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Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN
BANC
G.R.
No.
L-46863
November
18,
1939
IRINEO
MOYA,
petitioner,
vs.
AGRIPINO
GA.
DEL
FIERO,
respondent.
Elpidio
Quirino
for
petitioner.
Claro
M.
Recto
for
respondent.
LAUREL,
J.:
This
is
a
petition
for
review
by
certiorari
of
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
the
above
entitled
case
declaring
the
respondent,
Agripino
Ga.
del
Fierro,
the
candidate-elect
for
the
office
of
mayor
of
the
municipality
of
Paracale,
Province
of
Camarines
Norte,
with
a
majority
of
three
votes
over
his
rival,
Irineo
Moya.
In
the
general
elections
held
on
December
14,
1937,
the
parties
herein
were
contending
candidates
for
the
aforesaid
office.
After
canvass
of
the
returns
the
municipal
council
of
Paracale,
acting
as
board
of
canvassers,
proclaimed
the
petitioner
as
the
elected
mayor
of
said
municipality
with
a
majority
of
102
votes.
On
December
27,
1937,
the
respondent
field
a
motion
of
protest
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Camarines
Norte,
the
Court
of
Appeals,
on
July
13,
1939
rendered
the
judgment
hereinbefore
mentioned
which
is
sought
by
the
petitioner
to
be
reviewed
and
reversed
upon
the
errors
alleged
to
have
been
committed
by
the
Court
of
Appeals:
1.
In
admitting
and
counting
in
favor
of
the
respondent,
8
ballots
either
inadvertently
or
contrary
to
the
controlling
decisions
of
this
Honorable
Court.
2.
In
admitting
and
counting
in
favor
of
the
respondent,
3
ballots
marked
"R.
del
Fierro."
3.
In
admitting
and
counting
in
favor
of
the
respondent,
7
ballots
marked
"Rufino
del
Firro."
4.
In
admitting
and
counting
in
favor
of
the
respondent,
72
ballots
marked
"P.
del
Fierro."
Taking
up
seriatim
the
alleged
errors,
we
come
to
the
first
assignment
involving
the
eight
(8)
ballots
now
to
be
mentioned.
(1)
With
reference
to
ballot
Exhibit
F-175
in
precinct
No.
2,
alleged
to
have
been
inadvertently
admitted
in
favor
of
the
respondent,
such
inadvertence
raises
a
question
of
fact
which
could
have
been
corrected
by
the
Court
of
Appeals
and
which
could
we
are
not
in
a
position
to
determine
in
this
proceeding
for
review
by
certiorari.
Upon
the
other
hand,
if
the
error
attributed
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
consisted
in
having
admitted
ballot
Exhibit
F-175
in
precinct
No.
2
instead
of
the
ballot
bearing
the
same
number
corresponding
to
precinct
No.
1,
and
this
latter
ballot
clearly
appears
admissible
for
the
respondent
because
the
name
written
on
the
space
for
mayor
is
"Primo
del
Fierro"
or
"Pimo
de
Fierro",
the
error
is
technical
and
deserves
but
scanty
consideration.
(2)
Ballot
Exhibit
F-26
in
precinct
No.
3
was
erroneously
admitted
for
the
respondent
by
the
Court
of
Appeals,
the
name
written
on
the
space
for
mayor
being
"G.T.
Krandes."
It
is
true
that
on
the
fourth
line
for
the
councilor
"Alcalde
Pinong
del
Fierro":
appears;
but
the
intention
of
the
elector
is
rendered
vague
and
incapable
of
ascertaining
and
the
ballot
was
improperly
counted
for
the
respondent.
As
to
this
ballot,
the
contention
of
the
petitioner
is
sustained
(3)
Ballot
Exhibit
F-77
in
precinct
No.
2
should
also
have
been
rejected
by
the
Court
of
Appeals.
The
ballot
bears
the
distinguishing
mark
"O.
K."
placed
after
the
name
"M.
Lopis"
written
on
space
for
vice-mayor.
The
contention
of
the
petitioner
in
this
respect
is
likewise
sustained.
(4)
Ballot
Exhibit
F-9
in
precinct
No.
2
was
properly
admitted
for
respondent.
On
this
ballot
the
elector
wrote
within
the
space
for
mayor
the
name
of
Regino
Guinto,
a
candidate
for
the
provincial
board
and
wrote
the
respondent's
name
immediately
below
the
line
for
mayor
but
immediately
above
the
name
"M.
Lopez"
voted
by
him
for
vice-mayor.
The
intention
of
the
elector
to
vote
for
the
respondent
for
the
office
of
the
mayor
is
clear
under
the
circumstances.
(5)
Ballot
F-131
in
precinct
No.
1
was
also
properly
counted
for
the
respondent.
On
this
ballot
the
elector
wrote
the
respondent's
name
on
the
space
for
vice-mayor,
but,
apparently
realizing
his
mistake,
he
placed
an
arrow
connecting
the
name
of
the
respondent
to
the
word
"Mayor"
(Alcalde)
printed
on
the
left
side
of
the
ballot.
The
intention
of
the
elector
to
vote
for
the
respondent
for
the
office
of
mayor
is
thus
evident,
in
the
absence
of
proof
showing
that
the
ballot
had
been
tampered
with.
(6)
Ballot
F-7
in
precinct
No.
5
is
admissible
for
the
respondent
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
committed
no
error
in
so
adjudicating.
Although
the
name
of
the
respondent
is
written
on
the
first
space
for
member
of
the
provincial
board,
said
name
is
followed
in
the
next
line
by
"Bice"
Culastico
Palma,
which
latter
name
is
followed
in
the
next
line
by
word
"consehal"
and
the
name
of
a
candidate
for
this
position.
The
intention
of
the
elector
to
vote
for
the
respondent
for
the
office
of
mayor
being
manifest,
the
objection
of
the
petitioner
to
the
admission
of
this
ballot
is
overruled.
(7)
Ballot
F-1
in
precinct
No.
2
is
valid
for
the
respondent.
On
this
ballot
the
Christian
name
of
the
respondent
was
written
on
the
second
space
for
member
of
the
provincial
board,
but
his
surname
was
written
on
the
proper
space
for
mayor
with
no
other
accompanying
name
or
names.
The
intention
of
the
elector
being
manifest,
the
same
should
be
given
effect
in
favor
of
the
respondent.
(8)
Ballot
F-44
in
precinct
No.
2
wherein
"Agripino
F.
Garcia"
appears
written
on
the
proper
space,
is
valid
for
the
respondent.
In
his
certificate
of
candidacy
the
respondent
gave
his
name
as
"Agripino
Ga.
del
Fierro."
The
conclusion
of
the
trial
court,
upheld
by
the
Court
of
Appeals,
that
the
letter
"F"
stands
for
"Fierro"
and
"Garcia"
for
the
contraction
"Ga."
is
not
without
justification
and,
by
liberal
construction,
the
ballot
in
question
was
properly
admitted
for
the
respondent.
The
second
error
assigned
by
the
petitioner
refers
to
three
ballots,
namely,
Exhibit
F-119
in
precinct
No.
1
Exhibit
F-24
in
precinct
No.
2,
and
Exhibit
F-6
in
precinct
No.
4.
These
three
ballots
appear
to
be
among
the
75
ballots
found
by
the
Court
of
Appeals
as
acceptable
for
the
respondent
on
the
ground
that
the
initial
letter
"P"
stands
for
"Pino"
in
"Pino
del
Fierro"
which
is
a
name
mentioned
in
the
certificate
of
candidacy
of
the
respondent.
The
petitioner
contends
that
the
initial
"R"
and
not
"P".
Even
if
we
could
reverse
this
finding,
we
do
not
feel
justified
in
doing
so
after
examining
the
photostatic
copies
of
these
ballots
attached
to
the
herein
petition
for
certiorari.
The
second
assignment
of
error
is
accordingly
overruled.
Upon
the
third
assignment
of
error,
the
petitioner
questions
the
correctness
of
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
adjudicating
to
the
respondent
the
seven
ballots
wherein
"Rufino
del
Fierro"
was
voted
for
the
office
of
mayor.
We
are
of
the
opinion
that
the
position
taken
by
the
Court
of
Appeals
is
correct.
There
was
no
other
candidate
for
the
office
of
mayor
with
the
name
of
"Rufino"
or
similar
name
and,
as
the
respondent
was
districtly
identified
by
his
surname
on
these
ballots,
the
intention
of
the
voters
in
preparing
the
same
was
undoubtedly
to
vote
for
the
respondent
of
the
office
for
which
he
was
a
candidate.lawphi1.net
The
fourth
assignment
of
error
deals
with
the
72
ballots
wherein
"P.
del
Fierro"
was
voted
for
the
office
of
mayor,
and
it
is
the
contention
of
the
petitioner
that
said
ballots
should
not
have
been
counted
by
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
favor
of
the
respondent.
For
the
identical
reason
indicated
under
the
discussion
of
petitioner's
second
assignment
of
error,
namely,
that
"P"
stands
for
"Pino"
in
"Pino
del
Fierro"
which
is
a
name
mentioned
in
the
certificate
of
candidacy
of
the
respondent,
we
hold
that
there
was
no
error
in
the
action
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
in
awarding
the
said
ballots
to
the
respondent.
With
the
exception
of
ballot
marked
as
Exhibit
F-26
in
precinct
No.
3
and
ballot
marked
as
Exhibit
F-77
in
precinct
No.
2,
we
are
inclined
to
accept
the
rest
of
the
disputed
ballots
for
the
respondent
not
only
for
the
specific
reasons
already
given
but
also
and
principally
for
the
more
fundamental
reason
now
to
be
stated.
As
long
as
popular
government
is
an
end
to
be
achieved
and
safeguarded,
suffrage,
whatever
may
be
the
modality
and
form
devised,
must
continue
to
be
the
manes
by
which
the
great
reservoir
of
power
must
be
emptied
into
the
receptacular
agencies
wrought
by
the
people
through
their
Constitution
in
the
interest
of
good
government
and
the
common
weal.
Republicanism,
in
so
far
as
it
implies
the
adoption
of
a
representative
type
of
government,
necessarily
points
to
the
enfranchised
citizen
as
a
particle
of
popular
sovereignty
and
as
the
ultimate
source
of
the
established
authority.
He
has
a
voice
in
his
Government
and
whenever
called
upon
to
act
in
justifiable
cases,
to
give
it
efficacy
and
not
to
stifle
it.
This,
fundamentally,
is
the
reason
for
the
rule
that
ballots
should
be
read
and
appreciated,
if
not
with
utmost,
with
reasonable,
liberality.
Counsel
for
both
parties
have
called
our
attention
to
the
different
and
divergent
rules
laid
down
by
this
Court
on
the
appreciation
of
ballots.
It
will
serve
no
good
and
useful
purpose
for
us
to
engage
in
the
task
of
reconciliation
or
harmonization
of
these
rules,
although
this
may
perhaps
be
undertaken,
as
no
two
cases
will
be
found
to
be
exactly
the
same
in
factual
or
legal
environment.
It
is
sufficient
to
observe,
however,
in
this
connection
that
whatever
might
have
been
said
in
cases
heretofore
decided,
no
technical
rule
or
rules
should
be
permitted
to
defeat
the
intention
of
the
voter,
if
that
intention
is
discoverable
from
the
ballot
itself,
not
from
evidencealiunde.
This
rule
of
interpretation
goes
to
the
very
root
of
the
system.
Rationally,
also,
this
must
be
the
justification
for
the
suggested
liberalization
of
the
rules
on
appreciation
of
ballots
which
are
now
incorporated
in
section
144
of
the
Election
Code
(Commonwealth
Act
No.
357).
It
results
that,
crediting
the
petitioner
with
the
two
ballots
herein
held
to
have
been
erroneously
admitted
by
the
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
respondent,
the
latter
still
wins
by
one
vote.
In
view
whereof
it
becomes
unnecessary
to
consider
the
counter-assignment
of
errors
of
the
respondent.
With
the
modification
of
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals,
the
petition
for
the
writ
of
certiorari
is
hereby
dismissed,
without
pronouncement
regarding
costs.
Avancea,
C.J.,
Villa-Real,
Imperial,
Diaz,
Concepcion
and
Moran,
JJ.,
concur.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN
BANC
G.R.
No.
L-29333
February
27,
1969
MARIANO
LL.
BADELLES,
protestant-appellant,
vs.
CAMILO
P.
CABILI,
protegee-appellee.
--------------------------
G.R.
No.
L-29334
February
27,
1969
BONIFACIO
P.
LEGASPI
and
CECILlO
T.
BARAZON
protestants-appellants,
vs.
