Civil Procedure NOTES

CASE NO. 1. PNB VS. SANAO MRKTG. CORP.
FACTS
01. LOAN Priv ate resps. & PNB secured by a REM covering several parcels of land situated in Camarines
Sur & Naga City.
02. EF - for failure of priv ate resps. to pay at maturity.
03. NOTI CE OF EFS announced that the sale of 13 titles cov ering 14 parcels of land located in
Camarines Sur & Naga City is scheduled on MAR. 22, 1999 at 9AM / soon thereafter, at the entrance
of the MTC of Pili, Cam. Sur. (This notice w as published in the Feb. 7, 14, 21 issues of Vox Bikol)
04. PCS dated Apr. 26, 1999 certified by Atty. Clav ecilla that on Mar. 22, 1999, at exactly 10AM, he sold
at a public auction at the LOBBY of the RTC, Hall of Justice, Naga City, the mortgaged properties to
PNB for P213k+, w /c amount the latter considered as proportionate payment of prs loan.
05. REGI STRY of PCS w / the RD of Cam Sur.
06. ACTI ON for NULLIFICATI ON of PCS & Auction Proceedings by priv . resps. w / the RTC of Naga City
07. PET. for the I ssuance of WOP w / the RTC of Pili, Cam. Sur by PNB ov er the properties covered by 7
TCTs.
08. I SSUANCE of WOP despite Opposition by priv ate resps.
09. MR w / Opposition was denied.
10. Pet. for Certiorari & Prohibition under R65 w/ the CA by priv . resps. alleging that the application for
EF was not submitted to the proper COC after payment of the filing fee, in contrav ention w/ SC
Administrativ e Order No. 3 & AC No. 3-98; & that the foreclosure sale was null & v oid for having been
held at the RTC of Naga City & not at the entrance of the MTC of Pili, Cam. Sur as published.
11. CA ruled in FAVOR of RESPS. Because of the lapses committed by Atty. Clav ecilla in the conduct of
the foreclosure proceedings, the PCS upon w /c the issuance of the WOP w as based, is fatally infirm, &
that consequently, the WOP w as not v alidly issued as the procedural requirements for its issuance
w ere not satisfied.
12. Pet. for Rev . under R45 w / the SC by PNB.
ISSUES
13. Did the CA err in holding that the procedural requirements in the conduct of the EF w as not complied
w /, thus, the issuance of the WOP w as not proper?
14. WON the CA committed an error in granting the resp.s pet. for rev . on certiorari & prohibition under
R65.
15. WON the pet. should be dismissed because pet. failed to append a SPA/BR to support the authority
of the signatory in the CNFS, failed to disclose that there w as another action pending, & that PNB
failed to mov e for reconsideration before filing the instant pet.
HELD
16. YES. PNB has sufficiently established its right to the WOP. I t presented as documentary exhibits the
contract of REM & the PCS on the face of w /c appears proof of its registration w/ the RD in Cam. Sur.
Since the lands w ere not redeemed w /in one year from the registration of the PCS, it should follow ,
therefore that PNB has acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the WOP. The RTC had a
MI NISTERI AL DUTY to issue that w rit, as it did actually, upon motion, conformably to S7 of Act No. 3135.
The CA erred in ruling that the WOP w as w rongfully issued despite the existence of procedural
lapses.
The judge to w hom an application for WOP is filed NEED NOT LOOK into the VALI DITY of the
mortgage / the MANNER of its foreclosure.
I n the issuance of a WOP, NO DI SCRETI ON I S LEFT to the trial ct. Any question regarding the
cancellation of the w rit / in respect of the v alidity & regularity of the public sale should be
determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in S8, Act. 3135.
17. YES. Considering that the RTC of Pili issued the WOP in compliance w / the prov s. of Act No. 3135, & as
a ministerial duty, I T CANNOT BE CHARGED W/ GRAVE ABUSE OF DI SCRETI ON. Absent grave abuse of
discretion, resps. should have filed an ordinary appeal instead of a pet. for certiorari.
The soundness of the order granting the WOP is a MATTER OF JUDGMENT w/ respect to w/c the
remedy is ordinary appeal.
Palpably, the CA exceeded its jurisdiction w hen it granted resps. pet. for certiorari.
18. The SC held that there w as SUBSTANTI AL COMPLIANCE w/ the PROCEDURAL REQS. of the Ct.
Although belatedly filed, the Resolution of the PNB Board dated Oct. 8, 1997, authorizing Mrs.
Amon to prosecute & defend cases for &// against the bank, amply demonstrates the
signatorys authority to sign & v erify the instant pet.
PNB w as likewise not obliged to disclose the alluded case pending before the CA as it w as not
initialed by the bank &, more importantly, the subject matter & the properties inv olved therein
are altogether different.
The contention that the Ct should not entertain the pet. until a MR has been filed does not hold
w ater where the proceeding in w /c the error occurred is a patent nullity.
Thus, a MR may be dispensed w / in the instant case.
Case Digest Page 1
TORRES RACAZA and TORRES PARAS vs. GOZUM
FACTS
01. Plaintiffs are the registered co-ow ners of a parcel of land w / 3-door apartment. The property w as
formerly ow ned by the father of the plaintiffs, the late Carlos Torres.
02. I n 1981, Ernesto Gozum occupied the back portion of the property on a P3,500.00 monthly rental &
continued to occupy the same ev en after the death of Carlos Torres on Dec. 26, 1993.
03. On Jul. 1, 1995, plaintiffs sent Gozum a letter of demand to v acate the premises.
04. After a failed barangay conciliation, on Nov . 24, 1995, plaintiffs commenced an ejectment case
w /c w as dismissed due to a technicality.
05. Tw o years after, the plaintiffs again sent a letter of demand to v acate & said that the v erbal
contract to lease has already expired & that the defendant already discontinued payment of
monthly rentals.
06. An accion publiciana w as filed w / the RTC.
a. Defendants filed a MTD alleging that unlaw ful detainer must be filed, w /c w as how ev er denied
because RTC said that an unlaw ful detainer must be filed w /in 1 yr from the notice to v acate giv en
as early as Jul. 1, 1995 & since ov er 2 yrs had passed w hen the case w as filed, the proper action is
accion publiciana & no longer unlaw ful detainer.
b. Defendant thereafter filed his answ er assev erating that he has a 10-year contract of lease ov er the
premises executed betw een him & plaintiffs late father on Oct. 1, 1989 to expire on Sept. 30, 1999 &
so, the notice to v acate & the present case w ere all prematurely done.
c. Defendant likew ise denied the allegation that he has not been paying rentals.
01. When it w as elev ated to the CA, the appellate ct. rev ersed the decision of the RTC & dismissed the
case, holding that the low er ct. had no jurisdiction ov er the complaint for accion publiciana
considering that it had been filed before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the last letter of
demand to resp. had been made. The CA ruled that the proper remedy of Prs. should hav e been
an action for unlaw ful detainer filed w / the municipal / metropolitan trial ct.
ISSUE
Whether the proper action is unlaw ful detainer / accion publiciana
HELD
I t should be accion publiciana.
To summarize, Prs. claim that (1) they are the ow ners of the property, being the successors-ininterest of the original ow ners; (2) their predecessors-in-interest entered into a v erbal lease
agreement w / resp. on a month-to-month basis; (3) they decided to terminate the v erbal
lease contract upon the expiration of the last monthly term sometime in 1995; & (4) on Jul. 1,
1995, they demanded that resp. leav e the property, but resp. refused to do so.
Undeniably, the foregoing av erments constitute a cause of action that is based primarily on
unlaw ful depriv ation / w ithholding of possession. Prs. seek the recov ery of the possession of the
leased premises follow ing the lapse of the term of the v erbal lease contract entered into by
Prs. predecessors-in-interest w / resp.. The allegation that the contract is on a month-to-month
basis becomes material in this sense because it signifies that the lease contract is terminable at
the end of ev ery month.
Thus, Prs. may exercise their right to terminate the contract at the end of any month ev en if
none of the conditions of the contract had been v iolated, & such right cannot be defeated by
the lessee's timely payment of the rent / by his w illingness to continue doing so.
Moreov er, ev en if the month-to-month agreement is only on a v erbal basis, if it is show n that
the property is needed for the lessors ow n use / for the use of an immediate member of the
family / for any of the other statutory grounds to eject, then the lease is considered terminated
as of the end of the month, after proper notice / demand to v acate has been giv en. At this
juncture, it must be pointed out that notice / demand to v acate had been properly serv ed
upon resp. through the letter dated Jul. 1, 1995.
Defendants say that the date should be reckoned from May 27, 1997 & not Jul. 1, 1995.
To reiterate, the allegation that the lease w as on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to
saying that the lease expired ev ery month. Since the lease already expired mid-year in 1995 as
communicated in Prs. letter dated Jul. 1, 1995, it w as at that time that resp.s occupancy
became unlaw ful.
Moreov er, a perusal of the May 27, 1997 letter show s that it merely reiterated their original
demand for resp. to v acate on the basis of the expiration of the v erbal lease contract
mentioned in the first letter.
I n sum, more than one year has lapsed from the letter to v acate & hence, the proper remedy
w ould be accion publiciana & not a case for unlaw ful detainer.
[1]
A trial ct has no authority to interfere w/ the proceedings of a ct. of equal jurisdiction.

Case Digest Page 2
[1]
A trial ct has no authority to interfere w/ the proceedings of a ct. of equal jurisdiction.
[2]
A final order / judgment is one that finally DISPOSES of a case, LEAVING NOTHING MORE to the ct to do w/ respect to it. It is an ADJUDICATIONON THE
MERITS which, considering the eveidence presented at the trial, DECLARES CATEGORICALLY WHAT THE RIGHTS & OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES ARE; / it
may be an order / judgment that DISMISSES an action.
[3] Disgruntled - to make somebody feel dissatisfied & irritated.
[4] Iota - a very small amount of something.
Case Digest Page 3
RUBEN SANTOS vs. Sps. TONY AYON & MERCY AYON

FACTS
01. A Complaint for illegal detainer (CC3506-B-96) on Nov. 6, 1996 by Ruben Santos
w/ the MTCC, vs Sps Tony & Mercy Ayon.
01. Pr. av erred that he is the registered ow ner of three lots situated at Lanzona
Subdiv ision, Matina, Davao City, covered by TCT Nos. 108174, 108175, & 108176.
Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land
cov ered by TCT No. T-247792.
02. The prev ious occupant of this property built a building w hich straddled both the
lots of the herein parties.
03. Resps. hav e been using the building as a w arehouse.
04. Pr. further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, w hen he bought the three lots, he
informed resps. that the building occupies a portion of his land. How ever, he
allow ed them to continue using the building.
05. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that
resps. demolish & remov e the part of the building encroaching his property & turn
ov er to him their possession.
06. But they refused. I nstead, they continued occupying the contested portion & even
made improv ements on the building.
07. The dispute w as then referred to the "barangay lupon", but the parties failed to
reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to
file action w as issued.
02. In their answer, resps. sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the ct.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the

parties. Resps. denied they were occupying Pr.s property by mere tolerance,
claiming they own the contested portion & have been occupying the same
long before Pr. acquired his lots in 1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of Pr..
On appeal, the RTC, in its Decision CC25, 654-97, affirmed "in toto "the MTCC
judgment.
Resps. then elevated the case to the CA through a petition for review.
In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by Pr., the CA held
that Pr.s proper remedy should have been an "accion" "publiciana "before the
RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus: In this case, petitioners were
already in possession of the premises in question at the time private respondent
3 lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a
building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private
respondents bare claim, no evidence was alluded to show that petitioners
possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-in-interest. The fact that
respondent might have tolerated petitioners possession is not decisive. What
matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of
petitioners possession from its inception. & in this regard, the Ct. notes that the
complaint itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been
occupying a portion of the above properties of the plaintiff for the past several
yrs. by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff. Nowhere is it alleged that his
predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners possession of the premises.
Consequently, respondent should present his claim before the RTC in an "accion
publiciana "& not before the MTC in a summary proceeding of unlawful
detainer.
Pr. filed a MR, but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review on "certiorari
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed a reversible error of law in holding that Pr.s
complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.
HELD
YES. It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a ct. over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint & cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.
This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed w/ the proper
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts & the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession
Case Digest Page 4
Courts, which actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession
but also all claims for damages & costs arising therefrom.
The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the
defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in
his pleadings & the question of possession cannot be resolved w/out deciding
the issue of ownership.
Under S1, R70 of the RCP, there are two entirely distinct & different causes of
action, to wit:
(1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from
the defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; &
(2) a case for unlaw ful detainer, w hich is an action for recovery of possession from
defendant w hose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by v irtue of a
contract (express or implied) w / the plaintiff, but became illegal w hen he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
Pr.s complaint for unlaw ful detainer in CC 3506-B-96 is properly w ithin the competence
of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:
4. That defendants (spouses) hav e constructed an extension of their residential house
as w ell as other structures & hav e been occupying a portion of the abov e PROPERTI ES
of the plaintiff for the past sev eral yrs. by v irtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at
the time he has no need of the property;
5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 & made demands to the
defendants to v acate & turn ov er the premises as w ell as the remov al (of) their
structures found inside the PROPERTI ES of plaintiff; that w /out any justifiable reasons,
defendants refused to v acate the portion of the PROPERTI ES occupied by them to the
damage & prejudice of the plaintiff.
6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Brgy. Captain of Matina
Crossing 74-A, Dav ao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of
February 1996. The "barangay" case reached the "Pangkat" but no settlement w as had.
Thereafter, a Certification To File Action dated Mar. 27, 1996 w as issued.
Verily, Pr.s allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful
detainer. We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over Pr.s complaint.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of
the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful w/out necessarily employing
the terminology of the law.
Here, there is an allegation in Pr.s complaint that resps. occupancy on the
portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Pr.s cause of action for
unlawful detainer springs from resps. failure to vacate the questioned premises
upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) yr. therefrom, or on
November 6, 1996, Pr. filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession
becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand made by the owner.
Our ruling in "Roxas vs. CA" is applicable in this case: A person who occupies
the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, w/out any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.
Case Digest Page 5
JUSTINO LARESMA vs. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA
FACTS
01. On May 24, 1994, resp. Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint w / the RTC of Toledo,
Cebu, Branch 29, against Laresma, a farmer, for recov ery of possession of Lot 4-E of
subdiv ision plan psd. 271428, a parcel of agricultural land located in Tampa-an,
Aloguinsan, Cebu. The lot had an area of 21,223 square meters cov ered by TCT No.
47171. He alleged, inter alia, that since 1985, the Pr. had been a lessee of a certain
Socorro Chiong, whose agricultural land adjoined his ow n; & that sometime in 1985, the
Pr., by means of threat, strategy, & stealth, took possession of his property & depriv ed
him of its possession. The resp. prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in his fav or, ordering the Pr. to v acate the property & pay him actual
damages, attorneys fees, & expenses of litigation. Appended to the complaint w as a
contract of lease executed by the Pr.s w ife, Praxedes Seguisabal Laresma, on March 1,
1977, ov er a parcel of land owned by Socorro Chiong covered by Tax Declaration No.
05561.
02. The Pr. av ers that he & his w ife Praxedes became ow ners of Lot No. 00013 by v irtue of
CLT No. 0-031817 w hich w as aw arded in the latters fav or. As such, they are entitled to
the possession of the lot. The Pr. contends that unless & until CLT No. 0-031817 is nullified
in a direct action for the said purpose before the DARAB, they cannot be ev icted from
the said property. He posits that the action of the resp. against him in the RTC for
recovery of possession of real property is, in reality, an indirect attack on the CLT issued
to his w ife w hich is proscribed by the ruling of this Ct. in Miranda v . CA. He asserts that
the decision of the trial ct. declaring him in illegal possession of the property & not a de
jure tenant of the resp. operates as an illegal forfeiture / cancellation of the CLT.
03. For his part, the resp. asserts that his complaint against the Pr. did not indirectly assail the
CLT issued to the latters wife. He contends that his action w as one for the recovery of
his possession of a portion of his property Lot 4-E cov ered by TCT No. 47171, & not that of
Lot No. 00013 cov ered by CLT No. 0-031817 w hich is a portion of Lot 4-C ow ned by his
aunt Socorro Chiong. He notes that the Pr. himself admits that he has nev er been his
agricultural tenant ov er his property. Consequently, the resp. concludes, the trial ct.
correctly ruled that the dispute betw een him & the Pr. is civ il in nature & w /in its
exclusiv e jurisdiction.
ISSUES
First WON the action of the resp. in the trial ct. is in reality an indirect attack on the
v alidity of CLT No. 0-031817 issued to Praxedes Laresma in the guise of an action for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) of the property covered by TCT No. 47171;
Second WON the RTC had jurisdiction ov er the action of the resp.; &
Third WON the Pr. is liable for damages in fav or of the resp.
RULING
We agree w / the resp. that the DARAB had no jurisdiction ov er his action against the Pr..
The bone of contention of the parties & the decisiv e issue in the trial ct. w as WON Lot
No. 00013 cov ered by CLT No. 0- 031817 is a portion of Lot 4-E cov ered by TCT No. 47171
under the name of the resp.. This is the reason w hy the parties agreed to hav e Lot No.
00013 resurv eyed in relation to Lot 4-C ow ned by Socorro Chiong & to Lot 4-E titled in
the name of the resp.. After a calibration of the ev idence on record & the reports of
Epan & Nav arro, the trial ct. ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C ow ned by
Socorro Chiong & not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of the resp.: I n v iew of the absence of
the abov e-mentioned indispensable requisites / any one of them in order to establish
the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship between plaintiff & defendant, as
earlier mentioned, does not make defendant a de jure tenant under the Land Reform
Program of the gov t under existing tenancy law s.
The Pr. has not assailed the aforequoted findings of the trial ct. in the petition at bar;
1
Case Digest Page 6
The Pr. has not assailed the aforequoted findings of the trial ct. in the petition at bar;
hence, he is bound by the said findings.
We agree w/ the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material av erments of his
complaint, the action of the resp. against the Pr. is not an agrarian dispute w /in the
exclusiv e jurisdiction of the DARAB. The w ell-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction
of the ct. ov er the subject matter of the action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint & the law , irrespective of WON the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all / some of the claims / reliefs sought therein. I n Movers-Baseco I ntegrated
Port Serv ices, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corp., w e ruled that the jurisdiction of the ct. ov er
the nature of the action & the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the ct. / upon a MTD for, otherw ise, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is v ested,
the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.
We also held in Arcelona v . CA that, in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision
arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not
necessarily from the face of the judgment only.
I t must be stressed that the regular ct. does not lose its jurisdiction ov er an ejectment
case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged
existence of a tenancy relationship betw een the parties. But it is the duty of the ct. to
receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. I f, after hearing, tenancy
had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the ct. should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
I t is axiomatic that the nature of an action & the jurisdiction of a tribunal are
determined by the material allegations of the complaint & the law at the time the
action w as commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal ov er the subject matter / nature of
an action is conferred only by law & not by the consent / w aiv er upon a ct. w hich,
otherw ise, would hav e no jurisdiction over the subject matter / nature of an action.
Lack of jurisdiction of the ct. ov er an action / the subject matter of an action cannot be
cured by the silence, acquiescence, / even by express consent of the parties. If the ct.
has no jurisdiction ov er the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu /
motu proprio. A decision of the ct. w/out jurisdiction is null & void; hence, it could never
logically become final & executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly /
collaterally.
We agree w/ the ruling of the trial ct. that based on the material allegations of the
resp.s complaint & even on the admission of the Pr., the latter had never been an
agricultural tenant of the resp.. I n fact, the resp. claimed that based on the CLT issued to
his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As such, the DARAB
had no jurisdiction ov er the said action.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the
parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to
establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner & the tenant /
agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant / agricultural lessee; & 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner & the tenant
/ agricultural lessee.
In Vda. de Tangub v. CA, we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is
limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts & land tenure-related problems; & c) approval &
disapproval of the conversion, restructuring / readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, & other non-agricultural uses.
Prs. & priv ate resp. hav e no tenurial, leasehold, / any agrarian relations w hatsoever that
could hav e brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform law s.
Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction ov er the controversy & should not hav e
taken cognizance of priv ate resp.s petition for injunction in the first place.
How ever, we find & so hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction ov er the action of the resp.
I n this case, the resp. filed his complaint against the Pr. on May 24, 1994. Hence, the
Case Digest Page 7
I n this case, the resp. filed his complaint against the Pr. on May 24, 1994. Hence, the
jurisdiction of the regular ct. ov er the nature of this action is gov erned by RA No. 7691,
w hich took effect on April 15, 1994. S3 thereof amended S33 of BP Blg. 129, & reads:
S33. Jurisdiction of MTCs: MTCs shall exercise (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, / possession of, real property, / any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property / interest therein does not exceed P20k /, in civil actions in MM, where such
assessed value does not exceed P50k exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses & costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
On the other hand, S1 of the Rule amending S19 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. RTCs shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdictions: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, / possession of, real
property, / any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20k
/, in civil actions in MM, where such assessed value does not exceed P50k exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses & costs: Provided, That in cases
of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
The actions env isaged in the aforequoted provisions are accion publiciana &
reinv indicatoria. To determine which ct. has jurisdiction ov er the action, the complaint
must allege the assessed v alue of the real property subject of the complaint / the
interest thereon.
I n this case, the complaint of the resp. against the Pr. for recov ery of possession of real
property (accion publiciana) reads:
3. That plaintiff is the owner & possessor of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. T-47171 of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu;
4. That defendant is the tenant of the land of Socorro P. Chiong, which adjoins the parcel
of land owned by the plaintiff as shown by a leasehold;
5. That sometime in 1985, by means of threats, strategy, & stealth, the herein defendant
took possession of the parcel of land owned by herein plaintiff, thus effectively depriving
plaintiff of the possession thereof;
6. That the defendants, while illegally occupying the land of herein plaintiff, cut trees, &
harvested the fruits of said land causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of
P50,000.00;
7. That despite demand, defendant has refused to vacate said land & return the
possession thereof to herein plaintiff, thus compelling the plaintiff to file the present action;
8. In filing the present action, the plaintiff engaged the services of counsel for P10,000.00 &
expects to incur expenses of litigation in the amount of P5,000.00.
The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed v alue of Lot 4-E cov ered
by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no show ing on the face of the complaint that the RTC
had exclusiv e jurisdiction over the action of the resp.. Moreover, as gleaned from the
receipt of realty tax payments issued to the resp., the assessed v alue of the property in
1993 w as P8,300.00.
Patently then, the MTC, & not the RT, had exclusiv e jurisdiction over the action of the
resp.. Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision, are null & v oid.
Case Digest Page 8
CASE NO. 15 CESAR T. HILARIO, et al. vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR,

