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Environmental Philosophy
In the other position of the anthropocentrist, are they also committed to the same principle of
environmental justice as the nonanthropocentrist? Sterba would answer that the anthropocentrist
also are committed to the The Principle of human Defense, and not surprisingly given to their
principle that human are superior to nonhuman species. Also with they would find the The
Principle of Human Preservation acceptable for it is an advantage for us human beings but they
would not buy the idea of the Principle of Nonhuman Preservation. Lastly Sterba recognizes , at
first glance it might appear that, given to the assumption that human have greater value in
anthropocentrism than nonhumans, the The Principle of Disproportionality no doubt, can be
said to be a valid principle of environmental justice simply because the basic needs of life always
morally overrides the non-basic needs of life when there is a conflict between the two
irrespective of whose needs they are.
For me I see Sterba has failed to reconcile both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric views of
environmental ethics. I see the whole argument of the author as pointless. Also Why would we
argue on mundane things such as the human superiority over nonhumans? The author has
forgotten the only thing that we possess that the nonhumans do not: reason. The lion might be
stronger, the dolphins sonar system might be far superior to that of ours, and the eagle might be
more sharp-sighted than us. But through our reason, we have made use of the metals below the
ground to give us a fighting chance against the lions. Now, they are under our mercy. Through
our reason, we have created systems that allow us to study the sonar-like capabilities of the
dolphin to improve ours or even to surpass the dolphin. Through our reason, we have created
aids to our eyes that allow our sight to pierce through the heavens and the void beyond,
surpassing the eagle. We cannot help but be superior to the animals and plants. Our reason might
allow us to compromise and compromise on nonhuman needs, but still, our primal nature
geared for survival is still there, and we cannot help but deploy the resources of our rational
faculty towards this primal need, even to the expense of nonhuman needs. Our reason allows
us to choose courses of action that does not violate nonhuman needs, but if we are tied down,
we cannot help but aggress against the basic needs of nonhuman nature, for survival. The author
questions the assertion that humans alone have the capacity to determine the value of things.
Still, the author did not mention the rational faculty in this regard. Why forget such an essential
component of our humanity in considering the question of the theory of value?
The argument of the author should not have been spiced with such nonsense when what he was
trying to tell is that in endorsing anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric ethics, we must favor the
Principle of Human Defense, a Principle of Human Preservation, and a Principle of
Disproportionality. Unless he was trying to shed light on the consequences of failing to recognize
the importance of the three principles (in that case, forgivable, but still very, very flawed in the
form and the way it was used), the employment of such support as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph is as absurd as trying to enter into diplomatic relations with termites.