Case Digests of Jurado, Tolentino and Balane

WESTERN MINDANAO STATE
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

LLB-III B
BATCH 2013-2014
SUCCESSION
CASE
DIGESTS
Based on the book of
Jurado, Tolentino and
Balane
SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. JIHAN EL R. EDDING
NOVEMBER 2013
[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

LIMJUCO VS.ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate
Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil
Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose
of settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived
after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the Public Service Commission..
Supreme Court if of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572
of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of
Pedro O. Fragante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service
Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.
LLB III-B
CENTENERA VS. SOTTO

G.R. No. L-49065
April 30, 1947
FACTS:
On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitorena file a motion praying that subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., marked
as Annex E, be approved and that it be decreed that certificates of title be issued in his name on lots 2,3, and 4
of the original plan Psu-66063 and upon lots 1,5,6,7, and 8 of the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd. The
movant alleged that on May 14, 1931, a decision was rendered by the lower court granting Rita Garchitorena
as heiress of her father Andres, title over four lots, the same described in her original application, subject to
lien in favor of Mariano Garchitorena and other creditors, with the exclusion of about 500 hectares belonging
to Ramon and Jose Alvarez, about 300 hectares of land of the public domain, a portion of 18 hectares
belonging to Hermogenes P. Obias and another portion of 24 hectares of land of the public domain, with the
exception of 4 hectares belonging to Januario Alvarez, all said portions being included in lot number 1. It is
also alleged that after said judgment was modified by the Supreme Court and some steps have been taken as a
[1]

result of said modification, lots 1,2,3 and 4 of land Psu-66063 were adjudicated to Mariano Garchitorena in
consideration of the amount of P28,745.93 a deed of sale having been executed to said effect on September 8,
1935, which was approved by the lower court on April 26, 1940, and that Mariano Garchitorena bought the
500 hectares of Ramon and Jose Alvarez on April 27, 1939. Several persons appeared to oppose the motion,
but only three of them came to appeal against the lower courts order dated June 28, 1941, decreeing the
issuance of certificate of titles in favor of Mariano Garchitorena on lots 2,3, and 4 of the original plan Psu
66063-Amd., and on lots, 1,6,and 7 of the same subdivision plan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Land Court has jurisdiction over the issuance of the certificate of title of the said lots.
HELD:
The jurisdiction of the Land Court extends no further than the inscription of the land described in its final
decree and the enforcement of that decree, and that, even though the land described in the petition be found by
the court, as between the petitioner and the oppositor, to be the property of the opponent, such land can not be
inscribed in his name, the Land Court having , as we have said , no jurisdiction or power to do so. It naturally
and necessarily follows that the opponent, if he desires the land of which he claims ownership to be registered
in accordance with law, must begin a new proceeding in the Land Court for that purpose.
LLB III-B
BARRIOS VS DOLOR
G.R. No. 559
March 14, 1903
FACTS:
The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the late Don
Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon, which he claims to
have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention as to the
law of the case he attached to the complaint a public instrument which appears to have been
executed by himself and Demonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which, according to the plaintiff, a
stipulation is made for a contract of partnership for the operation of the said estate, and,
furthermore, a community, of ownership is established with respect to the estate in favor of the
two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has been recorded in the
registry of property. Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Dona Maria
Pascuala Dolor raised an incidental issue as previous question, praying that the instrument
referred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded in the registry of
property, and that it be returned to the plaintiff without leaving in the record any transcript or
copy thereof of extract therefrom, resting this contention upon rticle 389 of the Mortgage Law.
This motion was granted by the judge by order of the 24 th of March, 1898, against which the
plaintiff appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and should be regarded as
third persons for the purposes of the Mortgage Law.
HELD:
[2]

The defendants are not third persons with respect to the contract entered into by their decedent,
Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the instrument of February 3, 1883, and they therefore cannot
avail themselves of the prohibition contained in article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose
of opposing the admission of this instrument as evidence in the case, because not recorded in the
registry of property. This prohibition was established solely and exclusively in favor of those
who, within the meaning of that law, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of the
defendants would be superior to that of the person whom they derived their rights, because he,
not being a third person, could not set up such an exception. This would certainly be most
illogical from a legal point of view, in view of the fact that the heir is, above stated, a mere
continuation of the civil personality of his decedent.
LLB III-B
SUILIONG & CO. VS. CHIO-TAYSAN
G.R. No. L-4777
November 11, 1908
FACTS:
Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, which was was
inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she
borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican
currency, and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan,
but no entry touching the transaction was noted in the land registry. Avelina Caballero died on
the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysn, the defendant in this action,
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known, under the system of civil
procedure in existence prior to the adoption of the present code, as an action for the declaration
of heirship and on the 5th day of August 1903, following order declaring her to be the only and
exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased.On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the city
of Manila by virtue of order entered the inscriptions in the land registry whereby the said Silvina
Chio-Taysan is made to appear as the owner of the land in question. On the 26 th day of May
1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from the Fire and Marine
Insurance and Loan Co.,of which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed liquidator, and mortgaged
the land in question as security for the payment of loan. Therefter the husband of Silvina ChioTaysan instituted special proceedings under the provisions of the present Code of Civil
Procedure, for the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased. On the 16 th day of
October 1905, he was appointed administrator. On the 10th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff in
this action filed its complaint against the defendant , Silvin Chio-Taysan, praying for judgment
for the amount loaned her as above set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the land.
The trial court enteree judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both the defendant and the
intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether one or more heirs could be entitled to be recognized as the owner or owners of the
property of the deceased in an action for declaration of heirship.
HELD:
A judgment in an action for the declaration of heirship in favor of one or more heirs could not
[3]

entitle such persons to be recognized as the owner or owners of the property of the deceased on
the same terms as such property was held by the deceased, for it passes to the heir, under the new
civil code, burdened with all the debts of the deceased, his death having created a lien thereon for
the benefit of the creditor; and indeed an examination of the proceedings prescribed in the new
code of Civil Procedure for the administration and distribution of the estates of deceased persons
leaves no room for doubt that those proceedings are exclusive of all other judicial proceedings
looking to that end, and supersede the judicial proceeding for the declaration of heirship, as
recognized in the old procedure, atleast so far as the proceedings served as a remedy whereby the
right of specific persons to succeed to the rights and obligations of the deceased as his heirs
might be judicially determined and enforced.
LLB III-B
Pavia vs. De la Rosa

8 Phil. 70
March 18, 1907
FACTS:
The plaintiffs prayed that a judgment be rendered in their favor and against the defendants for the
sum of 15,000 pesos, Philippine Currency, as damages, together with costs of action, alleging in
effect that by reason of the death of the testator, Pablo Linart e Iturralde, Francisco Granda e
Iturralde was appointed executor under the will of the said deceased, in which will the minor
Carmen Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir, and that owing to the death of the
executor Francisco Granda toward the end of December, 1893, there was substituted as executor
Jose de la Rosa, who took possession of the personal property of the state, amounting to 10,673
pesos, Mexican Currency, as well as the property situated at No. 27 Calle Solana, Walled City,
[4]

likewise the property of the testator; that during the month of April, 1904, the plaintiff, Rafaela
Pavia, in her own behalf, and as guardian of Carmen Linart y Pavia, executed a power of
attorney in behalf of the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa with the powers therein expressed, and the
attorney having accepted such power proceeded to administer the aforesaid estate in a careless
manner until the 20th of August, 1903, neglecting the interests of the plaintiffs and wasting the
capital, and causing damages amounting to over 15,000 pesos, Philippine currency, owing to the
fact of having retired or disposed of without any necessity the sum of 7,207 pesos Mexican
currency, together with interest thereon amounting to 360.25 pesos, which amounts would have
produced 12,321.90 pesos, Mexican currency, for the plaintiffs; that the executor and attorney De
la Rosa neglected to appraise, count, and divide the estate of Linart, deceased, notwithstanding it
was his duty to do so, and leased the aforesaid house No. 27 Calle Solana to his relatives from
December, 1893, to August, 1903, at a much lower rental than could have been obtained, thereby
causing the plaintiffs losses amounting to 6,570 pesos, Mexican Currency; that the aforesaid Jose
de la Rosa died on the 14th of September, 1903, leaving the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la
Rosa as his only heirs and representatives, Eusebio Canals being the husband of the said Bibiana.
ISSUE
WON the defendant Bibiana and Salud de laRosa are responsible for the personal acts of
Josedela Rosa.
HELD:
No. It has not been shown that the estate or the intestate succession of the deceased, Jose de la
Rosa, was ever opened or that an inventory has ever been presented in evidence, notwithstanding
that at the time of the death of De la Rosa, the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.190) was already
in force, and that in accordance with its provisions the estate of the deceased should have been
administered and liquidated.- In accordance with the provisions of the Act No.190 it is
understood that estate or intestate succession of a deceased person is always accepted and
received with benefit of inventory, and his heirs, even after having taken possession of the estate
of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of said deceased with their
own property, but solely with that property coming from the estate or intestate succession of said
deceased.- The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or
intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered,
the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate of the
deceased, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the purpose of appraising the
property of the estate and deciding as to the claims against said estate
ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.

LLB III-B
[5]
Montelibano vs. Cruz,

35 Off. Gaz. 1083
April 30, 1964
FACTS:
Spouses Alejandro Montelibano and his wife Gliceria, who died, respectively, on August 14,
1927 and September 19, 1914, were survived by the children, Jose M. Alfredo M. Concepcion
and Alejandro all surnamed Montelibano. On September 6, 1927, Jose M. Montelibano applied
in Civil Case No. 4281 of the aforementioned court for letters of Administration of his deceased
father Alejandro Montelibano. A similar petition was filed on November 12, 1927, with the same
court and docketed therein as Case No. 4428, as regards the estate of Gliceria M. Montelibano.
In due course, the inventories of the properties constituting the estates of the aforementioned
deceased spouses was submitted on October 2, 1930. Subsequently, or on June 11, 1931, the
corresponding petition for declaration of heirs of said spouses and project of partition of their
respective estates was file. Said petition and project of partition were approved the court on July
21, 1931. Nothing appears to have be done in said cases until September 11, 1940, when the
attention of the court was called to the payment of the corresponding inheritance taxes,
whereupon both cases we declared closed on September 14, 1940.
ISSUES:
[6]

Whether or not the petition for declaration of heirs is valid.
HELD:
Petitioners assail the accuracy or validity of these grounds, but a review of the record does not
show that they have succeeded in their endeavor. What is more, during the period intervening
from the issuance of the order of October 22, 1958, to that of April 11, 1962, petitioners had
begun to introduce their evidence. Apparently, the nature thereof was not such as to impart to
respondent judge the impression that petitioners' cause of action was sufficiently, meritorious to
warrant a reconsideration of the first order. At any rate, the issue hinges on whether or not the
other properties of respondent herein which are subject to the notice of lis pendens suffice to
protect petitioners' alleged rights, should the same be eventually upheld judicially. Upon the
records before us, we are not prepared to conclude that respondent Judge had abused his
discretion, much less gravely, in resolving this question, in the affirmative.

LLB III-B
LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN

66 PHIL 547
November 23, 1938
FACTS:
Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3rd person. But Lorenzo before he was able to pay the debt, he
died. But when he died, he had no property. Theoretically, there should have been succession
between Lorenzo and Anna. So Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But because Lorenzo
had no properties, Anna did not inherit anything from Lorenzo.
ISSUE:
Can the 3rd person claim from Anna?
HELD:
No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the inheritance is only to
the extent of the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had debts. The value of the inheritance should
only be to the value of the debts. But there was no property left.So the value of the inheritance is
zero. The debts cannot beenforced against Anna because Anna inherited nothing. ARTICLE 777.
The rights to the succession aretransmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
[7]

LLB III-B
Uson vs. Del Rosari

G.R. No. L-4963
January 29, 1953
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Recovery of the ownership and possession
FACTS:
Five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four
children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed
Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in
1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other
heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21,

1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a
public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and,
in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by
way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property that may be left by her husband upon his death.
[8]
ISSUE:
WON Maria Urson has the right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband
upon his death.
HELD:
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of

Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the
defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino
Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now codefendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is
evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he
was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only
heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly
said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria
Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over
the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed
of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the
subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co.,
41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants
are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil
Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new
Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the
law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and
because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new
[9]

code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article
2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed
that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article
provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it
shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise
thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior
legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested
or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of
this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657,
old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of
the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying
in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in
question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while
the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to
assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said;
apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property,
inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may
be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either
in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code).
Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the
alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
AMIILBAHAR, NURULAIN K.
LLB III-B
Baun vs. Heirs of Baun
G.R. No. L-30750
[10]

October 24, 1929
FACTS:
On May 31, 1928, the administrator of the estate filed a motion, requesting
authority to sell personal and real properties of the estate, in order to pay its
debts. The motion alleged (a) that the estate was indebted to the Asociacion
Cooperativa del Credito Rural de Tarlac in the sum of P1,000, with interest at
10 per cent from February 11, 1925; (b) that it was also indebted to Manuel
Urquico in the sum of P7,412.22, with interest at 12 per cent from November
1, 1927; and (c) that the estate was without sufficient funds to meet said
obligations.
On June 1, 1928, the heirs of the estate, with the exception of Damiana
Manankil, widow of the deceased, filed their written conformity to the
proposed sale of the only real property of the estate described in the
inventory, consisting of a parcel of land and the machinery and building
thereon. They also stated that Genara Pineda offered P20,000 of said
property and that they considered said offer as most advantegeous and
beneficial to their interest. Said written conformity was assign by Alejandro
Calma in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors Guillermo and
Simeona Calma, and by Celedonia Baun, with the consent of her husband
Lorenzo Mallari.
On June 15, 1928, the court appointed Jose Fausto, an attorney at law, as
guardian ad litem of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, heirs of
Jacinto Baun, with special reference to the proposed sale of the real property
of the estate.
Some time thereafter said guardian ad litem filed his report, recommending
favorably the proposed sale of the land and the machinery and building
thereon to Genara Pineda at the price offered by her.
On June 29, 1928, the court authorized the administrator of the estate to sell
[11]

the property of the deceased in the form and manner most advantageous to
the estate. The pertinent part of the order of the court said:" Por la presente
queda autorizado el referido administrador para vender los vienes del
aludido finado en la forma que crea procedente y ventajosa para los fines
arriba indicados."
On July 6, 1928, Simplicio Baun, the administrator of the estate, filed a

petition requesting approval by the court of the sale of said real property to
Pedro Santos for the sum of P22,000. The administrator sold the property to
said vendee, who gave a better price than that offered by Genara Pineda,
which was for P20,000 only, as above stated.
On July 7, 1928, the court approved said sale, and on July 10, 1928, ordered
the vendee Pedro Santos to immediately deliver to the administrator of the
estate the price of the property amounting to P22,000.
ISSUE:
WON That the administrator sold the real property of the estate without
having first sold the personal property;
WON that Damiana Manankil, the widow of the deceased, who was also an
heir of the estate, did not give her conformity or consent to said sale;
WON that no notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the
property of the estate was served upon the heirs, either personal or by
publication, as required by section 722, paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and (d) that no hearing was held on said application of the
administrator.
HELD:
[12]

(1) that said real property was sold because the personal property of the
deceased was insufficient to meet the obligation of the estate; (2) that the
real property of the estate was sold upon the initiative and with the written
consent of the heirs and consequently they are now estopped from attacking
the validity of said sale; (3) that notice of the hearing of the application for
authority to sell the property of the estate was not necessary inasmuch as
the requirements of the law had been virtually satisfied by the written
consent of the heirs to the sale; and (4) that the written consent of all of the
heirs was not necessary because the law does not specifically require the
consent in writing all of the heirs.
That the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regulating the sale of the
estate of the deceased and prescribing certain formalities, were not complied
with in the sale of the real property in question, and consequently the sale is
null and void.
In this jurisdiction, by virtue of the provisions of articles 657 and 661 of the
Civil Code, the heirs succeeded to all the rights and obligations of the
decedent "by the mere fact of his death." The rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death." In other words, the
heirs succeed immediately to all the rights and obligations of the ancestor by
the merefact of the death of the ancestor. From the death of the ancestor the
heirs are the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the ancestor, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by the law.
The only law providing for the sale of the property which formerly belonged
to the deceased and prescribing the formalities antecedent to said sale, is
found in sections 714 and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
in view of what precedes, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, the
sale is hereby declared null and void; and the record is hereby remanded to
the lower court with the direction that, after the citations of all the heirs
including Catalina Tejeiro and all of the other creditors and Pedro Santos, and
after giving them an opportunity to be heard, it issue such orders in harmony
with this decision as will, in equity and justice, protect the interest of all
parties concerned, to the end that the estate of Jacinto Baun may be finally
settled and terminated. The appellants are also hereby ordered to deposit
[13]

with the lower court such additional amount as may be found necessary to
pay in full all the indebtedness and obligations of the estate, including the
interest thereof; or, otherwise, the court shall proceed to sell the property of
the estate for the purpose of paying said indebtedness. And without any
finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
LLB III-B
Cuison vs. Villanueva

[14]

90 Phil. 850;
FACTS:On February 14, 1939, Manuel Cuison filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for the probate of a document marked exhibit "A", said to be the last will
and testament of Leodegaria Villanueva who died on December 14, 1938. The heirs instituted in
said will were Reynaldo Cuison, a nephew of the testatrix and six minor children Maria
Dolores, Hernando, Leonardo, Angel, Maria Jimena and Telma, all surnamed Macasa, said to be
grandnephews and nieces. Petitioner Manuel Cuison was appointed administrator and he
qualified as such.
On January 29, 1941, the lower court, presided over by Judge Sotero Rodas,
dismissed the petition "por falta de gestion de solicitante." Upon motion of
the petitioner the order of dismissal was reconsidered, the case reinstated
and later, by order of November 28, 1941, the lower court denied the
probate of the will and declared that the deceased Leodegaria Villanueva
died intestate. Upon another motion for reconsideration filed by Manuel
Cuison the order of denial of probate was reconsidered and Manuel Cuison
was ordered to secure a transcript of the stenographic notes taken during
the hearing of probate held on March 15, 1941. This order of reconsideration
was dated December 6, 1941. One or two days later the Pacific war broke
out.
On December 16, 1948, the oppositor Nicolas Villanueva, et al., move for the
definite dismissal of the petition for probate. By order of January 10, 1949,
Judge Jose Teodoro, then presiding over the trial court, definitely denied the
petition for probate. On January 22, 1949, petitioner Manuel Cuison moved
for the reconsideration of the order of denial of the petition for probate.
On August 16, 1949, Elisa, Ricardo, Josefina, Luis, Hermenigilda, all

surnamed Cuison, for the first time, entered this case, claiming to be
legitimate brothers and sisters of Reynaldo Cuison the nephew of the
testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva instituted as one of the heirs in the will,
exhibit "A". Further claiming that said Reynaldo Cuison died intestate on
February 12, 1939, about two months after the death of the testatrix, they
filed a petition for relief under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court, from the order January 10, 1949 definitely denying probate of the will.
The petitioners Elisa Cuison, et al., further claimed that Reynaldo Cuison,
their brother, upon his death, left neither legitimate nor natural
acknowledged children, consequently, his only heirs are the said petitioners
[15]

and their brother Manuel Cuison. The petition for relief was based on the
allegation that they had no actual knowledge of the order of January 10,
1949, denying the probate of the will, until the month of July, 1949; that up
to the filing of the petition for relief, petitioners had never been direct or
actual parties to the probate proceedings but they were constructive parties,
since the proceedings were in rem and the order of the denial of probate
would affect them as heirs of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison; that there nonappearance or participation in the probate proceedings may be regarded as
excusable negligence; and that if they were given a chance, they would
prove the validity and the due execution of the will in question and would
present the instrumental witnesses. The trial court presided over by Judge
Eduardo D. Enriquez, acting upon the petition, denied the same by order of
February 18, 1950. However, instead of considering the merits of the petition
for relief, Judge Enriquez based his order of denial on the ground that,
pursuant to the provisions of Article 925 of the Civil Code, present petitioner
have no right to represent their deceased brother, Reynaldo Cuison, in the
inheritance of the testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva, consequently they have
no interest in the will or the property involved and so have no personality to
intervene in these proceedings by filing the petition for relief.
ISSUE:
The petition for probate was opposed by Nicolas Villanueva and others who
claim to be relatives of the testatrix.
HELD:
The proceedings for the probate of a will, he should show an interest in said
will or the property affected thereby (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil, 244). The
lower court was equally right in holding that under Art. 925, paragraph 2, of
the old Civil Code, the right of representation shall take place only infavor of
children of brothers and sisters, which petitioners Elisa Cuison et al., are not.
But said trial court erred in holding and assuming that petitioners Elisa
Cuison et al., were invoking the right to represent their brother Reynaldo
Cuison, for they were not. They seek to inherit the legacy of their brother
provided for in the will for their own right and not in representation of their
deceased brother. The law is clear that there is representation only when
relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he
[16]

would have had still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had
already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein, and had acquired the right
to the legacy given by her to him, upon for death, for the reason that under
Arts. 657 and 65l of the Civil Code the rights to the succession of a person
transmitted from the moment of his death and an heir succeeds to all rights
and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of the latter's death. It is a
fact that the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still
alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death,
he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the
legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy, which he received by virtue of
the will. In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to
succeed to the right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of
the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property.
LLB III-B
Enriquez vs. Abadia

