ARTICLE XI: COMPLETE

CASES DIGESTS
Section 3: Impeachment
Proceedings
Francisco vs. De Venecia, G.R. 160261,
Nov. 10,2003
FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2,
2003, former President Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint, which was dismissed,
against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." A day after the dismissal, a
second impeachment complaint was filed against
the Chief Justice. Respondent House of
Representatives argues that the House
impeachment Rules do not violate the
Constitution (Sec. 3(5) of Art. XI), contending
that the term initiate does not mean to file.
ISSUE #1: When is an impeachment complaint
deemed initiated?
RULING: In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint of impeachment
or a citizen files a verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the House through a

resolution of endorsement against an

impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings
against such official are deemed initiated on the
day the Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution against such
official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient
in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of
the Members of the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of
the filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the Secretary
General.
ISSUE #2: Are impeachment proceedings
outside the scope of judicial review?
RULING: No. Our Constitution, though vesting
in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and
(5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,
and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official. The power of judicial
review as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to
include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch
or instrumentality. There exists no constitutional
basis for the contention that the exercise of

judicial review over impeachment proceedings

would upset the system of checks and balances.
The second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional. Having concluded that the
initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Davide on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

Gutierrez vs. House Com. on Justice,

G.R. 193459, Feb. 15, 2011
Facts: The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas
Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for
certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of
September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice (public
respondent). Before the 15th Congress opened
its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth
Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15,
Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22,
2010, private respondents Risa HontiverosBaraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and
Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an

impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon

the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. A day after
the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27,
2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives,
transmitted the impeachment complaint to
House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who, by
Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.
Issue #1: Did the House Committee on Justice
fail to ascertain the sufficiency of form and
substance of the complaints on the basis of the
standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules?
Ruling: No. The Court said that the
determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is an
exponent of the express constitutional grant of
rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives
which
committed
such
determinative function to public respondent. In
the discharge of that power and in the exercise
of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and
substance
of
an
impeachment
complaint. Prudential considerations behoove
the Court to respect the compliance by the
House of its duty to effectively carry out the
constitutional purpose, absent any contravention
of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
Contrary to petitioners position that the
Impeachment Rules do not provide for
comprehensible standards in determining the
sufficiency of form and substance, the
Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that
there must be a verified complaint or
resolution, and that the substance requirement

is met if there is a recital of facts constituting

the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee.
Issue #2: Should the Impeachment Rules be
published to be effective?
Ruling: No. It is within the discretion of
Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that
the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
promulgate a decision means to deliver the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication. It is not for this Court to tell a coequal
branch
of
government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed
a
specific
method
of
promulgation. The Court is in no position to
dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the
dictates of the Constitution. Had the
Constitution intended to have the Impeachment
Rules published, it could have stated so as
categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries. Other than
promulgate, there is no other single formal
term in the English language to appropriately
refer to an issuance without need of it being
published.
Issue #3: Should the impeachment against
Gutierrez be considered a prohibited second
impeachment proceedings initiated within oneyear?
Ruling: Contrary to petitioners asseveration
that within one year from July 22, 2010, no
second impeachment complaint may be accepted
and
referred
to
public
respondent,
Francisco states that the term initiate means to
file the complaint and take initial action on
it. The initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint which must be accompanied with an

action to set the complaint moving. It refers to

the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House
on the complaint is the referral of the complaint
to the Committee on Justice. Petitioner misreads
the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas,
S.J. that no second verified impeachment may
be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action which contemplates a
situation where a first impeachment complaint
had already been referred. Bernas and
Regalado,
who
both
acted
as amici
curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of
initiating includes the act of taking initial action
on the complaint. From the records of the
Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the
term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress'
taking initial action of said complaint. Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee
on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third
of the members of the House of Representatives
with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may
not be filed against the same official within a
one year period.
Issue #4: Should an impeachment complaint
only allege one impeachable offense under the
one offense, one complaint rule of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure?
Ruling: The Court says: without going into
the effectiveness of the suppletory application of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out

the relevant constitutional provisions, which

prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress,
and without delving into the practicability of the
application
of
the one
offense
per
complaint rule, the initial determination of
which must be made by the House which has yet
to pass upon the question, the Court finds that
petitioners invocation of that particular rule of
Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to
state that the Constitution allows the indictment
for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment,
assembled in one set known as the Articles of
Impeachment. It, therefore, follows that an
impeachment complaint need not allege only
one impeachable offense.

