NATURE OF FELONIES (Article 3)

ELEMENTS OF FELONIES --PEOPLE v. SILVESTRE AND ATIENZA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs. ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA G.R. No. L35748, December 14, 1931
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The former as principal by direct participation,
sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550,
Penal Code; and the latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor; and both are further sentenced
to the accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and severally, the
amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Romana Silvestre lived adulterously with her codefendant Martin Atienza, a married man; that both were denounced for
adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's second husband; that in view of the petition of the accused, who promised to
discontinue their life together, and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good offices of the municipal president of
Paombong, the complaining husband asked for the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance of their promise, both of the
accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Nio, in the same municipality; that under pretext for some nipa leaves from her
son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Nio, Romana Silvestre followed him to
his house in the barrio of Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there; that her codefendant, Martin Atienza followed
her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same house; that on the night of November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all
were gathered together at home after supper, Martin Atienza expressed his intention of burning the house as the only means of
taking his revenge on the Masocol resident, who had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for adultery against
them, which compelled them to leave the barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's threat without
raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court
below found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a
direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the
commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of
the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson committed by her
codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away
their furniture because he was going to set fire to their house as the only means of revenging himself on the barrio residents, her
passive presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation, and her
failure to give the alarm when the house was already on fire?

The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice, encouragement,
or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of
moral or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence
while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved
Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it
does not make her liable as an accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, of
the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:
2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in which people are accustomed to meet together,
without knowing whether or not such building or house was occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion, if the damage
caused in such cases shall exceed six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre, there was nobody in De la
Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it, he cannot be convicted merely arson less serious than what the trial court
sentenced him for, inasmuch as that house was the means of destroying the others, and he did not know whether these
were occupied at the time or not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited house, when the incendiary does not
know whether there are people in it at the time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are exposed, not less serious is
the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by means of another inhabited house which the firebrand knew to be
empty at the moment of committing the act, if he did not know whether there were people or not in the others, inasmuch as the
same danger exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might have been convicted of the crime of
arson in the most serious degree provided for in article 549 of the Penal Code, if the information had alleged that at the
time of setting fire to the house, the defendant knew that the other houses were occupied, taking into account that barrio
residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of
another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not
constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed
passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without
knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which results in
destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.

PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ (GR No. 182348, November 20, 2008)
The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias Boy Bicol was at his nipa hut

hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking
with accused-appellant. They shouted Boy Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy Bicol you
have a warrant of arrest.) Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant
was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his firearm at him.
The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital
weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings
CVDC, the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag containing the seized drug.
Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the hideout was sent to the Philippine National
Police crime laboratory for examination and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus
separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of firearm.
According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicols house having been asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicols
motorcycle. While accused-appellant was there, persons who identified themselves as police officers approached the place,
prompting accused-appellant to scamper away. He lied face down when gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him
get up. He saw the police officers searching the premises and finding shabu and firearms, which were on top of a table or
drawer.[2] When he asked the reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was because he was a companion of Boy
Bicol. He denied under oath that the gun and drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he was only
invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house. [3]
Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements of the offense of possession of dangerous drug was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive possessions were not proved. He asserts that
the shabu was not found in his actual possession, for which reason the prosecution was required to establish that he had
constructive possession over the shabu. He maintains that as he had no control and dominion over the drug or over the
place where it was found, the prosecution likewise failed to prove constructive possession.

The two buy-bust team members corroborated each others testimonies on how they saw Boy Bicol talking to
accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa hut. That table, they testified, was the same table where they saw
theshabu once inside the nipa hut. This fact was used by the prosecution to show that accused-appellant exercised dominion
and control over the shabu on the table. We, however, find this too broad an application of the concept of constructive
possession.
In People v. Torres,[10] we held there was constructive possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused was
not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the masters bedroom of his house.
In People v. Tira,[11] we sustained the conviction of the accused husband and wife for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Their residence was searched and their bed was found to be concealing illegal drugs underneath. We held
that the wife cannot feign ignorance of the drugs existence as she had full access to the room, including the space under the
bed.
In Abuan v. People,[12] we affirmed the finding that the accused was in constructive possession of prohibited drugs
which had been found in the drawer located in her bedroom.
In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs since they were shown to
enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these drugs were found.
In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that
was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was accusedappellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy
Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol. But in spite of the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant
to illegal possession of drugs, the trial court declared the following:

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has merit.
The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.[6] On the third element, we have held that the possession must be with knowledge of the accused or
that animus possidendi existed with the possession or control of said articles. [7]Considering that as to this knowledge, a
persons mental state of awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that:
Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty,
resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a
case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as
well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the
attendant events in each particular case. [8]

It cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol he knew that the shabu
was on the table with other items that were confiscated by the police operatives. The court [surmises]
that the accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang hiding in that nipa hut where they were caught
red-handed with prohibited items and dangerous [drugs]. [13]
The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecutions evidence, that accused-appellant was part of a gang
dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy Bicols nipa hut, the prosecution was not able to show his
participation in any drug-dealing. He was not even in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found inside a room
with shabu, not as the rooms owner or occupant but as a guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust team,
the prosecution curiously failed to produce the firearm that accused-appellant supposedly used.
The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual
or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.

The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show that: he was inside the nipa hut at the time the buybust operation was taking place; he was talking to Boy Bicol inside the nipa hut; he was seen holding a shotgun; when PO1
Calanoga, Jr. pointed his firearm at accused-appellant, the latter dropped his shotgun; and when apprehended, he was in a
room which had the seized shabu, digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines. Accusedappellant later admitted that he knew what the content of the seized plastic bag was. [9]

Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicols nipa hut, his subsequent arrest
was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides:

Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu, whether in its
actual or constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant.

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto.
For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[14]
Accused-appellants act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have been sufficient basis for his
arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was
committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied possessing the firearm, the prosecutions charge was
weak absent the presentation of the alleged firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the trial court because of this gaffe. His
arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be
committing any offense.
In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive possession by accused-appellant of the seized shabu and his
succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other issue raised.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated November 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Carlos Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 11(2) of RA
9165 in Criminal Case No. 6518 of the RTC, Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal.

1.
2.

REQUISITES OF CRIMES COMMITTED by DOLO OR MALICE:

People v. Sia Teb Ban

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. SIA TEB BAN (alias JUAN TONINO, alias JUAN
ANTONIO, alias PEDRO ANTONIO, G.R. No. L-31695
November 26, 1929
Found guilty of qualified theft and habitual delinquency, the defendant was sentenced by the municipal court of Manila and on
appeal, by the Court of First Instance of this City, to two years, four months, and one day presidio correccional, with costs, and
to the additional penalty of twenty-one years' imprisonment.
He now contends that he is not guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
But it has been proved that he took the watch described in the information without the owner's consent, having been overtaken
a few moments later by a friend of the offended party, who found the stolen watch on the appellant. It is alleged that animus
lucrandi has not been proved. We find it sufficiently established, as the acts of the accused (one's intention may be gathered
from one's deeds) unequivocally show. 1awphil.net

It is a fundamental doctrine of law that the act penalized by the law is presumed to be voluntary unless contrary is shown (art.
1, Penal Code). And from the appellant's felonious acts, freely and deliberately executed, the moral and legal presumption of a
criminal and injurious intent arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary (sec. 334, No. 2,
Act No. 190).
In view of the fact that we find no merit in this appeal and that the law provides for the imposition of accessory penalties, the
appealed judgment is modified, the appellant being sentenced to the accessory penalties provided in article 58 of the Penal
Code, the said judgment being affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

3. People vs. Taneorefer to article 12 cases

MISTAKE OF THE FACT --1. US v. Ah Chong Mistake of Fact
2. Erro in Personae People v. Oanis,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and
asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D.
Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the
above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and,
if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis
who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene,
a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the
chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups
with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was
supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene
was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied
by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with
his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw
the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed
was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased.
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial
hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers
were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies
are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also

because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching
somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson
while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter
was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the
crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in
bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their
mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was
awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated,
and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no
error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants.
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but
that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel
ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and
Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made
previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the
honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is
murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15
Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the
door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed
and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had
been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a
man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol
demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol
leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these
instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time
or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take
the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the
accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in
the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves,
and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed,
according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was
really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm
(People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence,

or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is
restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the
person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5
C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a
fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing
him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in
effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by
such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or
does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the
mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly
supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to
warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation not condonation should be the
rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es
preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho
del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que
se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is,
however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5,
of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be
taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and ( b)
that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants have acted in the performance of a
duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance
of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are
overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the
fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without
making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

3.

US vs. ENRIQUEZ (32 Phil., 202)

Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never justified
when their duty could be performed otherwise. A shoot first, think later disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized
society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the
cost of human life.
In the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of
Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around
7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva,
who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the
passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10
kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.[17]
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not see any one on the road
flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores executed a sketch [19] depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the
road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right after
the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the
gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were
used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the
jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he
instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan
reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded.He dashed back to Salangsangs house as
instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being
loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital. [20] This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as
the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to another
jeepney and taken to the nearby St. FrancisHospital.[21]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded each other, and that they
were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the defense would say. [22] He professed that he, together with his copassengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each holding
long firearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off at the
hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed companions. [23] He further
narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7,
1988.[24] He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan
whom he identified to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for that
matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on
the passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle. [26]
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence of his companions at
his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated Villanuevas and Flores narration of the events immediately
preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his house and
reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley
of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores frantic call for help.He immediately proceeded to the
scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the gate of Narons house where, inside, he noticed a
congregation of more or less six people whom he could not recognize. [27]At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva
being loaded into another jeepney occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the
Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mothers house, but before driving off, he allegedly
caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the

same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent
the night at his mothers house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him with whom, however, he was not able
to talk.[28]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in front of Narons house
was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty
as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the hospital, but he
could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his
injured companions to the hospital.[29]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had
previously examined the firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for
gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could she tell
how many firearms were discharged that night nor the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to
administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after
the incident. She affirmed having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of
which had punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained,
rather inconclusively, that the bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill
or moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road. [30] Additionally, Silvestre
Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms
and ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the memorandum
receipts for the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco. [31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the injuries of Villanueva
and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanuevas head as well as
from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last between
10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this
wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were both
standing upright on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of the assailants waist; but if the victim was seated,
the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be
upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated
victim and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient, he noted a lacerated
wound at the right temporal region of the head one consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He
noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from the front:
one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another, throughand-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and
fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as claimed,
his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than
the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed
over to and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at Licups left side. He
explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after
Licup had changed his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have
been caused by a bullet fired at the victims back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface
prior.[33]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been caused by a bullet fired from the front
but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the
abdomen, considering that he might have changed position following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was
more than one assailant who fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule
out the possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He could not tell

which of Licups three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the
others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with his head lying low and steady. [34]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that
the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with and tried for gross
misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon
sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from service. [35] Dolly Porquerio, stenographer at the
NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the report on the shooting
incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the sketch
showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had
been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Central Office for consideration. [36] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these
documents together with the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the commander of the
Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the
accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April
5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police
assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA
members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time
no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and
bring their M-16 rifles with them.[37]
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he had
earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated
that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there
were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of
his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw
jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that
it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to
stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and
his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno, [38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they
were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons
house directly at the subject jeepney.[39]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at Pamintuan that they
were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the vehicle
but found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby
St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who
fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.[40]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in
fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements, [41] and
that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein. [42] That night,
he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan
Police Substation, [43] the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario
Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed. [44] He denied that they had committed an ambuscade
because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. [45] He said that the shots which
directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from
Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone
past the spot on the road where they were assembled. [46]

Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the accused after the incident
because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that his co-accused had already been investigated by the main
police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno. [47] He admitted an
administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet
on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation independently
conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged the
volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen victims of
ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that
rebel elements had been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has
accordingly conducted clearing operations in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated that days prior to the
incident, Yapyucos team had already been alerted of the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyucos
declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was
supposedly attached Pamintuans statement referring to Flores as being married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan and
found after surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He affirmed having found that guns were indeed fired
that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. [49]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as well as the latters
documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present
evidence and submitted their memorandum as told.[51]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful
performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police
and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them. [52] With the evidence in hand,
it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of
homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted
homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and
acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in
respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma.
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which brought the
eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order;
[54]
that the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk
to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective
action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates
their defense of lawful performance of official duty; [55] that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit
petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on
Pamintuans report that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior
motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did; [56] that there was insufficient or total absence of
factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the
result of either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish
attempt to gain commendation.[57]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing to the
culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims,
as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory
of the bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the

street and inside the front yard of Narons house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp
post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. [62]
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners admission that they did
discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to
achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no
conclusive proof of who among the several accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally
wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to have discharged their
firearms that night petitioners herein. [63] Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by which the accused collectively
and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk
or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation; [64] and that on the basis of
the self-serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the incident by
Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM. [65] It likewise found very
consequential the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly because it was
incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the prosecution
evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some
of them in their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Narons residence from
which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself. [66]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts
causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be
supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere
suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds true for evident
premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and
the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of
all the elements of that circumstance.[67]
APPEAL TO THE SC:
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy and labels the same to be
conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts intended to participate
in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal object
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at
the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were taken to the hospital on his jeepney. [73] He
also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayans declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a
well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the
barangay officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the
latter alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. [74] He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the scene of the
incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the incident was in line with the
fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof a fact which has been affirmed by the
NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.
[75]
He also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other
accused in these cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements. [76]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the Sandiganbayan has not
proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been
adduced at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in the
case: one, the police officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs

comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of evidence. They question their
conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials
and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay
officials and CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and, hence, the
finding that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact. [77] Also, they believe that
the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the
court itself and those presented in a separate trial.They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and
suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal prosecution. [78] Finally, they lament
that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with the
other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they
identified as among the perpetrators of the crime. [79]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim that judging by the
uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police operation
or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever
been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed decision.They advance that as
police officers, they merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among
the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had
community of criminal design with the rest of the accused. [80] They affirm Yapyucos statement that they fired warning
shots at the subject jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and only after it failed to stop
when flagged down as it then became apparent that it was going to speed away as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the
chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would have
otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the victims had been personally or even
remotely known to either of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that
they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held their fire when
Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then
they could have easily fired at the victims directly.[82]
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of conspiracy as
established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as
though having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsangs residence. It posits that the manner by which
the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged. [83] It believes
that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the road that would give them a direct
line of fire at the target as shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney. [84] This intent was
supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a
supervening consequence.[85] It refutes the invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual
basis to support the belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown that
they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle.But while it recognizes that the accused had merely
responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the
performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals instead.
[86]

