fully exploded their first atom bomb in August 1949.

After that only

sembled their troops and where the war would be fought if it came to

the nuclear powers appeared to possess real freedom of action when a

one, but also the diplomatic parquet on which strategic deals were

crisis threatened; the sovereignty of European countries was deriva-

struck to keep interests in balance and prevent war. This had been

tive at best, guaranteed by one or the other of the two superpowers,

Germany's role in the center of Europe since the close of the Thirty

which spread its nuclear umbrella over its own sphere of interest

Years' War; now it continued in a new variation.

and dictated the political, ideological, and economic conditions that

O n September 2 1, 1949, the three High Commissioners of the

would prevail there: The traditional right of nation states to self-

Western forces of occupation ordered the chancellor of the Federal

determination was overlaid by the politics of bipolarity, which gov-

Republic of Germany (FRG) to appear before them, so that they

erned the military, ideological, and economic domains. Stalin stated

could solemnly present the "Occupation Statute" to the head of the

this principle clearly in a discussion with Yugoslav Communists in the

new republic's government. It set down the supreme authority of the

spring of 1945: 'This war is not like the wars of the past; whoever

occupying powers, which took precedence over Bonn's Basic Law, To

controls a territory will impose his own social system on it, as far as

make these circumstances absolutely clear, the three representatives

his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."

of the Allies wanted to stand on a red carpet during the ceremony,

The division of Europe was thus a precondition for the world

while the German delegation would be assigned a position to one side

peace that was born out of the Second World War. Only if both sides

of the carpet. Konrad Adenauer had been chosen federal chancellor

recognized the existing frontiers and spheres of power could the

by the newly elected first German Bundestag (Federal Parliament)

unstable balance between the superpowers be maintained. A divided

with the slimmest possible majority only a few days before. His cabi-

Germany was an essential structural support in this edifice, and Berlin

net included politicians from the Christian Demomatic Union, the

a keystone; had the architecture ever collapsed, it would have set off a

Free Democratic Party, and the German Party, a conservative agrar-

third world war. For this reason Germany was paradoxically unified at

ian party from the region around Hanover that was later absorbed by

the same time it was divided. On the one hand it was carved into two

the CDU; the Social Democratic Party, under the leadership of Kurt

states that belonged to opposing blocs, but on the other the four big

Schumacher, was relegated to the benches of the opposition for the

powers that had won the Second World War attached great impor-

time being. The new federal chancellor, fresh from his democratic le-

tance to their sovereign authority for Germany as a whole. For this

gitimation through this election, had not the slightest intention of let-

reason the Soviet troops of occupation retained the name Group of

ting die high commissioners treat him like an inferior, and he stepped

Soviet Forces in Germany into the 1980s, much to the displeasure of

right up onto the forbidden carpet, too. The Allies responded to

the government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In all

Adenauer's gesture with tight smiles; the new federal chancellor had

questions of German policy including the stationing of troops on

made it clear he intended to use every inch of the leeway available

German soil, the Big Four thus had the last word, and the sovereignty

to him.

of both German states necessarily remained limited in consequence.

Where foreign policy was concerned, Adenauer knew very well

The more things change, the more they remain the same. As the

that this leeway was narrowly circumscribed. In his first speech to the

great powers maneuvered, Germany was the field on which they as-

Bunde.~tog on September 20, 1949, in which he stated the policies of

3M)

A Divided N a t i o n

A Divided Nation

301

his government, he emphasized that his primary aim was t o integrate

sisting on a treaty that would allow Germany to participate on an

the Fcderal Republic, now powerless and represented in international

equal basis with the other countries.

affairs by the victorious powers, into the "western European wor1d"as

Nor was everyone within Germany itsclf willing to go along with a

soon as possible, and to achieve sovereignty, military security, and

policy of unconditional integration into the West. In all the niajor

freedom of action. He announced further that he intended to link the

parties, from the governing CDU to the opposition SPD, there were

partial state of the FRG once and for all with the West, both culturally

politicians who favored breaking the ties to the Western bloc and

and philosophically, to prevent Germany h o m ever again pursuing a

seeking to create a unified, neutral Germany between the two super-

swing policy between East and West or rapprochement with the So-

powers of the Cold War, evcn if this could only be achieved at the

viet Union. The firm ties to the West envisaged by Adeuauer also

price of limited sovereignty. In the spring of 1952 this hope appeared

aimed at overcoming the divisions between France and Germany and

almost within grasp: Stalin sent several notes t o the Western Allies

making Germany a reliable and predictable political partner. The first

and the government of the Federal Kepublic in which he proposed

chancellor of the Federal Republic was convinced that only from such

unifying the two partial German states into a neutral whole to be

a secure position would reunification become conceivable as a solu-

placed under the control of the Big Four, with strictly linlited armed

tion to the German question.

forces; it would be a democracy based solely on "democratic and

The course of world politics favored Adcnauer's aims. The Cold

peace-loving partiesn-whatever

that might mean from a Soviet per-

War turned into a hot war when Communist North Korea attacked

spective. The Western powers rejected Stalin's proposal, and the gov-

the southern part of the country on June 25, 1950. It seemed to the

ernment of the Federal Republic concurred unconditionally in this

leaders of the Western world as if the Kremlin were embarking on a

rcjection, convinced that integrating West Germany into the Western

global offensive that could lead to a third world war. The permanent

bloc was more important than uniting both parts in a weak whole wa-

demilitarization of Germany had been one of the most important

vering hetween East and West. But even if Bonn had taken a different

Allied war goals. Now it appeared obsolete, especially since an army

view, it would not have altered the majority decision in Washington,

had existed de facto for some time in East Germany, camouflaged un-

London, and Paris.

der the name Barracks-based People's Police (Korernierte Volkspolizei).

