependsupon what may be called the visible (ripa). And this is
enoughfor the Buddhistto call it a sort of "causal"dependence.6But it is not
dependedupon in the way the visualorgan(the eye) is dependedupon for the
arisingof a visual perceptualstate. It is dependedupon by way of being its
object(visaya),to use, again, an alreadyproblematicterm. The Abhidharmakosa gives the following distinctionbetween a visaya and an alambana.7A
visayais the potentialobject of a perceptualconsciousness,in the sense that
when a cognizingstate arises it has to select its visaya.For example,the eyeconsciousnesshas to select the visible (ripa). But a particularalambanais
actually dependedupon, it is a rupa which has been causally responsible,
whenevera particularstate actuallyarises.For all otherpracticalpurposes,the
distinctionbetweenthem may be suspended.
My perceptionof red-colordependsupon red-coloras its alambana(objective ground),and my perceptionof the table dependsupon the table as its
alambana.But if my perceptionof red-coloris a productof some hallucinogenic drug,would I still be justifiedin callingthe red expanseits alambanaits objective support?And if the perceptionof the table is due to some
neurophysiologicaltrick in the brain would it still have an alambana?
Apparentlya class of Indianphilosopherswas inclinedto say yes! As long as
there is an appearance(pratibhdsa)(for example, red-appearanceor tableappearance)it must be rooted in an alambana(objectiveground).In fact, they
put forward the following thesis: alambana = pratibhdsa. In other words,

alambanaandpratibhdsaare only two ways of referringto the samething.The

implicationsof this doctrineare manifold,as we shallsee presently.
Thepramdnatheoryof the Indianphilosophers,much like the sense-datum
theoriesof Westernepistemologists,seeks to ground human knowledgein a
mode of experiencethat is immune to such failures as error, illusion, and
hallucination.If there were an indisputableway of distinguishingveridical
perceptionfrom the nonveridicalones, the problemof knowledgewould be
easily solved. But in view of the embarrassinglack of an agreed-upondevice,
the idealistsargue (and in fact Vasubandhuhas argued)8that error,hallucinations, and dreams provide paradigmaticexamples in which an "object"
(visayaor artha)appearsbut is not "out there."The "object"in all such cases
is at best located in the mind, and at worst is nonexistent(asat) as external
reality.From this point, it is furtherarguedthat what appearsin everystate of
our consciousnessis likewise mind-dependentor internal to consciousness
itself, there being no justificationto suppose that it is rooted in an external
object (alambana).Thus, Vasubandhureached his philosophic conclusion
whichwas devastatinglysimple:The so-calledexternalworldis only a creation
of the mind;the "stuff"of the world is made of consciousnessonly (vUijdpti-

218 Matilal

matrata).What is emphasizedmainlyhereis the essentialdependenceof what

"appears"in a state of consciousnessuponthat consciousnessitself. And this
finallyleads to a radicalform of idealism(from which a short step would be
solipsism):The worldaroundus is the worldwithinus.9
This is one extremewherealambana(objectiveground)is not distinguished
from the pratibhdsa(appearance).Thereis anotherextremeview of a different
kind where again alambana is not distinguished from the pratibhasa.
Embarrassedby the persistenceof nonveridicalperception,the realisticwing
representedby the PrabhakaraMImamsakawanted to combat skepticism,
idealism, and solipsism-all in one blow-by denying completelythe possibility of error of illusion or even hallucination.According to them, all
perceptionsare veridical;it is an errorto think that therecould be any error.
The so-calledperceptualerroris explainedby themas a fusionor confusionof
two differentand distinguishablecognitivestates:one is a memorystate while
the otheris a perceptualstate. In the usualmirage-illusions,the appearanceof
wateractuallybelongs to the memorystate (for we have alreadyexperienced
wateron many previousoccasions),while the appearanceof "this"or "there
[it is]" belongs to the perceptualstate. Thus,pratibhdsais also the alambana
in memoryis rooted eventuallyin the actual
here, for the water-appearance
water experienced.This was the position of the PrabhakaraMimamsakas,
who wererealistsor anti-Idealists.Theycut the GordianKnot of idealismand
solipsismin this amazinglysimpleway. Let us go back to the Yogacaras.The
philosophicargumentof the BuddhistIdealistis somethinglike this:
A cognitionor a state of consciousnessdoes not needa groundor alambana
externalto itself (witnesseitherhallucinationsor dreams).What is possiblein
one case mustalso be possiblein everyothercase, for they are merelystatesof
consciousnessin essence. Thus, the thesis about the externalworld is: the
externalworlddoes not exist, or if it exists we have no way of knowingthat it
exists.
It is instructiveto understandthe SautrantikaBuddhist position in this
context. For the Sautrantikaseemed to have allowed the possibilityof the
externalworld which the YogacaraBuddhistwas unwillingto allow. In this
connectionwe have to discussalso what is known as the Buddhisttheoryof
Atoms were posited as somethinglike the data of
atomism,paramanuvdda.
sensoryperceptualconsciousness.If it is the datumof eye-consciousnessbased
upon visual perception, it is given the blanket name rupa (the visible).
are identified:smell, taste, touch,
Similarlythe data of other sense-experience
and sound.The materialobject,underthis view, is a fictionalconstructionout
of these sensory"atomistic"data. This view seems to be somewhatclose to
phenomenalismin the West, although caution is necessaryin order not to
forgetits peculiarities.The data (the atoms)are, as a Sautrantikawouldput it,
"substantiallyreal"(dravya-sat),whereasthe materialobjects,such as the pot
or the table, are only imaginedto be real (samvrti-sat).This can be compared

