G.R. No.

94759

January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA
as Presiding Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON.
VICENTE
CRUZ,
Acting
Mayor
and
the
MUNICIPALITY
OF
STA.
MARIA,
BULACAN, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The authority of the local executive to protect the
community from pollution is the center of this
controversy.
The antecedent facts are related in the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Petitioner, a domestic private corporation
engaged in the manufacture and export of
charcoal briquette, received a letter dated
February 16, 1989 from private respondent
acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full
cessation of the operation of the petitioner's
plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, until further order. The letter
likewise requested Plant Manager Mr.
Armando Manese to bring with him to the
office of the mayor on February 20, 1989
the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's
permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit;
and of other document.
At the requested conference on February 20,
1989, petitioner, through its representative,
undertook to comply with respondent's
request for the production of the required
documents. In compliance with said
undertaking, petitioner commenced to
secure
"Region
III-Department
of
Environmental and Natural Resources AntiPollution Permit," although among the
permits previously secured prior to the
operation of petitioner's plant was a
"Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution
Installation" issued by the then National
Pollution
Control
Commission
(now
Environmental Management Bureau) and is
now at a stage where the Environmental
Management Bureau is trying to determine
the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to

be installed as part of petitioner's request

for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to
its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its
representatives to the office of the mayor to
secure the same but were not entertained.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and
reasonable
notice
upon
petitioner,
respondent acting mayor ordered the
Municipality's station commander to padlock
the premises of petitioner's plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its
operation.
Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted
an
action
for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary
injunction against private respondent with
the court a quo which is presided by the
respondent judge. In its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, it alleged therein that the closure
order was issued in grave abuse of
discretion.
During the hearing of the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
on April 14, 1989, herein parties adduced
their respective evidences. The respondent
judge, April 19, 1989, found that petitioner
is entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, hence, it
ordered as follows:
In view of the foregoing, upon
petitioner's posting of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 to answer
for such damages that respondents
may sustain should petitioner
eventually be found not entitled to
the injunctive relief hereby issued,
let a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION issue ordering the
respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and
other person acting in his behalf
and stead to immediately revoke
his closure order dated April 6,
1989, and allow petitioner to
resume
its
normal
business
operations until after the instant
case shall have been adjudicated

on the merits without prejudice to

the inherent power of the court to
alter, modify or even revoke this
order at any given time.
SO ORDERED.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued on April 28, 1989, upon
petitioner's posting a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00.
Private respondent filed his motion for
reconsideration dated May 3, 1989. Said
motion for reconsideration was heard on
May 30, 1989. Petitioner's counsel failed to
appear and the hearing proceeded with the
Provincial
Prosecutor
presenting
his
evidence. The following documents were
submitted:
a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the
Technology Developers Inc., prepared by
one Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and
recommendation read:
Due to the manufacturing process
and nature of raw materials used,
the fumes coming from the factory
may contain particulate matters
which are hazardous to the health
of the people. As such, the
company should cease operating
until such a time that the proper air
pollution device is installed and
operational.
b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets
of coupon bond containing signatures of
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan;
c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon.
Roberto Pagdanganan Governor of the
Province of Bulacan, dated November 22,
1988, complaining about the smoke coming
out of the chimney of the company while in
operation.
Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the
lower court, on June 14, 1989, issued an
order (a) setting aside the order dated April

28, 1989, which granted a Writ of

Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b)
dissolving the writ consequently issued.
A motion for reconsideration dated July 6,
1989 was filed by petitioner. Said motion
drew an opposition dated July 19, 1989 from
private respondent.
Resolving the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the respondent judge
issued an order dated August 9, 1989,
denying said motion for reconsideration.1
Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner in the
Court of Appeals seeking to annul and set aside (a)
the order issued by the trial court on June 14, 1989,
setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, and (b)
the order of August 9, 1989, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the order of June 14,
1989. In due course the petition was denied for lack
of merit by the appellate court in a decision dated
January 26, 1990. 2 A motion for reconsideration
thereof filed by petitioner was denied on August 10,
1990.
Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court. Six errors are alleged to have been
committed by the appellate court which may be
synthesized into the singular issue of whether or not
the appellate court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in rendering its question decision and
resolution.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the
sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of
its discretion. By the same token the court that
issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve
the writ as the circumstances may warrant.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances
militate against the maintenance of the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured.
While it is true that the matter of

determining whether there is a pollution of

the environment that requires control if not
prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National
Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry
of
Human
Settlements,
now
the
Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the
mayor of a town has as much responsibility
to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and
by virture of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control
and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the
emissions in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February
16, 1989, called the attention of petitioner
to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its
plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute
the air in the locality but also affect the
health of the residents in the area," so that
petitioner was ordered to stop its operation
until further orders and it was required to
bring the following:
(1) Building permit;
(2) Mayor's permit; and
(3)
Region
III-Department
of
Environment
and
Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution permit. 3
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in
response to the complaint of the residents
of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels.4 The alleged NBI finding that
some of the signatures in the four-page
petition
were
written
by
one
person, 5 appears to be true in some
instances, (particularly as among members
of the same family), but on the whole the
many signatures appear to be written by
different persons. The certification of the
barrio captain of said barrio that he has not
received any complaint on the matter 6 must
be because the complaint was sent directly
to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was

issued only after an investigation was made
by Marivic Guina who in her report of
December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes
emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that
no proper air pollution device has been
installed.7
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building
permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria,
but instead presented a building permit
issued by an official of Makati on March
6,1987.8
6. While petitioner was able to present a
temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on
December 15, 1987, the permit was good
only up to May 25, 1988. 9 Petitioner had not
exerted any effort to extend or validate its
permit much less to install any device to
control the pollution and prevent any hazard
to the health of the residents of the
community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction by the trial court and the
appellate court correctly upheld the action of the
lower court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner
focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning
industry.1wphi1 It must be stressed however, that
concomitant with the need to promote investment
and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health,
nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious
effect of the pollution of the environment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159059

VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN
REPRESENTATION
OF
DEMETRIO
T.
COMENDADOR,Petitioner,
vs.
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C.
BOMBASI, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench are appeals by certiorari1 from the
Decision2 of
the
Fourth
Division
of
the
Sandiganbayan;
(1)
finding
Demetrio
T.
Comendador3 (Mayor Comendador) and Paulino S.
Asilo, Jr.4 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing
the cases against accused Alberto S. Angeles;5 (3)
ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan,
Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S.
Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now respondents
Visitacion C. Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C.
Bombasi damages; and (4) dismissing the cases
against the spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza 6 and
Benita and Isagani Coronado.7
The factual antecedents of the case are:
On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacions
late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De
Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna
(represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo
P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby
the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of
property comprising of a lot and a store located at
the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at
Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the
respondents mother for a period of twenty (20)
years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March
1998, extendible for another 20 years.8
G.R. Nos. 159017-18

March 9, 2011

PAULINO
S.
ASILO,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses
VISITACION
AND
CESAR
C.
BOMBASI, Respondents.

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De

Coronado could build a firewall on her rented
property which must be at least as high as the store;
and in case of modification of the public market, she
or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.

Visitacion took over the store when her mother died

sometime in 1984.9 From then on up to January 1993,
Visitacion secured the yearly Mayors permits. 10
Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of
Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacions request for inspection
on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B.
Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of
Public Works and Highways,11 Regional Office No. IVA, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact
and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe
was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the
fire until 15 October 1993.
On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a
letter12 from Mayor Comendador directing her to
demolish her store within five (5) days from notice.
Attached to the letter were copies of Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 15613dated 30 August 1993 and
a Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna.
The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156
states that:
NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby
resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador
to enforce and order the Coronados to demolish the
building constructed on the space previously rented
to them in order to give way for the construction of a
new municipal market building.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T.
Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file
an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the
expenses incurred due to the delay in the completion
of the project if the Coronados continuously resists
the order.
On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter
to Mayor Comendador saying that: (1) the lease
contract was still existing and legally binding; (2) she
was willing to vacate the store as long as same place
and area would be given to her in the new public
market; and (3) in case her proposals are not
acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for the latter to
just file an unlawful detainer case against her
pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156.
Pertinent portions of the letter read:

x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the

Municipal Council and the opinion rendered by the
Laguna Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my
considered view, however, arrived at after
consultation with my legal counsel, that our existing
lease contract is still legally binding and in full force
and effect. Lest I appear to be defiant, let me
reiterate to you and the council that we are willing to
vacate the said building provided that a new contract
is executed granting to us the same space or lot and
the same area. I believe that our proposal is most
reasonable and fair under the circumstance. If you
are not amenable to the said proposal, I concur with
the position taken by the Council for you to file the
appropriate action in court for unlawful detainer to
enable our court to finally thresh out our
differences.141avvphi1
On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion ordering
her to vacate the portion of the public market she
was occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the
letter; else, a court action will be filed against her.
On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183
authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store
being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. The
significant portion of the Resolution reads:
Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong
pagkakaisang
IPINASIYA:
Ang
pagbibigay
kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na
ipagiba ang anumang istrakturang nagiging sagabal
sa mabilis at maayos na pagbabangon ng pamilihang
bayan.15
On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino
S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a letter 16 to Visitacion
informing her of the impending demolition of her
store the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion
wrote a reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there is no
legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a
court order and that the Resolutions did not sanction
the demolition of her store but only the filing of an
appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She
further replied that if the demolition will take place,
appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions
will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all
persons who will take part in the demolition.

On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on

the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos.
183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store
with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.
Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a
licensed civil engineer, estimated the cost of the
demolished property as amounting to P437,900.0018
On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her
husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a
Civil Case19 for damages with preliminary injunction
against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor
Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and
Alberto S. Angeles. The complaint was soon after
amended to include the Spouses Benita and Isagani
Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as
formal defendants because they were then the
occupants of the contested area.
The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant
Municipality and defendant Municipal Mayor
from leasing the premises subject of lease
Annex "A" hereof, part of which is now
occupied by PNP Outpost and by the
Municipal Collectors Office, and the
equivalent adjacent area thereof, and to
cause the removal of said stalls;
2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to
occupy the equivalent corner area of the
leased areas being now assigned to other
persons by defendants Municipality and/or
by defendant Municipal Mayor, and to allow
plaintiffs to construct their stalls thereon;
3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after
trial;
4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the following
(a) P437,900.00
for
loss
of
building/store and other items
therein;

(b) P200,000.00
damages;
(c) P200,000.00
damages;

for

for

exemplary

moral

(d) P30,.00 for attorneys fees

and P700.00 for every attendance
of counsel in court.
5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs
as justice and equity may warrant in the
premises.20
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal
complaint21 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and
Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.
On 22 February 1996, an Information 22 against Mayor
Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed, which
reads:
That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan,
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, accused Demetrio T. Comendador,
being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S.
Asilo, Jr. being then the Municipal Administrator and
accused Alberto S. Angeles being then the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator, all of the
Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the
crime herein charged in relation to, while in the
performance and taking advantage of their official
functions, conspiring and confederating with each
other, and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality
or through gross inexcusable negligence, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the
demolition of a public market stall leased by the
municipal government in favor of one Visitacion
Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground
therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the latter in
the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY
(P437,900.00).
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered
their separate pleas of "Not Guilty."
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case

No. SP-4064 (94)23 with Criminal Case No. 23267

pending before the Third Division pursuant to Section
4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, which pertinently
reads:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right
to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be recognized;
Provided, however, that where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal
case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.24
During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles
died on 16 November 1997. Accordingly, the counsel
of Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles.
On 22 September 1999, the Third Division of
Sandiganbayan issued an Order25 DISMISSING the
case against Angeles. The germane portion of the
Order reads:
In view of the submission of the death certificate of
accused/defendant Alberto S. Angeles, and there
being no objection on the part of the Public
Prosecutor,
cases
against
deceased
accused/defendant Angeles only, are hereby
DISMISSED.
The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17
September 2002. As a result, the counsel of the late
Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before
the Sandiganbayan informing the court of the fact of
Mayor Comendadors death.
On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

hereby rendered as follows:

judgment

is

In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused

Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec.
3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in
the absence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, said accused are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2 months
imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as
maximum.
The order of the court dated September 22, 1999
dismissing the cases against the accused Alberto S.
Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby
reiterated.
In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and
Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual
damages for the destruction of the store;
P100,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. The
prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the court
found no aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime.
In view of this courts finding that the defendant
spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza are lawful occupants
of the subject market stalls from which they cannot
be validly ejected without just cause, the complaint
against them is dismissed. The complaint against
defendant spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado is
likewise dismissed, it appearing that they are
similarly situated as the spouses Coroza. Meanwhile,
plaintiff Visitacion Bombasi is given the option to
accept market space being given to her by the
municipality, subject to her payment of the
appropriate rental and permit fees.
The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same
having become moot and academic.
The
compulsory
counterclaim
of
defendant
Comendador is likewise denied for lack of merit.26
Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration 27 of the Decision

alleging that there was only an error of judgment

when he complied with and implemented the order of
his superior, Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged
that there is no liability when a public officer commits
in good faith an error of judgment. The
Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution28 dated 21 July
2003 denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the
ground that good faith cannot be argued to support
his cause in the face of the courts finding that bad
faith attended the commission of the offense
charged. The Court further explained that the
invocation of compliance with an order of a superior
is of no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot be
described as having the semblance of legality
inasmuch as it was issued without the authority and
therefore the same was patently illegal." 29
The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion
for Reconsideration30 on 12 May 2003 alleging that
the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished
both
his
criminal
and
civil
liability.
The
Sandiganbayan on its Resolution 31 granted the
Motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal
liability is concerned and denied the extinction of the
civil liability holding that the civil action is an
independent civil action.
Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari. 32
Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain
conviction under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the
public officer must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence. He
also contended that he and his co-accused acted in
good faith in the demolition of the market and,
thereby, no liability was incurred.
On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the
death of Mayor Comendador prior to the
promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY
Mayor Comendadors criminal liability but also his
civil liability. She also asserted good faith on the part
of the accused public officials when they performed
the demolition of the market stall. Lastly, she
contended that assuming arguendo that there was
indeed liability on the part of the accused public
officials, the actual amount of damages being
claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no basis and
was not duly substantiated.