As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence adduced before the
Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners,
together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as
directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them with the filing of their memorandum.It asserts there was no
denial of due process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for
bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to

present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other
accused, especially where the latter has failed to register his objection thereto. [87]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to rest on loose predicates.
Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of the incident on the date
and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno as well as
Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the prosecution,
[88]
explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that
armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay
Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but
by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet
contention arises as to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them
had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal. [89] To this end, the
prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit [90] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counteraffidavit[91] of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit [93]of Yapyuco; and the
joint counter-affidavit[94] of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in question. In brief,
Cunanan and Puno stated therein that [their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle when it accelerated after warning
shots were fired in air and when it ignored Yapyucos signal for it to stop; [95] in their earlier affidavit they, together with
Yapyuco, declared that they were constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle. [96] Yapyucos open court
declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the
subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came clear that it
was trying to escape.[97] He suggested substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was the whole team [which fired]
at the fleeing vehicle [98] that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the
CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post
while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle. [99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only Manguerra from their group
who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning shots, [100] and that it was the policemen [who] directly fired
upon the jeepney.[101] Manguerra himself shared this statement. [102] Yet these accounts do not sit well with the physical
evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony,
described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports
Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already
moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also
bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he,
Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Narons house sitting on
the right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that
the line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it. [103]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who among the accused
actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney
affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Narons house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said
vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be
applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may not evade the effect of their
having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them
of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco. [104]

Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but is
inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as
Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter,
the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission. [105] It is thus
perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony
implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they could
have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their
claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the
prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their coaccused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the
lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. [106] The justification is based on the complete
absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed
with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. [107] Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may
not be penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or
the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged
were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this
case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law enforcement
operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them who were either police and barangay officers
or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a
suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect
vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless
arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a
crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence
suggests that the accused were acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all
circumstances. Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would
threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the
accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material
evidence was presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the
victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or not they were at the
time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand.
Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers
must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing
duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must
always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be
accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or
a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the
process pertains to other government officers or agencies. [108]

A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from
bodily harm.[109] United States v. Campo[110] has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the
authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and
finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or
death results from the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the
offender if the officer had used necessary force. [111] He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating
the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.
[112]
People v. Ulep[113] teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does
not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that
police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an
immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and
discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously
nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the
contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and
purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always
bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be
protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights. [114]

Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four members of a family in their
home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others
the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding them
liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. Other than suspicion, there is no evidence that Welbino
Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they
were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, they were
peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly,
therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The
massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution. [116]
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming that it failed to heed the
first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney
had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners signal to
stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to,
[117]
still, we find incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at least one other
vehicle at the scene the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects
whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of force, and it is
incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that respect.Although
the employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not seem

to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No
explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their overanxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of
police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury
to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of which could not
have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context
of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission
which is the subject of the prosecution. [118] Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
negates the intent component of the crime. [119] It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general
intent.[120] The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, [121] and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind
of any other person.[122] A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; [123] (b)
that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime [125] or the existence of the
mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. [126]
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong, [127]but
in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had
mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad
elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder
after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that
moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a
knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because
of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact
as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to
him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence
of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the
rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them he is legally guiltless of
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately
extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to
be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion
for the extreme measure. x x x [128]

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the justification of an act, which is otherwise
criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. [131] Thus, Ah
Chong further explained that

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute
the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake
of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. [132]
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been established
beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the
prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [133] By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon
the certainty of guilt. [134] The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but
whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence. [136] Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second,
defendant's agency in the commission of the act. [137] In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than
the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act
or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or
murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice),
that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after
the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.[138] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of
personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof. [139]Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and
attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of
certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses. [140]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating
the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused
Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as
Yapyucos testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the
suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the
identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his
(Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were
employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of
ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA
members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had
died during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged. [141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and materiality. Motive is generally
held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is
established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive. [142] The question of motive is important in cases
where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt
that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the deed.
[143]

In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to kill anyone of the
victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the
passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along the
line of fire. We do not doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to
sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish
that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a
specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence. [144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber carbine. [145]While
the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At
the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof
being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that
moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers
would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do not
appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the likelihood
of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say
the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire
directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like
this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver
and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned
towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the passenger
side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The
circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer
accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State[146] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his
own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the
determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that
every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have
killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not
intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the
slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.

V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate intent of killing Licup
and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be
found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of another
act performed without malice. [147] People v. Guillen[148] and People v. Nanquil [149] declare that a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,[150] we held that that
there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to
kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.

10

Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, likewise
militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and
design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other
were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold
an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose.[151]

but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed attempted homicide, a
modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a
consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period
ofprision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
of arresto mayor.

DISTINGUISH GENERAL FORMS SPECIFIC INTENT --Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the
legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution.[152] The instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners that they
were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the
moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and strategically posted themselves at the place
appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to let their
suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape
as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them.As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were
confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the jeepneys supposed escape even if
it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their concerted action of almost
simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of
the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve their object as shown by the
concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there
is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that night and which directly caused
the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since
only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the same,
they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation which had gone
terribly wrong.[153]
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes of homicide and
attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that
they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed
victims.[154] The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is
consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived
their suspects to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and
indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt
thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for
principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day,

FELONIES COMMITTED BY CULPA --1. DEFINITIONS --

Imprudence

Negligence
2. Art. 365 Imprudence or Negligence
3. REQUISITES OF CULPA OR FAULT --4. People v. Guillen,

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIO GUILLEN, G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
Julio Guillen has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful
candidate, assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine
Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and
fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when,
according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the
approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity presented
itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party attended by a big crowd, President
Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government
and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which was duly
licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of
Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document (Exhibit
B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon.

11

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also contained
peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to
carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he
hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech.
General Castaeda saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the
platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm;
and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground
and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. It was found that the fragments of
the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) who died on the following day as the result of mortal wounds
caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
THE ISSUES

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly
governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at
President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim;
and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang
were the injured parties.
Issue: Whether or not the killing of Simeon Varela (guest) was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery even if the
e was not the person whom Guillen intended to kill.

First issue: Whether or not Guillen is guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela.
RULING: Yes, Guillen is guilty of murder.
The evidence shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand
grenades, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and
causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at
least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President; although it was not his main
intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main
purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio,
Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies
committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore
liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as
imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act
should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of
such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232.)
Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)

RULING: Yes, there was treachery even if the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill if it
appears from the evidence that the victim could not put up defense against the attack or become aware of it.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one
whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up
defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation
may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one
who became his victim (People vs. Mabug-at).
ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the commission of
crime should be appreciated.
Ruling: Yes, the crime is aggravated by nocturnity and contempt of public authorities in the commission of the crime.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with the
intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him
"by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries
caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of article 148 of
the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for
in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to
redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the
hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we
shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of
throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances

12

because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said
crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art.
248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and
circumstances hereinabove narrated.
CRIMES PUNISHED BY SPECIAL LAW
1.

Elements of felonies:

People v. Silvestre and Atienza,

US v. Divino,

December 4, 1908 G.R. No. 4490

THE UNITED STATES, vs. FELICIANO DIVINO, defendant-appellant.
This cause was brought against Feliciano Divino for the crime of lesiones graves, and appealed by him to this court from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Moro Province, whereby he was sentenced to the penalty of two years
eleven months and eleven days of presidio correccional, with the accessory penalty of suspension from all public office,
profession, occupation, or right of suffrage, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The feet of the witness show several large scars which surround both feet, beginning at the instep and extending to the sole
all around the feet. The appearance of the said scars indicates that they were not caused by blows inflicted by a cutting
instrument, but are the result of a lesion of considerable width. In addition to the wide scar that surrounds each foot there
are several small scars (folio 103).
The court observes that both feet are deformed at the instep as if they had been tightly bound with a cord, and the resulting
depression had become permanent. The left foot is also quite deformed, the toes being separated to an abnormal extent; the
right foot is deformed in the same manner although not so much. The soles of both feet are deformed on account of
protuberances of what seems to be callous matter. (Folio 109.)
With regard to said lesiones the complaint reads:
That one day in the month of July, 1903, in the municipality of Davao, district of Davao, Moro Province, the accused, in his
house, tied a girl named Alfonsa by the hands and legs, laid her on the floor, stuffed a piece of cloth into her mouth, and
fastened her body to the boards of the said floor; he then wrapped her feet around with pieces of cloth, saturating said cloth
with petroleum, and thereafter set the cloth on fire by means of a match; the cloth burned for about five minutes or more,
seriously burning the girl's feet, and causing lesiones in said members from the result of which the said girl became
disabled in the said principal members. (Folio 18.)
The so-called Alfonsa does not know her age, but the court below, however, estimated her to be 13. Neither does she know
who are her parents; her former surname was Divino but is now Esperat, and she calls Segundo Esperat her father, because
she says she lived in his house a month; when asked if Esperat was her true father, she answered no, that she was only his
adopted child. She described the affair in the following manner:

used for hulling rice and handed it to Feliciano who placed it across my legs, tying its ends to the floor so that I was unable
to stir. While I was in this position on the floor; Feliciano's daughter caught me by the head and shoulders and held me
down. Feliciano then lighted a match and set fire to my feet. They left me thus for the length of time required to smoke two
cigarettes and until the flames were extinguished. After half a minute Feliciano released me and took me to the storehouse;
there they left me and locked the door. At noon they gave me some food; they kept me three nights in the storehouse.
Afterwards they took me out and locked me up in the hog-pen; they left me there without any covering and exposed to the
open air, but they afterwards fixed up a temporary cover to protect me.
And in answer to questions put to her, she continued to say that there were present in the sala while Feliciano was burning
her feet, Clara, the eldest daughter of the latter, who was then 13 years old, and the younger ones Nining and Nating
together with three servants, Petra, Catalina, and Pedro; that while they were burning her feet, her hands were tied
alongside her body; that Clara, Feliciano's daughter, held her by the head and shoulders; that a stick was placed over her
legs and tied to the floor, and another was put over her chest and also tied to the floor; that thereafter she was taken to a
storeroom beneath the house wherein she remained three days and nights, and from thence she was taken to a hog-pen in
the rear of the kitchen, which she now says had a roof, remaining there one month, and that when she left it she continued
to live in the house for three months, until one day, at midnight, without the knowledge of Feliciano, she left in company of
a girl named Irinea for the purpose of making a complaint; that they went to the office of Mr. Wood, which gentleman was
present in the court-room (pointing him out). And when asked where Mr. Wood's office was she pointed out the government
building of the district of Davao.
On cross-examination she said that a Bagobo named Andalan had taken her over to Feliciano's house to live; that she did
not know whether her parents were Bagobos, nor who they were, and that, when she reached the age of reason, she found
herself in the house of Feliciano, so that her first recollections are of the time of when she was in Feliciano's house, that she
had reported the matter to the American military governor, but to the questions of the counsel for the defense as to whether
any action was taken, the fiscal objected and the court sustained the objection; that, when she went to Feliciano's house, she
already had a scar on the left cheek and another near the mouth; that they tied her body with a rope, bound her hands, place
over her legs a pestle such as is used for hulling rice, and the three daughters sat on her head and shoulders (it is no longer
one daughter who held her down by the head and shoulders).
Another witness called Petra, who has no surname and does not know the race to which she belongs nor what age she is,
although the court below reckons her to be between 17 and 21, and who lives in Davao, with Maria (the accused's third
wife who, according to the data contained in the proceedings, was at the time separated from him), declares that Alfonsa's
injuries were the result of the burns caused by the accused one night; that the latter called her, laid her on the floor of
the sala of the house, tied her down, placing sticks over her chest and feet, put some rags on the latter and set fire to them,
the flames lasting the time required to smoke one cigarette and a half (Alfonsa said two cigarettes and afterwards one hour
and a half); she further testified in relation to the incidents of the storeroom and the hog-pen, and said that, while she was
still in the sala, she saw the feet, that the skin was swollen, and that Alfonsa was kept for one year in the hog-pen. But upon
being afterwards asked by the court how many months there were in a year she said: "One crop of rice," and that she did
not know how many months there were in a year, nor days in the week nor hours in a day, and that, when saying one year,
she mean a long time; that when she left the house Alfonsa was still in the hog-pen.

I was in the kitchen preparing food and they sent for me to go to the sala. After I was in the sala Feliciano's daughter took a
rag and soaked it in petroleum. Feliciano then ordered me to lie down on the floor. Feliciano's eldest daughter took a rag
and forced it into my mouth. She then got another rag and blindfolded me with it. Feliciano's daughter then got a pestle

13

The third witness for the prosecution is Mr. Orville Wood, 30 years of age, agriculturist, residing in the municipality of
Davao; he was formerly an assistant superintendent of schools, and later served as secretary of the district of Davao from
January, 1904, until the time when he testified; he states that he had been in the old house of Feliciano, where the affair is
said to have occurred, for about three hours some time in 1905; that he knows Maria Verano who is married to Feliciano
Divino, and believes that he saw her the day before that on which he testified; that he has also known Feliciano Divino
since the year 1904, and that he knows Alfonsa, the girl who testified in court in his presence on that same day; and he
described a conversation that he had with Feliciano Divino on the balcony of the government building in the following
terms:

down with her feet stretched out; that her feet had been bandaged many times; that her father was not angry on the occasion
that petroleum was applied to Alfonsa's feet; that a physician called at their house to attend to Alfonsa; that when Alfonsa
came to their house, her feet were sore and ulcerated. And it was the fiscal who put in the question "Whether at the time she
had only a small ulcer on her feet," to which she replied yes; that at that time they had previously washed Alfonsa's feet
with hot water, and that thereafter the petroleum was applied and the feet bandaged.