FELIX
Z.
ACTUB,
PROVIDENCIO
P.
ABRAGAN,
MANUEL
F.
CELDRAN,
CASIMERO
P.
CABIGON
and
BENITO
ONG,
protestees-
appellees.
Bonifacio
P.
Legaspi
for
and
in
his
own
behalf.
Camilo
P.
Cabili.
Gerardo
B.
Padilla
and
Ignacio
Espaol
and
Voltaire
I.
Roviro
for
protestees-appellees.
FERNANDO,
J.:
Two
election
protests
against
the
duly
proclaimed
Mayor
and
Councilors
of
Iligan
City,
after
the
Nov.
14,
1967
elections,
based
on
the
allegations
of
flagrant
violations
of
certain
mandatory
provisions
of
the
Election
Code,
to
be
more
specifically
set
forth
hereafter,
were
dismissed
in
a
single
order
by
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Lanao
del
Norte,
the
Honorable
Teodulo
C.
Tandayag
presiding.
The
cases
are
now
before
us
on
appeal.
1
In
one
of
them, the
election
of
Honorable
Camilo
P.
Cabili
to
the
Office
of
City
Mayor
of
Iligan
City,
was
contested
by
protestant,
2
now
appellant,
Mariano
Badelles.
In
the
other, the
protestants
are
the
now
appellants,
Bonifacio
P.
Legaspi
and
Cecilia
T.
Barazon
3
who
along
with
the
five
protestees were
among
those
who
were
registered
candidates
voted
for
in
such
election
for
councilors
in
the
City
of
Iligan,
with
the
protestees
being
credited
with
the
five
highest
number
of
votes,
with
protestants
Legaspi
and
Barazon
obtaining
sixth
and
seventh
places,
respectively.
In
such
order
of
dismissal,
it
was
admitted
that
while
irregularities
as
well
as
misconduct
on
the
part
of
election
officers
were
alleged
in
the
election
protests
filed,
there
was
however
an
absence
of
an
allegation
that
they
would
change
the
result
of
the
election
in
favor
of
the
protestants
and
against
the
protestees,
that
such
irregularities
would
destroy
the
secrecy
and
integrity
of
the
ballots
cast,
or
that
the
protestees
knew
of
or
participated
in
the
commission
thereof.
For
the
lower
court
then,
the
lack
of
a
cause
of
action
was
rather
evident.
Hence
the
order
of
dismissal
of
March
23,
1968,
which
was
sought
to
be
fortified
by
the
invocation
of
the
doctrines
that
voters
should
not
be
deprived
of
their
right
to
vote
occasioned
by
the
failure
of
the
election
officials
to
comply
with
the
formal
prerequisites
to
the
exercise
of
the
right
of
suffrage
and
that
the
rules
and
regulations
for
the
conduct
of
elections
while
mandatory
before
the
voting
should
be
considered
directory
thereafter.
The
validity
of
such
order
of
dismissal
is
now
to
be
inquired
into
by
us
in
this
appeal.
In
the
petition
of
protestant
Badelles,
dated
December
8,
1967,
and
marked
as
received
the
next
day
by
the
Clerk
of
Court
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Lanao
del
Norte,
15th
Judicial
District,
it
was
stated
that
both
he
and
protestee
Camilo
P.
Cabili
were
the
duly
registered
candidates
for
the
Office
of
City
Mayor
of
Iligan
City,
both
having
filed
their
respective
certificates
of
candidacy
in
accordance
with
law
and
as
such
candidates
voted
for
in
the
November
14,
1967
election.
It
was
then
alleged
that
the
Board
of
Canvassers,
on
November
25,
1967,
proclaimed
as
elected
protestee
for
having
obtained
11,310
votes
while
protestant
was
credited
with
8,966
votes.
Protestant
would
impugn
the
election
of
Cabili
on
the
ground
that
there
were
"flagrant
violation
of
mandatory
provisions
of
law
relating
to
or
governing
elections
...."
in
that
more
than
200
voters
were
registered
per
precinct
contrary
to
the
provision
limiting
such
number
of
200
only
and
that
no
publication
of
the
list
of
voters
for
each
precinct
was
made
up
to
the
election
day
itself,
enabling
persons
who
under
the
law
could
not
vote
being
allowed
to
do
so.
As
a
result
of
such
alleged
"flagrant
violations
of
the
laws
relation
to
or
governing
elections"
around
8,300
individuals
were
allowed
to
vote
illegally.
It
was
likewise
asserted
that
not
less
than
8,000
qualified
voters
were
unable
to
exercise
their
right
of
suffrage
in
view
of
their
failure,
without
any
fault
on
their
part,
to
have
the
proper
identification
cards
or
the
non-listing
of
their
names
in
the
list
of
voters.
It
was
stated
further
that
even
in
the
case
of
those
individuals
provided
with
identification
cards
with
their
names
included
in
the
list
of
voters,
they
could
not
avail
themselves
of
their
right
of
suffrage
as
their
applications
for
registration
could
not
be
found.
Mention
was
also
made
of
the
fact
that
the
final
lists
of
voters
and
the
applications
for
registration
were
delivered
to
their
respective
precincts
late
on
election
day
itself
thus
preventing
them
from
voting.
Moreover,
confusion,
so
it
was
alleged,
was
caused
by
the
excessive
number
of
voters
being
listed
and
many
having
been
assigned
to
precincts
other
than
the
correct
ones.
What
was
thus
objected
to
is
the
fact
that
illegal
votes
were
cast
by
those
not
qualified
to
do
so,
numbering
8,300
or
more
and
that
an
approximately
equal
number,
who
were
duly
registered
with
the
Commission
on
Elections,
Iligan
City,
were
unable
to
vote
due
to
the
above
circumstances.
The
proclamation
then
could
not
have
reflected
the
true
will
of
the
electorate
as
to
who
was
the
mayor
elected,
as
the
majority
of
protestee
Cabili
over
the
protestant
consisted
of
only
2,344
votes.
The
prayer
was
among
others
for
the
proclamation
of
protestee
as
well
as
other
candidates
for
elective
positions
in
the
City
of
Iligan
being
set
aside
and
declared
null
and
void,
protestant
pleading
further
that
he
be
granted
other
such
relief
as
may
be
warranted
in
law
and
equity.
4
The
protest
of
the
candidates
for
councilor
Legaspi
and
Barazon
in
the
other
case
against
protestees was
in
substance
similarly
worded.
The
prayer
was
for
the
setting
aside
and
declaring
null
and
void
the
proclamation
of
protestees
with
protestants
seeking
such
other
relief
which
should
be
theirs
according
to
law
and
to
equity.
In
the
first
case,
protestee
Cabili
moved
to
dismiss
the
petition
on
the
following
grounds:
"1.
That
the
protest
was
filed
beyond
the
reglementary
period
allowed
by
the
Revised
Election
Code;
2.
That
[the
lower
court]
has
no
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter
of
the
present
case,
the
Commission
on
Elections
being
the
proper
body
to
hear
the
same;
3.
That
the
complaint
states
no
cause
of
5
action." This
very
same
grounds
were
relied
upon
in
a
motion
to
dismiss
by
protestees
Actub
and
Cabigon,
filed
in
the
other
suit.
As
above
noted,
in
a
single
order
of
March
23,
1968,
the
two
above
election
protests
were
dismissed,
the
lower
court
being
of
the
opinion
that
neither
petition
alleged
a
cause
of
action
"to
justify
[it]
to
try
the
same."
The
first
ground
of
the
motion
to
dismiss
to
the
effect
that
the
protests
in
both
cases
were
filed
beyond
the
reglementary
period
was
rejected.
The
claim
as
to
lack
of
jurisdiction
was
likewise
held
to
be
without
merit.
The
single
order
of
dismissal
in
both
cases
as
indicated
was
based
on
the
lack
of
a
cause
of
action.
The
reasoning
followed
by
the
lower
court
in
reaching
the
above
conclusion
that
there
was
no
cause
of
action,
proceeded
along
these
lines:
"Mere
irregularities
or
misconduct
on
the
part
of
election
officers
which
do
not
tend
to
affect
the
result
of
the
elections
are
not
of
themselves
either
ground
for
contest
or
for
proper
matters
of
inquiry...
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
protest
that
the
alleged
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officers
would
tend
to
change
the
result
of
the
election
in
favor
of
the
protestants
and
against
the
protestees.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
the
8,000
voters
who
failed
to
vote
were
all
voters
of
protestants
and
the
8,300
illegal
voters
who
voted
were
for
the
protestees.
There
is,
therefore,
no
legal
and
practical
justification
for
the
court
to
inquire
into
the
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials,
as
alleged
in
the
petition,
for
it
would
not
give
any
benefit
in
favor
of
the
protestants
to
the
end
that
they
will
be
declared
the
duly
elected
mayor
and
councilors,
respectively,
of
this
6
City."
It
was
further
stated
in
such
order
of
dismissal:
"There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
the
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials
have
destroyed
the
secrecy
and
integrity
of
the
ballots
cast.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
the
non-
compliance
of
the
election
officials
of
the
provisions
of
the
election
laws
regarding
the
registration
of
voters
were
intentional
on
their
part
for
the
purpose
of
committing
frauds
for
the
benefit
of
the
protestees.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
because
of
the
alleged
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials
in
not
following
the
provisions
of
the
election
laws
regarding
the
registration
of
voters
and
the
distribution
of
the
precincts,
that
all
the
votes
cast
during
said
elections
are
illegal,
nor
is
there
an
allegation
in
the
protests
that
the
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials
would
affect
the
election
in
favor
of
the
7
protestees."
A
greater
regard
for
the
cause
of
accuracy
ought
to
have
admonished
the
lower
court
from
asserting
in
an
uncompromising
tone
the
absence
of
an
allegation
that
the
protestants
in
both
cases
failed
to
allege
that
if
the
facts
pleaded
by
them
were
proved
the
result
would
not
have
been
different.
It
is
true
the
complaints
could
have
been
more
explicitly
worded,
but
as
they
stood,
the
absence
of
such
a
claim
could
not
be
so
confidently
asserted.
To
repeat,
both
protests
were
dismissed.
We
do
not
discount
a
certain
degree
of
plausibility
attaching
to
the
line
of
reasoning
thus
pursued
by
the
lower
court.
We
are
not
unaware
of
the
undeniable
fact
that
both
petitions
were
not
distinguished
by
skill
in
their
drafting
or
precision
in
their
terminology.
Nonetheless
the
seriousness
and
gravity
of
the
imputed
failure
to
have
the
elections
conducted
freely
and
honestly,
with
such
irregularities
alleged,
give
rise
to
doubts,
rational
and
honest,
as
to
who
were
the
duly
elected
officials.
Such
allegations,
it
is
to
be
stressed,
would
have
to
be
accepted
at
their
face
value
for
the
purpose
of
determining
whether
there
is
a
cause
of
action,
a
motion
to
dismiss
amounting
to
a
hypothetical
admission
of
facts
thus
pleaded.
We
cannot
in
law
and
in
conscience
then
sustain
the
order
of
dismissal.
Without
the
lower
court
having
so
intended,
the
dismissal
would
amount
to
judicial
abnegation
of
a
sworn
duty
to
inquire
into
and
pass
upon
in
an
appropriate
proceeding
allegations
of
misconduct
and
misdeeds
of
such
character.
Accordingly,
we
reverse.
8
Abes
v.
Commission
on
Elections points
the
way,
but
the
lower
court
was
apparently
impervious
to
its
teaching.
It
may
not
be
controlling,
but
it
furnishes
more
than
a
hint.
It
would
seem,
though,
that
for
the
court
below,
its
message
did
not
ring
out
loud
and
clear.
The
opinion
in
the
Abes
case,
penned
by
Justice
Sanchez,
starts
thus:
"Petitioner's
cry
for
relief,
so
their
petition
avers,
is
planted
upon
the
constitutional
mandate
of
free,
orderly,
and
honest
elections.
Specifically,
they
list
a
number
of
repressible
acts."
Among
those
mentioned
were
that
blank
official
registration
forms
were
taken
from
the
office
of
the
Quezon
City
Comelec
Register
several
weeks
before
election
day,
November
14,
1967;
that
active
campaigning
within
the
polling
places
by
Nacionalista
leaders
or
sympathizers
of
Nacionalista
candidates
were
allowed;
that
voters
were
permitted
to
vote
on
mere
mimeographed
notices
of
certain
Nacionalista
candidates;
that
voters
were
compelled
to
fill
their
official
ballots
on
open
tables,
desks
and
in
many
precincts
outside
the
polling
places;
that
thousands
of
voters
sympathetic
to
the
Nacionalista
candidates
were
allowed
to
vote
beyond
the
hours
for
voting
allowed
by
law;
that
identification
cards
were
delivered
by
partisan
leaders
of
respondents
Nacionalista
candidates,
and
those
who
did
not
signify
their
preference
for
Nacionalista
candidates
were
not
given
such
cards;
that
the
precinct
books
of
voters
were
not
sealed
within
the
deadline
fixed
by
law;
and
that
the
resulting
effect
of
irregularities
was
to
prevent
full
fifty-one
per
cent
of
the
registered
voters
from
voting.