219

with the acceptanceof basic units or primitivesin logical atomism, out of

which the rest of the world can be constructed.This system is basically
phenomenalisticin the sensethat the basicunits, these atoms, are phenomenal
elementsratherthan physicalelements.The atoms are not, one must note, the
materialatoms of the Vaisesikas.And, of course,the claim is that these basic
units are "obtainable"or "perceptible"individuals,in the sense that they
cause perceptions and are cognitively immediate. This claim is probably
indicative of an underlyingphilosophical attitude, a desire to show that
nothing beyond the phenomenalneed be countenancedin order to explain
everythingincludingthe physicalthings-a furtherdesireto show that if the
first claim is successfullysubstantiatedthe so-called physical world, as we
commonly understandit, can at best be dispensedwith as nonultimateor
nonfinal, and hence it does not merit the importanceor value we usually
attach to it. Very few Westernphenomenalistswould, however,make such a
value judgmentabout the physical world. The choice of a phenomenalistic
basisis usuallyarguedfor in the West,as far as I know, on the groundthat the
phenomenalby its very nature comprisesthe entire content of immediate
experience and therefore all knowables must eventually be explicable or
analyzablein terms of phenomena. But analyzabilityor explicabilityof a
complex concept can hardlybe a criterionof its falsity or even comparative
unreality.Rather,what is claimedis epistemologicalpriorityor proximityand
immediacyfor the phenomenaland consequentlyits indubitabilityover the
other,that is, the set of constructedelements.The Sautrantikaarguesthat the
importantdifferencebetweenthesetwo classesof entities,the substantiallyreal
atom and the gross object, is that the functionof causalityis assignedto the
first but not the second. An entity which is only imaginedto be real cannot
reallycauseanything.We cannotridean imaginedhorse.
The atomicity of the Sautrantikasensory data, I repeat, should not be
confused with that of the materialatoms of the Vaisesikas.These data are
called "atoms"most probablybecauseof two reasons:(1) their subtletyand
uniquenessto each occasion, and (2) their unanalyzabilityinto furtherdata.
The Sautrantikaalso admit that these atomic data are in perpetualflux.
Moreover,althougheach atomicdatumis coordinatedto some sense-organ,it
is by no means the content of any sense-experience;rather it is said to
determinecausallythe content of such experience.Thus, it would probablybe
a mistaketo assimilatethe Sautrantikaview into a formof phenomenalism(as
has sometimesbeen done).
Let us ponderagain over the relationbetweenthe Westernsense-datumand
the atomic datum of the Saurtrantika.Most sense-datumphilosophersagree
that sensingis a form of knowing,and that a sense-datumis what we know
immediately.It is also arguedthat a sense-datumin some sensemust "belong
to" a materialobjectand it is a centralproblemof epistemologyto determine
or explainin what mannerthis takesplace.The "causaltheorists"(like Russell