Section 4: Sandiganbayan
Desierto vs. Carandang, G.R. no. 148076,
Jan. 11, 2011
Facts: Antonio Carandang is the general
manager if the television network RPN. In his
tenure, he was charged with grave misconduct
before the Ombudsman. The charge says that he
had entered into a contract with AT
Broadcasting Incorporated in which he had
financial and material interests. The said
transaction is tantamount to grave misconduct
under the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
In this said petition, Carandang
challenges the jurisdiction over him of the of the
Ombudsman and of the Sandiganbayan on the
ground that he was being held to account for acts
committed while he was serving as general
manager and chief operating officer of Radio

Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), which was not

a government-owned or -controlled corporation;
hence, he was not a public official or employee.
Issue: As general manager and chief operating
officer of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. does
the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
Carandang?
Ruling: The Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan
have jurisdiction over administrative cases
committed exclusively by the officials and
employees if government owned and govt
controlled corporations(in which a government
directly or indirectly owns or controls at least
majority or 51% share of the capital stock.
Consequently, RPN is neither a government
owned or controlled corporation. The
government may have shares in RPNs capital
stock but it is only 32.4%. In conclusion, the
petition is meritorious and Carandang is correct
that the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan have
no jurisdiction over him for being an employee
of a private company.

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 180122,

March 13, 2009
Facts: Sandiganbayan tried and affirmed graft
charges against Felicimo Lazarte Jr., an engineer
and chair of the National Housing
Authority(NHA). He allegedly used public
funds amounting to P230,000 to pay a Makatibased construction company for a ghost
project(financing a project that is not part of a
plan) in Bacolod City.
Further, he was accused of conspiring
with fellow officers;namely, Josephine Angsico,
Virgilio Dacalos, Robert Balao, and Josephine

Espinosa. They filed a motion to quash the

allegation, and after a thorough investigation,
the court dismissed the charges of the alleged
conspirants for failure to prove participation, but
it retained Lazartes charge.
Issue: As department manager of the NHA
(Salary Grade 26), does the Sandiganbayan have
jurisdiction over petitioner Lazarte?
Ruling: The Court sustains the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no
moment that petitioner does not occupy a
position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a
department manager of the NHA, a governmentowned or controlled corporation, at the time of
the commission of the offense, which position
falls within the scope of its jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees, including those
in
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law. NHA being part of that.
Further, the position of manager in a
government-owned or controlled corporation, as
in the case of Philhealth, is within the
jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the
position that petitioner holds, not her salary
grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan---- that which includes the
position held by Lazarte.

Section 6: Ombudsman as an
Independent Body
Ombudsman versus- CSC, G.R. No. 162215,
July 30, 2007
Facts: The Court is called upon to settle once
again a controversy between two independent

constitutional bodies and delineate the limits of

their respective powers. In the exercise of its
mandate, this Court reaffirms its commitment to
constitutionalism and the rule of law. The
controversy traces its roots to Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelos letter dated July 28, 2003
to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
requesting the approval of the amendment of
qualification standards for Director II positions
in the Central Administrative Service and
Finance and Management Service of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Acting thereon, the CSC
issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 dated January
23, 2004 disapproving the request.
Issue: What is the extent of CSCs power of the
personnel
organization,
staffing
and
qualification over the employees of the
Ombudsman?
Ruling: Under the Constitution, the Office of
the Ombudsman is an independent body. As a
guaranty of this independence, the Ombudsman
has the power to appoint all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman,
except his deputies. This power necessarily
includes the power of setting, prescribing and
administering the standards for the officials and
personnel of the Office. To further ensure its
independence, the Ombudsman has been vested
with the power of administrative control and
supervision of the Office. This includes the
authority to organize such directorates for
administration and allied services as may be
necessary for the effective discharge of the
functions of the Office, as well as to prescribe
and approve its position structure and staffing
pattern. Necessarily, it also includes the
authority to determine and establish the
qualifications,
duties,
functions
and
responsibilities of the various directorates and
allied services of the Office. This must be so if

the constitutional intent to establish an

independent Office of the Ombudsman is to
remain meaningful and significant. Since the
responsibility
for
the
establishment,
administration and maintenance of qualification
standards lies with the concerned department or
agency, the role of the CSC is limited to
assisting the department or agency with respect
to these qualification standards and approving
them. The CSC cannot substitute its own
standards for those of the department or agency,
especially in a case like this in which an
independent constitutional body is involved.