resp. Heirs of SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, resps.-intervenors.
Saturday, March 22, 2014
4:03 PM NO. 15 CESAR
CASE
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
T. HILARIO, et al. vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, resp. Heirs of

SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, resps.-intervenors.
FACTS
Prs. are co-owners of a parcel of land located in Romblon.
In 1996, they filed a complaint w/ the RTC of Romblon vs resp., alleging
that as co-owners, they are entitled to possession of the lot, & that resp.
constructed his house thereon w/out their knowledge & refused to vacate
the property despite demands to do so. They prayed for the private resp.
to vacate the property & restore possession thereof to them.
The complaint, however, failed to allege the assessed valueof the land.
Nevertheless, Prs. were able to present during the trial the most recent Tax
Dec., w/c shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.
The resp. filed a MTD on theground of lack of jurisdiction because of the
failure to allege the value of the land. The motion was denied.
Resp. then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the
complaint, contending that Prs. had no cause of action against him since
the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the
Mr. & Mrs. Salustiano Salvador.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Prs.
On appeal,the CA reversed the decision, holding that the action was one
for the recovery of ownership & possession of real property, & that absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the
MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action. The CA then ordered the
refiling of the case in the proper ct..
ISSUE
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
HELD
NO. Pr. argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion
reivindicat oria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus,
regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive
jurisdiction falls w/in the said ct. This argument is w/out merit.
The jurisdiction of the ct. over an action involving title to / possession of
land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property & not
the market value thereof.
In the case in controversy, the complaint does not contain an allegation
stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The ct.
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed / market value of land. The Ct.
noted that during the trial, the Prs. adduced in evidence a tax dec.,
showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00.
ThePrs., however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the Tax Dec.
containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their
complaint in 1996.
Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the
same in 1995 / 1996, the MTC, & not the RTC had jurisdiction over the
Case Digest Page 9
same in 1995 / 1996, the MTC, & not the RTC had jurisdiction over the
action of the Prs., since the case involved title to / possession of real
property w/ an assessed value of less than Php20,000.00.
As the CA had held:The determining jurisdictional element for the accion
reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property
in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the
assessed value exceeds Php20,000.00, & the MTC, if the value is
Php20,000.00 / below.
An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the
municipality where the property is located, & is contained in the Tax Dec.
In the case at bench, the most recent Tax Dec. secured & presented by
the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that
the property was worth Php 3.5M, not to mention that there is absolutely
no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an
assessed value.
It is the amount in the Tax Dec. that should be consulted & no other kind
of value, & as appearing in Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00. The case,
therefore, falls w/in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC of
Romblon w/c has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is
located, & not the ct. a quo.
Case Digest Page 10
CASE NO. 14. VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. CA & Heirs of JUAN

DE LA CRUZ
CASE
4:03 PMNO. 14. VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. CA & Heirs of JUAN DE LA CRUZ
FACTS
01. Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land w/ Compensation &
Damages against Pr. before the RTC Br. XI of Tuao, Cagayan.
02. They alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land containing
13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan.
03. In the mid-70s, Pr. started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
a.
b.
01.
a.
b.
property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of resps.

In 1993, they asked Pr. to remove the house as they planned to construct a
commercial building on the property; that Pr. refused, claiming ownership over
the lot; & that they suffered damages for their failure to use the same.
Pr. filed a MTD claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under RA
No. 7691 arguing that since the 346 sq m lot w/c he owns adjacent to the
contested property has an assessed value of P1,730.00, the assessed value of
the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount.
RTC denied the MTDstating that the action was in the nature of accion
publiciana.
Upon appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE
WON the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved.
WON the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property involved.
HELD
NO. The doctrine on w/c the RTC anchored its denial of Pr.'s MTD, as affirmed by
the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession / accion publiciana lies w/ the
RTCs regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true.
As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the
assessed value of w/c is below P20k, if outside Metro Manila; & P50k, if w/in.
The Ct. has also declared that all cases involving title to / possession of real
property w/ an assessed value of less than P20k if outside Metro Manila, falls
under the original jurisdiction of the MTC
Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever
mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the resps.
Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC / the MTC has original &
exclusive jurisdiction over the Pr.'s action. The ct.s cannot take judicial notice of
the assessed / market value of the land.
Jurisdiction of the ct. does not depend upon the answer of the defendant /
even upon agreement, waiver / acquiescence of the parties. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the ct. over the nature of the action & the subject matter thereof
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the ct. / upon a
MTDfor, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
the defendant.
Considering that the resps. failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value
of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the MTD.
Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null & void,& the CA erred in
affirming the RTC.
Case Digest Page 11
affirming the RTC.
Case Digest Page 12
CASE NO. 13 DANILO DUMO & SUPREMA DUMO vs. ERLINDA

ESPINAS, et al.
4:04 PM
CASE NO. 13 DANILO DUMO & SUPREMA DUMO vs. ERLINDA ESPINAS, et al.
FACTS
01. A complaint for forcible entry w / prayer for the issuance of a TRO &// PI w as filed by sps.
Danilo & Suprema Dumo v s resps. w / the MTC of Bauang, La Union, docketed as
CC881. I n their complaint, Prs. alleged:
a. That plaintiffs are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy land w/ all the improvements
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
standing thereon, located in Paringao, Bauang, La Union, w/ an area of 1, 514 sq. m., covered
by Tax Dec. No. 22839;
That on Nov. 17, 1995, Severa Espinas filed a civil complaint before this same ct., docketed as
CC857, entitled Quieting of Title &// Ownership & Possession against sps. Sandy & Presnida
Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same real property, for w/c plaintiffs seeks that
the Ct takes judicial notice of the same;
That although a decision has been rendered against the defendants in CC857, the same was
not enforced as per Sheriffs return dated Nov. 4, 1996, attached to the records of CC857;
That on Oct. 30, 1996, at about 1:45 P.M., all defendants acting for the interest of Severa Espinas,
apparently disgruntled[3] w/ the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the
questioned real property, & in open defiance w/ the official action taken by the sheriff, took it
upon themselves, employing force, intimidation, & threat, to enter the said question real
property, & despite protestations made by plaintiffs, who were there then present & visibly
outnumbered by defendants & their agents who were armed w/ sticks, bolos, hammers, & other
deadly weapons, successfully drove out plaintiffs, & took over the premises; that arrogantly, the
defendants were boasting aloud that they were under instructions by the judge to do just
that to forcibly enter & take over the premises; that defendants while inside the premises,
demolished & totally tore down all the improvements standing thereon, consisting of, but not
limited to shed structures intended for rent to the public;
That defendants are still in the premises to date, & have even started putting & continuously
putting up structures thereon;
That the plaintiff being the rightful owner of the disputed property & not being a party in CC857,
can never be bound by the proceedings thereon; that the acts of defendants in forcibly
entering the property of plaintiff, & taking over the same w/out no lawful basis is patently a
violation of her proprietary rights, the commission & the continuance of the unlawful acts
aforementioned of defendants verily works injustice to plaintiffs;
01. Prs. prayed for the payment of actual damages in the amount of P75k, lost earnings of
P5k per day, moral damages of P100k & attorneys fees in the amount of P50k.
02. On Nov . 12, 1996, the MTC issued a TRO directing the defendants to cease & desist from
destroying / demolishing the improvements found on the subject land & from putting up
structures thereon.
03. I n its Order of Jan. 15, 1997, the MTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
04. I n their Answer, resps. contended as part of their Special & Affirmativ e Defenses:
a. That Sps. Marcelino & Severa Espinas purchased the questioned parcel of land from Carlos
Calica in 1943;
b. That said parcel of land has been declared for taxation purposes under their name & the real
estate taxes have been religiously paid;
c. That said parcel of land has been surveyed, w/c Plan Psu-202273 is duly approved by the
Director of Land, w/ an area of 1,065 sq. m. more / less;
d. That to remove & clear all doubts & cloud over the ownership of said parcel of land, CC857 was
filed & after hearing, decision was rendered declaring herein defendants the lawful owners of
said parcel of land;
e. That under & by virtue of said Decision, defendants entered, occupied & possessed said land, &
in the exercise of their right of ownership, cleaned the same of illegally constructed structures
w/c were done w/out the knowledge & consent of herein defendants;
01. After trial, the MTC rendered judgment holding that Prs. w ere able to prov e their right of
possession over the subject property.
Case Digest Page 13
possession over the subject property.

02. Aggriev ed by the decision of the MTC, resps. appealed the case to the RTC of Bauang,
La Union. I t was docketed as CC1099-BG.
03. I n a letter filed w / this Ct. dated Jul. 24, 1998, RTC Judge w ho handles CC1099-BG,
requested that she be allow ed to inhibit herself from further sitting in said case on the
ground that the Prs. hav e filed an administrativ e complaint against her for partiality, &
by reason of such complaint she honestly feels that she can no longer continue
deciding CC1099-BG w /out bias & unnecessary pressure. However, in SCs Resolution,
the request w as denied on the ground that the mere filing of an administrativ e
complaint does not preclude a judge from deciding a case submitted to him/her for
resolution. Hence, Judge Molina-Alim proceeded in deciding the case.
04. I n its Decision, the RTC rev ersed & set aside the Decision of the MTC & dismissed the
case filed by the Prs., Sev era Espinas had a possession antedating that of the latter.
Ev en if the possession of plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest, Sps. Pedro & Bernardo
Trinidad since 1951, were to be considered, still, Sev era Espinas enjoys the priority of
possession long before the filing of the instant case on Oct. 30, 1996. Under these
circumstances, priority in time should be the piv otal cog in resolv ing the issue of
possession.
05. What is more, Sev era Espinas was never divested of her possession except in 1987 w hen
the plaintiffs put up the retaining seaw all on the w estern portion & cyclone wire on the
southern portion of the property w/out Sv eras consent. Despite the latters
protestations, plaintiffs continued to introduce these improvements & challenged her to
file a suit in Ct. & lately, in CC857, w hen Saldy & Fresnida Saldaa tried to encroach on
the property claiming ownership thereof.
06. What is more, the possession of Sev era Espinas since 1943 w as bolstered by the decision
rendered in the land registration case, as w ell as in the CC, w herein she w as declared
the ow ner of the property in question.
07. Hence, the MTC erred in finding plaintiffs to hav e priority of possession. On the contrary,
defendants ev idence is v ery clear that Sev era Espinas & her husband had been in
actual, open, continuous, adv erse in the concept of ow ner, possession of the land
since 1943.
08. I n addition, the ev idence of possession presented in the land registration & quieting of
title cases surely dispels any iota[4] of doubt that may exist in regard to the possession of
defendant Sev era Espinas over the subject property.
09. As regards the issue on the award of damages: The rule is settled that in forcible entry /
unlaw ful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recov ered is the fair rental v alue
/ the reasonable compensation for the use & occupation of the leased property. The
reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of
rightful possession; hence, the damages w /c could be recovered are those w/c the
plaintiff could hav e sustained as a mere possessor, / those caused by the loss of the use
& occupation of the property, & not the damages w /c he may hav e suffered but w/c
hav e no direct relation to his loss of material possession (Araos v s. CA, 232 SCRA 770).
10. Then too, under S17 of R70, in forcible entry & unlaw ful detainer, the monetary aw ard is
limited to the sum justly due as arrears of rent / as reasonable compensation for the use
& occupation of the premises, attorneys fees & costs. I n this case, the MTC erred in
aw arding damages w/c are not the reasonable compensation for the use &
occupation of the property. Rather, these are damages w /c may hav e been suffered
by plaintiffs w/c hav e no direct relation to the use of material possession, hence, should
not hav e been awarded.
11. Besides, the award of P30k as actual damages plus P500/day as loss earnings has no
factual & legal basis, hence, should hav e been disallow ed.
12. True, the aforecited rule now allows attorneys fees to be aw arded, but the grant of the
same must be in accordance w / Art.2208 of the Civ . Code w /c in all cases must be
reasonable. The aw ard of attorneys fees by the MTC lacks basis. The body of the
appealed decision indeed does not show justification for the aw ard. Hence, there is no
basis for such aw ard, w /c, consequently, should have been removed. The pow er of the
Case Digest Page 14
basis for such award, w/c, consequently, should have been removed. The pow er of the
Ct. to aw ard attorneys fees under the above cited article, demands factual, legal &
equitable justification. I ts basis cannot be left to speculation & gesture.
13. Prs. then filed a Pet. for rev iew w / the CA. On Oct. 14, 1999, the CA promulgated the
presently assailed Decision setting aside the judgment of the RTC & reinstating w/
modification the decision of the MTC, by deleting the awards for actual, moral &
exemplary damages.
Prs. filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the same w as denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated Feb. 18, 2000.
Hence, the present Pet.
ISSUE/S
1. WON Decision rendered by the RTC is null & v oid because it v iolates Prs.
constitutional right to due process considering that Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim
w ho sat during the trial & penned the questioned RTC decision had prev iously admitted
her bias against Prs.
2. WON the RTC had no authority to rev erse the judgment of the MTC respecting the
aw ard of damages & the CA did not hav e jurisdiction to rule on the matter of damages
because this issue was not raised in the appeal filed before it.
3. WON the RTC & CA erred in holding that actual, moral & exemplary damages
cannot be aw arded in ejectment cases.
HELD
1. NO. A critical component of due process is a hearing before a tribunal that is impartial &
disinterested. Every litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. All the other elements of due process, like notice & hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision were to come from a biased judge. S1 of R137 of the RoC
provides: S 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge / judicial officer shall sit in any case in w/c he,
/ his wife / child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor / otherwise, / in w/c he is
related to either party w/in the sixth degree of consanguinity / affinity, / to counsel w/in the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, / in w/c he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee / counsel, / in w/c he has presided in any inferior ct. when his
ruling / decision is the subject of review, w/out the written consent of all parties in interest, signed
by them & entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just / valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory & voluntary. The instances
mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively presume that judges
cannot actively & impartially sit in a case. The second paragraph, w/c embodies voluntary
inhibition, leaves to the discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for
other just & valid reasons, w/ only their conscience as guide.
To be sure, judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, & out of such suspicions a suggestion is made
of record that they might be induced to act w/ prejudice for / against a litigant, they
should conduct a careful self-examination. Under the second paragraph of the cited
Section of the Rules of Ct., parties have the right to seek the inhibition / the disqualification
of judges who do not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial / independent in
handling a case. Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on their own
sound discretion. That discretion is a matter of conscience & is addressed primarily to
their sense of fairness & justice.
However, judges are exhorted to exercise their discretion in a way that the peoples faith in
the ct.s of justice would not be impaired. A salutary norm for them to observe is to reflect
on the possibility that the losing parties might nurture at the back of their minds the thought
that the former have unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against them. Of course, the
judges right must be weighed against their duty to decide cases w/out fear of repression.
Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just &
valid causes. The mere imputation of bias / partiality is not enough ground for them to
inhibit, especially when the charge is w/out basis. This Ct. has to be shown acts / conduct
clearly indicative of arbitrariness / prejudice before it can brand them w/ the stigma of
bias / partiality.
Case Digest Page 15
bias / partiality.
In a string of cases, the SC has said that bias & prejudice, to be considered valid reasons
for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved w/ clear & convincing evidence.
Equally important is the established doctrine that bias & prejudice must be shown to have
resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the
judge learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented & the conduct observed by
the magistrate, such opinion -- even if later found to be erroneous -- will not prove personal
bias / prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be inferred from the
decision / the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice /
corrupt purpose. At bottom, to disqualify a judge, the movant must prove bias & prejudice
by clear & convincing evidence.
In any case, Prs. contention that they have been deprived of due process is denied by the
fact that they were able to appeal the questioned RTC Decision to the CA via a Pet. for
review &, subsequently, file a MR of the CA Decision. The essence of due process is found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard & submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. What the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. As
long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would
have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the
essence of due process.
2. NO. We hav e held that an appellate ct. is clothed w / ample authority to rev iew
rulings ev en if they are not assigned as errors. This is especially so if the ct. finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case before it.
We hav e consistently held that an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned, / upon w /c a determination of the question raised by the error
properly assigned is dependent, w ill be considered by the appellate ct.
notw ithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.
Prs. admit in the present Pet. that herein resps., in their appeal w / the RTC, raised
the question of WON the prev ailing party may be aw arded damages. Since this
issue had been seasonably raised, it became open to further ev aluation. I t was
only logical & natural for the RTC to deal w / the question of w hether Prs. are
indeed entitled to the damages aw arded by the MTC.
Moreover, even if the issue on damages w as not raised by resps. in their appeal w /
the RTC, it is not erroneous on the part of the RTC to delete the award of damages
in the MTC decision considering that the RTC judgment reversed the decision of the
MTC. I t w ould be the height of inconsistency if the RTC sustained the award of
damages in favor of herein Prs. when, in the same decision, it reversed the MTC
judgment & dismissed the complaint of Prs.
3. NO. The SC agrees w/ the CA & the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to aw ard
actual, moral & exemplary damages in v iew of the settled rule that in ejectment cases,
the only damage that can be recov ered is the fair rental v alue / the reasonable
compensation for the use & occupation of the property.
Although the MTCs order for the reimbursement to Prs. of their alleged lost
earnings ov er the subject premises, w/c is a beach resort, could hav e been
considered as compensation for their loss of the use & occupation of the property
w hile it w as in the possession of the resps., records do not show any evidence to
sustain the same.
Thus, w e find no error in the ruling of the RTC that the aw ard for lost earnings has
no ev identiary / factual basis; & in the decision of the CA affirming the same.
Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession,
damages w /c could be recovered are those w /c the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, / those caused by the loss of the use & occupation
of the property, & not the damages w /c he may hav e suffered but w /c have no
direct relation to his loss of material possession.
Case Digest Page 16
CASE NO. 12. MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A.