Was this a tnissed opportunity for German unity? The discussion

Could anyone know whether it was developing plans for an attack

has continued up to the present day, and it will not end until the So-

along the same lines as North Korea? The solution seemed to be a

viet archives are opened and the real intentions of the Soviet Union

European Defense Community (EDC), an international military or-

arc revealed. It is probable that the Allied decision was based on accu-

ganization with integrated troop contingents from France, Italy, the

rate assumptions, however; .the Soviet campaign occurred in the deci-

Benelux countries, and also the FRG. In May 1950 the Bonn govern-

sive months before the Federal Republic joinedthe Western security

ment had already begun confidential discussions on building up a

and economic communities, and almost everything suggests Stalin's

West German army. The negotiations over creating the EDC were

aim was to prevent its integration into the Western pacts and the for-

long and hard fought; they met with resistance in all the participating

mation of an EDC at the last minute. The policymakers of the Fed-

countries, and Adenauer made the situation even more diffi~ultby in-

eral Republic did not fail to seize an o]>portonity to achieve Gernian

302

A Divided N a l i o n

A Divided N o l i o n

303

political links countries would he forced to abandon isolated national

hecame apparent when Chancellor Adenauer and French President

policies.

Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) conducted a joint review of French

When Winston Churchill called for the creation of a "United

and German troops after signing the treaty on Franco-German coop-

States of Europe" in a speech in Zurich on September 19, 1946, and

eration on January 22, 1963; the review was held on the fields of

said it should be based on a partnership between France and Ger-

Champagne, where so much blood had flowed in battles between the

many-a

two countries. From the bitterest of enemies to the closest of al-

shocking idea at the time-he

did not envision Great Brit-

ain as a member. This was thoroughly in keeping with the spirit of

lies-after

centuries of fateful entanglements, this represented a pro-

classic British "balance of power" policy, which sought to keep the

found turning point in European history.

restless Continent across the Channel quiet with a system of pacts, so

The fact that the Western community of nations was willing to in-

that Britain could safely devote itself to its far-flung interests overseas.

clude the Federal Republic after World War I1 had far-reaching conse-

But the collapse of the British and French colonial empires during the

quences. From the start, American support for the Adenauer gov-

1950s made it clear that the era of European world domination was

ernment lent considerable prestige to the new democracy within

gone for good; Europe had been thrown back on its own resources

Germany itself. For the first time in German history, being a demo-

and could have some say in the alliance with the United States only if

crat was equivalent with success. Who can say how the first German

it gathered and concentrated its remaining might. The first step taken

democracy, the Weimar Republic, would have fared if a man such as

to link Europe together economically was the founding of the Euro-

Ebert, Stresemann, or even Briining had enjoyed the goodwill of die

pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which placed pro-

Allies, as Konrad Adenauer did after World War II? The development

e
duction of both commodities in France, Germany, Italy, d ~ Nether-

of the West German democracy owes its success in part to this factor,

lands, Belgium, and Luxemburg under a single oversight body. It

although it was certainly aided by the "economic miracle."

was followed by the union of these same countries, known as The Six,

At the outset the prognosis for an economic boom was not good.

in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European

In the winter of 1949-50 unemployment reached heights reminiscent

Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) on March 25, 1957. The

of the worst years of the Wei~narKepublic, and food rationing, which

most recent developments in this process have been the creation of

had been introduced in 1939, did not end until March 1950. Then,

the European Union (EU), with its vast superstructure of commis-

however, the outbreak of the Korean War hrought a worldwide eco-

sions, councils, general directorships, and bureaucrats, and the Euro-

nomic upswing that spurred considerable growth in the West Ger-

pean Parliament in Strashourg.