Section 13: Ombudsmans Powers

Boncalon vs. Ombudsman, G.R. 171812,
Dec. 28, 2008
Facts: On November 25, 1997, Loida C.
Arabelo, the State Auditor II of Bago City,
Negros Occidental, conducted an audit on the
cash accounts of Boncalon, a Cashier IV
at Bago City Treasurers Office. The audit
revealed a cash shortage of P1,023,829.56. The
state auditor also discovered, upon verification
from the depository bank, that the entry in
Boncalons cashbook pertaining to the deposit of
P1,019,535.21 on October 31, 1997 was false. D
eposits totaling said amountwere made only on
November 25, 1997 and December 22, 1997, in
the amounts of P200,000.00 and P819,535.21,
respectively. In view of the audit findings,
Boncalon was administratively charged with
dishonesty before the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas)
.Issue: Is the Ombudsman limited only to the
power to recommend, but not to impose, the

penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,

censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee?

Ruling: Ombudsman has the power to directly

impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an
erring public official, other than a member of
Congress and the Judiciary, within the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority as
provided for in Section 13(3), Article XI of the
1987Constitution, and Section 15(3) of Republic
Act No. 6770. While Section 15(3) of RA 6770
states that the Ombudsman has the power to
recommend, removal, suspension, demotion
of government officials and employees, the same
Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in
the alternative may enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21of RA 6770.
The word or in Section 15(3) before the phrase
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 grants the Ombudsman this
alternative power. Section 21 of RA 6770 states
that, the power of disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the
Government, except impeachable officers,
members of Congress, and the Judiciary vests in
the ombudsman. And under Section 25 of RA
6770, the Ombudsman may impose in
administrative proceedings the
penalty ranging from suspension without pay for
one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits
or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed,
illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of
the ombudsman.

Ombudsman vs. Samaniego, G.R. no.

175573, Oct. 5, 2010
Facts: This is a resolution of the second motion
for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner
Office of the Ombudsman to our decision dated
September 11, 2008, particularly a
pronouncement with respect to the stay of the
decision of the Ombudsman during the
pendency of an appeal:
Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,
the court held that the mere filing by respondent
of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the
joint decision against him. Respondents prayer
for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction (for purposes of staying the execution
of the decision against him) was therefore a
superfluity. The execution of petitioners joint
decision against respondent should be stayed
during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.
Issue: Is the Ombudsmans decision imposing
the penalty of suspension for one year
immediately executor pending appeal?
Ruling: Yes. The court ruled, The decision of
the Ombudsman is immediately executory
pending appeal and may not be stayed by the
filing of the appeal or the issuance of an
injunctive writ. An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory. In case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by
reason of the suspension or removal. The

Ombudsmans decision imposing the penalty of

suspension for one year is immediately
executory pending appeal. Moreover, Section
13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes
the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its
own rules of procedure. In this connection,
Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 also provide that the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power to promulgate its
rules of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions and duties
and to amend or modify its rules as the interest
of justice may require. For the CA to issue a
preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty
imposed by the Ombudsman in an
administrative case would be to encroach on the
rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Section 15: Ill-gotten Wealth and