Liability
of
the
accused
under Republic Act No. 3019

public

officials

Causing undue injury to any party, including the

government, could only mean actual injury or
damage which must be established by evidence.34

by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by

Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of
the Laguna District Engineer Office.40 To quote:

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently

interpreted as "actual." Undue has been defined as
"more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and
injury as "any wrong or damage done to another,
either in his person, rights, reputation or property
[that is, the] invasion of any legally protected
interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of
these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. 35

An inspection has been made on the building (a

commercial establishment) cited above and found
out the following:

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions throughmanifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that
the accused are public officers or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public
officers commit the prohibited acts during the
performance of their official duties or in relation to
their public positions; (3) that they caused undue
injury to any party, whether the Government or a
private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by
giving
unwarranted
benefits,
advantage
or
preference to the other party; and (5) that the public
officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faithor gross inexcusable negligence.33
We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of
criminal and civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo
and petitioner Mayor Comendador as here
represented by his widow Victoria Bueta.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is
undisputable that the first two requisites of the
criminal offense were present at the time of the
commission of the complained acts and that, as to
the remaining elements, there is sufficient amount of
evidence to establish that there was an undue injury
suffered on the part of the Spouses Bombasi and that
the public officials concerned acted with evident bad
faith when they performed the demolition of the
market stall.

It is evident from the records, as correctly observed

by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor
Comendador as accused below did not deny that
there was indeed damage caused the Spouses
Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the
finding that:
xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was
carried
out
without
a
court
order,
and
notwithstanding a restraining order which the
plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done
in the exercise of official duties which apparently was
attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in
the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein
accused the authority to demolish plaintiffs store.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment
but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. 36 [It]
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or selfinterest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.37
It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused
public officials committed bad faith in performing the
demolition.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that
respondents structure is a public nuisance. The
abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings
is possible if it is nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se is
that which is nuisance at all times and under any
circumstance,
regardless
of
location
and
surroundings.39 In this case, the market stall cannot
be considered as a nuisance per se because as found
out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected

1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which

is attached.
2. It is located within the market site.
3. The building has not been affected by the
recent fire.
4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show
signs of being exposed to fire.41
Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not
enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor
law,42the present Local Government Code 43 does not
expressly
provide
for
the
abatement
of
nuisance.44 And even assuming that the power to
abate nuisance is provided for by the present code,
the accused public officials were under the facts of
this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the
store. A closer look at the contested resolutions
reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized
to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance
to obey the order or to demolish the building using
legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without
legal order in this case was not among those
provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally
impossible provision.
Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
as represented by the then Mayor Comendador, was
placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business
permits45 in favor of the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431
of the New Civil Code provides that, through
estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.
The
representation
made
by
the
municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right
to continuously operate its store binds the
municipality. It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to
receive the benefits of the store operation and later
on claim the illegality of the business.

The bad faith of the petitioners completes the

elements of the criminal offense of violation of Sec.
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad faith
serves as the source of the civil liability of Asilo,
Angeles, and Mayor Comendador.
It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16
November 1997, a motion to drop him as an accused
was filed by his counsel with no objection on the part
of the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted
favorably on the motion and issued an Order
dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the
other hand, when Mayor Comendador died and an
adverse decision was rendered against him which
resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration
by Mayor Comendadors counsel, the prosecution
opposed the Motion specifying the ground that the
civil liability did not arise from delict, hence, survived
the death of the accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld
the opposition of the prosecution which disposition
was not appealed.
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of
Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case
extinguished their criminal liabilities.
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil
liability of Mayor Comendador survived his death;
and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had
it not been for the fact that the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil
liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality.
We laid down the following guidelines in People v.
Bayotas:46
Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation

from which the civil liability may arise as a result of

the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)
Where the civil liability survives, as explained
[above], an action for recovery therefore may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action47 and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. 48
The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter,
Human Relations, were cited by the prosecution to
substantiate its argument that the civil action based
therein is an independent one, thus, will stand
despite the death of the accused during the
pendency of the case.

On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of

Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8249, in support of its argument
that the civil action was dependent upon the criminal
action, thus, was extinguished upon the death of the
accused. The law provides that:
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by, the
Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the
civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such
action shall be recognized. (Emphasis ours)
We agree with the prosecution.
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of
the case could have extinguished the civil liability if
the same arose directly from the crime committed.
However, in this case, the civil liability is based on
another source of obligation, the law on human
relations.49 The pertinent articles follow:
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
And, Art. 32(6) states:
Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law;
xxxx

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether

or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
As held in Aberca v. Ver:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal
provision [Art. 32 of the New Civil Code] is to provide
a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message
is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred
rights with impunity. x x x.50
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to
the applicability of the law on human relations. First,
the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD
of the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the
complaint
for
damages
specifically
invoked
defendant Mayor Comendadors violation of plaintiffs
right to due process. Thus:
xxxx
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the
store in question, the individual natural defendants
did not only act with grave abuse of authority but
usurped a power which belongs to our courts of
justice; such actuations were done with malice or in
bad faith and constitute an invasion of the property
rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of law.
xxxx
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there
was a violation of the right to private property of the
Spouses Bombasi. The accused public officials should
have accorded the spouses the due process of law
guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code.
The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by
the defense will not, as already shown, justify
demolition of the store without court order. This
Court in a number of decisions51 held that even if
there is already a writ of execution, there must still
be a need for a special order for the purpose of
demolition issued by the court before the officer in
charge
can
destroy,
demolish
or
remove

improvements over the contested property. 52 The

pertinent provisions are the following:
Before the removal of an improvement must take
place, there must be a special order, hearing and
reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39
of the Rules of Court provides:

civil and criminal cases before it although their

consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil
liability "arising from the offense charged."
We must, however, correct the amount of damages
awarded to the Spouses Bombasi.

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of

execution. When the property subject of execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon
motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing
and after the former has failed to remove the same
within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary

to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable.55 In this case,
the Court finds that the only evidence presented to
prove the actual damages incurred was the itemized
list of damaged and lost items56 prepared by
Engineer Cabrega, an engineer commissioned by the
Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs.

The above-stated rule is clear and needs no

interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must
be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices
to the parties for the issuance of a special order of
demolition.53

As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport

Corporation v. People of the Philippines,57

This special need for a court order even if an

ejectment case has successfully been litigated,
underscores the independent basis for civil liability,
in this case, where no case was even filed by the
municipality.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is
based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It
frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in
the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It is an
amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.54
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely
based on due process violations was filed even
ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the
fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was
substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria
who specified in her petition that she has
"substituted him as petitioner in the above captioned
case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal
Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not
applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct
when it maintained the separate docketing of the

x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners

that respondents failed to prove that the damages to
the terrace caused by the incident amounted
to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by
respondents to prove actual damages claimed by
private respondent were the summary computation
of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr.
amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by
the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private
respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for
carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical
works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify
on his estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial
court awardedP150,000.00 as actual damages to
private respondent but failed to state the factual
basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely
declared in the decretal portion of its decision that
the
"sum
of P150,000.00
as
reasonable
compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged
apartment." The appellate court, for its part, failed to
explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00
in its three-page decision. Thus, the appellate court
merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants,
they contend that there was no urgent necessity to
completely demolish the apartment in question
considering the nature of the damages sustained as
a result of the accident. Consequently, appellants
continue, the award of P150,000.00 as compensation

sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged

apartment is an unconscionable amount.
Further, in one case,58 this Court held that the
amount claimed by the respondent-claimants
witness as to the actual amount of damages "should
be admitted with extreme caution considering that,
because it was a bare assertion, it should be
supported by independent evidence." The Court
further said that whatever claim the respondent
witness would allege must be appreciated in
consideration of his particular self-interest. 59 There
must still be a need for the examination of the
documentary evidence presented by the claimants to
support its claim with regard to the actual amount of
damages.
The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega
presented as an exhibit60 partakes of the nature of
hearsay evidence considering that the person who
issued them was not presented as a witness. 61 Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
another person who is not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that
the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule.62 Further, exhibits do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided under Sections
37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the
actual damages claimed, this Court grants temperate
damages for P200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered
by the Spouses Bombasi. Temperate damages are
awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the New
Civil Code when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. The
amount of temperate or moderated damages is
usually left to the discretion of the courts but the
same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that the
temperate damages should be more than nominal
but less than compensatory.63 Without a doubt, the
Spouses Bombasi suffered some form of pecuniary
loss in the impairment of their store. Based on the
record of the case,64 the demolished store was
housed on a two-story building located at the
markets commercial area and its concrete walls
remained strong and not affected by the fire.
However, due to the failure of the Spouses Bombasi

to prove the exact amount of damage in accordance

with the Rules of Evidence,65 this court finds
that P200,000.00 is the amount just and reasonable
under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the
instant
appeal
is DENIED.
Accordingly, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Court affirms the decision finding
the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T.
Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the
dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against
Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In
view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador
pending trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but
his civil liability survives. The Municipality of
Nagcarlan,
Paulino
Asilo
and
Demetrio
T.
Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda.
De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable
to the Spouses Bombasi for temperate damages in
the amount of P200,000.00 and moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00.
Costs against the petitioners-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

vs.
CITY OF BUTUAN, represented in this case by
Democrito D. Plaza II, City Mayor, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The 1987 Constitution enunciates the policy that the
territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.1 In obedience to that mandate of the
fundamental law, Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government
Code,2 expresses that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy in order to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners
in the attainment of national goals, and that it is a
basic aim of the State to provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure
instituted
through
a
system
of
decentralization whereby local government units
shall
be
given
more
powers,
authority,
responsibilities and resources.
While the Constitution seeks to strengthen local units
and ensure their viability, clearly, however, it has
never been the intention of that organic law to create
an imperuim in imperio and install an infra sovereign
political subdivision independent of a single
sovereign state.
The Court is asked in this instance to resolve the
issue of whether under the present set up the power
of the Land Registration Office ("LTO") to register,
tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for
the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to local
government units.

G.R. No. 131512

January 20, 2000

LAND
TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE
[LTO],
represented by Assistant Secretary Manuel F.
Bruan,
LTO
Regional
Office,
Region
X
represented by its Regional Director, Timoteo
A. Garcia; and LTO Butuan represented by
Rosita G. Sadiaga, its Registrar, petitioners,

The Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City

held3 that the authority to register tricycles, the grant
of the corresponding franchise, the issuance of
tricycle drivers' license, and the collection of fees
therefor had all been vested in the Local Government
Units ("LGUs"). Accordingly, it decreed the issuance
of a permanent writ of injunction against LTO,
prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its
employees and other persons acting in its behalf,
from (a) registering tricycles and (b) issuing licenses
to drivers of tricycles. The Court of Appeals, on
appeal to it, sustained the trial court.1wphi1.nt