One
of
the
issues
raised
on
the
above
facts
is
whether
or
not
the
Commission
on
Elections
could
annul
the
aforesaid
election
in
Quezon
City
on
the
above
allegations
of
fraud,
terrorism
and
other
illegal
practices
committed
before
and
during
the
election.
The
petition
did
not
prosper;
it
was
dismissed.
The
remedy,
we
held,
lay
not
with
the
Commission
on
Elections
but
with
the
courts
of
justice
in
an
election
protest.
In
the
language
of
Justice
Sanchez:
"The
boundaries
of
the
forbidden
area
into
which
Comelec
may
not
tread
are
also
marked
by
jurisprudence.
That
Comelec
is
not
the
proper
forum
to
seek
annulment
of
an
election
based
on
terrorism,
frauds
and
other
illegal
practices,
is
a
principle
emphasized
in
decisions
of
this
Court."
For
as
announced
in
Nacionalista
Party
v.
Commission
on
9
Elections, assuming
that
there
be
a
failure
to
conduct
an
election
in
a
free,
orderly
and
honest
manner,
"the
duty
to
cure
or
remedy
the
resulting
evil"
did
not
rest
with
the
Commission
on
Elections
but
in
"some
other
agencies
of
the
Government."
More
specifically,
with
reference
to
provincial
and
municipal
officials,
election
contests
"are
entrusted
to
the
courts."
Then
came
this
express
affirmation:
"The
power
to
decide
election
contests
necessarily
includes
the
power
to
determine
the
validity
or
nullity
of
the
votes
questioned
by
either
of
the
contestants."
.
As
so
emphatically
observed
in
the
Abes
opinion,
"there
has
been
neither
deviation
nor
retreat
from
the
foregoing
pronouncement."
After
which
came
the
following:
"The
ratiocination
advanced
that
there
was
failure
of
election
due
to
rampancy
of
terrorism,
frauds,
and
other
irregularities,
before
and
during
elections,
such
that
allegedly
about
51%
of
the
registered
voters
were
not
able
to
vote,
will
not
carry
the
day
for
petitioners.
For,
in
the
first
place,
this
is
grounded
upon
bare
assertions.
Respondents
contest
the
correctness
thereof.
And
in
the
answer
of
respondents
Amoranto,
Mathay
and
others,
they
aver
that
out
of
162,457
registered
voters
in
Quezon
City,
100,382
voters
actually
cast
their
votes
about
62%
of
the
registered
voters.
But
above
all,
as
pointed
out
in
City
Board
of
Canvassers
vs.
Moscoso,
[the]
nullity
of
an
election
for
municipal
officials
should
be
determined
in
a
petition
contesting
the
election
of
municipal
officers-elect
to
be
filed
before
the
Court
of
First
Instance."
Why
an
election
protest
is
more
fitly
and
appropriately
the
procedure
for
determining
whether
irregularities
or
serious
violations
of
the
electoral
law
vitiated
the
conduct
of
elections
was
clearly
and
succinctly
explained
in
the
Moscoso
decision
above
cited,
the
10
opinion
coming
from
Justice
Makalintal.
Thus:
"The
question
of
whether
or
not
there
had
been
terrorism,
vote-buying
and
other
irregularities
in
the
1959
elections
in
Tacloban
City
should
be
ventilated
in
a
regular
election
protest,
pursuant
to
section
174
of
the
Election
Code,
and
not
in
a
petition
to
enjoin
the
city
board
of
canvassers
from
canvassing
the
election
returns
and
proclaiming
the
winning
candidates
for
municipal
offices."
It
would
follow
then
that
if
the
grievance
relied
upon
is
the
widespread
irregularities
and
the
flagrant
violations
of
the
election
law,
the
proper
remedy
is
the
one
availed
of
here,
the
protest.
11
That
such
should
be
the
case
should
occasion
no
surprise.
Time
and
time
again,
we
have
stressed
the
importance
of
preserving
inviolate
the
right
of
suffrage.
If
that
right
be
disregarded
or
frittered
away,
then
popular
sovereignty
becomes
a
myth.
As
Justice
Laurel
correctly
pointed
out:
"As
long
as
popular
government
is
an
end
to
be
achieved
and
safeguarded,
suffrage,
whatever
may
be
the
modality
and
form
devised,
must
continue
to
be
the
means
by
which
the
great
reservoir
of
power
must
be
emptied
into
the
receptacular
agencies
wrought
by
the
people
through
their
Constitution
in
the
interest
of
good
government
and
the
common
weal.
Republicanism,
in
so
far
as
it
implies
the
adoption
of
a
representative
type
of
government,
necessarily
points
to
12
the
enfranchised
citizen
as
a
particle
of
popular
sovereignty
and
as
the
ultimate
source
of
the
established
authority."
A
republic
then
to
be
true
to
its
name
requires
that
the
government
rests
on
the
consent
of
the
people,
consent
freely
given,
intelligently
arrived
at,
honestly
recorded,
and
thereafter
counted.
Only
thus
can
they
be
really
looked
upon
as
the
ultimate
sources
of
established
authority.
It
is
their
undeniable
right
to
have
officials
of
their
unfettered
choice.
The
election
law
has
no
justification
except
as
a
means
for
assuring
a
free,
honest
and
orderly
expression
of
their
views.
It
is
of
the
essence
that
corruption
and
irregularities
should
not
be
permitted
to
taint
the
electoral
process.
It
may
not
always
be
thus
unfortunately.
That
should
be
the
ideal
however.
If
there
be
a
failure
to
observe
the
mandates
of
the
Election
Code,
the
aggrieved
parties
should
not
be
left
remediless.
Under
the
law
as
it
stands,
it
is
precisely
an
election
protest
that
fitly
serves
that
purpose.lawphi1.nt
It
was
sought
to
be
thus
utilized
in
these
two
cases,
perhaps
in
a
rather
awkward
and
far
from
entirely
satisfactory
manner.
Than
itself
is
no
reason
for
the
courts
to
slam
the
door
against
any
opportunity
for
redress.
Yet,
that
is
what
would
happen
if
the
order
of
dismissal
complained
of
were
not
set
aside.
Hence
the
inevitability
of
its
reversal.
The
scope
of
our
decision
must
not
be
misinterpreted
however.
All
that
it
directs
is
that
the
protetees
in
both
cases
be
required
to
answer.
Thereafter,
if,
as
is
not
unlikely,
there
be
a
denial
of
the
serious
imputations
made
as
to
the
alleged
irregularities,
the
lower
court
could
properly
inquire
into
what
actually
transpired.
After
the
facts
are
thus
ascertained
in
accordance
with
the
accepted
procedural
rules,
then
the
appropriate
law
could
be
applied.
It
must
be
clearly
emphasized
that
we
do
not
at
this
stage
intimate
any
view
as
to
the
merit,
or
lack
of
it,
of
either
protest.
That
would
be
premature
to
say
the
least.
All
we
do
is
to
set
aside
the
order
of
dismissal.
WHEREFORE,
the
order
of
dismissal
of
March
23,
1968,
is
reversed
and
the
two
cases
remanded
to
the
lower
court
for
proceeding
and
trial
in
accordance
with
this
opinion
and
the
law.
Without
costs.
Concepcion,
C.J.,
Reyes,
J.B.L.,
Dizon,
Makalintal,
Zaldivar,
Sanchez,
Castro,
Capistrano
and
Teehankee,
JJ.,
concur.
Separate
Opinions
BARREDO,
J.,
concurring:
I
concur
whole-heartedly
in
everything
contained
in
the
ably
written
opinion
of
our
distinguished
colleague,
Mr.
Justice
Fernando,
including,
of
course,
the
disposition
he
makes
therein
of
these
cases
before
Us.
It
may
not
be
amiss,
nonetheless,
to
add
a
few
words
which
I
consider
appropriate,
in
the
light
of
my
experience
in
handling
some
election
cases
before
my
appointment
as
Solicitor
General.
The
thing
that
has
struck
me
most
in
these
two
cases,
both
denominated
as
election
protests,
is
that
the
prayers
of
the
two
petitions
therein
are
identical
in
that
they
do
not
ask
for
the
seating
of
the
petitioners,
who
call
themselves
protestants,
in
the
places
of
the
protestees-respondents.
What
they
ask
in
the
main
is
that
"the
proclamation
of
the
protegees
as
duly
elected
(mayor
and
councilors)
be
set
aside
and
declared
null
and
void".
This
sole
principal
prayer
was
precisely
what
gave
appellees
in
both
cases
cause
to
contend
that
(1)
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Lanao
del
Sur
had
no
jurisdiction
over
the
subject
matter,
it
being
allegedly
the
Commission
on
Elections
that
has
such
jurisdiction,
and
(2)
neither
of
the
petitions
state
any
cause
of
action.
Of
course,
the
trial
court
properly
overruled
the
first
ground.
It
is,
however,
best
for
all
concerned
that
the
observations
and
arguments
adduced
by
the
trial
judge
in
disposing
of
the
second
ground
are
placed
in
proper
light.
Ruling
on
the
first
ground
above-stated,
His
Honor
held
thus:
Mere
irregularities
or
misconduct
on
the
part
of
election
officers
which
do
not
tend
to
affect
the
result
of
the
elections
are
not
of
themselves
either
ground
for
contest
or
for
proper
matters
of
inquiry...
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
protest
that
the
alleged
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officers
would
tend
to
change
the
result
of
the
election
in
favor
of
the
protestants
and
against
the
protestees.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
the
8,000
voters
who
failed
to
vote
were
all
voters
of
protestants
and
the
8,300
illegal
voters
who
voted
were
for
the
protetees.
There
is,
therefore,
no
legal
and
practical
justification
for
the
court
to
inquire
into
the
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials,
as
alleged
in
the
petition,
for
it
would
not
give
any
benefit
in
favor
of
the
protestants
to
the
end
that
they
will
be
declared
the
duly
elected
mayor
and
councilors,
respectively,
of
this
City.
The
failure
of
election
of
officers
to
obey
the
mandatory
provisions
of
a
statute
relating
to
the
conduct
of
the
election
and
designed
to
secure
the
secrecy
and
integrity
of
the
ballot
may
so
taint
the
votes
with
irregularity
as
to
cause
the
rejection
of
the
entire
votes
of
the
district.
It
should
be
remembered,
however,
that
all
statutes
tending
to
limit
the
citizen
in
the
exercise
of
the
right
of
suffrage
are
to
be
construed
liberally
in
his
favor,
and
that
the
courts
are
loath
to
disfranchise
voters
who
are
wholly
innocent
of
wrongdoing.
As
a
consequence,
it
is
a
firmly
established
general
rule
that
voters
will
not
be
rejected,
even
though
election
officers
fail
to
comply
with
the
directory
provisions
of
a
statute,
if
there
is
no
fraud
or
other
irregularity
and
failure
to
comply
is
unintentional;
nor
is
it
material
in
this
connection
that
the
failure
of
the
election
officers
to
perform
their
duty
subjects
them
to
penalties.
Likewise,
the
courts
will
not
permit
the
will
of
the
voters
to
be
defeated
by
fraud
on
the
part
of
election
officers
if
it
is
possible
to
avoid
such
a
result.
In
short,
a
fair
election
and
an
honest
return
should
be
considered
as
paramount
in
importance
to
minor
requirements
which
prescribe
the
formal
steps
to
reach
that
end,
and
the
law
should
be
so
construed
as
to
remedy
the
evils
against
which
its
provisions
are
directed
and
at
the
same
time
not
to
disfranchise
voters
further
than
is
necessary
to
attain
that
object.
In
case
of
a
violation
of
the
law
on
the
part
of
an
election
officer,
punishment
may
be
provided
therefor,
and
in
this
way
the
law
can
be
rendered
effectual
without
going
to
the
extent
of
depriving
a
voter
of
his
right
to
have
his
vote
counted
in
consequence
of
such
violation.