220 Matilal

and others) claim that we make a causal inference and are thus led from sensedata to material objects. The phenomenalists, such as Mill, would regard
material things as permanent possibilities of sensations. Yet H. H. Price has
argued that a phenomenalist must hold that sense-data are neither mental nor
physical, and that they are not caused at all and they are not even real in the
ordinary sense of the word. 1 Price continues:
According to him [the Phenomenalist] we must simply take the sense-given
continuum as a going concern. There it is, and all statements in which material
things and events are mentioned, are ultimately statements about it-about
the manner in which it does or could develop itself, whether now or in the past
or in the future.
According to Price, the phenomenalist is right in rejecting the idea that
sense-data are causally dependent upon the thing, (that is, a table) as their
"source." For if by "thing" we mean the "complete thing," then this complete
thing is a combination of the family of sense-data and the physical occupant of
the particular space, and thus it would involve the absurdity of saying that A
(the sense-datum) is causally dependent upon AB (the complete thing, that is,
family of sense-data and the physical occupant). If by "thing" we mean,
however, the physical occupant only, then Price allows that the table or other
physical occupant may well be the remote cause of the sense-data composing
the family. And in the same view, it can be claimed that sense-data are also
causally dependent upon the organism of the sentient. The atomic data of the
Sautrantika, however, are stated to be independent of the mind or consciousness. They are not mental, and it would be also difficult to call them physical.
But they are claimed to be "external" to consciousness. Certainly they are not
caused by the material object, the table. Rather it is believed that they cause
the so-called appearance of the false table, the "material object." Thus, the
Sautrantika disagrees with an important part of the thesis of the Causal
Theorists: namely, "M (a material object) is present to my senses" is equivalent to "M causes a sense-datum with which I am acquainted." Besides, the
Sautrantika believes that the existence of the extramental reality, that is, the
atomic data, is only inferable from the appearances (pratibhdsa) of the gross
material object in our perceptual consciousness. For (a) the atomic data must
have caused the arising of this perceptual consciousness; and (b) by so causing
the perceptual consciousness to arise, they have also caused indirectly the
appearance of a gross material object, which is a mere appearance, only
imagined to be real.
If we have followed the Sautrantika argument so far, we would be in a
better position to appreciate and understand Diinnga's arguments in his
Examination of the Alambana, where he rejects the view that the alambana is
something external to consciousness. The opponent of Difinnga, presumably a
Sautrantika, has argued that these five kinds of atomistic data would act as the
alambana to give "causal" support to the five kinds of perception due to the

221

five kindsof senses.This "atomist"(Difinnga'sopponent)concedesthat what

appearsin consciousness,or what constitutesthe appearance(pratibhdsaor
dkdra)in consciousness,is differentfrom theseatomisticdata. For, afterall, a
perceptualconsciousnessis describedas that of a table or a pot (and so it
refersintentionallyto a pot or a table).The problembeforethe atomistis this:
although a visual perceptioncan be "causally"dependent(as its alambana)
the resultingcognition does
upon the atoms of the visible (rupa-paramanu),
not have atom-appearance,for the atomic data are impartite,discrete,and
many,whilewhat appearsin consciousnessis a unitaryobject,a table-also a
grossobject.
Diinnga rejectsthis view on the following ground."IAn alambanaof a
perceptualconsciousnessmust fulfill at least two conditions:(1) It is "causally" responsiblefor the arising of that piece of consciousness(tat-kdrana);
and (2) it is also what constitutesthe appearance(pratibhdsa)of that piece of
consciousness.In other words,Dinnagasupportsthe basic positionto whichI
have alreadyreferred.What appearsin consciousnessis also nondistinctfrom
that in whichthat pieceof consciousnessis objectivelygrounded(pratibhdsa=
alambana).Now, the so-called atomistic data may fulfill the first condition,
but not the second. Hence they cannot be called the alambanaof a piece of
consciousness.The "phenomenal"objects,that is, the objectswhich are only
"imaginedto be real" (samvrti-sat),such as a table, may constitute the
appearance(pratibhdsa)of a piece of consciousness,but they cannot be
"causally"dependedupon (as a pratyaya)for the arisingof that consciousness. For remember,you cannotget a sproutout of an imaginedseed!
From Santaraksita(800 circa A.D.) we learn that BhadantaSubhagupta,12
perhapsalso a Sautrantika,tried to supportthe Buddhist"atomistic"theory
by arguingas follows:A gross body, such as a table, may be thoughtof as an
atom cluster. The Buddhist doctrine of momentarinessrequiresthat these
atomicdata emergeat one instant(moment)simultaneouslyand withoutgaps
(and disappearat the next moment). Just as (a follower of Diinnagaagrees
that) the instantaneous(momentary)object such as a pot-momentemerges
and perishesinstantly,makingroom for a new and similarpot-momentat the
next moment,and thus, as a result,we seem to perceivea pot that is supposed
to persist through time, similarlythe data called the atom-visibles'(rupaparamdnu)arise in space togetherand without seeminggaps, and this generates
our seemingperceptionof the genericnature(samanya)of an object,that is, a
grossphysicalbody, a pot, that seemsto have partsand henceis divisible(that
is, extendsin space).
A modernexamplewould be that of a cinemashow wheredistinctfilms of
differentposturesof a horse runningare run before our eyes fast enough to
generatethe illusion of continuous motion-pictureof a horse running.The
modern photographyalso providesa better exampleof spatialcontinuityor
spatial extension, where discrete dots or points on the screen being put