PANDAY
4:05 PM NO. 12. MA.
CASE
FACTS
LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY
01. Resps. filed a Pet. w/ the RTC for quo warranto w/ Damages & Prayer for
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
Mandatory & Prohibitory Injunction, Damages & Issuance of TRO against herein
Prs..
Resps. alleged that they had been members of the board of directors & officers
of St . John Hospital, Inc., but Prs., who are also among the incorporators &
stockholders of said Corp., forcibly & w/ the aid of armed men usurped the
powers w/c supposedly belonged to resps..
RTC Branch 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in Naga City.
However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case
folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a
ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative
jurisdiction.
RTC Branch 58 then proceeded to issue & serve summons on Prs..
Prs. filed their Answer raising therein the affirmative defenses of improper venue,
lack of jurisdiction, & wrong remedy of quo warranto.
Thereafter, the other Prs. also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative
defenses. All the parties were then required to submit their respective
memoranda. RTC Br.58 denied the MTD & ordered the case remanded to the RTC
Naga City w/c under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special ct.
to try & decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.
Petioner then filed a Pet. for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether a branch of the RTC w/c has no jurisdiction to try & decide a
case has authority to remand the same to another co-equal ct..
HELD
The assailed order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a Pet. under Rule 45.
An order denying a MTDis merely interlocutory & therefore not appealable, nor
can it be the subject of a Pet. for review on certiorari.
Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal
from the judgment after trial.
The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to
trial, & if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment.
However in the int erest of just ice & t o prevent more violence bet ween t he
part ies, the ct. preceded to give due course to a case despite the wrong
remedy resorted by the Pr..
Evidently, the RTC Br58 lacks jurisdiction over resps. Pet. for quo warranto. Based
on the allegations in the Pet., the case was clearly one involving an intracorporate dispute. The trial ct. should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799
& the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Ct., RTC-Br. 58 was never
designated as a Special Commercial Ct.; hence, it was never vested w/
jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SC.
Such being the case, RTC Br.58 did not have the requisite authority / power to
order the transfer of the case to another branch of the RTC.
The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the Pet.
Case Digest Page 17
order the transfer of the case to another branch of the RTC.

The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the Pet.
for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the filing of the Pet. w/ the RTC Br.58 w/c had no
jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.
Case Digest Page 18

4:05 PM
CASE NO. 11. HILARION M. HENARES, JR vs. LAND

TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING & REGULATORY BOARD
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
& DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS

FACTS
Asserting their right to clean air, Prs. contend that the bases for their
Pet. for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use
CNG as an alternativ e fuel, lie in S16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v . Factoran, & Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999.
Prs. attempted to compel judicial action against the ban of air
pollution & related env ironmental hazards.
Prs. alleged that the particulate matters such as complex mixtures of
dust, dirt, smoke, & liquid droplets emitted into the air from v arious
engine combustions hav e caused detrimental effects on health.
Prs. av er that other than the writ applied for, they hav e no other
plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Prs. insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the v ery
same S3, R65 of the Rev ised Rules of Ct. that the Solicitor General
inv okes.
ISSUE
WON mandamus lies to compel the use of CNG.
HELD
Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of gov t to a
coordinate branch, for the obv ious reason that neither is inferior to
the other. The need for future changes in both legislation & its
implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Ct.,
especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides,
comity w/ & ct.esy to a coequal branch dictate that we giv e
sufficient time & leeway for the coequal branches to address by
themselv es the env ironmental problems raised in this Pet.. The Clean
Air Act designates the DENR to set the emission standards for fuel use
& the task of dev eloping an action plan. As far as motor v ehicles are
concerned, it dev olv es upon the DOTC & the line agency whose
mandate is to ov ersee that motor v ehicles prepare an action plan &
implement the emission standards for motor v ehicles, namely the
LTFRB. Regrettably, howev er, the plain, speedy & adequate remedy
herein sought by Prs., i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
Case Digest Page 19
resps. to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is

av ailable only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined
by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the resps.
LTFRB & the DOTC to order owners of motor v ehicles to use CNG. At
most the LTFRB has been tasked to grant preferential & exclusiv e
Certificates of Public Conv enience / franchises to operators of NGVs
based on the results of the DOTC surv eys.
Case Digest Page 20
CASE NO. 10. WACKWACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E.
WON alias RAMON LEE & BIENVENIDO A. TAN
CASE
4:07 PMNO. 10. WACKWACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE
& BIENVENIDO A. TAN

FACTS
01. I n its amended & supplemental complaint for interpleader of Oct.23, 1963, Pr., a nonstock, civ ic & athletic Corp. duly organized under the law s of the Phils., w / principal
office in Mandaluyong, Rizal, alleged:
a. for its first cause of action, that Lee E. Won claims ownership of its MFC(membership fee
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
certificate) 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in CC26044 of the CFI of Manila, & also by
virtue of MFC201-Serial No.1478 issued on Oct. 17, 1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy CoC of
CFI of Manila, for & in behalf of the president & the secretary of the Corp. & of the People's Bank
& Trust Co. as transfer agent of the said Corp., pursuant to the order of Sep. 23, 1963 in the said
case;
that Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid MFC201 by
virtue of MFC201-Serial No.1199 issued to him on Jul. 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in
his favor by "Swan, Culbertson & Fritz," the original owner & holder of MFC 201;
that under its articles of incorporation & by-laws the Corp. is authorized to issue a maximum of
400 MFCs to persons duly elected / admitted to proprietary membership, all of w/c have been
issued as early as Dec. 1939;
that it claims no interest whatsoever in said MFC201;
that it has no means of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof;
that it is w/out power to issue two separate certificates for the same MFC201, / to issue another
MFC to Lee, w/out violating its articles of incorporation & by-laws; &
that MFC201-serial no. 1199 held by Tan & the MFC 201-serial No. 1478 issued to Lee proceed
from the same MFC 201, originally issued in the name of "Swan, Culbertson & Fritz".
For its second cause of action, it alleged MFC 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy CoC of
CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corp. is null & void because issued in violation of its by-laws, w/c
require the surrender & cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before
issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president &
secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in CC26044 is not binding
upon Tan, holder of MFC 201-serial no. 1199;
that Tan is made a party because of his refusal to join it in this action / bring a separate action to
protect his rights despite the fact that he has a legal & beneficial interest in the subject matter of
this litigation; &
that he is made a part so that complete relief may be accorded herein.
j.
k. The Corp. prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee & Tan to interplead & litigate
their conflicting claims; & (b) judgment be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of
the tw o is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, & ordering the surrender
& cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of
Lee.
l. I n separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds
of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, & bar by prescription.
These motions were duly opposed by the Corp.
m. Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment & failure to state a cause of action w ell
taken, the trial ct. dismissed the complaint, w/ costs against the Corp.
ISSUE
WON there is propriety & timeliness in the filing of the remedy of interpleader.
HELD
A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to ct.. He
need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader w/in a reasonable time after a dispute
has arisen w/out waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he
may be barred by laches / undue delay.
But where he acts w/ reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the
Case Digest Page 21
remedy is not barred.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after
judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,
especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment & neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where
judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by
one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
The Corp. has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for
interpleader in CC26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves
their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered
against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it.
By then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to
show that lie has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. & since the
Corp. is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly
improper & unavailing.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corp. had already been
made independently liable in CC26044 &, therefore, its present application for interpleader
would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the
appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the
aforesaid CC&, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights
anew, & thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, w/c is one of the purposes of an
interpleader suit, w/ the possiblity that the benefits of the final judgment in the said CCmight
eventually be taken away from him; & because the Corp. allowed itself to be sued to final
judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for w/c
reason it is barred by laches / unreasonable delay.
Case Digest Page 22
CASE NO. 9. ALEJANDRO NG WEE VS. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

4:07 PM
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
CASE NO. 9. ALEJANDRO NG WEE VS. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

FACTS
Alejandro Ng Wee, a v alued client of Westmont Bank (now United Ov erseas Bank),
made sev eral money placements totaling P210,595,991.62 w / the bank's affiliate,
Westmont I nv estment Corp. (Wincorp), a domestic entity engaged in the business
of an inv estment house w/ the authority & license to extend credit.
Sometime in Feb. 2000, Pr. receiv ed disturbing new s on Wincorp's financial condition
prompting him to inquire about & inv estigate the co.'s operations & transactions w /
its borrow ers.
He then discov ered that the co. extended a loan equal to his total money
placement to a Corp. [Pow er Merge] w / a subscribed capital of only P37.5M. This
credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to
another Corp. [Hottick Holdings].
When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case against it & its
surety.Settlement was, howev er, reached in w /c Hottick's president, Virata,
assumed the obligation of the surety.
Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp & Hottick's president, Pr.'s money
placements were transferred w/out his know ledge & consent to the loan account
of Pow er Merge through an agreement that v irtually freed the latter of any liability.
Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp & its officers & directors, Pr.
w as enticed to roll ov er his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to
Virata/Power Merge.
Finding that Virata purportedly used Pow er Merge as a conduit & conniv ed w /
Wincorp's officers & directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit w /out any
intention of paying the said placements, Pr. instituted, on Oct. 19, 2000, CC00-99006
for damages w/ the RTC of Mla. One of the defendants impleaded in the complaint
is herein resp. Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman & Director of Wincorp.
On Oct. 26, 2000, on the basis of the allegations in the complaint & the Oct. 12,
2000 Affidav it of Pr., the trial ct. ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties not exempt from execution of all the defendants
in the CCsubject, among others, to Pr.'s filing of a P50M-bond.
The w rit w as, consequently, issued on Nov . 6, 2000.
Arguing that the w rit w as improperly issued & that the bond furnished w as grossly
insufficient, resp., on Dec. 22, 2000, moved for the discharge of the attachment. The
other defendants likew ise filed similar motions.
On Oct. 23, 2001, the RTC, in an Omnibus Order, denied all the motions for the
discharge of the attachment.
The defendants, including resp. herein, filed their respectiv e motions for
reconsideration but the trial ct. denied the same on Oct. 14, 2002.
I ncidentally, w hile resp. opted not to question anymore the said orders, his codefendants, Virata & UEM-MARA Philippines Corp. (UEM-MARA), assailed the same
v ia certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA, howev er, denied the certiorari Pet. on Aug. 21, 2003, & the MR thereof on
Mar. 16, 2004.
I n a Pet. for review on certiorari before the SC, in G.R. No. 162928, w e denied the Pet.
& affirmed the CA rulings on May 19, 2004 for Virata's & UEM-MARA's failure to
sufficiently show that the appellate ct. committed any rev ersible error.
We subsequently denied the Pet. w / finality on Aug. 23, 2004.
On Sept. 30, 2004, resp. filed before the trial ct. another Motion to Discharge
Case Digest Page 23
16.
Attachment, re-pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the
follow ing additional grounds: (1) that he w as not present in Wincorp's board
meetings approving the questionable transactions; & (2) that he could not have
connived w/ Wincorp & the other defendants because he & Pearlbank Securities,
Inc., in w/c he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the co. as they were also
victimized by its fraudulent schemes.
17. Ruling that the grounds raised w ere already passed upon by it in the previous orders
affirmed by the CA & the SC, & that the additional grounds were resp.'s affirmative
defenses that properly pertained to the merits of the case, the trial ct. denied the
motion in its Jan. 6, 2005 Order.
18. W/ the denial of its MR, resp. filed a certiorari Pet. before the CA. On Sept. 14, 2005,
the appellate ct. rendered the assailed Decision rev ersing & setting aside the
aforementioned orders of the trial ct. & lifting the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to
the extent that it concerned resp.'s properties.
19. Pr. moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the CA denied the same in
its Jan. 6, 2006 Resolution. Thus, Pr. filed the instant Pet.
ISSUE
WON THE CA COMMI TTED SERI OUS LEGAL ERROR I N RESOLVI NG FAVORABLY THE
GROUNDS ALLEGED BY RESP. I N HI S PET. & LI FTI NG THE WRI T OF PRELI MI NARY
ATTACHMENT, SI NCE THESE GROUNDS ALREADY RELATE TO THE MERI TS OF
CC00-99006 W/C, UNDER PREVAI LI NG JURI SPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE USED AS BASI S
FOR DI SCHARGI NG A WRI T OF PRELI MI NARY ATTACHMENT.
HELD
I n the case at bench, the basis of Pr.'s application for the issuance of the w rit of
preliminary attachment against the properties of resp. is S1(d) of R57 of the RoC w/c
pertinently reads: S1. Grounds upon w /c attachment may issue.- At the
commencement of the action / at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff /
any proper party may hav e the property of the adv erse party attached as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recov ered in the follow ing cases: x
xxx (d) I n an action against a party w ho has been guilty of a fraud in contracting
the debt / incurring the obligation upon w /c the action is brought, / in the
performance thereof.
For a w rit of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show
the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be
inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt / failure to comply w/ his
obligation.
The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to
defraud the creditor.
I n the instant case, Pr.'s Oct. 12, 2000 Affidav it is bereft of any factual statement that
resp. committed a fraud.
The affidav it narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction betw een Wincorp &
Virata &// Power Merge, w/c, by the w ay, explains w hy this Ct., in G.R. No. 162928,
affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter.
The affidav it, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to
how the fraud imputed to resp. was committed for the ct. to decide WON to issue
the writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that resp., at
the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan / intention not to
pay, / w/out any showing of how resp. committed the alleged fraud, the general
av erment in the affidav it that resp. is an officer & director of Wincorp w ho allegedly
conniv ed w / the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
I n the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give
a hint about what constituted the fraud & how it was perpetrated because
established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.
Case Digest Page 24
established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.

Verily, the mere fact that resp. is an officer & director of the co. does not necessarily
give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud / that he connived w/ the other
defendants to commit a fraud.
While under certain circumstances, ct.s may treat a Corp. as a mere aggroupment
of persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the
wrongdoing has been clearly & convincingly established.
Let it be stressed that the prov isional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh &
rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation & annoyance. The rules gov erning its
issuance are, therefore, strictly construed against the applicant, such that if the
requisites for its grant are not show n to be all present, the ct. shall refrain from issuing
it, for, otherwise, the ct. w/c issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.
Likew ise, the writ should not be abused to cause unnecessary prejudice. I f it is
wrongfully issued on the basis of false / insufficient allegations, it should at once be
corrected.
Considering, therefore, that, in this case, Pr. has not fully satisfied the legal
obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by
resp., the trial ct. acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of
preliminary attachment against the properties of resp.
Case Digest Page 25
CASE NO. 8 - ANITA MANGILA, VS. CA, ET AL.