G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954
Topic/Doctrine: Will and Testament
FACTS:
In September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed document purporting to
be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died onJanuary 14, 1943, in the municipality
of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2,
1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will,
filedopposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that
in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wroteout in longhand the will in Spanish
which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left hand margin of the front page of each
of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic
numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.
[17]

The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the hand writing of the
testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills
were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new
Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal
view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and
may override any defect in form,said trial court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father
Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it was executed the civil
code proscribes the execution of such wills.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the executionof
holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted to probate. This is
because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law
existing at the time of the testators death nor the law at the time of its probate, but by the law existing at the
time of the execution of the instrument. For the verysimple reason that although the will becomes operative
only after the testators death, still hiswishes are given expression at the time of execution.
LLB III-B
IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064
February 27, 1953
Topics/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death.
FACTS:
Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and
some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the
same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian
of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now
belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.
ISSUE:
Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?
HELD:
The sale to defendant is valid. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
[18]

The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.
AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-III B
JAKOSALEM VS RAFOLS
G.R. No. L-48372
July 24, 1924
Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heir/s.
FACTS:
The land in question described in the appealed in the decision originally belonged to Juan
Melgar. When he died judicial administration of his estate was commenced. During the
pendency of the said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the
deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the
stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in possession of the land
as lessee of the purchaser. On December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased
Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she
conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendantappellee Nicolasa Rafols, who, entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in
possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover
said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and while
that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to
Generosa
Teves,
the
herein
plaintiff-appellant.
HELD:
Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are
[19]

transmitted from the moment of his death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in coownership by the heir/s. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in
the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in
the
division
upon
termination
of
the
co-owership.
It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it
would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the
property left by her deceased father Juan Melgar. And as on December 12, 1920, upon the
partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the
whole land which the latter made in favor of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.
Upon the confirmation of the sale of December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the
conveyance by Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in 1921 could no longer be
done. And even in the case of a double sale, where neither of the purchasers has
registered the sale, the first in possession namely, Pedro Cui, should be referred.
When the sale made in the latter's favor was confirmed on December 12, 1920,
Susana Melgar was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should
be considered as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in
1921
only,
wherefore,
it
is
subsequent
to
that
of
Pedro
Cui.
AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-III B
LORENZO VS POSADAS
G.R. No. L-43082
June 18, 1937
Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death.
FACTS:
Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and
personal properties. The will which was duly admitted to probate, provides among other things,
that all properties of the testator shall pass to his nephew, Matthew Hanley. However, it also
provides that all real estate shall be placed un-der the management of the executors for a period
of ten years,after the expiration of which the properties shall be given to the said Matthew
Hanley. Plaintiff Lorenzo was appointed as trustee. During plaintiffs incumbency astrustee, the
defendant Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time
of his death consisted of realty and personalty, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax. The
defendant prayed that the trustee be ordered to pay the Government the inheritance tax together
with the penalties for delinquency in paying such tax. The trustee paid under protest and
however, he demanded that he be refunded for the amount paid. The plaintiff contends that the
inheritance tax should be based upon the value of the estate at the expiration of the period of ten
years after which according to thetestators will, the property could be and was to be delivered
tothe instituted heir, and not upon the value thereof at the timeof the death of the testator. The
defendant overruled plaintiffs protest and refused to refund the amount.
ISSUES:
1. When does the inheritance accrue?
[20]

2. Should the inheritance be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of
thetestators death or on its value 10 years later?
HELD:
1. Invoking the provision of Art. 657 (now Art. 777) of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Laurel, held: Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of
the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedents
death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of that date.
The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made
effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed ,to
receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become
operative at or after death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax
accrued as of the date.
2. Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testators death - If death is the
generatingsource from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being
and if,upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax
vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of
thedecedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent
increaseor decrease in value.A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the
predecessor's death, notwithstandingthe postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of
the estate by the beneficiary, andthe tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that
time regardless of itsappreciation or depreciation.
AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-III B
Osorio vs. Osorio

GR No.L- 16544
March 30, 1921
[21]
Topic/Doctrine: THE DONATION CANNOT INCLUDE FUTURE PROPERTY

FACTS:
The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of stock of "Ynchausti Steamship Co." and the
dividends corresponding to them, which were included in the inventory of the properties of the
deceased Da. Maria Petrona Reyes, whose estate is administered by the defendant. The facts was
D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint account association for the
exploitation of the shipping business, he being the owner of one-third of the company's capital.
This capital amounted to P500,000, of which P166,666.66, that is, one-third belonged to D.
Antonio Osorio. Upon his death, his heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio,
then administratrix of the estate of the deceased, to present a project of partition, and said
administratrix inserted in the project with the consent of all the heirs, among the properties which
belonged to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes, the sum of P94,000 as her part in the "share of the
estate in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.," that is, a little over P166,666.66, which was
the share in said business of the deceased Osorio during his lifetime. The project of partition was
approved on May 10, 1915, with the consent of the heirs, by the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, which had cognizance of the testamentary and administration proceedings of the estate of
the deceased Osorio.
On February 28, 1914, the widow of D. Antonio Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes, now also deceased,
executed before the notary D. Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in favor of her son D.
Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff, giving to him one-half of her share in the one-third part which
belonged to her husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., a donation which was duly
accepted by the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said document with the plaintiff. On that
date, February 28, 1914, the estate of D. Antonio Osorio was not yet distributed among his heirs,
and the donor Da. Petrona Reyes in order to correct the error in said document, wherein it was
stated that said half was adjudicated to her as part of her conjugal property, when the partition
was yet being effected, executed another document dated July 3, 1915, maintaining said donation
in effect in the sense that she ceded and donated to her son D. Leonardo Osorio, for the same
reasons stated in the document of February 28, 1914, all interest or participation in said shipping
business of Ynchausti & Co., which was adjudicated to her in the division of the estate of D.
Antonio Osorio, which division was approved by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on May
10, 1915.
After the death of D. Antonio Osorio and before the distribution of the estate, Ynchausti & Co.
purchased the steamer Governor Forbes and recognized the heirs of D. Antonio Osorio as having
an interest to the extent of one-third in the ownership and business of said steamer. It was agreed
upon by all the interested parties that the share of Da. Petrona Reyes, widow of Osorio, in the
vessel Governor Forbes, at the time of the incorporation of "The Ynchausti Steamship Co." was
P61,000, equivalent to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. Said sum was deposited with the
Steamship Co. until the final settlement of the question that had arisen between the heirs of Da.
Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof for, while the plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the
donation made in his favor by Da. Petrona Reyes, he is the owner of said shares and of their
[22]

value which is P61,000; the defendant on the other hand contends that said shares are not
included in the donation in question and belong to the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff was valid under the
law on succession particularly the future inheritance/property.
HELD:
It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on
February 28, 1914, a future property, such as the share in the business of the deceased Osorio,
which was adjudicated to her on May 10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right to
all or part of the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of Ynchausti &
Co.
According to article 635 of the Civil Code, the donation cannot include future property. By
future property is meant that of which the donor cannot dispose at the time of the donation. This
court believe the concurring opinion of Manresa that the future properties, the donation of which
is prohibited by said article, are those belonging to others, which, as such, cannot be the object of
disposal by the donor; but the properties of an existing inheritance, as those of the case at bar,
cannot be considered as another's property with relation to the heirs who through a fiction of law
continue the personality of the owner.
AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADUL
LLB III-B
Tinsay vs. Yusay

GR No.L- 23126
March 17, 1925
Topic/Doctrine: PARTITION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE; ESTOPPEL
FACTS:
[23]
Juan Yusay died leaving a widow, Juana Servando. After his death his
descendants made a partition by a private instrument of certain lands,
community property of his marriage to Juana Servando. Though she took no
part in the partition her interest in the land was nevertheless distributed
among the descendants. On the strength of the partition the descendants,
among them the appellants, went into possession of the respective portions
allotted to them in said partition. Some years later the portions of the
appellants were registered in their names in a cadastral proceeding. Upon
the subsequent death of the widow, the appellants as heirs of the widow
claimed a share of her interest in the land. Held: (a) That, B not being a party
to the partition agreement, the agreement standing alone was ineffective as
to her interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the partition of her
interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of a future
inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article
1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have accepted
the benefit of the partition agreement to the prejudice of the other heirs and
refuse to make restitution of the property received by them by virtue of said
agreement, they are estopped from repudiating the agreement and from
claiming an interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.
HELD:
Held: (a) That, Juana Servando not being a party to the partition agreement, the agreement
standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the partition
of her interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of a future inheritance and
was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that,
nevertheless, if the appellants have accepted the benefit of the partition agreement to the
prejudice of the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of the property received by them by
virtue of said agreement, they are estopped from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an
interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.
LLB III-B
Arroyo vs. Gerona

GR No.L- 36059
Date: March 31, 1933
Topic/Doctrine: EXPECTANT HEIRS AND PERSONS IN CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONS; FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
[24]

FACTS:
The appellant, a paternal uncle of a demented girl, qualified as her guardian
and, being at the same time executor of the will of his own deceased mother
(grandmother of the demented girl), submitted an inventory in the testacy of
his mother, including therein as property of the latter the real estate which
his ward had inherited from her own parents. The result of this trick of
passing his ward's property through the estate of her grandmother was to
make it appear that the greater part of such property had passed to the
'appellant under the will of the grandmother.
HELD:
That this device, coupled with the failure of the appellant to reveal to the
other heirs of his ward the true state and value of the property pertaining to
the latter, was a fraudulent contrivance sufficient to relieve such heirs from
an agreement made by them with the appellant, subsequent to the death of
the ward, with respect to the disposition of the property pertaining to her.
LLB III-B
Tordilla vs. Tordilla

G.R No. 39547
May 3, 1934
Topic/Doctrine: A certain value is stated in a deed of donation, that the value is different
than its actual value at the time of donation.
FACTS:
[25]
Francisco Tordilla died intestate, leaving his wife, a legitimate son and Moises Tordilla a natural
child and an appellant in the case at bar. One of the contentions of the appellant that where a
certain value is in a deed of donation. The value cannot be questioned when properties are
brought into collation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct?
HELD:
This is incorrect, as Article 1045 of the Civil Code provides for the assessment of the property at
its actual valuation at the time of donation. The recital in the deed cannot therefore be
controlling.
BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B
Allison Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippines

and Register of Deeds of Manila
G. R. No. L-35694
December 23, 1933
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Principle of Lexreisitae
FACTS:
Allison Gibbs is a citizen of California and domiciled therein, that he and Eva Gibbs where
[26]

married at Ohio, USA. She acquired 3 parcels of land in the city of Manila, she died survived by
her husband Allison leaving him the properties in Manila. Allison contend that the law of
California should determine then extent of the title, if any. While the oppositor and respondent
relies on Article XI Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which imposes tax inheritance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of California shall apply to Allison?
HELD:
In accordance with the rule that real property is subject to Lexreisitae, the respective rights of
husband and wife in such property, in the absence of ante nuptial contract, are determined by the
law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the
place where the marriage was celebrated. Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the
title which vested Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands herein
questioned must be determined in accordance with Lexreisitae.
BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B
Bacayo vs. Borromeo

G.R. No. L- 19382
August 31, 1965
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Laws of Succession, a decedents uncle and aunts may not succeed
abintastado so long as the nephews and nieces of the decedent survived, willing and
qualified to succeed.
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris died without a surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse but survived
by her aunt Filomena, nephews and nieces who were children of Melodias only brother who
[27]

predeceased the decedent. These two classes of heirs sought to participate in the estate of
Melodia. The trial court ruled that the nephews and nieces shall succeed by right of
representation and excluded Filomena.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the estate of the decedent?
HELD:
Our laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed abintastado so long as the
nephews and nieces are willing and qualified to succeed.
BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B
Michael C. Guy vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Parents or Guardian may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization.
FACTS:
Sima Wei died intestate and left 10 million pesos consists of real and personal properties. He was
survived by his wife Shirley and five children. They prayed before the court to appoint the
petitioner a special administrator of the estate. Michael contend that respondents had been paid,
waived, abandoned or extinguished by reason that when Remedios, the mother of the natural
child of Sima Wei, received a financial support for education as a condition the natural children
[28]

shall repudiate their rights to the estate of Sima Wei. As a result, the estate of Sima Wei is free
from any liabilities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parents or guardian of a minor can repudiate the inheritance of their ward?
HELD:
Under Article 1044 of the Civil Code second paragraph provides that parents or guardian s may
repudiate the inheritance of their ward only by judicial authorization. In the case at bar, such
requisite is absent therefore, there was no repudiation transpired and the natural children are
entitled to their legitime.
BADEO, MICHAEL J.
LLB III-B
Quison vs. Salud

12 Phil. 109
November 21, 1908
Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions
FACTS:
Upon the merits of this case the only question is one of fact, namely, is the
boundary line between the land formerly owned by Fidel Salud, the father of
the defendant, and land owned by Claro Quison, father and uncle of the
plaintiffs, the estero or River Nagsaulay, or is it, as found by the court below,
a straight line of mango and bamboo trees to the south of the abovementioned estero? The land in controversy is situated between this line of
[29]

trees and the estero.
That Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed,
but the defendant claims that he [Quison] never owned any land south of the
estero. A large amount of evidence, principally parol, was introduced upon
this question, and after an examination thereof, we are satisfied that it
clearly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below, and that it
was proven at the trial that the land in question belongs to the heirs of
Quison. Claro Quison died in 1902.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of succession were transmitted to the heirs after
the decedents death, according to Article 777 of the Civil Code
HELD:
Yes. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next of kin
and heirs, but it is said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain
this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been
taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that,
without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is
nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Procedure,
the title to property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to
his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims
of the administration and the property may be taken from the claims of the
purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent the
immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself
to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been
appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the
plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.
[30]

BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.
LLB-III B
ILUSTRE vs. FRONDOSA

G.R. No. L-6077
November 16, 1910
FACTS:
Francisco Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903 and appears
from the record that at the time of his death he was the owner of certain
property. The plaintiff alleges, and the fact is not denied, that he was
appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco Calzado. The
record fails to show when he was appointed.
On the 31st of July, 1909, nearly six years after the death of the said
Calzado, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the present action to
recover the property and alleged that: that at the time of the death of
Francisco Calzado he was the owner of the property described in the
complaint; that at the time of the death of Francisco Calzado he had no
relatives, descendants or ascendants, but nephews, who being of lawful age
divided among themselves the property in question and sold to the
defendant the said property; that at the time of the division of the estate
among the heirs of the deceased and at the time the lands were sold, there
were no debts against the estate of the said Francisco Calzado; that the
plaintiff is not a creditor of the estate of the said deceased.
During the trial of the cause the defendant showed by oral and documentary
proof that he was in possession of the land in question; that he had
purchased the same from some of the nephews and heirs of the deceased
[31]

Francisco Calzado; that he had purchased the interest of all the heirs except
perhaps three. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause to
show that any of the heirs of the deceased were minors or that there were
any debts existing against the said estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs succeed immediately to all the property of the
deceased
HELD:
Yes. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in
other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer
it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and
can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege.
The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be

divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the
division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is
certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the
settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are
all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate
should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The
property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts
against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners
of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of
the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show
that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they
[32]

intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs
of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their
remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.

LLB-III B
[33]
BAUTISTA vs. Justices of the Special First Division of the Court of

Appeals
G.R. No. 79958
October 28, 1988
FACTS:
The parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated December 15,

1975: that both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the
name of petitioner Manuel Bautista, and the latter inherited this land from
his father, Mariano Bautista; both petitioners and private respondents admit
that on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed-private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of
petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document,
although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial
Partition; that the parties admit that the private respondents, with the
exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Manolito Bautista of that property and upon registration, certificates were
issued to his name thereof; that Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in
favor of the other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of
Sale, certificates were issued to private respondents; that the parties admit
that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child,
Evangeline Bautista; that the property in question was the subject matter of
extrajudicial partition of property among the heirs of the late Juliana
Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista; that all the parties agreed to
submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista; and that the
NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.
The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate
Court that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no longer be
questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting that the
signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition
is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven
[34]

facts renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was
supposed to be a partition without court intervention of the estate of the late
Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista, constituting the subject
property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears to have waived his
right or share in the property in favor of private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property of the surviving husband can be the subject of
an extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife; whether or not
there was preterition
HELD:
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of

the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a
will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not
belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject
matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To
include in an extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the
estate of the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his
property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the
decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject
matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously
prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.
[35]
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of
Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the
latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista
would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to
share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said
document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is
their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition
was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.

LLB-III B
MALAHACAN vs. IGNACIO

G.R. No. L-6207
August 4, 1911
[36]
DOCTRINE: The fact that the hereditary estate is placed under

administration will not affect the application of the rule stated in Art. 777 to
the effect that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent.
FACTS:
The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods,
chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the
defendants, the only heirs at law of the said deceased, to recover possession
of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which
said real estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before
the commencement of this action. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the
ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his
death. Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this
suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs
instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession
thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record
or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against
Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground upon which an
administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession of the real estate of
which his intestate died seized is that such land will be required to be sold to
pay the debts of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the said heirs instantly became the owners and were
entitled to the immediate possession thereof.
HELD:
YES. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in
other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of
debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
[37]

administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer
it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and
can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a
petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and
partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age
and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be
burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property
belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against
the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever
in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an
undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the
same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that
the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they
intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs
of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their
remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.
DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.