It
may,
therefore,
be
stated
as
a
general
rule
that
if
ballots
are
cast
by
voters
who
are,
at
the
time,
qualified
to
cast
them
and
who
have
done
all
on
their
part
that
the
law
requires
of
voters
to
make
their
voting
effective,
an
erroneous
or
even
unlawful
handling
of
the
ballots
by
the
election
officers,
charged
with
such
responsibility
will
not
be
held
to
disfranchise
such
voters
by
throwing
out
their
votes
on
account
of
erroneous
procedure
had
sorely
by
the
election
officers,
provided
the
votes
are
legal
votes
in
their
inception
and
are
still
capable
of
being
given
proper
effect
as
such.
Nor
will
an
election
be
set
aside
because
of
regularities
on
the
part
of
the
election
officials
unless
it
appears
that
such
irregularities
affect
the
results.
(18
Am.
Jur.
Sec.
225,
pp.
331-332,
cited
on
pp.
621-622,
Revised
Election
Code
by
Francisco).
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
the
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials
have
destroyed
the
secrecy
and
integrity
of
the
ballots
cast.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
the
non-compliance
of
the
election
officials
of
the
provisions
of
the
election
laws
regarding
the
registration
of
voters
were
intentional
on
their
part
for
the
purpose
of
committing
frauds
for
the
benefit
of
the
protestees.
There
is
no
allegation
in
the
petition
that
because
of
the
alleged
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials
in
not
following
the
provisions
of
the
election
laws
regarding
the
registration
of
voters
and
the
distribution
of
the
precincts,
that
all
the
votes
cast
during
said
elections
are
illegal,
nor
is
there
an
allegation
in
the
protests
that
the
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials
would
affect
the
election
in
favor
of
protestees.
A
misconduct
or
irregularity
committed
by
an
election
official
is
not
a
sufficient
ground
to
annul
the
votes
cast
in
the
precincts
where
the
person
elected
neither
knew
of
nor
participated
in
the
misconduct
and
it
is
not
shown
that
any
elector
who
voted
or
the
persons
elected
either
participated
in
such
misconduct.
(18
Am.
Jur.
Sec.
228,
p.
333,
cited
on
page
622,
Revised
Election
Code
by
Francisco).
While
this
ruling
is,
on
the
whole,
correct,
His
Honor
failed
to
emphasize
that
the
cases
before
him
were
precisely
ones
for
the
annulment
and
setting
aside
of
the
election
for
Mayor
and
Councilors
in
the
City
of
Iligan
and
that,
therefore,
the
only
question
that
should
be
resolved
is
whether
or
not
the
facts
alleged
in
the
petitions
in
question
constitute
sufficient
grounds
for
such
relief.
Instead,
the
trial
court
made
as
may
be
seen
above,
a
long
discourse
on
the
thesis
that
"the
purpose
of
an
election
contest
is
to
correct
the
canvass,"
and
that
"the
general
rule
is
that
whatever
may
be
the
cause
of
an
election
contest,
the
true
gravamen
of
the
case
is
to
determine
who
receives
the
highest
number
of
votes,
etc."
(pp.
5-8,
Order
in
question)
and
then
held
that
there
was
no
allegation
in
both
petitions
that
"would
give
any
benefit
in
favor
of
the
protestants
to
the
end
that
they
will
be
declared
the
duly
elected
mayor
and
councilors,
respectively,
of
this
City"
ergo,
the
said
petitions
do
not
state
any
cause
of
action.
More
specifically,
the
trial
court
looked
in
vain
for
allegations
to
the
effect
that
"the
alleged
irregularities
committed
by
the
elections
in
favor
of
the
protestants
and
against
the
protestees."
(p.
7,
id.)
For
example,
His
Honor
reasoned
out
that
"there
is
no
allegation
...
that
the
8,000
voters
who
failed
to
vote
were
all
voters
of
protestants
and
the
8,300
illegal
voters
who
voted
were
for
the
protetees."
(id.).
I
am
afraid
that
such
discourse,
if
quite
impressive
as
an
exposition
of
considerable
learning
in
election
law
matters,
is
rather
irrelevant.
I
believe
that
what
should
be
emphasized
in
these
cases
is
that
ruling
in
Our
decision
to
the
effect
that
in
an
election
protest,
(otherwise
entitled
at
times,
petition
or
complaint
or
motion
of
protest)
it
is
not
necessary
to
allege
that
the
true
results
of
the
election
in
question
would
be
in
favor
of
protestant
and
against
protestee
on
the
basis
of
the
legal
votes,
or
that
the
proclaimed
result
would
be
changed
if
the
facts
alleged
are
proven,
when
the
sole
ground
of
protest
and
the
only
purpose
of
the
protestant
is
to
have
the
whole
election
in
a
precinct
or
municipality
annulled
and
set
aside.
Indeed,
as
pointed
out
in
the
brief
of
appellants:
In
the
case
G.R.
No.
L-29333,
the
prayer
is
for
the
annulment
of
the
proclamation
of
protestee-appellee
Camilo
P.
Cabili
and
of
the
local
elections
held
in
Iligan
City
on
November
14,
1967,
while
in
case
G.R.
No.
L-29334,
the
prayer
is
for
the
annulment
of
the
proclamation
of
protestee-appellees
Felix
Z.
Actub
et
al.
and
of
the
local
elections
held
in
Iligan
City
on
November
14,
1967.
Section
177
of
the
Revised
Election
Code
provides:
SEC.
177.
Decision
of
the
Contest.
The
court
shall
decide
the
protest
...
and
shall
declare
who
among
the
parties
has
been
elected,
or
in
the
proper
case,
that
none
of
them
has
been
legally
elected....
Under
the
above-quoted
provision
of
law,
the
courts
are
authorized
to
declare
that
none
of
the
candidates
has
been
legally
elected,
which
in
effect
would
mean
that
the
elections
are
annulled.
If
it
were
not
the
intention
of
the
lawmaker
not
to
authorize
the
courts
to
annul
an
election,
such
authority
would
not
have
been
provided
in
Section
177
of
the
Revised
Election
Code
quoted
above.
Francisco,
in
his
book
How
to
Try
Election
Cases,
1952
Edition,
p.
82,
citing
as
authorities
the
decisions
of
this
Honorable
Court
in
Bustos
vs.
Moir
and
Fajardo
35
Phil.
16;
and
Manalo
vs.
Sevilla,
24
Phil.
609,
states:
The
court
is
authorized,
in
a
proper
case,
not
only
to
recount
the
ballots
and
reject
those
which
it
considers
illegal
and
accept
those
which
it
considers
valid
but
it
is
also
authorized,
in
a
proper
case,
to
annul
the
election
completely.
It
is
therefore
clear
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
holding
that
the
purpose
of
the
protestants
in
filing
these
protest
is
not
in
accord
with
the
purpose
of
the
Revised
Election
Code
in
allowing
a
defeated
candidate
to
file
an
election
protest.
In
other
words,
I
like
to
make
it
very
clear
that
an
election
protest
may
be
filed
not
only
for
the
purpose
of
having
the
protestant
declared
elected,
but
even
for
the
purpose
alone
of
having
the
election
annulled.
Otherwise
stated,
protestants
may
come
to
court,
not
necessarily
to
win
an
election,
but
even
if
solely
to
have
the
court
declare
that
no
one
has
won
because
the
election
is
void
and
that
it
is
obvious
and
pure
common
sense
that
in
the
latter
case,
the
protestant
does
not
have
to
allege
the
probability
of
his
being
the
real
victor,
for
in
such
a
case,
his
prayer
precisely
is
that
it
be
declared,
using
the
language
of
the
law,
"that
none
of
them
has
been
legally
elected."
Surely,
the
following
ruling
of
the
trial
court:
An
election
contest
is
a
summary
proceeding
the
object
of
which
is
to
expedite
the
settlement
of
the
controversy
between
candidates
as
to
who
received
the
majority
of
the
legal
ballots
(Gardiner
vs.
Romulo,
26
Phil.
522,
524).
The
purpose
of
an
election
contest
is
to
correct
the
canvass
of
which
the
proclamation
is
a
public
manifestation
and
the
power
granted
by
law
to
the
court
must
agree
with
and
be
adequate
to
such
an
object.
Hence,
the
court
can
directly
declare
which
candidate
is
to
be
elected
leaving
the
canvass
made
by
the
Board
null
and
void,
and
the
candidate
so
declared
elected
may
assume
position
of
the
office
(Aquino
vs.
Calebia
&
Sahagun,
55
Phil.
984).
It
being
the
policy
of
the
law
to
give
effect
to
elections,
the
general
rule
is
that
whatever
may
be
the
cause
of
an
election
contest,
the
true
gravamen
of
the
case
is
to
determine
who
receives
the
highest
number
of
votes
(20
C.J.
217).
In
an
election
case,
the
court
has
an
imperative
duty
to
ascertain
by
all
means
within
its
command
who
is
the
real
candidate
elected
by
the
electorate.
(Ibasco
vs.
Ilao,
G.R.
No.
L-17512,
December
29,
1960).
Hence,
only
candidates
have
the
right
to
file
an
election
protest.
(Gil
Hermanos
vs.
Hord,
10
Phil.
217).
From
the
foregoing
authorities,
it
could
be
concluded
that
the
purpose
of
the
election
law
to
allow
a
candidate
to
file
an
election
protest
is
for
the
court
to
determine
whether
the
protestant
or
the
protestee
is
the
winner
of
the
election
under
protest.
In
the
present
case,
the
object
of
the
protestants
in
filing
their
protests
based
on
the
prayer
of
their
petitions
is
not
to
declare
them
the
duly
elected
mayor
and
councilors,
respectively,
of
this
City
but
merely
to
declare
null
and
void
the
proclamation
and
election
of
the
protestees
as
well
as
the
elections
held
in
Iligan
City
of
November
14,
1967.
The
purpose,
therefore
of
the
protestants
in
filing
these
protests
is
not
in
accord
with
the
purpose
of
the
Revised
Election
Code
in
allowing
a
defeated
candidate
to
file
an
election
protest.
must
be
emphatically
denounced
as
a
misreading
by
His
Honor
of
the
real
import
of
the
authorities
cited
by
Him.
Such
proposition
represents
the
most
narrow
concept
of
the
judicial
remedies
in
matters
of
election.
No
single
precedent
in
extant
jurisprudence
whether
here
or
in
any
other
country
can
be
found
to
support
it.
I
am
equally
confident
that
no
thesis
in
any
of
the
existing
legal
publications
can
be
referred
to
as
upholding
such
an
illogical
idea.
To
sanction
such
a
ruling
is
to
kill
almost
entirely
all
hopes
for
a
clean,
orderly
and
honest
suffrage
in
this
country,
which
the
Commission
on
Elections
alone
may
not
be
able
to
achieve
in
all
possible
cases.
Indeed,
as
pointed
out
by
appellants
the
trial
court
would
have
been
right
if
it
had
only
adhered
to
the
decisions
already
rendered
by
this
Court
on
the
subject,
cited
by
said
appellants
in
their
brief.
The
real
issue
then
in
these
cases
is
whether
or
not
the
facts
alleged
in
the
respective
petitions
of
appellants
constitute
sufficient
ground
or
grounds
for
annulment
of
the
election
of
Mayor
and
Councilors
in
Iligan
City,
held
in
November,
1967.
On
this
score,
it
has
to
be
admitted
that,
indeed,
the
petitions
of
appellants
which
appear
to
have
been
prepared
by
a
single
counsel
are
not
as
accurately
and
precisely
worded
as
to
fit
exactly
into
the
pattern
that
may
perhaps
be
most
ideal
in
cases
of
this
nature,
but
I
cannot
go
along
with
His
Honor's
ruling
that
the
allegations
in
said
petitions
are
legally
inadequate
to
serve
as
a
basis
for
the
relief
of
annulment
of
the
election
therein
prayed
for.
His
Honor
seemed
to
be
more
concerned
with
what
he
considered
the
need
for
direct
averments
that
the
irregularities
and
violations
of
the
election
law
alleged
by
appellants
resulted
in
the
destruction
of
the
"secrecy
and
integrity
of
the
ballot
cast,"
that
"all
the
votes
cast
in
said
elections
are
illegal"
and
that
"the
irregularities
committed
by
the
election
officials
would
affect
the
election
in
favor
of
the
protestees."
(p.
8,
id.)
I
feel
that
His
Honor
was
asking
too
much
and
unnecessarily
because,
as
they
appear
to
me,
these
allegations
as
well
as
the
others
His
Honor
considered
as
indispensably
required,
are
more
in
the
nature
of
legal
conclusions,
not
supposed
to
be
averred
in
the
pleadings,
rather
than
statements
of
ultimate
facts.