222 Matilal

togetherwithoutgaps createsthe pictureof an extendedmaterialobjectsuch

as a table. Subhagupta'sargumentmay thus be rephrasedas follows:Just as a
follower of Diinnagamust accept the appearanceof temporal continuity
(temporalextension)of an object like a pot althoughhe knows that it is an
illusion, so also he should admit the appearanceof the spatial continuity
(spatialextension)of a pot in spite of its being an illusion.But the Yogacara
Buddhistacceptsthe firstand rejectsthe second.
The following account of the dispute between the Yogacara and the
Sautrantikacan be gleanedfrom Santaraksita:
Yogacara:If the so-calledatom-stimulantsgenerateperceptualconsciousness
out of theirown function,why do they not appearin consciousness(in other
words, why do we not say, "I see atoms or atom-clusters,"throughparamarsa)?And since this is not so, how can we say that they are perceived?The
momentariness(lack of temporalcontinuity)of everythingis establishedon
separate evidence (pramana),that is, the evidence of reason (compare
anumdna),and therefore,we call the appearanceof temporalcontinuity,that
is, persistenceof things through time, to be illusory. But what is the independentevidence for establishingthe reality of such atomic data, the
extramentalatom-visibles,suchas the yellowstimulantor the whitestimulant?
If they cannot be established(independently),the appearanceof the atomclustersas grossobjectsout therecannotalso be established.
Sautrantika:Hereis an argument(evidenceof reason)to provethat the atomstimulantsare real.A gross objectis alwaysmadeup of a clusterof smalleror
moresubtleobjects:witnessa mountainrangewhichis formedby a numberof
small mountains(hills) put together.Hence this gross pot that is visiblemust
be made up of the clusterof the subtler,atomic, constituents.They are what
we call the atom-visibles,that is, the visibleatomicdata.
Yogacara:Your argumentis faulty.The so-calledgrossness(sthulatva)of the
objectis exactlyin disputehere.Does this grossnessreallybelongto the object
out there?If so, then you have assumedalreadywhat you intendedto prove
originally,namely,the externalityof objects,or the existenceof objects"out
there."For grossnessto belong to the outisde thing, you must first establish
that thereare outsidethingsfor such grossnessto belong to. If, however,you
say that grossnessis that whichappearsas such invariablyin the experienceof
all personsincludingthe fools, the illiterate,and the educated,alike,then such
is present even in a dreamappearanceof grossness (sthulatva-pratibhdsa)
object (for example, a dream-elephant)or in errors like "this is a piece of
silver."
Thus, just as the appearanceof grossness in a dream-object(a dream
elephant)cannot lead us to infer the independentreality of the constituent
atomisticdata (the atom-visibility)of suchobjects,similarlythe appearanceof
grossness in an ordinary cognitive state cannot be used as a reason for
establishingthe constituentatomisticdata as independentlyreal.
The above is a good illustrationof the philosophicdispute between the
Sautrantikaand Yogacara.But perhapswe are back to the old problem-the
problemof finding a distinguishingmark that may serve to distinguishthe
class of veridicalperceptionsfrom that of nonveridicalones, such as dreams
and hallucinations.As far as the pratibhdsa(appearance)is concerned,no