man economy. After years of deprivation, Germans had an all but

For the present-day observer the world of the original founding is

insatiable appetite for consumer goods, and German industries, bat-

long gone, and with it the florid, hopeful rhetoric that accompanied

tered by war damage and Allied dismantling, investcd large sums in

the first steps toward European unification. In retrospect the hombas-

new production facilities. The Marshall Plan provided the necessary

tic oratory seems just as improbable as the willingness of all the fust

capital and set the course toward increased economic ties with the

participants to relinquish some of their national independence, as if it

West. Then during the Korean War, when the United States and west-

were a matter of course. The extent

ern European nations-Germany's

308

A Divided N o t i o n

LO which

the world had changed

chief foreign competitors-had

A Divided N a t i o n

309

to devote much of their production capacities to arms manuracture,

was the phrase used to explain the almost inexplicable, namely the

Gcrman exports were able to penetrate world market.. Finally, Ger-

transformation of an entire people within the span uf fifty years. All

man labor unions' willingness to hold down wage demands in the first

the passions, the fanaticism, and convulsions of the Weimar Republic

few years of the Federal Republic's existence paid off. Although

tliat caused 22 million people t o cast their votes for the Communist

wages increased at a slightly lower rate than the gross national prod-

and National Socialist Parties in the March elections of 1933 seemed

uct, the pay of the average worker nonetheless grew by 5 percent an-

to have been swallowed up, the way the earth absorbs rain.

nually. After the greatest defeat in their history, Germans experienced the greatest economic upturn in their history.

They had been replaced by the republic in Bonn, which was unemotional, rational, sober-quite

boring, in fact-and

a marvel of

The West German government used its economic leverage to in-

stability. Two slogans with which the Christian Democratic Party of

troduce social policy reforms little short of revolutionary. The Fed-

Konrad Adenauer and his successful Economics Minister, Ludwig Er-

eral War Victims Relief Act (Bunde.~versorgungs#esetz),passed in 1950,

hard (1891-1977), won election after election were "Amuence for

provided assistance t o three million people, and the Equalization of

Everybody" and "No Experiments." Most citizens had had their fill of

Burdens Act of 1952 initiated an unprecedented redistribution of

politics-the

wealth within the population, in order to indemnify those who had

instead devoted themselves t o their private lives and hard-earned

lost their property and savings as a result of the war, expulsion, and

pleasures, investing in homes, Volkswagen "bugs," and vacations in

expropriation in the East.

Mallorca. The old patriarch in the Palais Schaumburg (the official

The Federal Displaced Persons A d , Workplace Labor Relations

Act, Federal Compensation A a , pension retbrm, immediate payment
of wages in case of illness, child care allowances-the

basis of the laws

sociologists dubbed them a "skeptical generationn-and

residence of the federal chancellor) could look after the nation.

The great majority of prominent figures in West German cultural
life, from the literary Group 47 t o the opinion-makers at the weeklies

creating the social welfare state as Germans know it today--stem

Der Spiegel and Die Zeit, felt alienated from a government that ap-

from the Adenauer era, a period when people believed that unlimited

peared to them stolid, materialistic, and hackward-looking. This was

economic growth was possible and that the country would remain

nothing new; the cultural avant-gardes of both the Weimar Repuhlic

able to afford such programs indefinitely.

and the kaiser era had viewed themselves as opposition movement. in

The inner stability of German democracy is closely related to the

a similar manner, and a fundamental antagonism between an "intellec-

"economic miracle" and social policies of the 1950s. The total West

tual elite" and a "power elite" seems to be a defining cl~aracteristicof

German population numbered 4 7 million; this included 10 million

the modern period in Europe generally. What is surprising in retro-

expellees and displaced persons from the German regions in the East,

spect is how insubstantial and derivative most of the cultural output

Czechoslovakia, and Hungary whom the Federal Republic had ab-

of the Federal Republic appears in comparison with that of the Wei-

sorbed, just as it would later absorb a further three million refugees

mar era. The few exceptional figures, among them the poet Paul

from the GDR. Extremist political parties existed on hoth the right

Celan and the novelist Giintcr Grass, tended t o be writers whose

and left, but their chances of attracting significant numbers of voters

roots lay farther t o the eaqt.

were small, since Germany's prosperity had given such an enormous

hoost to the process of democratization. "Bonn isn't Weimar"-this

310

A Divided N a t i o n

The other German state, the German Democratic Repuhlic, had

little

LO

offer that could match the attractiveness of this robust and

A Divided N a l i o n

31 1

successful model. The GDR was the westernmost outpost of the Soviet sphere of influence and as such was regarded hy Stalin arid his
successors as a strategic pillar of their system. Its creation in 1949 was

durdi den

consequently more than just a reaction to the founding of the FRG.

The GDR's first head of state was the Communist Wilhel~nPieck

(1876-1960) and the head of government was the former Social

Democrat Otto Grotewohl (1894-1964), both later members of
the SED. However, the man with real power-if
"friends" in the Soviet Union-was

one discounts the

First Deputy Minister-President

Walter Ulbricht (1893-1973), who step-by-step took over all key positions in both the party and the state.
The legitimation of the GDR was weak from the beginning. Although the government was able t o reawaken a great deal of dormant
idealism through its promise to establish socialism, this resulted in
rieither free elections nor economic success. The Soviet nod el was
visible in all areas of public and political life. The SED, headed by the
Politburo of the Central Committee, exercised control over the government, society, and the centrally planned economy. The Ministry
for State Security, created in I950 on the model of Moscow, was
organized along military lines and shove to nip all opposition in the
bud by establishing a network of spies throughout the country. "Ene-

fjrenzen dcs Dcufs&cn Rei&rs 7937

mies of the state" were arrested on nebulous charges and occasionally

without any charges at all. The militarization of public life went beyond what was necessary to run the National People's Army; it was a
form of political Gleichscholtung of the whole population, serving to

