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Soon, Aivan Sisinio A.

Environmental Philosophy

Author: James P. Sterba


Title of Article: Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics
Publisher: The White Horse Press
Year of Publication: 1994
The approach of James Sterbas work Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric
Environmental Ethics is to clarify the debate between the nonanthropocentric-anthropocentric
to environmental ethics, specifically in the debate about the equality of species. He wants to
show the most defensible form from both anthropocentrist and nonanthropocentrist position
regarding to the principle of environmental justice. Despite their theoretical disagreement of both
sides, Sterba wants to present that each position have to agree on a common set of principles for
achieving environmental justice. By converging these two deferent positions, it allows them to
show their strengths and weaknesses of both positions in leading to us to accept same principles
of environmental justice.
In general, the anthropocentrist is taken to believe that there exists a morally relevant
inequality between humans and the nonhuman species, while in the position of the
nonanthropocentrist they deny the idea of existence of such inequality. The aim of Sterba is to
show the despite their differences regarding species equality, both sides would allow for the
exact same rage of preferential satisfaction of human needs over those of nonhuman species.
Sterba begins his defense with the nonanthropocentist position. For Sterba, the important
question to be addressed is whether such commitment to species equality eliminates the
possibility of justifiably preferring humans over nonhuman in situation of conflict. His answer to
this is it can be justified within the case of self-defense according to The Principle of human
Defense, second type of justified preference is it should be occur in the case where human
preservation is at stake in reference to The Principle of Human Preservation for the survival of
human species but unlike the The Principle of human Defense there is no strictly analogous
principle exist in human ethics. , the third principle of justice to sterba clearly argues the both
nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrist should be committed to The Principle of
Disproportionality that species equality requires a distinction between basic and nonbasic need
and a weighting of the former over the latter. Both The Principle of Human Preservation and
The Principle of Disproportionality trade upon the distinction between basic and nonbasic
needs. Sterba employs different standards for qualifying basic needs; for humans the standard is
that of a decent life, whereas for nonhuman that standard is healthy life.

In the other position of the anthropocentrist, are they also committed to the same principle of
environmental justice as the nonanthropocentrist? Sterba would answer that the anthropocentrist
also are committed to the The Principle of human Defense, and not surprisingly given to their
principle that human are superior to nonhuman species. Also with they would find the The
Principle of Human Preservation acceptable for it is an advantage for us human beings but they
would not buy the idea of the Principle of Nonhuman Preservation. Lastly Sterba recognizes , at
first glance it might appear that, given to the assumption that human have greater value in
anthropocentrism than nonhumans, the The Principle of Disproportionality no doubt, can be
said to be a valid principle of environmental justice simply because the basic needs of life always
morally overrides the non-basic needs of life when there is a conflict between the two
irrespective of whose needs they are.
For me I see Sterba has failed to reconcile both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric views of
environmental ethics. I see the whole argument of the author as pointless. Also Why would we
argue on mundane things such as the human superiority over nonhumans? The author has
forgotten the only thing that we possess that the nonhumans do not: reason. The lion might be
stronger, the dolphins sonar system might be far superior to that of ours, and the eagle might be
more sharp-sighted than us. But through our reason, we have made use of the metals below the
ground to give us a fighting chance against the lions. Now, they are under our mercy. Through
our reason, we have created systems that allow us to study the sonar-like capabilities of the
dolphin to improve ours or even to surpass the dolphin. Through our reason, we have created
aids to our eyes that allow our sight to pierce through the heavens and the void beyond,
surpassing the eagle. We cannot help but be superior to the animals and plants. Our reason might
allow us to compromise and compromise on nonhuman needs, but still, our primal nature
geared for survival is still there, and we cannot help but deploy the resources of our rational
faculty towards this primal need, even to the expense of nonhuman needs. Our reason allows
us to choose courses of action that does not violate nonhuman needs, but if we are tied down,
we cannot help but aggress against the basic needs of nonhuman nature, for survival. The author
questions the assertion that humans alone have the capacity to determine the value of things.
Still, the author did not mention the rational faculty in this regard. Why forget such an essential
component of our humanity in considering the question of the theory of value?
The argument of the author should not have been spiced with such nonsense when what he was
trying to tell is that in endorsing anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric ethics, we must favor the
Principle of Human Defense, a Principle of Human Preservation, and a Principle of
Disproportionality. Unless he was trying to shed light on the consequences of failing to recognize
the importance of the three principles (in that case, forgivable, but still very, very flawed in the
form and the way it was used), the employment of such support as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph is as absurd as trying to enter into diplomatic relations with termites.

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