The
truth
of
the
matter
is
that,
viewed
as
a
whole,
the
petitions
in
question
sufficiently
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
what
appellants
are
complaining
about
is
that
the
elections
held
in
Iligan
City
in
November,
1967
were
characterized
by
general
and
specific
circumstances,
that
leave
rational
doubt
as
to
whether
or
not
the
true
will
of
the
people
of
said
City
could
be
reflected
in
the
proclaimed
results.
In
the
more
polished
and
inimitable
language
of
Mr.
Justice
Fernando,
"...
the
seriousness
and
gravity
of
the
imputed
failure
to
have
the
elections
conducted
freely
and
honestly,
with
such
irregularities
alleged,
give
rise
to
doubts,
rational
and
honest,
as
to
who
were
the
duly
elected
officials".
It
is
my
considered
opinion
that
while
it
is
truly
desirable
that
election
protests
should
be
discouraged
where
they
have
hardly
any
basis
in
fact
or
in
law,
the
earlier
to
free
from
doubt
the
title
to
their
respective
offices
of
those
chosen
to
direct
the
affairs
of
our
government,
whether
national
or
local,
thereby
giving
them
the
peace
of
mind
and
freedom
of
action
gravely
needed
in
the
formulation
of
policies
and
the
implementation
thereof,
courts
should
also
be
careful
in
seeing
to
it
that
their
doors
are
not
untimely
shut
to
complaints
regarding
the
commission
of
electoral
frauds,
irregularities
and
illegalities,
the
most
despicable
banes
of
popular
suffrage,
which
though
unhappily
worded
are
fairly
indicative
of
a
situation
wherein
the
will
of
the
electorate
has
not
been
freely
and
clearly
expressed.
To
my
mind,
the
rule
foIlowed
in
an
unbroken
line
of
decisions
of
this
Court,
to
the
effect
that
the
commission
of
irregularities
by
election
officials,
no
matter
how
serious,
and
the
actual
discovery
of
frauds
and
violations
of
law
by
either
candidates
or
voters,
are
not
in
themselves
sufficient
to
cause
the
annulment
of
an
election
unless
so
expressly
provided
by
law,
or
that
the
frauds,
illegalities
and
irregularities
are
so
rampant
and
diffusive
as
to
place
the
result
of
such
election
in
grave
doubt,
is
one
that
governs
more
the
rendition
of
judgments
in
election
cases
and
the
evaluation
of
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
elections
in
question,
as
portrayed
in
the
evidence
already
presented
before
the
court,
rather
than
as
a
strict
criterion
for
determining
whether
a
complaint
or
petition
or
motion
of
protest
sufficiently
states
a
cause
of
action
for
annulment.
Respecting
contrary
opinion
others
may
entertain
on
the
matter,
I
regard
it
as
a
sound
rule
that
pleadings
in
election
cases,
at
least,
should
not
be
subjected
to
such
minute
examination
as
should
be
done
to
facts
duly
established
after
proper
hearing,
if
only
because
facts
are
unerring
manifestations
of
the
truth,
while
allegations
in
pleadings
often
suffer
from
the
common
flaws
in
the
means
of
human
expressions
as
well
as
from
the
usual
imperfection
of
human
language.
If
words
are
but
children
of
thoughts,
parents
and
offsprings
not
always,
as
among
men
and
animals,
look
exactly
alike.
Pleadings
in
such
cases
must,
therefore,
be
read
with
more
liberality
so
as
to
make
it
difficult,
if
not
impossible
for
grievances
against
the
suppression
in
one
form
or
another
of
the
expression
of
the
popular
will,
well-
grounded
in
fact,
may
not
be
thrown
out
merely
because
of
lack
of
skill
and
precision
in
the
formulation
of
the
corresponding
protests.
More
importance
should
be
given
to
the
substantial
matters
sufficiently
appearing
in
such
pleadings
as
intended
to
be
brought
to
the
court
for
a
remedy,
than
to
the
form,
at
times,
ambiguous
and
often
ungrammatically
phrased,
in
which
they
are
expressed.
In
any
event,
in
case
of
doubt
as
to
which
should
be
done,
such
doubt
must
be
resolved
in
giving
due
course
to
the
protest,
unless
it
is
manifestly
evident
that
the
same
has
been
filed
for
other
than
legitimate
purposes.
As
already
indicated,
my
vote
is
for
the
reversal
of
the
appealed
order
sustaining
the
motion
to
dismiss
filed
by
appellees
in
the
court
below,
because
I
agree
with
the
decision
herein
of
Mr.
Justice
Fernando
that
there
are
enough
indications,
within
the
four
corners
of
the
questioned
petitions,
of
irregularities
and
illegalities
which,
if
proven,
may
result
in
the
annulment
of
the
elections
prayed
for
by
appellants.
Footnotes
1
L-29333.
L-29334.
Felix Z. Actub, Providencio P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran, Casimero P. Cabigon, and Benito Ong.
Felix Z. Actub, Providencio P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran, Casimero P. Cabigon, and Benito Ong.
Motion to Dismiss of Protestee Cabili.
Order of the lower court of March 23, 1968, pp. 6-7.
Ibid, p. 8.
L-28348, December 15, 1967.
85 Phil. 149 (1949).
10
City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso, L-16365, September 30, 1963.
11
Cf.
Gardiner
v.
Romulo,
26
Phil.
521
(1914);
Garchitorena
v.
Crescini,
39
Phil.
258
(1918);
Cailles
v.
Gomez,
42
Phil.
496
(1921);
Mandac
v.
Samonte,
49
Phil.
284
(1926);
De
Leon
v.
Cruz,
92
Phil.
403
(1952);
Ticao
v.
Nanawa
L-17890,
August
30,
1962;
and
City
Board
of
Canvassers
v.
Moscoso,
L-16365,
September
30,
1963.
12
Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939).
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004]
ARTURO
M.
TOLENTINO
and
ARTURO
C.
MOJICA,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
SENATOR
RALPH
G.
RECTO
and
SENATOR
GREGORIO
B.
HONASAN,
respondents.
D
E
C
I
S
I
O
N
CARPIO,
J.:
The
Case
This
is
a
petition
for
prohibition
to
set
aside
Resolution
No.
NBC
01-005
dated
5
June
2001
(Resolution
No.
01-005)
and
Resolution
No.
NBC
01-006
dated
20
July
2001
(Resolution
No.
01-006)
of
respondent
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC).
Resolution
No.
01-005
proclaimed
the
13
candidates
elected
as
Senators
in
the
14
May
2001
elections
while
Resolution
No.
01-006
declared
official
and
final
the
ranking
of
the
13
Senators
proclaimed
in
Resolution
No.
01-005.
The
Facts
Shortly
after
her
succession
to
the
Presidency
in
January
2001,
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated
then
Senator
Teofisto
T.
Guingona,
Jr.
(Senator
Guingona)
as
Vice-President.
Congress
confirmed
the
nomination
of
Senator
Guingona
who
took
his
oath
as
Vice-President
on
9
February
2001.
Following
Senator
Guingonas
confirmation,
the
Senate
on
8
February
2001
passed
Resolution
No.
84
(Resolution
No.
84)
certifying
to
the
existence
of
a
vacancy
in
the
Senate.
Resolution
No.
84
called
on
COMELEC
to
fill
the
vacancy
through
a
special
election
to
be
held
simultaneously
with
the
regular
elections
on
14
May
2001.
Twelve
Senators,
with
a
6-year
term
each,
were
due
[1]
th
to
be
elected
in
that
election.
Resolution
No.
84
further
provided
that
the
Senatorial
candidate
garnering
the
13 highest
number
[2]
of
votes
shall
serve
only
for
the
unexpired
term
of
former
Senator
Teofisto
T.
Guingona,
Jr.,
which
ends
on
30
June
2004.
On
5
June
2001,
after
COMELEC
had
canvassed
the
election
results
from
all
the
provinces
but
one
(Lanao
del
Norte),
COMELEC
issued
Resolution
No.
01-005
provisionally
proclaiming
13
candidates
as
the
elected
Senators.
Resolution
No.
01-005
also
provided
th
that
the
first
twelve
(12)
Senators
shall
serve
for
a
term
of
six
(6)
years
and
the
thirteenth
(13 )
Senator
shall
serve
the
unexpired
[3]
term
of
three
(3)
years
of
Senator
Teofisto
T.
Guingona,
Jr.
who
was
appointed
Vice-President. Respondents
Ralph
Recto
(Recto)
th
th
and
Gregorio
Honasan
(Honasan)
ranked
12
and
13 ,
respectively,
in
Resolution
No.
01-005.
On
20
June
2001,
petitioners
Arturo
Tolentino
and
Arturo
Mojica
(petitioners),
as
voters
and
taxpayers,
filed
the
instant
petition
for
prohibition,
impleading
only
COMELEC
as
respondent.
Petitioners
sought
to
enjoin
COMELEC
from
proclaiming
with
th
finality
the
candidate
for
Senator
receiving
the
13
highest
number
of
votes
as
the
winner
in
the
special
election
for
a
single
three-
year
term
seat.
Accordingly,
petitioners
prayed
for
the
nullification
of
Resolution
No.
01-005
in
so
far
as
it
makes
a
proclamation
to
such
effect.
Petitioners
contend
that
COMELEC
issued
Resolution
No.
01-005
without
jurisdiction
because:
(1)
it
failed
to
notify
the
electorate
of
the
position
to
be
filled
in
the
special
election
as
required
under
Section
2
of
Republic
Act
No.
6645
(R.A.
No.
[4]
6645);
(2)
it
failed
to
require
senatorial
candidates
to
indicate
in
their
certificates
of
candidacy
whether
they
seek
election
under
[5]
the
special
or
regular
elections
as
allegedly
required
under
Section
73
of
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
881;
and,
consequently,
(3)
it
failed
to
specify
in
the
Voters
Information
Sheet
the
candidates
seeking
election
under
the
special
or
regular
senatorial
elections
as
[6]
purportedly
required
under
Section
4,
paragraph
4
of
Republic
Act
No.
6646
(R.A.
No.
6646).
Petitioners
add
that
because
of
these
omissions,
COMELEC
canvassed
all
the
votes
cast
for
the
senatorial
candidates
in
the
14
May
2001
elections
without
distinction
such
that
there
were
no
two
separate
Senate
elections
held
simultaneously
but
just
a
single
election
for
thirteen
seats,
irrespective
of
[7]
term.
Stated
otherwise,
petitioners
claim
that
if
held
simultaneously,
a
special
and
a
regular
election
must
be
distinguished
in
the
documentation
as
well
as
in
the
canvassing
of
their
results.
To
support
their
claim,
petitioners
cite
the
special
elections
simultaneously
held
with
the
regular
elections
of
13
November
1951
and
8
November
1955
to
fill
the
seats
vacated
by
Senators
[8]
Fernando
Lopez
and
Carlos
P.
Garcia,
respectively,
who
became
Vice-Presidents
during
their
tenures
in
the
Senate.
Petitioners
point
out
that
in
those
elections,
COMELEC
separately
canvassed
the
votes
cast
for
the
senatorial
candidates
running
under
the
regular
elections
from
the
votes
cast
for
the
candidates
running
under
the
special
elections.
COMELEC
also
separately
proclaimed
[9]
the
winners
in
each
of
those
elections.
Petitioners
sought
the
issuance
of
a
temporary
restraining
order
during
the
pendency
of
their
petition.
Without
issuing
any
restraining
order,
we
required
COMELEC
to
Comment
on
the
petition.
On
20
July
2001,
after
COMELEC
had
canvassed
the
results
from
all
the
provinces,
it
issued
Resolution
No.
01-006
declaring
official
and
final
the
ranking
of
the
13
Senators
proclaimed
in
Resolution
No.
01-005.
The
13
Senators
took
their
oaths
of
office
on
23
July
2001.
In
view
of
the
issuance
of
Resolution
No.
01-006,
the
Court
required
petitioners
to
file
an
amended
petition
impleading
Recto
and
Honasan
as
additional
respondents.
Petitioners
accordingly
filed
an
amended
petition
in
which
they
reiterated
the
contentions
raised
in
their
original
petition
and,
in
addition,
sought
the
nullification
of
Resolution
No.
01-006.
In
their
Comments,
COMELEC,
Honasan,
and
Recto
all
claim
that
a
special
election
to
fill
the
seat
vacated
by
Senator
Guingona
was
validly
held
on
14
May
2001.COMELEC
and
Honasan
further
raise
preliminary
issues
on
the
mootness
of
the
petition
and
on
petitioners
standing
to
litigate.