Guide b he Equolirotion of Burdens Ad

Ipomphlet. b p u ~ h 19551
.

create and enforce uniformity, as did the rituals of an ever-expanding

sale relugeei and expllees Is the losses they

by lhe
The EEquolizalionol Burdens Act
Bunderiagon Moy 16, 1952, o w lhe opporv hod ruliered, a i well or cilirenr whose prop
t,wl d the Social Dernxrotr ond West German ery had been deslroyed in the wor Tlie~e
Communisl Pory,rerillled n ihe greatest redirtr- funds helped ihourands ol people m o b o

cult of the state. Although people in thc GDR worked very hard, the

standard of living and a,uality of products remained considerably be-

im,

bution o l m l t h m German hislory Every West

star1 in the West alfer the wor ollrl h o m e inle

low Western standards. Production levels in nationally owned compa-

German w ~ l ha to101 riel worlh ol more lhan

grated into Wesl Germon 'inefy

Map key Black = Wor damage, orr of

nies and agriculture between the Elbe and Oder rivers sank to far be-

5,000 D M a1 lhe tme d h e 1949 currency

relorm war taxed 015 percent of ihe lot01
rum, payable in 30 yeoily inrtollmenlr The
yleld-by

1983 11 ornounled lo owoximalsly

126 billion marts-r

312

iw

ngr. light groy = losses in the Eon; Light g r v

orld while = l o w 3 through expulnon: Dork
yroy = reiwjee~Irom {he Sovtel zone

low prewar levels, yet despite this the economy of the GDR was
considererl by far the most successful within the Council lor Mutual

paid ovl to compen-

A Divided Notion

A Divided Notion

313

Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Eastern counterpart of the

European Economic Community.
At the second party conference of the SED in July 1952 it was announced that socialism would have to be built under the conditions of
the "intensifying class struggle" that Marxist doctrine declared wa5 inevitable. Thc penitentiaries filled with the victims of arbitrary judicial
verdicts; agriculture was collectivized, the middle class effectively destroyed, and a one-sided build-up of heavy industry accompanied by
drastic price increases and a 10 percent increase in production norms
for industrial workers. Ulbricht's radical course appeared risky to the
Soviets, and in June 1953 the coercive measures were suddenly rescinded on Moscow's instructions.
The "leaders of the working class" thought of everything except the
workers, whose increased norms were not reduced. The first to go on
strike on June 17, 1953, were construction workers on large building
sites along the Stalin-Allee, intended to become a showcase for socialism. The strike swiftly spread to other industries in the GDR. It began
mainly with demands for better economic and social conditions, but
soon the mood shifted to one of general hostility toward the SED regime. Demands were raised for West German political parties to be
allowed in the GDR, and for fi-ee and secret elections. The strike

By 1952 h e SED hod eaebl~rheditvll ro

it furthermore became evident

llimly in East Germony that Walter Ulbr~chl

to announce at fhe second parN
Conference tho1 h e bullding ol iocioiirm

war woceedino .occordina- to .~ l o n . 'In

that the Federal Reoublic's

,~~~~tics
to
security organizations
~~

~~

turned into a national protest movement, and the regime was able to

poctlce thli translated no1 into ihe introduc

were irreversible, the Soviet Un-

stay in power only by calling for Soviet tanks, which crushed the re-

tion of new i d w r bul into odaptaiion lo (he

ontiquoled system of Swet Slolinirm The

ion shifted its stance in 1955, ad-

bellion. For all the bitterness it left behind, the uprising was not a

conference posed o motion requiring "even

more lhorougP study

01

complete Cailure. The population and the regime had tested one an-

~ ~ i d toi t llle
i ~CUII
~

stolin. (he SED leader

other, learning the other's strengths and weaknesses; the SED leader-

ship concenlrald on crealiny cadres, pro

rnollny cril~c<rm
and sell-cril~cirm,and conlral

ship now knew what its limits were and how important it would be to

lrom above

satisfy the population's needs for basic material goods if the party dictatorship were to survive. The entire world had witnessed that Com-

OI

Stolin's wrilinys. In

by Porty orgon~zotionsor ihe

marl ellect~vemwnr ol cemenllng the,, hold

on cower

vancing
tt

a new theory that the

. questionn had been oerGerman

manently solved through the creation of two German states with

diflerent sociopolitical svstcms.

This made reunification of Ger-

munist rule in the GDR would vanish in a puff of smoke if not backed

many through integration into the West impossible. Policv in th~:

up by Soviet tanks rolling through the streets in times of crisis.

GDK underwent a corresponding transformation: Clearly recogniz\.