When Feliciano first came to the balcony we spoke of another matter; what he afterwards stated in connection with this
matter was in answer to a question finally addressed to him by the Governor Bolton; Governor Bolton said to Feliciano that
he, Feliciano, had informed him previously that it was Maria who had burned Alfonsa's feet, but Governor Bolton knew at
the time that this was not true, and asked him who had burnt her feet; Feliciano replied that it was he who burnt Alfonsa's
feet, but that his wife, Maria, had ordered him to do it; the governor asked him who was the head of his house; he or his
wife.

Captain Tomas sent the girl to me for treatment because she was suffering from ulcers. As Captain Tomas insisted, I
admitted her to my house. When we got to my house I found out that she had a great many sores and I kept her there in
order to cure her. I took care of her and gave her food and clothing. Her malady improved at times, but after two or three
months reappeared. She had ulcers on both feet and on the face. The sores on her face healed, but the ulcers on her feet
became worse until they finally extended to the sole of the foot. I ordered her to treat the sore with petroleum, but she
would not do it. After some time I had to look after the ulcers personally. At times they improved, and at others became
worse. The ulcer on the sole of her foot became larger. The other ulcers did not entirely heal, the infection remained inside.
The wounds on the instep and upper part of the feet progressed fairly well, but those that she had on her soles did not,
because she always went out of the house and walked about. I continued to look after and treat all the ulcers that appeared.
As several years elapsed without the ulcers becoming entirely cured, I decided to cure them with petroleum, but she
objected and smelled badly, I called her one evening to the sala and examined it. When I found that it had grown too large
on both feet, I ordered some hot water and told my daughters to hold the girl because she objected to having petroleum
applied to her feet. I ordered them to hold her while I washed the ulcers with hot water. I then poured petroleum over her
feet and bandaged them. Fearing that she would go out of the house and again walk in the dirt, put her in the storeroom.
After a few days I ordered her upstairs and locked her in the pantry where the servants slept.
When questioned as to where the servants went with Alfonsa, he said that he came to know of it because the governor had
sent him word and told him that his servant girl accused him of burning her feet, but he denied it and explained the truth of
the matter, of how he had tried to cure her feet; the governor told him to go back to his house, and that he would investigate
the affair; he afterwards ordered him to the town and when he reached it, Mr. Wood alone was there; Mr. Wood told him
that the best thing that he could do was to settle the matter as soon as possible., The court then asked:

The witness goes on to say that he subsequently spoke with Petra, Catalina, and Pedro in regard to the affair in 1904, and
also spoke with Petra, Alfonsa, and another whose name he does not recollect, and that, when he asked Alfonsa who had
burnt her feet, she at first said that she did not know, but when he insisted on her telling him she replied that Feliciano's
children had done it. On being asked if he knew of the crime in June, 1903, he said no, that it had come to his knowledge in
the month of September, 1904; when asked whether, prior to the time that Feliciano told Governor Bolton in the presence
of the witness that he, Feliciano, had burnt Alfonsa's feet, Feliciano had told him that another person had done it, he
answered yes, that his wife, Maria, had burnt Alfonsa's feet; this statement was made to him at his office in the month of
December, 1904, the other one having been made to the governor in October, 1905; and to the question "Why did he tell
you this? he replied:
When Alfonsa came to the office for the first time, she was very frightened, and we could hardly get anything, from her; we
relied upon Feliciano's word as to who was the guilty party; the girl was small and sickly and we could not obtain any
information from her. When she was removed from the hands of Feliciano and turned over to another family that was not
related to him, and when she found out that she would not have return to him, it happened one day that I was at the balcony
of the office and saw her coming up the street; when she had nearly reached the road, Feliciano Divino was coming out of
the Auat's store, directly in her road; she turned round at once and ran to the stairs of the office, and hid herself behind
Segundo Esperat; as the result of a conversation that I had with her, on said occasion I spoke to Feliciano and he then
confessed his guilt; Feliciano told me that Maria had burnt Alfonsa's feet at a time when she was absent from his house; he
did not say when, and said nothing more.
Clara Divino, 16 years of age, a witness for the defense, testified; that when Alfonsa went to their house she had several
sores on her face and feet, and a bruise on her ankle; her father wanted to apply some medicines to them but she took no
heed; that one day her father said: "Let us cure her with herbs;" the treatment took a long time, and as she would not remain
quiet, her father ordered her to stay in the house in order to cure her the better, but she always went out, and her father then
called her and put petroleum on her feet; this proved very effective and cured her to some extent; her father, in order to
prevent her going out of the house locked her in the storeroom for several days, and afterwards in the pantry upstairs, a
room for one side of the kitchen used by the servants; and that after Alfonsa ran away from the house, she saw her in the
streets; that no force was used in treating her; that her father held her while they applied petroleum to her feet; she denied
that she ever bound or secured with a stick or laid on the floor, because she held her by the shoulders; that she was sitting

Finally, Feliciano Divino, the accused, testified as follows:

Was this the same conversation as to which Mr. Wood testified? A. I did not understand what Mr. Wood said last night,
but I will only say what took place. When I asked him what kind of a settlement he wished, he suggested to me that I
support Alfonsa for four years at the rate of 5 pesos a month. He made a written agreement with me. Inasmuch as this girl
had rendered me good service, I had no objection to allowing her 5 pesos a month. He asked me to sign the paper, telling
me that the agreement was that I was to pay Alfonsa 5 pesos a month for a period of four years. I did not read the paper
because I had great confidence in Mr. Wood. Under said agreement I have been paying for two years and three months.
Q. In what condition were the feet of the girl when she first entered your house? A. When she came to my house her feet
were somewhat deformed, the toes were twisted, and there was an ulcer on her ankle.
Tomas Monteverde, the Captain Tomas to whom the accused refers, testified that he had twice been gobernadorcillo, and
twice justice of the peace; that one day as he was going beyond Talomo, where the accused lived, in order to examine a
corpse, he saw Alfonsa on the road in very bad condition; she was covered from the face to her feet with ulcers
called ibung, and which smelled offensively; he gave her to Feliciano to be cured; this was in 1898, when he still was
justice of the peace in the time of the Spanish Government; subsequently, in answer to questions put by the court, he said

14

that, after the girl was delivered to Feliciano, he saw her almost every month because when going to pueblo they called at
his house; on making him describe the ulcers and scars that he had seen, he said that the whole of the instep was red in
color and denuded of the skin, and that she had ulcers in the sole of her foot, a scar above the left ankle, and several scars
on her face.
In view of the admission of the accused" says the trial judge "in view of the present condition of the feet of the
injured party, which positively prove that the scars which appear on them are the result of burns, and in view of the lack of
any explanation on the part of the defense as to the manner in which said burns were produced, it limiting itself to showing
that they are the result of ulcers, the court has no doubt that Alfonsa and Petra told the truth in everything of importance.

It was a bad ulcer" says the expert "that extended over the instep under the ankle, passing to the middle of the sole; it
was two and half inches wide, and it lacked two inches of surrounding the foot.

And considering that the accused was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves, defined and punished by article 416, paragraph
3, of the Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstances 1 and 2 of article 10 of the said code, without any mitigating
circumstance, the court sentenced him to the penalties stated in the beginning.
The testimony of Orville Wood, who at that time was secretary of the military governor of said district, was not impugned
or discredited in any way, and far from being ignored in the examination of these proceedings, should command due
attention as being the testimony that furnished the data for the proper judgment of facts that four years later were put
forward as constituting a crime, without there appearing in the proceedings any reason or cause whereby a poor helpless
girl, after living five or six years in the house of the accused, should have been injured by the latter in so cruel a manner as
described. If Alfonsa spoke the truth, one month and three weeks after she was tortured she was on her way to the
government building, and on seeing the accused in the road she "ran to the stairs of the office and hid herself behind
Segundo Esperat." She was accompanied by one Quirina, and Alfonsa "said hardly anything, it was her friend Quirina who
said the most," and Quirina only complained of the treatment that she had received in Feliciano's house, and requested that
she be sent elsewhere. And as Governor Bolton was aware of the circumstance, had it partaken of the character of a crime,
it can not be assumed, because nothing induces such a presumption, that he would have let it pass without causing it to be
prosecuted and punished.

After the new soft tissue was formed level with the skin, in order to avoid an excessive contraction, I cut some pieces of the
girl's skin and placed them over the wound. I did this several times before effecting a complete cure. I presented my bill for
seven hundred and sixty-six pesos (P766). (Folios 145 and 148.)

That petroleum was forcibly applied to the feet of Alfonsa, there can be no doubt; but that besides the action of the oil, fire
was applied, and above all, that said application of fire was a mere stroke of cruelty, and that the torture was kept up for an
hour and a half, or the time required to smoke two cigarettes, or one cigarette, when the testimony even regarding the
manner in which said coercion was effected was contradictory, a point which was so important, for the subjection of the
tortured girl or the patient to whom the cure was applied, is a thing that can not be conclusively established; and even if, by
means of circumstantial evidence, the burns were actually proven, it can not be established in a conclusive manner that the
injury was caused maliciously.
This must have been the consideration which induced the secretary, who, as an honorable man, must have been indignant at
the cruel injuries which the prosecution has attempted to exaggerate at the trial, to limit his action to obtaining from the
accused a written obligation allowing Alfonsa a monthly pension of five pesos for her subsistence. This was confirmed by
the accused, and has in no manner been contradicted in the proceedings, although the investigations to establish the
criminality of the deed were most searching.
The expert testimony offered by the prosecution should be carefully noted, as should also the opinion of the lower court in
connection therewith contained in its judgment. The said witness states that he rendered assistance to Alfonsa from the 29th
of December, 1905, to the 16th of December, 1906 the burns are supposed to have been caused two years previously
on account of a large ulcer that she had on the left foot, in a place that showed an old scar; according to the court's remark
on folio 109, said left foot was the most deformed."

The soles of both feet are deformed by reason of protuberances of what appears to be callous matter.
The witness continues his explanation of the prolonged treatment of the said ulcer, and ends thus:

The following rulings are contained in the latter part of the judgment:
No damages are allowed as no proof has been offered whereon the court may base the amount thereof. The court considers
that the prejudice caused to the injured party by an ulcer of one of the feet that was cured by Dr. Ames was not directly
occasioned by the accused. (Folio 186.)
Granting among the admissions made by the accused, that he continued the treatment of the ulcers of the girl until he or his
daughters burned her, or that the action of the petroleum irritated the said ulcers and caused them to spread, as may be
judged from the extent of the scars, to have been intended to cause an evil, but rather as a remedy; however, taking into
account the imprudence defined in paragraph 2 of article 568 of the Penal Code, as having been committed by an ignorant
person who was prohibited from exercising the art of healing not only by the regulations governing it but also by the Penal
Code, the penalty prescribed by the paragraph above referred to, that is, arresto, must therefore be applied in its medium
and maximum degrees.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and it is our opinion that, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of article 568 of the Penal Code, Feliciano Divino should be, and he is hereby, sentenced for
simple imprudence to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to suspension from office and right to suffrage during
the period of his sentence, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
2.

Dolo is not required to punish crimes by special penal laws.

People v. Go Chico
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission.
the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle
Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in
miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in
the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day
previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the
medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in
question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying
them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the medallions

15

described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of the medallions in question
and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In
many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely
immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially
worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces
the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with
precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The
case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent
period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection
against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most
corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from
that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the
public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and
kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with which A
consummated the act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B,
then society has been injured and its security violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A,
then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for
this is that A does not become a danger to society and institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind.
The mere discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must
go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend
upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the
public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that
The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the
intent of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have
been innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be determined by the court by
considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the
intention of the legislature.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its
motive, constitutes the crime.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the
health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are
exposed to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult task. Experience has taught the
lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his
intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify
legislation which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and
compels him to know and certain.

The court ruled out the evidence offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is
quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent,
and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the
commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in those
mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
xxx

xxx

xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that the act
was knowingly and intentionally done.
In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:
But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:
In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases
in which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant
understands the facts that give character to his act.
In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the
legislative prohibition.
In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every
criminal offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true as to
statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law
implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law
he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive,
willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a
judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any person would be
liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to
sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the injury that if they believed, from the
evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of
his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the
defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed.

16

The court says:

The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The
statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or
willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically defeated. The intention of the
legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up
their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense.
It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent
should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the
prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the
interpretation.
Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate
the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are
inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to
commit the crime.

