TANADA V.

TUVERA [136 S 27] - F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on

matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs,
general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non
requirement
for
the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is
thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of
said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the
date
when
it
goes
into
effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the
date
of
its
effectivity.
xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
TANADA v TUVERA146 SCRA 446
FACTS:
The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws, presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, executive orders, and administrative orders being enacted
to be published first in the Official Gazette as well as a fifteen day period before said law
can be made valid in accordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is
a requirement for its effectivity.
HELD:
For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or decrees
being enacted by their government, sufficient appropriation of time and publication is

necessary. According to Article 2 of the Civil Code, all laws must be given 15 days upon
its publication in the Official Gazette for it to be enacted. This is to give sufficient time
for the people to learn of such laws as well as to respect their right to be informed. The
respondents however brought up the fact that the Official Gazette may not be the most effective
medium for the people to be educated of certain new laws given its erratic publication
dates as well as its limited number of readers, with lieu of more potent mediums
of instructions such as newspapers of general circulation because of its wide readership
and regular dates of printing. The court nevertheless rules that such periodicals are not
what is required by the Civil Code and such amendments are left to the legislative branch
of the government. Having said this, the court finds in favor of publishing all laws,
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,executive orders, and
administrative orders with a 15 day leeway, or unless stated, for them to take into

DE ROY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 157 SCRA 757

FACTS:
This is a case of certiorari seeking to declare null and void the resolution denying
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed
entry of judgment since the decision insaid case had become final; and the resolution
denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time. T
he CA applied the rule laid down in
Habaluyas Enterprises,Inc. v. Japzon
, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the 15-dayperiod for appealing or for filing
a Motion for Reconsideration cannot be extendedPetitioners contend that the rule
enunciated in the above case should not be madeto apply to them owing to the nonpublication of the HABALUYAS decision in theOfficial Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the CA was promulgated.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner's contention meritorious?
HELD:
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
OfficialGazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective.It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions
of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Courtdecisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court ReportsAnnotated (SCRA) and law journals.
57 SCRA 757 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Publication of
Laws Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed
the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to
the death of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand
but that she was ignored.

In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De
Roys counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled
that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteenday period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable
because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE
PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided . . .;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the
Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the
Supreme Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986)
when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not
be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should
accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue

of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the
Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-seven.

G.R. No. L-6339

April 20, 1954

MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee.
Manansala
and
Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee.

Manansala

for

appellants.

DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars,
operated a taxi business under the name of Waval Taxi. He employed among others
three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods
ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanicsand
chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca,
a transportation company, as a result of which, according to the mechanicsand chauffeurs
above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in
their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation
for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and
one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because
the failure of their former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the
three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained

as plaintiffs. The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that it stated no cause of action and the trial court for the time being denied the motion
saying that it will be considered when the case was heard on the merits. After trial the
complaint was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the Court of
Appeals which Tribunal after finding only questions of law are involved, certified the
case to us.
Case Digest:
Manuel Lara et al were former taxi drivers of Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr. In September
1950, Del Rosario sold some of his vehicles which led to Lara et al not being needed
anymore. Eventually, their services were terminated. Because their employer did not give
them their one months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, Lara et al sued Del Rosario.
However, Del Rosario contended that the Code of Commerce was already repealed hence
Lara et al have no legal basis. Del Rosario contends that the New Civil Code took effect
in August 1950 or a year after release for publication.
ISSUE: When did the New Civil Code took effect?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Lara et al has no legal basis for their claims since
the provision of the COde of Commerce they are relying on was already repealed by the
New Civil Code. Their alleged dismissal from service without notice took place in
September 1950 after the New Civil Code took effect.
The Supreme Court also clarified that, in an obiter dictum, that the new Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official
Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having been
made on August 30, 1949.
odolfo Navarro was the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, said judge
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. On his part, Domagtoy
claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that
Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have
been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he performed
a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he
solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes. Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the
law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former
wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to
have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the
request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdictionwas only done by one party,
the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this
provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article
7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers
only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of
the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.

Case Digest on People vs. Licera

PEOPLE V. LICERA [65 S 270 (1975)] - F: In 1961, accused was granted an
appointment as secret agent of Governor Leviste. In 1965, accused was charged with
illegal possession of firearms. The SC held that where at the time of his appointment,
People v. Macarandang (1959) was applicable, which held that secret agents were exempt
from the license requirement, and later People v. Mapa (1967) was decided, the earlier
case should be held applicable.

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HELD: Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions,
although in them selves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the
date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry
into effect.

A new doctrine abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely
affect those favored by the old rule.