It was now also clear that the C;DR had no chance to prevail in a di-

ing its inability to keep pace in political and economic competition

rect competition with the Federal Kepublic for legitimation. When

with the FRG, the GDR rejected the goal of reunification under the

A Divided Notion

315

existing prospects. In these circumstances it was only logical that

other's sphere of influence wa- inviolable. The world powers' agenda

later, after 1974, the GDR went on to proclaim itself a "socialist na-

was now detente instead of confrontation. By insisting on reunifica-

tion" in a "socialist German state," thereby categorically denying h e

tion and its status as sole representative of all Germans, the Federal

existence of a national community that included West Germany-at

Republic, until then the United States' most loyal ally against the So-

least as long as socialism had not established itself there, too.

viet Union, was becoming a mounting obstacle in the great powers'

In reality, however, the bright lights of West Berlin exercised an al-

search for equilibrium. The Hallstein Doch-ine, which called for the

most magical attraction for the people of the German Democratic

Federal Republic t o break off diplomatic relations with every country

Republic, with the result that the stream of refugees across the border

that sent diplomats to East Berlin, proved a dead end. Especially in the

grew larger and larger, reaching a total of 1.65 n~illionby 1961, a

Arab world, where leaders calculated that support from the Soviet

figure equivalent to the entire population of East Berlin. Over the

Union could be worth more to them than anything Bonn could give,

long term the Soviet Union could not go on permitting so many peo-

the inclination grew to recognize the GDR and accept a rupture with

ple t o "vote with their feet," in Lenin's phrase. Even more dangerous

the FRG as part of the bargain.

than the loss of people and productive capacity was the loss of face

Within the country signs were pointing toward change as well. In

suffered daily by "socialism as it actually exists." In October 1958

October 1963 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer-a1Fectionately

Nikita Khrushchev, the new ruler in the Kremlin, demanded that the

as der Alte, "the old mann-resigned,

Western Allies withdraw from Berlin and relinquish control over the

to a close. His successor, Ludwig Erhard, the popular "father of the

access routes t h o u g h the GDR; Berlin would become a "free city."

economic miracle," and his party, the CDU, won the parliamentary

After his election President Kennedy responded by formulating the

elections on September 19, 1965, in conjunction withits Bavarian sis-

three essentials for Berlin from the American point of view: freedom

ter party, the Christian Social Union, falling only four seats short of

for the population, the continued presence of Western troops, and

an absolute majority. However, the Free Democratic Party (FDP),

free access by air, water, rail, and the autobahns. The war of nerves

their partner in the governing coalition, lost a quarter of its seats,

over the city escalated until on the night of August 13, 1961, East

while the opposition SPD under its charismatic leader Willy Brandt

German soldiers and paramilitary forces dug trenches and erected

(191 3-1992) posted significant gains. Furthermore, Erhard did not

barbed-wire fences around the free sector of Berlin. During the next

succeed in turning his success at the ~ o l l into

s la3ting policies. Part of

few weeks a solid wall of cement through the center of the city was

his strategy for victory had been to promise voters massive increases

added to these barriers. From then o n anyone trying to flee t o West

in government entitlement programs, but now government expendi-

Berlin risked being shot by the border guards.

tures began rising at a faster rate than the gross national product. An

known

bringing the first postwar era

Quite apart from its lethal and intimidating effects, the Berlin Wall

economic recession added t o the budget difficul6es, and Erhard, who

created clarity. Its construction represented a one-sided violation of

had once made vigorous consumption his campaign slogan, was now

the city's status, which the Western Allies could not have prevented

forced to preach moderation-in

except by risking war. The Cuban missile crisis, which hrought the

majority because the FDP refused to share responsibility for tht;

world t o the brink of nuclear war in 1962, made the situation even

growing budget deficit and left the coalition on October 27, 1966.

clearer: The price of peace was an understanding on each side that the

316

A Divided Notion

vain. His government finally lost its

The Grand Coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD that fol-

A Divided N o l i o n

317

lowed undcr Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1904-1 994) rep re^

the early postwar r e p u b l i c w h i c h allowed many officials, judges,

sented a transition. While the government's economic policies met

and diplomats from the Nazi era to continue their careers un-

with success--the recession ended, and new tax regulations helped to

touched-the

strengthen and prolong the economic upturn-the

partners were too

perity, the defamation of leftist and radical ideas, which had been go-

heterogeneous for the coalition to last. In the area of German and

ing on for dccades, and the frenzied consumerism of a generation

eastern European policy, both the SPD and FDP were prepared to fol-

s e e b i g to compensate for the psychological and material depriva-

low the signals toward detente coming from Moscow, Washington,

tions it had endured during the war and immediate postwar years.

cultural stagnation accompanying the growth of pros-

and Paris and to recognize the current "realities,"namely the division

Just as a delayed shock reaction to the industrialization of Europe

of the Continent and with it the partition of Germany. This meant

had set in at the start of the twentieth century and led t o radical new

reaching some kind of settlement for "regulated co-existence" with

views on how life should be lived, so too it appeared in the early

the German Democratic Republic. The Kiesinger government in fact

1960s as if it took a later generation fully t o absorb the horrors and

took some steps in this direction by discarding the Hallstein Doctrine

crimes of the National Socialist era. A deep surge of moral outrage

and establishing diplomatic relations with Romania and Yugoslavia,

surfaced in Wcst German society among thoughtful people; intellec-

and also by entering into direct talks with Moscow. In addition, the

tuals, university students, opinion-makers, teachers, prolessors, and

West German cabinet decided in May 1967 to accept and respond to

journalists were overcome by a need t o make up for the failure of

communications from the GDR government. This new realism went

their mothers and fathers to resist, and to demonstrate their abhor-

too far for numerous CDU/CSU politicians, particularly the leader-

rence of what Germans had done. Only so, they felt, could they avoid

ship of the CSU. Kiesinger managed t o hold his cabinet together by

being implicated in the crushing burden of guilt for the most recent

achieving a consensus to ignore the problems for the time being.

chapter of German history.