4:08 PM
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
CASE NO. 8 - ANITA MANGILA, VS. CA, ET AL.

FACTS
Pr. Mangila is an importer of sea goods w ho engaged in the serv ices of the resp.,
the ow ner of a freight forwarding business. The Pr. failed to pay the priv ate resp. on
sev eral shipments made by the latter.
Priv ate resp. filed a civ il action against Pr. Mangila for the collection of sum of
money amounting to P106,376. How ev er, the sheriff failed to serv e the summons
because according to the help found at the Pr.s residence the latter had left for
Guam.
Construing Pr.s departure from the Philippines as done w / intent to defraud her
creditors, priv ate resp. filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On Sept. 26, 1988,
the trial ct. issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment against Pr.. The follow ing day,
the trial ct. issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
Subsequently, a Notice of Lev y was serv ed upon the help of the Pr..
On Nov . 7, 1988, the Pr. filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment w /out
submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial ct.. She pointed out that up to then,
she had not been serv ed a copy of the Complaint & the summons. Hence, Pr.
claimed the ct. had not acquired jurisdiction ov er her person. The ct. granted her
motion for Discharge of Attachment upon her filing of a counter-bond. How ev er,
the Ct. did not rule on its jurisdiction / the w rit of preliminary attachment.
On Dec. 26, 1988, priv ate resp. applied for an alias summons, w /c the trial ct. issued
on Jan. 19, 1988. I t was only on Jan. 26, 1989 that summons w as finally serv ed on Pr..
The case pursued & on the day of the pre-trial, the trial ct. issued an Order
terminating the pre-trial & allowing the priv ate resp. to present ev idence ex-parte.
The Trial Ct. ruled in fav or of priv ate resp..
The Pr. receiv ed a copy of the Decision, ordering Pr. to pay resp. P109,376.95 plus 18
percent interest per annum, 25 percent attorneys fees & costs of suit.
ON appeal, the Pr. included the question of v alidity of the w rit of preliminary
attachment. Howev er, the CA affirmed the decision of the TC & upheld the v alidity
of the w rit of preliminary attachment.
Hence, this Pet..
ISSUE
WON the writ of preliminary attachment w as v alid?
HELD
NO. This Ct. has long settled the issue of w hen jurisdiction ov er the person of the
defendant should be acquired in cases w here a party resorts to prov isional
remedies. The Pr. contends that because of failure to serv e summons on Pr. /
simultaneously w / the w rits implementation, Pr. claims that the trial ct. had not
acquired jurisdiction ov er her person & thus the serv ice of the w rit is v oid. The ct.
agrees w / the contention of the Pr..
Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy
at the commencement of the action / at any time thereafter.
This phrase refers to the date of filing of the complaint w /c is the moment that marks
the commencement of the action. The reference plainly is to a time before
summons is serv ed on the defendant, / ev en before summons issues. The grant of
the prov isional remedy of attachment inv olv es three stages:
first, the ct. issues the order granting the application;
Case Digest Page 26
first, the ct. issues the order granting the application;

second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the w rit; &
third, the w rit is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction ov er the person of the
defendant be first obtained.
How ev er, once the implementation of the w rit commences, the ct. must hav e
acquired jurisdiction ov er the defendant for w /out such jurisdiction, the ct. has no
pow er & authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing
from the Ct. will not bind the defendant.
I n the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment w as issued on Sept. 27,
1988 & implemented on Oct. 28, 1988.
How ev er, the alias summons was serv ed only on Jan. 26, 1989 / almost three months
after the implementation of the w rit of attachment.
The trial ct. had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on Sept. 27 since a
motion for its issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action.
How ev er, on the day the writ was implemented, the trial ct. should hav e, prev iously
/ simultaneously w/ the implementation of the w rit, acquired jurisdiction ov er the Pr..
Yet, as w as shown in the records of the case, the summons w as actually serv ed on
Pr. sev eral months after the writ had been implemented.
Case Digest Page 27
CASE NO. 07 MIGUEL PEREZ RUBIO vs. HON SAMUEL REYES, et.al.
4:09 PM
CASE NO. 07 MIGUEL PEREZ RUBIO vs. HON SAMUEL REYES, et.al.
FACTS
01. It appears that the Perez Rubio sps. owned shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. registered in
their names & in the names of Joaquin Ramirez & Joaquin Ramirez, Jr.
02. The Perez Rubios, w/ the conformity of the Ramirezes, sold said shares to Robert O. Phillips & Sons,
Inc. for P5.5M payable in installments & other conditions agreed upon.
03. Phillips & Sons, Inc., & Phillips, himself & his wife, entered into an agreement w/ the Perez Rubios
deferring payment of the Apr. 30, 1964 installments already overdue to Aug. 31, 1964.
04. In the meantime, Phillips, in his behalf & in that of his wife & ROPSI entered into negotiations for
the sale of their shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, Inc. to Alfonso Yuchengco.
05. Upon being informed of this, the Perez Rubios, through their attorney-in-fact, Joaquin Ramirez,
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
First
Second
reminded the Phillips sps. & the ROPSI in writing of their obligations under the contract of sale &
reminded them in particular that the shares subject matter thereof were still subject to the
payment of the unpaid balance of the sale price. They gave a similar notice to Alfonso
Yuchengco, but expressed no objection to the sale provided the obligations in their favor were
satisfied.
the Phillips through their attorney, sent a letter to the Perez Rubios telling them, in substance, that
the only obstacle to the consummation of the Phillips-Yuchengco sale of the shares of stock of
Hacienda Benito, Inc. was their letter of Nov. 24, 1964 & warned that unless the same was
withdrawn by Mar. 29, they would seek redress elsewhere.
On Mar. 27, 1965, the Perez Rubios, for their part, wrote Phillips that due to the latter's inability to
comply w/ the former's conditions, the negotiations going on between them were cancelled, &
should the full amount due to them remained unpaid by noon of Mar. 31, 1965, they would file
action in ct. in the afternoon thereof.
Original Complaint w/ prayer for issuance of a TRO &// ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
(CC8632) w/ the CFI by ROPSI, et al. vs. Miguel Perez Rubio to prevent & restrain defendant from
further unlawful & willful interference w/ the transaction between the plaintiff Corp. w/ Alfonso T.
Yuchengco on the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc., & from enforcing
whatever amount he may claim to be due to them from the plaintiffs under the Agreements
after the approval of the injunction bond.
Upon an "ex-parte" Pet. filed by the plaintiffs, the resp. judge issued a writ of preliminary
injunction. Subsequently, the resp. judge also denied Perez Rubio's motion to dissolve the
preliminary injunction.
The Perez Rubios filed a motion to dissolve the above reproduced writ of preliminary injunction,
w/c the resp. judge denied on May 6, 1964.
But even before the motion could be acted upon, they also filed their answer to the complaint
w/ a counterclaim of P4.5M representing the unpaid balance of the sale price of their shares.
Because of this the Perez Rubios were charged w/ contempt.
The original Pet. for "certiorari" filed in this case is based principally on the allegation that, in
taking cognizance of CC8632 & in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction "ex -parte" mentioned
heretofore.
Miguel Perez Rubio, to whom all the Perez Rubio shares had been assigned, filed in this Ct. a
motion for the admission of an amended supplemental Pet. impleading the following additional
parties: Victoria Valley Development Corp. & Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co., who objected to
their inclusion as such on different grounds.
When the original Pet. was filed, the SC issued a preliminary injunction against resps., until further
orders from this Ct., enjoing them:
(a). from proceeding w/ Civs. Case # 8632;
(b). from proceeding w/ the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda Benito, Inc., / any of its
assets, to Alfonso Yuchengco / to any other person; &
(c). from performing any act w/c will either diminish the value of said Hacienda, subject matter
of the above-mentioned case.
Thereafter, resps. filed an "ex-parte" Pet. either for the modification of the preliminary injunction
issued by the SC / for its dissolution upon a counterbond.
ISSUES
Whether the SC should admit the Amended Supplemental Pet. &/ / the Ex-Parte Pet. for
Modification
Whether the resp. ct. erred in taking cognizance of Civs. Case # 8632 & in issuing the writ of
Case Digest Page 28
Second Whether the resp. ct. erred in taking cognizance of Civs. Case # 8632 & in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction ex parte.
THE CT.S RULING
01. Yes. The SC deems them sufficient if prov en to entitle Prs. to relief against the
additional parties therein named. The same is, therefore, admitted.
02. On the other hand, the Pet. that the original resps. as well as the new parties be cited
for contempt, & the Pet. for the issuance of a mandatory injunction & a writ of
preliminary attachment may best & properly be taken up only after a full hearing of this
case on the merits, for to resolv e them now one way / the other will necessarily require
a consideration of the main issue inv olved herein.
03. I n connection w/ the urgent "ex-parte" Pet. filed by the resps. for a modification of the PI
herein granted / for its dissolution upon the filing of a bond, it appears that the
Hacienda Benito, I nc. is not a party resp. neither upon the original Pet. nor upon the
amended supplemental Pet., although it is plain from the allegations made in both that
the shares of stock of said co., & naturally its assets, are the very subject of controversy.
04. However, the injunction issued in this case is directed exclusively to the parties herein &,
in connection w/ the assets of said hacienda, they are the only ones enjoined from
performing any act w/c will either diminish the value of said shares of stock / deplete
the assets of said hacienda. The Pet. for modification in this regard is, therefore, not well
founded & modification is denied.
05. I nasmuch as the Pet. for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued by Us in this
case, upon the filing of a bond, is "ex -parte", the resps. are hereby ordered to serve a
copy thereof upon Pr., who is hereby required to submit his comments in connection
therewith, if he so desires, w/in ten days from receipt thereof.
Case Digest Page 29

4:09 PM
CASE NO. 6. RP vs. CA et al.