People v. Bayona
The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may
be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he
got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act
complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to
intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such
an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended
to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited
act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime
and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)
While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally
responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent (Bishop's
New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of
public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great master of things", to forbid in a limited class of cases the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go
Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to
require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co
Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)

The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a
man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not
violate the provision of law in question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would
be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a
polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not be
carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we
have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p. 169,ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place
on the request of the board of election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his
arms.
If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not proved that he tried to
influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a
horse race on election day with impunity.
As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the provision in question, that is a matter for
the Chief Executive or the Legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

US v. Siy Cong Bieng

Benito Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, the defendants in this action, were convicted in the court below of a
violation of section 7 of Act No. 1655 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Pure Food and Drugs Sct, and
each of them was sentenced to pay a fine of P10 and one-half of the costs of the proceedings. From this judgment
the defendant Benito Siy Cong Bieng alone appealed.
ISSUE: whether a conviction under the Pure Food and Drugs Act can be sustained where it appears that the sale
of adulterated food products charged in the information was made without guilty knowledge of the fact of
adulteration, and without conscious intent to violate the statute; and second, whether a principal can be convicted
under the Act for a sale of adulterated goods made by one of his agents or employees in the regular course of his
employment, but without knowledge on the part of the principal of the fact that the goods sold were adulterated.
While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held criminally
responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil intent, , the courts have
always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great master
of things," to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer. (U. S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. Rep., 128; U. S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. Rep., 488.) In such
cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown.
As was said in the case of State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 619, 623):
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent, as distinguished from a mere intent, to violate the criminal law,
is an essential ingredient in every criminal offense, and that where there is the absence of such intent there is no

17

offense; this is especially so as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is
done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken
as to the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to
depend upon the positive, will intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
In the case of United States vs. Go Chico (14 Phil. Rep., 128, 138) it was said that: "Care must be exercised in
distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act."
The intent to commit an act prohibited and penalized by statute must, of course, always appear before a conviction upon a
charge of the commission of a crime can be maintained. But whether or not the existence of guilty knowledge and criminal
or evil intent, that is to say, the conscious intent or will to violate the statute, just also appear in order to sustain a judgment
of conviction is a question which must be determined in each case by reference to the language of the statute defining the
offense.
The growing interest manifested during the past decade on the subject if pure food has been reflected in the passage of the
Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, and in the passage of similar acts by a number of the state legislatures.
The Philippine Pure Food and Drugs Act (No. 1655) is, with some light modifications, substantially identical with the
Federal act. Its prohibitions of the sales of adulterated foodstuffs and drugs are absolute and general. Indeed, they could
hardly be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word
implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the design and purpose of the Act would
in many instances be thwarted and practically defeated. The intention of the Legislature is plain that persons engaged in the
sale drugs and food products cannot set up their ignorance of the nature and quality of the commodities sold by them as a
defense. We conclude therefore that under the Act proof of the facts of the sale of adulterated drugs and food products as
prohibited by the Act is sufficient to sustain a conviction, without proof of guilty knowledge of the fact of adulteration, or
criminal intent in the making of the sale other than that necessarily implied by the statute in the doing of the prohibited act.
Counsel for appellant has cited a number of cases touching the various phases of the question now under discussion, but it
will be sufficient for our purposes to limit ourselves to some reference to the cases wherein prosecutions have arisen upon
charges of violations of pure food laws. In some of these statutes guilty knowledge and criminal intent is made essential to
the commission of the offense prohibited, and of course where such is the case guilty knowledge and criminal intent must
appear before a conviction can be sustained. But the overwhelming weight of authority construing statutes, generally
known as pure food laws, is to the effect that in the absence of language in the statute making guilty knowledge and
criminal intent an essential element of the acts prohibited thereunder, it is not necessary to charge or to prove that
prohibited sales of food products are made with guilty knowledge or criminal intent in order to sustain convictions under
such statutes.
Supported by numerous citations of authority, Thornton in his work on "Pure Food and Drugs," says with reference to the
Federal act of June 30, 1906: "The intent with which these several violations of the statute is done is immaterial. There may
be no intention to violate the statute, yet if the act produces the result forbidden by the statute, an offense has been
committed." (Sec. 119, p. 202.)

And again: "Repeated statements have been made in this work that an intent to violate the statute is not necessary in order
to incur the infliction of a penalty for the sale or keeping for sale [of] adulterated or impure food or drugs. An act
performed with no intent to violate a purefoods statute is just as much a crime under this Federal Pure Food and Drug Act
of June 30, 1906, as if a criminal design to violate it was intended and entertained at the time of its performance. This rule
extends to sales or other acts by servants." (Sec. 512, p. 613.)
And again, at section 559, the same author, citing numerous authorities, shows that in prosecutions for the sale of
adulterated milk it has been quite uniformly held that it is no defense that the accused had no knowledge of the fact of
alteration, and that it need not be alleged or proven that he had such knowledge, in the absence of special words in the
statute requiring the sale to be made with knowledge of the adulteration.
In the case of People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321), the court said: "It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has
grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and
the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. The redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult
task. Experience such taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the
dealer's knowledge and of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an
emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of
what he sells and compels him to know and to be certain."
Upon the question of the liability of the master for the violation of a pure food law by his clerk committed without his
knowledge or consent, the leading case would seem to be Groff vs. State (171 Ind., 547). In that case the court said:
The distribution of impure or adulterated food for consumption is an act perilous to human life and health; hence,
a dangerous act, and cannot be made innocent and harmless by the want of knowledge or the good faith of the
seller.
Guilty intent is not an element in the crime . . . . hence, the rule that governs in that large class of offenses, which
rests upon criminal intent, has no application here. Cases like this are founded largely upon the principle that he
who voluntarily deals in perilous articles must be cautious how he deals.
The sale of oleomargarine in an adulterated form, or as a substitute for butter, is a crime against the public health.
Whoever, therefore, engages in its sale, or in the sale of any article interdicted by the law, does so at his peril, and
impliedly undertakes to conduct it with whatever degree of care is necessary to secure compliance with the law.
He may conduct the business himself, or by clerks or agents but if he chooses the latter the duty is imposed upon
him to see to it that those selected by him to sell the article to the public obey the law in the matter of selling;
otherwise, he, as the principal and the responsible proprietor of the business, is liable for the penalty imposed by
the statute.
See also the cases of State vs. Bockstruck (136 Mo., 335), and Commonwealth vs. Vieth (155 Mass., 442).
Labatt in his work on Master and Servant (vol. 7, sec. 2569) discusses the general rule as to liability of the master for
criminal conduct of his servant as follows: "Although the courts are in accord as to the master's liability when he

18

participates in the criminal conduct of his servant, there is a decided conflict of opinion as to his responsibility when the act
of the servant is without the master's knowledge or connivance and against his express orders. These cases can be
reconciled to some extent by the difference in the language employed in the statutes to define the various offenses, and the
policy of the statutes themselves. Wherever guilty intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, it would be impossible to
fix responsibility upon the master for his servant's transgression of the law, if the master did not harbor such an intent. . . .
In most instances where the master is held to be responsible criminally for the wrongful conduct of his servant, it is on the
theory that the act complained of is positively forbidden, and therefore guilty intention is not essential to a conviction of the
offense."

For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charged with
parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two informations. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced, following which, a judgment of conviction was
rendered. Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
conviction. The Court ruled that although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is
proper if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
SYLLABUS

And in section 2573, supported by numerous citations from cases dealing with infringement of liquor laws and pure food
laws, he say: "I f certain acts are positively forbidden by statute, and it is the policy of the law to prohibit them, irrespective
of what the motive or intent of the person violating statute may be, no principle of justice is violated by holding the master
responsible for the conduct of his servant on the same theory that he is held responsible civilly."
Upon the reasoning and the authority of the cases there referred to, we are of opinion that even in the absence of express
provisions in the statute, the appellant in the case at bar was properly held criminally responsible for the act of his agent in
selling the adulterated coffee, and indeed it seems write clear that his liability is expressly contemplated under the provision
of section 12 of Act No. 1655 of the Philippine Commission, which is as follows:
The word "person" as used in this Act shall be construed to import both the plural and the singular, as the case
demands, and shall include corporations, companies, societies, associations, and other commercial or legal
entities. When construing and enforcing the provisions of this Act, the act, omission, or failure of any officer,
agent, or other person acting for or employed by any corporation, company society, association, or other
commercial or legal entity, within the scope of his employment or office, shall in every case be also deemed to be
the act, omission, or failure of such corporation, company, society, association, or other commercial or legal
entity, as well as that of the person.
It is contended that the express provisions of this section, referring as they do to the liability of any "corporation, society,
association, or other commercial or legal entity," do not include cases of agency of a private individual. We are of opinion,
however, that the words "commercial or legal entity" as used in this provision is sufficiently comprehensive to include a
private individual engaged in business who makes use of agent or agents, employee or employees, in the conduct of his
business; and even if this position could be successfully controverted we would still be of opinion that the provisions of this
section clearly and definitely indicate the policy of the statute to prohibit and penalize the acts forbidden thereunder,
irrespective of what the motive or intent of the person violating the statute may be, and to hold the master in all cases
responsible for the act, omission or failure of his servant, within the scope of his employment, whether he be a private
individual, a corporation, company, society, association, or other commercial or legal entity.
We conclude that the judgment of conviction entered in the court below should be affirmed, with the costs of this instances
against the appellant. So ordered.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; GUILT OF THE ACCUSED DULY
ESTABLISHED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. After going through the evidentiary record, we find no
reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza has
been duly established. Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996]). While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented
by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accused-appellant, the established circumstances abovestated,
however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and with the hypothesis that accused-appellant is
guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. And when circumstantial evidence constitutes an
unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete
and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused (People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546 [1996]). The unbelievable story
of accused-appellant that the killing was perpetrated by the smuggling syndicates man is all too plainly a mere
concoction of accused-appellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; RELATIONSHIP PER SE OF A WITNESS WITH THE VICTIM
DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN HE IS BIASED. Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court
erred in giving full credence to the testimony of his father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter, Charmaine
Mendoza. But having been in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of their
testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect (People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731
[1996]). As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his family
went to the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had already several occasions of altercation. Such fact
was shown when accused-appellant left his wife and daugther at the party without informing them where he would
be. The victims father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-appellant and his daughter, Cecilia had been
quarrelling. Accused-appellant suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man. He
contends that Alipio is not a credible witness for the prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that
Alipio resents him on account of his having children with another woman. It is basic precept that relationship per
se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is biased. The Court finds improbable and contrary to
human experience accused-appellants claim that Alipio testified for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown
that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

PEOPLE vs. LANDICHO (CA)

19

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE RETRACTION BY A PROSECUTION WITNESS DOES NOT NECESSARILY VITIATE
THE ORIGINAL TESTIMONY.Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaines retraction. But the
trial court correctly disregarded the same. The first time Charmaine took the witness stand was in December, 1988,
barely a month after her mothers death. Her recantation was made two years later when she was already in the
custody of accused-appellant who was allowed to go out on bail. Charmaines first testimony was to the effect that she
saw her father, accused-appellant, hiding a gun under the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such
act. Such contradictory statements should not discredit Charmaine as a witness. The present rule is that testimony of a
witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities
and improbabilities of the case (People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction by a prosecution
witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony. Testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside
and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be
carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made carefully and keenly scrutinized,
and the reasons or motives for the change discriminatingly analyzed (Molina vs. People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]). The
trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former testimony for the
prosecution. The second declaration was received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial court. Neither are
we persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that Charmaine was living with and dependent upon her
father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her second declaration.
4. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES CANNOT BE EXTENDED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS. Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number
41001, the fatal weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there
had been a dispute between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she
went, and not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man. But this claim is belied
by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the fatal weapon. Charmaine
testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother was shot. And weeks
earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by
the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by accusedappellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by accused-appellant himself and a
mission order authorizing him to carry the said weapon. But accused-appellant claims that these documents were
illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of cohmunication and papers, and/or his
right against unreasonable search and seizure. The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as
a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57
[1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. In the instant case,
the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a
private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; USE OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM CONSIDERED ONLY AS SPECIAL
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND NOT A SEPARATE OFFENSE. Although the prosecution duly
established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed,
fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said decree

and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide, and not as a separate offense. (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998). Withal, accusedappellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm. This notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposed for
the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be increased. The death penalty cannot be imposed
upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in November, 1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty was
still proscribed.
On November 11, 1988, accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then 10-year-old daughter attended
the birthday party of a relative of accused-appellant held at McDonalds in Harrison Plaza. While the party was going on,
accused-appellant left and proceeded to Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where he had some beer. When it was time for
Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could not find accused-appellant, hence, they decided to just leave, proceeding
directly to their residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias (p. 4, Appellees Brief.).
Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 oclock in the evening but accused-appellant was not yet there. After
a while, mother and daughter left for the house of Cecilias parents in Bacoor, Cavite to bring some perfume for Cecilias
brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid.).
At about 9 oclock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They rode a jeepney and at the gate of the
subdivision where they live, they saw the car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilias god-daughter, and they hitched a ride
home. Finally home, they saw their car already parked in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights in their house were on
but the screen door was locked. They knocked at the window but accused-appellant did not respond. A moment later,
however, accused-appellant opened the back door and mother and daughter went straight to the masters bedroom (Ibid.).
While inside the masters bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold water and to
douse him. She willingly obliged, after which she was told to go to her room. She change her clothes and readied herself
for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine having left
accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter, Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running out of her room, Charmaine
saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding
a gun under the bed in her parents room (pp. 5-6, Ibid.).
Charmaine ran towards her gasping and bleeding mother and held her. Then, accused-appellant asked Charmaine to
call her Aunt Dolores Mendoza to inform her of the death of Cecilia. Dolores could not believe Charmaine and talked to
accused-appellant instead (Ibid.).
Meanwhile, the victim bled to death on the floor.
Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had been
shot and is already dead. Gabac, on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch anything and that he would be
arriving shortly. When Gabac finally arrived, he and accused-appellant carried the lifeless body of Cecilia into accusedappellants car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.

20

Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival. The autopsy report indicated the cause of death as follows:

that moment, his wife showed him some money and uttered Dad, okey na. She also brought out the .38 caliber revolver
from her bag then changed her clothes, and went to the bathroom, and he fell asleep (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 21-28).

Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder
Upon receiving information about the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa, together with
investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas, Cpl. Gorgonio Nortales and Pfc. Rolando Almario, proceeded to the hospital to
investigate the incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any statement or comment. Thereafter , the policemen invited
Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las
Pias. While they were inspecting the premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something tucked inside Gabacs waist. He promptly told
Gabac Pare pakisurrender mo nga iyong baril. Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38 caliber revolver with Serial
No. 41001 and with two empty shells and two live rounds. Gabac informed Africa that the gun was handed to him by
accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the crime scene to respond to the call of accused-appellant for assistance (p.
7, Ibid.)
Cecilias father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughters death, and that valuables were being taken out
of his daughters house, decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces of property therein, including
accused-appellants personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)
From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order No. 86-580-893 dated
November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing Commander,
580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized accused-appellant to carry a Colt
Revolver, .38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986 to December 15, 1986. There was also a
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10, 1986, approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the Philippine
Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for
Personnel which described the firearm as One Colt Revolver SN 41001 (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).
Accused-appellants own account of the incident is to the effect that before the shooting incident on the night of
November 11, 1988, he and his wife Cecilia were arguing about the latter carrying an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver, and
that a few weeks earlier they likewise argued because he found out that his wife was still supporting her parents as well as
her brothers and sisters.
Further, accused-appellant claimed that he saw men roaming near their house and that he had received death threats
over the telephone because Cecilia owed $35,000.00 to some people, in relation to her jewelry and perfumes business. She
also allegedly owed people some cash which was coursed through her by workers from Saudi Arabia to be sent to their
relatives in the Philippines (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 14-19).
Accused-appellant claimed that he went home at around 7 oclock on the night of November 11, 1988, after his wife,
Cecilia, and daughter, Charmaine, had left him at the party. When his wife and Charmaine arrived, they proceeded to the
masters bedroom, after which, her daughter kissed him goodnight. He and his wife were then left alone in their room and at

Thereafter, accused-appellant declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside their
room. When he went out, he saw his wife wounded and bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody run from the backdoor of
their house which banged.Consequently, he ran outside and pursue the intruder who ran from the backdoor, but accusedappellant claimed that he only went up to their gate because of his concern over his wifes condition.
When he went back, he woke up Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia, both of them cried. After a while, he
called up his brother-in-law, policeman Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 32, p. 34, p. 37) and the two of them
then brought Cecilia to the hospital.
In the hospital, some police investigators from the Las Pias Police Station asked accused-appellant about the incident,
but he refused to comment. He was later invited to the police station for investigation, but due to the advice of his relative,
Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any statement to the police about the incident.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. While he admitted having been married to Cecilia on February 28,
1976, he claimed that his wife was killed by somebody else. Further, even as he denied possession of a .38 caliber revolver,
he admitted to have been authorized to carry a .45 caliber between the years 1968 and 1969 (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 7
and 68).
Accused-appellant swore that he had no reason to kill his wife because he loved her. However, he admitted to have
sired children by another woman (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 51).
The trial court did not give credence and weight to the defenses theory that the victim was engaged in illegal
activities which supposedly led to her death. Rather, the trial court found that accused-appellant had the opportunity and the
propensity to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Accordingly, although the evidence was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a pronouncement that all elements
which were needed to arrive at a conclusion that accused-appellant killed his wife were present and that no proof had been
established by him to overturn its findings (p. 67, Ibid.).
After going through the evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are convinced that
the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza has been duly established.
Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518 [1996]). Direct evidence of the commission
of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt ( People vs. Damao,
253 SCRA 146 [1996]).