The adverse rulings of both the court a quo and the

appellate court prompted the LTO to file the instant
petition for review on certiorari to annul and set
aside the decision,4 dated 17 November 1997, of the
Court of Appeals affirming the permanent injunctive
writ order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of
Butuan City.
Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the
salient
provisions
introduced
by
the
Local
Government Code is in the area of local taxation
which allows LGUs to collect registration fees or
charges along with, in its view, the corresponding
issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the
driving of tricycles.
The 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject
to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local governments.5
Sec. 129 and Section 133 of the Local
Government Code read:
Sec. 129. Power to Create Sources or
Revenue. Each local government unit
shall exercise its power to create its own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees,
and charges subject to the provisions
herein, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government units.
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the
Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
Unless otherwise provided herein, the
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration

of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all
kinds of licenses or permits for the driving
thereof, except tricycles.
Relying on the foregoing provisions of the law, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod ("SP") of Butuan, on 16
August 1992, passed SP Ordinance No. 916-92
entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of
Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the
issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and
imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for
other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among
other things, the payment of franchise fees for the
grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the
registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance
of a permit for the driving thereof.
Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of
the national government that, indeed, has been
transferred to local government units is the
franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority
of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to
qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.
In order to settle the variant positions of the parties,
the City of Butuan, represented by its City Mayor
Democrito D. Plaza, filed on 28 June 1994 with the
trial court a petition for "prohibition, mandamus,
injunction with a prayer for preliminary restraining
order ex-parte" seeking the declaration of the validity
of SP Ordinance No. 962-93 and the prohibition of the
registration of tricycles-for-hire and the issuance of
licenses for the driving thereof by the LTO.
LTO opposed the prayer in the petition.
On 20 March 1995, the trial court rendered a
resolution; the dispositive portion read:
In view of the foregoing, let a permanent
injunctive writ be issued against the
respondent Land Transportation Office and
the other respondents, prohibiting and
enjoining them, their employees, officers,
attorney's or other persons acting in their
behalf from forcing or compelling Tricycles
to be registered with, and drivers to secure
their licenses from respondent LTO or secure

franchise from LTFRB and from collecting

fees thereon. It should be understood that
the registration, franchise of tricycles and
driver's license/permit granted or issued by
the City of Butuan are valid only within the
territorial limits of Butuan City.
No pronouncement as to costs.6
Petitioners timely moved for a reconsideration of the
above resolution but it was to no avail. Petitioners
then appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its now
assailed decision, the appellate court, on 17
November 1997, sustained the trial court. It ruled:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
DISMISSED and the questioned permanent
injunctive writ issued by the court a
quo dated March 20, 1995 AFFIRMED.7
Coming up to this Court, petitioners raise this sole
assignment of error, to wit:
The Court of Appeals [has] erred in
sustaining the validity of the writ of
injunction issued by the trial court which
enjoined LTO from (1) registering tricyclesfor-hire and (2) issuing licenses for the
driving thereof since the Local Government
Code
devolved
only
the
franchising
authority of the LTFRB. Functions of the LTO
were not devolved to the LGU's.8
The petition is impressed with merit.
The
Department
of
Transportation
and
Communications9 ("DOTC"), through the LTO and the
LTFRB, has since been tasked with implementing laws
pertaining to land transportation. The LTO is a line
agency under the DOTC whose powers and functions,
pursuant to Article III, Section 4 (d) [1],10 of R.A. No.
4136, otherwise known as Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, as amended, deal primarily with the
registration of all motor vehicles and the licensing of
drivers thereof. The LTFRB, upon the other hand, is
the governing body tasked by E.O. No. 202, dated 19
June 1987, to regulate the operation of public utility
or "for hire" vehicles and to grant franchises or
certificates of public convenience ("CPC"). 11 Finely
put, registration and licensing functions are vested in

the
LTO
while
franchising
and
regulatory
responsibilities had been vested in the LTFRB.
Under the Local Government Code, certain functions
of the DOTC were transferred to the LGUs, thusly:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of

this Code, enact ordinances granting
franchises and authorizing the issuance of
permits or licenses, upon such conditions
and for such purposes intended to promote
the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
city and pursuant to this legislative
authority shall:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(VI) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by

the Department of Transportation and
Communications,regulate the operation of
tricycles and grant franchises for the
operation thereof within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city. (Emphasis supplied).
LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the
operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises
for the operation thereof. "To regulate" means to fix,
establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or
established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or
to subject to governing principles or laws. 12 A
franchise is defined to be a special privilege to do
certain things conferred by government on an
individual or corporation, and which does not belong
to citizens generally of common right. 13 On the other
hand, "to register" means to record formally and
exactly, to enroll, or to enter precisely in a list or the
like,14 and a "driver's license" is the certificate or
license issued by the government which authorizes a
person to operate a motor vehicle.15 The devolution
of the functions of the DOTC, performed by the
LTFRB, to the LGUs, as so aptly observed by the
Solicitor General, is aimed at curbing the alarming
increase of accidents in national highways involving
tricycles. It has been the perception that local
governments are in good position to achieve the end
desired by the law-making body because of their

proximity to the situation that can enable them to

address that serious concern better than the national
government.
It may not be amiss to state, nevertheless, that
under Article 458 (a)[3-VI] of the Local Government
Code, the power of LGUs to regulate the operation of
tricycles and to grant franchises for the operation
thereof is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by
the DOTC. In compliance therewith, the Department
of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC")
issued "Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of
LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire
to Local Government units pursuant to the Local
Government Code." Pertinent provisions of the
guidelines state:
In lieu
of the Land
Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) in
the
DOTC,
the
Sangguniang
Bayan/Sangguniang Panglungsod (SB/SP)
shall perform the following:
(a) Issue, amend, revise, renew,
suspend, or cancel MTOP and
prescribe the appropriate terms
and conditions therefor;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Operating Conditions:
1. For safety reasons, no tricycles
should
operate
on
national
highways utilized by 4 wheel
vehicles greater than 4 tons and
where normal speed exceed 40
KPH. However, the SB/SP may
provide exceptions if there is no
alternative route.
2. Zones must be within the
boundaries of the municipality/city.
However, existing zones within
more than one municipality/city
shall be maintained, provided that
operators serving said zone shall
secure MTOP's from each of the
municipalities/cities
having
jurisdiction over the areas covered
by the zone.

3. A common color for tricycles-forhire operating in the same zone

may be imposed. Each unit shall be
assigned and bear an identification
number, aside from its LTO license
plate number.
4. An operator wishing to stop
service completely, or to suspend
service for more than one month,
should report in writing such
termination or suspension to the
SB/SP which originally granted the
MTOP prior thereto. Transfer to
another zone may be permitted
upon application.
5. The MTOP shall be valid for three
(3) years, renewable for the same
period. Transfer to another zone,
change of ownership of unit or
transfer of MTOP shall be construed
as an amendment to an MTOP and
shall require appropriate approval
of the SB/SP.
6. Operators shall employ only
drivers duly licensed by LTO for
tricycles-for-hire.
7. No tricycle-for-hire shall be
allowed to carry more passengers
and/or goods than it is designed
for.
8. A tricycle-for-hire shall be
allowed to operate like a taxi
service, i.e., service is rendered
upon demand and without a fixed
route within a zone.16
Such as can be gleaned from the explicit language of
the statute, as well as the corresponding guidelines
issued by DOTC, the newly delegated powers pertain
to the franchising and regulatory powers theretofore
exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of
the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles
and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are
the powers of LTO under R.A. No. 4136 requiring the
registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or

operated on or upon any public highway" in the

country. Thus
Sec. 5. All motor vehicles and other vehicles
must be registered. (a) No motor vehicle
shall be used or operated on or upon any
public highway of the Philippines unless the
same is properly registered for the current
year in accordance with the provisions of
this Act (Article 1, Chapter II, R.A. No. 4136).
The Commissioner of Land Transportation
and his deputies are empowered at anytime
to examine and inspect such motor vehicles
to determine whether said vehicles are
registered, or are unsightly, unsafe,
improperly
marked
or
equipped,
or
otherwise unfit to be operated on because
of possible excessive damage to highways,
bridges and other infrastructures.17 The LTO
is additionally charged with being the
central repository and custodian of all
records of all motor vehicles.18
The Court shares the apprehension of the
Solicitor General if the above functions were
to likewise devolve to local government
units; he states:
If the tricycle registration function
of respondent LTO is decentralized,
the incidence of theft of tricycles
will most certainly go up, and
stolen tricycles registered in one
local
government
could
be
registered in another with ease.
The determination of ownership
thereof will also become very
difficult.
Fake driver's licenses will likewise
proliferate. This likely scenario
unfolds where a tricycle driver, not
qualified
by
petitioner
LTO's
testing, could secure a license from
one municipality, and when the
same is confiscated, could just go
another municipality to secure
another license.

Devolution will entail the hiring of

additional personnel charged with
inspecting
tricycles
for
road
worthiness, testing drivers, and
documentation. Revenues raised
from tricycle registration may not
be enough to meet salaries of
additional personnel and incidental
costs for tools and equipment.19
The reliance made by respondents on the broad
taxing power of local government units, specifically
under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is
tangential. Police power and taxation, along with
eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty
which the State might share with local government
units by delegation given under a constitutional or a
statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a
public purpose and legislative in nature but the
similarities just about end there. The basic aim of
police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in
its case, focuses an the power of government to raise
revenue in order to support its existence and carry
out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to
each other in many respects, the grant of one does
not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other.
The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence,
separate and distinct powers, varying in their
respective
concepts,
character,
scopes
and
limitations. To construe the tax provisions of Section
133(1) indistinctively would result in the repeal to
that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently
has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the law
could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of
Book III of the Local Government Code in the same
manner that the specific devolution of LTFRB's power
on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal
by implication is not favored.20 The power over
tricycles granted under Section 458(8)(3)(VI) of the
Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to
regulate their operation and to grant franchises for
the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause
contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of
the Local Government Code must not be held to have
had the effect of withdrawing the express power of
LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles
and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory
in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of
the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road
safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor
vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by
R.A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute

must not be construed in isolation but must be taken

in harmony with the extant body of laws.21
The Court cannot end this decision without
expressing its own serious concern over the seeming
laxity in the grant of franchises for the operation of
tricycles-for-hire and in allowing the indiscriminate
use by such vehicles on public highways and
principal thoroughfares. Senator Aquilino C. Pimentel,
Jr., the principal author and sponsor of the bill that
eventually has become to be known as the Local
Government Code, has aptly remarked:
Tricycles
are
a
popular
means
of
transportation, specially in the countryside.
They are, unfortunately, being allowed to
drive
along
highways
and
principal
thoroughfares where they pose hazards to
their passengers arising from potential
collisions with buses, cars and jeepneys.
The operation of tricycles within a
municipality may be regulated by the
Sangguniang Bayan. In this connection, the
Sangguniang concerned would do well to
consider prohibiting the operation of
tricycles along or across highways invite
collisions with faster and bigger vehicles
and impede the flow of traffic.22
The need for ensuring public safety and
convenience to commuters and pedestrians
alike is paramount. It might be well, indeed,
for public officials concerned to pay heed to
a number of provisions in our laws that can
warrant in appropriate cases an incurrence
of criminal and civil liabilities. Thus
The Revised Penal Code
Art.
208. Prosecution
of
offenses; negligence and tolerance. The
penalty
of prision
correccional in
its
minimum period and suspension shall be
imposed upon any public officer, or officer of
the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of
his office, shall maliciously refrain from
instituting prosecution for the punishment of
violators of the law, or shall tolerate the
commission of offenses.

The Civil Code

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or
moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file
an action for damages and other relief
against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.1wphi1.nt
Art. 34. When a member of a city or
municipal police force refuses or fails to
render aid or protection to any person in
case of danger to life or property, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for
damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action
herein
recognized
shall
be
independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.
Art.
2189.
Provinces,
cities
and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or
supervision.
The Local Government Code
Sec. 24. Liability for Damages. Local
government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to
persons or damage to property.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision which enjoins the
Land Transportation Office from requiring the due
registration of tricycles and a license for the driving
thereof is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncements on costs.
Let copies of this decision be likewise furnished the
Department of Interior and Local Governments, the
Department of Public Works and Highways and the
Department of Transportation and Communication.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP
Superintendent,
Metropolitan
Traffic
Command, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITY OF
PARAAQUE,
METRO
MANILA,
PALANYAG
KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE,respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62,
which granted the writ of preliminary injunction
applied for by respondents Municipality of Paraaque
and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag
for brevity) against petitioner herein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality
passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which
authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz,
Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. The said
ordinance was approved by the municipal council
pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979,
authorizing and regulating the use of certain city
and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces
within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market
and/or vending areas, under certain terms and
conditions.
On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority
approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal
council of respondent municipality subject to the
following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are
not used for vehicular traffic, and
that the majority of the residents
do not oppose the establishment of
the flea market/vending areas
thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to
be used as flea market/vending
area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of
the road shall be used by
pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the
vending area is to be used shall be
clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending
areas shall be temporary and shall
be closed once the reclaimed areas

are developed and donated by the

Public Estate Authority.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque
issued a resolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor
Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any
service cooperative for the establishment, operation,
maintenance and management of flea markets
and/or vending areas.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered
into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate,
maintain and manage the flea market in the
aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit
dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paraaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up
by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen.
Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan
Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel
St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to
respondent Palanyag.
On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General
Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag
giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea
market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be
dismantled.
Hence,
on
October
23,
1990,
respondents
municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a
joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with
damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to
which
the
petitioner
filed
his
memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction.
On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from
enforcing his letter-order of October 16, 1990
pending the hearing on the motion for writ of
preliminary injunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an
order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s.
1990 of the Municipality' of Paraaque and enjoining
petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his
letter-order against respondent Palanyag.

Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru

the Office of the Solicitor General alleging grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge in issuing
the assailed order.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether
or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the
municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease
and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for
flea markets is valid.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner,
contends that municipal roads are used for public
service and are therefore public properties; that as
such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation
or private contract by any person, even by the
respondent Municipality of Paraaque. Petitioner
submits that a property already dedicated to public
use cannot be used for another public purpose and
that absent a clear showing that the Municipality of
Paraaque has been granted by the legislature
specific authority to convert a property already in
public use to another public use, respondent
municipality is, therefore, bereft of any authority to
close municipal roads for the establishment of a flea
market. Petitioner also submits that assuming that
the respondent municipality is authorized to close
streets, it failed to comply with the conditions set
forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority for the
approval of the ordinance providing for the
establishment of flea markets on public streets.
Lastly, petitioner contends that by allowing the
municipal streets to be used by market vendors the
municipal council of respondent municipality violated
its duty under the Local Government Code to
promote the general welfare of the residents of the
municipality.
In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance,
the trial court ruled:
. . . that Chanter II Section 10 of
the Local Government Code is a
statutory grant of power given to
local
government
units,
the
Municipality of Paraaque as such,
is empowered under that law to
close its roads, streets or alley
subject to limitations stated therein
(i.e., that it is in accordance with

existing laws and the provisions of

this code).
xxx xxx xxx
The actuation of the respondent
Brig. Gen. Levi Macasiano, though
apparently within its power is in
fact an encroachment of power
legally vested to the municipality,
precisely
because
when
the
municipality enacted the ordinance
in question the authority of the
respondent
as
Police
Superintendent
ceases
to
be
operative on the ground that the
streets covered by the ordinance
ceases to be a public thoroughfare.
(pp. 33-34, Rollo)
We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the
question of whether the disputed municipal
ordinance authorizing the flea market on the public
streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in
force during the time the said ordinance was
enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as Local Government Code, in
connection with established principles embodied in
the Civil Code an property and settled jurisprudence
on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is
divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of
property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code
states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in
the
provinces,
cities
and
municipalities, consists of the
provincial roads, city streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said
provinces, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by
any of them is patrimonial and
shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions
of special laws.

Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz,

Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets
are local roads used for public service and are
therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government
which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress
(Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA
1334). Hence, local governments have no authority
whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon
them by Congress. One such example of this
authority given by Congress to the local governments
is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10,
Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which
states:
Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local
government unit may likewise,
through its head acting pursuant to
a resolution of its sangguniang
and in accordance with existing
law and the provisions of this Code,
close any barangay, municipal, city
or provincial road, street, alley,
park or square. No such way or
place or any part of thereof shall
be close without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby. A
property thus withdrawn from
public
use may
be
used
or
conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to
the local unit concerned might be
lawfully
used
or
conveyed.
(Emphasis ours).
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives
authority to local government units to close roads
and other similar public places should be read and
interpreted in accordance with basic principles
already established by law. These basic principles
have the effect of limiting such authority of the
province, city or municipality to close a public street
or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays
down the basic principle that properties of public
dominion devoted to public use and made available
to the public in general are outside the commerce of
man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process which should be
complied with before closing a road, street or park,

the closure should be for the sole purpose of

withdrawing the road or other public property from
public use when circumstances show that such
property is no longer intended or necessary for public
use or public service. When it is already withdrawn
from public use, the property then becomes
patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc.
et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29,
1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the
respondent municipality can "use or convey them for
any purpose for which other real property belonging
to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of
Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local
Government Code. In one case, the City Council of
Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal
road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as an
abandoned road, the same not being included in the
City Development Plan. Thereafter, the City Council
passes another resolution authorizing the sale of the
said abandoned road through public bidding. We held
therein that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a
city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from
public use. Such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an
ordinary contract (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.,
Inc.
v.
Bercilles,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However,
those roads and streets which are available to the
public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular
traffic are still considered public property devoted to
public use. In such case, the local government has no
power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of
or lease it to private persons. This limitation on the
authority of the local government over public
properties has been discussed and settled by this
Court en banc in "Francisco V. Dacanay, petitioner v.
Mayor Macaria Asistio, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R.
No. 93654, May 6, 1992." This Court ruled:
There is no doubt that the disputed
areas from which the private
respondents' market stalls are
sought to be evicted are public
streets, as found by the trial court
in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public
street is property for public use
hence outside the commerce of
man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code).
Being outside the commerce of
man, it may not be the subject of
lease
or
others
contract

(Villanueva, et al. v. Castaeda and

Macalino, 15 SCRA 142 citing the
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30
SCRA 602; Espiritu v. Municipal
Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil.
869; And Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48
O.G. 4860).
As the stallholders pay fees to the
City Government for the right to
occupy portions of the public
street,
the
City
Government,
contrary to law, has been leasing
portions of the streets to them.
Such leases or licenses are null and
void for being contrary to law. The
right of the public to use the city
streets may not be bargained away
through contract. The interests of a
few should not prevail over the
good of the greater number in the
community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general
welfare,
the
respondent
city
officials are under legal obligation
to protect.
The Executive Order issued by
acting Mayor Robles authorizing
the use of Heroes del '96 Street as
a vending area for stallholders who
were granted licenses by the city
government
contravenes
the
general law that reserves city
streets and roads for public use.
Mayor Robles' Executive Order may
not infringe upon the vested right
of the public to use city streets for
the purpose they were intended to
serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for
vehicles and pedestrians.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent
municipality has the authority to pass the disputed
ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented
because it cannot be considered approved by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance
by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed
by the former for the approval of the ordinance, to
wit:

1. That the aforenamed streets are

not used for vehicular traffic, and
that the majority of the residents
do(es)
not
oppose
the
establishment
of
the
flea
market/vending areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to
be used as flea market/vending
area shall be marked distinctly, and
that the 2 meters on both sides of
the road shall be used by
pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the
vending area is to be used shall be
clearly designated;
4. That the use of the vending
areas shall be temporary and shall
be closed once the reclaimed areas
are developed and donated by the
Public
Estate
Authority.
(p.
38, Rollo)
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of
proof that it has complied with the foregoing
conditions precedent to the approval of the
ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality
that the closed streets were not used for vehicular
traffic and that the majority of the residents do not
oppose the establishment of a flea market on said
streets are unsupported by any evidence that will
show that this first condition has been met. Likewise,
the designation by respondents of a time schedule
during which the flea market shall operate is absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along
Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and
traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors
occupying the streets. To license and allow the
establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G.
Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the
problem of congestion. We take note of the other
observations of the Solicitor General when he said:
. . . There have been many
instances of emergencies and fires
where
ambulances
and
fire
engines, instead of using the roads

for a more direct access to the fire

area, have to maneuver and look
for other streets which are not
occupied by stalls and vendors
thereby losing valuable time which
could, otherwise, have been spent
in saving properties and lives.
Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital,
the St. Rita Hospital. However, its
ambulances and the people rushing
their patients to the hospital
cannot pass through G.G. Cruz
because of the stalls and the
vendors. One can only imagine the
tragedy of losing a life just because
of a few seconds delay brought
about by the inaccessibility of the
streets leading to the hospital.
The children, too, suffer. In view of
the occupancy of the roads by
stalls
and
vendors,
normal
transportation flow is disrupted and
school children have to get off at a
distance still far from their schools
and walk, rain or shine.
Indeed one can only imagine the
garbage and litter left by vendors
on the streets at the end of the
day. Needless to say, these cause
further pollution, sickness and
deterioration of health of the
residents therein. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)
Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing
findings and observations of petitioners. Instead,
respondents want this Court to focus its attention
solely on the argument that the use of public spaces
for the establishment of a flea market is well within
the powers granted by law to a local government
which should not be interfered with by the courts.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not
absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by
toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code.
Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be
subservient to paramount considerations of health
and well-being of the members of the community.
Every local government unit has the sworn obligation
to enact measures that will enhance the public

health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and

order, and promote the general prosperity of the
inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective,
the local government should refrain from acting
towards that which might prejudice or adversely
affect the general welfare.

(DSWD). Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents

Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa and DSWD
Secretary
Corazon
Juliano-Soliman
from
implementing the said program on the ground that it
amounts to a "recentralization" of government
functions that have already been devolved from the
national government to the local government units.

As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the

general public have a legal right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public
roads and streets and the officials of respondent
municipality have the corresponding duty arising
from public office to clear the city streets and restore
them to their specific public purpose.

The Facts
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction
strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries.2 Dubbed "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino," it
was pre-pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat
and Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the municipalities
of Lopez Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental,
the Caraga Region; and the cities of Pasay and
Caloocan3 upon the release of the amount of P50
Million Pesos under a Special Allotment Release
Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget
and Management.4

The instant case as well as the Dacanay case,

involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for
lack of basis and authority in laws applicable during
its time. However, at this point, We find it worthy to
note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local
Government Lode, has already been repealed by
Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government
Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992.
Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and
obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the
new Code and arising out of contracts or any other
source of prestation involving a local government
unit shall be governed by the original terms and
conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at
the time such rights were vested.

On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued Administrative

Order No. 16, series of 2008 (A.O. No. 16, s.
2008),5 setting the implementing guidelines for the
project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino
Program" (4Ps), upon the following stated objectives,
to wit:

G.R. No. 195770

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the
decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated
December 17, 1990 which granted the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as PNP
Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from
enforcing the demolition of market stalls along J.
Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension
and Opena streets is hereby RESERVED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

July 17, 2012

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and

NELSON
ALCANTARA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and
SECRETARY CORAZON JULIANO-SOLIMAN OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and
DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), Respondents.

1. To improve preventive health care of

pregnant women and young children
2. To increase enrollment/attendance of
children at elementary level
3. To reduce incidence of child labor
4. To raise consumption of poor households
on nutrient dense foods

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
For the Courts consideration in this Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition is the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 10147 or the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2011 1 which
provides a P21 Billion budget allocation for the
Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by
the Department of Social Welfare & Development

5. To encourage parents to invest in their

children's (and their own) future
6. To encourage parent's participation in the
growth and development of young children,
as well as involvement in the community.6
This
government
intervention
scheme,
also
conveniently referred to as CCTP, "provides cash
grant to extreme poor households to allow the

members of the families to meet certain human

development goals."7

a. Ensure availability of the supply side on

health and education in the target areas.

Eligible households that are selected from priority

target areas consisting of the poorest provinces
classified by the National Statistical Coordination
Board (NCSB)8 are granted a health assistance of
P500.00/month,
or
P6,000.00/year,
and
an
educational assistance of P300.00/month for 10
months, or a total of P3,000.00/year, for each child
but up to a maximum of three children per
family.9 Thus, after an assessment on the appropriate
assistance package, a household beneficiary could
receive from the government an annual subsidy for
its basic needs up to an amount of P15,000.00, under
the following conditionalities:

b. Provide necessary technical assistance for

Program implementation

a) Pregnant women must get pre natal care

starting from the 1st trimester, child birth is
attended by skilled/trained professional, get
post natal care thereafter
b) Parents/guardians must attend family
planning sessions/mother's class, Parent
Effectiveness Service and others
c) Children 0-5 years of age get regular
preventive health check-ups and vaccines
d) Children 3-5 years old must attend day
care program/pre-school
e) Children 6-14 years of age are enrolled in
schools and attend at least 85% of the
time10
Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also
institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network
among the Department of Education (DepEd),
Department of Health (DOH), Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), the National AntiPoverty
Commission
(NAPC)
and
the
local
government units (LGUs), identifying specific roles
and functions in order to ensure effective and
efficient implementation of the CCTP. As the DSWD
takes on the role of lead implementing agency that
must "oversee and coordinate the implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of the program," the
concerned LGU as partner agency is particularly
tasked to

c.
Coordinate
the
implementation/operationalization
of
sectoral activities at the City/Municipal level
to better execute Program objectives and
functions
d. Coordinate with various concerned
government agencies at the local level,
sectoral representatives and NGO to ensure
effective Program implementation
e. Prepare reports on issues and concerns
regarding Program implementation and
submit to the Regional Advisory Committee,
and
f. Hold monthly committee meetings11
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)12 executed by
the DSWD with each participating LGU outlines in
detail the obligation of both parties during the
intended five-year implementation of the CCTP.
Congress, for its part, sought to ensure the success
of the CCTP by providing it with funding under the
GAA of 2008 in the amount of Two Hundred NinetyEight Million Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P298,550,000.00). This budget allocation increased
tremendously to P5 Billion Pesos in 2009, with the
amount doubling to P10 Billion Pesos in 2010. But the
biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the GAA
of 2011 at Twenty One Billion One Hundred NinetyFour Million One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Pesos
(P21,194,117,000.00).131wphi1
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator,
joined by Sergio Tadeo, incumbent President of the
Association of Barangay Captains of Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija, and Nelson Alcantara, incumbent
Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Monica, Quezon
City, challenges before the Court the disbursement of
public funds and the implementation of the CCTP
which are alleged to have encroached into the local
autonomy of the LGUs.