Honasan
also
claims
that
the
petition,
which
seeks
the
nullity
of
his
proclamation
as
Senator,
is
th
actually
a
quo
warranto
petition
and
the
Court
should
dismiss
the
same
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
For
his
part,
Recto,
as
the
12
ranking
Senator,
contends
he
is
not
a
proper
party
to
this
case
because
the
petition
only
involves
the
validity
of
the
proclamation
of
the
th
13
placer
in
the
14
May
2001
senatorial
elections.
The
Issues
The
following
are
the
issues
presented
for
resolution:
(1)
Procedurally
(a)
whether
the
petition
is
in
fact
a
petition
for
quo
warranto
over
which
the
Senate
Electoral
Tribunal
is
the
sole
judge;
(b)
whether
the
petition
is
moot;
and
(c)
whether
petitioners
have
standing
to
litigate.
(2)
On
the
merits,
whether
a
special
election
to
fill
a
vacant
three-year
term
Senate
seat
was
validly
held
on
14
May
2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to
[10]
oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A
perusal
of
the
allegations
contained
in
the
instant
petition
shows,
however,
that
what
petitioners
are
questioning
is
the
validity
of
the
special
election
on
14
May
2001
in
which
Honasan
was
elected.
Petitioners
various
prayers
are,
namely:
(1)
a
declaration
that
no
special
election
was
held
simultaneously
with
the
general
elections
on
14
May
2001;
(2)
to
enjoin
COMELEC
from
declaring
anyone
as
having
won
in
the
special
election;
and
(3)
to
annul
Resolution
Nos.
01-005
and
01-006
in
so
far
as
these
Resolutions
proclaim
Honasan
as
the
winner
in
the
special
election.
Petitioners
anchor
their
prayers
on
COMELECs
alleged
failure
to
comply
with
certain
requirements
pertaining
to
the
conduct
of
that
special
election.
Clearly
then,
the
petition
does
not
seek
to
determine
Honasans
right
in
the
exercise
of
his
office
as
Senator.
Petitioners
prayer
for
the
annulment
of
Honasans
proclamation
and,
ultimately,
election
is
merely
incidental
to
petitioners
cause
of
action.
Consequently,
the
Court
can
properly
exercise
jurisdiction
over
the
instant
petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of
the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act threatened
[11]
to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the
[12]
writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
[13]
[14]
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol, we took cognizance of a petition
to set aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time
the petition was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the
order sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such
elections, the mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question
of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the
conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date
of the election.
On
Petitioners
Standing
Honasan
questions
petitioners
standing
to
bring
the
instant
petition
as
taxpayers
and
voters
because
petitioners
do
not
claim
that
COMELEC
illegally
disbursed
public
funds.
Neither
do
petitioners
claim
that
they
sustained
personal
injury
because
of
the
issuance
of
Resolution
Nos.
01-005
and
01-006.
Legal
standing
or
locus
standi
refers
to
a
personal
and
substantial
interest
in
a
case
such
that
the
party
has
sustained
or
will
[15]
sustain
direct
injury
because
of
the
challenged
governmental
act.
The
requirement
of
standing,
which
necessarily
sharpens
the
[16]
[17]
presentation
of
issues,
relates
to
the
constitutional
mandate
that
this
Court
settle
only
actual
cases
or
controversies.
Thus,
generally,
a
party
will
be
allowed
to
litigate
only
when
(1)
he
can
show
that
he
has
personally
suffered
some
actual
or
threatened
injury
because
of
the
allegedly
illegal
conduct
of
the
government;
(2)
the
injury
is
fairly
traceable
to
the
challenged
action;
and
(3)
[18]
the
injury
is
likely
to
be
redressed
by
a
favorable
action.
Applied
strictly,
the
doctrine
of
standing
to
litigate
will
indeed
bar
the
instant
petition.
In
questioning,
in
their
capacity
as
voters,
the
validity
of
the
special
election
on
14
May
2001,
petitioners
assert
a
harm
classified
as
a
generalized
grievance.
This
generalized
grievance
is
shared
in
substantially
equal
measure
by
a
large
class
of
voters,
if
not
all
the
voters,
who
voted
in
that
[19]
election.
Neither
have
petitioners
alleged,
in
their
capacity
as
taxpayers,
that
the
Court
should
give
due
course
to
the
petition
because
in
the
special
election
held
on
14
May
2001
tax
money
[was]
x
x
x
extracted
and
spent
in
violation
of
specific
constitutional
protections
against
abuses
of
legislative
power
or
that
there
[was]
misapplication
of
such
funds
by
COMELEC
or
that
public
money
[20]
[was]
deflected
to
any
improper
purpose.
On
the
other
hand,
we
have
relaxed
the
requirement
on
standing
and
exercised
our
discretion
to
give
due
course
to
voters
[21]
[22]
suits
involving
the
right
of
suffrage.
Also,
in
the
recent
case
of
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
v.
Zamora,
we
gave
the
same
liberal
treatment
to
a
petition
filed
by
the
Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
(IBP).The
IBP
questioned
the
validity
of
a
Presidential
directive
deploying
elements
of
the
Philippine
National
Police
and
the
Philippine
Marines
in
Metro
Manila
to
conduct
patrols
even
though
the
IBP
presented
too
general
an
interest.
We
held:
[T]he
IBP
primarily
anchors
its
standing
on
its
alleged
responsibility
to
uphold
the
rule
of
law
and
the
Constitution.
Apart
from
this
declaration,
however,
the
IBP
asserts
no
other
basis
in
support
of
its
locus
standi.
The
mere
invocation
by
the
IBP
of
its
duty
to
preserve
the
rule
of
law
and
nothing
more,
while
undoubtedly
true,
is
not
sufficient
to
clothe
it
with
standing
in
this
case.
This
is
too
general
an
interest
which
is
shared
by
other
groups
and
the
whole
citizenry
x
x
x.
Having
stated
the
foregoing,
this
Court
has
the
discretion
to
take
cognizance
of
a
suit
which
does
not
satisfy
the
requirement
of
legal
standing
when
paramount
interest
is
involved.
In
not
a
few
cases,
the
court
has
adopted
a
liberal
attitude
on
the
locus
standi
of
a
petitioner
where
the
petitioner
is
able
to
craft
an
issue
of
transcendental
significance
to
the
people.
Thus,
when
the
issues
raised
are
of
paramount
importance
to
the
public,
the
Court
may
brush
aside
technicalities
of
procedure.
In
this
case,
a
reading
of
the
petition
shows
that
the
IBP
has
advanced
constitutional
issues
which
deserve
the
attention
of
this
Court
in
view
of
their
seriousness,
novelty
and
weight
as
precedents.
Moreover,
because
peace
and
order
are
under
constant
threat
and
lawless
violence
occurs
in
increasing
tempo,
undoubtedly
aggravated
by
the
Mindanao
insurgency
problem,
the
legal
controversy
raised
in
the
petition
almost
certainly
will
not
go
away.
It
will
stare
us
in
the
face
again.
It,
therefore,
behooves
the
Court
to
relax
the
rules
on
standing
and
to
resolve
the
[23]
issue
now,
rather
than
later.
(Emphasis
supplied)
We
accord
the
same
treatment
to
petitioners
in
the
instant
case
in
their
capacity
as
voters
since
they
raise
important
issues
involving
their
right
of
suffrage,
considering
that
the
issue
raised
in
this
petition
is
likely
to
arise
again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House
of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law, thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1)
year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special
election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the
vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only
for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days
nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to
be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill
the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy.However, in case of
such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than
sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other
things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did
COMELEC,
in
conducting
the
special
senatorial
election
simultaneously
with
the
14
May
2001
regular
elections,
comply
with
the
requirements
in
Section
2
of
R.A.
No.
6645?
A
survey
of
COMELECs
resolutions
relating
to
the
conduct
of
the
14
May
2001
elections
reveals
that
they
contain
nothing
which
would
amount
to
a
compliance,
either
strict
or
substantial,
with
the
requirements
in
Section
2
of
R.A.
No.
6645,
as
amended.
Thus,
[24]
[25]
nowhere
in
its
resolutions
or
even
in
its
press
releases
did
COMELEC
state
that
it
would
hold
a
special
election
for
a
single
three-year
term
Senate
seat
simultaneously
with
the
regular
elections
on
14
May
2001.
Nor
did
COMELEC
give
formal
notice
that
it
th
would
proclaim
as
winner
the
senatorial
candidate
receiving
the
13
highest
number
of
votes
in
the
special
election.
The
controversy
thus
turns
on
whether
COMELECs
failure,
assuming
it
did
fail,
to
comply
with
the
requirements
in
Section
2
of
R.A.
No.
6645,
as
amended,
invalidated
the
conduct
of
the
special
senatorial
election
on
14
May
2001
and
accordingly
rendered
Honasans
proclamation
as
the
winner
in
that
special
election
void.
More
precisely,
the
question
is
whether
the
special
election
is
invalid
for
lack
of
a
call
for
such
election
and
for
lack
of
notice
as
to
the
office
to
be
filled
and
the
manner
by
which
the
winner
in
the
special
election
is
to
be
determined.
For
reasons
stated
below,
the
Court
answers
in
the
negative.
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature
[26]
directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the elections validity. In a general election, where the
[27]
law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be
held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with
[28]
the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute
[29]
and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of
[30]
the election.
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the
time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered
[31]
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill
such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any
other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters
with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House of
Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should
take place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject
only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended.This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to call x x x a special
election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the office to be
filled. The COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it
will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the special election
and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELECs
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The
test
in
determining
the
validity
of
a
special
election
in
relation
to
the
failure
to
give
notice
of
the
special
election
is
whether
the
want
of
notice
has
resulted
in
misleading
a
sufficient
number
of
voters
as
would
change
the
result
of
the
special
election.
If
the
lack
of
official
notice
misled
a
substantial
number
of
voters
who
wrongly
believed
that
there
was
no
special
election
to
fill
a
vacancy,
[32]
a
choice
by
a
small
percentage
of
voters
would
be
void.
The
required
notice
to
the
voters
in
the
14
May
2001
special
senatorial
election
covers
two
matters.
First,
that
COMELEC
will
hold
a
special
election
to
fill
a
vacant
single
three-year
term
Senate
seat
simultaneously
with
the
regular
elections
scheduled
on
the
th
same
date.
Second,
that
COMELEC
will
proclaim
as
winner
the
senatorial
candidate
receiving
the
13
highest
number
of
votes
in
the
special
election.
Petitioners
have
neither
claimed
nor
proved
that
COMELECs
failure
to
give
this
required
notice
misled
a
sufficient
number
of
voters
as
would
change
the
result
of
the
special
senatorial
election
or
led
them
to
believe
that
there
was
no
such
special
election.
Instead,
what
petitioners
did
is
conclude
that
since
COMELEC
failed
to
give
such
notice,
no
special
election
took
place.
This
bare
assertion
carries
no
value.
Section
2
of
R.A.
No.
6645,
as
amended,
charged
those
who
voted
in
the
elections
of
14
May
2001
with
the
knowledge
that
the
vacancy
in
the
Senate
arising
from
Senator
Guingonas
appointment
as
Vice-President
in
February
2001
was
to
be
filled
in
the
next
succeeding
regular
election
of
14
May
2001.
Similarly,
the
absence
of
formal
notice
from
COMELEC
does
not
preclude
the
possibility
that
the
voters
had
actual
notice
of
the
special
election,
the
office
to
be
voted
in
that
election,
and
the
manner
by
which
COMELEC
would
determine
the
winner.
Such
actual
notice
could
come
from
many
sources,
such
as
media
reports
[33]
of
the
enactment
of
R.A.
No.
6645
and
election
propaganda
during
the
campaign.
More
than
10
million
voters
cast
their
votes
in
favor
of
Honasan,
the
party
who
stands
most
prejudiced
by
the
instant
petition.
We
simply
cannot
disenfranchise
those
who
voted
for
Honasan,
in
the
absence
of
proof
that
COMELECs
omission
prejudiced
voters
in
the
exercise
of
their
right
of
suffrage
so
as
to
negate
the
holding
of
the
special
election.
Indeed,
this
Court
is
loathe
to
annul
elections
and
will
only
do
so
when
it
is
impossible
to
distinguish
what
votes
are
lawful
and
what
are
unlawful,
or
to
arrive
at
any
certain
result
whatever,
or
that
the
great
body
of
the
voters
have
been
prevented
by
violence,
intimidation,
and
threats
from
[34]
exercising
their
franchise.
Otherwise,
the
consistent
rule
has
been
to
respect
the
electorates
will
and
let
the
results
of
the
election
stand,
despite
[35]
irregularities
that
may
have
attended
the
conduct
of
the
elections.