FACTS
01. Forcible Entry & Unlawful detainer case by the Bureau of Public Schools on Dec. 24, 1958 vs. De
02.
03.
(a).
(b).
(c).
(d).
01.
(a).
(b).
(c).
(d).
(e).
01.
(a).
Ocampo over Lot Nos.817 & 2509. But was dismissed. On appeal, the CFI of Negros Occidental
dismissed the complaint.
Application For Registration Of The Same Parcels of Land on Jun. 29, 1960, by de Ocampo in LR
Case No.N-4 LRC Rec. No. N-19196. Rep. filed its opposition in due time.
Complaint For Recovery Of Possession Of The Subject Lots [CC264 (6154]).w/ prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on May 2, 1961, by Rep., represented by
the Sol. Gen., vs. de Ocampo w/ the CFI of Negros Occidental.
De Ocampos Answer: that the properties alleged to have been donated by Jalandoni to the
then BoE were different fr. the properties involved in this case, the former being titled lands (TCT
No. 1251) containing 2,912,474 sq. m., while Lot Nos. 817 & 2509 applied for by de Ocampo &
w/c Rep. sought to recover were unregistered lands, & that granting, w/out admitting, that they
are the same lands, the ct no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action since
the issue of possession over said lots was already decided by the CFI of Negros Occidental.
Preliminary Hearing on May 26, 1961, the CFI where the land registration case was pending, but
inasmuch as the issues involved in both CC264 (6154) for recovery of possession & the land
registration case were identical, the parties agreed to a joint trial, this time before Br. VII, Judge
Jose D. Divinagracia, presiding, where the CCwas pending.
Judgment: By the CFI on Aug. 3, 1965, dismissing the complaint in CC264 (6154) & adjudging the
registration of the subject two lots in the name of the then applicant de Ocampo. On Oct. 1,
1966, OCT576 was issued in his name.
It is admitted by Rep. that it received a copy of the decision on Aug. 13, 1965 but no appeal
was taken therefrom.
PRJ w/ PI Pending Proceeding by Rep. w/ the trial ct, praying, among other things, that de
Ocampo be restrained from enforcing the decision dated 3 Aug. 1965, & that after the hearing,
an order be issued declaring the decision to be not yet final & executory, & granting Rep. the
right to file a MR &// appeal w/in the period granted, to commence upon receipt of the order.
The pet. alleged that the Rep.'s failure to appeal was due to accident, mistake &// excusable
negligence, specifically, stating that its docket clerk, merely committed excusable negligence
when he inadvertently attached the copy of the decision to the file of another case; that it was
only on Nov. 5, 1965, that its docket clerk found the copy of the same; & that Pr. has a
substantial cause of action in CC264 (6154) & a good & substantial defense in LRC No. N-4 Rec.
No. N-19196.
The Pet. was, however, given due course despite resps opposition thereto for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period.
On Feb. 21, 1966, Anglo filed a motion for intervention alleging that he bought the subject lots fr.
de Ocampo on Jan. 6, 1966 & that TCT No. 42217 of the RD for Negros Occidental was issued to
Anglo on Jan. 12, 1966. He also filed an answer in opposition to Rep.'s PRJ on the grounds,
among others, that the decree of registration & certificate of title had already been issued &
that a writ of preliminary injunction will not lie to restrain enforcement of the decision of the trial
ct.
After resps. filed their respective memoranda, the trial ct dismissed the Rep.'s PRJ for lack of
competent proof, pursuant to S6, R38, of the RoC w/c the said ct required a hearing.
Rep. filed a MR of the aforesaid order dismissing its PRJ & likewise filed a manifestation averring
additional grounds in support of the MR. Anglo & de Ocampo opposed the same.
Rep. filed an "Amended PRJ &// Rev. of Decree w/ PI.
In specific regard to the Pet. for Rev. of the decree, contending that
1. actual fraud had been perpetrated by de Ocampo in securing the lower ct's decision
ordering the registration of the lots in his name, as well as the issuance of the decree of
registration &
2. the corresponding certificate of title, on the grounds w/c, advert to de Ocampo's alleged
misrepresentations that the 2 parcels of land applied for by him in the LRC were "different
from the two parcels of land of the same lot numbers, technical descriptions & areas
belonging to the Govt, knowing such allegations to be false, the truth of the matter being
Case Digest Page 30
belonging to the Govt, knowing such allegations to be false, the truth of the matter being
that said parcels of land are the same property owned by the Govt";
3. that there was previous registration of the same parcels of land, under the Torrens System in
favor of Meerkamp & Co. w/c later sold the same to Jalandoni who, in turn, gave the lots
to the BoE as a legatee & that the CFI no longer had jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of the lots, in favor of de Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration of the same
lands in favor of Meerkamp & Co..
4. Additionally, Rep. claimed:
i. that its counsel was not giv en notice of de Ocampo's motion & the corresponding order dated Sep.
ii.
iii.
iv .
v.
v i.
16, 1965, for the issuance of the decree of registration & the issuance of the decree itself by the LRC,
in violation of its constitutional rights to due process,
that it has also been "in continuous peaceful, adverse, open & public owner & possessor, in good
faith & w/ just title" of the lots "deriving the fruits & products of said properties & appropriating them to
the purpose & purposes they were intended for"; that they were in fact declared for tax purposes;
that the lands were leased for 10 yrs. but the lease was amended sev eral times to extend the same;
that on Sep. 17, 1964, Rep.'s counsel filed a "Pet. for an Order to Produce the Original Documentary
Exhibits & Submit Same to the NBI for Examination, w/c Pet. was communicated to de Ocampo's
lawyers, earlier on Sep. 7, 1964;
That they did not object / state that the originals were burned / lost;
that it was only on Sep. 28, 1964 that de Ocam po's lawyers revealed for the first tim e in their
"Manifestation & Reply" that the purported originals were burned in the house of one of de
Ocam pos Counsels on May 16, 1963; &
that the "supposed originals were fake & their alleged burning was false & these pretenses were
intentionally resorted to only to ev ade the examination of the spurious documents by the NBI & as
camouflage to hide their fraudulent character.
1. On Oct. 4, 1966, the trial ct set, aside its order dismissing Rep.s PRJ having found Rep.'s MR well-
founded, & scheduled Dec. 1 & 2, 1966, for Rep.'s witnesses to testify, & likewise gave resps., a
chance to oppose the amended Pet. Resps. & Rep. filed their opposition & reply; respectively.
2. In a subsequent hearing on Jun. 6, 1967, the trial ct ordered Rep. to present its evidence in the
absence of resps., who objected thereto for lack of jurisdiction, the parcels of land having been
already registered in the name of de Ocampo & in fact transferred to an alleged buyer in good
faith, the other, Anglo.
3. On Aug. 30, 1967, the trial ct rendered its decision on the Amended PRJ against Rep., upon
resolution of what it considered the "decisive" issue, i.e., that the allegations in the PRJ did not
constitute actual & extrinsic fraud w/c is the only ground available to review / reopen a decree
in cadastral cases pursuant to S38 of Act 496. On the other issues, the trial ct found that it was
through mistake, accident & excusable negligence that the decision of Aug. 3, 1965 was not
brought to the attention of Solicitor Salva"as it was inadvertently clipped to the record of
another case". However, while the PRJ itself another case was filed w/n the reglementary period
prescribed in S3, R38, of the RoC the remedy of PRJ was no longer available since the decree, &
later the title, were already issued in the name of de Ocampo. It also held that the amended
Pet. was still legally available as it was filed w/in 1 yr. after the issuance of the decree, pursuant
to S38 of Act No. 496, "in case of actual fraud" & that it had jurisdiction to entertain the
amended Pet. & to receive evidence in support thereof, but it had to deny the relief prayed for
on grounds already adverted to. Finally, it held that the fact that the Rep. was not notified of the
motion & the corresponding issuance of the decree & title was immaterial since Pets. for
issuance of decrees in cadastral cases are analogous to petitions for execution in ordinary cases
& parties are not entitled to notice thereof as a matter of right. Thus, the trial ct held that the
evidence adduced by the Pr. in this incident "does not establish actual & constructive fraud w/c
is the only kind of fraud that is considered a legal ground to review, reopen / set aside the
decree"w/c has already been issued in the name of de Ocampo.
01. From the said decision, Rep. appealed to the CA. De Ocampo & Anglo moved to dismiss the
appeal w/c was opposed by Rep. A supplemental motion to the same effect was later filed by
de Ocampo for failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that it was filed on time,
followed by an "ex parte "motion to consider the Solicitor General to have waived his right to
oppose the said supplemental MTD & that the case be submitted for resolution. A new party,
Salvacion Maraon, sought to intervene in the case & also filed a MTD the appeal before resp.
appellate ct.
02. In its minute resolution the CA resolved (1) To DISMISS the appeal for failure of the record on
appeal to show on its face that the record on appeal was filed w/in the period fixed by the
Rules, it appearing that appellant's motion for extension of 20 days from Oct. 14, 1967 to file the
record on appeal was never granted by the lower ct (there being no showing to that effect in
Case Digest Page 31
record on appeal was never granted by the lower ct (there being no showing to that effect in
the record on appeal); & even if there was such an order granting it, the extension asked for
would have expired on Novs. 3, 1967 &, therefore, the record on appeal filed on Novs. 9,1967
was filed six days late; & (2) to DENY the motion to intervene of intervenor Salvacion Maranon. At
any rate, the purpose of intervening; w/c is to join the appellees in their MTD the appeal of the
appellant, has already been served by the dismissal of the instant appeal.
(a). On Sep. 11, 1969, Rep. filed a MR but on Novs. 14, 1969, the CA RESOLVED TO DENY the
said MR.
03. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE/S
Should the govt, represented by Pr. Rep. not be permitted by resp. CA to show that it stands lost
thru fraudulent machinations close to 300ha. of prime sugar land to the private resps. who have
allegedly secured their titles to these holdings long after the same parcels of land were already
titled in the name of the original owner, Meerkamp & Co. &, therefore, the trial ct's action in
directing the issuance of the title in the name of resp. de Ocampo is null & void "ab initio "& of no
legal effect, simply because Pr. Rep. failed to show in its record on appeal that it was perfected
on time & that it actually filed its record on appeal 6 days late?
HELD
04. The SC has repeatedly construed S6, R41, of the RoC as mandatory & jurisdictional in nature,
non-compliance w/ w/c justifies the dismissal of the appeal.
05. However, a consideration in depth of the unique & peculiar facts attendant to this case &
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
01.
02.
the procedural & substantive implications of the dismissal of the appeal now sought to be
reviewed & reconsidered; & a due & proper regard to the merits of the case rather than a
fascicle reliance on procedural rules, compel the SC to reverse & set aside the dismissal of
Rep.'s appeal by the CA for the following reasons, "viz":
Should Rep. prove that the subject lots were registered in favor of Meerkamp & Co. before
1919, the trial ct's decision decreeing again the same lots in the name of De Ocampo in
1965 is null & void "ab initio "for lack of jurisdiction & a fatal infirmity necessarily attaches to
the said decision;
There are strong & substantial allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations & machinations
employed by de Ocampo in securing his title.
a. Relevant to this is The express finding of the trial ct that The PRJ was filed w/in the
reglementary period prescribed in S3, R38 of the RoC, & the Amended Pet. was filed
w/in one yr. from issuance of the decree.
b. If the appeal is dismissed w/out considering its merits, the above periods will resumed
to run & will lapse, & the reliefs sought herein will be forever foreclosed to Rep.;
Assuming that resps. can invoke, the material data rule, &// the fact that Rep.'s appeal was
filed out of time because the record On appeal was submitted to the Ct 6 days beyond the
requested extension of 20 days, it always in the power of this Ct to suspend its rules / to
except certain cases therefrom whenever countervailing considerations so warrant; &
The SC, is not powerless to prevent gross miscarriage of Justice, w/c would follow if Rep.'s
appeal is dismissed since it stands to lose close to 300 ha. of prime sugar land already
titled in its name & devoted to educational purposes if it is true that the land registration
ct was w/out jurisdiction to issue a Second decree of registration in favor of resp. de
Ocampo &, if it is also true that fraudulent misrepresentations & machinations attended
resp. de Ocampo's application for registration & likewise prevented Rep. from exposing the
fake exhibits, on the basis of w/c he secured his title.
If Rep.'s contentions are true that the said lots had been registered twice, w/ OCT No. 370
issued in favor of Meerkamp & Co. before 1919 & another, OCT No. 576, issued in the name
of de Ocampo in 1965 / some 46 yrs. later then the decision of the trial ct, sitting as
land registration ct, is null & void "ab initio "& suffers from a fatal infirmity, w/c is also a
ground for the Rev. of a decree of registration. provided no innocent purchaser for value
will be prejudiced.
It is very significant in this connection that de Ocampo admitted the donation of Jalandoni
in favor of the BoE, but averred that the lots so donated were titled, while the applied for by
him in the land registration case were unregistered. Yet, both parties claim to be the owners
of the same lots. De Ocampo also gave the area of the lots covered by TCT No. 1251, in the
name of Jalandoni, as 2,912,474 sq. m., / 291 ha. plus. Coincidentally, Lots Nos. 817 & 2509
claimed by Rep. have a total area of 289.47 ha., / only about two (2) ha. less.
These factors, brought to light by de Ocampo himself, cannot simply be ignored in reaching
Case Digest Page 32
02. These factors, brought to light by de Ocampo himself, cannot simply be ignored in reaching
the conclusion that the disputed resolutions of resp. CA be reversed.
03. It is also important to advert to the documentary exhibits adduced by Rep. in the hearing of
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
the Amended Pet. below, one of w/c was a certification dated Novs. 8, 1952 signed by the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, stating that on May 13, 1919, there was registered
a sale executed by Meerkamp & Co. in favor of Esteban Jalandoni & as a result OCT No,
370 in the name of the Co. was cancelled & TCT No. 1251 was issued to Jalandoni; that TCT
No. 1251 was later cancelled by virtue of the will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land to
the then BoE; that TCT No. 6014 was correspondingly issued to the BoE; & that lease
contracts were annotated in TCT No. 6014 in favor of Francisco Copper, executed by the
Division Superintendent of Schools. However, the above certification does not mention the
lot numbers, & no certificates of title were exhibited in ct, the incumbent Register of Deeds
having declared that the titles could not be found in his office.
The trial ct also made the express finding that the alleged deed of donation by Luis
Mosquera in favor of de Ocampo, acknowledged before one Notary Public does not
appear in his notarial book w/c is on file in the Bureau of Record Management, Manila,
from Oct. 16, 191 1 to May, 1913.
The Provincial Assessor likewise issued a certification, stating that the subject lots were never
declared in the name of Mosquera. His later certification states that the said lots were
assessed in the name of the BoE, & that the technical descriptions in the Bureau of Lands
records show that the same lots were in the name of Meerkamp & Co..
Authorities are in agreement that a land registration ct is w/out jurisdiction to decree again
the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case, & that the second
decree entered for the same land is null & void.
If there is no valid & final judgment by the land registration ct to speak of, then the filing of
an admittedly late appeal from the decision denying the Amended Pet. would be
immaterial & of no moment, in so far as these proceedings are concerned in view of the
congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision. decreeing for the second
time the registration of the same Lots Nos. 817 & 2509 in favor of resp. de Ocampo, despite
an earlier registration in the name of Meerkamp & Co..
Jurisprudence holds that the appellant's failure to perfect an appeal on time, "although
ordinarily decisive, carries no persuasive force" & may be completely disregarded if the trial
ct acted w/out jurisdiction.
"US vs. Jayme": lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal & may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c organizes
the ct; it is given only by law, & in the manner prescribed by law & an objection on the lack
of such jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. The infirmity cannot be cured by
silence, acquiescence, / even by express consent, / by win of the parties.
In the interest of justice, w/c is the paramount consideration in all litigations, & especially
considering the cloud surrounding the decision of the land registration ct, as aforesaid, the
more judicious course to follow is for resp. CA to entertain Rep.'s appeal, not to dismiss it, so
that if it finds the same to be meritorious, & the decision appealed from is reversed, the
correct Identity of the lots that were donated to the then BoE (admitted by de Ocampo),
as well as those parcels of land applied for by said resp. in the land registration case, may
already be ascertained once & for all, in the trial ct below, & in this same proceeding,
w/out Rep. having to resort to relitigation to prove its claim. Further proceedings will not
prejudice resps.. On the contrary, the cloud over their titles, OCT No. 576 & TCT No. 42217.
issued in favor of de Ocampo & Anglo, respectively, will be removed if Rep.'s claim is not
true.
There is a serious charge, w/c is also crucial to the issue between the parties, that resp. de
Ocampo used fraudulent misrepresentations & machinations in securing his title.
If the charge is true, there is the element of willful intent to deprive Rep. of just rights w/c
constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as distinguished from legal fraud.
As Justice Fernando stressed, ""Nicolas vs. Director of Lands " should erase any doubt as to
the extreme judicial displeasure at this species of fraud of an applicant seeking to include
as a part of the property to w/c title is sought land actually in possession of another.
This is very relevant in view of the denial of the Amended Pet. w/c was premised on the
conclusion that allegations in the said Pet. did not constitute actual & extrinsic fraud & w/c,
according to the trial ct, is "the only ground" available to review / reopen the decree.
Case Digest Page 33
according to the trial ct, is "the only ground" available to review / reopen the decree.
15. Of related significance is the express finding of the trial ct that the original PRJ was filed w/in
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
the reglementary period pursuant to S3, R38 of the RoC, & the Amended Pet. was filed w/in
one yr. from issuance of the decree.
For, if the appeal is dismissed notwithstanding allegations of fraud w/c appear to be
supported by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the Amended Pet. below the
appealed decision will become final & executory, & the aforesaid periods will lapse,
foreclosing forever to Rep. the reliefs prayed for in the Amended Pet.
Although Rep. may seek to recover the lots in a different action that may still be legally
available to it after the appeal is dismissed, that recourse will involve not only a relitigation
&, therefore. multiplicity of suits, but will also entail the risk that subject lots may be disposed
of to innocent purchasers for value to put them beyond recovery.
As it is, Anglo, has already intervened, alleging that he bought the same lots from de
Ocampo on Jan. 6, 1966, & that TCT No. 42217 was in fact issued to him. A new party,
Salvacion Maraon, also sought to intervene in the case & filed in CA a MTD Rep.'s appeal
before the said Ct.
The foregoing overriding considerations then the alleged lack of jurisdiction & the alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations & machinations, w/c, buttressed by strong evidence, can
nullify the second registration &// set aside OCT No. 576 issued to de Ocampo taken in
relation w/ the procedural & substantive implications w/c could & would arise if the appeal
were dismissed, namely, the risk that the holdings may be transacted to third parties & the
fact that Rep.'s action to recover tile holdings would give rise to multiplicity of suits
compel the SC to conclude that the only recourse in the interest of just & expeditious
proceedings. considering that these have been pending for close to 20 yrs. now is to
suspend the rules &// to except this case from their operation. For when the operation of the
Rules of will lead to an injustice the SC has, in justifiable instances, resorted to this
extraordinary remedy to prevent it.
The Rules have been drafted w/ the primary objective of enhancing fair trials & expediting
justice. As a corollary, if their application & operation tend to subvert & defeat instead of
promote & enhance it, their suspension is justified.
In the words of Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in "Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo", "This
Ct, through the revered & eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of
"C Viuda de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo", to lay down for recognition in this jurisdiction the
sound rule in the administration of justice holding that 'it is always in the power of the ct (SC)
to suspend its own rules / to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice required it ...
Exceptions to the operation of the mandatory & jurisdictional character of the rules on
perfection of appeals are to be noted in "Sarmiento vs. Salud, et al"., penned by Justice J.B.
Reyes, "Dequito vs. Lopez " & "Carillo vs. Allied W orkers Association of the Philippines " both
written for the Ct by Justice E. M. Fernando, decided yrs. after the Revised RoC took effect
in Jan., 1964.
In the Sarmiento case, the late appeal was allowed on the ground of laches on the part of
the appellees, the filing of the MTD having taken place 6 yrs. after the brief for appellees
was filed, & after the case was submitted for decision. This, according to the Ct, "constitutes
a unique instance of laches w/out comparable precedent in the records of the Ct.
The "Dequito & Carillo "cases, upon the other hand, took into account the fact that labor
cases were involved. Justice Fernando expressly noted in the Dequito case that "in the light
of the constitutional as well as codal & statutory mandates, there being an explicit
command of protection to labor as well as the promotion of social justice," the MTD the late
appeal w/c was "filed much too late" hardly deserved sympathy / consideration.
In the "Carillo "case, no question whatsoever as to the late appeal was raised, hence, "it
would seem that whatever right to contest the jurisdiction could have been availed of is by
now no longer in existence. Continuing, Justice Fernando stated that "Social justice would
be a meaningless term if in a situation like the present, an element of rigidity would be
affixed to procedural precepts & made to recover the matter. Flexibility should not be ruled
out. Precisely, what is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental principle expressly
so declared by the Constitution is the effectiveness of the community's effort to assist the
economically underprivileged." The responsibility to protect labor is incumbent "not only on
the legislative & executive branches but also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into a
Case Digest Page 34
26.
27.
28.
29.
the legislative & executive branches but also on the judiciary, to translate this pledge into a
living reality.
W hile the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds, they nevertheless support
the view that the rigid adherence to the rules on perfection of appeals may & should be
relaxed where compelling reasons so warrant.
The grounds invoked in this case not only lack of jurisdiction but gross injustice itself
more than justify the exception considering further that the delay in the perfection of the
appeal involved 6 days only.
Finally, enshrined in our legal & judicial annals is the maxim that no person should enrich
himself at the expense / prejudice of others. Cts should not be used as instruments to
disregard this elemental & basic norm w/c is the essence of justice & fair play. The whole
trust of our laws on civil relations enjoins all those who come before the cts of justice to
observe true faith & candor in their dealings w/ one another the govt included.
The commendable & determined efforts on the part of the citizenry to fashion a New
Society rid of graft, corruption & the persistent malaise of land grabbing, will be set back, if
the subject lots consisting of close to 300 ha. w/c are devoted to educational
purposes have indeed been wrongfully titled to resp. de Ocampo, Happily, W e can at
this stage still prevent this, if true, by setting aside the dismissal of Rep.'s appeal & according
the parties the opportunity in this proceeding, & w/out further need to re-litigate, to
terminate this litigation, w/c has been pending for close to 20 long yrs. in fairness to both
parties.
Case Digest Page 35
CASE NO. 5 ANTONIO NAVARRO & GRAHMMS, Inc. vs.

Metrobank, et al.
01.
(a).
(b).
(c).
01.
(a).
(b).
(c).
01.

CASE
NO. 5 ANTONIO NAVARRO & GRAHMMS, Inc. vs. Metrobank, et al.
4:12 PM
FACTS
Metrobank filed w/ the RTC, a Pet. for JF of REM executed by the Pr.s in its favor.
After due proceedings, on Jan. 16, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment granting the right of
Metrobank to foreclose the properties belonging to defendant Antonio Navarro covered by 3
TCTs.
A MR was filed by Navarro on Feb. 18, 1998 but was denied on Mar. 25, 1998.
The Pr.s received their copy of the order denying the MR on Apr. 7, 1998.
On Apr. 14, 1998, the last day of the reglementary period, the Pr.s filed w/ the RTC a Notice of
Appeal from its Jan. 16, 1998 Decision & Mar. 25, 1998 Order. However, the Pr.s failed to pay the
requisite docket & other lawful fees.
Acting on the Motion To Deny Due Course To Notice Of Appeal w/ Motion for Execution w/c was
filed by Metrobank, the RTC, while ruling in favor of the timeliness of the Pr.s' notice of appeal,
nevertheless denied the appeal for not being accompanied by the required docket fees.
Hence, in its Order dated May 27, 1998, the RTC granted the motion of the resps. for the issuance
of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision.
On Jun. 2, 1998, the RTC correspondingly issued the WOE prayed for by Metrobank.
On Jun. 11, 1998, the counsel for the Pr.s informed the ct by letter that on Jun. 9, 1998, he sent his
messenger to the ct to pay the docket fees on the notice of appeal but was refused by the
receiving clerk.
Pet. for Writ of Certiorari was filed w/ the CA assailing the May 27, 1998 Order of the RTC for
having been issued w/ grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack / excess of jurisdiction. In
their reply to the comment, the Pr.s, for the first time, proffered to the appellate ct an
explanation for their admitted failure to pay the appellate docket fees w/in the prescribed
reglementary period.
(a). The Pr.s, thus, av erred: Pr.s' failure to pay the appellate docket fee is not w/out a v alid explanation.
(b).
At the time of the filing of Notice of Appeal, Pr.s' counsel's lone secretary, w/out informing in
adv ance the undersigned, decided to migrate to another country for "greener pasture," leav ing the
undersigned the responsibility to tend to all the cases in his office. The undersigned's operation was
literally disabled & in shambles ; Thus, when the undersigned discov ered this inadv ertence, he
immediately tried to remedy the situation & can only hope that this Honorable Ct can understand
the undersigned's predicament.
The CA promulgated its Decision dismissing the Pr.'s appeal. The Pr.'s MR & its supplement thereto
was, likewise, denied by the appellate ct.
02. Hence, the Pet. at bar.
ISSUE
Did the RTC correctly rule in denying/dismissing Pr.s notice of appeal on the graound of their
failure to pay the docket & other legal fees?
THE CT'S RULING
Yes. Time & time again, the SC has consistently held that the "payment of docket fees w/in the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal . W/out such payment, the
appeal is not perfected. The appellate ct does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action & the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final & executory."
It bears stressing that appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. Corollary to this
principle is that the appeal must be exercised strictly in accordance w/ the provisions set by law.
The payment of the docket fees w/in this period is a condition sine qua non to the perfection of
the appeal.
Contrary to the Pr.s' predication, the payment of the appellate docket & other lawful fees is not
a mere technicality of law / procedure. It is an essential requirement, w/out w/c the decision /
final order appealed from would become final & executory as if no appeal was filed at all.
The SC has consistently ruled that litigation is not a game of technicalities & that every case must
be prosecuted in accordance w/ the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented & justly resolved. However, we have also ruled that rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive & weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate w/ his failure to comply w/ the prescribed
procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort
on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.
Case Digest Page 36
on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.
Our ruling in this case is not antithetical to our ruling in La Salette College vs. Victor Pilotin, viz:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket
fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay
those fees w/in the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal;
second, such power should be used by the ct in conjunction w/ its exercise of sound discretion in
accordance w/ the tenets of justice & fair play, as well as w/ a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances.
In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Mangubat, the payment of the docket fees
was delayed by six (6) days, but the late payment was accepted, because the party showed
willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those fees.
Yambao vs. CA, saw us again relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that "the appellate
ct may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that
there is a justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees w/in the
prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, / a similar supervening
casualty, w/out fault on the part of the appellant."
In the present case, putting the blame on the counsel's secretary for her failure to perfect the
Pr.s' appeal to the CA is unjustified. As aptly declared by the appellate ct: The reason given for
movants' failure to pay the docket fees, i.e., that their counsel's employee had left his office has
been debunked by the SC as "a hackneyed & habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who
fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the RoC. The SC has also often
repeated that the negligence of clerks w/c adversely affect the case handled by lawyers, is
binding upon the latter .
Indeed, this Ct has admonished law offices to adopt a system of distributing & receiving
pleadings & notices, so that the lawyers will be promptly informed of the status of their cases.
Hence, the negligence of clerks w/c adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers is binding
upon the latter.
Case Digest Page 37
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT INC., vs. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS CORP, et al.