LLB-III B
[38]
BELTRAN vs.DORIANO
G.R. No. L-9969
October 26, 1915
[39]

DOCTRINE: By the mere fact of the death of the husband, his children and
heirs, together with their mother, by operation, of law succeeded him in the
dominion, property and possession of the land and its improvements, for,
from the moment Doroteo Guintu died, though survived by his widow, the
rights to the succession of their deceased father were thereby transmitted to
his children, since the latter, as his forced heirs, succeeded him in all his
rights and obligations.
FACTS:
Modesta Beltran filed a complaint in which they allege that they were the
owners in fee simple of a parcel of mangrove swamp land; that the
defendants unlawfully took possession of and continue to occupy the said
land of the plaintiff. It appears Feliciana Doriano, the widow of the late
Francisco de la Rosa have declared that the said deceased, Francisco de la
Rosa, husband and father of the deponents, left at his death property
consisting mostly of mangrove swamp land which has not yet been judicially
petitioned; but in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate, there was
presented a proposed partition which had not yet been approved, and which
set forth that there had been awarded to Maria de la Rosa, as her share of
the estate, the mangrove swamp land situated, as specifically described in
the deed of sale executed by her on the same date in behalf of Modesta
Beltran and ratified before the notary Esteban Victorio. In the same proposed
partition there was adjudicated to Feliciano de la Rosa, likewise as a part of
his share in the estate, another parcel of mangrove swamp land, the
description of which is given in the deed of sale executed in turn by him in
behalf of the spouses Doroteo Guintu and Modesta Beltran. The heirs of the
deceased De la Rosa agreed to recognize these sales as valid and effective
as though the hereditary property had been judicially partitioned and the
said lands legally adjudicated to the vendors who alienated them and they
furthermore waived all the rights they might have therein. By virtue of the
acquisition by the spouses Guintu and Beltran of the land, they entered into
the possession of the property and took steps to improve it and increase the
number of plants in order to secure the greatest benefit therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-heir is prohibited from selling his share.

[40]
HELD:
NO. There is no provisions of law whatever which prohibits a co-heir from

selling his share of the estate, or legal portion, to a stranger, before the
partition of the hereditary property is approved by the court, for article 1067
of the Civil Code prescribes: "If any of the heirs should sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the co-heirs may
subrogate themselves in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the
value of the purchase, provided they do so within the period of a month, to
be counted from the time they were informed thereof." .
Still more: section 762 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains among others
the following provisions: "Such partition may be made although some of the
original heirs or devisees have conveyed their shares to other persons; and
such shares shall be set to the persons holding the same as they would have
been to the heirs or devisees."
In law, the rule governing property held by various co-owners in common is

analogous to that which obtains where the estate of a deceased person is
held pro indiviso by several co-participants, for, pursuant to article 450 of the
Civil Code, "each one of the participants in a thing possessed in common is
considered as having exclusively possessed the part which may be alloted to
him on the distribution for the entire period during which there is no
division." .
The provisions of this article appear to be confirmed by that contained in

article 1068 of the Civil Code. Feliciano de la Rosa could, therefore, lawfully
sell the said land in question as a part of his share of the estate, even before
the approval of the proposed partition of the property, which his father,
Francisco de la Rosa, left at his death and besides, apart from this, the sale
made by him appears to have been expressly recognized by himself and his
co-heirs as well as by his mother, Feliciana Doriano, in Exhibit B.
As the defendants legally alienated the land by absolute sale to the plaintiffs
and received the price thereof, they can never justify the seizure, made with
manifest bad faith, of the products of the said land which no longer belongs
[41]

to them.

LLB-III B
BONDAD vs. BONDAD

G.R. No. L-8092
March 14, 1916
DOCTRINE: The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately.
FACTS:
Rufina Bondad had two brothers and two sisters, respectively named Venancio,
Placido, Maria, and Paula. The last named died leaving four children: Eleno,
[42]

Estanislao, Raymundo, and Pedro, all surnamed Emlano. Rufina Bondad brought suit
against her said brothers sisters, and nephews to secure the partition of the
property left to these defendants by their father or grandfather, respectively,
Crisanto Bondad upon his death. She designates the lands to be divided.
Documentary and parol evidence was introduced, and the Court of First Instance of
Laguna decided the case by dismissing the complaint and absolving defendants
therefrom, with the costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a need for the intervention of an administrator in the

absence of any outstanding debts.
HELD:
NO. It has been repeatedly shown in the record that there are no debts outstanding
against either succession, and the complaint itself so states. Under the provisions of
the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. If they desire to
administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves
and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for
partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. Where there are no
debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention
of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence
of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right whatever to
intervene in any way in the division of the estate among the heirs.
If, at the present time or in the future, some creditor should come forward with a
claim, or if debts of either or both of the two intestate estates should appear,
prescription after two years could not be set up against such creditors or against
such debts, because the date from which the beginning of the two years should be
counted, could not be determined. This is the risk that is incurred in a partition of
these intestate estates and hence the need of making the partition in writing, that
is, so that it would not prejudice any third person; but among themselves the heirs
must abide by the terms upon which they have agreed.
[43]

LLB-III B
LEGASTO vs. VERZOSA
G.R. No. L-32344
March 31, 1930
DOCTRINE: No contracts may be entered into with respect to future

inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos
of the estate in accordance with article 1056.Considering that the language
of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person may, by
acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein said
article is found, without the authority of a testament containing an
expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition
thus made would be tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided
for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments, and
especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal
consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime,
whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of their property.
FACTS:
Sabina Almadin executed a will devising certain parcels of land belonging to
her, to her four nieces and daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin,
designating the parcels to be given to each.Sabina Almadin partitioned her
property among her aforesaid sister and nieces, executing a deed to her
niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels of her
land therein described. On the same day, Sabina Almadin executed a deed in
favor of her niece Oliva Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land
described in said instrument. Sabina Almadin executed a deedin favor of her
niece Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the four parcels of land therein
described. Again on the said day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a
deed to her niece Ruperta Palma assigning to her three parcels of land
described therein. The assignees, Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, Oliva
Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, took possession of their respective parcels thus
ceded by Sabina Almadin, and have to this day been cultivating them as
exclusive owners thereof. Sabina Almadin passed away and her sister,
[44]

Catalina Almadin, presented by Attorney Federico Marino, propounded her
will, mentioned above, for probate. The said will was not admitted to
probate. 1 Vivencio Legasto, then, the special administrator appointed by
said Court of First Instance of Laguna to take charge of Sabina Almadin's
estate, filed the complaint which originated this case, claiming the delivery
of the parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among
her nieces, the defendants and appellants herein, was valid enforceable.
HELD:
NO. Article 1056 of the Civil Code Provides:ART. 1056. If the testator should
make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
forced heirs.
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes

reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be
entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of
which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article
1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion that a
partition thus made should be on the basis of a testemantary or legal
succession and should be made a conformity with the fundamental rules
thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of
the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that they
[45]

simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner,
which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in
order to carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons
interested.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and
authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by
an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without
a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the
partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers
to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of
his property gratis inter vivos in not called a testator, but a donor. In
employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish
between the one who freely donates his property in life and one who
disposes of it by will to take effect his death.
Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since
before making the partition of her property among her nieces, the
defendants herein, she executed a will giving to each of them the same
parcels of land which she later transferred to them gratuitously.
And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal
requisites, consequently, the partition which she made of her estate among
her nieces the defendants-appellants herein, during her lifetime is likewise
null and void.

LLB-III B
BALDEMOR vs. MALANGYAON

G.R. No. L-8806
March 24, 1916
[46]
Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:
To the petition the defendants duly answered, denying generally and

specifically the facts stated in the complaint, and alleging: That they were
the legitimate descendants of the said Benedicto Bonot, that they were all of
lawful age, that they had, prior to the commencement of the present action,
mutually made a division among themselves of the property in question, that
there are no debts existing against the estate of the said Benedicto Bonot,
and that the plaintiff is without authority to maintain said action in support of
the allegation that the defendants had mutually divided the estate of their
parent.
After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge,
reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was without right to maintain the
action in question and dismissed the complaint, absolving the defendants
from any liability under the same, without costs, reserving to the defendant,
Clara Falcon, the right to maintain an action against her co-heirs form any
fraud which they may have committed against her interest. From that
judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court. There was no proof adduced
during the trial of the cause, the case having been submitted to the lower
court upon the pleadings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special administrator may maintain an action for the
purpose of taking possession of said property, thereby depriving the heirs of
possession of the same.
HELD:
Section 596 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions as amended by section

1 of Act No. 2331 provides that: Whenever all the heirs of a person who died
[47]

intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due
from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, be agreement
duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court. Said section clearly gives the heirs the right to mutually
partition their estate.
DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.
LLB III-B
VELAZCO vs. VIZMANOS

G.R. No. L-21244
February 7, 1924
FACTS:
Encarnacion Saenz de Vizmanos died intestate on November 16, 1921,

leaving no heirs by force of law ( herederos forzosos). The appellee was
appointed the administrator of the estate of the deceased and, in the
administration proceedings, the Court of First Instance issued an order of
distribution in which certain collateral relatives of the deceased in the fourth
degree were declared heirs. The appellants herein are relatives in the sixth
degree and claim participation in the inheritance, but were excluded there
from in the order of the distribution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants contention of claiming participation in the

heritance is valid as they are in the sixth degree?
[48]
HELD:
There is no dispute as to the fact that the persons declared heirs are nearer
to the deceased in relationship than are the appellants, but counsel for the
latter argues strenuously that the former were not properly represented in
the administration proceedings and that, therefore, the court had no
jurisdiction over them and could not properly declare them heirs.
There is of course, no merit whatever in this contention. Under articles 657,

658, and 661 of the Civil Code, the title to the inheritance is transmitted to
the heirs immediately upon the death of the predecessor and, upon sufficient
proof that certain persons are the heirs of the deceased, it becomes the duty
of the court to order the distribution of the estate to them in the due course
of the administration proceedings no matter whether such persons have
formally appeared in the proceedings or not.
The order of distribution appealed from is in conformity with article 921 of
the Civil Code and is hereby affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

LLB III-B
FULE vs. FULE

G.R. No. 21859
September 30, 1924
FACTS:
[49]
Saturnino Fule died intestate. Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased,
and prayed specially for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as such
administrator. The petitioner further prayed that during the pendency of the
petition for the appointment of an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara
be then and there appointed as special administrator for said estate. The
petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the
owner of real and personal property located in the municipality of San Pablo,
Province of Laguna, of the value of P50,000 with a rental value of about
P8,000 and that, in addition to said real and personal property, he also left
about P30,000 in cash. The lower court on the day of the presentation of the
petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator and required
him to give a bond of P8,000. The special administrator presented in court an
inventory of the alleged property of the deceased.
The petitioner answered the motion of the oppositors and opposed their
petition for the revocation of the appointment of a special administrator. He
alleged that the oppositors had been requested to make a partition of the
property of the deceased; that no partition of the property of the deceased
had been made during the lifetime of the deceased; that the property
described in Exhibit A attached to the motion of the oppositors was the
exclusive and absolute property of the petitioner, who had for more than
forty years been in the quiet, public, and exclusive possession of the same,
as owner; and prayed that the motion of the oppositors is denied.
ISSUE:
1. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within the time required by law?
2. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint and administrator for the estate of
Saturnino Fule, deceased?
HELD:
Upon
the
issue
thus
presented,
the
[50]
Honorable
judge,
revoked
the

appointment of the special administrator and ordered him to render an
account. On the same day, the Honorable Judge denied the appointment of
an administrator, and suggested to the petitioner that within thirty days from
that date he should amend his petition and present an ordinary action for the
partition of the property of the estate of the deceased, and in case he should
fail to do so it would be understood that the petition for the appointment of
an administrator is denied.
Upon the second question, it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the
parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed
against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661
of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person
who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. When the heirs
are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate
should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The
administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division
of the estate among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no
debts against the estate. When there are no debts and the heirs are all
adults, their relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that
of any other co-owners in common, and they may recover their individual
rights, the same as any other co-owners of undivided property. And even
when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay
the debts and divide the property among themselves according to their
respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case of a will, without probating
the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with a
complete equitable title to their particular share of the estate. The right of
the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exists in the division of
personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division,
then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the
deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in debt, the heirs are
all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity
thereof. It is difficult to conceive of any one class or item of property
susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several
parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of
adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the co-owners as well as of the
whole.

LLB III-B
[51]
REYES vs. BARRETTO-DATU

G.R. No. L-17818
January 25, 1967
Topic: Effect of Inclusion of Intruder in Partition
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died, he
left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia
Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and his
nephews and nieces. Usufruct was reserved for his widow. The widow then prepared a project of
partition which she signed in her own behalf, and as guardian of the minor Milagros. This was
approved by CFI Manila. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her
share and secured the cancellation of the originals and the issuance of new titles in her own
name.
Upon the widows death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which,
she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left
all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first
rejected. Plaintiff then filed an action for the recovery of one-half portion of properties left for
them under Bibianos will. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right
of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all theother properties willed and
delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of
Bibiano, thereby directly attacking thevalidity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon. The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from
which Saludacquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio. This was based on Article 1081 of
the Civil Code of 1889: A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,without being
so, has been included, shall be null and void. CFI rejected plaintiffs contention that since
Bibiano was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was
valid in favor of Salud to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as
defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from
[52]

Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from
Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Art 1456 of the new Civil Code establishing that
property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirerin implied trust for the real owner.
ISSUE:
1. WON the partition between Salud and Milagros in the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Bibiano is void.
2. WON there was preterition?
HELD:
1. NO
The agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually
consummated, so much so that the titles inthe name of the deceased were cancelled, and new
certificates issued in favor of theheirs, long before the decree was attacked. The only instance
that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to
secure relief isreopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
insteadof an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, for another courtor
judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffleproperties long
ago distributed and disposed of. Art. 1081 has been misapplied. Salud admittedly had been
instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant
Milagros; hence,the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said article.
2. NO.
The fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime does not
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir. There was no preterition, or total ommission of a
forced heir.

LLB III-B
[53]
Dais vs CFI of Capiz

51 Phil 396
FACTS:
Serapion Dais died intestate. The court appointed a judicial administrator to do the transactions
on the inheritance according to the orders of the court especially on the liquidation and partition
processes. The Dais Heirs filed for a complaint to dismiss the appointment of an administrator
for the estate of the decedent. The Dais heirs wanted that their respective portions be delivered to
them immediately because they contested that the they already acquired ownership from the
moment the decedent died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs after accepting inheritance can demand delivery of respective portions
even there is an appointed administrator.
HELD:
No. Although the heirs acquired ownership over the inheritance from the moment of death of the
decedent, they cannot compel the administrator to deliver to them their respective portions to
which they are entitled. The judicial administrator, by virtue of his appointment, acquires the
right to the possession of the estate subject to the orders of the court.
DONDOYANO, CINDY MAE F.
LLB III-B
ARSENIO DE VERA for himself and as guardian ad litem of the minors

[54]

ARTURO, TEOGINISA, DEOGRACIAS, SIMEON, GUILLERMO and VICTORIA
surnamed DE VERA,
vs.
CLEOTILDE GALAURAN
67 Phil 273
April 10, 1939
Topic/Doctrine: Article 777, Effect of Judicial Settlement
FACTS:
Isabel Domingo Is survived by Arsenio de Vera and six minor heirs. During the lifetime of
deceased wife and herein petitioner, they mortgaged their property to secured a loan from
respondent CleotildeGaularan. According to petitioner, respondent illegally made them to sign a
deed which made them believed to be of mortgage and which later turnedout to be a sale.
Petitioner instituted an action against respondent before CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the
sale. Respondent interposed a demurrer alleging that plaintiffs has no cause of action for they
have not been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. Lower court sustained demurrer and
the action was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs may commence an action for the recovery of property without the
necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status.
HELD:
Yes they may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor. If the
deceased turned out to have debts, the creditors or the heirs themselves may initiate a special
proceeding. The lower court should have granted this petition instead of sustaining the demurrer
and dismissing the action.
FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
Maria Lao vs. Dee Tim

90 Phil. 868
Date:
[55]

FACTS:
Yap Siong died leaving a considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An
administrator was appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and
distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each claiming to be the
legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be the
legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock in the Philippine
and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore entitled, as
heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.
Respondent Dee Tim on the other hand claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and
Yap Siong were joined in holy wedlock in accordance with the laws of China and that the said Yap
Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.
Petitioners presented a great deal of proof and a number of documents to support their contention.
Yap Siong admitted in a public document that Mari Lao was his wife. The respondent Dee Tim
presented a great deal of proof also to show that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong, to support
that contention she presented what she contended was a certificate of marriage, it was positive proof
of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with reference to marriage
ceremonies. To support her contention she presented a number of witnesses
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Yap Siong be divided equally between petitioners and respondents.
HELD:
When two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same
man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children, and each
family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That
provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who
innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of
all parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. A woman who is deceived by a
man, who represents himself as a single man, and who marries him, she and her children are entitled
to all the rights of legitimate wife and children.
FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
FORTUNATA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ, MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ DE
HALLARE, LUZ RODRIGUEZ DE CARLOS AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and ABELARDO
RODRIGUEZ
92 Phil. 273
[56]

Date: November 24, 1952
FACTS:
Flaviano Rodriguez died leaving an estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow,
Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all
the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a
liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration of the widow with the understanding that each
of the six children would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal shares from year to year for the
needs of their families provided that they do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled. Eight years
after the death of decedent ,respondent filed a petition for administration and the petitioners objected.
Respondents admitted the existence of a verbal agreement entered into between the heirs, wherein they agreed
not to liquidate the estate and to place it under the administration of the widow in view of the unsettled
conditions then prevailing at the time, but they contend that while that was the understanding the same was not
carried out because in reality it was Benjamin Rodriguez, one of the petitioners herein, who took over the
administration of the estate and in the discharge of his duties he failed and refused to give to respondent
Abelardo Rodriguez his share in the income which he badly needed for the support of his family, for which
reason he started the intestate proceedings which gave rise to the present petition for certiorari. Lower court
after overruling appointed Abelardo Rodriguez as Administrator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an administrator in an estate with no debts and all the heirs entitled to the share are all of age
can validly be appointed by the court.
HELD:
Yes, It appears that both parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to be appointed as
administrator and the court made its choice only after weighing the fitness and qualifications of the persons
recommended. The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of the disqualifications.
FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
MORALES vs. YAEZ