At this point not only policy on eastern Europe and Germany

A wave of protest swept across Germany, borne on a tide or anti-

seemed stranded, but the ship of state as a whole. A fundamental shift

fascist moral indignation and set in motion when a student participat-

in the political and cultural climate of West Germany had begun in

ing in a demonstration against a state visit to West Gcrrnany by the

the early 1960s. The rising generation regarded the values of its par-

Shah of Ira11wa5 shot and killed by a West Berlin l,oliceman on June 2,

ents as obsolete and suspect, in a repetition of the generational

1967. The protesters wanted to teal- down the "fossilized structures"

conflict that typically occurs in German history every fifty years, be it

of society, expose the institutions of liheral Gcrman democracy as

the Vorrnarz movement of the 1840s, t h e j n de rihcle, or the Weimar

bastions of "everyday fascism," unmask the Establishment and replace

era. Once again a young generation found itself unable to endure the

it with an enlightened "counter-elite." For several years the "extra-

attitudes of its elders, while the elders saw themselves as rational and

parliamentary opposition" (~u/rer~orliurnentorixche

Oppmition, o r APO)

enlightened, stripped of illusions but with a willingness to com-

mounted protests approaching civil insurrections at universities and

promise, and prepared to accept the limitations on what could be

elsewhere; Marx and Lcnin, long relegated to the status of outworn,

achieved. Young Germans delivered a scathing critique of the society

cynically manipulated idols in eastern Europe, experienced a second

in which they were growing up, heaping scorn on thc pragmatism

brief heyday in the liberal West. The sparks of rebellion fhilcd to ig-

of the Adenauer era, the conservative-restorative foundations of

nite, however, because the workers-the

318

A Divided N a t i o n

pillars of a new socialist

A Divided Notion

319

was finally concluded on September 3, 1971, and led to considerable

several interpretations of the past naturally emerged. Four very dif-

easing of the situation in West Berlin, an island surrounded by the

ferent understandings of German history dominated the debate.

GDR. Had a CDU-led government been in office in West Germany, i t

Richard von Weizsacker, speaking for the opposition, argued that all

could hardly have ignored this new phase of detente, but Brandt's gov-

German policy must be directed at recreating the German nation

ernment had far fewer reservations in following the lead of the more

state as Bismarck had founded it in 1871. Alluding to Ernest Renan's

powerful Western Allies and agreeing to nonaggression pacts with

famous definition of a nation ("a vast solidarity, constituted by knowl-

Moscow and Warsaw. Just as Adenauer had earlier accepted the

edge of the sacrifices h a t we have made in the past and of those we

wishes of the Western Allies for German integration with the West,

are willing to make in the future"), Weizsacker described Germany as

because he was convinced it was for the best, so now Brandt vigor-

"the quintessence of a shared past and future, of language and culture,

ously pursued rapprochement with the Soviet bloc states and the

of consciousness and will, of government and territory. With all its

GDR, not only because this was in accord with the wishes of his

flaws, with all its errors arising from the spirit of the times, and yet

American allies, but because he himself believed it was urgendy nec-

with a common will and consciousness, this nation of ours was given

essary.

its stamp in the year 1871. It is from this, and from this alone, that we

The debate in the Bundestog over these "Eastern treaties" reached

its climax on March 2 2 , 1972, a shining hour in German parliamen-

today have a sense that we are Germans. It has not yet been replaced
by anything else."

tary history comparable t o the National Assembly's epic legislative

Weizsacker was vehemently contradicted by speakers from all

duels of 1 8 4 8 4 9 in St. Paul's Church. For the first time in decades

camps. A speaker from the SPD pointed to the difference between a

legislators grappled with the questions of what Germany really was,

state and a nation, observing that a great majority of the nation had

and what its future should be. Speakers from the governing parties

heen oppressed by Bismarck's state. Those wishing t o shape the future

praised the opportunities that "normalization" between East and West

with reference t o Germany's past, he continued, should rather seek

would create for Germany, while speakers from the opposition CDU

to carry on the struggle for freedom represented by the Peasants'

stressed the dangers. The focus of the discussion lay not on matters

Wars, the Enlightenment, the workers' movement, and the resistance

such as the exchange of ambassadors and what form West German re-

against Hitler.