21

During the trial of the case, it was duly established that the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella
Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias, were the Mendozas, namely, accused-appellant Octavio, his daughter Charmaine,
and his now deceased wife Cecilia. On the night Cecilia was shot to death, no one was there except these three
persons. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the trial court of his innocence by denying that he killed his wife,
insinuating that another person is the killer. This stance of denial is negative self-serving evidence which deserves no
evidentiary weight (People vs. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 [1996]). The insinuation of accused-appellant that some
convenient intruder perpetrated the killing is absolutely without basis and unsubstantiated. It is plainly an afterthought, a
devised plot to escape just punishment. In fact, accused-appellant even refused to give any statement or comment to the
police investigators to enlighten them about the shooting incident. If indeed, Cecilia was shot and killed by somebody else
as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely have been but natural for him, as a husband to cooperate with police
authorities for the speedy apprehension of the gunman, by informing them immediately of the alleged intruder-killer. But
he did not and instead, he took the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, to keep silent about the incident when the police
conducted the investigation, which is rather odd if he really were innocent. Verily it was only on November 16, 1992, or 2
years after the incident that he came out with the story about the handy intruder. He kept silent for two long years.
Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of his
father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter, Charmaine Mendoza. But having been in a better position to observe
the witnesses, the trial courts appreciation of their testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect
(People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]).
As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his family went to
the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had already several occasions of altercation. Such fact was shown when
accused-appellant left his wife and daughter at the party without informing them where he would be. The victims father,
Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accused-appellant and his daughter, Cecilia, had been quarrelling. Accusedappellant suspected that Cecilia was having an illicit relationship with another man. He contends that Alipio is not a
credible witness for the prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents him on account of his
having children with another woman.
It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is biased. The
Court finds improbable and contrary to human experience accused-appellants claim that Alipio testified for no other
purpose but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper motive, thus, his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.
The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads us to believe
that accused-appellant killed his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal liability on his theory that when
Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear to be a naturally spontaneous narration, but rather
evidently a coached one. According to to him, this theory was bolstered when she cried and suddenly, embraced accusedappellant in public view.
On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility, this, being in
accord with human behavior and nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful experience for her, at a very tender
age, to testify in court against her own father whom she loves and respects as shown by the act of embracing him.

Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaines retraction. But the trial court correctly disregarded
the same. The first time Charmaine took the witness stand was in December, 1988, barely a month after her mothers
death. Her recantation was made two years later when she was already in the custody of accused-appellant who was
allowed to go out on bail. Charmaines first testimony was to the effect that she saw her father, accused-appellant, hiding a
gun under the bed, and her subsequent testimony was that she saw no such act. Such contradictory statements should not
discredit Charmaine as a witness. The present rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities and improbabilities of the case (People vs. Cura, 240
SCRA 234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony. Testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done,
both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under
which each was made carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change discriminatingly analyzed
(Molina vs. People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).
The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former testimony for
the prosecution.The second declaration was received with caution, and it did not impressed the trial court. Neither are we
persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that Charmaine was living with and dependent upon her father,
accused-appellant, at the time she gave her second declaration.
Another fact which militates against accused-appellants denial that he killed his wife is that the paraffin test
conducted on him yielded positive results. Notably, this test was conducted a day after the shooting incident.
Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001, the fatal
weapon, and even implied that the gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant, there had been a dispute
between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife carried wherever she went, and not about the
fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another man.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the possessor of the fatal
weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother was
shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac,
when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by
accused-appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by accused-appellant is further
established by the memorandum receipt signed by accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry
the said weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these documents were illegally procured in grave
violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search
and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies. The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the
occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones
person from interference by government and it cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.

22

In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law
Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellants claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber pistol, the
certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of the Firearm and Explosive
Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm holder of any kind (p. 69, Rollo).
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by accusedappellant, the established circumstances abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and
with the hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypotheses that he is not. And when
circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it
cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by the accused (People vs. Verano , 264 SCRA 546
[1996]). The unbelievable story of accused-appellant that the killing was perpetrated by the smuggling syndicates man is all
too plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree
No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for accused-appellant, Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997
amended the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance
in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998).
Withal, accused-appellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm. This notwithstanding, that is, despite the presence of such aggravating circumstance, the penalty
imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua, may no longer be increased. The death penalty cannot be
imposed upon accused-appellant since the killing occurred in November, 1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty
was still proscribed.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

3.

when the act described by special law are inherently immoral - Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, November 19, 2001).

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the
individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line
demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must
be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights
and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would
endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of
maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that
would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order,
carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary sociopolitical ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in
threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law
as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to
its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He
therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries
are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

23

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty
of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all
ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to
26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 ( Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. CaseNo. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised
Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to
file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were
only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of
probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were
never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25
June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted
his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in
the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires
less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process;
and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. [3] Courts invariably train their
sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the
presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature
is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the
acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with
caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality,
invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain
whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La
Union
Credit
Cooperative,
Inc.
v.
Yaranon [4] we
held
that
as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and
the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably
transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the
statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will
hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the
instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable
the
accused
to
determine
the
nature
of
his
violation. Section
2
is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements
of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage
of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

24

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its
application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the
realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is
the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR inCONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overtOR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION
PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro,JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social
Security System (SSS), 329,855,000SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN
THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND
FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESSTHREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal
assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4.These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; [6] much less do we have to
define every word we use.Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to
define each and every word in an enactment.Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability
to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as
the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, [7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words. [8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.

25

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely
evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES
OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that
two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in
such a big amount, on line25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read,
therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series.
Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts
of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same
category
of
enumeration
found
in
Sec.
1,
par.
(d),
say,
misappropriation,
malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing
for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec.
4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?

26

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal
acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize.Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. [10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely
couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard thoughdefectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction,
while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. [11] With more reason,
the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [12] It
must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not
be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially
where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of
its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." [14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is

outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct.In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." [16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
[17]
the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." [18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages
in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." [20] As has
been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law
on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied
to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. [22] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in
sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before
the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and
amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged. [27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously
claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by

27

dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the
law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will
take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder
Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that
courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details,
and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and
elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and
that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to
guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not
suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and
inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the
statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster,
Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US
Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative
Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the
immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in
all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused
is entitled to an acquittal. [29] The use of the"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law.It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important
in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. [30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo
Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts
enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount
committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million
since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x
x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For
example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of
pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the
conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the
offense.

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or
preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount
is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of
bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to
accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need
to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the
amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration
the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will
sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act
of the public officer in:

28

transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof
in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or
element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50)
raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern
at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at leastP50,000,000.00.[31]

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are
concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder
and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood
from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and
opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a
purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only
operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without
invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced
by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the
law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for
a separability clause -

overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill
gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it
necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid,the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very
important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying
Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts
complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not
plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without
applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for
violation of the Plunder Law?

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of
some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly
be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent.Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully,
unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every
individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
on the acts charged constituting plunder?

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.

[33]

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which,
in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

29

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each
and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -

offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same
having been eternally consigned byPeople v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this
Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect,
assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the AntiPlunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender
is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not
apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."[35]

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which
have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as
unscrupulous people relentlesslycontrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and
radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle
those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the
legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public
office.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made
or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death,
are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in
the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to
the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no
less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can
equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual
prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that
may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices,
shall we emerge triumphant in the midst offerment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by
RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

MOTIVE
1. Motive Distinguished from Intent
2. When IS motive is relevant or irrelevant

People v. Taneo,
FELONIES
1. ART. 3 RPC (dolo & culpa) note the correct translation of dolo
2. Elements of Felonies:
3. Difference between dolo and culpa Dolo is through malice (intent/mens rea) while culpa is by negligence or
impurdence

30

4.

Distinguish felonies from crimes in general:

Felonies are acts or omissions penalized by the RPC while crime is the broader concept covering acts
omissions penalized by the RPC and those under special penal laws
-

FELONIES COMMITTED BY MEANS OF DOLO

1.
2.

concept of mens rea

REQUISITES:
PP vs. ANACITO OPURAN (GR 147674-75, March 17, 2004)

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., prosecution witness Bambi
Herrera was studying his lessons inside his house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang were outside sitting side by side
with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench. [4]
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambis house, shouting: Theres a long-haired man! Bambi stood up and looked
through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife while the latter appeared to be
trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds on different parts of his body, he managed to
stand up and run inside Bambis house, with Anacito chasing him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to
prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also
threw stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito left.[5]
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the hospital. He saw
Anacitos two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said: Never mind because he [referring to
Anacito] is mentally imbalanced. [6] As nobody from among his neighbors responded to his plea for help, Bambi carried
Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the lower portion of the neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a
drinking session, helped Bambi bring Allan to the hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later.[7]
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of Barangay San Pablo,
Catbalogan,Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the latters wife. While there,
Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw people running. He learned that Anacito had
stabbed somebody.[8]
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise noticed
Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near the so-called lovers lane, Anacito
emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three to four times. [9]
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He then saw
Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents house, but the latter did not make it because he collapsed near the fence. Tomas
also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house of the Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was
brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital, where he died the following day.[10]

Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Allan
and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allans body, one of which was fatal because it affected the upper lobe of
the right lung and bronchial vessel. [11] Demetrio Jr. sustained four stab wounds and died of pulmonary failure due
to hypovolemiafrom external and internal hemorrhage.[12]
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito Opuran. He declared that on the
evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another barangay in Catbalogan, Samar. He
never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight policemen entered his house, pointed their guns
at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the police station and detained there until the following morning. He denied
being present at the place and time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and
friend whom he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with prosecution
witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied and lowly
regarded by his accusers.[13]
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense to present witnesses. Then on 16
February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension of the hearing on the following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000,
upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order authorizing the psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in
consonance with that Order, Anacito underwent a psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P.
Tan; (3) Dr. Tan issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a normal mental status on that
date but was suffering from some degree of Mental Aberration, which required further psychiatric evaluation at Tacloban
City.[14]
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for the psychiatric examination of
Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.[15]
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-psychiatrist of the
EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on Anacito. At the resumption of the hearings on 20 November
2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito three times through interviews. From her interview with Anacitos
sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of Anacitos psychiatric history of inability to sleep and talking
irrelevantly. She found that Anacito had a psychotic disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory
hallucinations. She confirmed her medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission of the
crime and even up to the present so that he could not stand trial and would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia. [16]
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was talking irrelevantly. [17] Anacito was
treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne. [18] They stayed in Manila for one month. In 1989, they
returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed the same medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long
in Manila for follow-up treatments, Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the
NCMH, however, referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for
examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada of the NCMH who

31

came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year. Since then until the year 2000, Anacito did not take any
medicine, nor was he subjected to examination or treatment. [19]
Anacitos other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19 November 1998, he heard a loud
voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud voices and then went out. When Francisco went out to verify, he did
not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner of the street carrying a knife. He surmised that Anacito
had committed a crime, and so he hugged him. Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios
house.Before the incident, he observed Anacito to be sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and sometimes
silent.[20]
In its decision[21] of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for the death of Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in disregarding the
exempting circumstance of insanity.[22] He contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore,
completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even assuming in gratis argumenti that he is criminally
liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is
illness as would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness
of his acts. He likewise maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in the Information as a qualifying
circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to establish with the required proof
his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. The mental state of Anacito, as
testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing incidents. Further, Dr. Verona was certain that
Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was uncertain that Anacito was unconscious at the time he stabbed the two
victims. The OSG also argues that treachery was duly alleged and proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be
treated as a qualifying circumstance in the killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial courts judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element. Without it, the
imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The
human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon
emotional and psychological appreciation. A mans act is presumed voluntary. [23] It is improper to assume the
contrary, i.e.that acts were done unconsciously,[24] for the moral and legal presumption is that every person is presumed to
be of sound mind,[25] or that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. [26] Thus, the presumption
under Article 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by evidence of
insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability. [27]
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it, [28] for insanity as a defense is in
the nature of confession and avoidance.[29] An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims
that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time

immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. [30] It is, therefore,
incumbent upon accuseds counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden
attack of insanity immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him. [31]
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what
is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior.[32] Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read the thoughts,
motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. [33]
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and
conduct.[34] However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. [35] As consistently held by
us, A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. [36] Thus, we had previously
decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of insanity certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of
cough syrup and consuming three sticks of marijuana before raping the victim; [37] slurping the victims blood and attempting
to commit suicide after stabbing him; [38] crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off a jeepney.[39]
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones[40] requires that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment because of a complete absence of
the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,[41] we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the test of
cognition whether there was a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act and (b) the test of
volition whether there was a total deprivation of freedom of the will. We observed that our case law shows common
reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is
exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying
complete deprivation of intelligence. This is expected, since a persons volition naturally reaches out only towards that
which is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. [42]
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is
intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own
perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. [43]
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacitos defense of insanity. The appellant points to the testimony of
prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito was a silent man who would sharply stare at the lady boarders a few days
before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and long pants when there was no occasion requiring a
formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the testimony of prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15minute time interval between the two stabbing incidents shows that the stabbing spree was without any known motive. [44]
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged behavioral oddity of Anacito two to three
days prior to the killing. His sister Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he was angry with her. [45] His
brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes talk to himself, laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and ,