G.R. No.L-9315.
March 24, 1956
Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the decedent
FACTS:
[57]
the death of
There is no question that said lands belonged to Eugeniano Saarenas who died intestate in 1937,
leaving no ascendants nor descendants; that as his surviving nephews (by a
sister)Defendant Proceso Yaez (and his sisters) took possession of said lots; and
that Plaintiffsare illegitimate (adulterous) children of Eugeniano, born between 1910 and 1927.
Plaintiffs action is founded on arts. 287 and 988 of the New Civil Code, giving illegitimate
children the right to succeed, where decedent leaves no ascendants nor descendants.
Defendant Yaez (and his sisters) claim the right to inherit under the Civil Code articles 946,
947, and 948 the law in force at the time of Eugenianos death. Applying the Civil Code, the
trial judge absolved the Defendant. He refused to apply the New Civil Code that grants for the
first time successional rights to illegitimate children, in accordance with this Courts decision in
Uson vs. Del Rosario, (92 Phil., 530) promulgated January 29, 1953, the pertinent portions of
which are: But Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor Defendants are
illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebrada and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to
any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June 1950,
they are given the status and rights which the law accords to the latter (Article 2264 and Article
278, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in
the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Art. 2253, new Civil Code).
HELD:
ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and
by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with
this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried
out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies
and bequests shall be respected; , their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every
compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code.
FERNANDEZ, ELAINE JOY A
LLB III-B
MARABILLES vs. QUITO
G.R. No.L-10408.
October 18, 1956
the decedent
the death of
FACTS:
Defendants, instead of answering the complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1)
[58]

that Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue, (2) that the complaint states no cause of action, and
(3) that the action had prescribed. Defendants attached to their motion as Annex A Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1065 issued in the name of one Guadalupe Saralde on March 31, 1941
and Original Certificate of Title No. 1018 as Annex B issued in the name of Patricio Marabiles
on February 19, 1954. This is a homestead patent granted under Act No. 2874. Plaintiffs filed a
written opposition to the motion, to which Defendants replied, and thereafter the court issued on
November 8, 1954 an order sustaining the motion. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint with
costs against the Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs appealed from this order to the Court of Appeals, the
case was certified to us on the ground that the questions raised are purely of law. One of the
grounds on which the lower court dismissed the complaint is that Plaintiffs do not have legal
capacity to sue because it appears that the title of the land was issued in the name of Patricio
Marabiles who already died and the complaint does not allege that Severina Marabiles and her
child who now appears as Plaintiffs had been duly declared as his heirs to entitle them to bring
the action. The court is of the impression that judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in
order that an heir may have legal capacity to bring the action to recover a property belonging to
the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judicial declaration of heirship is necessary to assert the right of heirs to the
property.
HELD:
The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be
so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a
deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of
death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in
which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract
may be imposed upon the deceased himself.
LLB III-B
ADRIANO vs. OBLEADA
G.R. No. L-39938
August 12, 1933
the decedent
FACTS:
[59]
the death of
The petitioner, Carmen Adriano, is the deceased Mariano Lopez's surviving mother
whom, under his will, he has instituted his heiress entitled to receive two thirds of
his estate. After the deceased Mariano Lopez's will had been admitted to probate
and the corresponding committee on claims and appraisal appointed, the herein
respondents, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, presented before said
committee their claim consisting in a credit amounting to P4,750 alleged to be the
unpaid balance of a promissory note for P5,000 signed by the deceased Mariano
Lopez and his wife, Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, the herein respondent. Inasmuch
as their claim was disallowed by the aforementioned committee on claims and
appraisal, the creditor-claimants, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, appealed
from the committee's advance resolution and filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila the corresponding action against Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, Mariano Lopez, for the recovery of the
said sum of P4,750 representing the unpaid balance of the promissory note for
P5,000, signed by the deceased Mariano Lopez and his wife Natalia Arevalo Vda. de
Lopez, one of the herein respondents. The promissory note in question was
reproduced by the creditor-claimants in their complaint which was registered as civil
case No. 44327. The defendant, Natalia Arevalo Vda.de Lopez, as administratrix of
the estate of the deceased, Mariano Lopez, filed an answer denying generally and
specifically the acts alleged in the complaint. The petitioner, Carmen Adriano, as
heiress, instituted by the deceased Mariano Lopez under his will, filed a motion in
the court praying that she be permitted to intervene in the aforementioned civil
case No. 44327, alleging that she had a legal interest in the case; that promissory
note upon which the alleged creditor-claimants, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica
Mariano, base their claim is fictitious; that the said promissory note is without
consideration, and that it was obtained through fraud, in connivance with the
defendant, Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner herein, being a heiress instituted by the deceased,
Mariano Lopez, can intervene in the case, there being in fact a judicial
administratrix to present the testamentary estate.
HELD:
Heirs; right to intervene in an action involving inheritance. The heirs have the
right to intervene in an action involving some of the property of the haereditas
jacens of a decedent when they believe that the acts of the judicial administrator
[60]

are prejudicial to their interest.

LLB III-B
CUEVAS vs ABESAMIS
G.R. No. L-47431
December 19, 1940
Topic/Doctrine:
Effect of Judicial Settlement- Hence, even before there has been a judicial
declaration of heirship, it is well established that an heir has a right to assert
a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to
be so. This is logical because of the principle that the property of a deceased
person, both real and personal, becomes the property of his heir by the mere
fact of death of his predecessor in interest.
FACTS:
Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for probate the last will and testament of her
deceased natural father, Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three
parcels of land, one share of stock in the "Gallera de Pearanda" of a par
value of P100, and two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas (alias
Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias
Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under the conditions
stated therein. However, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five others entered
their opposition to the distribution of the properties described in the will and
had commenced an action for the partition of said properties. The will was
admitted to probate and Concordia Cuevas was appointed executrix with a
bond of P1,000. Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did institute civil
case No. 4816 against the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia
Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the partition, alleging
that said properties belonged, in the first instance, to Anacleto Mercado,
their common causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with
the understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the minor
children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the
Crescenciano. A judgment was rendered adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of
the properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for the
defendants. The court ordered the commissioners of partition to declare as
sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco and Isaias
Abesamis.lawphil.net Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate court a
partition plan adjudicating the three lots and the two carabaos in favor of the
legatees mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court for the reason
[61]

that it was not in conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision
in civil case No. 4816. The executrix submitted an amended inventory and
later another project of partition distributing the properties of the estate in
accordance with the terms of the will, which were objected by the
defendants, because these included their legitimate shares under the
decision in civil case No. 4816. The opposition was upheld by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case
No. 4816 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that the
estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled only to one-eight (1/8) of the
property described in the will, is a nullity and can not bind the estate of
Crescenciano Abesamis.
HELD: Yes.The herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole
heiress of the deceased. As said defendants were declared in default and
are, to be sure, bound by the decision in that case, we are of the opinion that
the appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its virtuality not to regard it
as totally ineffectual against the testate estate. In the absence of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is no necessity of a
previous declaration of status and the heir or heirs can sue and be sued in
that capacity.
FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.
LLB-IIIB
[62]
ARAYATA vs JOYA
G.R. No. L-28067
March 10, 1928
Topic/Doctrine: Effect of Judicial Settlement- While it is very true that they acquire
ownership therof from the moment of the death of their predecessor, yet upon the
appointment of a judicial administrator, the latter, by virtue of his appointment,
acquires a right to the possession of the estate, subject to the orders of the court,
unless he consents to the heirs continuing in possession therof.
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of
lease to six lots of the friar lands. Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia
Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya
continued his lease. While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya
purchase the lots he had been leasing, on installments, from the Government, under
said Act No. 1120. As the number of lots which a purchaser could acquire under the
law was limited, lots Nos. 1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for sale. In
order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with
the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots
to Cecilio Joya by donation. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet
completed the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular
Government. All the lots in question except lot No. 547, are in the possession of the
defendants, who enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920 lots Nos. 2352, 1086, 1153
and 1031, were transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Cecilio Joya. On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his
executor, the herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after the proper
proceedings. In March, 1920, in the course of the testamentary proceedings, the
executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the
legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the herein
plaintiff's opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.
ISSUE:
[63]

Whether or not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession and the
products of the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government
HELD:
Yes. We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the defendants were
void. If the lands, which are the subject matter of said legacies and which are in the
possession of the defendants, still belong to Cecilio Joya's estate, because no
judicial partition has as yet been made of the property he left, which is subject,
together with its fruits, to the payment of his debts, said defendants cannot invoke
the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to possession in good faith insofar as
the fruits are concerned; because even when the legacies are valid they acquired
only when the latter judicially assigned to them in the final partition, and because,
while said lands are under administration, the administrator is obliged to render an
account of his management of the same and the products thereof.
LLB-III B
MACROHON vs SAAVEDRA
G.R. No. L-27531
December 24, 1927
Topic/Doctrine: Kinds of Succession - There are three ways in which
succession may be effected: by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the
same time. In the first case the succession is called testamentary, because it
is based on the last will and testament, which is the orderly manifestation of
the testator's will; in the second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by
operation of the law; and the third is called mixed, because it partakes of the
character of both testamentary and legal succession.
FACTS:
Victoriana Saavedra died without descendants or ascendants, being at that
time married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them having executed
a joint will, which joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this court.
The only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to
inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews
and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano
Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra
Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or did not
dispose of her property in said will. It was stated in the will that in case of the
death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, the
properties be given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should
either of the two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, all the said
properties be given to the survivor. In case that Victoriana Saavedra should
survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,Lot No. 838, Lot No. 817 and Lot No. 768
[64]

shall belong exclusively to Victoriana Saavedra. Should Victoriana Saavedra
die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, Lot No. 817 be adjudicated to
Segunda Saavedra, widow, sister of Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens and
encumbrances. Lot No. 768 be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra and her
heirs, on condition that she devote the products of the same to having
masses said for the repose of the soul of Victoriana Saavedra. In case of the
death of either of the two, the surviving spouse be appointed executor of this
our last will and testament.This executor submitted a scheme of partition
and distribution of the property in accordance with the terms of the joint will,
to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined
insisting upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of
Juan Saavedra and others be overruled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the brother, sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were
entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen parcels of land, given to the
legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint
will.
HELD:
Yes. As we have said, the acquisition of right by the alleged legatees
depends on the occurrence of the event constituting the condition, that is,
the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham prior to that of his wife; and this
condition not having been complied with, the said Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian have not acquired any right, and therefore the testatrix's estate is to be
divided among her heirs in accordance with the law.
LLB-IIIB
[65]
LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170,
January 31, 1952
Topic/Doctrine: It is the estate left by the decedent, instead of his heirs directly, that
becomes vested and charged with his obligations which survived after his death.
FACTS:
Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of
P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to
file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the
deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner could succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's
deceased parent?
HELD:
No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that
[66]

the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property
which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have
been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts
of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a
person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in
the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The
foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not
a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the
inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been
determined.
IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.

LLB III-B
LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837
November 23, 1938
Topic/Doctrine: It is the estate left by the decedent, instead of his heirs directly, that becomes
vested and charged with his obligations which survived after his death.
FACTS:
Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff
Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her
as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio
died, and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate
proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course
include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum
payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the
intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties
inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory
heir of his father Eusebio.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff has the right to collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's
estate?
[67]
HELD:
No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation
are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without
leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil
Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable
for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is
received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties
received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their
father from whom they did not inherit anything.

LLB III-B
GUINTO VS. MEDINA

50 Off. Gaz. 199
(CA)
Topic/Doctrine: It is the estate left by the decedent, instead of his heirs directly, that becomes
vested and charged with his obligations which survived after his death.
FACTS:
Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina. The trial court ruled in
favor of Guinto.However, Guinto still appealed because the trial court dismissed his claim for
damages. While the case was onappeal, Medina died. Medina was substituted by his heirs.
ISSUE:
WON the heirs of Medina are liable for damages to Guinto in excess of the inheritance they
received?
HELD:
No.The heirs of Medina, having been merely substituted in his place at the time of his death,
their liability for damages is only to the extent of the value of the property they might have
[68]

received, if any, from him.

LLB III-B
BONA vs. BRIONES

G.R. No. L-10806
July 6, 1918
Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills
FACTS:
Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased
Francisco Briones who died on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of
the will which the said deceased husband on September 16, 1911. The
petition was granted on January 20, 1915.
The counsel of the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator,
[69]

opposed the probate of the will alleging that the said will was executed
before two witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or
influence exercised upon the person of the testator who thus signed through
fraud and deceit; and prayed that for that reason the said will be declared
null and of no value.
On March 27, 1915, the judge rendered judgment, denied probate to the will.
dated March 27, 1915, denying probate to the will. Counsel for Monica Bona
appealed On March 31, 1915, the judge admitted the appeal, ordered the
original records to be brought up, and reiterated his order of December 28,
1913, declaring Bona as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal interposed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities

prescribed by section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
HELD:
Yes. It is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by

Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, the order denying probate was
rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated being prior to that of Act No. 2645
amending said section 618 and promulgated on February 24, 1916, which
took effect only from July first of the last named year: so that, in order to
explain whether or not the above-mentioned will was executed in accordance
with the law then in force, the last named law cannot be applied and the will
in question should be examined in accordance with, and under the rules of,
the law in force at the time of its execution.
The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless
it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other person in
[70]

his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not
render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and
attested as in this section provided.
A mere reading of the

clear manner that the
shadow of doubt the
solemnities prescribed
have been observed.
last four paragraphs or parts of the will shows in a

said will in its form and contents expresses without
will of the testator; and that in its execution the
by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190
Moreso, it is not proper to just invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely
because of some small defect in form which are not essential or of great
importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente
was also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of
act, he understood the contents of the will better than the two other
attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested the
execution of the will during its making until it was terminated and signed by
the testator, by the witnesses, and by himself, even though he did it in the
capacity of a notary.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated
section 618 cannot be required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as
this document was executed in September, 1911, five years before said
amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died
on August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the enforcement of
the said law; and so, the only law applicable to the present case is the
provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in accordance with the
provisions of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been
presented to the court many months before the amendatory act went into
effect.
It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive
effect only governs the rights arising from acts done under the rule of the
former law; but if the right be declared for the first time by a subsequent law
it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject
to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right
[71]

of the same origin.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be declared

that the will has been executed in due form by Francisco Briones on
September 16, 1911, and that the said will contains and expresses the last
will and testamentary wishes of the deceased testator. Without any special
ruling as to costs.So ordered.
JAAFAR, KAIZER A.
LLB III-B
VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL

G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
holographic will. That time, holographic wills were not yet allowed. Abadia died on January 14,
1943. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in the will, filed a petition
for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Thereafter, some cousins and nephews of
the deceased filed an opposition.
On January 14, 1952, the Trial Court admitted to probate the holographic will of the deceased on
the ground that, the same was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it
was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law
still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code
was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal
view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any defect in form.
The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved
in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
[72]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed.
HELD:
No. The will should not be allowed. Although the New Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under
article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed, it is a fact, however,
that at the time the will was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943,
holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for
the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters
and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first
two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Furthermore, Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will
as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." For the
reason that, although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Will is denied probate.
With costs.
JAAFAR, KAIZER A.
LLB III-B
[73]
TORRES vs LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-24569
February 26, 1926
Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent
FACTS:
In 1924, Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands leaving
a considerable estate. Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will
asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by
Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1) That
the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia
and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by
the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted
in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the
document was obtained through fraud and deceit.
After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the
will. In the decision of the trial judge appeared, among others:
[74]

The topics suggested by the assignments of error Testamentary
Capacity and Undue
Influence will be taken up separately and in
order. An attempt will be made under
each subject first to make
findings of fact quite separate and apart from those of the judge and
second to make findings of law and the law by rendering judgment.
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
FACTS:
For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health.
His breakdown was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing
years and to an accident which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6). Ultimately, on
August 10 1923, on his initiative, Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente F.
Lopez as the administrator of his property (Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance
of Manila to name a guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his age and
pathological state. This petition was opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta
acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that while Rodriguez was
far from strong on account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after
his property with the assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The
deposition of Tomas Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same shows
that he was able to answer nearly all of the questions propounded
intelligently). At the conclusion of the hearing, an order was declaring Tomas
Rodriguez incapacitated to take care of himself and to manage his property
and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian.
Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on November
27, 1923. There he was to remain sick in bed until his death. On the door of
the patients room was placed a placard reading No visitors, except father,
mother, sisters, and brothers. (Ppermitted to visit the patient only the
following named persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez,
Luz Lopez de Bueno, Remedio Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad Vizcarra,
Apolonia Lopez, Antonio Haman, and Gregorio Araneta ((Exhibit 9). The list
did not include the names of Margarita Lopez and her husband Antonio
Ventura. Indeed the last named persons experienced considerable difficulty
in penetrating in to the room of Rodriguez.
[75]
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas
Rodriguez in the hospital , Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a will
and suggested that the matter be taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p.
550). This information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F. Lopez,
who then interviewed Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of
Manila, for the purpose of securing him to prepare the will
As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with
that signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses with the single
exception of the change of the date from December 31, 1923, to January 3,
1924. Two copies besides the original of the will were made. The will is brief
and simple in terminology.
On the afternoon of January 3, 1924 there gathered in the quarters of Tomas

Rodriguez in the Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez and Dr. A. De
Asis, attesting witness; and Dr. Elias Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo
and Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for purposes of observation.
(Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8 of Vl. Legarda, S. R. p. 34. ) Possibly
also Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least
they were hovering in the background.
Not even prior to demise of the deceased, the two actions in the Lopez
family had prepared themselves for a fight over the estate. The Luz Lopez
faction had secured the services of Doctor Domingo, the physician in charge
of the Department of Insane of San Lazaro Hospital an Assistant Professor of
Nervous and Mental Diseases in the University of the Philippines, as
attending physician; as associated with him for purposes of investigation Dr.
Fernando Calderon the Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dr.
Florentino Herrera, a physician in active practice in the City of Manila; and
had arranged to have two members of the medical fraternity, Doctors De
Asis and Bonoan as attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had
taken equal precautions by calling a witnesses in the guardship proceedings
Dr. Sixto de los Angeles Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal
Medicine in the University of the Philippines, and Dr. Samuel Tietze, with long
experience in mental diseases; thereafter by continuing Doctors de Los
Angeles and Tietze to examine Tomas Rodriguez and by associating with
them Dr. William Burke, a well-known physician of the City of Manila. Skilled
lawyers were available to aid and abet the medical experts. Out of such
situations, do will contests arise.
[76]
An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of

their testimony shows that on most facts they concur. Their deductions from
these facts disclose a substantial divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task
to try to reconcile the views of these distinguished gentlemen who honestly
arrived at definite but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can do
under the circumstances is to set forth the findings of the Calderon
committed on the hand and of the De Los Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez
individually and jointly before the date when the will was executed. All of
them, as we have noticed were, present at the signing of the will to note the
reactions of the testator
Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as

to the mentality of Tomas Rodriguez.
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los