The Issue
THE P21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER
THE DSWD IN THE GAA FY 2011 VIOLATES ART. II,
SEC. 25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING
FOR THE RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES
ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.
Petitioners admit that the wisdom of adopting the
CCTP as a poverty reduction strategy for the
Philippines is with the legislature. They take
exception, however, to the manner by which it is
being implemented, that is, primarily through a
national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to
which the responsibility and functions of delivering
social welfare, agriculture and health care services
have been devolved pursuant to Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, in relation to Section 25,
Article II & Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitioners assert that giving the DSWD full control
over the identification of beneficiaries and the
manner by which services are to be delivered or
conditionalities are to be complied with, instead of
allocating the P21 Billion CCTP Budget directly to the
LGUs that would have enhanced its delivery of basic
services, results in the "recentralization" of basic
government functions, which is contrary to the
precepts of local autonomy and the avowed policy of
decentralization.
Our Ruling
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to
ensure the autonomy of local governments14 and
even devotes a full article on the subject of local
governance15 which includes the following pertinent
provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government
structure
instituted
through
a
system
of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers,

responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the

qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.

basic services and facilities in their

respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the
same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationallyfunded projects, facilities, programs and
services, thus:

xxx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies
composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices,
and
representatives
from
non-governmental
organizations within the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the
autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
economic and social growth and development of the
units in the region. (Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and
meaningful autonomy that would develop them into
self-reliant communities and effective partners in the
attainment of national goals,16 Section 17 of the Local
Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties
and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to
be self-reliant and shall continue exercising
the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this
Code. Local government units shall likewise
exercise such other powers and discharge
such other functions and responsibilities as
are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include,
but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges
the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of

subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local
government
unit
concerned
is
duly
designated as the implementing agency for
such projects, facilities, programs and
services. (Underscoring supplied)
The essence of this express reservation of power by
the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency,
it has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU.
The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals 17 that
while it is through a system of decentralization that
the State shall promote a more responsive and
accountable local government structure, the concept
of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of
local government units into "mini-states."18 We
explained that, with local autonomy, the Constitution
did nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of
the national government over the affairs of the local
government" and, thus, did not intend to sever "the
relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government
units."19 In Pimentel v. Aguirre,20 the Court defined
the extent of the local government's autonomy in
terms of its partnership with the national government
in the pursuit of common national goals, referring to
such key concepts as integration and coordination.
Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the
national government has not completely relinquished

all its powers over local governments, including

autonomous regions. Only administrative powers
over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller
political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable
the country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance
to the local government unit as to preclude any and
all involvement by the national government in
programs implemented in the local level would be to
shift the tide of monopolistic power to the other
extreme, which would amount to a decentralization
of power explicated in Limbona v. Mangelin 21 as
beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy, thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration
or
decentralization
of
power.1wphi1 There
is
decentralization
of
administration when the central government
delegates
administrative
powers
to
political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local
governments more responsive and accountable and
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social
progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises general supervision over
them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the [sic]
favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to self-

immolation, since in that event, the autonomous

government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.22
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic
facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. The
national government is, thus, not precluded from
taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs
especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.23 Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden
of proving the invalidity of the provisions under the
GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget
for an intervention program formulated by the
national government itself but implemented in
partnership with the local government units to
achieve the common national goal development and
social progress can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of local
governments.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24661 February 28, 1974

BENJAMIN RABUCO, VENANCIO G. GUIRNALDA,
LEODEGARIO
ALOBA,
ELEUTERIO
IBAES,
ROGELIO
ARAGONES,
ASENCIO
ABANCO,

BENEDICTO
BAUTISTA,
MAXIMO
AQUINO,
PAULINA
DALUMIAS,
NENITA
RAMOS,
GUILLERMO
VARIAS,
EMELDA
ARELLANO,
PEDRO BILBAO, ERNESTO BONBALES, ROSITA
OCA BAUTISTA, TERESITA ESTEBAN, JOSE
BENJAMIN, LORENZO BELDEVER, LEODEGARIO
TUMLOS,
PATRICIO
MALATE,
ANSELMO
CORTEJOS,
ANACLETA
ADUCA,
SALOME
BARCELONA, ENRICO CELSO, IRENE CAMBA,
MARIA COLLADO, RUFINO CANTIL, ANANIAS
CANILLO, MAXIMO DE CASTRO, CEFERINO
SALAZAR, PATRIA ANAYA, FELISA VELASCO,
IGNACIO
SARASPI,
FLAVIO
DINAGUIT,
REMEDIOS BAROMETRO, PEDRO GEBANIA,
RUBEN GEGABALEN, EMETRIO EDAO, LUCIANO
ARAGONES, ADRIANO ESTRELLADO, BONIFACIO
EVARISTO,
ISIDORO
EDORIA,
TIMOTEA
ECARUAN,
BIENVENIDO
COLLADO,
CENON
DAJUYA,
RAFAELA
FERNANDEZ,
ALFONSO
FAUSTINO,
AVELINO
GARCIA,
RICARDO
GUIRNALDA, FRANCISCO HENERAL, CARMEN
KIONESALA, FELICIANO LUMACTOD, DOLORES
VILLACAMPA, NARCISO LIM, EUFEMIO LEGASPI,
MATILDE
MABAQUIAO,
EULOGIO
VIA,
MACARIO ANTONIO, JEREMIAS DE LA CRUZ,
MARTIN MANGABAN, SIMEON MANGABA T.,
CARIDAD
MER
MILLA,
FELIX
MAHINAY,
NAPOLEON MARZAN, ISAIAS MANALASTAS,
JOSEFA CORVERA, JOSE APRUEDO, ARSENIO
REYES,
EUGENIA
A.
ONO,
CORNELIO
OPOLENCIA,
SEDECIAS
PASCUA,
ABUNDIO
PAGUNTALAN,
ESPERANZA
DE
QUIROS,
CRESENCIO
SALEM,
MOISES
FERNANDEZ,
FORTUNATO GONZALES, SOCORRO R. VALEN,
RODOLFO
COLLADO,
VENERIO
CELSO,
GREGORIO DE LA CRUZ, CELSO ALCERA,
NICOLAS ARAGONES, JOSEFINA MANANSALA,
ADELAIDA CALASIN , JOSE AGUSTIN, TOMAS
JOSEPH, MANUEL DADOR, SERGIO LIPATON,
ERNESTO SUMAYDING, MARCELINO DIOSO,
MIGUEL ALCERA, CRISANTA ENAMER, JUAN
VIADO HILARION CHIOCO, EUROPIA CABAHUG,
VICTORIA DUERO, CONSORCIO ENOC, MAMERTO
GAMONIDO,
BONIFACIO
SABADO,
MARIA
INTROLIZO, HENRY ENOLBA, REYNALDO LIM,
FORTUNATO
LIPON,
ERNESTO
MALLOS,
FLORENTINA PATRICIO, MAMERTO PALAPALA,
RAMON
DE
PERALTA,
JOSE
PARRAS,
APOLINARIO YAP, JUAN ROQUE, FELIX ROQUE,
GLICERIA SALAZAR, MIGUELA SABIO, AGAPITO
SAYAS, PAULINO SARROZA, PACIFICO JUANICO,
LIBERADO TULAWAN, LIGAYA LAUS, ERNESTO
VERZOSA, LEOPOLDO BERNALES, JAIME VISTA,
ISAIAS AMURAO, BENITA M. BARENG, and

BRIGIDA
SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by
HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, HON. LADISLAO J. TOLENTINO, City
Engineer of Manila, their agents, employees,
assistants and all persons acting under them;
HON. BENJAMIN GOZON, Administrator, Land
Reform
Authority
substituted
by
HON
CONRADO ESTRELLA as Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reforms and his
agents, employees, assistants and all persons
acting under his orders, respondent. 1
G.R. No. L-24915 February 28, 1974
BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al., (the same copetitioners
in
L-24661), petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by
HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, et al., (the same co-respondents in L24661), respondents.
G.R. No. L-24916 February 28, 1974
BENJAMIN RABUCO, et al. (the same copetitioners in L-24661), petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS substituted by
HON. RAMON BAGATSING as CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, et al., (the same co-respondents in L24661), respondents-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of
Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established
doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the
State (although titled in the name of the municipal
corporation) and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona
fide occupants by Congressional authorization and
disposition does not constitute infringements of the
due process clause or the eminent domain provisions
of the Constitution but operates simply as a
manifestation of the legislature's right of control and
power to deal with State property.
The origin and background of the cases at bar which
deal with the decisive issue of constitutionality of

Republic Act 3120 enacted on June 17, 1961, as

raised by respondent mayor of Manila in resisting
petitioners' pleas that respondent mayor not only
lacks the authority to demolish their houses or eject
them as tenants and bona fide occupants of a parcel
of land in San Andres, Malate 2 but is also expressly
prohibited from doing so by section 2 of the Act, may
be
summarized
from
the
Court
of
Appeals' 3 certification of resolution of May 31, 1965
as follows:
Case L-24916 involves petitioners' appeal to the
Court of Appeals 4 from the decision of the Manila
court of first instance dismissing their petition for
injunction and mandamus to enjoin the demolition of
their houses and the ejectment from the public lots in
question and to direct respondent administrator of
the Land Authority (now Secretary of Agrarian
Reform) to implement the provisions of Republic Act
3120 for the subdivision and sale on installment
basis of the subdivided lots to them as the tenants
and bona fide occupants thereof, and instead
ordering their ejectment.
Case L-24915 involves
petitioners'
independent
petition for injunction filed directly with the Court of
Appeals January 29, 1965 5 to forestall the demolition
overnight of their houses pursuant to the order of
demolition set for January 30, 1965 at 8 a.m. issued
by respondents city officials pending the elevation of
their appeal. The appellate court gave due course
thereto and issued the writ of preliminary injunction
as prayed for.
The two cases were ordered "consolidated into one"
since they were "unavoidably interlaced." The
appellate court, finding that the constitutionality of
Republic Act 3120 was "the dominant and
inextricable issue in the appeal" over which it had no
jurisdiction and that the trial court incorrectly
"sidetracked" the issue, thereafter certified the said
cases to this Court, as follows:
The validity of Republic Act 3120
which was seasonably posed in
issue in the court below was
sidetracked by the trial court, thus:
The
constitutionality
of Republic Act
No. 3120 need

not be passed
upon
as
the
principal question
in
issue
is
whether
the
houses of the
petitioners
are
public nuisances,
which the court
resolved in the
affirmative. As a
matter of fact
even
if
the
petitioners were
already
the
owners of the
land on which
their
respected
houses
are
erected,
the
respondent
city
officials
could
cause
the
removal thereof
as
they
were
constructed
in
violation of city
ordinances
and
constitute public
nuisance.
It is significant to note, however,
that what is sought by the
respondent City Mayor and City
Engineer of Manila is not only the
demolition of the petitioners'
houses
in
the
premises
in
controversy, but their ejectment as
well. Moreover, Republic Act 3120
does intend not only the dismissal
of the ejectment proceedings
against the petitioners from the
land in controversy upon their
motion, but as well that any
demolition order issued against
them shall also have to be
dismissed. The law says:
Upon approval of
this
Act
no
ejectment
proceedings
against
any

tenants or bona
fide
occupant
shall be instituted
and
any
proceedings
against any such
tenant
or bona
fideoccupant
shall
be
dismissed
upon
motion of the
defendant. Provid
ed,
That
any
demolition order
directed against
any
tenant
or bona
fide occupant
thereof, shall be
dismissed. (Sec.
2, R. A. 3120).
Indeed, the petitioners-appellants,
who contended in the court below
that it was not necessary to decide
on the validity or constitutionality
of the law, now asseverate that
'Republic Act No. 3120 expressly
prohibits ejectment and demolition
of
petitioners'
home.'
The
petitioners' argument in their
appeal to this Court runs as
follows:

judgment,
as
wrongly claimed
by respondentsappellees.
3. Ejectment and
demolition
against
petitionersappellants
are
unlawful
and
clearly prohibited
by Republic Act
No. 3120.
The defense of the respondents
Mayor and City Engineer of Manila
to arguments 2 and 3 is the
invalidity of the said Republic Act
3120 for being in violation of the
Constitutional prohibition against
the deprivation of property without
due process of law and without just
compensation. So that even if
argument 2 interposed by the
petitioners-appellants should be
rejected, still they may claim a
right, by virtue of the aforesaid
provisions of Republic Act 3120, to
continue
possession
and
occupation of the premises and the
lifting of the order of demolition
issued
against
them.
The
constitutionality
of
the
said
Republic Act 3120, therefore,
becomes
the
dominant
and
inextricable issue of the appeal.

1.
Petitionersappellants
are
entitled to the
remedies
of
injunction
and mandamus,
being vested with
lawful possession
over Lot 21-B,
Block
610,
granted by law,
Republic Act No.
3120.

Case L-24661 for the continuation and maintenance

of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by the Court of Appeals for preservation of the status
quo was filed by petitioners directly with this Court
on June 21, 1965, pending transmittal of the records
of Cases L-24915 and L-24916 to this Court as
certified by the Court of Appeals which declared itself
without jurisdiction over the principal and decisive
issue of constitutionality of Republic Act 3120.

