GARCIA,v.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 170122
603 SCRA
FACTS: The Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan on October
29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of properties against retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife,
herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark to recover unlawfully acquired
funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29. Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II,
but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with Plunder in
an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP
303,272,005.99. the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties
identified in both forfeiture cases. The corresponding summons was issued and all served on Gen. Garcia
at his place of detention. Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture, they contend that the same is under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. The OMB countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the
Garcias in default. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same motion as pro
forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias
in default.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture cases.
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. Petitioners
posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division
of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first
assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, the civil
liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus: Such liability
is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The
action of forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary and to his other lawful
income. Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Thus
if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.

PEOPLE v. HENRY T. GO
G.R. No. 168539
March 25, 2014
FACTS: On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict, among others, respondent Henry Go for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. The prosecution was given a period of ten
(10) days within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo
Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. The prosecution
complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case,
even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer. The
respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him contending that, independently of
the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent,
who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not
be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to quash
and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of the respondent Go, despite
him being a private individual.
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Settled is the rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto. The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein
respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even
if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information. Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer.
The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the
public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the
present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

JIMENEZ v. SORONGON
687 SCRA 151
FACTS: On August 19, 2003, petitioner Jimenez, the President of Unland Shipping and Management
Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City
against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The petitioner alleged that the
respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of incorporation to secure a license
to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA. The 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the
filing of information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the RTC
of Mandaluyong City. Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered
the May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The petitioner
and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition and comment to the opposition, respectively.
RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the
respondents for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.The
RTC granted respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamils motion for
judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found that no evidence on
record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a
recruitment agency from the POEA. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of
probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief
from the RTC. On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited
pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutors conformity. Then petitioner appealed to CA
by way of certiorari but denied it.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioners petition
for certiorari for lack of legal personality.
DOCTRINE: The Suprem Court ruled in the affirmative. The petitioner has no legal personality to
assail the dismissal of the criminal case It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the
defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible. Procedural law basically mandates that all
criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG
is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides: The People is the real party in interest in a
criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in
this Court.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since
the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, which is the existence of
probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party
of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves
the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.

MIGUEL v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 172035
675 SCRA 151
FACTS: Petitioner Miguel, a former Mayor of Koronadal, was charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the Ombudsman, for giving unwarranted benefits
and advantages to other accused, by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to
provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management
of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a
newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from participating in said
prequalification. The Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Suspend the petitioner filed by the OSP.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was also denied, prompting him to file a petition for
certiorari challenging the validity of the suspension order. The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that
the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. He alleges that the phrases evident bad
faith and manifest partiality actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused rendering the information
fatally defective.
ISSUE: Whether or not the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act is valid.
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. In deference to the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the
offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with
such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In
particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as
defined in the law. The raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond
the standard of a person of common understanding in appreciating the import of the phrase acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality. A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase
acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of
the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and
non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.

PEOPLE v. SORIA
G.R. No. 179031
November 12, 2012
685 SCRA 483
FACTS: Respondet Soria was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime rape of his
daughter, in the RTC. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court modified the judgment of the trial court
charging the respondent of simple rape instead for failure to present the daughters birth certificate as
competent proof of her minority. The penalty was also modified from death to reclusion perpetua. Still
insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to the SC an appeal. Appellant asserts that he should be
acquitted of the crime of rape since there is no evidence that would establish the fact of sexual
intercourse. Aside from the prosecutions failure to prove penile contact, "AAAs" testimony was also
wanting in details as to how he took off her underwear or whether she saw his penis during the incident
despite leading questions propounded on the matter by the prosecution. The medical report even revealed
that "AAAs" hymen remained intact and that there were no notable lacerations or external physical
injuries thereon. Appellant therefore surmises that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to file this baseless
rape case against him in retaliation for his act of confronting her about her illicit relationship with a
neighbor. Sora contends that the information did not specify whether the crime of rape was committed
through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape.
DOCTRINE: The SC ruled in the negative but with modification. The Information in this case did not
specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual
assault. The Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which
constituted rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the
Information alleged that appellant used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While
these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was
committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the case.
"Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have
been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that
the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The
allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a
description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of
multifariousness." Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been
waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through
sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial.
On the issue of failure of the prosecution to establish the minority of the victim, the SC held that despite
the information describing AAA" as a 7-year old daughter of appellant. While it also became the subject
of stipulation during the pre-trial conference, same is insufficient evidence of "AAAs" age. Her minority
must be "proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself". "There must be independent evidence
proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of
denial by the accused." Documents such as her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on
record to prove the minority of "AAA" other than her testimony, appellants absence of denial, and their
pre-trial stipulation. The prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were
lost, destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally absent.
It is settled that "when either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted
or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. As such, appellants relationship with "AAA" may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE v. VALDEZ
663 SCRA 151
FACTS: The two accused were charged in the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of
Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson. The two accused were found to have
conspired, confederated, and with qualified treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strengeth, wilfully and unlawfully attacked the victim and shot him with a gun, causing the latters death.
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State established the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the
information
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court held in the negative. The high court pronounced PO2 Valdez guilty of
three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the information not sufficiently alleging the
attendance of treachery. Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any
of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the
offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide
variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime
committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or
qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need
for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal
conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused
sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It should not be difficult to see that
merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the
execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense
that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for
there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion
of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as
an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the information.

CASTILLO v. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 191240
July 30, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Phillip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.Upon their arraignment, respondentand his brother
Ramon pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision finding
Salvador guilty of the crime of Estafa. Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the RTC and acquitted Salvador of the crime of estafa.
Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that even if the court of appeals
decided to acquit him, it should have at least retained the award of damages to the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in acquitting the accused.
DOCTRINE: The SC held in the negative. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This
is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for
damages is "for the same act or omission."
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general
presumption, "that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed
to prove that all the elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even
establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince that she
was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business.
Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance inthis case indicate the weakness of her submissions
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, in the case at bar, the petitioner failed to
prove the same. Thus, the SC affirmed the decision of the CA.