01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
First
Second
01.
02.
FACTS
Pr Madrigal filed a Pet. for Voluntary Insolvency w/ the RTC & as such, the trial ct declared Madrigal insolv ent.
Complaint for Damages by Madrigal w/ the RTC v s herein resps. alleging that for hav ing been entered into a joint v enture with
Lapanday and
Madrigal had purchased a v essel by obtaining a P10,000,000 bank loan; &
contrary to their representations & guarantees & despite demands, Lapanday & Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to deliv er
those Del Monte charter hire contracts.
The ct granted resps. MTD, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action. Applying Ss. 32 & 33 of the Insolv ency Law, the trial
ct opined that upon the filing by Madrigal of a Pet. for Voluntary Insolv ency, the latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for
Damages. The RTC ruled that the exclusiv e right to prosecute the actions belonged to the ct-appointed assignee. Pr filed a MR,
w/c was later denied.
Pet. for Certiorari w/ the CA by pr seeking to set aside Orders of the trial ct.
(a). The CA ruled that since the main issue in the instant case was purely legal, the Pet. could be treated as one for rev iew as an
exception to the general rule that "certiorari" was not proper when appeal was av ailable.
(b). Lapanday & Lorenzo challenged this ruling through a MR.
(c). After a hearing on the MR was conducted, the CA issued the assailed Decision granting the MR & dismissing Madrigals pet
for certiorari. The CA opined that an order granting a MTD was final & thus the proper subject of an appeal, not "certiorari".
Furthermore, ev en if the Pet. could be treated as an appeal, it would still hav e to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
according to the CA. The appellate ct held that the issues raised by Pr inv olv ed pure questions of law that should be brought
to the SC, pursuant to S. 2 of R 50 & S. 2(c) of R 41 of the RoC.
Hence, this Pet. for Rev . under R45.
ISSUES
Did the CA commit an egregious error by ruling that the order of the lower ct w/c granted priv ate resps. Motions to Dismiss are not
proper subjects of a Pet. for Certiorari under R65?
Did the Honorable CA commit serious error in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the Pet. for Certiorari filed byPr before it?
HELD
Pr claims that it correctly questioned the trial cts Order through its Pet. for "Certiorari". Rsps insist that an ordinary appeal was the
proper remedy. W e agree w/ resps.
(a). Under R41, an appeal may be taken from a judgment / final order that completely disposes of the case / of a particular
matter therein when declared by the RoC to be appealable.
(b). An order / a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done w/ it in
the trial ct.
(c). Au contraire , "an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leav es something to be done as regards
the merits of the latter.
(d). A writ of "certiorari" may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction / grav e abuse of discretion amounting to lack
/ excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior ct w/in
the bounds of its jurisdiction.
(e). For "certiorari" to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
a. the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board / any officer exercising judicial / quasi-judicial functions;
b. such tribunal, board / officer has acted w/out / in excess of jurisdiction, / w/ grav e abuse of discretion amounting to lack /
excess of jurisdiction; &
c. there is no appeal / any plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
(a). "W /out jurisdiction" means that the ct acted w/ absolute lack of authority.
(b). There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the ct transcends its power / acts w/out any statutory authority.
(c). "Grav e abuse of discretion" implies such capricious & whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equiv alent to lack / excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary / despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, / personal
hostility; & such exercise is so patent / so gross as to amount to an ev asion of a positiv e duty / to a v irtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined / to act at all in contemplation of law.
(d). Between an appeal & a Pet. for "certiorari", there are substantial distinctions w/c shall be explained below.
a. As to the Purpose: Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. W here the
error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law / fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
b. As to the Manner of Filing: Ov er an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction & power of rev iew. Ov er a certiorari, the
higher ct uses its original jurisdiction in accordance w/ its power of control & superv ision ov er the proceedings of lower ct s. An
appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a Pet. for certiorari is an original & independent action that was not
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment / order complained of.
c. As to the parties involved: The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a Pet. for
certiorari are the aggriev ed party (who thereby becomes the Pr) against the lower ct / quasi-judicial agency, & the
prev ailing parties (the public & the priv ate resps., respectively).
d. As to the Subject Matter: Only judgments / final orders & those that the RoC so declare are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower ct prior to an ap peal
from the judgment; / where there is no appeal / any plain, speedy / adequate remedy.
e. As to the Period of Filing: Ordinary appeals should be filed w/in 15 days from the notice of judgment / final order appealed
from. W here a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal & a record on appeal w/in 30 days
from the said notice of judgment / final order. A Pet. for Rev . should be filed & serv ed w/in 15 days from the notice of denial
of the decision, / of the Prs timely filed motion for new trial / MR. In an appeal by "certiorari", the Pet. should be filed also w/in
fifteen days from the notice of judgment / final order, / of the denial of the Prs motion for new trial / MR. On the other hand,
a Pet. for "certiorari" should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, / resolution. If a motion for
new trial / MR was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
f. As to the Need for a MR: A MR is generally required prior to the filing of a Pet. for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain & adequate remedy expressly av ailable under
the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment / final order.
(a). Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy if Appeal Is Av ailable:
a. W here appeal is av ailable to the aggriev ed party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal
(including Pets for Rev .) & certiorari are mutually exclusiv e, not alternative / successive. Hence, "certiorari" is not & cannot be
a substitute for an appeal, especially if ones own negligence / error in ones choice of remedy occasioned such loss / lapse.
b. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no av ailable appeal / any plain, speedy & adequate remedy.
c. W here an appeal is av ailable, "certiorari" will not prosper, ev en if the ground therefor is grav e abuse of discretion.
CAs Jurisdiction ov er Pet. for Certiorari
Pr was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Pet. for "Certiorari" filed w/ the CA. The issue raised there was the trial cts
alleged error in dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
As Pr was challenging the trial cts interpretation of the law -- posing a question of law -- the issue inv olv ed an error of judgment, not
of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed by a ct in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not necessarily equiv alent to
"grav e abuse of discretion.
(a). The Dismissal -- a Final Order: An order of dismissal, whether correct / not, is a final order.
It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leav es nothing more to be done by the lower ct. Thereforethe
remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
Case Digest Page 38
remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.

Pr av ers that S5 of R16 bars the filing of an appeal when the dismissal is based on lack of cause of action. It adds that S5 limits the
remedy of appeal only to dismissals grounded on prior judgments / on the statute of limitations, / to claims that hav e been
extinguished / are unenforceable. W e find this interpretation absurd.
The prov ision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitute "res judicata. "Howev er, such dismissals are still subject to a
timely appeal. For those based on other grounds, the complaint can be refiled. S5, therefore, confirms that an appeal is the
remedy for the dismissal of an action.
Citing Ss.1(a) & 1(h),R41, Pr further claims that it was prohibited from filing an appeal. S. 1(a) of the said R prohibits the filing of an
appeal from an order denying a MR, because the remedy is to appeal the main decision as Pr could hav e done. In fact, under S9,
R37, the remedy against an order denying a MR is to appeal the judgment / final order. S1(h) does not apply, because the trial cts
Order did not dismiss the action w/out prejudice.
(a). Exception to the Rule Not Established by Pr
W e are not unaware of instances when this Ct has granted "certiorari" despite the av ailability of appeal.
W here the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prov e adequate -- either in point of
promptness / completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could result -- a writ of "certiorari" may still be issued.
Pr cites some of these exceptions to justify the remedy it has undertaken w/ the appellate ct, but these are not applicable to the
present factual milieu.
Ev en assuming that the Order of the RTC was erroneous, its error did not constitute grav e abuse of discretion. Pr asserts that the trial
ct should not hav e dismissed the Complaint / should hav e at least allowed the substitution of the assignee in Prs stead.
These alleged errors of judgment, howev er, do not constitute a despotic, capricious,/ whimsical exercise of power. On the
contrary, Pr av ailed of "certiorari" because the 15-day period w/in w/c to file an appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that
"certiorari" is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
As prev iously stressed, appeal -not "certiorari" -- was the correct remedy to elev ate the RTCs Order granting the MTD. The appeal,
w/c would hav e inv olv ed a pure question of law, should hav e been filed w/ the SC pursuant to S2(c) of R41 & S2 of R50, RoC.
The SCA for "certiorari" & appeal are two different remedies that are mutually exclusiv e; they are not alternativ e / successive.
W here appeal is av ailable, "certiorari" will not prosper, ev en if the ground therefor is grav e abuse of discretion. Basic isthe rule that
"certiorari" is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
Case Digest Page 39
DOMINGO NEYPES, et al. vs. CA, et al.

FACTS
01. ACTION for ANNULMENT of JUDGMENT & Titles of land &// Reconveyance &// Reversion w/ PI before the RTC by
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
prs. vs. the Bureau of Lands & the Bureau of Forest Dev., Landbank, & heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
The trial ct. granted prs Motion to Declare the BoL & BFD in default for their failure to file answer, but denied as
vs. the resp. heirs of del Mundo bec. the substituted service of summons on them was improper; the ct. denied
Landbanks MTD for lack of cause of action bec. there are hypothetical admissions & matters that could only
be determined after trial; &, the MTD filed by resp. was also denied bec. there were factual matters that could
be determined only after trial.
Resp. heirs filed a MR of the order denying their MTD on the gr. that the trial ct could very well resolve the issue
of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself w/out waiting for the trial proper.
The trial ct dismissed prs complaint on the gr. that the action has already prescribed.
Prs. allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on MAR. 3, 1998 &, on the 15t h day thereafter / on
MAR.18, filed a MR.
On JUL. 1,1998, the trial ct issued another order dismissing the MR w/c prs received on JUL. 22, 1998.
Notice of Appeal filed 5 days later (Jul. 27, 1998) by prs. & paid the appeal fees on Aug. 3, 1998(11 days fr.
receipt)
The CA denied the NOA holding that it filed 5 days late.
The order denying the NOA was received by prs on JUL. 31, 1998.
MR was filed by prs but this too was denied on Sep. 3, 1998.
Pet. for Certiorari & Mandamus under R65 was filed by prs assailing the dismissal of the NOA before the CA.
On Sep. 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the pet. ruling that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from Mar. 3, 1998 / the day they received the decision dismissing the original complaint.
Pet. for Rev. under R45 w/ the SC.
ISSUE
W/in w /c period should prs appeal?
HELD
Under S3, R41 of the RCP, the period of ordinary appeal shall be taken w/in 15days from notice of the
judgment / final order[2] appealed from. The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely MNT / MR.
Under S3, R41, prs had 15days from notice of judgment / final order to appeal the decision of the trial ct.
On the 15 t h day of the original appeal period (Mar. 18, 1998,) prs did NOT file a NOA but instead opted to
file a MR. Accdg. to the trial ct., the MR ONLY interrupted the running of the 15 -day appeal period. PRs
however argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15days from receipt of the
final order / the order dismissing their MR.
In setting aside technical infirmities & thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been
oblivious to / unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those
situations where technicalities were dispensed w/, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force
& effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural
rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a
grave injustice. Our judicial system & the cts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between
the strict enforcement of procedural laws & the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity
for the just & proper disposition of his cause.
The SC may promulgate procedural rules in all cts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal / even
establish new rules for a more simplified & inexpensive process, & the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it & to the CA, particularly Rules 42, 43 & 45, the Ct allows extensions of time,
based on justifiable & compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of
15 days / more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules & to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Ct deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days w/in w/c to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial / MR.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to R 40 governing appeals from the MTCs to the RTCs; R
42 on Pet.s for Rev. from the RTCs to the CA; R 43 on appeals from quasi -judicial agencies to the CA & R
45 governing appeals by "certiorari" to the SC.
The new rule aims to regiment / make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, MR (whether full / partial) / any final order / resolution.
W e thus hold that prs seasonably filed their notice of appeal w/in the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from Jul. 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their MR).
To recapitulate , a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal w/in 15 days from receipt of the RTCs
decision / file it w/in 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial /
MR. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of "only" if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final & executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in R 41, S. 3.
Prs here filed their notice of appeal on Jul. 27, 1998 / five days from receipt of the order denying their MR
on Jul. 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well w/in the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.
Case Digest Page 40
DBP VS SPS GATAL

4:13 PM
FACTS
LOAN by Sps. Gatal from DBP secured by a REM ov er a commercial lot.
EF by DBP for failure of Sps. Gatal to pay their loans.
Consolidation of the Title of the lot in the name of DBP.
PAS but none of the bidders was able to meet the bid price ceiling.
DBP offered the property for NEGOTI ATED SALE on condition that the buyer must pay
20% of the selling price as downpayment, the balance payable under the terms of the
interested buyer.
06. Sps. Gatal submitted their bid in the amount of P2.16M & made a deposit equiv alent to
10% of the bid price.
07. How ever, another buyer, Jimmy Torrefranca, offered a bid of P2.3M / P140k higher than
resps. bid.
08. Upon learning of Torrefrancas offer, resp. w rote DBP to match the bid but it w as
rejected bec. Torrefranca was already declared the preferred bidder.
I. COMPLAINT for INJUNCTION w/ prayer for TRO & PI (CC5996) w / the RTC by resp. to
declare the sale of the property to Torrefranca v oid & uphold resp. RI GHT TO PREEMPTI ON; & maintain the STATUS QUO bet. The parties prior to the filing.
(a). RTC granted the application for PI .
II. Pet. for the I ssuance of a WOP (CC6097) w / the same RTC by DBP.
(a). RTC ordered the issuance a WOP.
(b). MTD & MTQ the WOP on the ground that there is another case pending inv olving
the same legal issues.
(c). RTC dismissed CC6097 & recalled its earlier Order granting the issuance of the
WOP on the gr. of litis pendentia.
(d). DBPs MR w as denied.
III. Pet. for Certiorari w/ the CA by DBP. CA dismissed the Pet. & upheld the challenged
orders.
- DBPs MR was denied.
IV. Pet. for Rev . on Certiorari w/ the SC.
ISSUE
Did the CA commit a rev ersible error in holding that the trial correctly dismissed the Pet.
for the I ssuance of WOP on the ground of litis pendentia?
HELD
I t is undisputed that both cases inv olve the same parties & the same property.
How ever, the rights asserted & the reliefs sought by the parties are NOT identical.
CC5996 is an action for injunction filed by resps. v s. DBP seeking the sale of the property
to Torrefranca v oid & to order DBP to respect resps right to re-emption & maintain the
status quo between the parties.
CC6097 is a pet. for the issuance of WOP filed by DBP being the purchaser of the lot at
the public auction.
Thus, resps. claim of litis pendentia is unav ailing.
To giv e effect to the right of possession, the purchaser must inv oke the aid of the ct. &
ask for a WOP w/out need of bringing a separate independent suit for this purpose.
Records show that title to the property has been consolidated to DBP. Thus, its pet. for a
WOP is in order.
Obv iously, the trial ct. erred when it granted resps MTD & recalled the WOP it earlier
issued.
Where the title is consolidated in the name of the mortgagee, the WOP becomes a
MATTER / RI GHT on the part of the mortgagee, & it is a MI NISTERI AL DUTY on the part
of the trial ct. to issue the same.
The pendency of a separate civ il suit questioning the v alidity of the sale of the
mortgaged property CANNOT BAR the issuance of a WOP.
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
Case Digest Page 41
mortgaged property CANNOT BAR the issuance of a WOP.