This
is
but
to
acknowledge
the
purpose
and
role
of
elections
in
a
democratic
society
such
as
ours,
which
is:
to
give
the
voters
a
direct
participation
in
the
affairs
of
their
government,
either
in
determining
who
shall
be
their
public
officials
or
in
deciding
some
question
of
public
interest;
and
for
that
purpose
all
of
the
legal
voters
should
be
permitted,
unhampered
and
unmolested,
to
cast
their
ballot.
When
that
is
done
and
no
frauds
have
been
committed,
the
ballots
should
be
counted
and
the
election
should
not
be
declared
null.
Innocent
voters
should
not
be
deprived
of
their
participation
in
the
affairs
of
their
government
for
mere
irregularities
on
the
part
of
the
election
officers,
for
which
they
are
in
no
way
responsible.
A
different
rule
would
make
[36]
the
manner
and
method
of
performing
a
public
duty
of
greater
importance
than
the
duty
itself.
(Emphasis
in
the
original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on 14
May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for
the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws.What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that
COMELEC fix the date of the election, if necessary, and state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for. Similarly,
petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on
the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and
in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely implemented the
procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator
Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad) made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be
filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by
th
providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 ) highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and
the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR]
T[ATAD].
Mr.
President,
I
move
that
we
now
consider
Proposed
Senate
Resolution
No.
934
[later
converted
to
Resolution
No.
84].
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
Is
there
any
objection?
[Silence]
There
being
none,
the
motion
is
approved.
Consideration
of
Proposed
Senate
Resolution
No.
934
is
now
in
order.
With
the
permission
of
the
Body,
the
Secretary
will
read
only
the
title
and
text
of
the
resolution.
T[HE]
S[ECRETARY].
Proposed
Senate
Resolution
No.
934
entitled
RESOLUTION
CERTIFYING
TO
THE
EXISTENCE
OF
A
VACANCY
IN
THE
SENATE
AND
CALLING
ON
THE
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
(COMELEC)
TO
FILL
UP
SUCH
VACANCY
THROUGH
ELECTION
TO
BE
HELD
SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH
THE
REGULAR
ELECTION
ON
MAY
14,
2001
AND
THE
SENATOR
THUS
ELECTED
TO
SERVE
ONLY
FOR
THE
UNEXPIRED
TERM
WHEREAS,
the
Honorable
Teofisto
T.
Guingona,
Jr.
was
elected
Senator
of
the
Philippines
in
1998
for
a
term
which
will
expire
on
June
30,
2004;
WHEREAS,
on
February
6,
2001,
Her
Excellency
President
Gloria
Macapagal
Arroyo
nominated
Senator
Guingona
as
Vice-President
of
the
Philippines;
WHEREAS,
the
nomination
of
Senator
Guingona
has
been
confirmed
by
a
majority
vote
of
all
the
members
of
both
House
of
Congress,
voting
separately;
WHEREAS,
Senator
Guingona
will
take
his
Oath
of
Office
as
Vice-President
of
the
Philippines
on
February
9,
2001;
WHEREAS,
Republic
Act
No.
7166
provides
that
the
election
for
twelve
(12)
Senators,
all
elective
Members
of
the
House
of
Representatives,
and
all
elective
provincial
city
and
municipal
officials
shall
be
held
on
the
second
Monday
and
every
three
years
thereafter;
Now,
therefore,
be
it
RESOLVED
by
the
Senate,
as
it
is
hereby
resolved,
to
certify,
as
it
hereby
certifies,
the
existence
of
a
vacancy
in
the
Senate
and
calling
the
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC)
to
fill
up
such
vacancy
through
election
to
be
held
simultaneously
with
the
regular
election
on
May
14,
2001
and
the
Senator
thus
elected
to
serve
only
for
the
unexpired
term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
FRANCISCO
S.
TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR]
T[ATAD].
Mr.
President,
I
move
for
the
adoption
of
this
resolution.
S[ENATOR]
O[SMEA]
(J).
Mr.
President.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
Sen.
John
H.
Osmea
is
recognized.
S[ENATOR]
O[SMEA]
(J).
Thank
you,
Mr.
President.
Will
the
distinguished
Majority
Leader,
Chairman
of
the
Committee
on
Rules,
author
of
this
resolution,
yield
for
a
few
questions?
S[ENATOR]
T[ATAD].
With
trepidation,
Mr.
President.
[Laughter]
S[ENATOR]
O[SMEA]
(J).
What
a
way
of
flattery.
[Laughter]
Mr.
President,
I
think
I
recall
that
sometime
in
1951
or
1953,
there
was
a
special
election
for
a
vacant
seat
in
the
Senate.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
the
one
who
was
elected
in
that
special
election
was
then
Congressman,
later
Senator
Feli[s]berto
Verano.
In
that
election,
Mr.
President,
the
candidates
contested
the
seat.
In
other
words,
the
electorate
had
to
cast
a
vote
for
a
ninth
senator
because
at
that
time
there
were
only
eight
to
elect
a
member
or
rather,
a
candidate
to
that
particular
seat.
Then
I
remember,
Mr.
President,
that
when
we
ran
after
the
EDSA
revolution,
twice
there
were
24
candidates
and
the
first
12
were
elected
to
a
six-year
term
and
the
next
12
were
elected
to
a
three-year
term.
th
My
question
therefore
is,
how
is
this
going
to
be
done
in
this
election?
Is
the
candidate
with
the
13
largest
number
of
votes
going
to
be
the
one
to
take
a
three-year
term?
Or
is
there
going
to
be
an
election
for
a
position
of
senator
for
the
unexpired
term
of
Sen.
Teofisto
Guingona?
S[ENATOR]
T[ATAD].
Mr.
President,
in
this
resolution,
we
are
leaving
the
mechanics
to
the
Commission
on
Elections.
But
personally,
I
th
would
like
to
suggest
that
probably,
the
candidate
obtaining
the
13
largest
number
of
votes
be
declared
as
elected
to
fill
up
the
unexpired
term
of
Senator
Guingona.
S[ENATOR]
O[SMEA]
(J).
Is
there
a
law
that
would
allow
the
Comelec
to
conduct
such
an
election?
Is
it
not
the
case
that
the
vacancy
is
for
a
specific
office?
I
am
really
at
a
loss.
I
am
rising
here
because
I
think
it
is
something
that
we
should
consider.
I
do
not
know
if
we
can
No,
this
is
not
a
Concurrent
Resolution.
S[ENATOR]
T[ATAD].
May
we
solicit
the
legal
wisdom
of
the
Senate
President.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
May
I
share
this
information
that
under
Republic
Act
No.
6645,
what
is
needed
is
a
resolution
of
this
Chamber
calling
attention
to
the
need
for
the
holding
of
a
special
election
to
fill
up
the
vacancy
created,
in
this
particular
case,
by
the
appointment
of
our
colleague,
Senator
Guingona,
as
Vice
President.
It
can
be
managed
in
the
Commission
on
Elections
so
that
a
slot
for
the
particular
candidate
to
fill
up
would
be
that
reserved
for
Mr.
Guingonas
unexpired
term.
In
other
words,
it
can
be
arranged
in
such
a
manner.
x
x
x
x
S[ENATOR]
R[OCO].
Mr.
President.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
Sen.
Raul
S.
Roco
is
recognized.
S[ENATOR]
R[OCO].
May
we
suggest,
subject
to
a
one-minute
caucus,
wordings
to
the
effect
that
in
the
simultaneous
elections,
the
th
13
placer
be
therefore
deemed
to
be
the
special
election
for
this
purpose.
So
we
just
nominate
13
and
it
is
good
for
our
colleagues.
It
is
better
for
the
candidates.
It
is
also
less
expensive
because
the
ballot
will
be
printed
and
there
will
be
less
disfranchisement.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
That
is
right.
S[ENATOR]
R[OCO].
If
we
can
just
deem
it
therefore
under
this
resolution
to
be
such
a
special
election,
maybe,
we
satisfy
the
requirement
of
the
law.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
Yes.
In
other
words,
this
shall
be
a
guidance
for
the
Comelec.
S[ENATOR]
R[OCO].
Yes.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
to
implement.
S[ENATOR]
R[OCO].
Yes.
The
Comelec
will
not
have
the
flexibility.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
That
is
right.
th
S[ENATOR]
R[OCO].
We
will
already
consider
the
13
placer
of
the
forthcoming
elections
that
will
be
held
simultaneously
as
a
special
election
under
this
law
as
we
understand
it.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
Yes.
That
will
be
a
good
compromise,
Senator
Roco.
S[ENATOR]
R[OCO].
Yes.
So
if
the
sponsor
can
introduce
that
later,
maybe
it
will
be
better,
Mr.
President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that there will be anyone running
specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.
th
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
Actually,
I
think
what
is
going
to
happen
is
the
13
candidate
will
be
running
with
specific
groups.
S[ENATOR]
T[ATAD].
Yes.
Whoever
gets
No.
13.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
I
think
we
can
specifically
define
that
as
the
intent
of
this
resolution.
S[ENATOR]
T[ATAD].
Subject
to
style,
we
accept
that
amendment
and
if
there
will
be
no
other
amendment,
I
move
for
the
adoption
of
this
resolution.
x
x
x
x
ADOPTION
OF
S.
RES.
NO.
934
If
there
are
no
other
proposed
amendments,
I
move
that
we
adopt
this
resolution.
T[HE]
P[RESIDENT].
There
is
a
motion
to
adopt
this
resolution.
Is
there
any
objection?
[Silence]
There
being
none,
the
motion
is
[37]
approved.
Evidently,
COMELEC,
in
the
exercise
of
its
discretion
to
use
means
and
methods
to
conduct
the
special
election
within
the
confines
of
R.A.
No.
6645,
merely
chose
to
adopt
the
Senates
proposal,
as
embodied
in
Resolution
No.
84.
This
Court
has
consistently
acknowledged
and
affirmed
COMELECs
wide
latitude
of
discretion
in
adopting
means
to
carry
out
its
mandate
of
ensuring
free,
orderly,
and
honest
elections
subject
only
to
the
limitation
that
the
means
so
adopted
are
not
illegal
or
do
not
[38]
constitute
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
COMELECs
decision
to
abandon
the
means
it
employed
in
the
13
November
1951
and
8
November
1955
special
elections
and
adopt
the
method
embodied
in
Resolution
No.
84
is
but
a
legitimate
exercise
of
its
discretion.
Conversely,
this
Court
will
not
interfere
should
COMELEC,
in
subsequent
special
senatorial
elections,
choose
to
revert
to
the
means
it
followed
in
the
13
November
1951
and
8
November
1955
elections.
That
COMELEC
adopts
means
that
are
novel
or
even
disagreeable
is
no
reason
to
adjudge
it
liable
for
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
As
we
have
earlier
noted:
The
Commission
on
Elections
is
a
constitutional
body.
It
is
intended
to
play
a
distinct
and
important
part
in
our
scheme
of
government.
In
the
discharge
of
its
functions,
it
should
not
be
hampered
with
restrictions
that
would
be
fully
warranted
in
the
case
of
a
less
responsible
organization.
The
Commission
may
err,
so
may
this
Court
also.
It
should
be
allowed
considerable
latitude
in
devising
means
and
methods
that
will
insure
the
accomplishment
of
the
great
objective
for
which
it
was
created
free,
orderly
and
honest
elections.
We
may
not
agree
fully
with
its
choice
of
means,
but
unless
these
are
clearly
illegal
or
constitute
gross
abuse
of
[39]
discretion,
this
court
should
not
interfere.
A
Word
to
COMELEC
The
calling
of
a
special
election,
if
necessary,
and
the
giving
of
notice
to
the
electorate
of
necessary
information
regarding
a
special
election,
are
central
to
an
informed
exercise
of
the
right
of
suffrage.
While
the
circumstances
attendant
to
the
present
case
have
led
us
to
conclude
that
COMELECs
failure
to
so
call
and
give
notice
did
not
invalidate
the
special
senatorial
election
held
on
14
May
2001,
COMELEC
should
not
take
chances
in
future
elections.
We
remind
COMELEC
to
comply
strictly
with
all
the
requirements
under
applicable
laws
relative
to
the
conduct
of
regular
elections
in
general
and
special
elections
in
particular.
WHEREFORE,
we
DISMISS
the
petition
for
lack
of
merit.
SO
ORDERED.
Panganiban,
Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo,
Sr.,
and
Azcuna,
JJ.,
concur.
Davide,
Jr.,
C.J.,
joins
Mr.
Justice
Puno
in
his
dissent.