223

distinctionis possible,and to the extent an alambana(objectiveground)is to

be identifiedwith the pratibhdsa)it is impossibleto find a distinction.Thus the
Yogacara concludes that the alambana is as much internal to a piece of
consciousnessas is the particularpratibhdsaof that consciousness.If there is
any datumlike the atom-visible,to act as the objectiveground,it is internalto
our perceptualconsciousness,just as any pratibhdsain that consciousnessis
also that in whichit is said to be objectivelygrounded.
The Sautrantikadevelops the concepts of arthakriya-samvdda
(accordance
with the function of objects) in order to distinguishthe veridicalperception
from the nonveridicalones. What is this "accordancewith the function of
objects"?Well,preceivinga gem on the floor, I may rushto pick it up, but if it
is a false perception(illusion),I will neverbe able to pick it up. In one case,
thereis accordwith the "functionof the object"(arthakriyd),in anotherthere
is discord, and thus, a nonveridicalperception is distinguishedfrom the
veridicalone. But the Yogacarais unimpressed
by such a "pragmatic"theory
of truth. For, accordingto him, it begs the question.The argumentassumes
the externalityof objects without really provingit. It is like the Johnsonian
way of proving that a stone exists by kicking it. Or, even it resemblesthe
Mooreanway of wavinga hand beforethe opponentto say that thereexists a
humanhand, for otherwisewhatelse can be waved?
The Yogacara,however,assimilatesthe conceptof arthakriyainto his own
theory. For, if the concept means to be congruent or coherent (or the
potentiality to be so) with the expected behavior pattern that invariably
follows the cognitivestate, then it is possiblefor a veridicalperceptionto meet
this requirementeven if we do not assume that the object is external to
consciousness.In fact, this is also the Yogacaraanswerto the questionof a
distinguishingcriterion between a veridical perceptionand a nonveridical
one-the former has arthakriyd,while the latter does not. The difference
betweena true perceptionof a gem and a (perceptual)illusion of it is much
like the differencebetweena real gem and a fake one. In the lattercase, you
can trade only the real gem for money, not the fake one. The differencein
what follows is accountableby referenceto the causal historyof the origination of the real gem and the fake one. Similarly,the causal ancestryof a
veridicalperception,as well as that of a nonveridicalone, accounts for the
differencesin what follows in either case. There is congruencewith the
in one case and the
expectedbehaviorpattern(comparearthakriydsarivdda)
lack of it in the other.
If the real gem and the fake gem are so much alike that they agree in all
conceivablepatternsof behavior(for example,both can earnyou a decentsum
of money,both are equallybeautiful),then the Yogacarawill arguethat there
is little point in calling one real and the other fake unless we are already
prejudicedwith the idea that one of them is certainlyreal and the otheris not.
In other words,we disqualifyourselvesto judge the real from the unreal,for

224 Matilal

we have prejudiced the issue. If however, we are already familiar with the
causal ancestry of both which determined the issue, the issue has already been
resolved for us, and we do not need any further arbiter of truth. We may just
kick, with Johnson, the stone in front to prove that it is real.

NOTES
1. B. K. Matilal, "A Critiqueof BuddhistIdealism,"BuddhistStudiesin Honourof I. B.
Horner,ed. L. Cousins,A. Kunst & K. R. Norman(Boston: D. Reidel PublishingCompany,
1974),pp. 139-169.
2. H. M. Smith,"Is Therea ProblemAbout Sense-Data?"AristotelianSoc. Suppl.15 (1936):
84.
3. GeorgeEdwardMoore,"SomeJudgementsof Perception,"in Philosophical
Studies,(New
York:Harcourt,Brace& Co., 1922),pp. 231-232.
4. C. D. Broad,ScientificThought(London:K. Paul,Trench,Trubner& CO., 1923),p. 244.
5. See Vatsyayana, Nydyabh.sya 1.1.4.

6. For the Buddhistuse of the term pratyayaas "causal condition"see B. K. Matilal,

school"PhilosophyEastand West25, no. 1 (1975):41-48. Also see
"Causalityin Nyaya-Vaisesika
Vasubandhu'sAbhidharmakosabhdsya,
Varanasi (ed. Swami DwarikadasSastri), 1971, pp.
279-282.
7. Abhidharmakosabhdsya,ibid.
8. See Vasubandhu's Vijnaptimdtratdsiddhi,Virhmatikd
Karika, first verse.

9. The situationis not verydifferentwith the sense-datumtheoristsin the West,althoughvery

few philosopherstoday would go as far as Vasubandhuwould ask us to go. Thus, W. H. F.
Barnescriticizes,"... once the sense-datumtheory is developedin the form stated above, it
followsthat even if physicalobjectsexist, they are neverpresentin perceptualexperience;and it
becomesan open questionwhetherthey have any existenceat all." ("TheMyth of Sense-Data,"
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [1944-1945], included in R. J. Swartz's Perceiving, Sensing

andKnowing(New York:AnchorBooks, 1965),p. 142. Most modernphilosopherswouldlike to

maintaina 'double-standard'
that would enablethem to eat theircake and have it. Thus, it is
claimedthat when I "directlysee" the sense-datum,I also "see", in (to use Moore'sterm) a
Pickwickiansense,the physicalobject.
10. H. H. Price,Perception(London1932).
11. Difinga's Alambanapariksd
(Tib.) ed. with Sanskritreconstructionby AiyaswamiSastri
(Madras1942),verses1-8.
ed. SwamiDwarikadasSastri,(Varanasi).
12. Santaraksita'sTattvasamgraha,