Angeles, Tietze, and Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a witness in the
gurardianship proceedings and had seen the patient of November 6 and 7,
1923. Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the guardianship case and
had visited the patient on November 9 and 12, 1923, and on January 15,
1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined Rodriguez on January 17,
20, and 24, 1924. The three physicians conducted a joint examination result.
Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is

disclosed by the treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear
the nurses remarks.
On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez there is no

dispute. On January 3, 1924, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76
years. He was suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and
senility.
Physically
he
was
a
wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors
Calderon, Domingo and Herrera admit that he was senile. They, together
with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare that his
memory however for remote events was generally good. He was given to
[77]

irrational
exclamations
symptomatic
of
a
deceased
mind.
While, however, Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the
intellectual faculties of the patient are sound, except that his memory is
weak, and that in executing the will the testator had full understanding of
the act he was performing and full knowledge of the contents thereof,
Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez was
of unsound mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the
simple type approaching the deteriorated stage.
The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a

will that the testator be of sound mind A sound mind is a disposing
mind. One of the grounds for disallowing a will is If the testator was insane
or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution. Predicated on these
statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of
testamentary capacity: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to
comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at
the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who
would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property
among the objects of his bounty. The mental capacity of the testator is
determined as of the date of the execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to
take a wide range in order that all facts may be brought out which will assist
in determining the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will
concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where
they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the
execution of the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon.
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity
that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under
guardianship at the time he made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist that the effect of the
judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this
statement we cannot write down our conformity. The provisions of the cited
section were taken from California, and there the Supreme court has never
held what is now urged upon us by the appellee. The rule announced that in
some states, by force of statute, the finding of insanity is conclusive as to the
existence of insanity during the continuance of adjudication, is found to rest
on local statutes, of which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. Even
[78]

where the question of insanity is out in issue in the guardianship
proceedings, the most that can be said for the finding is that it raises a
presumption of incapacity to make a will but does not invaluable the
testament if competency can be shown. The burden of providing sanity in
such case is cast upon the proponents.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result
of senile dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which
will are most often contested. A Newton, Paschal, a Cooley suffering under
the variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient lunacy,
would have proved historic subjects for expert dispute. Had Shakespeares
King Lear made a will, without any question it would have invited litigation
and doubt.
ISSUE:
Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to

make a will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity
and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of proof
and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE
FACTS:
The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence exercised by
the persons benefited in the will in collaboration with others. The trial judge
found this allegation to have been established and made it one of the bases
of his decision
Tomas Rodriguez voluntary named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The
latter subsequently became his guardian. There is every indication that of all
his relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez,
who, on the suggestion of Rodriguez secured Maximino Mina to prepare the
will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have gathered the
[79]

witnesses and physicians for the execution of the will. This faction of the
Lopez family was also a favor through the orders of Doctor Domingo as to
who
could
be
admitted
to
see
the
patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed a preconceived
plan on the part of the persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez to secure
his signature to the testament. The trial judge may be correct in this
supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing of Judge
Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis and Mr. Legarda
would so demean themselves and so fully their characters and reputation as
to participate in a scheme having for its purpose to delude and to betray an
old man in his age, rather named was acting according to the best of his
ability to assist in a legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover,
considering the attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her
husband and his apparent enmity toward them, it seems fairly evident that
even if the will had been made in previous years when Rodriguez was more
nearly in his prime, he would have prepared somewhat a similar document.
One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the art of the beneficiary or some other
person for his benefit (Code of Civil Procedure, sec., 634[4]). Undue
influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills and as
further mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as that which
compelled the testator to do that which is against the will from fear the
desire of peace or from other feeling which is unable to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.
HELD:
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly to the
regular manner in which the will was executed and to the testators mental
condition. The other subscribing witness, also, a physician on the contrary
testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would require the court to disallow
the will. The attending physician and three other eminent members of the
medical fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will, expressed
opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we
have the professional speculations of three other equally eminent members
of the medical profession when the will was executed. The advantage on
those facts is all with those who offer the will for probate.
The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical
[80]

distress. It was reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account
the evident prejustice of the testator against the husband of Margarita
Lopez.
Tomas Rodriguez comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he
was engaged. He had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew
what the will was to contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He
signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at the bottom and on
the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon him. While for some months prior to the making of the will he had not
manage his property he seem to have retained a distinct recollection of what
it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his memory failed him with
reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they were,
he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be
natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument distributed the
property naming the objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina
disclosed as insistence on giving all of his property to the two persons whom
he
specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years,
may have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may
have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a
been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of
life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms
testamentary capacity. That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach
after an exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing
the evidence for the oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious
consideration which it deserves.
The judgment of the trial court is set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez is
admitted to probate without special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.
JAAFAR, KAIZER A.
LLB III-B
[81]
Jaboneta us. Gustilo

No. 1641.
January 19, 1906
Topic/Doctrine:WILLS; PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND WITNESSES; VALIDITY.The

true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether
they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to
each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
FACTS:
Probate of the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied by the lower
court because the latter was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio
Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo
Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
According to the testimony of Jena, he left the room seeing Javellana holding the pen in position
to sign the last will and testament of the testator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta complied with the requirement of
the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
HELD:
Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in
the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining
witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will,
convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act
of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being
[82]

written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the
purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at
the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically
present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took
place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to
prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he
finally left the room.
We are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument were
complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on the ground stated
in the ruling appealed from.
JAJURIE, FATIMA BADRIA J.
LLB-III B
Nera vs. Remando

No. 5971.
February 27, 1911
Topic/Doctrine:The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to
an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend
upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them, but whether at that moment existing
conditions and the position of the parties, with relation to each other, were such
that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each
other sign.
FACTS:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the
instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the
subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the
time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their
signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in
a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was
hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures
to the instrument.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room
where the will was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures.
HELD:
[83]

A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness
was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the
time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of
course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree
admitting the document to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased.
It is to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the
moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each
other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator
and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the
presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each
other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing
conditions.
LLB-III B
Icasiano vs. Icasiano

No. L-18979
June 30, 1964
Topic/Doctrine:The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature
to one page of a testament is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
FACTS:
The late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at
the house of her daughter, published before and attested by three
instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V.
Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy. The will was acknowledged by the testatrix
and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before
attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila. The
records show that the original of the will which consists of five pages, and
while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature
of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3)
thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental
petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each
and every page.
[84]

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that
the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they
written or affixed on the same occasion as the original,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his
signature to one page of a will invalidates the same.
HELD:
No. The inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to
one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the
course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its
bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses.

LLB-III B
IN RE WILL OF LUCINA ANDRADA

G.R. No. 16008
September 29, 1921
Doctrine: In relation to Article 805 of the Civil Code (Forms of Wills)
FACTS:
Lucina Andrada died on June 5, 1919, in the Municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz; and soon thereafter a
petition was presented to the Court of First Instance of Capiz by Lucila Arce to establish a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Upon hearing the petition, his Honor, Judge
Antonio Villareal, declared that the document in question had not been executed in conformity with the
requirements and he therefore refused to admit the purported will to probate, and the petitioner appealed.
The attesting clause of the will in question is incorporated in the will itself, constituting the last paragraph
thereof; and its defect consists in the fact that it does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the
will is written, though it does state that the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page, as is
in fact obvious from an inspection of the instrument. Each of the pages moreover bears successively the
Visayan words, "isa," "duha," "tatlo," "apat," "lima," which mean respectively "one," "two," "three," "four,"
"five," Visayan being the dialect in which the instrument is written.
ISSUE:
[85]

Whether or not the document in question had not been executed in conformity with the requirements of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature.
HELD:
According to 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is required that each and
every page of the will shall be numbered correlatively in letters and that the attesting clause shall state the
number of sheets or pages used. Without deciding in this case whether the will in question is rendered invalid
by reason of the manner in which the pages are numbered, the court is unanimous upon the point that the
defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal. The law plainly says that the attestation shall state the number
of sheets or pages used, the evident purpose being to safeguard the document from the possibility of the
interpolation of additional pages or the omission of some of the pages actually used. It is true that this point is
also safeguarded by the other two requirements that the pages shall be consecutively lettered and that each
page shall be singed on the left margin by the testator and the witnesses. In light of these requirements it is
really difficult to see any practical necessity for the additional requirement that the attesting clause shall state
the number of sheets or pages used. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the last mentioned requirement
affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has
seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material. It results that the trial judge did not err in
refusing probate of the will, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the
appellant.
JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.

LLB-III B
Cagro v. Cagro et al.

G.R. No. L-5826
April 29, 1953
Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Art. 805 of the Civil Code (Forms of Will)
FACTS:
The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Samar which admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan,
Samar on Feb. 14, 1949.The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was
not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the
witnesses on the left hand margin. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the
left hand margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to the
attestation clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid.
HELD:
[86]

Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their
signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission of
their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation. Moreover, the signatures affixed on the
left hand margin are not substantial conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely in
conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add
clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses. The probate of the will is denied.
LLB-IIIB
Cruz vs. Villasor

G.R. No. L-32213
November 26, 1973
Topic/Doctrine: Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code (Forms of Wills)
FACTS:
Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing the
probate of the last will of testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. The surviving spouse of the said
decease opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator
having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
The first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the
second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.
In which three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Paares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. As the third witness is
the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared
before the notary public to acknowledge the will. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court
allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was
given due course.
[87]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in accordance with
law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code?
HELD:
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties. We are inclined to sustain that
of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with
law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his
participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning
a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement ( Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if the
notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested
sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It
would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to
minimize fraud . He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging
witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
LLB-IIIB
[88]
Cuevas v. Achacoso
GR No. L-3497
MAY 18, 1951
Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of a will
FACTS:
The attestation clause in this case was signed by the testator, but signed
below his name by the witnesses. The clause was made by the testator
himself more than by the instrumental witnesses.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Valid. It substantially complies with the statute. The apparent anomaly is not serious to invalidate
the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of
the 3 witnesses.
JIMENEZ, MAY MARIE ANN A.

LLB III-B
.
[89]
MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No. L-4888
May 25, 1953
Topic/Doctrine: Codicil
FACTS:
Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B),
disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were
submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of
the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed
by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to a
supposed last will, be probated?
HELD:
Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day before
Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an
addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents of
Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not
have
the
legal
effect
and
force
to
a
testamentary
disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the
Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it,"
and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.
[90]

LLB III-B
Dichoso v. Gorostiza
GR No. L-35586
October 31, 1932
Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of the Will
FACTS:
The will of the deceased Caridad Alcantara de Gorostiza was denied probate in the trial court, for
the reason that the attestation clause failed to state that the testatrix signed every page of the will
as required by section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the attestation clause is fatally defective as to annul the will.
HELD:
It was held that the attestation clause is legally sufficient for the will to be admitted to probate.
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the same statute be made. It is sufficient if
from the language employed it can reasonably deduced that the attestation clause fulfils what the
law expects of it.

LLB III-B
[91]
GAN VS. YAP

Reference: G.R. No. L-12190
Date: August 30, 1958
Doctrine: In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced. Therefore,
a lost holographic will cannot be probated
FACTS:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge,
refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.
HELD:
NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The
loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony
were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted
by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
up to that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.
JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.
LLB III-B
[92]
AZAOLA VS. SINGSON

Date: August 5, 1960
Doctrine: The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not
mandatory.
FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for
probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the
nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on
the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less, before
the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the testatrixs
handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the general power
of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence
certificates showing the testatrixs signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually
written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on
the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent
must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing
of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented "did not
prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not
mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature
of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.
HELD:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the
genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to require
the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of
[93]

a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious
that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control
of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses;
they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can
declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature
are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand;
or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance
with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become impossibility.
This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert
evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity
of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity.
Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their
testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On
the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the
Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine,
is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that
the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
LLB III-B
GONZALES VS. CA
Date: May 25, 1979
Doctrine: Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at
any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
[94]

trustworthiness and being reliable, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may
be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in
Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with.
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of
Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel's will designating her as the principal beneficiary and
executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of
Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the
following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by
law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due
to her age and sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said
decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA
erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law when
there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered credible
as required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good standing
in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1. YES. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more
than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles
820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a person to be an instrumental
witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends
on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that
said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda.de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
"Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that
the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a
given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to
believe his testimony."
2. NO. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for
[95]

being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless
the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be
believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article
820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or
deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is
shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that
he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court,
and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
LLB III-B
IGNACIA DIAZ vs. ANA DE LEON

No. 17714
May 31, 1922
Topic/Doctrine: WILLS; REVOCATION; "ANIMO REVOCANDI."According to the statute
governing the subject in this jurisdiction the destruction animo revocandi of a will constitutes, in
itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.) The original will herein presented
for probate having been destroyed animo revocandi, cannot be declared the will and last testament of
the testator.
FACTS:
[96]
The testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to
him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This
was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator,
being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the
testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the
former.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now deceased, was revoked by him?
HELD:
We find that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not clothed with all the necessary
requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will with
animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious
to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the
testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he
was confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot
now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon. Judgment is affirmed with costs
against the petitioner.
KINANG, JEZRILL C.
LLB III-B
JESUSA LACSON VDA. DE ARROYO vs. EL BEATERIO DEL SANTISSIMO

ROSARIO DE MOLO
No. L-22005
May 3, 1968
Topic/Doctrine: Remedial law; Appeal; Findings of fact of Court of Appeals conclusive upon
Supreme Court; Meaning of question of law.The Supreme Court can review decisions of the
Court of Appeals only on errors of law, its findings of fact being conclusive. For a question to be
one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. If the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence,
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation,
the question must be deemed factualfor the Court of Appeals to solve.
[97]
Same; Evidence; Who are competent to testify on land value; Competency and credibility of
witness distinguished.A witness who personally knows the land sought to be expro priated
because he had possessed it as owner or had administered it or lived on it for a long time, or
because he had bought and sold much land situated in the same municipality, or had engaged in
farming and business and had therefore acquired experience and knowledge of the value of lands
in the locality, is competent to testify on the value of said land. Professional appraisers and
dealers engaged in the business of buying and selling similar property are also competent to
testify as to value or are competent to express their judgment as to its value. Competency as a
witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must
accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter
because he is competent but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony.
FACTS:
Appeal by certiorari taken by Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and other heirs of the late Ignacio
Arroyo, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.28555 affirming the one
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Civil Case No. 4759 entitled Jesusa Lacson
Vda. de Arroyo, et al. vs. Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, et al. holding that the
plaintiffs have failed to establish fair and reliable basis upon which the donation in question may
be justly declared inofficious, and, for this reason, dismissing the case, without costs.
On July 2, 1924, the late Ignacio Arroyo partitioned his entire estate inter vivos among his three
children, by executing with them a public instrument called Convenio de Reparticion de Bienes
y Adjudicacion de Herencia. The three children also received therein their inheritance from their
deceased mother Maria Pidal, the first wife of Ignacio Arroyo. The estate of Ignacio Arroyo was
apportioned in four parts, with specified properties being given to each of the three children, and
the remaining properties, likewise specified, being adjudicated to Ignacio Arroyo, or reserved for
himself, as comprising- his one-third portion of free disposal.
On March 8, 1927 Jose Arroyo died leaving his widow Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and their
children as his only heirs.
On January 9, 1928, Ignacio Arroyo, in a public document called Escritura de Donacion,
disposed of almost all of the properties adjudicated to him in the aforementioned Convenio de
Reparticion, in favor of Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, a religious corporation. This
donation.with all the conditions thereof, was accepted by the donee on the same date and in the
same instrument. Subsequent documents clarifying the properties subject matter of the donation,
and modifying the conditions imposed thereby, were executed.
On October 22. 1931 Ignacio Arroyo executed his last will and testament. The Convenio de
Reparticion aforementioned was reproduced in said will as an integral part thereof, following a
statement therein regarding its execution, and regarding its being confirmed and reproduced
therein so that its validity will never be questioned. The donation in favor of the Beaterio del
Santissimo Rosario de Molo, its acceptance and
[98]
On January 8, 1935 Ignacio Arroyo died and his last will and testament was probated, without
any opposition, by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on February 25, 1935.
On January 20, 1936 Ricardo Carreon, as administrator of the intestate estate of Concepcion
Gerona, filed an amended complaint against Lucio Lacson as executor of Ignacio Arroyo, Jose
Arroyo, Jr. as administrator of the intestate estate of Jose Arroyo, the Beaterio del Santissimo
Rosario do Molo and the Municipality of Iloilo seeking the recovery, inter alia, of one-half of the
properties adjudicated to Jose Arroyo and Mariano Arroyo in the Convenio de Reparticion And
one-half of the properties donated to the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo in the
Escritura de Donacion. The court rendered judgment against the defendants, but cleared the
Beaterio and the municipality of Iloilo from any liability, and refrained from disturbing the status
of the properties donated to them, reserving the right of the plaintiff to claim from the executor
of Ignacio Arroyo one-half of the value of these donated properties. The Arroyos appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court but war destroyed the records of the case, so that a new trial was
ordered. Civil Case No. 9137 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo was then tried anew, but on
November 3, 1949, the plaintiffs therein and Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo, as administratrix of
the intestate estate of Jose Arroyo entered into an agreement whereby the former renounced and
waived in favor of the latter all their rights and interests on any and all the properties therein
litigated in consideration of the sum of P65,000.00 and the assumption of the obligation to pay
the attorneys fees of the counsel of the plaintiffs in the sum of P40,000.00. Upon motion of
both parties the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 9137 on the
same date.
On March 13, 1958, Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and her children, as the heirs of Jose
Arroyo, filed the complaint in this case, seeking declaration of the donation made by Ignacio
Arroyo to the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo in 1928 as inofficious and to recover the
excess thereof. After due trial, decision was rendered on August 29, 1960, dismissing the
complaint for failure of the plaintiffs to establish fair and reasonable basis upon which the
donation in question may be justly declared inofficious. The counterclaim was likewise
dismissed.
After a careful consideration of the foregoing facts, the trial court held that the plaintiffs have
failed to establish fair and reasonable basis upon which the donation in question may be justly
declared inofficious. For its part, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
because, in its opinion, the decision appealed from does not err in finding no fair and reasonable
basis for declaring the Beaterio donation inofficious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficiency of plaintiffsappellants evidence as a fair and reasonable
basis for resting a finding that the donation in question is inofficious.
HELD:
A question of law has been declared as one not calling for the examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the are to the effect that For a question to be one of law, it must
[99]

involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them.
The review should be confined to the facts and circumstances found by the Court of Appeals.
That such facts and circumstances in this case do not sustain the theory of the appellant. Indeed it
is seriously to be doubted whether we could reverse the conclusion of the appellate court to the
effect that those facts and circumstances are not enough evidence to show clearly and beyond
doubt that the parties intended the contract to be a mortgage instead of a conditional conveyance.
That conclusion is obviously ONE OF FACT, not a bit different from the verdict of a jury in a
murder trial that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution has proved, or has not
shock and similar injuries, and accordingly, ordered plaintiffs to pay .
In the light of the foregoing it is clear that petitioners now seek a reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals not upon a question of law but upon one of factone which necessarily
involves the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by them, it being their
contention that such evidence, which the Court of Appeals precisely held to be insufficient to
justify the granting of the relief sought, is, in fact, sufficient for that purpose. In other words,
petitioners seek to have Us substitute our judgment in lieu of that of the Court of Appeals in the
resolution of a question of fact.
But to avoid the necessarily fatal application of the well settled rule on the matter, petitioners
lone assignment of error in the brief submitted to Us attempts to state the issue somewhat
differently, saying that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not declaring the donation in
question inofficious and in not ordering the return to petitioners of the excess thereof. Re-stating
the issue at page 2 of their brief they submit again that the only question presented in this appeal
is whether the conclusions of the
What We said in Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, 41 Phil. 160, 169, is simply to
the effect that a witness who personally knows the land sought to be expropriated because he had
possessed it as owner or had administered it or levied on it for a long time, or because he had
bought and sold much land situated in the same municipality, or had been engaged in farming
and business and had therefore acquired experience and knowledge of the value of lands in the
locality, is competent to testify on the value of said land. To hold that a particular person is
competent to testify upon a given matter does not mean that his testimony upon the same must be
believed by the Court or must be deemed by the Court or must be deemed by the latter to be of
sufficient probative value to establish the point which it was intended to prove. Competency as a
witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must
accept what he says. A perusal of the decision subject of review clearly .shows that the Court of
Appeals did not hold that witness Doromal was not a competent witness in relation to the value
of the properties involved in the questioned donation; it simply declined to believe his testimony
or to give it probative value sufficient to prove what petitioners were trying to establish. Had the
Court of Appeals considered him not to be a competent witness upon that matter, it would have
completely ignored or disregarded his testimony instead of weighing it or evaluating it; this,
however, resulting in the Court arriving at the conclusion that such evidence did not have
sufficient probative value to convince the Court.
[100]

As regards the Court of Appeals refusal to believe or to be bound by the testimony of petitioner
Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo because a sale between brothers can not be a reliable index of the
fair market value of a property, petitioners now contend that there is no evidence at all that the
deceased Jose Arroyo (late husband of said petitioner) or the deceased Mariano Arroyo were
trying to help one another when they executed the deed of conveyance involving one-half share
of Haciendas Manolita and Conchita in favor of the former. This obviously raises the same
question of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed any error in evaluating the testimony
of the witness already nameda question purely of fact which We are not authorized to review.
KINANG, JEZRILL C.
LLB III-C
Rosario Guevara vs. Ernesto Guevara