The rule equally applies to separate civ il suits questioning the v alidity of the mortgage /
its foreclosure & the v alidity of the public auction sale.
There being no litis pendentia, the CA likew ise erred in applying the doctrine of noninterference bet. cts. of equal rank [1] .
When Br. 47 issued the WOP, it did not interfere w / the jurisdiction of BR. 4 in the
injunction case. I t merely exercised its ministerial function of issuing the WOP.
Case Digest Page 42
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Remedial Law Q&A Page 43
2006 Bar
Wednesday, March 19, 2014
10:55 PM
-I 1. What is the concept of remedial law? 2%

2. Distinguish between substantive law and remedial law. 2%
3. How are remedial laws implemented in our system of government? 2%
4. Distinguish jurisdiction from venue? 2%
5. What do you mean by (a) real actions; and (b) personal actions? 2%
- II What court has jurisdiction over an action for specific performance filed by a subdivision homeowner against a
subdivision developer? Choose the correct answer. Explain. 2.5%
1. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission
3. The Regional Trial Court
4. The Commercial Court or the Regional Trial Court designated by the Supreme Court to hear and decide
"commercial cases".
- III 1. What is forum shopping? 2.5%
2. Honey filed with the Regional Trial Court, Taal, Batangas a complaint for specific performance against
Bernie. For lack of a certification against forum shopping, the judge dismissed the complaint. Honey's
lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching thereto an amended complaint with the certification
against forum shopping. If you were the judge, how will you resolve the motion? 5%
- IV Jojie filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna a complaint for damages against Joe. During the pre-trial, Jojie
and her counsel failed to appear despite notice to both of them. Upon oral motion of Jojie, Joe was declared as in
default and Jojie was allowed to present her evidence ex palte. Thereafter, the court rendered its Decision in
favor of Jojie.
Joe hired Jose as his counsel. What are the remedies available to him? Explain. 5%
-VMay Congress enact a law providing that a 5,000 square meter lot, apart of the UST compound in Sampaloc,
Manila, be expropriated for the construction of a park in honor of former City Mayor Arsenio Lacson? As
compensation to UST, the City of Manila shall deliver its 5-hectare lot in Sta. Rosa, Laguna originally intended as a
residential subdivision for the Manila City Hall employees. Explain. 5%
- VI Explain each mode of certiorari:
a. As a mode of appeal from the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. 2.5%
b. As a special civil action from the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. 2.5%
c. As a mode of review of the decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Constitutional
Commissions. 2.5%
- VII Mark filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue a complaint for refund of taxes paid, but it was not acted upon.
So, he filed a similar complaint with the Court of Tax Appeals raffled to one of its Divisions. Mark's complaint was
dismissed. Thus, he filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over Mark's petition? 2.5
- VIII Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the Decisions in criminal and administrative cases of the
Ombudsman? 2.5%
- IX 1. What are the requisites for the issuance of (a) a writ of preliminary injunction; and (b) a final writ of
injunction? 2.5%
2. Distinguish between injunction as an ancillary remedy and injunction as a main action. 2.5%
-X 1. Define a temporary restraining order (TRO). 2%
2. Maya Regional Trial Court issue injunction without bond? 2%
3. What is the duration of a TRO issued by the Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court? 2%
4. Differentiate a TRO from a status quo order. 2%
5. Maya justice of a Division of the Court of Appeals issue a TRO? 2%
- XI 1. What is an interlocutory order?
2. What is the difference between a judgment and an opinion of the court? 2.5%
2006 Bar
Sunday, March 23, 2014
1:48 AM
- XII Tina Guerrero filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, a complaint for sum of money amounting to P1
Million against Carlos Corro. The complaint alleges, among others, that Carlos borrowed from Tina the said
amount as evidenced by a promissory note signed by Carlos and his wife, jointly and severally. Carlos was served
with summons which was received by Linda, his secretary .However, Carlos failed to file an answer to the
complaint within the 15-day reglementary period. Hence, Tina filed with the court a motion to declare Carlos in
default and to allow her to present evidence ex parte. Five days thereafter, Carlos filed his verified answer to the
complaint, denying under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note; and contending that
he has fully paid his loan with interest at 12% per annum.
1. Was the summons validly served on Carlos? 2.5%
2. If you were the judge, will you grant Tina's motion to declare Carlos in default? 2.5%
- XIII Sergio Punzalan, Filipino, 50 years old, married, and residing at Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City , of sound
and disposing mind, executed a last will and testament in English, a language spoken and written by him
proficiently. He disposed of his estate consisting of a parcel of land in Makati City and cash deposit at the City
Bank in the , sum of P300 Million. He bequeathed P50 Million each to his 3 sons and P150 Million to his wife. He
devised apiece of land worth P100 Million to Susan, his favorite daughter-in-Iaw. He named his best friend, Cancio
Vidal, as executor of the will without bond
1. Is Cancio Vidal, after learning of Sergio's death, obliged to file with the proper court a petition for probate of
the latter's last will and testament? 2%
2. Supposing the original copy of the last will and testament was lost, can Cancio compel Susan to produce a
copy in her possession to be submitted to the probate court? 2%
3. Can the probate court appoint the widow as executor of the will? 2%
4. Can the widow and her children settle extrajudicially among themselves the estate of the deceased? 2%
5. Can the widow and her children initiate a separate petition for partition of the estate pending the probate
of the last will and testament by the proper court? 2%
- XIV When is bail a matter of right and when is it a matter of discretion ? 5%
- XV Leticia was estranged from her husband Paul for more than a year due to his suspicion that she was having an
affair with Manuel, their neighbor. She was temporarily living with her sister in Pasig City.
For unknown reasons, the house of Leticia's sister was burned, killing the latter. Leticia survived. She saw her
husband in the vicinity during the incident. Later, he was charged with arson in an Information filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
During the trial, the prosecutor called Leticia to the witness stand and offered her testimony to prove that her
husband committed arson.
Can Leticia testify over the objection of her husband on the ground of martial privilege? 5%
- XVI 1. What are the requirements in order that an admission of guilt of an accused during a custodial investigation
be admitted in evidence? 2.5%
2. As counsel of an accused charged with homicide, you are convinced that he can be utilized as a state
witness. What procedure will you take? Explain. 2.5%
- XVII In 1996, Congress passed Republic Act No.8189, otherwise known as the Voters' Registration Act of 1996,
providing for computerization of elections. Pursuant thereto, the COMELEC approved the Voters' Registration and
Identification System (VRIS) Project. It issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the project. After the public
bidding, Fotokina was declared the winning bidder with a bid of P6 Billion and was issued a Notice of Award. But
COMELEC Chairman Gener Go objected to the award on the ground that under the Appropriations Act, the budget
for the COMELEC's modernization is only P1 Billion. He announced to the public that the VRIS project has been set
aside. Two Commissioners sided with Chairman Go, but the majority voted to uphold the contract.
Meanwhile, Fotokina filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to implement the
contract. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing Chairman Go, opposed the petition on the ground
that mandamus does not lie to enforce contractual obligations. During the proceedings, the majority
Commissioners filed a manifestation that Chairman Go was not authorized by the COMELEC En Banc to oppose
the petition.
1. May the OSG represent Chairman Go before the RTC notwithstanding that his position is contrary to that of
the majority? 5%.
2. Is a petition for mandamus an appropriate remedy to enforce contractual obligations? 5%
NOTHING FOLLOWS.
Pasted from <http://lawphil.net/courts/bm/barQ/2006/remedialQ.html>
2007 Bar
1:48 AM
-I (Total 10%)
a. What are the rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in our courts? (6%)
b. Can a foreign arbitral award be enforced in the Philippines under those rules? Explain briefly. (2%)
c. How about a global injunction issued by a foreign court to prevent dissipation of funds against a
defendant therein who has assets in the Philippines? Explain briefly. (2%)
- II (Total 10%)
True or False. If the answer is false, explain your answer briefly.
a. The surviving parties rule bars Maria from testifying for the claimant as to what the deceased Jose had
said to her, in a claim filed by Pedro against the estate of Jose (3%)
b. A defendant who has been declared in default can avail of a petition for relief from the judgment
subsequently rendered in the case. (3%)
c. A motion is pleading. (2%)
d. A counterclaim is pleading. (2%)
- III (Total 10%)
1. What is the hearsay rule? (5%)
2. In relation to the hearsay rule, what do the following rules of evidence have in common? (5%)
1. The rule on statements that are part of the res gestae;
2. The rule on dying declarations;
3. The rule on admissions against interest.
- IV (10%)
Husband H files a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Pasig City. Wife W files a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasay City, praying for custody over their minor child. H files a
motion to dismiss the wife's petition on the ground of the pendency of the other case. Rule.
-V(Total 10%)
a. Distinguish the effects of the filling of a demurrer to the evidence in a criminal case and its filing in a civil
case. (5%)
b. What is reverse trial and when may it be resorted to? Explain briefly. (5%)
- VI (Total 10%)
a. On his way home, a member of the Caloocan City police force witnesses a bus robbery in Pasay City and
effects the arrest of the suspect. Can he bring the suspect to Caloocan City for booking since that is where
his station is? Explain briefly. (5%)
b. In the course of serving a search warrant, the police finds an unlicensed firearm. Can the police take the
firearm even if it is not covered by the search warrant? If the warrant is subsequently quashed, is the
police required to return the firearm? Explain briefly. (5%)
- VII (Total 10%)
a. B files a petition for cancellation of the birth certificate of her daughter R on the ground of falsified
material entries there in made by B's husband as the informant. The RTC sets the case for hearing and
directs the publications of the order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Summons was served on the Civil Registrar but there was no appearance during the hearing.
The RTC granted the petition. R filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals,
saying that she was not notified of the petition and hence, the decision was issued in violation of due
process. B opposed saying that the publication of the court order was sufficient compliance with due
process. Rule. (5%)
b. G files a complaint for recovery of possession and damage against F. in the course of the trial, G marked
his evidence but his counsel failed to file a formal offer of evidence. F then presented in evidence tax
declarations in the name of his father to establish that his father is a co-owner of the property. The court
ruled in favor of F, saying that G failed to prove sole ownership of the property in the face of F's evidence.
Was the court correct? Explain briefly. (5%)
2007 Bar
1:52 AM
- VIII (Total 10%)