32

at times, he was just quiet. [46] Also relied upon by the appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history
and the expert testimony of the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr. Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambis personal perception that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito
to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his
occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute
interval are not sufficient proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such
unusual behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude imputability. [47]
Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law. What it shows is
that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to remedy his lack of sleep and
noisiness.As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of
reason.Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios
claimed that she requested the confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito
was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a recommendation for Anacitos
confinement, there was no indication in the records as to when the recommendation was made, who made the
recommendation, and the reason for the recommendation. [48]
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,[49] we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to the incident
in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged insane by the institute. Applying
this principle to Anacitos case, we find another cogent reason to reject his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While Remedios
insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito needed
the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed the medicine prior to the stabbing
incident.She bought medicine for Anacito only in April 2000 because he was again noisy in the jail. [50] It seems that it was
only after the stabbing incident, when he was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Veronas examinations on Anacito were based on incomplete
or insufficient facts.[51] For one thing, she admitted to have examined Anacito for only three sessions lasting one to two
hours each.[52] Her one-page medical report[53] reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in appearance, wearing blue shirt and pants.
Mesomorphic, dark complexion with earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with auditory hallucination, kabastosan,
kanan yawa. He further said his sleep was minanok and complained of occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment
and insight fair. Fair impulse control.
Comments:

From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient has a psychiatric disorder. It is most likely
that the patient is psychotic before and during the commission of the crime. He is presently psychotic and cannot stand
trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Veronas conclusions have no supporting medical bases or data. She failed to demonstrate how
she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing. [54] Further, she did not have Anacitos complete
behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she mentioned that Anacito could not distinguish right from
wrong, but she was not certain that he was not conscious of killing his victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a
diagnostic case of schizophrenia, but stated in the next breath that Anacito was not grossly insane. [55]
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Veronas short psychiatric evaluation report and her testimony
that Anacitos judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that his mental condition in
1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he was psychiatrically examined. The most that we can
conclude is that her findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacitos mental
condition only for said time. It could be that Anacito was insane at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all
probability, insanity could have been contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact
with friends and relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the realization of the gravity of
his offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to
disrupt his mental equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before
or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the inquiry. [56] His mental condition after that
crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. [57]
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in the year
2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial
and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties. [58] Additionally, the trial judge
observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to
him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the
futility of his earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction [59] or an afterthought.[60] In any event,
Anacito failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan
Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction. [61]
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the mitigating circumstance of diminished
willpower. In the cases where we credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of insanity, it was clear from
the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental disease that affected his intelligence and willpower
for quite a number of years prior to the commission of the act he was being held for. [62] The situation does not exist in the
cases at bar. It was only in 2000 that Anacito was diagnosed as psychotic with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations
and was found to be schizophrenic. There is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at the time
he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her report, only at the witness
stand.

33

We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is concerned because
the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault. [63] For treachery to be considered, it must be present and
seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the
perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed. [64]
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim in a dark
place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the lovers lane, Anacito emerged from his hiding place and
stabbed the former several times. Anacitos attack came without warning; it was deliberate and unexpected, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. [65]
We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
because treachery was not alleged with specificity as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention is
belied by the information itself, which alleged: All contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying circumstance of
treachery. In any event, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances
need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.[66]
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the crime of murder, which is punishable
byreclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible
penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime. For the crime of
homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is
within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
there being no modifying circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he spent P43,500 for the wake and burial of
his son, only P11,945[67] is substantiated by receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we shall award to Demetrio Jr.s heirs
temperate damages[68] of P25,000[69] conformably with current jurisprudence.[70]
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he spent P10,000. However, he failed to
present receipts to substantiate his claim. Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages in the amount of P10,000 on the
ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim incurred expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of P50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and Allan is affirmed in line with
recent jurisprudence.[71] Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.[72]
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim moral damages in the amount
ofP50,000 consistent with controlling case law.[73] Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.[74]
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 in view of the
presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery.[75]

Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the total amount of P161,945 and the
heirs of Allan damages in the total amount of P110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 4693
and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, respectively. Apart from the P50,000 civil indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio,
Jr., in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; (b) P25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) P25,000 as exemplary
damages, or a total of P150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; and
(b)P10,000 as temperate damages, or a total of P110,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

3.

ABSENCE OF INTENT/MENS REA:

UNITED STATES vs. CATOLICO, 18 Phil. 504
THE UNITED STATES vs. RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, G.R. No. L-6486 March 2, 1911
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cagayan, Hon. Charles A. Low presiding,
convicting the defendant of the crime of malversation of public funds and sentencing him to two months' imprisonment, to
perpetual disqualification to hold public office or public employment of any kind, and to the payment of the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the peace of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, on the 2d
day of October, 1909, had before him sixteen separate civil cases commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct
individuals, each one for damages resulting from a breach of contract; that said cases were all decided by the appellant in favor
of the plaintiff; that each one of the defendant in said cases appealed from the decision of the justice of the peace and deposited
P16 as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of P50, each one of which was approved by the court; that on the 12th
day of said month the plaintiff in said cases presented a writing to the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging that the
sureties on the said bonds were insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the appellant; that thereupon the
latter ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order, required each of the appellants to file another bond
within fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the appellants in said causes presented new bonds within the time fixed, the
plaintiff in said causes applied to the appellant, as said court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of the
said sixteen cases and commanding the execution of the same, at the same time asking that the sums deposited by the
defendants in said actions be attached (so called in the record) and delivered to him in satisfaction of said judgments; that the
accused acceded to the petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached and delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time
requiring of the plaintiff a bond of P50 for each attachment, conditioned that he would respond for the damages which should
result from such attachment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

34

After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the said sixteen cases presented a complaint against the
appellant to the Court of First Instance, by virtue of which said court ordered that the plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the
clerk of the Court of First Instance the sums deposited by the defendants in said actions. Canillas obeyed the order of the court
and made the delivery as required.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as
properly to subject him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of record, it was not
criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention arises from the act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the accused. We are in entire accord with that
recommendation. The case made against the appellant lacks many of the essential elements required by law to be present in the
crime of malversation of public funds. The accused did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person;
neither did he feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in good faith under the belief that he
was acting judicially and correctly. The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his hands by the defendants - appellants in
the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the benefit of the plaintiff in those actions, after the appeals had been dismissed and
the judgments in his court had become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment
which he held in those cases, can not be considered an appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No.
1740. He believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a perfect right under the law to cancel the
bonds when it was clearly shown to him that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to require the filing of new undertakings,
giving the parties ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings were not filed, and to
declare the judgment final. He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and said judgment had become final, the
sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the judgments in the actions in which said sums had been deposited
and that he was acting judicially and legally in making such applications.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of, even though it be admitted that the crime,
if any, is that of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In
all prosecutions for violations of the preceding section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person
described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the funds and property properly
in his charge on the demand of any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or depositary shall be
deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or property have been put to personal uses or used for personal ends
by such person within the meaning of the preceding section." Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes
only a prima facie case against the person accused. If he present evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or
property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was
necessary for the accused to offer any such evidence, for the reason that the people's own pleading alleged, and its own proofs
presented, along with the criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money had not been put to personal
uses or used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution demonstrated, both by the allegations in its information filed
against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that the absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use
thereof by the accused, thus affirmatively and completely negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted, arises from
the absence of the funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts which were presented for the purpose of
creating
such
presumption
were
accompanied
by
other
facts
which
absolutely
prevented
its
creation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by
such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non
facit reum, nisi mens rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be
innocent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of justice of the peace. He had jurisdictions of
the actions before him. He had a right and it was his duty to require the payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving
of a proper undertaking with solvent sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the
said cases, he may have exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and power, a
question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so far as appears from the record, at most a pure mistake of judgment, an
error of the mind operating upon a state of facts. Giving the act complained of the signification most detrimental to the
appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function, and not an intention to
deprive any person of his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose to do justice to litigants and not to embezzle
property. He acted that honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally and justly due, and not to enrich himself
or another by criminalmisappropriation. It was an error committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It
was a mistake, not a crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule
is that, if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with
criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which
such presumption springs must be a criminal act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may have been an error; it
may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other

On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of estafa, as defined in paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal
Code, then the presumption just referred to does not arise. Mere absence of the funds is not sufficient proof of conversion.
Neither is the mere failure of the accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case.
(U. S. vs. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.) Conversion must be affirmatively proved, either
by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows. (U.
S. vs. Morales,supra.) chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from custody forthwith.

PEOPLE vs. FRANCIS ABARCA (G.R. No. 74433. September 14, 1987)
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in
Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus
station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the

35

morning). He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could
not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went
home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 89, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife
and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving
there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was
not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh.
The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was
hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were
also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and
abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the
kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the
hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a
month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his
wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under
exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters
under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is no question that the
accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he
went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills

any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife
having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be
the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the
accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does
not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result
of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The
killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-quoted article, far from
defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit amounting practically to an
exemption from an adequate punishment to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his
spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury.
Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his
righteous indignation, the accused who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of
homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the
protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical
injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore,
Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance,
for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to
result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct
crime, would make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and,
incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd,
since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime
charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom,
not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23
Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that its
counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII)

36

of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of
the general provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a
specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction
of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his protection.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and
21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service
of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be
qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery
in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and
Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General
recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense,
proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule,
one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a
felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his
rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he
was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it
appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a
precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part.
Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries
through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half
months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she was
placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellantarresto
mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty
(than destierro). 13

PEOPLE vs. BERONILLA, 96 Phil 566

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO
PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO G.R. No. L-4445
February 28, 1955
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the
Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown
persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold,
regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra.
Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold
to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason,
espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry
a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with
a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of
the municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal
returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed
Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding
the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus
Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos, Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos,
Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy, Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members; while Felix Alverne and
Juan Balmaceda were named prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the
accused. Later, Atty. Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the
proceedings for several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the
jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the
records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to
Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions:
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as
executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last
confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's
remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent
him the following message:

37

Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan
Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin
Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza as members of
the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo Afos as grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator,
were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of
Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to
all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army,
applied for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The
rest of the defendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their
application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of
First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.
Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by the Amnesty
Commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed: defendant Juan Balmaceda was
discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as state witness, although actually he was not called to testify;
while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence.
Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the
members of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio
Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to
establish their participation in the crime; but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and
Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from
17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal toreclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and
severally in the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the costs.
In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the
Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of
the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La
Paz, Abra.
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this
Court.
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were
done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a), instructing all military mayors under
its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to appoint juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and
find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to
be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with
instructions of superior military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes
than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram
Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of
Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as
follows:

"Message: VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED
JURY SYSTEM PD BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD
SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE
ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD
REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San Esteban, Ilocos Sur,
was relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of
records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold
(Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann message was known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night
of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually
receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina
could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could
Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a
relative of Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have read it
over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed
by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4), Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the
receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the Presidencia where Mayor Arsenio
Borjal is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I was on duty as guard, that Mayor Borjal should
be tied, on orders of Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned
of the decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being ordered
to be tied. I personally delivered the note of Borjal to Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead
told me that I should tie Mayor Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor
Borjal was tied, as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message arrived,
otherwise Beronilla would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial. Moreover, it is
difficult to believe that having learned of the contents of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda should not have relayed it to
Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family, considering that they were relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was
contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda
claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the
agreement was made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to
hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of
superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did
(Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions,
how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply (Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your

38

impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for
disobedience?
4.
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann
message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the
accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided that the
concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the
case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be held that the manslaughter stemmed
from purely personal motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011 and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of
the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made
upon express orders of the higher command; the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney
Jovito Barreras) chosen by Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its
legality, and it was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an observer
(Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed; and when the verdict of
guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's headquarters for review, and Borjal was not
punished until the records were returned eight days later with the statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of
the case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after
finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and
hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for
political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior
officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality,
without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18
Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900;
21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.

Distinction between general intent and specific intent:

FELONIES COMMITTED BY MEANS OF CULPA

1. U.S. vs. DIVINO, 12 Phil 175
2. PEOPLE vs. GUILLEN, 85 Phil 307
3. US vs. CATANGAY, 28 Phil 490

On the night of the crime the deceased, Mauricio Ramos, taking his shotgun with him went to hunt deer in the barrio of
Quinatijan, municipality of Candelaria, Tayabas, first passing by the house of Santiago Abandia, whom he took along with
him and in his company also passed by the house of the defendant, Joaquin Catangay, whom they both invited to bring his
shotgun and go with them for a hunt; that while the three men were passing along in the middle of a field of talahib (high
grass), the deceased in front of the carrying lighted lantern fastened to his forehead, behind him the defendant, and lastly
Santiago Abandia, the first two men saw a deer were all mounted; that thereupon Santiago Abandia stopped his horse and
also dismounted in order that the deer might not become aware of the presence of the hunters by the noise; that few
moments afterwards. two shots were heard in quick succession and then the light the deceased carried went out; that
Santiago Abandia, upon noticing that the said light was extinguished, approached the deceased; and he found the defendant
alongside of him, raising him up, saying: "What can have happened to my godfather?'; that, as the deceased could not get
up, Santiago Abandia asked the defendant for matches and lit a little stick, by which light witness saw the wound in the
back of the head of the deceased, who was already dead; and that the said wound consisted of a fracture of the left parietal
region, the brain being exposed. It has also been proved that there had been no previous trouble between the defendant and
the deceased, but that on the contrary they had always been on intimate terms of friendship.

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by
such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non
facit reum, nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person performing the act complained of be innocent. (U.
S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).