2. Civil Case No.

56092 has not
been barred by
any
prior

The Court gave due course thereto and on August

17, 1965 issued upon a P1,000 bond the writ of
preliminary injunction as prayed for enjoining
respondents "from demolishing and/or continuing to

demolish the houses of herein petitioners situated in

Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610 of the Cadastral Survey
of the City of Manila, or from performing any act
constituting an interference in or disturbance of their
present possession."
The records of two cases certified by the appellate
court, L-24915 and L-24916, were eventually
forwarded to this Court which per its resolution of
August 24, 1965 ordered that they be docketed and
be considered together with case L-24661.
In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of
undetermined origin gutted the Malate area including
the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and
dwellings. Respondents city officials then took over
the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing or
repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners'
instance, the Court issued on June 17, 1970 a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents
city officials "from performing any act constituting an
interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners'
possession of Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the
Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila" as
safeguarded them under the Court's subsisting
preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965.
The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar, as
correctly perceived by the appellate court is the
constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 whereby
Congress converted the lot in question together with
another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are
reserved as communal property" into "disposable or
alienable lands of the State to be placed under the
administration and disposal of the Land Tenure
Administration" for subdivision into small lots not
exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on
installment basis to the tenants or bona fide
occupants
thereof 6and
expressly
prohibited
ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes
under section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate
court's certification resolution, supra.
The incidental issue seized upon by the trial court as
a main issue for "sidetracking" the decisive issue of
constitutionality, to wit, that petitioners' houses as
they stood at the time of its judgment in 1965 "were
constructed in violation of city ordinances and
constituted public nuisances" whose removal could
be ordered "even if petitioners were already the
owners of the land on which their respective houses
are erected" has become moot with the burning

down of the petitioners' houses in the fire of April 19,

1970.
If the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for
constituting deprivation of property without due
process of law and without just compensation as
contended by respondents city officials, then the trial
court's refusal to enjoin ejectment and demolition of
petitioners' houses may be upheld. Otherwise,
petitioners' right under the Act to continue
possession and occupation of the premises and to
the lifting and dismissal of the order of demolition
issued against them must be enforced and the trial
court's judgment must be set aside.
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act
must be stricken down as unconstitutional for
depriving the city of Manila of the lots in question
and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to
bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of
just compensation is untenable and without basis,
since the lots in question are manifestly owned by
the city in its public and governmental capacity and
are therefore public property over which Congress
had absolute control as distinguished from
patrimonial
property
owned
by
it
in
its private or proprietarycapacity of which it could
not be deprived without due process and without just
compensation. 7
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the
properties were "reserved as communal property"
and ordered their conversion into "disposable and
alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to
the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established
doctrine that the act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative
power which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The case of Salas vs. Jarencio 8 wherein the Court
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act 4118
whereby Congress in identical terms as in Republic
Act 3120 likewise converted another city lot (Lot 1-B2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of Manila
also in Malate) which was reserved as communal
property into disposable land of the State for resale
in small lots by the Land Tenure, Administration to
the bona fide occupants is controlling in the case at
bar.
The Court therein reaffirmed the established general
rule that "regardless of the source or classification of

land
in
the
possession
of
a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own
funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit
of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to
the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of
the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as
an agent for the performance of a part of its public
work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the
same as if the State itself holds the property and
puts it to a different use" 9 and stressed that "the
property, as has been previously shown, was not
acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in
its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its
name a registered title is not questioned, but this
title should be deemed to be held in trust for the
State as the land covered thereby was part of the
territory of the City of Manila granted by the
sovereign upon its creation." 10
There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in
question (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and Republic
Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to
implement the social justice policy of the Constitution
and the government program of land for the landless
and that they were not "intended to expropriate the
property involved but merely to confirm its character
as communal land of the State and to make it
available for disposition by the National Government:
... The subdivision of the land and conveyane of the
resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
Congressional authorization does not operate as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain without just
compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection
(2), Article III of the Constitution, 11 but simply as
a manifestationof
its right and power to
deal
with state property." 12
Since the challenge of respondents city officials
against the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120
must fail as the City was not deprived thereby of
anything it owns by acquisition with its private or
corporate funds either under the due process clause
or under the eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution, the provisions of said Act must be
enforced and petitioners are entitled to the injunction
as prayed for implementing the Act's prohibition
against their ejectment and demolition of their
houses.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower

court (in Case No. L-24916) is hereby set aside, and
the preliminary injunction heretofore issued on
August 17, 1965 is hereby made permanent. The
respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform as
successor agency of the Land Tenure Administration
may now proceed with the due implementation of
Republic Act 3120 in accordance with its terms and
provisions. No costs.

QUIASON, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled
"Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V.
Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether
the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units is subject, to the prior approval of
the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the
implementator of the agrarian reform program.
On
December
22,
1988,
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988,
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for nonfood and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing
project
for
provincial
government
employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by
GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN
V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33
at
Pili,
Camarines
Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION),
ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN
JOAQUIN,respondents.

WHEREAS,
the
province
of
Camarines Sur has adopted a fiveyear Comprehensive Development
plan, some of the vital components
of
which
includes
the
establishment of model and pilot
farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops, soil
testing
and
tissue
culture
laboratory centers, 15 small scale
technology soap making, small
scale products of plaster of paris,
marine biological and sea farming
research
center,and
other
progressive feasibility concepts
objective of which is to provide the
necessary scientific and technology
know-how
to
farmers
and
fishermen in Camarines Sur and to
establish a housing project for
provincial government employees;
WHEREAS, the province would
need additional land to be acquired
either by purchase or expropriation
to implement the above program
component;

WHEREAS,
there
are
contiguous/adjacent properties to
be (sic) present Provincial Capitol
Site ideally suitable to establish the
same pilot development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of
Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis
R.Villafuerte,
filed
two
separate
cases
for
expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and
Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action
Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court,
Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V.
Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a
motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The
San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the
motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints
on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for
their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989,
the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the
Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to
answer for damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do
not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the
order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of their property and a motion to
admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions
were denied in the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San
Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of
1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared
null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order
dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to
dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of the property subject of the
expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990,
denying the motion to admit the amended motion to

dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order

be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing
the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ
of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of
Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to
initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections
4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and
that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment
to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that
under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the
Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent
domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed
the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must
first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands
of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial
court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' lands and the
order denying the admission of the amended motion
to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend
the expropriation proceedings until after the Province
of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert the classification of the property of the
private respondents from agricultural to nonagricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San
Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints
for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of
the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the
nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of
the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the
complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals
ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the
Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the
authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to

change the classification of the lands sought to be

expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural
use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that
the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a
broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public
use" for which the power of eminent domain may be
exercised. The old concept was that the condemned
property must actually be used by the general public
(e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the
taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional
requirement of "public use". Under the new concept,
"public use" means public advantage, convenience or
benefit, which tends to contribute to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole community,
like a resort complex for tourists or housing project
(Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220
[1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461
[1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the
questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would
inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the
people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once
operational, the center would make available to the
community invaluable information and technology on
agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry.
Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen
and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement
of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero,
154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern
since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum the
general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur
that its exercise of the power of eminent domain
cannot be restricted by the provisions of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657),
particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an
agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation
of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of
Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of

Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Law and must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220,
petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine
Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by
the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist
resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282
hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of
8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was
affected by the land reform program and covered by
emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was
"no need under the facts of this petition to rule on
whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to
another purpose or engage in a balancing of
competing
public
interest,"
it
upheld
the
expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed
to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970
square meters formed part of the resort complex. A
fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that
this Court viewed the power of expropriation as
superior to the power to distribute lands under the
land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to
expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by
stressing the fact that local government units
exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment,
pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
It is true that local government units have no
inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise
it only when expressly authorized by the legislature
(City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950,
50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the
power to expropriate, the legislature may retain
certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg.
Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S
Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a
limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the
delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in
the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:

A local government unit may,

through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute
condemnation
proceedings
for
public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the
least that local government, units must first secure
the approval of the Department of Land Reform for
the conversion of lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use, before they can institute the
necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there
is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform
Law
which
expressly
subjects
the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the
Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention
of the Department of Agrarian Reform in
expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands.
After the lapse of five (5) years
from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible
and
sound
for,
agricultural
purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for
residential,
commercial
or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the
landowner, with due notice to the
affected parties, and subject to
existing laws, may authorize the
reclassification or conversion of the
land and its disposition: Provided,
That the beneficiary shall have fully
paid his obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends
signals that it applies to lands previously placed
under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of
"the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in
Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority
of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine

the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the

purpose to which it would be devoted by the
expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial or
industrial uses, such authority is limited to the
applications for reclassification submitted by the land
owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to
political subdivisions cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10
N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the
local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first
applying for conversion of the use of the lands with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of
these projects would naturally involve a change in
the land use. In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether
the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local
government unit that shall determine whether the
use of the property sought to be expropriated shall
be public, the same being an expression of legislative
policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a
particular undertaking has no real or substantial
relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90
L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg.
and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW
885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes,
no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace
the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially
mentioned
as
subject
thereto
(Alliance
of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of
the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political
subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign
powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law
couched in general term.

The fears of private respondents that they will be

paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declarations of their property, are unfounded. This
Court has declared as unconstitutional the
Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in
expropriation cases to be the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or the
assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As
held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA
528 [1990], the rules for determining just
compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to
submit evidence on what they consider shall be the
just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' property; (b)
orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents' property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court,
denying the amended motion to dismiss of the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138896

June 20, 2000

BARANGAY
SAN
ROQUE,
TALISAY,
CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO
SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO
SYLIANCO, ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG,
LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO,
LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR.
and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction
of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of
the subject property.
The Case
Before
us
is
a
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari assailing the March 29, 1999 Order 1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City (Branch
58) in Civil Case No. CEB-21978, in which it
dismissed a Complaint for eminent domain. It ruled
as follows:
Premises considered, the motion to dismiss is hereby
granted on the ground that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the Orders
dated February 19, 1999 and February 26, 1999, as
well as the Writ of Possession issued by virtue of the
latter Order are hereby recalled for being without
force and effect.2
Petitioner also challenges the May 14, 1999 Order of
the RTC denying reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) 3 a Complaint to

expropriate a property of the respondents. In an

Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of
the power to take private property for public use
after payment of just compensation. In an action for
eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of
action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact
that the action also involves real property is merely
incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."4
Assailed RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court,

raising a pure question of law.6 In a Resolution dated
July 28, 1999, the Court denied the Petition for
Review "for being posted out of time on July 2, 1999,
the due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for
extension of time to file petition was denied in the
resolution of July 14, 1999."7 In a subsequent
Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court
reinstated the Petition.8
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue
for the consideration of this Court:

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed

before it, holding that an action for eminent domain
affected title to real property; hence, the value of the
property to be expropriated would determine
whether the case should be filed before the MTC or
the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been
filed before the MTC since the value of the subject
property was less than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated
in this wise:

Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases

for eminent domain or expropriation where the
assessed value of the subject property is below
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?9

The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears

from the current Tax Declaration of the land involved
that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven
Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant to Section
3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil
actions involving title to, or possession of, real
property with an assessed value of less than
P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case
at bar, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the
property involved is located.

Main Issue:

The instant action for eminent domain or

condemnation of real property is a real action
affecting title to or possession of real property,
hence, it is the assessed value of the property
involved which determines the jurisdiction of the
court. That the right of eminent domain or
condemnation of real, property is included in a real
action affecting title to or possession of real property,
is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus,
"Real actions are those affecting title to or possession
of real property. These include partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosures of mortgage on,
real property. . . ."5

This Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit

In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19
(1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; . . . . ." It argues that the
present action involves the exercise of the right to
eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the
Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or
possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the
case should have been brought before the MTC,
pursuant to BP 129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of
RA 7691. This law provides that MTCs shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions
that involve title to or possession of real property,
the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs.

We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation

suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test to
determine whether it is so was laid down by the
Court in this wise:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court
indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in suits to
have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this
Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases, besides the
determination of damages, demand an
inquiry into other factors which the law has
deemed to be more within the competence
of courts of first instance, which were the
lowest courts of record at the time that the
first organic laws of the Judiciary were
enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of
the Philippine Commission of June 11,
1901). 10
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not
involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it
deals with the exercise by the government of its
authority and right to take private property for public
use. 11 In National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 12 the
Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two
phases:
The
first
is
concerned
with
determination of the authority of

the
the

plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent

domain and the propriety of its exercise in
the context of the facts involved in the suit.
It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of
the action, "of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint." An order
of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a
final one, of course, since it finally disposes
of the action and leaves nothing more to be
done by the Court on the merits. So, too,
would an order of condemnation be a final
one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly
state, in the proceedings before the Trial
Court, "no objection to the exercise of the
right of condemnation (or the propriety
thereof) shall be filed or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain
action is concerned with the determination
by the court of "the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken." This is
done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. The
order fixing the just compensation on the
basis of the evidence before, and findings
of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
would finally dispose of the second stage of
the suit, and leave nothing more to be done
by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration
in an expropriation suit is whether the government or
any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence,
the courts determine the authority of the
government
entity,
the
necessity
of
the
expropriation,
and
the
observance
of
due
process. 1 In the main, the subject of an expropriation
suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain,
a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is dutybound to determine the just compensation for
it.1avvphi1 This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined

only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of

the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines
v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are
within
the
jurisdiction
of
Courts
of
First
Instance," 14 the forerunners of the regional trial
courts. The said case was decided during the
effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP
129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first
instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation." 15 The 1997
amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended
to change these jurisprudential precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that
the present action involves the title to or possession
of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of
retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in
remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation
proceedings are examples of real actions that affect
the title to or possession of a parcel of land. 16
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought
merely to distinguish between real and personal
actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the
nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In
fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that
jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within
the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is
whether the government may expropriate private
property under the given set of circumstances. The
government does not dispute respondents' title to or
possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question
of who has a better title or right, for the government
does not even claim that it has a title to the property.
It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to
"appropriate and control individual property for the
public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience
or welfare may demand." 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and
the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142971

31833

Market
value

P240,660.00

Assessed
Value

P72,200.00

May 7, 2002

THE
CITY
OF
vs.
SPOUSES
APOLONIO
DEDAMO, respondents.

CEBU, petitioner,
and

BLASA

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In its petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner City of
Cebu assails the decision of 11 October 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204 1 affirming
the judgment of 7 May 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 13, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB14632, a case for eminent domain, which fixed the
valuation of the land subject thereof on the basis of
the recommendation of the commissioners appointed
by it.
The material operation facts are not disputed.
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed
in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent
domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and
Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it
needed the following parcels of land of respondents,
to wit:

Lot
1527

Title No

Lot
1528

No.

Area-

793
meters

square

Area
sought to
be
expropriat
ed

478
meters

square

Tax
Declaratio
n-

03450

Title No.

31832

Market
value for

P1,666,530.00

No.