lations with eastern Europe would take but on the future of Germany

Several delegates from southern Germany who took the floor saw

within Europe: Did German reunification "within the borders of

themselves in an entirely different historical context. In their view,

1937" take precedence, as the Christian Democratic opposition in-

Germany was actually nothing but an

sisted? The treaties certainly made that possibility appear more re-

regions, and cities-Prussia,

mote. O r should priority h e given to peace and detente throughout

Gotha, and many others-which

Europe, as the governing coalition argued, even if the price had to be

only very late in their history, and then only for a short time. And

abandonment of German hopes for reunification? Was Germany's

finally, the Social Democrat Carlo Schmid referred to the German na-

goal still to become a unified nation again, or did that now belong to

tion state as a historical form of community that had once existed but

the past7

was now virtually obsolete, no more than a preliminary step on the

As the legislators talked of several possible. futures for Germany,

322

A Divided N a t i o n

assemblage of various states,

Bava~ia,Wiirttemberg, Saxe-Coburgcame together t o form a nation state

way to the nation of Europe.

A Divided N o t i o n

323

1982, when the SPD-FDP coalition broke down and Helmut Kohl

GROSSVERANSTALTUNG am 18.2.

(CDU) became chancellor at the head of a CDU-FDP coalition, have

any effect on the German question or the way it was viewed by West
German government officials or newspaper editors. In 1987 Erich
Honecker, head of the East German government and general secretary of the SED, made an official visit to the Federal Republic. The
press photographs published around the world showing Kohl and
Honecker, with deadpan expressions, jointly reviewing an honor
p a r d of the Bundeswehr, signaled that relations in central Europe were
now on a normal and stable footing.
It is the case in politics and history that nothing lasts longer than a
provisional solution, while nothing is more fragile than a situation de-

'

KEIN BLOCK C IN BlBLlS

signed to last. German unity was already well on the way to becoming
a reality when the chancellor and chairman of the Council of Ministers were shaking hands. Where the road began is not entirely clear,
but it must have been somewhere in the forests of White Russia. It
was there that American spy satellites first registered the appearance

..........
.............. .........
, ,

of ultramodern Soviet intermediate-range mobile missiles in 1976.

The unsettling aspect of this discovery was the fact that these missiles
threatened Europe and western Asia but not the United States.
Helmut Schmidt, federal chancellor at the time and unlike his

Nuclear Powe~?No Thanks!

[poster of the Cllizenr' lniliotrve of the
RllineMotrrNeckor Region. honkfurl/Main.
19ROi
-,

predecessor not a visionary but a hard-headed pragmatist, was among

During the 1970~

the first Western politicians to grasp the implications: These weapons

wen1 a piobund rhifi in "aim

he ear~ler
cull of lwhnalagy ond economic pioqresr

made it possible to attack Europe by circumventing the American nuclear umbrella. They created the eventuality of a war in Europe that
would not threaten the North American continent; as a result Europe
could be strategically decoupled from the United States and became
vulnerable to both political and military blackmail. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnw appeared t o be pursuing a dual strategy, in which the Soviet Union was building up a new threat to strategic balance behind a

,80sE",,,~

termediate-range missiles in west-

der- ern

sove wav ro d e e. ~msrrmlam

obou~the iv
.
lure 01 ciuilizol~on.Thls rhrh w o s nowhere
more a m i e n ~
lhan in we31 ~ e r m o w
where cillzenr' intliol8ver sprang up wery
wllere opposing nucleat power plan~s,exof ~ i , p ~ , tCO,,II~~~IO.
~.
b h n r , and governmen1 censuses. Germonr,
who had appored lo ire madels of otedisnce toward ou~horiv,now set ohout o r t m
i r h i q h e resi of ihe world with iheir aniigov
ernmenl mililoncy

Europe, and thereby

a
. open
.

European nuclear umbrella under

the larper
American on?
~~.
a
~~

A public-opinion debate over

implementation of the NATO de.
cision erupted in Europe; it was
particular]y ferocious in

cermany,

A peace movement formed that

vehemently opposed the stationing

ghanistan in December 1979 increaed suspicions in the West. NATO

of Western missiles in Germany

and mobilized hundreds of thousands of pacifistically minded citizens.

responded with a "double track" decision to station corresponding in-

When some factions of the governing parties lent this opposition

curtain of friendly diplomatic overtures. The Soviet invasion of Af-

326

A Divided N o t i o n

A Divided N o t i o n

327

their support, the realist Helmut Schmidt could no longer feel sure

more oriented toward the needs of the people, t o rejuvenate the

he had the hacking of his own party; this played a major role in his de-

whole country by the close of the century. In many respects he was

parture as chancellor and replacement by Helmut Kohl, leader of the

successful. But like so many reformers of the past, once he loosened

CDU. It is one of Kohl's achievements as chancellor that he pushed

the reins of absolute authoritarian rule in ordcr to modernize the sys-

through deployment ofthe new missiles over considerable public op-

tem, Gorbachev lost control over the pace of developments. Just like

position; equally, the peace movelrlent deserves credit for making

Jacques Necker in 1789, who wanted t o reform government finances

sure that no one could accuse Germany of being bellicose and aggres-

in France and helped set off the French Revolution instead, Gor-

sive. Both actions, the upgrading of missile systems and demonstra-

bachev attempted to reform the Soviet Union but ended by hlowing it

tion of a firm resolve for peace, in fact went hand in hand and sent an

to bits.
The altered climate in the Soviet Union made itself felt throughout

unmistakable signal to Moscow.