The defendant testifying in his own defense stated that upon seeing that the deer, which the deceased had also
noticed, might escape, he made haste to approach the latter, who had his back toward him and was on his left, and
that, in taking hurried steps for that purpose, the defendant stumbled against an embankment or pilapil that lay
between him and the deceased; that thereupon he fell on one knee, an accident which caused the shotgun, which
he had already loaded, cocked, and aimed at the deer, the half of whose body was now lost from sight, to be
discharged, this one charge striking the deceased in the head.

But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied
their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of
Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation. The evidence on record
regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra, is contradictory. The Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of
one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La Paz, Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and
this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo when he dismissed the case against said accused on March 15, 1949. On the other
hand, Judge Bocar and Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the
Department of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days
before Borjal was slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential directive to the
Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls
within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off. Gaz., 2360), as was done inPeople vs.
Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.

The crime charged in the present case should be qualified as one of homicide occasioned by reckless negligence
a crime provided for and punished by article 568, in connection with article 404, of the Penal Code for the
reason that there was no malice or criminal intention on the part of the defendant in the discharge of his shotgun
which resulted in wounding and causing the instantaneous death of the deceased, Mauricio Ramos; but that was,
however, reckless negligence on the part of defendant, for, as the deceased whom he was approaching, was
almost directly in front of him, he should have taken the precaution an elemental one in handling firearms so
likely to be discharged by the slightest accident not to have carried his shotgun cocked and aimed, as he did on
the occasion in question.

For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

39

The defendant having appealed from said judgment, his counsel accepts the finding therein made of the proved facts, but
contends that the court erred in holding that such facts constitute reckless negligence and, therefore, in applying article 568
of the Penal Code.
According to the trial judge, the reckless negligence on the part of the defendant consists in that latter did not take the
necessary precaution, which the court considered elemental on that occasion in view of the circumstances, not to carry his
shotgun cocked and aimed; but the court also took into account the fact that, as testified by the defendant, the discharge of
his firearm (the shot from which wounded and killed the deceased) was caused by his stumbling against an enbankment
or pilapil that law between him and the victim, causing him to fall to one of his knees.
The accidental cause, then, of the discharge of the arm was not due to the fact of the defendant's having it cocked and
aimed, but to the accident of his stumbling against an embankment in the way. The occurrence was entirely accidental and
involuntary. Consequently, the crime charged in this prosecution lacks the necessary element to allow of its being
considered as reckless negligence under article 568 of the Penal Code, as would have been the case if though through no
malice on the part of the defendant, the damage had been produced, nevertheless, by some voluntary act of his. (U.S. vs.
Barnes, 12 Phil. Rep., 93; and decision of the supreme court of Spain, of June 28, 1881.)
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the
situation in which he is placed and with the importance of the act which he is to perform. (U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. Rep.,
375.)
In the case of United States vs. Barias (23 Phil. Rep., 434) this court, citing the case of Ahern vs. Oregon Telephone
Co., (24 Oreg., 276, 294; 35 Pac., 549), said: "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative
or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary,
and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances."
In order to determine, therefore, whether there was imprudence or negligence on the part of the defendant, or whether or
not he took the necessary precautions to avoid the unfortunate accident that occurred, the surrounding circumstances, the
nature of the act that he was about to perform or was performing and the situation in which he found himself, must be taken
into account.
In the judgment appealed from the statement is made that the defendant, according to his testimony, when he stumbled
against the enbankment or pilapil and fell to the ground on one knee already had his shotgun cocked and aimed at the deer,
the half of whose body was then lost to sight.
It is shown by the testimony of the defendant himself that when he perceived that there was a deer in sight he was three or
four meters away from the deceased and, with respect to the relative position of the latter and the defendant, at the point
marked No. 3 on the rough sketch (Exhibit 1), that is, behind the deceased, who was at a point a little aside and to the right
of a straight line in the direction of the deer, so that, as appear from the said sketch, the defendant, from where he was,
could have discharged his gun at the animal without serious danger to the deceased, because the latter was not in the direct
line of fire, but some distance away.

From the foregoing questions and answers, it is seen that when the defendant became aware of the presence of the deer he
saw the deceased squatting down, almost kneeling on the ground and aiming at the animal; that he had been in this posture
for some little time without shooting, and as the defendant could see only half of the deer's body and the animal was about
to run away, the defendant tried to approach or get beside the deceased, in order to aim and shoot thence; that he did in fact
go toward the decease, holding the shotgun in both hands with the barrel pointing upwards, though in the direction of the
deer, and with the safety catch closed; and that, at the moment he pushed up the safety catch to open it, he stumbled against
an embankment, slipped and fell, and the gun he was holding in his hands was discharged.
Under the circumstances in which the defendant found himself, it was not necessary for him the employ extraordinary
caution, because the danger in which the deceased, who was at one side though some distance ahead of him, might then
have been was not great; it was enough that he should have taken the precaution that he did, and which was that which the
circumstances required in attempting to approach the deceased, to point upwards the gun he was carrying and to take
advantage of the occasion when the deceased was squatting and almost kneeling in this position the latter could not be in
danger of being hit if the gun was fired, while, on the other hand, he would have been free from all danger, had the
defendant succeeded in getting beside him, as he intended to do, in order to shoot thence, as being a point from which he
could see the whole of the deer.
Neither can it be held that there was negligence or lack of care in the fact that the defendant tried to open the safety catch of
the gun while he was going toward the deceased and when he was but a short distance from him, for, in view of the nature
of the act which he was about to perform, it was natural that he should have the gun prepared to fire at the game, at once, or
as soon as he should have succeeded in placing himself beside his companion. So, if the gun was discharged through the
defendant's having stumbled against an embankment there, the shot causing the death of his companion, and this
embankment cannot be attributed to a want of caution or precaution on the part of the defendant (he did not see it, for, as he
himself testified, he was going along with his eyes fixed on the deer, and it is also understood that he would not have been
looking down, as he had his companion near at hand), the death of the deceased can only be attributed to an unforeseen and
unfortunate accident, for which the defendant can not be held criminally liable.
The Attorney-General, however, states in his brief that the defendant's liability may reasonable be inferred from his
testimony given in the criminal investigation held before the justice of the peace of Candelaria, Tayabas.
That testimony, which is shown in Exhibit B presented in evidence at the trial, in the part thereof pertinent to the matter in
question, reads as follows: "We were hunting on horseback and had agreed that if the man who was well ahead, that is,
Mauricio, should alight fro his horse, it would be a sign that he had found an animal; and it happened in fact that Mauricio
did alight from his horse. Then I also disamounted and on seeing that there was a deer immediately fired at it, but, owing to
the confusion existing at the time, I am unable to say positively whether or not he fired before I did, or whether I shot the
deer or the deceased."
According to the justice of the peace himself, who testified at the trial, the said testimony was taken down by him in
Spanish, he having translated it from Tagalog, in which language the defendant testified before him. Counsel for the
defense, on the other hand, tried to prove by means of cross-questions addressed to the justice of the peace at the hearing,
that the latter, in taking down the said testimony in Spanish, after translating it from Tagalog the language used by the

40

defendant must have omitted therefrom that part of the statement he made at the trial, relative to the cause of the
discharge of the shotgun on that occasion.
From the aforementioned testimony it merely appears indeed that an agreement had been made between the deceased,
Mauricio Ramos, his other companion and the defendant, that when the man who was well ahead, that is, the deceased,
should alight from his horse, it would be a sign that there was game in sight; and that the defendant, on seeing that
Mauricio, the deceased, had alighted from his horse, also disamounted from his and, on seeing that in fact there was a deer,
immediately fired his shotgun at it.
The lower court described very little importance to this testimony, for it is not mentioned in the decision, but took due
account of that given by the defendant at the trial; he found him guilty upon the ground that, as aforesaid, he did not take
the proper precaution, in view of the circumstances, not to carry his shotgun at that time cocked and aimed. But even
though the first testimony had been taken into account, it could not serve to prove that the defendant acted with negligence
or want of diligence in firing the shot, for the simple reason that there is not a single in the testimony in question as to the
positions of the defendant and the deceased with relation to each other, nor to that of the deceased in relation to the deer,
which in sight of the defendant. Neither can it be affirmed, upon examination of the rough sketch Exhibit 1, that the
deceased was in the line of fire, for, on drawing a straight line from the deer to the defendant, as shown in the sketch, it is
seen that the deceased was not on the line, but at one side of it and at such a distance away from it as to preclude the idea
that he would be in such danger as to have made it necessary for the defendant to have adopted precautions other than those
the actual circumstances of the case required before he fired his gun from that position.
After due consideration, then, of the said testimony, either separately or in relation with the merits of the case, and of that
given by the defendant himself at the trial, also in connection with the same merits, it cannot be held that the defendant is
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence, as charged in the complaint.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, we freely absolve the defendant, with the costs of both instances de
officio.

MISTAKE OF FACT
1. US vs. AH CHONG, 15 Phil. 503
2. PEOPLE vs. OANIS, 74 Phil 257
3. REQUISITES:
4. Mistake of fact is not tenable in the following:
Error in personae
When the accused is criminally negligent
5. Differentiate Mistake of Fact from Mistake of Identity (error in personae)
CRIMES MALA PROHIBITA
1. Differentiate Crimes Mala In Se from Crimes Mala Prohibita
2. U.S. vs. SIY CONG BIENG, ET. AL. (30 Phil 577)
3. U.S. vs. GO CHICO, 14 Phil. 129

4.

In PEOPLE vs. TIO WON CHUA (GR 149878, July 1, 2003)

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, convicting appellants
Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu (Tiu Won) and Qui Yaling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua (Qui Yaling) for violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.
Appellants were charged with the crime of illegal possession of a regulated drug, i.e., methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu
Their testimonies show that the police authorities, acting on an information that drug-related activities were going on
at the HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila, surveyed the place on October 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1998. At about
10 p.m. of October 6, they conducted a test-buy operation, together with a Chinese-speaking asset. They were able to
buyP2,000.00 worth of substance from appellants, which, upon examination by the PNP crime laboratory, proved positive
formethamphetamine hydrochloride.[3] Nonetheless, they did not immediately arrest the suspects but applied for a warrant
to search Unit 4-B of HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Their application to search the unit supposedly
owned by Timothy Tiu was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila on October 9. [4] Armed
with the warrant, they proceeded to the place and learned that Tiu Won was not inside the building. They waited outside but
Tiu Won did not come. After several stakeouts, they were able to implement the warrant on October 12. Failing to get the
cooperation of the barangay officials, they requested the presence of the building coordinator, Noel Olarte, and his wife,
Joji, who acted as witnesses.
During the enforcement of the warrant, there were three (3) persons inside the apartment, namely, appellants Tiu Won
and Qui Yaling, and a housemaid. The search was conducted on the sala and in the three (3) bedrooms of Unit 4-B. On top
of a table inside the masters bedroom, one (1) big pack, containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was found inside a black leather
mans handbag supposedly owned by Tiu Won, while sixteen (16) small packs of shabu weighing 20.3673 grams were
found inside a ladys handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling. Also contained in the inventory were the following items: an
improvised tooter, a weighing scale, an improvised burner and one rolled tissue paper. [5] The authorities also searched a
Honda Civic car bearing Plate No. WCP 157, parked along Masangkay Street, registered in the name of the wife of Tiu
Won and found four (4) plastic bags containing 6.2243 grams of shabu, which were likewise confiscated. A gun in the
possession of Tiu Won was also seized and made subject of a separate criminal case.
The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one
and the same person. They presented papers and documents to prove that appellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu,
as stated in the search warrant. Tiu Won also claimed that he does not live in the apartment subject of the search warrant,
alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan and is a resident of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. Nonetheless,
he admitted that his co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his mistress with whom he has two children. Qui Yaling admitted being the
occupant of the apartment, but alleged that she only occupied one room, while two other persons, a certain Lim and a
certain Uy, occupied the other rooms. Both appellants denied that they were engaged in the sale or possession of shabu.
They asserted that they are in the jewelry business and that at the time the search and arrest were made, the third person,
whom the prosecution identified as a housemaid, was actually a certain Chin, who was there to look at some of the pieces
of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied that a gun was found in the possession of Tiu Won.

41

Qui Yaling recalled that upon asking who was it knocking at the door of her apartment on October 12, the police
authorities represented that they were electric bill collectors. She let them in. She was surprised when upon opening the
door, around ten (10) policemen barged inside her unit. She, together with Tiu Won and Chin, was asked to remain seated in
the sofa while the men searched each room. Tiu Won alleged that after a fruitless search, some of the policemen went out,
but came back a few minutes later with another person. Afterwards, he was made to sign a piece of paper. Appellants also
claimed that the policemen took their bags which contained money, the pieces of jewelry they were selling and even Qui
Yalings cell phone. They both denied that shabu was discovered in the apartment during the search. Appellants were
arrested and brought to the police station.
These issues can be trimmed down to two i.e., the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest conducted
pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the RTC.
As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu, which did not include appellant Qui
Yaling, appellants contend that because of this defect, the search conducted and consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being
fruits of an illegal search, the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.
We beg to disagree. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.[8] As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the name of the person to be
searched does not invalidate the warrant,[9] especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drugrelated activities of the accused. In fact, a John Doe warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio
personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. [10] We have also held that a mistake in the identification of
the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. [11]
Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the
name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was described properly. Besides, the
authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently
implementing it. They can therefore be presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to
be searched although they may not have specifically known the names of the accused. Armed with the warrant, a valid
search of Unit 4-B was conducted.
We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was not part of the
description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be
directed at the place particularly described in the warrant. [12] Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful
arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach or control of the person arrested,
or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. [13] In this case, appellants were
arrested inside the apartment, whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) appellants were in possession of
an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
appellants were freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. [14] We also note that the crime under

consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal
liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. [15]
In the case at bar, the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside Unit 4-B, HCL
Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Surveillance was previously conducted. Though no arrest was made after
the successful test-buy operation, this does not destroy the fact that in a subsequent search, appellants were found in
possession of shabu. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are consistent in that after the test-buy operation, they
obtained a search warrant from Judge Makasiar, pursuant to which, they were able to confiscate, among others, several
packs of shabu from a mans handbag and a ladies handbag inside a room in the unit subject of the warrant. Furthermore,
the seizure of the regulated drug from Unit 4-B is proven by the Receipt for Property Seized [16] signed by SPO1 de Leon,
the seizing officer, Noel, the building administrator, and Joji Olarte, his wife, who were also present. De Leon attested to
the truth and genuineness of the receipt which was not contradicted by the defense.
Be that as it may, we cannot sustain the trial courts decision attributing to both appellants the illegal possession of the
same amount of shabu. We note that nowhere in the information is conspiracy alleged. Neither had it been proven during
the trial. As such, we need to look at the individual amounts possessed by each appellant.
In his testimony, Tiu Won admitted ownership of the mans handbag where 234.5 grams of shabu were found, viz:
Q: During those ten to 20 minutes, what were those policemen doing inside that unit?
A: They went inside the rooms and started ransacking the drawers and everything. As a matter of fact, even
handbags were searched by them.
Q: Whose handbags were searched?
A: My bag, the one I was carrying that day, with jewelry and checks and others were taken by them.
[17]
(emphasis supplied)
Qui Yaling, in her appellants brief, denied owning the handbag where 20.3673 grams of shabu were discovered.
However, during her testimony, she admitted its ownership, viz:
Q: Now, the police testified before this court that you has (sic) a bag and when they searched this bag, it yielded
some sachets of shabu(.) (W)hat can you say about that?
A: That is an absolute lie, sir. What they saw in my bag were my cosmetics.[18] (emphasis supplied)
An admission is an act or declaration of a party as to the existence of a relevant fact which may be used in evidence
against him.[19] These admissions, provided they are voluntary, can be used against appellants because it is fair to presume
that they correspond with the truth, and it is their fault if they do not. [20]