a. X files an unlawful detainer case against Y before the appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court. In his answer,
Y avers as a special and affirmative defense that he is a tenant of X's deceased father in whose name the
property remains registered. What should the court do? Explain briefly. (5%)
b. The heirs of H agree among themselves that they will honor the division of H's estate as indicated in her
Last Will and Testament. To avoid the expense of going to court in a Petition for Probate of the Will, can
they instead execute an Extrajudicial Settlement Agreement among themselves? Explain briefly. (5%)
- IX (10%)
L was charged with illegal possession of shabu before the RTC. Although bail was allowable under his
indictment, he could not afford to post bail, and so he remained in detention at the City Jail. For various reasons
ranging from the promotion of the Presiding Judge, to the absence of the trial prosecutor, and to the lack of the
notice to the City Jail Warden, the arraignment of L was postponed nineteen times over a period of two years.
Twice during that period, L's counsel filed motions to dismiss, invoking the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
Both motions were denied by the RTC. Can L file a petition for mandamus? Reason briefly.
-X (Total 10%)
a. RC filed a complaint for annulment of the foreclosure sale against Bank V. in its answer, Bank V set up a
counter claim for actual damages and litigation expenses. RC filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim
on the ground the Bank V's Answer with Counterclaim was not accompanied by a certification against
forum shopping. Rule. (5%)
b. A files a case against B. While awaiting decision on the case, A goes to the United States to work. Upon
her return to the Philippines, seven years later, A discovers that a decision was rendered by the court in
her favor a few months after she had left. Can a file a motion for execution of the judgment? Explain
briefly. (5%)
NOTHING FOLLOWS.
2008 Bar
1:52 AM
I
Lani filed an action for partition and accounting in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against her
sister Mary Rose, who is a resident of Singapore and is not found in the Philippines. Upon motion, the
court ordered the publication of the summons for three weeks in a local tabloid, Bulgar. Linda, an OFW
vacationing in the Philippines, saw the summons in Bulgar and brought a copy of the tabloid when she
returned to Singapore. Linda showed the tabloid and the page containing the summons to Mary Rose,
who said, "Yes I know, my kumare Anita scanned and e-mailed that page of Bulgar to me!"
Did the court acquire jurisdiction over Mary Rose? (4%)
II
Fe filed a suit for collection of P387,000 against Ramon in the RTC of Davao City. Aside from alleging
payment as a defense, Ramon in his answer set up counterclaims for P100,000 as damages and P30,000
as attorney's fees as a result of the baseless filing of the complaint, as well as for P250,000 as the
balance of the purchase price of the 30 units of air conditioners he sold to Fe.
a. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over Ramon's counterclaims, and if so, does he have to pay docket
fees therefor? (3%)
b. Suppose Ramon's counterclaim for the unpaid balance is P310,000, what will happen to his
counterclaims if the court dismisses the complaint after holding a preliminary hearing on Ramon's
affirmative defenses? (3%)
c. Under the same premise as paragraph (b) above, suppose that instead of alleging payment as a
defense in his answer, Ramon filed a motion to dismiss on that ground, at the same time setting
up his counterclaims, and the court grants his motion. What will happen to his counterclaims?
(3%)
III
a. Angela, a resident of Quezon City, sued Antonio, a resident of Makati City before the RTC of
Quezon City for the reconveyance of two parcels of land situated in Tarlac and Nueva Ecija,
respectively. May her action prosper? (3%)
b. Assuming that the action was for foreclosure on the mortgage of the same parcels of land, what is
the proper venue for the action? (3%)
IV
Filomeno brought an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City against Marcelino
pleading two causes of action. The first was a demand for the recovery of physical possession of a parcel
of land situated in Pasay City with an assessed value of P40,000; the second was a claim for damages of
P500,000 for Marcelino's unlawful retention of the property. Marcelino filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the total amount involved, which is P540,000, is beyond the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Is
Marcelino correct? (4%)
V
Within the period for filing a responsive pleading, the defendant filed a motion for bill of particulars that
he set for hearing on a certain date. However, the defendant was surprised to find on the date set for
hearing that the trial court had already denied the motion on the day of its filing, stating that the
allegations of the complaint were sufficiently made.
a. Did the judge gravely abuse his discretion in acting on the motion without waiting for the hearing
set for the motion? (3%)
b. If the judge grants the motion and orders the plaintiff to file and serve the bill of particulars, can
the trial judge dismiss the case if the plaintiff does not comply with the order? ( 3%)
VI
After his properties were attached, defendant Porfirio filed a sufficient counterbond. The trial court
discharged the attachment. Nonetheless, Porfirio suffered substantial prejudice due to the unwarranted
attachment. In the end, the trial court rendered a judgment in Porfirio's favor by ordering the plaintiff to
pay damages because the plaintiff was not entitled to the attachment. Porfirio moved to charge the
plaintiff's attachment bond. The plaintiff and his sureties opposed the motion, claiming that the filing of
the counterbond had relieved the plaintiff's attachment bond from all liability for the damages. Rule on
Porfirio's motion. (4%)
VII
a. The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. The judgment obligee subsequently received
information that a bank holds a substantial deposit belonging to the judgment obligor. If you are
the counsel of the judgment obligee, what steps would you take to reach the deposit to satisfy the
judgment? (3%)
b. If the bank denies holding the deposit in the name of the judgment obligor but your client's
informant is certain that the deposit belongs to the judgment obligor under an assumed name,
what is your remedy to reach the deposit? (3%)
VIII
Bembol was charged with rape. Bembol's father, Ramil, approached Artemon, the victim's father, during
the preliminary investigation and offered P1 Million to Artemon to settle the case. Artemon refused the
offer.
a. During trial, the prosecution presented Artemon to testify on Ramil's offer and thereby establish
an implied admission of guilt. Is Ramil's offer to settle admissible in evidence? ( 3%)
b. During the pre-trial, Bembol personally offered to settle the case for P1 Million to the private
prosecutor, who immediately put the offer on record in the presence of the trial judge. Is
Bembol's offer a judicial admission of his guilt? (3%)
IX
The search warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu." During the service of
the search warrant, the raiding team also recovered a kilo of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
newsprint. The accused moved to suppress the marijuana leaves as evidence for the violation of Section
11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 since they were not covered by the search
warrant. The State justified the seizure of the marijuana leaves under the "plain view" doctrine. There
was no indication of whether the marijuana leaves were discovered and seized before or after the
seizure of the shabu. If you are the judge, how would you rule on the motion to suppress? (4%)
X
Jose, Alberto and Romeo were charged with murder. Upon filing of the information, the RTC judge
issued the warrants for their arrest. Learning of the issuance of the warrants, the three accused jointly
filed a motion for reinvestigation and for the recall of the warrants of arrest. On the date set for hearing
of their motion, none of the accused showed up in court for fear of being arrested. The RTC judge
denied their motion because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the movants. Did
the RTC rule correctly? (4%)
XI
Arturo lent P1 Million to his friend Robert on the condition that Robert execute a promissory note for
the loan and a real estate mortgage over his property located in Tagaytay City. Robert complied. In his
promissory note dated September 20, 2006, Robert undertook to pay the loan within a year from its
date at 12% per annum interest. In June 2007, Arturo requested Robert to pay ahead of time but the
latter refused and insisted on the agreement. Arturo issued a demand letter and when Robert did not
comply, Arturo filed an action to foreclose the mortgage. Robert moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of cause of action as the debt was not yet due. The resolution of the motion to dismiss was delayed
because of the retirement of the judge.
a. On October 1, 2007, pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, Arturo filed an amended
complaint alleging that Robert's debt had in the meantime become due but that Robert still
refused to pay. Should the amended complaint be allowed considering that no answer has been
filed? (3%)
b. Would your answer be different had Arturo filed instead a supplemental complaint stating that
the debt became due after the filing of the original complaint? (2%)
XII
After receiving the adverse decision rendered against his client, the defendant, Atty. Sikat duly filed a
notice of appeal. For his part, the plaintiff timely filed a motion for partial new trial to seek an increase
in the monetary damages awarded. The RTC instead rendered an amended decision further reducing the
monetary awards. Is it necessary for Atty. Sikat to file a second notice of appeal after receiving the
amended decision? (3%)
XIII
An heir/oppositor in a probate proceeding filed a motion to remove the administrator on the grounds of
neglect of duties as administrator and absence from the country. On his part the heir/oppositor served
written interrogatories to the administrator preparatory to presenting the latter as a witness. The
administrator objected, insisting that the modes of discovery apply only to ordinary civil actions, not
special proceedings. Rule on the matter. (4%)
XIV
On August 15, 2008, Edgardo committed estafa against Petronilo in the amount of P3 Million. Petronilo
brought his complaint to the National Bureau of Investigation, which found that Edgardo had visited his
lawyer twice, the first time on August 14, 2008 and the second on August 16, 2008; and that both visits
concerned the swindling of Petronilo. During the trial of Edgardo, the RTC issued a subpoena ad
testificandum to Edgardo's lawyer for him to testify on the conversations during their first and second
meetings. May the subpoena be quashed on the ground of privileged communication? Explain fully. (4%)
XV
Half-brothers Roscoe and Salvio inherited from their father a vast tract of unregistered land. Roscoe
succeeded in gaining possession of the parcel of land in its entirety and transferring the tax declaration
thereon in his name. Roscoe sold the northern half to Bono, Salvio's cousin. Upon learning of the sale,
Salvio asked Roscoe to convey the southern half to him. Roscoe refused as he even sold one-third of the
southern half along the West to Carlo. Thereupon, Salvio filed an action for the reconveyance of the
southern half against Roscoe only. Carlo was not impleaded. After filing his answer, Roscoe sold the
middle third of the southern half to Nina. Salvio did not amend the complaint to implead Nina.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering Roscoe to reconvey the entire southern half to Salvio.
The judgment became final and executory. A writ of execution having been issued, the Sheriff required
Roscoe, Carlo and Nina to vacate the southern half and yield possession thereof to Salvio as the
Roscoe, Carlo and Nina to vacate the southern half and yield possession thereof to Salvio as the
prevailing party. Carlo and Nina refused, contending that they are not bound by the judgment as they
are not parties to the case. Is the contention tenable? Explain fully. (4%)
XVI
The mutilated cadaver of a woman was discovered near a creek. Due to witnesses attesting that he was
the last person seen with the woman when she was still alive, Carlito was arrested within five hours
after the discovery of the cadaver and brought to the police station. The crime laboratory determined
that the woman had been raped. While in police custody, Carlito broke down in the presence of an
assisting counsel and orally confessed to the investigator that he had raped and killed the woman,
detailing the acts he had performed up to his dumping of the body near the creek. He was genuinely
remorseful. During the trial, the State presented the investigator to testify on the oral confession of
Carlito. Is the oral confession admissible as evidence of guilt? (4%)
XVII
Ben sold a parcel of land to Del with right to repurchase within one (1) year. Ben remained in possession
of the property. When Ben failed to repurchase the same, title was consolidated in favor of Del. Despite
demand, Ben refused to vacate the land, constraining Del to file a complaint for unlawful detainer. In his
defense, Ben averred that the case should be dismissed because Del had never been in possession of the
property. Is Ben correct? (4%)
XVIII
Domenico and Gen lived without benefit of marriage for twenty years, during which time they
purchased properties together. After Domenico died without a will, Gen filed a petition for letters of
administration. Domenico's siblings opposed the same on the ground that Gen has no legal personality.
Decide. (4%)
XIX
After Alma had started serving her sentence for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), she filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, citing Vaca vs. CA where the sentence of imprisonment of a party
found guilty of violation of BP 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the check
involved. She prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from
detention. In the alternative, she prayed that pending determination on whether the Vaca ruling applies
to her, she be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102, Sec.14, which provides that if a person is
lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not punishable by death,
he may be admitted to bail in the discretion of the court. Accordingly, the trial court allowed Alma to
post bail and then ordered her release. In your opinion, is the order of the trial court correct a. Under Rule 102? (2%)
b. Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure? (2%)
XX
A tugboat owned by Speedy Port Service, Inc. (SPS) sank in Manila Bay while helping tow another vessel,
drowning five (5) of the crew in the resulting shipwreck. At the maritime board inquiry, the four (4)
survivors testified. SPS engaged Atty. Ely to defend it against potential claims and to sue the company
owning the other vessel for damages to the tug. Ely obtained signed statements from the survivors. He
also interviewed other persons, in some instance making memoranda. The heirs of the five (5) victims
filed an action for damages against SPS.
Plaintiffs' counsel sent written interrogatories to Ely, asking whether statements of witnesses were
obtained; if written, copies were to be furnished; if oral, the exact provisions were to be set forth in
detail. Ely refused to comply, arguing that the documents and information asked are privileged
communication. Is the contention tenable? Explain. (4%)
XXI
a. Compare the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution with that under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. (4%)
b. Give at least three instances where the Court of Appeals may act as a trial court. (3%)
NOTHING FOLLOWS.
2009 Bar
1:52 AM
PART I
I
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in
not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
a. The Vallejo standard refers to jurisprudential norms considered by the court in assessing the probative
value of DNA evidence.
b. The One-Day Examination of Witness Rule abbreviates court proceedings by having a witness fully
examined in only one day during trial.
c. A suit for injunction is an action in rem.
d. Under the doctrine of adoptive admission, a third party's statement becomes the admission of the party
embracing or espousing it.
e. Summons may be served by mail.
II
Angelina sued Armando before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila to recover the ownership and
possession of two parcels of land; one situated in Pampanga, and the other in Bulacan.
a. May the action prosper? Explain. (2%)
b. Will your answer be the same if the action was for foreclosure of the mortgage over the two parcels of
land? Why or why not? (2%)
III
Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed with the RTC of Lipa City a Complaint
for Rescission of Contract of Sale of Land against Brigido, a resident of Barangay San Miguel, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. The subject property, located in Barangay Talisay, Lipa City, has an assessed value of P19,700.00.
Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping executed in New
York City, duly notarized by Mr. Joseph Brown, Esq., a notary public in the State of New York.
Brigido filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
a. The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Amorsolo because he is not a resident of the
Philippines; (2%)
b. The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action involving real property with an
assessed value of P19,700.00; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the Municipal Trial Court where
the defendant resides; (3%) and
c. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping are fatally defective because there is no
accompanying certification issued by the Philippine Consulate in New York, authenticating that Mr.
Brown is duly authorized to notarize the document. (3%)
Rule on the foregoing grounds with reasons.
IV
Pedrito and Tomas, Mayor and Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of San Miguel, Leyte, are charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act). The information alleges, among others, that the two conspired in the purchase of several units of
computer through personal canvass instead of a public bidding, causing undue injury to the municipality.
Before arraignment, the accused moved for reinvestigation of the charge, which the court granted. After
reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an amended information duly signed and approved by
the Special Prosecutor, alleging the same delictual facts, but with an additional allegation that the accused gave
unwarranted benefits to SB Enterprises owned by Samuel. Samuel was also indicted under the amended
information.
Before Samuel was arraigned, he moved to quash the amended information on the ground that the officer who
filed the same had no authority to do so. Resolve the motion to quash with reasons. (3%)
V
Frank and Gina were married on June 12, 1987 in Manila. Barely a year after the wedding, Frank exhibited a
violent temperament, forcing Gina, for reasons of personal safety, to live with her parents. A year thereafter,
Gina found employment as a domestic helper in Singapore, where she worked for ten consecutive years. All the
time she was abroad, Gina had absolutely no communications with Frank, nor did she hear any news about
him. While in Singapore, Gina met and fell in love with Willie.
On July 4, 2007, Gina filed a petition with the RTC of Manila to declare Frank presumptively dead, so that she
could marry Willie. The RTC granted Gina's petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC, stating that it was appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact and
law.
a. Is a petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death a special proceeding? Why or why not? (2%)
b. As the RTC judge who granted Gina's petition, will you give due course to the OSG's Notice of Appeal?
Explain. (3%)
Bar
1:55 AM
VI
Arrested in a buy-bust operation, Edmond was brought to the police station where he was informed of his
constitutional rights. During the investigation, Edmond refused to give any statement. However, the arresting
officer asked Edmond to acknowledge in writing that six (6) sachets of "shabu" were confiscated from him.
Edmond consented and also signed a receipt for the amount of P3,000.00, allegedly representing the "purchase
price of the shabu." At the trial, the arresting officer testified and identified the documents executed and
signed by Edmond. Edmond's lawyer did not object to the testimony. After the presentation of the testimonial
evidence, the prosecutor made a formal offer of evidence which included the documents signed by Edmond.
Edmond's lawyer objected to the admissibility of the documents for being the "fruit of the poisoned tree."
Resolve the objection with reasons. (3%)
VII
Cresencio sued Dioscoro for collection of a sum of money. During the trial, but after the presentation of
plaintiff's evidence, Dioscoro died. Atty. Cruz, Dioscoro's counsel, then filed a motion to dismiss the action on
the ground of his client's death. The court denied the motion to dismiss and, instead, directed counsel to
furnish the court with the names and addresses of Dioscoro's heirs and ordered that the designated
administrator of Dioscoro's estate be substituted as representative party.
After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Cresencio. When the decision had become final and
executory, Cresencio moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Dioscoro's estate to enforce his
judgment claim. The court issued the writ of execution. Was the court's issuance of the writ of execution
proper? Explain. (2%)
VIII
On July 15, 2009, Atty. Manananggol was served copies of numerous unfavorable judgments and orders. On
July 29, 2009, he filed motions for reconsideration which were denied. He received the notices of denial of the
motions for reconsideration on October 2, 2009, a Friday. He immediately informed his clients who, in turn,
uniformly instructed him to appeal. How, when and where should he pursue the appropriate remedy for each
of the following: (10%)
a. Judgment of a Municipal Trial Court (MTC) pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction dismissing his client's
application for land registration?
b. Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denying his client's petition for a Writ of Habeas Data?
c. Order of a Family Court denying his client's petition for Habeas Corpus in relation to custody of a minor
child?
d. Order of the RTC denying his client's Petition for Certiorari questioning the Metropolitan Trial Court's
(MeTC's) denial of a motion to suspend criminal proceedings?
e. Judgment of the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) affirming the RTC decision convicting his
client for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code?
IX
Modesto sued Ernesto for a sum of money, claiming that the latter owed him P1-million, evidenced by a
promissory note, quoted and attached to the complaint. In his answer with counterclaim, Ernesto alleged that
Modesto coerced him into signing the promissory note, but that it is Modesto who really owes him P1.5million. Modesto filed an answer to Ernesto's counterclaim admitting that he owed Ernesto, but only in the
amount of P0.5-million. At the pre-trial, Modesto marked and identified Ernesto's promissory note. He also
marked and identified receipts covering payments he made to Ernesto, to the extent of P0.5-million, which
Ernesto did not dispute.
After pre-trial, Modesto filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, while Ernesto filed a motion for
summary judgment on his counterclaim. Resolve the two motions with reasons. (5%)
X
Upon termination of the pre-trial, the judge dictated the pre-trial order in the presence of the parties and their
counsel, reciting what had transpired and defining three (3) issues to be tried.
a. If, immediately upon receipt of his copy of the pre-trial order, plaintiff's counsel should move for its
amendment to include a fourth (4th) triable issue which he allegedly inadvertently failedto mention
when the judge dictated the order. Should the motion to amend be granted? Reasons. (2%)
b. Suppose trial had already commenced and after the plaintiff's second witness had testified, the
defendant's counsel moves for the amendment of the pre-trial order to include a fifth (5th) triable issue
vital to his client's defense. Should the motion be granted over the objection of plaintiff's counsel?
Reasons. (3%)
PART II
XI
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in
not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
a. The accused in a criminal case has the right to avail of the various modes of discovery.
b. The viatory right of a witness served with a subpoena ad testificandum refers to his right not to comply
with the subpoena.
c. In the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan may grant petitions for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.
d. An electronic document is the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
e. The filing of a motion for the reconsideration of the trial court's decision results in the abandonment of a
perfected appeal.
XII
Mike was renting an apartment unit in the building owned by Jonathan. When Mike failed to pay six months'
rent, Jonathan filed an ejectment suit. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered judgment in favor of Jonathan,
who then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The MTC issued the writ.
a. How can Mike stay the execution of the MTC judgment? Explain. (2%)
b. Mike appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MTC decision. Mike then filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the
sheriff had already executed the MTC decision and had ejected Mike from the premises, thus rendering
the appeal moot and academic. Is the CA correct? Reasons. (3%)
XIII
a. Continental Chemical Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for a sum of money against Barstow Trading
Corporation (BTC) for the latter's failure to pay for its purchases of industrial chemicals. In its answer, BTC
contended that it refused to pay because CCC misrepresented that the products it sold belonged to a new
line, when in fact they were identical with CCC's existing products. To substantiate its defense, BTC filed a
motion to compel CCC to give a detailed list of the products' ingredients and chemical components,
relying on the right to avail of the modes of discovery allowed under Rule 27. CCC objected, invoking
confidentiality of the information sought by BTC. Resolve BTC's motion with reasons. (3%)
b. Blinded by extreme jealousy, Alberto shot his wife, Betty, in the presence of his sister, Carla. Carla
brought Betty to the hospital. Outside the operating room, Carla told Domingo, a male nurse, that it was
Alberto who shot Betty. Betty died while undergoing emergency surgery. At the trial of the parricide
charges filed against Alberto, the prosecutor sought to present Domingo as witness, to testify on what
Carla told him. The defense counsel objected on the ground that Domingo's testimony is inadmissible for
being hearsay. Rule on the objection with reasons. (3%)
XIV
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) filed with the
RTC a complaint for the expropriation of the parcel of land owned by Jovito. The land is to be used as an
extension of the national highway. Attached to the complaint is a bank certificate showing that there is, on
deposit with the Land Bank of the Philippines, an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property.
Then DPWH filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. Jovito filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that there are other properties which would better serve the purpose.
a. Will Jovito's motion to dismiss prosper? Explain. (3%)
b. As judge, will you grant the writ of possession prayed for by DPWH? Explain. (3%)
XV
a. Florencio sued Guillermo for partition of a property they owned in common. Guillermo filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint because Florencio failed to implead Hernando and Inocencio, the other co-owners
of the property. As judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss? Explain. (3%)
b. Mariano, through his attorney-in-fact, Marcos, filed with the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for
annulment of sale against Henry. Marcos and Henry both reside in Asin Road, Baguio City, while Mariano
resides in Davao City. Henry filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prematurity for
failure to comply with the mandatory barangay conciliation. Resolve the motion with reasons. (3%)
XVI
a. After the prosecution had rested and made its formal offer of evidence, with the court admitting all of
the prosecution evidence, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court. The prosecution
was allowed to comment thereon. Thereafter, the court granted the demurrer, finding that the accused
could not have committed the offense charged. If the prosecution files a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the court order granting the demurrer was not in accord with the law and jurisprudence,
will the motion prosper? Explain your answer. (3%)
b. A criminal information is filed in court charging Anselmo with homicide. Anselmo files a motion to quash
the information on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Will the motion be
granted? Why or why not? (3%)
XVII
Having obtained favorable judgment in his suit for a sum of money against Patricio, Orencio sought the
issuance of a writ of execution. When the writ was issued, the sheriff levied upon a parcel of land that Patricio
owns, and a date was set for the execution sale.
a. How may Patricio prevent the sale of the property on execution? (2%)
b. If Orencio is the purchaser of the property at the execution sale, how much does he have to pay? Explain.
(2%)
c. If the property is sold to a third party at the execution sale, what can Patricio do to recover the property?
Explain. (2%)
XVIII
Pinoy died without a will. His wife, Rosie, and three children executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of his
estate. The deed was properly published and registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. Three years
thereafter, Suzy appeared, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Pinoy. She sought to annul the settlement
alleging that she was deprived of her rightful share in the estate.
Rosie and the three children contended that (1) the publication of the deed constituted constructive notice to
the whole world, and should therefore bind Suzy; and (2) Suzy's action had already prescribed.
Are Rosie and the three children correct? Explain. (4%)
XIX
a. Distinguish the two (2) modes of appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals. (3%)
b. What is the writ of amparo? How is it distinguished from the writ of habeas corpus? (2%)
c. What is the writ of habeas data? (1%)
-NOTHING FOLLOWS-
XVII
Having obtained favorable judgment in his suit for a sum of money against Patricio, Orencio sought the
issuance of a writ of execution. When the writ was issued, the sheriff levied upon a parcel of land that Patricio
owns, and a date was set for the execution sale.
a. How may Patricio prevent the sale of the property on execution? (2%)
b. If Orencio is the purchaser of the property at the execution sale, how much does he have to pay? Explain.
(2%)
Explain. (2%)
XVIII
Pinoy died without a will. His wife, Rosie, and three children executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of his
estate. The deed was properly published and registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. Three years
thereafter, Suzy appeared, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Pinoy. She sought to annul the settlement
alleging that she was deprived of her rightful share in the estate.
Rosie and the three children contended that (1) the publication of the deed constituted constructive notice to
the whole world, and should therefore bind Suzy; and (2) Suzy's action had already prescribed.
Are Rosie and the three children correct? Explain. (4%)
XIX
a. Distinguish the two (2) modes of appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals. (3%)
b. What is the writ of amparo? How is it distinguished from the writ of habeas corpus? (2%)
c. What is the writ of habeas data? (1%)
-NOTHING FOLLOWS-
Class B
Class B Page 56
Class C
Class C Page 57
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CASE NO. 1. PNB VS. SANAO MRKTG. CORP.

Case Digest Page 1

TORRES RACAZA and TORRES PARAS vs. GOZUM

A trial ct has no authority to interfere w/ the proceedings of a ct. of equal jurisdiction.

A trial ct has no authority to interfere w/ the proceedings of a ct. of equal jurisdiction.

Case Digest Page 3

RUBEN SANTOS vs. Sps. TONY AYON & MERCY AYON

w/ the MTCC, vs Sps Tony & Mercy Ayon.

has no jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the

Case Digest Page 5

JUSTINO LARESMA vs. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA

Case Digest Page 6

Case Digest Page 8

CASE NO. 15 CESAR T. HILARIO, et al. vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR,

T. HILARIO, et al. vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, resp. Heirs of

Case Digest Page 10

CASE NO. 14. VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. CA & Heirs of JUAN

01. Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land w/ Compensation &

Damages against Pr. before the RTC Br. XI of Tuao, Cagayan.

13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan.

property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of resps.

affirming the RTC.

Case Digest Page 12

CASE NO. 13 DANILO DUMO & SUPREMA DUMO vs. ERLINDA

possession over the subject property.

Case Digest Page 15

Case Digest Page 16

CASE NO. 12. MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A.

LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA VS. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY

order the transfer of the case to another branch of the RTC.

Case Digest Page 18

Saturday, March 22, 2014

CASE NO. 11. HILARION M. HENARES, JR vs. LAND

& DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS

resps. to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is

Case Digest Page 20

& BIENVENIDO A. TAN

Case Digest Page 21

remedy is not barred.

Case Digest Page 22

CASE NO. 9. ALEJANDRO NG WEE VS. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

CASE NO. 9. ALEJANDRO NG WEE VS. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

Case Digest Page 23

established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.

Case Digest Page 25

CASE NO. 8 - ANITA MANGILA, VS. CA, ET AL.

CASE NO. 8 - ANITA MANGILA, VS. CA, ET AL.

first, the ct. issues the order granting the application;

Case Digest Page 27

Case Digest Page 28

Case Digest Page 29

Saturday, March 22, 2014

CASE NO. 6. RP vs. CA et al.

Case Digest Page 30

Case Digest Page 31

Case Digest Page 33

Case Digest Page 35

CASE NO. 5 ANTONIO NAVARRO & GRAHMMS, Inc. vs.

Saturday, March 22, 2014

02. Hence, the Pet. at bar.

Case Digest Page 36

Case Digest Page 37

MADRIGAL TRANSPORT INC., vs. LAPANDAY HOLDINGS CORP, et al.

Case Digest Page 38