Puno,
J.,
please
see
dissenting
opinion.
Vitug,
J.,
joins
the
dissent.
Ynares-Santiago,
J.,
joins
J.
Punos
dissent.
Tinga,
J.,
joins
Justice
Punos
dissent.
[1]
As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 7166, as amended.
[2]
Resolution No. 84 reads:
WHEREAS,
the
Honorable
Teofisto
Guingona,
Jr.
was
elected
Senator
of
the
Philippines
in
1998
for
a
term
which
will
expire
on
June
30,
2004;
WHEREAS,
on
February
6,
2001,
Her
Excellency
President
Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated
Senator
Guingona
as
Vice-President
of
the
Philippines;
WHEREAS,
the
nomination
of
Senator
Guingona
has
been
conferred
by
a
majority
vote
of
all
the
members
of
both
Houses
of
Congress,
voting
separately;
WHEREAS,
Senator
Guingona
will
take
his
Oath
of
Office
as
Vice-President
of
the
Philippines
on
February
9,
2001;
WHEREAS,
Republic
Act
No.
7166
provides
that
the
election
for
twelve
(12)
Senators,
all
elective
Members
of
the
House
of
Representatives,
and
all
elective
provincial,
city
and
municipal
officials
shall
be
held
on
the
second
Monday
of
May
and
every
three
years
thereafter.
Now,
therefore
be
it
Resolved
by
the
Senate,
as
it
is
hereby
resolved
to
certify
as
it
hereby
certifies,
the
existence
of
a
vacancy
in
the
Senate
and
calling
the
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC)
to
fill
up
said
vacancy
through
election
to
be
held
simultaneously
with
the
regular
election
on
May
14,
2001
and
the
senatorial
candidate
th
garnering
the
thirteenth
(13 )
highest
number
of
votes
shall
serve
only
for
the
unexpired
term
of
former
Senator
Teofisto
T.
Guingona,
Jr.
(Emphasis
supplied)
[3]
Resolution No. 01-005 reads:
WHEREAS,
the
Commission
on
Elections,
sitting
[E]n
[B]anc
as
the
National
Board
of
Canvassers
for
the
election
of
Senators
of
the
Philippines,
officially
canvassed
in
open
and
public
proceedings
the
certificates
of
canvass
of
votes
cast
nationwide
for
senators
in
the
national
and
local
elections
conducted
on
May
14,
2001.
Based
on
the
canvass
of
the
Certificates
of
Canvass
submitted
by
seventy-eight
(78)
out
of
seventy-nine
(79)
Provincial
Boards
of
Canvassers,
twenty
(20)
City
Boards
of
Canvassers
of
cities
comprising
one
(1)
or
more
legislative
districts,
two
(2)
District
Boards
of
Canvassers
of
Metro
Manila,
and
one
(1)
Absentee
Voting,
and
the
remaining
uncanvassed
certificate
of
canvass
which
will
not
anymore
affect
the
results,
the
Commission
on
Elections
sitting
En
Banc
as
the
National
Board
of
Canvassers
finds
that
the
following
candidates
for
senators
in
said
elections
obtained
as
of
June
04,
2001
the
following
number
of
votes
as
indicated
opposite
their
names:
Name
Votes
Garnered
(as
of
4
June
2001)
NOLI DE CASTRO
16,157,811
JUAN M. FLAVIER
11,676,129
SERGIO R. OSMEA, III
11,531,427
FRANKLIN M. DRILON
11,223,020
RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR.
11,187,447
JOKER P. ARROYO
11,163,801
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.
11,084,884
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN
10,877,989
EDGARDO J. ANGARA
10,746,843
PANFILO M. LACSON
10,481,755
LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA
10,456,674
RALPH G. RECTO
10,387,108
GREGORIO G. HONASAN
10,364,272
NOW,
THEREFORE,
by
virtue
of
the
powers
vested
in
it
under
the
Constitution,
the
Omnibus
Election
Code
and
other
election
laws,
the
Commission
on
Elections
sitting
En
Banc
as
the
National
Board
of
Canvassers
hereby
PROCLAIMS
the
above-named
thirteen
(13)
candidates
as
the
duly
elected
Senators
of
the
Philippines
in
the
May
14,
2001
elections.
Based
on
the
certificates
of
canvass
finally
tabulated,
the
first
twelve
(12)
Senators
shall
serve
for
a
term
of
six
(6)
years
and
the
th
thirteenth
(13 )
Senator
shall
serve
the
unexpired
term
of
three
(3)
years
of
Senator
Teofisto
T.
Guingona,
Jr.
who
was
appointed
Vice-President
of
the
Philippines
pursuant
to
Section
9,
Article
VII
of
the
Constitution,
in
relation
to
Section
9,
Article
VI
thereof,
as
implemented
under
Republic
Act
No.
6645.
(Emphasis
supplied)
[4]
This
provision
states:
The
Commission
on
Elections
shall
fix
the
date
of
the
special
election,
which
shall
not
be
earlier
than
forty-
five
(45)
days
nor
later
than
ninety
(90)
days
from
the
date
of
such
resolution
or
communication,
stating
among
other
things
the
office
or
offices
to
be
voted
for:
Provided,
however,
That
if
within
the
said
period
a
general
election
is
scheduled
to
be
held,
the
special
election
shall
be
held
simultaneously
with
such
general
election.
[5]
This
provision
reads:
Certificate
of
candidacy.
No
person
shall
be
eligible
for
any
elective
public
office
unless
he
files
a
sworn
certificate
of
candidacy
within
the
period
fixed
herein.
A
person
who
has
filed
a
certificate
of
candidacy
may,
prior
to
the
election,
withdraw
the
same
by
submitting
to
the
office
concerned
a
written
declaration
under
oath.
No
person
shall
be
eligible
for
more
than
one
office
to
be
filled
in
the
same
election,
and
if
he
files
his
certificate
of
candidacy
for
more
than
one
office,
he
shall
not
be
eligible
for
any
of
them.
However,
before
the
expiration
of
the
period
for
the
filing
of
certificates
of
candidacy,
the
person
who
has
filed
more
than
one
certificate
of
candidacy
may
declare
under
oath
the
office
for
which
he
desires
to
be
eligible
and
cancel
the
certificate
of
candidacy
for
the
other
office
or
offices.
The
filing
or
withdrawal
of
a
certificate
of
candidacy
shall
not
affect
whatever
civil,
criminal
or
administrative
liabilities
which
a
candidate
may
have
incurred.
[6]
This
provision
reads:
Certificates
of
Candidacy;
Certified
List
of
Candidates.
x
x
x
The
names
of
all
registered
candidates
immediately
followed
by
the
nickname
or
stage
name
shall
also
be
printed
in
the
election
returns
and
tally
sheets.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.
[8]
Senator
Roseller
T.
Lim
was
elected
in
the
special
election
of
13
November
1951
while
Senator
Felisberto
Verano
was
elected
in
the
special
election
of
8
November
1955.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 8-12.
[10]
Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule 66, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[11]
Sections 1-2, Rule 65, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[12]
Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute resolution).
[13]
Acop
v.
Guingona,
G.R.
No.
134856,
2
July
2002,
383
SCRA
577;
Viola
v.
Hon.
Alunan
III,
343
Phil.
184
(1997);
Alunan
III
v.
Mirasol,
342
Phil.
467
(1997).
[14]
342 Phil. 467 (1997).
[15]
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, 24 August 1993, 225 SCRA 568.
[16]
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).
[17]
CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).
[18]
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
[19]
See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
[20]
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392 (internal citations omitted).
[21]
De
Guia
v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
104712,
6
May
1992,
208
SCRA
420;
Gonzales
v.
COMELEC,
129
Phil.
7
(1967).
See
also
Telecom
&
Broadcast
Attys.
of
the
Phils.,
Inc.
v.
COMELEC,
352
Phil.
153
(1998).
[22]
G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[23]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[24]
E.g.
Resolution
No.
3258,
dated
28
September
2000
(providing
for
the
calendar
of
activities
and
periods
of
prohibited
acts
in
connection
with
the
14
May
2001
elections
as
amended
by
Resolution
Nos.
3322,
dated
5
October
2000;
3284,
dated
20
October
2000;
3306,
dated
7
November
2000;
3426,
dated
22
December
2000;
and
3359,
dated
6
February
2001);
Resolution
No.
3632,
dated
1
March
2001
(canceling
the
certificates
of
candidacy
of
nuisance
senatorial
candidates);
and
Resolution
No.
3743,
dated
12
March
2001
(providing
for
the
general
instructions
to
the
Boards
of
Election
Inspectors
on
the
casting
and
counting
of
votes).
[25]
E.g. undated COMELEC pamphlet entitled Frequently Asked Questions on the May 14, 2001 Elections.
[26]
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
[27]
Ibid; ibid.
[28]
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 282 (1996).
[29]
Ibid.
[30]
McCoy v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951).
[31]
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
[32]
See 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 292 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 72 (1965).
[33]
Indeed,
the
fact
that
13
senators
were
due
to
be
elected
in
the
14
May
2001
elections
and
that
the
senator
elected
to
the
th
13
place
will
serve
the
remaining
term
of
Senator
Guingona
was
published
in
news
reports
(see
Philippine
Star,
9
February
2001,
pp.
1,
6
and
Daily
Tribune,
9
February
2001,
pp.
1,
8;
Philippine
Daily
Inquirer,
12
February
2001,
pp.
1,
10;
14
February
2001,
pp.
1,
A20;Today,
8
February
2001,
p.
10;
Manila
Bulletin,
9
February
2001,
pp.
3,
8).
Furthermore,
the
fact
that
the
administration
and
opposition
coalitions
each
fielded
13
senatorial
candidates
(and
not
only
12)
was
similarly
given
extensive
coverage
by
news
publications
(see
Philippine
Daily
Inquirer,
12
February
2001,
pp.
1,
10;
13
February
2001,
pp.
1,
A14;
14
February
2001,
pp.
1,
A20;
Philippine
Star,
13
February
2001,
pp.
1,
4;
14
February
2001,
pp.
1,
6;
Today,
9
February
2001,
pp.
1,
4;
12
February
2001,
pp.
1,
10;
13
February
2001,
pp.
1,
10;
Manila
Standard,
13
February
2001,
pp.
1,
2;
Malaya,
13
February
2001,
pp.
1,
6;
14
February
2001,
pp.
1,
4;
Daily
Tribune
14
February
2001,
pp.
1,
6;
Manila
Times,
14
February
2001,
pp.
1,
2A;
Philippine
Star
Ngayon,
13
February
2001,
pp.
1,
4).
[34]
Florendo,
Sr.
vs.
Buyser,
129
Phil.
353
(1967);
Capalla
v.
Tabiana,
63
Phil.
95
(1936);
Kiamzon
v.
Pugeda,
54
Phil.
755
(1930);
Cailles
v.
Gomez,
42
Phil.
852
(1924).
Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
881,
as
amended,
(Omnibus
Election
Code),
on
failure
of
elections
(resulting
to
the
annulment
of
elections),
provides:
SEC.
6.
Failure
of
election.
If,
on
account
of
force
majeure,
violence,
terrorism,
fraud,
or
other
analogous
causes
the
election
in
any
polling
place
had
not
been
held
on
the
date
fixed,
or
had
been
suspended
before
the
hour
fixed
by
law
for
the
closing
of
the
voting,
or
after
the
voting
and
during
the
preparation
and
the
transmission
of
the
election
returns
or
in
the
custody
or
canvass
thereof,
such
election
results
in
a
failure
to
elect,
and
in
any
of
such
cases
the
failure
or
suspension
of
election
would
affect
the
result
of
the
election,
the
Commission
shall,
on
the
basis
of
a
verified
petition
by
an
interested
party
and
after
due
notice
and
hearing,
call
for
the
holding
or
continuation
of
the
election
not
held,
suspended
or
which
resulted
in
a
failure
to
elect
on
a
date
reasonably
close
to
the
date
of
the
election
not
held,
suspended
or
which
resulted
in
a
failure
to
elect
but
not
later
than
thirty
days
after
the
cessation
of
the
cause
of
such
postponement
or
suspension
of
the
election
or
failure
to
elect.
[35]
Alcala
v.
Commission
on
Elections,
218
Phil.
322
(1984);
Villareal
v.
Fornier,
84
Phil.
756
(1949);
Lucero
v.
De
Guzman,
45
Phil.
852
(1924).
[36]
Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).
[37]
Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8 February 2001, pp. 49-54. (Emphasis supplied)
[38]
E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).
[39]
Pugutan v. Abubakar, 150 Phil. 1 (1972) citing Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 237 (1941).
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