42

Qui Yaling likewise argues that the lower court erred in attributing ownership of the handbag to her considering that
there was another girl present at the apartment during the search. She contends that since the prosecution was not able to
establish the ownership of the bag, then such could have also been owned by Chin.
We do not subscribe to this argument. The defense failed to bring Chin to court, although during the course of the
presentation of their evidence, they manifested their intention to present her testimony. Furthermore, a visitor does not
normally leave her bag lying anywhere, much more in the masters bedroom. Being the occupant of the apartment, it is more
logical to presume that the handbag belongs to Qui Yaling. The failure of the prosecution to present the bags and proofs that
the bags belong to the appellants is immaterial because the bags, the license of Tiu Won found inside the mans handbag and
the passport of Qui Yaling found inside the ladies handbag are not illegal. Having no relation to the use or possession of
shabu, the authorities could not confiscate them for they did not have the authority to do so since the warrant authorized
them to seize only articles in relation to the illegal possession of shabu. [21] Not within their control, they could not have
been presented in court.
We now come to the penalties of the appellants. R. A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659, applies. Thus, since
234.5 grams of shabu were found inside the mans handbag, deemed to be owned by Tiu Won, he is guilty of violating
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, while Qui Yaling, whose handbag contained only 20.3673 grams of shabu is guilty
of violating Section 20 thereof. Section 16, in connection with Section 20 (1 st paragraph), provides the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the amount of shabu
involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is less than 200 grams, Section 20 punishes the offender with the penalty
ranging from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of RTC Br. 27, Manila as to the penalty of appellant Tiu Won is affirmed, while
that of appellant Qui Yaling is modified. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and a fine of five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in accordance with Section 16 and Section 20 (1 st paragraph) of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. Qui Yaling y Chua is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of prision correccional as
minimum toprision mayor as maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
SO ORDERED.

5. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R.
148560,November 19, 2001)
MOTIVE
1. Concept
2. When Important
3. Distinguished from criminal intent
Intent is an element of a felony while motive is not
Motive is the impelling reason for the crime while intent is the purpose to use particular means
Intent is always essential in intentional felonies while motive is essential only when the identity of the
perpetrator is in doubt

4.

MOTIVE vs. CRIMINAL INTENT

PEOPLE vs. MARLON DELIM, ET. AL., ([G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003]

Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto
Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of
Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modestos wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using
Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their
relatives.Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit Modesto and his
family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in
their home. Joining them were Modesto and Ritas two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat
their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the three
intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously
grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. [4] Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded
Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by
the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to
the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto
only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Nio, at Sitio Labayog,
informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to
report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his father. He and his other relatives
scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters away
from Modestos house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives
returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January
26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito
Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they
found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of
decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives
immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modestos cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other
policemen rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.[5] Rita and
Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom
they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized
Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police investigators. [6] Police
authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective
houses.The police officers scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.

43

The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police investigators
were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their firearms. [8]
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases
for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal
Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. [9]
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi. [10]
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their
house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modestos house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized
that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him
concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B,
Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since
then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leons alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown in
Pangasinan during his employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his brother
was at her house to give her his laundry. She claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can
be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that he was a resident of Laoag City from
January 1998 up to February 1999.[11]
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999. During
his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately
proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in
Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder.
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in the
Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court opined that under
the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim
(while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim
from helping the latter. They submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim,
the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went further to charge accused
with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the criminal charge being determined not from the

caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated these being
conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. They further submit that since the
prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable
for the death of the victim but only for kidnapping the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited
therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the
malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved
by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al., [14] that for kidnapping to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and
not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the malefactor. This Court further held:
x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that the detention
and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and
ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.[15]
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victims
liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into,
or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. [16] The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal
complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element
of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that
an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure
to act.[17] Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited
act.Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific
intent.[18] Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the
circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record. [19]
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the
accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution
need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt
and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.
[20]
The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. [21] Crime is rarely
rational.In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of

44

his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. [22] In kidnapping for
ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the
house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances.
The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover,
there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto
of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. [23] Irrefragably then, the crime
charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268
thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The
proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
[24]

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the
criminal act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the act. [25] Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two
things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. [26] In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the
prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that
defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death.
[27]
To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter
alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the
words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because
of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[28]
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained five
(5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab wounds,[29] defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly
weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and location of
the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the
consequences flowing therefrom. [30] As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:[31]
This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own acts, is applied
even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the

impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when
one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not
intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of
proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. [32] What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section
4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [33]
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial
evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual
support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense charged. [34] For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused
is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.[35] If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove that accusedappellants, in confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun.Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded him out
of his house:
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout
when he stood guard by the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with Modesto in
tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help
from their relatives and police authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found under the
thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project located about 200 meters away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver
exuded bad odor and was already in the state of decomposition:

45

The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in a state
of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The
victim sustained five gunshot wounds and defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:

may have freed the victim shortly after taking him, or the victim may have been able to escape and that thereafter a person
or some other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give any explanation. Instead,
they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.

The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and the distention of
his scrotum and penis are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for a
period ranging from three to six days. [41] Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact death of the
victim.An equally persuasive authority states:

Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he conspired with
accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.

The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to the
discovery of his cadaver which was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200
meters away from his house, is consistent with and confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that the victim was
killed precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.
5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were
nowhere to be found:
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto and
Rita:
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong
circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an offense does not
create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence against them and if not satisfactorily
explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact, killed Modesto. [45]
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed,
Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one hand
and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on the other before the incident, or any motivation on the part of the
three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that a person or persons other
than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial notice that
nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all. [46] In this case, the inscrutable facts are that
Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the gunpoint,
hogtied, put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with Modesto in tow, Rita heard
three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under the bushes and already in a state of
putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot wounds and died because of a
gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts having been
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was
some causes or influences moving the mind. [47] The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the prosecution should not be
trashed simply because the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut
the same and explain what happened to the victim after taking him from his house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. [48] Conspiracy must
be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is
deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment. [49] To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be
proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. [50] It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of
the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is
deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim. [51] This is based on the
theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:
x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered and treated as the acts and
declarations of his principal. What is so done by an agent, is done by the principal through him, as his mere instrument.
Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). If the conspiracy be
proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the
common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he does as the agent of the
co-conspirators. R. v. OConnell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.[52]
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm
and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words
and declarations of all.[53]
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a
handgun.Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald
had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard
by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors
were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to achieve
a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime
were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking
assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait accompli as
well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald. [54] Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group, is guilty of the killing of Modesto.
[55]
Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Ronald nevertheless he is a
principal by direct participation. [56] If part of a crime has been committed in one place and part in another, each person
concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of the
conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of

46

the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the
actor and the crime. [57]
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were marred by
inconsistencies:
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later however, Randy
claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their house. She later
changed her testimony and declared that it was Robert, together with Marlon and Ronald who barged into
the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she testified that after the
three men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered the house and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999, and she was
accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified that he was alone when he looked for his father
from January 24 to 26, 1999.[58]
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions
culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its unique
advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they give their testimonies
before the court. In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of the
witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved by any improper or
ill motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and
probative weight.[59] The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or their
testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and
a persons sense of observation is impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness
is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute
neither the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of his testimony. [60] Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same
side with respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the
prominent facts.[61]Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility
of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[62]
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and the true
meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the
questions propounded to the witness and his answers thereto. [63]

Randys testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his testimony
that Ronald and Marlon brought his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have known
the destination of accused-appellants but he saw the direction to which they went. While it may be true that when asked to
identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had been consistent
throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leons counsel never crossexamined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of Leon as one of those who barged into their house to
give her an opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules
of Evidence which reads:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present,
and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing
they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. [64]
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired impeachment of
her.[65] As to whether Rita and Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the door of the
house or entered the house are inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the night to prevent Rita and
Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the earmarks of
truth and sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination, they responded with consistency upon material details
that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus
finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the trial court regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving credence and
probative weight to their evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their collective evidence to prove their
defense is strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution
because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender. [66] It is hard for the
prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are
burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the time of
the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said crime. [67] They failed to
discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the
culprits. The house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers away
from the house of Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove
his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he was a resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that
he was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the crime. With respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside
from his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the
killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of unlicensed

47

firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that indeed treachery was
attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder defined in and penalized by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and
conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce
the effect of qualifying the crime. [68] As this Court held: No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may
seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of defendant. [69] Article 14, paragraph 16 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of
execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is
deliberately or consciously adopted. [70] Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there
is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.
[71]
In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present
any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and
killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation
when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. [72] What is primordial, this Court
held in People v. Rogelio Francisco[73] is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in
order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength. [74] In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and
Ronald deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the
malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took
advantage of their numerical superioty and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed. [75]
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized by
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is
no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to
possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a
special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder. [76] Neither can dwelling, although proven, aggravate
the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court.[77] Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case,
nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused. [78]

There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should be meted
an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years
and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum of P75,000.00
awarded as moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. [79] The amount
ofP25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order. [80] In addition, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be
awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence. [81]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Accusedappellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages.
G.R. No. 88724

April 3, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CEILITO ORITA

Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at Borongan,
Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just
brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at
the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid). All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She
then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the
first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant to use the back door leading to the second
floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck,
appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they reached the second floor, he commanded her
to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall. With one hand holding the
knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her
T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).

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He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her
vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could
not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again
of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant
thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed the partition. When she
saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again chased her. She fled to another room and
jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of the boarding house,
and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back door.
When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the
stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. When
they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They
heard a sound at the second floor and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend
appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was
physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit
"A") which states: Physical Examination Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with no underclothes; appears in state of shock, per unambulatory. Neck- Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck. Breast
Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast. Back Multiple
pinpoint marks. Extremities Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the
perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact;
no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no
discharges noted.
ISSUE: INCONSISTENCIES IN THE WITNESS TESTIMONIES
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show remarkable and vital
inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its candor, truth and validity." (p.
33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies which are not sufficient to
blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in
their testimonies may in fact be justifiably considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little
deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make mistakes

sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor
details must be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact, complete uniformity in details
would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988,
162 SCRA 609). However, one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the testimony of the
victim that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her. According to the
accused, this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the victim in
order that there will be a consumation of the act." (p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious had the
testimony of the victim ended there. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the
aggression. This is a material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and
can discern if a witness is telling the truth (People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989).
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed
provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v
Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 487; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135
SCRA 280; People v. Soterol G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not only
state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The victim's testimony from the
time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by
Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in
view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees, linear abrasions below the
left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the
vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 5253, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the
incident and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):
. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the weight of both accused
and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in the manner as narrated. The partitions of every room
were of strong materials, securedly nailed, and would not give way even by hastily scaling the same.
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et al., G.R. No. L-48731,
December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55, Rollo):
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the ground which was correctly
estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened individual being
pursued. Common experience will tell us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high
buildings, many have been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without being injured. How much
more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom honor appears to be more valuable than her life
or limbs? Besides, the exposure of her private parts when she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated,

49

is enough indication that something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing
was adduced to show that she was out of her mind.
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We ruled that:
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered entirely naked by appellant
and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the latter and managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned
by spouses hardly known to her. All these acts she would not have done nor would these facts have occurred
unless she was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A CRIME OF FRUSTRATED RAPE WAS COMMITTED
However, We believe the subject matter that really calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's conviction
for frustrated rape is proper. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the
genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black's Law
Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and
it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of
rape.1wphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case
of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209, 212, Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies
which is readily understood even by law students:
. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by
overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should
produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a
foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all
of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has
performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated
felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the
beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which
should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not
arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point
by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his
purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left
to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.Thus, the felony is
consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras,
G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505),
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil.
434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on
the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

50

Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eria 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We found
the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended
party. However, it appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions.
Likewise, We are aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September
12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty
of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are
of the opinion that this particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eria case, supra, might have
prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim, the trial court relied on
the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared that the findings in the vulva does not give a concrete
disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact, he tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there
actually was penetration." (p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as interpreted by Dr. Reinerio
Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether there was penetration or not. It is true,
and the Court is not oblivious, that conviction for rape could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony of the
offended party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People v. Royeras People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109,
113). But the citations the people relied upon cannot be applicable to the instant case. The testimony of the
offended party is at variance with the medical certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the
mind of the court. It should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical
certificate, both should in all respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. On the contrary, it is
stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due
to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of
the genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent
this testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23,
1984):
Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
A It entered but only a portion of it.

Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when you said comply?
A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q And was it inserted?
A Yes only a little.
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if
credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752,
September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v. Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349).
Moreover, Dr. Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this
case (People v. Alfonso, supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the accused because after a
thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
consummated rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of
a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of
the 1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited
Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised
Penal Code but instead reduced the same toreclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14,
1990). Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala,
G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA
705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

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