Prescription
Republic vs Cojuangco, GR No. 166859,
April 12, 2011
Facts: Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., served as a
public officer during the Marcos administration.
During the period of his incumbency as a public
officer, he acquired assets, funds, and other
property grossly and manifestly disproportionate
to his salaries, lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property. . Having fully
established himself as the undisputed coconut
king with unlimited powers to deal with the
coconut levy funds, the stage was now set for
Cojuangco to launch his predatory forays into
almost all aspects of Philippine economic
activity namely: softdrinks, agribusiness, oil

mills, shipping, cement manufacturing, and

textile.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. taking undue
advantage of his association, influence and
connection, acting in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, and the individual defendants,
embarked upon devices, schemes and
stratagems, including the use of defendant
corporations as fronts, to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people, such as when he misused
coconut levy funds to buy out majority of the
outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel
Corporation in order to control the largest agribusiness, foods and beverage company in the
Philippines.
Issues: (1) What is the concept and concurring
elements of ill-gotten wealth? (2) Were
Cojuangcos SMC illegally acquired with
coconut levy-funds?
Ruling (1): In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Co., Inc., this Court described ill-gotten
wealth as follows: Ill-gotten wealth is that
acquired through or as a result of improper or
illegal use of or the conversion of funds
belonging to the Government or any of its
branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
financial institutions, or by taking undue
advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence, resulting
in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and
grave damage and prejudice to the State. And
this, too, is the sense in which the term is
commonly understood in other jurisdiction.
The two concurring elements to be
present before assets or properties were
considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they
must have originated from the government
itself, and (b) they must have been taken by

former President Marcos, his immediate family,

relatives, and close associates by illegal means.
Ruling (2): No. The Republic did not discharge
its burden as the plaintiff to establish by
preponderance of evidence that the respondents
SMC shares were illegally acquired with
coconut-levy funds. The Court finds its evidence
insufficient to prove that the source of funds
used to purchase SMC shares indeed came from
coconut levy funds. Its evidence do not suffice
to prove the material allegations in the complaint
that Cojuangco took advantage of his positions
in UCPB and PCA in order to acquire the said
shares.

Republic vs. Cojuangco, G.R. no. 139930,

June 26, 2012
Facts: This case, which involves another
attempt of the government to recover ill-gotten
wealth acquired during the Marcos era, resolves
the issue of prescription.
On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro
D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes,
Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma
incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.
(UNICOM), with an authorized capital stock
of P100 million divided into one million shares
with a par value of P100 per share. On
September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM
directors approved another amendment to
UNICOMs capitalization. About 10 years later
or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a complaint for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 against
respondents, before the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG). About nine years
later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a

Memorandum, stating that although it found

sufficient basis to indict respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action
has already prescribed. In a
Memorandum, dated May 14,
1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved
the OSPs recommendation for dismissal of the
complaint. The OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration on the Office of the
Ombudsmans action but the latter denied the
same; hence, this petition.
Issue: May the prosecution of offenses arising
from, relating or incident to, or involving illgotten wealth contemplated in Section 15,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution be barred by
prescription?
Ruling: Yes. The court already settled
in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto that Section 15,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only
to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
not to criminal cases such as the complaint
against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus,
the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating
or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth
contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution may be barred by
prescription. Prescription of actions is a valued
rule in all civilized states from the beginning of
organized society. It is a rule of fairness since,
without it, the plaintiff can postpone the filing of
his action to the point of depriving the
defendant, through the passage of time, of access
to defense witnesses who would have died or
left to live elsewhere, or to documents that
would have been discarded or could no longer
be located. Moreover, the memories of
witnesses are eroded by time. There is an
absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar

actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to

file in court

Section 17: SALN

Re: request for copy of 2008 statement of
assets, liabilities and networth [saln] and
personal data sheet or curriculum vitae of
the justices of the supreme court and
officers and employees of the judiciary,
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012
Facts: In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena
C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ),
sought copies of the Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices
of this Court for the year 2008. She also
requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the
Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating
their database of information on government
officials. Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer
also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of
the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court
of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated
purpose. Since then, several requests for copies
of the SALN and other personal documents of
the Justices of this Court, the CA and the
Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed.
Issue: Are the information contained in the
SALN matters of public concern necessitating
public disclosure?
Ruling: Yes. While public concern like
public interest eludes exact definition and has
been said to embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know,
either because such matters directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, the

Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI,

has classified the information disclosed in the
SALN as a matter of public concern and interest.
In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from
the right to know. Both of constitutional
origin, the former is a command while the latter
is a permission.