In addition, after Ronald Reagan was elected president of the

eastern Europe. Opposition groups such as Charta 7 7 in Czechoslo-

United States, the Western superpower altered its policy toward the

vakia or Solidarity in Poland emerged into thc open and discovered

Soviet Union. Not content t o continue the poker game with the

that their governments had grown hesitant t o use the old repressive

Russians over intermediate-range missiles, the new administration

measures. Elsewhere, as in Hungary, the Communists in power-or

proposed another round of rearmament, involving installation of a

at least some of them-discovered they had liberal, pluralistic inclina-

missile-defense system that would make the United States immune to

tions and began copying Gorbachev's reforms. The satellite countries

nuclear attack. It was Reagan's express intention t o force the Soviet

of eastern Europe pulled away from the Soviet Union one after an-

Union to arm itself to death, and in European intellectual circles it

other, with Poland taking the lead. The rapidity of these develop-

was customary to express outrage over this and ridicule the former

merits

actor in the White House. However, Reagan's policy of confrontation

the first time a revolution took place not mainly in the streets but on

met with success that no one had anticipated. The Soviet Union

television. The coverage of demonstrations in Prague looked just like

staked everything on this one issue and forced arms production to the

the images from Dresden or Warsaw, hut this was because people in

limit, sending the country into a spiraling economic collapse. The war

Prague had seen the pictures of the Dresden demonstrations on their

in Afghanistan, which dragged on and imposed further enormous

television sets, just as people in Dresden had previously seen the

costs,

broadcasts from Warsaw.

way

the final straw.

was connected with the medium in which they occurred: For

by Soviet standards relatively

Events provided the material; images created the objects they de-

of the Communist Party who seized power in the USSR

picted; the revolution proceeded through television; and everything

in 1985, had the courage and far-sightedness to draw the logical con-

else simply occurred as a result. This is why th; upheavals progressed

clusion from the disaster. The whole world learned two Russian

with such extraordinary speed, and why-in

words, perestroika, "restructuring," and glasnost, 'openness." The aim

revolutions-there

was renewal of the Soviet Union and its principles of leadership, and

pied not the centers of power hut prime time.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the new-and

young-head

the creation of an efficient economy, a modern state, and policies

328

A Divided Nalion

great contraqt to earlier

was no bloodshed at all. The demonstrators occu-

For a few months it appeared as if the GDR might withstand the

A Divided Nolion

329

tide, an island in the storm, despite the seething discontent in the

population. Erich Honecker and his ruling cadre were not the only

ones convinced of this. Honecker, blind to all the signs that the Soviet
Union was collapsing, believed weaklings and traitors were at work in

SED rule. ~h~ death.l,low to the regime came from its H~~~~~~~~
comrades, who opened their wcstern border to the swelling tide of
fleeing East Germans. What options remained to the men arolu~d

on

Moscow. But West Germans also observed the mounting unrest

~
~
the evening
~
of~~~~~~b~~
~ 9 , ,989,
k they opened
~
the ~
crossing points in the Berlin Wall. The unification of the two German

among the inhabitants of the GDR with more concern than hope.

states was inevitable, and was accomplished within less than a year.

Hardly anyone could imagine that the Soviet Union would let its
western outpost go, and many recalled the pictures of the June 1953
uprising in East Berlin. People were aware, too, that Egon Krenz, a
leading member of the East German politburo, had just been in China
and congratulated leaders there on the massacre of demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square. Something similar might have been in the offing in
Leipzig or Berlin.
Those who feared the SED leaders were capable of it would not
have misjudged them; the misjudgment lay in the speculations about
Soviet interests. Gorbachev realized perfectly well that with its very
Gcrman, pig-headed dogmatism the SED was digging its own grave.
Furthermore, connections between the Soviet Union and the "Western Group of Soviet Forces" in the GDR had been interrupted since
Poland had broken out of formation. The Soviet leadership had no
choice but to pull back and consolidate its front lines. The Soviet
Union was preparing to withdraw into its inner sanctum, to try to
come to grips with its own destructive internal contradictions; it
would release the countries on its western perimeter to Europe, on
the assumption that, rich as it was, the West would come to the rescue of the eastern European economies and would also give the Soviet
Union credit for the mode of its withdrawal.
When in the fall of 1989 the cry went 11p from rlemonstrators
in the hundreds of thousands, "We are the peopleJ-to

be trans-

formed soon thereafter into "We are one people".-unnerved

secu-

rity officials turned to the Soviet anlhassador in the GDR to demand

military bacldng in suppressing the protests. The unthinkable happened. The Russians turned them down, and that spelled the end for

330

A Divided Nolion

A Divided N o l i o n

331