Area-

Tax
Declaratio
n-

1,146
meters

square

03472

19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the

trial court on 21 September 1994.3
the whole
lot

Market
value
of
the Area
to
be
expropriat
ed

Assessed
Value

On 14 December 1994, the parties executed and

submitted to the trial court an Agreement 4 wherein
they declared that they have partially settled the
case and in consideration thereof they agreed:
P100,380.00

P49,960.00

for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a

public road which shall serve as an access/relief road
of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum
Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel
Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable
site for the purpose. The total area sought to be
expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an
assessed value of P1,786.400. Petitioner deposited
with the Philippine National Bank the amount of
P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of
the property to enable the petitioner to take
immediate possession of the property pursuant to
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.2
Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
because the purpose for which their property was to
be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for
benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings,
Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from them
the property at its fair market value if it wanted to,
just like what it did with the neighboring lots.
Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the
consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or
less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots.
Finally, respondents alleged that they have no other
land in Cebu City.
A pre-trial was thereafter had.
On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section

1. That the SECOND PARTY hereby conforms

to the intention to [sic] the FIRST PARTY in
expropriating their parcels of land in the
above-cited case as for public purpose and
for the benefit of the general public;
2. That the SECOND PARTY agrees to part
with the ownership of the subject parcels of
land in favor of the FIRST PARTY provided
the latter will pay just compensation for the
same in the amount determined by the
court after due notice and hearing;
3. That in the meantime the SECOND PARTY
agrees to receive the amount of ONE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND
FOUR
HUNDRED
PESOS
(1,786,400.00) as provisional payment for
the subject parcels of land, without
prejudice to the final valuation as maybe
determined by the court;
4. That the FIRST PARTY in the light of the
issuance of the Writ of Possession Order
dated September 21, 1994 issued by the
Honorable Court, agreed to take possession
over that portion of the lot sought to be
expropriated where the house of the
SECOND PARTY was located only after
fifteen (15) days upon the receipt of the
SECOND
PARTY
of
the
amount
of
P1,786,400.00;
5. That the SECOND PARTY upon receipt of
the aforesaid provisional amount, shall turn
over to the FIRST PARTY the title of the lot
and within the lapse of the fifteen (15) days
grace period will voluntarily demolish their
house and the other structure that may be
located thereon at their own expense;
6. That the FIRST PARTY and the SECOND
PARTY jointly petition the Honorable Court to
render judgment in said Civil Case No. CEB14632 in accordance with this AGREEMENT;

7. That the judgment sought to be rendered

under this agreement shall be followed by a
supplemental judgment fixing the just
compensation for the property of the
SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners
appointed by this Honorable Court to
determine the same shall have rendered
their report and approved by the court.
Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed
three commissioners to determine the just
compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated.
The commissioners were Palermo M. Lugo, who was
nominated by petitioner and who was designated as
Chairman; Alfredo Cisneros, who was nominated by
respondents; and Herbert E. Buot, who was
designated by the trial court. The parties agreed to
their appointment.
Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their
report, which contained their respective assessments
of and recommendation as to the valuation of the
property.1wphi1.nt
On the basis of the commissioners' report and after
due deliberation thereon, the trial court rendered its
decision on 7 May 1996,5 the decretal portion o which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in accordance
with the report of the commissioners.
Plaintiff is directed to pay Spouses Apolonio
S. Dedamo and Blasa Dedamo the sum of
pesos: TWENTY FOUR MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NINE
HUNDRED
THIRTY
(P24,865.930.00)
representing the compensation mentioned
in the Complaint.
Plaintiff and defendants are directed to pay
the following commissioner's fee;

1.
To
Lugo

Palermo

- P21,000.00

2. To Herbert Buot

- P19,000.00

as of the date of the filing of the complaint. It asserts

that it should be, which in this case should be 17
September 1993 and not at the time the property
was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision
in "National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."8

3.
To
Cisneros

Alfredo

- P19,000.00

Without pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the commissioners' report was
inaccurate since it included an area which was not
subject to expropriation. More specifically, it
contended that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 square
meters but the actual area to be expropriated is only
478 square meters. The remaining 315 square
meters is the subject of a separate expropriation
proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8348, then pending
before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City.
On 16 August 1996, the commissioners submitted an
amended assessment for the 478 square meters of
Lot No. 1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square
meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50. The
assessment was approved as the just compensation
thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December
1996.6 Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the
decision was amended to reflect the new valuation.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 59204.
Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing
the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50.
The just compensation should be based on the
prevailing market price of the property at the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals.
In its decision of 11 October 1999, 7 the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.
Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition
for review in the case at bar. It raises the sole issue
of whether just compensation should be determined

In their Comment, respondents maintain that the

Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision
of the trial court because (1) the trial court decided
the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties
that just compensation shall be fixed by
commissioners appointed by the court; (2) petitioner
did not interpose any serious objection to the
commissioners' report of 12 August 1996 fixing the
just compensation of the 1,624-square meter lot at
P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from
attacking the report on which the decision was
based; and (3) the determined just compensation
fixed is even lower than the actual value of the
property at the time of the actual taking in 1994.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government's
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose.9 However, the Government must pay the
owner thereof just compensation as consideration
therefor.
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point
of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which
expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The
Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local
government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to
the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of
the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair

market value of the property based on the

current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided finally, That, the
amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the
time of the taking of the property.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National
Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.10 We did not
categorically rule in that case that just compensation
should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although
the general rule in determining just compensation in
eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of
an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not at the
date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings."
Also, the trial court followed the then governing
procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provided as
follows:
SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation.
Upon
the
entry
of
the
order
of
condemnation, the court shall appoint not
more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be
taken. The order of appointment shall
designate the time and place of the first
session of the hearing to be held by the
commissioners and specify the time within
which their report is to be filed with the
court.
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn
document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by
them, agreed to be bound by the report of the
commission and approved by the trial court. The
agreement is a contract between the parties. It has
the force of law between them and should be
complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of
the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts
have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith.

Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere

consent, and from that moment the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.
Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November
1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious
objection.11 It is therefore too late for petitioner to
question the valuation now without violating the
principle
of
equitable
estoppel.
Estoppel in
pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to
speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts
to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former
is permitted to deny the existence of such
facts.12 Records show that petitioner consented to
conform with the valuation recommended by the
commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement
now and assail correctness of the commissioners'
assessment.1wphi1.nt
Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
provides that just compensation shall be determined
at the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation,13 such law cannot prevail over R.A.
7160, which is a substantive law.14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
assailed judgment on the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59204, the petition in this case is
hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RESOLUTION NO. 552, S-19974

G.R. No. 156684

April 6, 2011

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY
COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioners appeal the adverse decision
promulgated on October 18, 20021 and resolution
promulgated on January 17, 2003, 2 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the
order issued in their favor on February 19, 2002 by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in Mandaluyong
City (RTC).3 Thereby, the CA upheld Resolution No.
552, Series of 1997, adopted by the City of
Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its then City Mayor to
take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation
of the parcel of land registered in the names of the
petitioners.
We affirm the CA.
Antecedents
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area
of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de
Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay
Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they
used as their residence, and the rest they rented out
to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their
only property and only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552,
Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor
Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal
steps for the expropriation of the land of the
petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low
cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city
inhabitants. The resolution reads as follows:

RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING HON. BENJAMIN S.

ABALOS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS FOR
THE EXPROPRIATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND
SITUATED ALONG DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ STREET,
BARANGAY MAUWAY, CITY OF MANDALUYONG,
OWNED BY MR. ANTONIO YUSAY
WHEREAS, there is a parcel of land situated along Dr.
Jose Fernandez Street, Barangay Mauway, City of
Mandaluyong, owned and registered in the name of
MR. ANTONIO YUSAY;
WHEREAS, this piece of land have been occupied for
about ten (10) years by many financially hard-up
families which the City Government of Mandaluyong
desires, among other things, to provide modest and
decent dwelling;
WHEREAS, the said families have already negotiated
to acquire this land but was refused by the abovenamed owner in total disregard to the City
Governments effort of providing land for the
landless;
WHEREAS, the expropriation of said land would
certainly benefit public interest, let alone, a step
towards the implementation of social justice and
urban land reform in this City;
WHEREAS, under the present situation, the City
Council deems it necessary to authorize Hon. Mayor
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS to institute expropriation
proceedings to achieve the noble purpose of the City
Government of Mandaluyong.
NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion duly seconded, the
City Council of Mandaluyong, in session assembled,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to authorize, as it
is hereby authorizing, Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, to institute expropriation proceedings
against the above-named registered owner of that
parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose Fernandez
Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong, (f)or
the purpose of developing it to a low-cost housing
project for the less privileged but deserving
constituents of this City.

ADOPTED on this 2nd day of October 1997 at the City

of Mandaluyong.
Sgd.
Adventor
R.
Acting Sanggunian Secretary

Delos

Santos

Attested:

Approved:

Sgd. Roberto J. Francisco

City Councilor & Acting
City Mayor

Sgd.
Benjamin
S. Abalos
PresidingO
fficer

Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution

No. 552 was but the initial step in the Citys exercise
of its power of eminent domain granted under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for
the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being
unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without
force and effect.
The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a
mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate
the legal steps towards expropriation, which included
making a definite offer to purchase the property of
the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was
premature.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the
City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit,
opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative
act of the City Government, because the special civil
action of certiorari was only available to assail
judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
that the special civil action of prohibition did not also
lie under the circumstances considering that the act
of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasijudicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding
the issuance of Resolution No. 552, the City had yet
to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or
usurpation, or had yet to act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon

the petitioners motion for reconsideration, set aside
its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was
null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not
premature because the passage of Resolution No.
552 would already pave the way for the City to
deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only
property; that there was no due process in the
passage of Resolution No. 552 because the
petitioners had not been invited to the subsequent
hearings on the resolution to enable them to
ventilate their opposition; and that the purpose for
the expropriation was not for public use and the
expropriation would not benefit the greater number
of inhabitants.

1. Can the validity of Resolution No. 552 be

assailed even before its implementation?
2. Must a citizen await the takeover and
possession of his property by the local
government before he can go to court to
nullify an unjust expropriation?
Before resolving these issues, however, the Court
considers it necessary to first determine whether or
not the action for certiorari and prohibition
commenced by the petitioners in the RTC was a
proper recourse of the petitioners.
Ruling

Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA.

In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the
CA concluded that the reversal of the January 31,
2001 decision by the RTC was not justified because
Resolution No. 552 deserved to be accorded the
benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity
absent any sufficient showing to the contrary; that
notice to the petitioners (Spouses Yusay) of the
succeeding hearings conducted by the City was not a
part of due process, for it was enough that their
views had been consulted and that they had been
given the full opportunity to voice their protest; that
to rule otherwise would be to give every affected
resident effective veto powers in law-making by a
local government unit; and that a public hearing,
although necessary at times, was not indispensable
and merely aided in law-making.
The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214,
Mandaluyong City dated February 19, 2002 in SCA
Case No. 15-MD, which declared Resolution No. 552,
Series of 1997 of the City of Mandaluyong null and
void, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the
CA denied their motion. Thus, they appeal to the
Court, posing the following issues, namely:

We deny the petition for review, and find that

certiorari and prohibition were not available to the
petitioners under the circumstances. Thus, we
sustain, albeit upon different grounds, the result
announced by the CA, and declare that the RTC
gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
1.
Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod
The special civil action for certiorari is governed by
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whose
Section 1 provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
xxx

For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner

must allege and establish the concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.6
It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari
seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, 7 and
does not correct just any error or mistake committed
by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions unless such court, board, or
officer thereby acts without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.8
The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal,
board, or officer must be exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. Judicial function, according to
Bouvier,9 is the exercise of the judicial faculty or
office; it also means the capacity to act in a specific
way which appertains to the judicial power, as one of
the powers of government. "The term," Bouvier
continues,10 "is used to describe generally those
modes of action which appertain to the judiciary as a
department of organized government, and through
and by means of which it accomplishes its purpose
and exercises its peculiar powers."
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part
of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy
involving legally demandable and enforceable rights
when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative
and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or
opinion.
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552. To
demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is
well to differentiate between a resolution and an

ordinance. The first is upon a specific matter of a

temporary nature while the latter is a law that is
permanent in character.11 No rights can be conferred
by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing
but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has
to say in the light of attendant circumstances. In
simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through
the
resolution,
therefore,
the
Sangguniang
Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of
all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion
was a constitutionally protected right.

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the

legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public
entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latters control and restraints, imposed "through the
law conferring the power or in other legislations." In
this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to
LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down
the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:

Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local

Government Code) required the City to pass an
ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation proceeding. In this regard,
Section 19 of The Local Government Code clearly
provides, viz:

"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government

unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further,
That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That,
the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government

unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner,
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further,
That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That,
the amount to be paid for the expropriated property
shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely
expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in
Municipality
of
Paraaque
v.
V.M.
Realty
Corporation,12 a case in which the Municipality of
Paraaque based its complaint for expropriation on a
resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled so:

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur

before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is
exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation,

as required under Section 9 Article III of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to
exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was
no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites
Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a
resolution may suffice to support the exercise of
eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is
not in point because the applicable law at that time
was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code,
which had provided that a mere resolution would
enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In
contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government
Code which was already in force when the Complaint
for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an
ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that
the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from
a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently -- a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise
eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would
have simply adopted the language of the previous
Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a
clear
divergence
from
the
previous
Local
Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160
categorically requires that the local chief executive
act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative
intent is determined principally from the language of
a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either

impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." In

the instant case, there is no reason to depart from
this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not
at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily
involves a derogation of a fundamental or private
right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change
in the legislative language from "resolution" under
BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 demands a
strict construction. "No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by
the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the
right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of
the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
interpretation."
xxx
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner
argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an
ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its
Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all
the acts of its mayor regarding the subject
expropriation.
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place,
petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an
ordinance, but it did not present any certified true
copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not
raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was
mentioned by private respondent, and only in
passing. In any event, this allegation does not cure
the inherent defect of petitioners Complaint for
expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is
hornbook doctrine that:
" x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question
submitted
before
the
court
for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in
the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are
true or not is beside the point, for their truth is
hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue
rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint?"