74 Phil. 479
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8. Allowance & Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
This is an action commenced by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she
claims to be her strict legitimate as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Victoriano
Guevara. Ernesto is a legitimate son of the decease. It appears that the deceased had left a will
disposing of his properties in favor of the defendant and the rest of his relatives, the plaintiff
among them. This will have not been probated. Rosario who has her fathers will, died and
nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made there in her favor. But four years
after her fathers death, she commenced this action. Wherein she presented the will, to prove that
she has been acknowledged as a natural daughter by the deceased. Because the will has not been
probated both Trial Court and Court of Appeals sustained the theory.
ISSUE:
Whether the procedure adopted by the plaintiff in accordance with law, invoicing the provisions
of the different sections of Rule 76 (now Rule 75) of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
[101]
It cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario in violation of procedural
law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent left a
will and no debts and heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate,
they must first present that will to the Court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with
the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to
law.
LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.
LLB III B
Ernesto Guevara vs. Rosario Guevara

98 Phil. 249/G.R. No. L-48840
December 29, 1943
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
This case is a sequel and aftermath of the aftermath of the case of Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil.
479. A Motion to dismiss was filed by Ernesto on the ground, among others, that the petition for
probate is barred by the Statute of Limitations considering that the testator died on Sept. 27,
1933, and that petition was filed 12 years after on Oct. 5, 1945. As a consequence, the lower
court dismissed the petition. The petitioner thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the order of the Lower Court. The case thereafter was elevated to the Supreme Court for
review by Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the Statute of Limitations is applicable to the Probate of the Wills.
HELD:
The Court failed to notice, that its Doctrine, was destructive of the right of testamentary
disposition and violative of the owners right to control his property within the legal limits. The
appeal ordered in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim of custodians and heirs interested in
[102]

their suppression. The Lower Court would in effect abdicate the tutelary power that passed to the
Republic from the former sovereigns, that potestad suprema que en mi reside para velarpor un
punctual cumplimento de las ultimas voluntades, asserted as one of the royal prerogatives in the
Real Cedula of March 18, 1776.
These decisions are of high persuasive value; they represent the trend of authority, and enable us
to conclude that reason and precedent reject the applicability of the Statute of
Limitations to probate proceedings because these are not exclusively established in the interest of
the surviving heirs, but primarily for the protection of the testators expressed wishes that are
entitled to respect as an effect of his ownership and right of disposition. If the probate of validly
executed will is required by public policy, as declared by the Supreme Court in the previous case,
the state could not have intended the statute of limitations to defeat the policy.
LLB III B
Mercado vs. Santos

66 Phil. 215/G.R. No. 45629
September 22, 1938
Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
The records show that the petitioner had presented a will purporting to the last will and testament
of his deceased wife for probate. The will was admitted to probate without any opposition.
Sixteen months after the allowance of the will, a complaint for forgery of the probated will was
instituted by the brothers and sisters of the deceased against the petitioner. The latter moved to
dismiss claiming that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and that the
order of allowance is conclusive as to its due execution. The motion was overruled. Whereupon,
the petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
As a result, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review by certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the probate of the will is a bar to the subsequent criminal prosecution of the petitioner for
the alleged forgery of the said will.
HELD:
The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of probate,
on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review
[103]

the action of a court of first instance when that court refuses to grant relief. After a judgment
allowing a will to be probated has become final and unappealable, and after the period fixed by
law has expired, the law as an expression of the legislative wisdom goes to further and the case
ends there.
The court held that, that the criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a
will which has been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
LLB III B
NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799
May 21, 1943
Topic/Doctrine: Institution of Heirs
FACTS:
This is a case where the testator AgripinoNeri in his will left all his property by universal title to
the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his
first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by
the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the
inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which
registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money
which the respondents were indebted to their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will shall be cancelled in view of the omission of heirs. Whether or not there
was disinheritance.
HELD:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that
testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he
had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his
second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul
the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
[104]
LIM, EKEENA, O.
LLB III-B
Nuguid vs Nuguid
17 SCRA 449
June 23, 1966
Topic/Doctrine: Effects of Preterition
FACTS:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir
of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of
administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir.Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not
apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
HELD:
Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs
in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit
[105]

them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a
case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the
parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution
of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
LIM, EKEENA, O.
LLB III-B
CRISOLOGO vs SINGSON
G.R. No. L-13876
February 28, 1962
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:
Testamentary Disposition
FACTS:
This involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint alleged that Singson owned half pro
indiviso of said property and that Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the duly probated
last will of Singson (original owner). Defendant's defense was that ConsolacionFlorentino was a
mere usufructuary of and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that
therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson appealed. At the time of the
execution of the will, the nearest living relatives of the original owner were her brothers
Evaristo, Manuel and DionisioSingson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her
grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
ISSUE:
Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or for sustitucion
fideicomisaria?
HELD:
The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only designate heirs wholl succeed him,
but also substitutes in the event that said heirs dont accept or are in no position to accept
inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.
[106]

Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular person with obligation, on part of latter, to
deliver the same to another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event. The
particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of heir in this manner: upon death of
ConsolacionFlorentino, whether before or after that of testatrix, property bequeathed to her shall
be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel,
Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of ConsolacionFlorentino. If this
created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be that ConsolacionFlorentino, upon death of
testatrix, became owner of one undivided half of the property,but if it provided for
sustitutionfideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over
same half. In the former, she would be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.
As Manresa says, a careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor
does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy
usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in
the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death
whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix. Her share shall belong to the brothers of
the testatrix. In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the
deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution
ConsolacionFlorentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the
death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.
LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B
[107]
Pecson vs. Coronel

G.R. No. L-20374
October 11, 1923
Doctrine: Undue Influence
FACTS:
Dolores Coronel, a resident of Pampanga executed her last will and testament whereby having no
forced heirs, willed to her nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to her niece Angela Coronel,
her properties, both movable and immovable, in consideration of the good services he has
rendered to the former. Further, Dolores also appointed Lorenzo Pecson executor of all that is
willed and ordained in her will, without bond and in his default, she appointed as substitute
executor her grandson Victor Pecson. As the testatrix does not know how to write her name, she
requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under her express direction in the presence of the
witnesses and the witnesses do the same. The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo
Pecson, and the opponents are Eriberto Coronel et al, blood relatives of the testatrix who contend
that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she
should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson and not the blood
relatives as the beneficiary of the estate of the testatrix.
HELD:
There was no undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson as the beneficiary of the estate of
the testatrix. The liberty to dispose of ones estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the
first paragraphof Article 763 (now Art. 842). As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the record
sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried, through fraud or any undue influence, to
frustrate the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate to her blood relatives. Further,
[108]

the preference given to Lorenzo Pecson is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the
moment. The proof adduced by this appelle, although contradicted, shows by a preponderance of
evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had been rendered by him to
Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the
administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life.
LUYAO, RODELO D.
LLB-IIIB
Lajom vs. Leuterio
G.R. No. L-13557
April 25, 1960
Doctrine: Preterition
FAC TS:
Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial proceedings of his testate estate were
instituted in the Court of First Instance. An agreement of partition and distribution was executed
by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of Maximo Viola
and Juana Toura, whereby the properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were divided among
themselves. Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying, among other things, that he be declared a
natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly recognized and acknowledged in accordance with the
laws in force prior to the Civil Code, thereby being a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and
Silvio Viola; that the agreement of partition and distribution executed in 1935 by these three
legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is a victim of preterition.
HELD:
It is alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made by
the deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby
converted into an intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly
untenable. There might have been merit therein if we were dealing with a special proceedings for
the settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in consequence of said
preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate
estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased. But, Civil Case No. 8077 is
an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court having jurisdiction over the same is
limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which admittedly do not include the
aforementioned riceland.
LUYAO, RODELO D.
LLB-IIIB
[109]
Aznar vs. Duncan

G.R. No. L-24365
June 30, 1966
Doctrine: Preterition
FACTS:
Christensen died testatewherein he declared that he has no living descendant or ascendant except
a natural daughter Lucy Duncan; that he is leaving the residue of his estate to said Lucy Duncan;
and that he is bequeathing the amount of P3,600.00 to Helen Garcia to whom he is not related in
any way. The will was admitted to probate. In the decision allowing the will the court declared
that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. Subsequently, in the partition proceedings,
an order was issued approving a project of partition wherein the estate was divided equally
between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural
daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said
order was based on the proposition that Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will thus
resulting in the annulment of the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir; hence the estate passed to
both of them as if the deceased had died intestate. Lucy Duncan appealed on the sole question of
whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in
equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heirs should be merely
reduced to the extent necessary to cover thelegitime of Helen Garcia to 1/4 of the entire estate.
She contends that the case should be governed by Art. 906 of the Civil Code.Helen Garcia, on
the other hand, contends that the case should be governed by Art. 854 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was preterition in the instant case.
HELD:
It is submitted that in this case there is no preterition within the meaning of Art. 854 of the Civil
Code. It is true that there is a total omission of the acknowledged natural child in the testators
will, and apparently the rule regarding preterition should, therefore, be applied. But then, we
must consider the fact that a donation inter vivos is actually given to a compulsory heir as an
advance on his inheritance. That is why in the partition of the estate of the donor upon the death
of the latter, it must be collated and subsequently, it must be charged against the legitime of such
compulsory heir. Consequently, there is no omission in this case which is complete and total in
character. Hence, if there is an impairment of the legitime of the acknowledged natural child
[110]

because the value of the property donated is less than the legitime to which he is entitled by
operation of law, his remedy lies in the right granted in Art. 906 of the Civil Code. He can ask for
the completion of his legitime.
LUYAO, RODELO D.
LLB-IIIB
Gallanosa vs Arcangel
83 SCRA 676|G.R. No. L-29300
June 21, 1978
FACTS:
FlorentinoHitosis executed a will in 1938 when he was eighty years old wherein he instituted as
his only heirs his stepson Pedro Gallanosa and the latters wife Corazon Grecia. He died in 1939,
survived by his brother Leon Hitosis and several nephews and nieces. A petition for probate was
duly filed by the testamentary heirs. Opposition to the probate was registered by the legal heirs.
After hearing, the probate court admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as
executor. In 1943, a project of partition of sixty-one (61) parcels of land constituting the bulk of
the testators estate was finally approved. There was no appeal from the decree of probate and
from the order of partition and distribution. In 1952, the testators legal heirs instituted an action
for the recovery of the 61 parcels of landon the ground of acquisitive prescription. The action
was dismissed. Again, there was no appeal from the order of dismissal. In 1967, said legal heirs
instituted another action in the same court against the testamentary heirs for the annulment of
the will and the recovery of the 61 parcels of land, alleging that the Gallanosa spouses caused the
execution of the will through fraud and deceit. Upon motion of defendants, the court dismissed
the action. Plaintiffs fi led a motion for reconsideration. Respondent Judge granted it and set
aside the order of dismissal. From this order of dismissal, defendants went up to the Supreme
Court by certiorari. Petitioners (defendants) contend that private respondents (plaintiffs) do not
have a cause of action for the annulment of the will and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of
landby reason of res judicata and of prescription. On the other hand, private respondents contend
that the will is void, and therefore their right of action is imprescriptible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of
FlorentionHitosis and for the recovery of the parcels of land.
HELD:
[111]
Speaking through Justice Aquino, the Supreme Court held:

It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from defendants motion to dismiss that
plaintiffs 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, and by prescription,
acquisitive and extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile and the jus gentium as
usucapio, longitemporispossesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December
3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the annulment of a will. In order that a
will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly
Sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98
Phil. 249).
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will
(Sec. 625, Act. 190; Sec. 1, Rule 76, now Sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of Art.838,
Civil Code). That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he
executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the
will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is
genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent
proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Morans Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).
MACROHON, JENIELYN, A
LLB III-B
MacamvsGatmaitan
60 Phil 358| G.R. No. 40445
August 17, 1934
FACTS:
[112]
The records show that NicolasaMacam fi led a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a
will and a codicil. Both will and codicil were executed by LeonardoMacam. The will was admitted to probate
without any opposition, but with regard to the codicil, however, an opposition to its probate was fi led by Juana
Gatmaitan. After hearing, the court ordered the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the codicil as well as of
the opposition thereto on the ground that since the allowance of the will had already become fi nal and executory, it
was too late to consider the codicil. Both parties appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N a probate of a will would be a final judgment prior to that of a codicil, thereof a bar to the probate of the
codicil?
HELD:
The Supreme Court, speaking through JusticeVillareal, held:
The fact that a will has been allowed without opposition and the order allowing the same has become final and
executor is not a bar to the presentation of a codicil, provided it complies with all the necessary formalities for
executing a will. It is not necessary that the will and the codicil be probated together as the codicil may be
concealed by an interested party and it may not be discovered until after the will has already been allowed; and they
may be presented and probated one after the other, since the purpose of the probate proceeding is merely to
determine whether or not the will and the codicil meet all thestatutory requirements for their extrinsic validity,
leaving the validity of their provisions for further consideration. The appeal taken by the petitioner NicolasaMacam
is, therefore, well-founded and the court a quo erred in flatly denyingher petition for the probate of the codicil on the
erroneousground that said codicil should have been presented at the sametime as the will.
With respect to the opposition of the oppositor-appellantJuana Gatmaitan, the fact that she failed to file opposition
tothe probate of the will does not prevent her from filing oppositionto the probate of the codicil thereof, inasmuch as
the willmay satisfy all the external requisites necessary for its validity,but the codicil may, at the time of its
execution, not be in conformitytherewith. If the testator had testamentary capacity atthe time of the execution of the
will, and the will was executedin accordance with all the statutory requirements, opposition toits probate would not
lie. On the contrary, if at the time of theexecution of the codicil, the testator lacked some of the subjectiverequisites
legally capacitating him to execute the same, orall the statutory requirements were not complied with in
theexecution thereof, opposition to its probate would lie.
LLB III-B
Cosovs Fernandez Deza

42 Phil 585|G.R. No.L- 16763
December 22, 1921
Topic/Doctrine:Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with
[113]

her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de
libredisposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred
Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was
set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the
testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the
testator.
ISSUE:
W/N the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
HELD:
It is worthwhile to recall the basic principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by
the jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be
of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency
and make him express the will of another rather than his own
LLB III-B
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara

vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First
Instance of Manila,
G.R. No. L-31703
February 13, 1930
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION
FACTS:
[114]

The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La
Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara,
deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented
by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez
Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of
execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La
Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the
decedent Ana Maria Alcantara.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple
substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
ISSUE:
WON the deposited amount belong to the fideicommisary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara.
HELD:
This will certainly provide for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise
to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code). The testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole
and universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the
will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall
receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit
about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary
substitution.
The disposition contained in clause IX of the will, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the
estate. In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although
at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second heir.
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the
right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it.
This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the
provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the
heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due
time to the fideicommissary heirs.
MOLEJON, JAYSON T.
LLB III-B
[115]
ELENA MORENTE
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA
G.R. No. L-3891
December 19, 1907
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: MODAL INSTITUTION
FACST:
[116]

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass
to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.
2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death,
and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have
children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left
by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds
shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he
have any.
3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which
the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the
testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the
probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the
legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the
husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the will of Consuelo contained modal institution
HELD:
Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and
article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly
imposed upon the widow or widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to
impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will?
It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her
sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is
provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached
the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first
clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does
not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him
in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a
loss
We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with
reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such
consideration we cannot say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married
again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express
[117]

condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that any
condition can be implied from the context of the will. In order to make a testamentary provision
conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will.
MOLEJON, JAYSON T.
LLB III-B
Santos vs. Buenaventura

18 SCRA 47
Doctrine: Timely withdrawal of opposition to the probation of no contest and forfeiture will
must not be penalized.
FACTS:
Decedent: Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.
Nearest kin: Brothers, a sister, nephews and nieces.
Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee, is one of the nieces.
[118]

Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not
executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the
testatrix Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the will Maxima was
mentally incapable of making a will.
After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositions, but
before the latter could close their evidence, Flora filed a manifest action that she is withdrawing
her opposition to the probate of the will.
The will provides a NO-CONTEST & FORFEITRURE clause.
ISSUE:
Did Flora actuations amount to violation of no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will?
HELD:
No. Where after realizing her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in good faith
because grounded on strong doubts appellant withdrew her opposition and join the appellee in
the latters petition for the probate of the will, appellant must not now be penalized for rectifying
her error. Such act of withdrawing before she rested her case contributed to the speedy probate of
will.
OMBRA, JHEMHAR I.
LLB III-B
Villaflor v. Villaflor
4 SCRA 550
Doctrine: Intent of testator must govern.
FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor of Zambales devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepumoceno, of all his real and personal pproperties, giving the other half to his brother.
It was provided in the will that clause for the provision for his brother would be deemed annulled
from the moment he bore any child with his wife.
Don Nicolas died without begetting any child.Thereafter, Dona Fausta died without having
second marriage. Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administration
[119]

of the estate of the widow Fausta contending that upon the widows death. Said plaintiff became
vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas.
ISSUE:
Is that the title to the properties became absolute vested in the widow upon her death.
HELD:
Yes. The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the
fixed law of interpretation, and all question raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith. Following the plain and literal meaning of
the testators words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.
OMBRA, JHEMHAR I.
LLB III-B
Chua vs. CFI

78 SCRA 412
Doctrine: There is reserve troncal if its four requisites concur.
FACTS:
In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia, he sired 3 children, Ignacio, Lorenzo, &
Manuel. When Fatricia died, Jose remarried with Consolaccion with whom he had a child named
Juanito. Manuel died without leaving any issue. Then, Jose died intestate leaving his widow
consolaccion and his son Juanito of the second marriage and sons Ignacio & Lorenzo of his first
marriage.
Lower court ordered that 1/2 portion of the disputed lot and the sum of p8,000 in favor of
Consolaccion, the other half lot in favor of Juanito. P3,000 in favor of Lorenzo and P1500 in
favor of Ignacio.
[120]
Thereafter, Juanito died intestate without issue. His mother Consolaccion succeeded him proindiviso share of said lot.
ISSUE:
WON there is reserve troncal?
HELD:
Yes. The requisites for reserve troncal are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito of
the second marriage died intestate. He died without leaving any issue. His pro-indiviso of 1/2
share was acquired by his mother by operation of law. When his mother died, Juanito who died
intestate had relatives within 3rd civil degree. These relatives are Ignacio, Dominador and
Remidios, the supposed legitimate child of Lorenzo who are the petitioner herein.
OMBRA, JHEMHAR I.
LLB III-B
EDROSO v SABLAN
September 13 1913
Topic/Doctrine: RESERVA TRONCAL
FACTS:
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on Sept. 22, 1882.In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,1902, unmarried and without
issue, and by his decease the two parcels of land inPagsanjan, Laguna, passed through
inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the
application for registration of her ownership.-Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan
[uncles german of Pedro] appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming either (1) that
the registration be denied OR (2) that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents
be recorded in the registration of each parcel.-The Court of Land Registration denied the
registration and the applicant appealed through a bill of exceptions. Registration was denied
because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property
[121]

required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly
in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
ISSUE:
WON the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved
HELD:
YES.-The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title]. He who
acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives-Art. 811, OCC provides:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree
and belong to the line whence the property proceeded.-Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro
Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who
are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and
Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.-If
Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only that he would have perforce left
her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.[Art. 809, OCC.] In such case only the half
constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by
operation of law would fall to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free
disposal would not have to be reserved. This is that in article 811 of the Civil Code says.-Proof of
testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. In this case, the interested
party has not proved that either of the lots became Marcelinasinheritance through the free
disposal of her son. Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the
Civil Code. Article 968: "Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower
contracting a second marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the
first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have acquired from the deceased
spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer w/out a valuable consideration."From principles of jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain, it is inferred that if
from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by
article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the
ascendants who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that
articles 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who
has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977, are: Inventory of the
property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in
the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article978, is the
assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.-Article 199
of amended Mortgage Law: "The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article
811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be
reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be required by the persons who should legally
[122]

represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be
reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding articles (relative to
the right reserved by article968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve
the right the provisions with respect to the father."-The lapse of the ninety days is not the
expiration by prescription of the period for the exercise of this right of action by the persons in
whose favor the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, and enables them
to exercise it at any time, since no limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right
required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the
property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to
that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be
sustained. What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?-The person required by article 811 to reserve the
right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title
and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision
of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although
under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should
possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required
by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.-On the
other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in
their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which
they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the
right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will
they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the
third-degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion
of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved
should, after their right has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more
than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for it is
impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he
exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be
reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the
person required to reserve it, just as it may even become absolute should that person die."-No act
of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him
in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in
ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer
may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of
persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the
property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the
law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein. Can the heir of the property required by
law to be reserved himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited?-YES
when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made agree thereto and provided that
the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land is recorded, as the law provides.
[123]
OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.

