AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.
FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the
convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November
8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.
ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution of
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to
judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both
subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1
violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the
people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample
basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of
delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June
1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF
ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO
18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the
Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently
approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and
holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that,

under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in

question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all
other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
violative to the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to
the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification
of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only
sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment
per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to
form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly
started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing
Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply
with this requirement.

CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

IBP v. ZAMORA
338 SCRA 81
FACTS:
The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. On Januray 17, 2000, the IBP filed the instant petition to declare the
deployment of Philippines Marines unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no emergency situation
would justify the employment of soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is in derogation of
Article II Section 3 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military
HELD:
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
enforcement and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the LOI itself which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of
the Marines authority. The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution and not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and cooperation between the military
and the civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby
dismissed.
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5
implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed
grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to
defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and
protected by the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional
HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that "the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws",
she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the
military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
WHAT COURTS MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

J. Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which
prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another.
Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner,
for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to
the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial
court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of
legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution
wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the
force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or
excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential
decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to
the grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In
the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient.
This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all
circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying
degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be
confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational
connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a
person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which
both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in
addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be said
that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the
purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is
not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court
of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method
toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his
defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of
powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.