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident

from the face of the Complaint for expropriation
which was based on a mere resolution. The absence
of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to
lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming
the trial courts Decision which dismissed the
expropriation suit.13 (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the absence of the proper expropriation
ordinance authorizing and providing for the
expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the
RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action.
2.
Prohibition does not lie against expropriation
The special civil action for prohibition is governed
also by Section 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent to desist from further proceedings in
the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
xxx
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful
and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to
provide for a fair and orderly administration of
justice.14 The writ of prohibition is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 15 For grave
abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the
petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person, whether

exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial

functions, has exercised its or his power in an
arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or
personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross
as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. 16 On the other hand, the term
excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board,
or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has
transcended such jurisdiction or acted without any
authority.17
The petitioner must further allege in the petition and
establish facts to show that any other existing
remedy is not speedy or adequate.18 A remedy is
plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effects of that
judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior
court.191avvphi1
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that
prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a
remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552,
for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption,
was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but only expressing its
collective sentiment or opinion.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a
procedure whereby the immediate possession of the
land under expropriation proceedings may be taken,
provided always that due provision is made to secure
the prompt adjudication and payment of just
compensation to the owner. 20 This bar against
prohibition comes from the nature of the power of
eminent domain as necessitating the taking of
private land intended for public use, 21 and the
interest of the affected landowner is thus made
subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State
decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the
power of judicial review becomes limited in scope,
and the courts will be left to determine the
appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid
to the affected landowners. Only when the
landowners are not given their just compensation for
the taking of their property or when there has been
no agreement on the amount of just compensation
may the remedy of prohibition become available.
Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not
called for, considering that only a resolution
expressing
the
desire
of
the
Sangguniang

Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property

was issued. As of then, it was premature for the
petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the
power of eminent domain could be exercised by the
City only through the filing of a verified complaint in
the proper court.22 Before the City as the
expropriating authority filed such verified complaint,
no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist.
Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not
also be deprived of their property under the power of
eminent domain.23

G.R. No. 187604

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated

on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618.

ABAD, J.:

Costs to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

June 25, 2012

CITY
OF
MANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALEGAR
CORPORATION,
TEROCEL
REALTY
CORPORATION,
and
FILOMENA
VDA.
DE
LEGARDA,Respondents.

This case is about the issues that a local government

unit has to cope with when expropriating private
property for socialized housing.
The Facts and the Case
On March 1, 2001 the City Council of Manila passed
Ordinance 8012 that authorized the City Mayor to
acquire certain lots1 belonging to respondents Alegar
Corporation,
Terocel
Realty
Corporation,
and
Filomena Vda. De Legarda, for use in the socialized
housing project of petitioner City of Manila. The City
offered to buy the lots atP1,500.00 per square meter
(sq m) but the owners rejected this as too low with
the result that on December 2, 2003 the City filed a
complaint for expropriation against them before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.2
The City alleged in its complaint that it wanted to
acquire the lots for its land-for-the-landless and onsite development programs involving the residents
occupying them.3 The City offered to acquire the lots
for P1,500.00 per sq m4 but the owners rejected the
offer. The total aggregate value of the lots for
taxation purpose wasP809,280.00 but the City
deposited P1,500,000.00 with the Land Bank of the
Philippines to enable it to immediately occupy the
same pending hearing of the case.
Both Alegar and Terocel questioned the legitimacy of
the Citys taking of their lots solely for the benefit of
a few long-time occupants. Alegar also pointed out
that, while it declined the Citys initial offer, it did not
foreclose the possibility of selling the lots for the
right price.5 The filing of the suit was premature

because the City made no effort in good faith to

negotiate the purchase.
Meantime, on June 9, 2004 the trial court issued a
writ of possession in the Citys favor. On December
19, 2006, upon the joint motion of the parties, the
RTC released the P1,500,000.00 deposit to the
defendant owners.
On October 15, 2007 the parties agreed to forego
with the pre-trial, opting instead to simultaneously
submit their memoranda on the issue of whether or
not there is necessity for the City to expropriate the
subject properties for public use. The owners of the
lots submitted their memorandum but the City did
not.
On February 12, 2008 the RTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the City did not comply
with Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) 7279 6 which set
the order of priority in the acquisition of properties
for socialized housing. Private properties ranked last
in the order of priorities for such acquisition and the
City failed to show that no other properties were
available for the project. The City also failed to
comply
with
Section
10
which
authorized
expropriation only when resort to other modes (such
as community mortgage, land swapping, and
negotiated purchase) had been exhausted.
The trial court pointed out that the City also failed to
show that it exhausted all reasonable efforts to
acquire the lots through a negotiated sale. Article 35
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code provides that when property
owners are willing to sell but for a higher price than
that offered, the local chief executive must confer
with them for the possibility of coming to an
agreement on the price. Here, after the owners
refused to sell the lots for P1,500.00 per sq m offer,
the City did not exert any effort to renegotiate or
revise its offer. The RTC also ruled that the City
submitted the issue of genuine necessity to acquire
the properties for public purpose or benefit without
presenting evidence on the same.

On February 27, 20098 the CA affirmed the RTCs

dismissal of the Citys action, mainly for the reason
that the City failed to comply with the requirements
of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279 which ranked
privately-owned lands last in the order of priority in
acquiring lots for socialized housing and which
preferred modes other than expropriation for
acquiring them. The CA rejected the Citys claim that
the RTC denied it its right to due process, given that
the City agreed to forego with pre-trial and to just
submit a memorandum on the threshold issues
raised by the owners answer regarding the propriety
of expropriation.9 The City simply did not submit a
memorandum.
Although
it
moved
for
the
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the City
filed a notice of appeal before the RTC could resolve
the motion.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:

Here, the Citys action was still in the first stage

when the RTC called the parties to a pre-trial
conference where, essentially, their task was to
determine how the court may resolve the issue
involved in the first stage: the Citys authority to
acquire by expropriation the particular lots for its
intended purpose. As it happened, the parties opted
to simultaneously submit their memoranda on that
issue. There was nothing infirm in this agreement
since it may be assumed that the parties knew what
they were doing and since such agreement would
facilitate early disposal of the case.11

2. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming

the RTCs ruling that the City failed to
comply with the requirements of Sections 9
and 10 of R.A. 7279 in trying to acquire the
subject lots by expropriation;

Unfortunately, the agreement implied that the City

was waiving its right to present evidence that it was
acquiring the subject lots by expropriation for a
proper public purpose. Counsel for the City may have
been confident that its allegations in the complaint
can stand on their own, ignoring the owners
challenge to its right to expropriate their lots for the
stated purpose. Parenthetically, the City moved for
the reconsideration of the RTCs order of dismissal
but withdrew this remedy by filing a notice of appeal
from that order to the CA. Evidently, the City cannot
claim that it had been denied the opportunity of a
hearing.

3. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to

set aside the RTCs ruling that the City failed
to establish the existence of genuine
necessity in expropriating the subject lots
for public use or purpose; and

Two. The CA correctly ruled that the City failed

show that it complied with the requirements
Section 9 of R.A. 7279 which lays down the order
priority in the acquisition through expropriation
lands for socialized housing. This section provides:

4. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to

rule that the owners withdrawal of its P1.5
million deposit constituted implied consent
to the expropriation of their lots.

Section 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land.Lands

for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to

rule that the RTC denied the City its right to
due process when it dismissed the case
without hearing the Citys side;

The Rulings of the Court

The City moved for the reconsideration of the order
of dismissal but before the RTC could act on it, the
City appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).7

authority to exercise the power of eminent domain in

the context of the facts of the case and, second, if
there be such authority, the determination of just
compensation. The first phase ends with either an
order of dismissal or a determination that the
property is to be acquired for a public purpose. 10

One. The RTC did not deny the City its right to be
heard on its action when that court dismissed the
same. An expropriation proceeding of private lands
has two stages: first, the determination of plaintiffs

to
of
of
of

(a) Those owned by the Government or any

of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or
controlled
corporations
and
their
subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle

lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for
Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
Program sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not
yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites
and Services or BLISS sites which have not
yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable
and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities
mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to onsite development of government lands. (Emphasis
supplied)
The City of course argues that it did not have to
observe the order of priority provided above in
acquiring lots for socialized housing since it found onsite development to be more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries who were these
lots long-time occupants. But the problem remains.
The City did not adduce evidence that this was so.
Besides, Section 10 of R.A. 7279 also prefers the
acquisition of private property by "negotiated sale"
over the filing of an expropriation suit. It provides
that such suit may be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisitions have been exhausted.
Thus:
Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes
of acquiring land for purposes of this Act shall
include, among others, community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture
agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted; Provided, further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for
purposes of this Act. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

There is a sensible reason for the above. Litigation is

costly and protracted. The government should also
lead in avoiding litigations and overburdening its
courts.

safeguards of property owners against the exercise

of that power. The burden is on the local government
to prove that it satisfied the requirements mentioned
or that they do not apply in the particular case.15

Indeed, the Court has held that when the property

owner rejects the offer but hints for a better price,
the government should renegotiate by calling the
property owner to a conference.12 The government
must exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain by
agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply
will warrant the dismissal of the complaint. Article 35
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code provides for this procedure. Thus:

Three. Admittedly, the City alleged in its amended

complaint that it wanted to acquire the subject lots in
connection with its land-for-the-landless program and
that this was in accord with its Ordinance 8012. But
the City misses the point. The owners directly
challenged the validity of the objective of its action.
They alleged that the taking in this particular case of
their lots is not for public use or purpose since its
action would benefit only a few. Whether this is the
case or not, the owners answer tendered a factual
issue that called for evidence on the Citys part to
prove the affirmative of its allegations. As already
stated, the City submitted the issue for the RTCs
resolution without presenting evidence.

Article 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale(a) The

offer to buy private property for public use or
purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the
property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its
acquisition, and the price offered.
xxxx
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their
property but at a price higher than that offered to
them, the local chief executive shall call them to a
conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement
on the selling price. The chairman of the
appropriation
or
finance
committee
of
the
sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the
sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall
participate in the conference. When an agreement is
reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be
drawn and executed.
Here, the City of Manila initially offered P1,500.00 per
sq m to the owners for their lots. But after the latter
rejected the offer, claiming that the offered price was
even lower than their current zonal value, the City
did not bother to renegotiate or improve its offer. The
intent of the law is for the State or the local
government to make a reasonable offer in good faith,
not merely a pro forma offer to acquire the
property.13
The Court cannot treat the requirements of Sections
9 and 10 of R.A. 7279 lightly.1wphi1 It held in Estate
or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. City
of Manila,14 that these requirements are strict
limitations on the local governments exercise of the
power of eminent domain. They are the only

Four. The City insists that it made a deposit of P1.5

million with the RTC by way of advance payment on
the lots it sought to expropriate. By withdrawing this
deposit, respondents may be assumed to have given
their consent to the expropriation.
But the advance deposit required under Section 19 of
the Local Government Code constitutes an advance
payment only in the event the expropriation
prospers. Such deposit also has a dual purpose: as
pre-payment if the expropriation succeeds and as
indemnity for damages if it is dismissed. This
advance payment, a prerequisite for the issuance of
a writ of possession, should not be confused with
payment of just compensation for the taking of
property even if it could be a factor in eventually
determining just compensation.16 If the proceedings
fail, the money could be used to indemnify the owner
for damages.17
Here, therefore, the owners withdrawal of the
deposit that the City made does not amount to a
waiver of the defenses they raised against the
expropriation. With the dismissal of the complaint,
the amount or a portion of it could be awarded to the
owners as indemnity to cover the expenses they
incurred in defending their right.
Notably, the owners neither filed a counterclaim for
damages against the City nor did they seek
indemnity for their expenses after the RTC dismissed
its action. Consequently, the City government is

entitled to the return of the advance deposit it made

and that the owners withdrew. But, considering the
expenses that the owners needed to incur in
defending themselves in the appeals that the City
instituted before the CA and this Court, an award
ofP50,000.00 in attorneys fees against the City is in
order. The owners must return the rest of
the P1,500,000.00 that they withdrew.
Lastly, the Court must point out that the ruling in this
case is without prejudice to the right of the City to refile the action after it has complied with the relevant
mandatory provisions of R.A. 7279 and Article 35 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 27, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV 90530 subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1. Petitioner City of Manila is ordered to

indemnify respondents Alegar Corporation,
Terocel Realty Corporation, and Filomena
Vda.
De
Legarda
in
the
amount
of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
2. Respondents Alegar Corporation, Terocel
Realty Corporation, and Filomena Vda. De
Legarda are in turn ordered to return the
advance deposit of P1,500,000.00 that they
withdrew incident to the expropriation case;
and
3. This decision is without prejudice to the
right of the City of Manila to re-file their
action for expropriation after complying with
what the law requires.
SO ORDERED.