LLB III-B
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA,

vs.MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO,
G.R. No. L-13386
October 27, 1920
FACTS:
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married
Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Julian Nieva died intestate
on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels
of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of
land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession.
Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which
marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the
defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased
father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of
the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the
defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the
complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
[124]

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in
question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under
the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana
Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was
duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that
the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff
lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said
mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal
provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.
2. Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or
grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant?
HELD:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously
from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from
his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother
Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo
Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was
Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an
illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death,
the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if
he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.
under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question
if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (But in said article 811 the legislator uses the
generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they
have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate
relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to
maintain the affirmative.
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or
grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article
811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of
[125]

legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the
natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring
to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only
upon the legitimate ascendant.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to
succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that
the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they
belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether
the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is
intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and
descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second
or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon,
Vizcaya and Catalua concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes
troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. This is one of the most delicate points
in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor
of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties
came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to
articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established
between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor
the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just
what this article intends to prevent.
It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant
who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and
this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed
must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established.
Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:A natural or legitimated child has
no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who
has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or
legitimated child.To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother,
Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the
foregoing article (943).
OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.
LLB III-B
[126]
Celedonia Solivio vs CA and Javellana

G.R. No. 83484,
February 12, 1990
Topic/Doctrine: RESERVA TRONCAL
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first postwar Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal
aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2)
the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr. Salustia
brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered
by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first
wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to
Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.During his
lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close
friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to
[127]

be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent
students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was
admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978"
which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
"4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that
herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger
sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of
the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to
make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far
away for (sic) each other." (p. 234, Record; italics supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on
March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying
that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and
that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for
three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio;
(2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir,
the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of
the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission
on July 17, 1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she
too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7,
1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor
of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution
of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for
[128]

reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
2. Whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same
in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation," and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
HELD:
I. The question of jurisdiction On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to
reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads
as follows:
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
"1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) the ascendant who inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.
"2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios) relatives
within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from
which the property came.
"3. The propositus the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue,
making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law." (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II,
1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom
he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on
his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
"ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
[129]

the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood."
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
"Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third
degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate without
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood, and
is entitled to one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate." (p. 57, Rollo)
"The Foundation has a Special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He
studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise
is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students
who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing
known as the Esteban Javellana Award. "Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.
Javellana Multipurpose Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and students'
use, and has likewise contributed to religious, civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst
others. Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation,
Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.
LLB III-B
[130]

Encarnacion Florentino et al vs. Mercedes Florentino et al
40 Phil. 480
November 15, 1919
Topic/Doctrine: Reserva Troncal
FACTS:
In 1908, Severina Foz de Leon died leaving by will her entire estate including the property,
which is the subject matter of this litigation, to her only daughter and compulsory heir, Mercedes
Florentino. The records show that she inherited the property in question from her deceased son
Apolinio Florentino III, who, in turn, had inherited it from his deceased father Apolinio
Florentino II. The right instituted heir, Mercedes Florentino, to the property is now contested by
the children and grandchildren of Apolinio Florentino II by a previous marriage with the
provision of Art. 811 ( now Art. 891) of the Civil Code and that they, together with Mercedes
Florentino, are entitled to the property as reservatorios.
ISSUE:
W/N the property is reservable and that the right of representation is applicable.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held: Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative
over the property which the reservista should return to him, excludes that of the ones more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same as a
reservatorio of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil
Code in Article 811 ( now Art. 891) is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit
of designated persons who are the relatives within the third degree of the person from whom the
reservable preoperty came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatorios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
Nevertheless, there is right of representation on the part of reservatorios who are within the third
degree, as the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
These reservatorios have the right to represent their ascendants who are the brothers of the said
deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with Article 811 of the Civil
Code (now Art. 891).
ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.
LLB III-B
Dionisia Padura et al vs. Baldovino et al
104 Phil. 1065
[131]

Date: December 27, 1958
FACTS:
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife, he had one
child. Manuel, and with his second wife, Benita, he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria.
Agustin died in 1908, leaving all his properties to Benita and the three children. Four parcels of
land were adjudicated to Fortunato. Shortly thereafter, Fortunato died without a will. Not having
any issue, the four parcels of land passed to his mother, Benita. In 1934, Candelaria also died,
leaving as her only heirs four legitimate children, petitioners herein. In 1940, Manuel also died,
leaving his only heirs seven legitimate children, oppositors herein. In 1952, Benita died. The
children of Manuel and Candelaria were declared to be the rightful reservatorios. Subsequently,
the children of Candelaria filed the instant petition seeking to have the reservable properties
partitioned, such that of the same be adjudicated to them on the basis that they inherit by right
of representation. The children of Manuel filed their opposition, maintaining that they (the 11
reservatorios) should all deemed as inheriting in their own right, as a consequence of which, they
should all inherit in equal shares.
ISSUE:
How shall the reservable properties be divided among the eleven reservatorios?
HELD:
The reservatorios nephews of the full blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the
others in conformity with Arts. 1006 and 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reserva
troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the
third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid
its being dissipated by the relatives of the inheritance ascendant (reservista). The stated purpose
of the reserve is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the
line of origin. But from this time on, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore,
the respective shares of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary
rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has
resolved that upon death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to
all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (propositus),
excluding those reservatorios of more remote degree. And within the third degree of relationship
from the descendant (propositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino).
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter
se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. In other
[132]

words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatorios) to whom the
property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify
otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstances that the reserve being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the
purpose of the law. The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil
Codes hostility to successional reserves and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the
reserve viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatorios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might
frustrate their reversionary right; and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their
right in the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive. This right is incompatible with
the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear
that the reservista, who may dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatorios existing.
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant-propositus, of
whom the reservatorios are the heirsmortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
the reservista. Had the nephews of whole and half blood succeeded the propositus directly, those
of full blood would undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood.
Why then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property
was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent (causante), the heirs and their
relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.

LLB III-B
Teodoro Delos Reyes vs. Maximo Paterno

34 Phil. 420
March 27, 1916
FACTS:
The records show that the reservista registered the property in question as free property under the
[133]

Land Registration Act without any opposition on the part of the reservatorios. After this death,
six years late, the plaintiff, commenced this action for the recovery of the property on the ground
that he is entitled to the ownership and possession thereof in accordance with the provision of
Art. 811 (now Art. 891) of the Civil Code. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that his failure to
present any opposition to the registration within a period of one year after the decree of
registration had been entered has the effect of extinguishing his right to the property.
Subsequently, his counsel presented a motion for rehearing wherein he invoked the doctrine in
the case of Edroso vs. Sablan.
ISSUE:
W/N the right to the property has extinguished when the reservista registered the property.
HELD:
YES. In the case of Edroso vs. Sablan, the persons holding the reservable rights presented their
opposition to the registration of the land in question during the pendency of the action in the
Court of Land Registration. In the present case, the land in question was registered in the month
of September, 1909. No objection was presented to the registration of the property. No question
is now raised that the proceedings for in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration
Act. Moreover, the plaintiff presented no claim whatever for a period of six years.

LLB III-B
BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA

29 SCRA 864
October 30, 1969
FACTS:
[134]
Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage
was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession
of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant
daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn
undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia
the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to
petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and
won for her possession of the lots plus damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of
his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only
in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest.
A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents name by
the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.
The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void
and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver
the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for
the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending,
Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed
after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the
donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m.
exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that
Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced
the legitime of Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus
declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to
Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter
[135]

nuptias for being inofficious.
HELD:
Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial courts

order of dismissal sustained.
Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net
estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation
would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes
of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious,
there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of
the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the
properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with
the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the
inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and
reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the
death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges,
which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made
them.
RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.

LLB III-B
[136]
Parish Priest of Roman Catholic vs Rigor

89 SCRA 493
FACTS:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of

ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around fortyfour hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual
Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative
(Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CAG.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
[137]

died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which
was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December
5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and
Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parish priest of Victoria could administer the rice lands in the absence of the
qualified devisee?
HELD:
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended
for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son
of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs
presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal
grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's
death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise,
although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary,
because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his
nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on
Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G.

Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that
Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of
Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which
was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was
studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be

a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of
Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the
parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
[138]

Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to
evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no
probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's
nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was
opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a
judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas
cercano que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone
of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified
in his will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend
for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a
situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like
to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet
in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer
the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the
testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy
and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the
time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the
priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical
career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant
priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He
unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on
Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by
the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
[139]

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by
the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee
That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions
regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of
Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator
was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a

trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who
desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having
been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies
did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of
the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became
a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888
of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for
any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except
in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el
legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article
960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does
not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution
nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among
the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51
Phil. 267).
[140]

LLB III-B
Rodriguez vs Ravilan
[141]

17 PHIL 63
G.R. No. 5343
September 16, 1910
FACTS:
The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of
one parcel of agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as
is usually sown with a ganta of seed corn, bounded on the north by property
of Damasa Manlili, on the south by that of Telesfora Barte, on the east by
that of Maria Mendoza, and on the west by that of Feliciana Barte; another
parcel of agricultural land in the barrio of Banilad of the same pueblo, of an
area usually covered in sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded on
the north by the street that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of
Dionisio Cortes, and on the east and west by that of Dionisio Cortes and
Lucio Ceniza, respectively; another parcel of land, situated in the same barrio
and of and an area required for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn, bounded
on the north by the street leading to Talamban, on the south by the land
Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley, and on the west by the property of
Marcelo Oano.
That said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from
these lands, other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and
pueblo of Bogo, of an area usually sown with 14 gantas of seed corn,
bounded on the north, south, east and west by property of Hermenegildo
Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nuez, and Feliciano Cortes, respectively;
another parcel in the same barrio, of an area sufficient for 3 gantas of seed
corn, bounded on the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south
by the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elorde, and
on the west by that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio,
of sufficient area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south,
east and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano
Cortes, and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area
ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south,
east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Mariano
Cabajug, and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the said
barrio, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Damiano
Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of
seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Mariano
[142]

Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and Anacleto Lambojon,
respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho of the
aforesaid pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the
north, south, east and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo
Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and Meliton Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio
of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded on the north, south, east,
and west by lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose Arfon and
Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of Dughoy,
Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north,
south, east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago
Ortelan, and Donato Mendoza; eleven plow carabaos, three carabao cows
with four calves, and four head of cattle, acquired by the community; a
mortgage credit of 130 pesos against Laureano Soliano, secured by a
mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the pueblo of Bogo, and
three carabaos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a partition of
the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have accrued
thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct enjoyed by the defendant?
HELD:
Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine
brothers and sisters were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier
Barte and Eulalia, and are therefore their only heirs, it should at least have
been shown that a lawful partition was made among their nine children, of
the property left by both spouses at their death, and that the three parcels of
land situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said
four brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the same.
Such a partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document,
which was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the Civil
Code provides "A division legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property which may have been awarded to him."
Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it
had been shown that the Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to
the four brothers and sisters aforementioned, there would have beenprima
facie proof that they were and certainly are the owners thereof.
[143]

LLB III-B
Pavia vs. Iturralde

5 PHIL 176
October 27, 1905
FACTS:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she
be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the
estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented
herself as a collateral descendant. Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed
one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same
time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased.
What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt,
Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased
through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of representation in the collateral line can extend to grandnieces?
HELD:
As a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of
the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of
one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of
the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart,
had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,
[144]

Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the
portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider that the word
"children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our
jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion. We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a
grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter,
being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right
of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which
would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased
uncle.
SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B
ROSALES v. ROSALES
148 SCRA 69
February 27, 1987
FACTS:
- Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2 children
Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox, and his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated
gross value of about P30,000.
- In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following individuals
the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate: Fortunato
(husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and Antonio (son), 1/4.
- Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her motherin-law.
HELD:
NO.A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law.Intestate or legal heirs are
classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by
the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as
in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or by the right of representation
[145]

provided for in Art 981 of the same law.
- The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There is no provision which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code
is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own
right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. If the legislature intended to make
the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
- Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Art 887. The
provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow
or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
- By the same token, the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's claim. The estate
contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased spouse. The subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea.
It is from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Art 981.
- Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his
blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea
cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-inlaw.
- Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he had an inchoate or
contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said
right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox who
succeeded from Petra by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father
Carterio.
SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B
[146]
Sarita vs. Candia

G.R. No. L-7768
November 14, 1912
FACTS:
The spouses Apolinario Cedeo and Roberto Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of
land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees.
Apolinario Cedeo died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. Andres Candia was holding and
cultivating the said land, but that as stated in the complainant, he did so merely under a lease and
paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that, from May, 1909, he refused to pay
the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land, appropriated the land and claimed ownership
thereof; and that he also took possession of four mares, twelve carabaos, and several pieces of
furniture which were in the house erected on the said land a house worth 50 pesos which he
also seized and claimed as his property. Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta Montesa as the son
of her sister said Apolonio Cedeo, otherwise known as Isidario Cedeo, was a cabeza de
barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under
his charge, on the 24th of June, 1881, sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarosa, who held it in
quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-four years and at his death such possession was
continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarosa, from whom witness, Andres Candia,
acquired the property by purchase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties are entitled to the estate by way of order of succession?
HELD:
First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according to
[147]

Exhibit D, there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the
plaintiffs to confide the suit to the attorney who has conducted it, has
absolutely no such right, because he cannot represent his grandfather
Domingo, since, as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation
can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, but not in
favor of the grandson of a brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son
of Sofia Cedeo who, in turn, was the daughter of Domingo Cedeo.
Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the
intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeo, does exist, it could only be
exercised by Cristeta Cedeo, the children of Macario Cedeo, and those of
Domingo Cedeo, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in inheritances the
nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting the right of
representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art 921); from which it is inferred
that, in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeo, the children of Macario Cedeo and
those of Domingo Cedeo, to exercise such a hereditary right, it should have
been noticed that the personality of these parties as the nearest relatives
excluded that of Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeo, of a more remote
degree.
Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning
whatever could be given to the document, Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, wherein
it is made to appear that the widow of Apolinario Cedeo, Roberta Montesa
implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she be allowed to
continue in her possession of the land and the house of the family; inasmuch
as, as coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of it and,
besides, had a right of usufruct to one-half of the other half of the same,
pursuant to the provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code, and until
she was satisfied for her part of usufruct, this half of the other half remained
liable for the payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.)
Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at
the death of such alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land
in question was not owned by him, it having been transferred in 1881,
according to a conclusion established by the trial judge. Therefore, the action
for the recovery of possession, derived from such alleged inheritance, cannot
exist.
SALA, Reeny B.
LLB III-B
[148]
Prasnick vs RP
G.R. No. L-8639
March 23, 1956
Topic/Doctrine: Adoption of Acknowledge Natural Children
FACTS:
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their marriage
was dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12, 1947 by the
Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and out of this
relation four children were born who are the minors he is now seeking to adopt. He
claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted
Philippine citizenship for which he has already applied and in the meantime he
wants to adopt them in order that no one of his relatives abroad could share in his
inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his former wife and acknowledged
said minors as his natural children.
The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335 of the
new Civil Code which provides that a person who has an acknowledged natural child
cannot adopt and considering that Petitioner has acknowledged the minors in
question as his children, he contends that he is disqualified from adopting them
under that article.
ISSUE:
[149]

Whether person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt.
HELD:
We believe that the Solicitor General has not made a correct interpretation of that
article for he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to be
adopted. A cursory reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition merely
refers to the adoption of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged
natural child and it does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has
acknowledged them as his natural children.
It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is
unnecessary because there already exists between the father and the child the
relation of paternity and filiation which is precisely the purpose which adoption
seeks to accomplish through legal fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the
rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimate
child and it is indeed to the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even
through legal fiction, a legitimate status. And this view is in keeping with the
modern trend of adoption statutes which have been adopted precisely to encourage
adoption (In re Havagords Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this modern
trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of paternity
and filiation but one which may give the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense
that adoption is now defined as a juridical act which creates between two persons
a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
SALI, EL-SHAL S.
LLB III-B
LLORENTE VS. RODRIGUEZ ET AL.

