Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689.

October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines,
respondent.

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a

male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation
and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was
in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of
the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his
birth certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048
Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special
law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his
or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth

certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be

addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized
at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22,
1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is
admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and
absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree
issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a
naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground
of bigamy.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board
and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio,
herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They
separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time
he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was
in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of

liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation
of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the
latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render
him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions.
With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but
the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond
judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Navarro vs. Judge Damagtoy

259 SCRA 129 Civil Law Family Code Law on Marriage Presumptive
Death; Absent Spouse

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

Rodolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He
submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First,
on September 27, 1994, said judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. On his part, Domagtoy claimed that he merely
relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has
been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn
to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside
his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he
solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the
parties.

HELD:

ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,

or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an

HELD: Yes. Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross
ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wifes presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration,

In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this
time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to
deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age,
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending
a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead
lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with
CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that
the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was

manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to
hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party,
the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle
underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article
3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing
officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8,
which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer
as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They
had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot
inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the
children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void
for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the
nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.
They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed
that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period

cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.

marriage to Norma is still void.

Hence, his

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of
rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted
as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

practically abandoned him; and that his wife committed bigamous

marriage.
REPUBLIC V IYOY (CASE DIGEST)
Facts:
1.

2.

On 25 March 1997, Respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a complaint in the RTC

for the nullity of marriage with his wife Fely, on the ground that after the
celebration of their marriage, he found his wife hot-tempered, nagger
and extravagant.
Then in 1984, Fely left the PH for the US leaving all their five children to
Crasus. After a year, she sent a letter to respondent re seeking divorce
but the latter disregarded the request.

3.

In 1985, respondent learned that Fely got married to an American.

4.

In 1987, Fely went back to the PH with her new husband; respondent
did not bother to talk to her because hes afraid that he might not bear
the pain and sadness.

5.

At the time the complaint was filed, it has been 13years since Fely left
and abandoned respondent and there was no more possibility of
reconciliation between them.

6.

Respondent alleged that Fely has psychological incapacity to perform

marital obligations set forth in the FC.

7.

In 1997, Fely refuted all the allegation about her, instead, argued that
her hot temperance was due to her husbands drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment, hence, the
reason why she left the country was for financial reasons.

8.

9.

She further invokes that although she left, she continued to give support
to her children. She also explained that after the divorce, she was
naturalized as an American Citizen, hence, her status re marriage is
governed by her present nationality.
After both parties filed their respective pre-trial briefs, the RTC gave
them opportunity to present evidence.

10. On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent and Fely null and void ab initio due to Felys
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. Crasus also adequately established that the defendant

11. Petitioner Republic assailed the RTCs decision saying that it was
contrary to law and evidence, hence, filed an appeal to the CA but the
appellate court affirmed the earlier decision of the RTC citing article 26
of the FC saying that to condemn plaintiff to remain shackle in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married
to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital
covenants is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which
this Court finds abhorrent.
12. With such, Petitioner Republic seek an appeal in the SC on the ground
that abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not
per se constitute psychological incapacity.
RULING:
1.

What constitute a psychological incapacity?

1. Citing Santos v CA, the Court stated that psychological
incapacity refers to no less than a mental incapacity that causes
a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.

2.

The only evidence presented by Crasus was his testimony which is put in
question for being self-serving. The evidence is not enough to convince
the Court that Fely had such grave mental illness that prevented her
from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

3.

It is worthy to emphasize that Art 36 contemplates downright incapacity

or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging,
and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent; her marriage to an Am
citizen; and even her flaunting of her American family may be indeed
manifestations of her alleged incapacity, nonetheless, the root cause for such
was not identified. If the root cause f the incapacity was not identified, then, it
cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for review on
certiorari
Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was
shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and
filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman
he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and
was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent
failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the
petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art
26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of
the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26
of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized
Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity
of foreign divorce decree with conformity to aliens national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign
decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage certificate without
judicial order recognizing the said decree. The registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is reversed and
Court ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings
in light of the ruling.

Dedel vs. CA

In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since
then. David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a
mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with
various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with
whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon
is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan
which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan
declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is
intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be
incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual
infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of
psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of
those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters
are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of
marriage.

Republic vs. CA
G.R. No. 108763,
Incapacity]

February

13

1997

[Article

36-

Psychological

FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo got married in 1985 in Manila. During the early years of
their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandered

money with them, his dependency from his parents for financial aid and
dishonesty in matters involving finances. Roridel became the sole breadwinner
of the family. She then resigned her job in Manila and went to Baguio. Reynaldo
left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated in fact for more
than
3
years.
Roridel filed a petition to have their marriage void under Article 36, citing
Reynaldo's psychological incapacity. She presented evidence consisted of her
own testimony, of her two friends, a social worker and a psychiatrist. Reynaldo
did not present any evidence and appeared only during the pre-trial. The RTC
granted the petition, declaring the marriage void. Solicitor General appealed to
the CA. CA denied the appeals and ruled in favor of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not opposing or conflicting personalities constitute psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological
incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code: 1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff; 2) the root cause of PI must be (a)
medically or clinically identified (b) alleged in the complaint (c) sufficiently
proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the decision; 3) it must be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage; 4) it must be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable; 5) it must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the marital obligations of marriage; 6) the marital
obligations must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71, and Articles 220, 221 and
225 in regard of parents and their children; 7) interpretation by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic of Church of the Philippines,
although not binding, should be given great respect; and 8) the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State.
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He

subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that
his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted
second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the
bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not
need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his
second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed
Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws Nationality Principle Divorce Obtained Abroad

In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in

Hong Kong. However, in 1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA.
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was
petitioning that he be granted management rights over a property in Manila
(The Galleon). It was his contention that the divorce decree they obtained
abroad do not apply to properties in the Philippines, hence, despite the divorce,
Reyess property in the Philippines remained conjugal with Upton. Judge Manuel
Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled that the divorce decree issued
by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared national
policy of the Philippines which prohibits divorce.

FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts
for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of
letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went
back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario

HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality (nationality principle).
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,

provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada Upton from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law,
Upton is no longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as
Reyess husband as he is not entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
He is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.