10 PHIL 585, No. 3339
March 26, 1908
Topic/Doctrine:Right of Representation
FACTS:
Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children
named Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle.
In the will executed by her, she instituted as her sole and general heirs, Jacinta,
Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela
Llorente. Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, leaving several legitimate children with
the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named
Rosa Llorente.
Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in
the proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate
children of the said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were
the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the
plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party thereto.
[150]

ISSUE:
Whether the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate
daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess
because of her death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural
daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children.
HELD:
From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother
who acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of
them, it does not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the
succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in
relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by
representing them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related
in any manner, because he does not appear among the legitimate family of which
said ascendants are the head.
If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited
from her, and in what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa
Llorente, would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from
the day in which the succession became operative, because she would then appear
by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained
to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of
representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision establishing such a doctrine;
that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing,
and that she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her
natural grandmother, representing her natural mother, is quite another thing. The
latter right is not recognized by the law in force.
SALI, EL-SHAL S
LLB III-B
Oyao vs. Oyao,

94 Phil. 204, No. L-6340
December 29, 1953
Topic/Doctrine: Natural children have no right to represent their natural father
or mother in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of the
latter.
FACTS:
This is an action to recover a piece of land alleged to have been inherited by
plaintiffs from their maternal grandfather, Aniceto Oyao, and to have been
usurped by defendant. Defendant denies the alleged usurpation and claims
ownership of the land, one-half of it as an inheritance from his deceased father,
Abundio Oyao, brother of Aniceto Oyao, to whom it had been donated by the
latter, and the other half by purchase from Aniceto Oyao himself.
[151]

There is no question that the disputed property formerly belonged to Aniceto
Oyao, who died intestate. Aniceto had two legitimate children, Simeona and
Eulalia, both of whom died before him but were survived by their recognized
natural children, the plaintiffs herein, who now lay claim to his hereditary estate
in representation of their deceased mothers and dispute the validity of the
donation in favor of Abundio Oyao and the sale in favor of defendant. Being of
the opinion that plaintiffs, as mere natural children could not represent their
respective mothers in the inheritance of their grandfather Aniceto Oyao.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs has the right of claim to the hereditary estate, as natural children in
representation of their deceased mothers.
HELD:
There can be no question on the proposition that natural children have not the
right to represent their natural father or mother in the succession of the
legitimate ascendants of the latter. This has been made clear in the case of
Llorente vs. Rodriguez et al., 10 Phil. 585.
In that case Rosa Llorente, a natural daughter of one of the legitimate children
of the deceased Martina Avalle, tried to intervene in the settlement of the estate
of the said deceased in representation of her father, a legitimate son of said
Martina Avalle, who had predeceased the latter. But Rosa Llorente was not
allowed to intervene because, as a natural child of one of Martina Avalle's
legitimate children, she had no right to the inheritance. Plaintiffs in the present
case are in that same position. Their claim to their grandfather's inheritance is,
therefore, without legal basis.
SALI, EL-SHAL S
LLB III-B
Grey Vs Fabie
GR. No. L-45160
May 28, 1939
FACTS:
After the death of Rosario Fabie y Grey, her alleged will was presented to the court for probate.
It was assailed by Serafin Fabie and Jose Fabie, the court, held that, they could not inherit
intestate from Rosario Fabie , had no interest in the will in question, hence, they have no right to
impugn it, whereupon, it ordered the continuation of the probate proceedings without the
intervention of the said oppositors.
The oppositors contend that they do not attempt to succeed their cousin by their own right but by
the right of representation. If Ramon Fabie were living, so they say, he would undeniably be
entitled to succeed his niece Rosario Fabie y Grey, in which case, upon the death of Ramon
Fabie, his natural children, the herein oppositors would succeed him, because Ramon Fabie had
[152]

no legitimate children. They cited article 924 and 925 of the Civil Code to support their
contentions.
After trial, the court probated the said will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, and appointed
the petitioner, Jose Grey, executor upon filing a bond for P10,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the oppositors-appellants are entitled to inherit from their natural cousin Rosario
Fabie y Grey
HELD:
No, they are not entitled to inherit even through the right of representation because they dont
have such right. The oppositors-appellants are not children of brothers or sisters of the deceased
Rosario Fabie y Grey, but of the latter's uncle, Ramon Fabie, hence, it is unnecessary to state that
the right of representation does not lie in this case. From this it inevitably follows that the
oppositors have no interest whatsoever in the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey,
wherefore, they are not entitled to intervene in the proceedings for the probate of the said will.
SAN JUAN, ANGELITA T.
LLB III-B
Director of Lands Vs Aguas
GR. No. L-42737
August 11, 1936
FACTS:
This appeal was taken by Teodoro Santos, Amado L. Santos, Mercedes Santos
and Bartola Santos from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
in cadastral case No. 4, G. L. R, O. Cadastral Record No. 127, ordering the
cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 4811 of the deceased Lucina
Guesa to the land designated as lot No. 2450-B of the cadastral case in
question, and the issuance of another certificate in favor of the appellee
Cayetano Guesa. The appellants' petition, which was denied by the court,
sought the issuance of the new certificate in their name, alleging that they
were the ones favored by the reservation to which the land described in said
certificate of title was subject.
The land in question had belong to Isidro Santos. He donated it to Tomas
Santos upon whose death, which took place on April 29, 1927, the property
was inherited by the latter's legitimate son, Romeo Santos. Upon the death
of Romeo Santos on April 23, 1928, it passed to his legitimate mother Lucina
Guesa to whom transfer certificate of title No. 4811 was issued with the
notation that the property was subject to the provisions of article 811 of the
Civil Code. Lucina Guesa died on April 14, 1933, and was succeeded by her
legitimate father Cayetano Guesa as sole heir. Tomas Santos was an
adulterous son, and the appellants and petitioners are the legitimate children
of Isidro Santos. Therefore, the appellants are not legitimate relatives of
[153]

Romeo Santos, although, with relation to him, they are within the third
degree and belong to the same line.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reservation established by article 811 of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the
ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the
relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction
between legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children
HELD:
The provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relatives. Is every
ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather
reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does
not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and,
on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family
exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the
ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon
the legitimate ascendant.
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that
they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of
the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811,
and as we will see also article 812, continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the
natural parents and children in the testamentary succession is wholly included in the eighth
section and is limited to the parents, other descendants of such class being excluded in articles
807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code is proof that it
refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering
the text of articles 938, which states that the provision of article 811 applies to intestate
succession which is just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of
articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of
articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or
indirectly to that provision.
LLB III-B
[154]
Anuran Vs Aquino
GR. No. L-12397
April 02, 1918
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino, to whose
estate the property described in the complaint belongs. The defendant, Ana
Aquino, is the natural child of a sister of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, that on
the death of Ambrosio Aquino, one Norberto Capia was appointed
administrator of his intestate estate, at the instance of Ana Aquino, acting
collusion with the administrator fraudulently represented to the court that
Ambrosio Aquino, had died intestate, leaving no heirs other than Ana Aquino,
a daughter of his deceased sister. At the time when these representations
were made, both Ana Aquino and the administrator well knew that the
plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, was the surviving spouse of Ambrosio Aquino, and
that Ana Aquino was not a legitimate but a natural daughter of the deceased
sister of Ambrosio Aquino. Without notice to the widow, Ana Aquino, acting in
collusion with the administrator appointed at her instance, fraudulently
procured the entry of an order in the administration proceedings dated March
12, 1912, authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator of all
property of the estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino, the defendant in
this suit, and that the motion of the administrator on which this order was
based was supported by the affidavit of Ana Aquino, setting forth the false
and misleading statement of the alleged facts as hereinbefore indicated.
The widow, Florencia Anuran, who was not a party of record in the
administration proceedings, did not discover that this order had been
entered until about the 14th day of February, 1914, when she promptly
entered her appearance in the administration proceedings and moved that
the order be set aside, and that she be declared the sole heir of the
deceased, who, as she alleged, had died without leaving either ascendants,
or descendants, or collateral relatives entitled to share in the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, the widow of Ambrosio Aquino be declared the
[155]

sole heir of the deceased
HELD:
Yes, In the light of the facts presented, there is not and cannot be any
substantial question as to the right of the widow to take the estate of her
deceased husband as his sole heir under the provisions of articles 943 and
952 of the Civil Code. These articles are as follows:
A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab intestate the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives inherit from the natural
or legitimated child.
In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children, whether of
the whole blood or not, of the same surviving spouse, if not separated by a
final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
LLB III-B
[156]
Diaz vs Pamuti
GR L-66574
Feb. 21, 1990
FACTS:
Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana werethe only legitimate
children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla; Juliana married Simon and out of their union were
born Felisa and anotherchild who died during infancy; Simona is the widow of Pascual and
mother of Pablo; Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona; Pascual
died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976; Pablo at the time of his death was survived by
his mother Simona and sixminor natural children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and
twominor children with Felixberta. 1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole
legitimate heir of Simona. Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor
childrenfile for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part orintervening in
the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona. 1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding
Felisa from further takingpart or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona.
Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to theIntermediate Appellate Court
declaring her as the sole heir of Simona.
ISSUE:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural children of
Pablo) Felisa?
HELD:
The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the successionof the latter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simon because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992
of the Civil CodeArt 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner fromthe illegitimate child. Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6
minor children are illegitimate.
[157]

Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely asuccession ab intestate
between the illegitimate child and the legitimatechildren and relatives of the father or mother of
said legitimate child. Theymay have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for
thepurposes of Art. 992.
An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimatechildren and relatives of his
father and mother.
SING, MARC ERIC W.
LLB III-B
SANTILLON vs. MIRANDA.

G.R. No. L-19281
June 30, 1965
Topic/Doctrine: Legitime
FACTS:
Santillon died without testament in leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta
Miranda. About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters
of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta
Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales. On April 25, 1961,
Claro filed a Motion to Declare Share of Heirs and to resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892
of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal
properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as
follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed
that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code
to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedros
inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
ISSUE:
[158]

How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only
survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
HELD:
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or
widower gets only one-fourth. She or he may get one-half if the testator so
wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by
testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow
or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where
the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislators desire to
promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.
SORRONDA, NIA MAY T.

LLB III-B
RE: MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO 79 SCRA 364

A.M. No. 190
October 18, 1977
FACTS:
This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY.
MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney of the Supreme court .Atty. Chanliongco died ab
intestato. The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the
[159]

Government Service System. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only
Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both
born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario,
Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age.
ISSUE:
What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of
which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR
DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH
AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE
THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:
1
. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO
A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF

RETIREMENT GRATUITY
P19,535.02
5
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY

VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE,
UNPAID SALARY AND 10%
ADJUSTMENT:
(1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE
6,752.72
(2) AS A LEGAL HEIR
P1,688.18
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER
P27,975.93
2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II
A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF
RETIREMENT GRATUITY
P39,070.05
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY

VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE,
ADJUSTMENT
3,376.36
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM
P42,446.41
3. MA. ANGELINA C.
BUENAVENTURA:
A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF
P9,767.51
[160]

RETIREMENT GRATUITY
B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY
ADJUSTMENT
844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER
P10,611.61
4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR.

TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS
MOTHER AND NATURAL
GUARDIAN, ANGELINA
CRESPO):
A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF
RETIREMENT GRATUITY
P9,767.51
B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY

ADJUSTMENT
844.10
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM
P10,611.61

LLB III-B
Vda. De Consuegra vs GSIS

37 SCRA 315, 325
[161]

Topic/Doctrine: Heirs
FACTS:
Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman of the Office of the District Engineer in
Surigao Del Norte.When he was still alive, he contracted two marriages:
o First Rosario Diaz; 2 children = Jose Consuegra Jr. and Pedro but both predeceased him
o 2nd Basilia Berdin; 7 children. (this was contracted in GF while the first marriage
subsisted)
Being a GSIS member when he died, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to
Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy.
Since he was in the govt service for 22.5028 years, he was entitled to retirement insurance
benefits, for which no beneficiary was designated.
Both families filed their claims with the GSIS, which ruled that the legal heirs were Diaz who is
entitled to one-half or 8/16 of the retirement benefits and Berdin and her children were entitled to
the remaining half, each to receive an equal share of 1/16.
Berdin went to CFI on appeal. CFI affirmed GSIS decision.
ISSUE:
To whom should the retirement insurance benefits be paid?
HELD:
Both families are entitled to half of the retirement benefits.The beneficiary named in the life
insurance does NOT automatically become the beneficiary in the retirement insurance. When
Consuegra, during the early part of 1943, or before 1943, designated his beneficiaries in his life
insurance, he could NOT have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the
beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under
the GSIS came about only when CA 186 was amended by RA 660 on June 18, 1951.
Sec. 11(b) clearly indicates that there is need for the employee to file an application for
retirement insurance benefits when he becomes a GSIS member and to state his beneficiary. The
life insurance and the retirement insurance are two separate and distinct systems of benefits paid
out from 2 separate and distinct funds.
In case of failure to name a beneficiary in an insurance policy, the proceeds will accrue to the
estate of the insured. And when there exists two marriages, each family will be entitled to onehalf of the estate.

LLB III-B
[162]
Del Rosario vs. Conanan

G.R. No. L-37903
March 30, 1977
Topic/Doctrine: Share of Surviving Spouse Concurring With Legitimate Ascendants and
Illegitimate Children (Article 1000 in relation to Article 343)
FACTS:
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court subject of which is the estate left by her
late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo,
Rizal.
The oppositor admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late Felix L. Del Rosario. The
latter admits that oppositor Dorotea Otera del Rosario, is the legitimate surviving wife of the
deceased Felix Del Rosario. Petitioner also admits that Marilou Del Rosario, is the legally
adopted child of the late Felix and Dorotea Otera del Rosario. They are the only surviving
nearest relatives of Felix(deceased). A petition for summary settlement is allowed under the
provision of the rules of court, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross
value of which does not exceed P10, 000.00. In the instant petition, however, clearly alleges that
the value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix amounts to P33,000.00 which is
obviously over and above the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action taken by the
petitioner construed as one filed under an intestate proceeding as the requirements provided by
law for the same has not been complied with.
The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case where it does not
exclude the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would
defeat the intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession, where
legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does
not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance.
The respondents countered petitioners record on appeal violates the material data rule in that it
does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed with the lower court in
disregard of the requirement of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on appeal
must contain such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. Further, the petitioner
not being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or
have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1,
Rule 69 in relation to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be
commenced or instituted by the party in interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the legitimate mother is included as intestate heir to be considered as
Co-owner with the surviving spouse and adopted child of Felix Del Rosario (deceased) over the
[163]

properties sought to be partitioned
HELD:
YES. As provided under Article 343 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 1000 should apply in
resolving their hereditary rights. Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate
parents of the deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural
child, which is comprehended in the term illegitimate children. Consequently, the respective
charges of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article
1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1000.If legitimate ascendants, the surviving
spouse and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate
children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate
children the other fourth.Thus, Dorotea Otera del Rosario, the legitimate surviving wife, shall
be entitled to , Marilou Del Rosario, the legally adopted child gets , and the legitimate
mother . The adopted child in such case gets the rights of an acknowledged natural child
(Articles 343, 341, and 1000 of the Civil Code), not of a legitimate child, otherwise the
legitimate ascendant (the mother) would be excluded. The presence of adopted child does not
exclude the legitimate parent or ascendant.
TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.

LLB III-B
GSIS vs. Custodio

G.R. No. L-26170
January 27, 1969
[164]
Topic/Doctrine: Share of Brothers and Sisters Concurring With Nephews and Nieces
(Article 1005)
FACTS:
The late Simeon Custodio who during his lifetime was a member of the Retirement Insurance
Fund administered by plaintiff GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
died intestate at Tanay, Rizal, on February 16, 1957. He was survived by his only sister,
SUSANA CUSTODIO and his nephews and nieces, namely, ROMUALDO, JULIAN,
MACARIO A., MOISES, MACARIO C., ADRIANO, CELESTINA, LUISA and DAVID, all
surnamed CUSTODIO. After Simeons death, there was found among his personal belongings an
undated and unsigned application form for Retirement accomplished by said SIMEON
CUSTODIO wherein his sister, SUSANA CUSTODIO was named the beneficiary, although said
application form was never submitted to the GSIS.
On July 7, 1957, at the residence of Leon K. Tongohan, son-in-law of Susana Custodio, at Tanay,
Rizal, SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, ADRIANO, and
CELESTINA, all surnamed CUSTODIO, and JULIA TONGOHAN 'executed a document
entitled 'Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs' which provides, among other things
that For any amount due the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, holder of GSIS policy No. 73557,
our Aunt Susana Custodio, as the decedent's only living sister, is hereby recognized by the
aforementioned heirs as the sole and only beneficiary of the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO,
and giving unto our Aunt Susana Custodio, the right to file, sign and receive whatever retirement
pay under Republic Act 660, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 728 and 1123, and other
amendments thereof.
The Custodio heirs wrote a letter to the Manager of the Government Service Insurance System
stating, among other things, that they 'inadvertently signed on July 7, 1957, without properly
having understood, a document whereby it was made to appear therein that the aforementioned
persons are waiving their claims on the benefits legally accruing to the aforementioned
deceased'. Appellee Susana Custodio made clear her non-opposition to the division of the estate
where Macario C., Luisa and David would share per stirpes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-signatory intestate heirs of late Simeon Custodio be considered as having
recognized Susana Custodio (sister) as the only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money?
HELD:
NO. The intestate heirs, Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio, who did not sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement, cannot be considered as having recognized Susana Custodio as the only
beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money. There is no evidence, the case having been submitted
[165]

for decision below solely on a stipulation of facts, that these non-signatory heirs had agreed, or
accepted other benefits under the deed of partition, as appellee now claims. Susana Custodio did
not oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and, actually, even prayed that said motion
be granted (Record on Appeal, page 56), although the court denied it just the same. These three
(3) heirs should inherit per stirpes, in accordance with Article 1005 of the Civil Code. As
Macario C. Custodio (as distinguished from Macario A., who signed the agreement) is the only
child of Crispin, said Macario C. inherits by representation the onefourth (1/4) share pertaining
to his father, while Luisa and David Custodio, being two (2) of six (6) children of Jacinto, are
each entitled to a sixth of one-fourth (1/6 x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary mass.

LLB III-B
PADURA vs BALDOVINO
G.R. No. L-11960
December 27, 1958
Topic/Doctrine: Full Blood Concurring With Half Blood
FACTS:
[166]

During the lifetime of Agustin Padura, he contracted two marriages, one with Gervacia Landig,
to whom he had one child, Manuel Padura, and second with Benita Garin to whom he had two
children, Fortunato and Candelaria Padura. Agustin died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will
and testament, duly probated, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his three (3) children
and his surviving spouse, Benita Garin.
Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without
having executed a will and not having any issue, the parcels of land were inherited exclusively
by his mother Benita. Benita was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject to the
condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came.
On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs her four(4) legitimate children: Cristeta,
Melania, Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-appellants). On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also
died, survived by his legitimate children Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and
Severino Padura (Petitioners-appellees). Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15,
1952, the heirs took possession of the reservable properties.
The CFI Laguna declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful reservees, and
as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and Manuel,
having predeceased the reservista).
The Baldovino heirs (children of Candelaria) filed a petition seeking to have the properties
partitioned, such that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees,
allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right of representation from their respective
parents, the original reservees. Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be deemed
as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share. In
essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood relatives of the reservista, were
contending that they should get more than their half-blood relatives, the Padura heirs. They
anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008 of the Civil Code. The CFI (now RTC) of Laguna
declared all the reservees, without distinction, co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the
parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the reserved properties should be apportioned among the heirs
equally?
HELD:
NO. As to the rule between brothers and sisters of the full blood survive with brothers and sisters
of half blood. The former shall be entitled a share double that of the latter (Article 1006). The
rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.
On ther hand, the children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or
per stirpes (Article 1008). Thus the Baldovino heirs shall get more than their half-blood
relatives, the Padura heirs.
In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom
[167]

the property should be returned but within that group. The nephews of the whole blood should
take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood.The reserva troncal is a
special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). The purpose of the
reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the
line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the
relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying
Art 891 in this case to the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of interstate succession.
In the same case of Florentino vs Florentino (as restated in the case) where upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class,
but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios
of more remote degree... And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews. Proximity of degree and
right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to share double that of brothers and nephews of
half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply.

LLB III-B
BICOMONG v ALMANZA
80 SCRA 421
November 29, 1977
FACTS:
The subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5 parcels of land w/c she
inherited from SilvestraGlorioso.
There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs. The Tolentinos, and Francisca Bagsic, for their
shares in the properties of Maura Bagsic.
When Maura Bagsic died, the properties passed on to CristetaAlmanza, who also died without
[168]

division of the properties.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Almanzas appealed to CA. It was contended
that since Maura died ahead of Felipa, Felipa succeeded to Mauras estate, to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs. They said the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones.The plaintiffs
claim that Felipa died ahead of Maura. CA certified case to SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maura is succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of nephews and nieces of halfblood.
HELD:
NO. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse,
collateral relatives succeed to the entire estate of deceased. Since Maura died intestate and her
husband and her ascendants died ahead of her, she is succeeded by surviving collateral relatives,
namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the children of her brother and sisters of half
blood, in accordance with Art 975 of New Civil Code.
The nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do
not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters
of the deceased. The contention that Maura should be succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of the
nephews and nieces of half-blood is erroneous. As it was shown, Felipa predeceased her sister
Maura.
TINGKAHAN, MARVEEN BAZAR S.

LLB III-B
ALVIAR VS ALVIAR, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-22402
June 30, 1969
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:Collateral Relatives
FACTS:
Clemente Alviar and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana
[169]

Carillo. Sometime after the latter's deatH, Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot
him five (5) children, namely; Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar.
Belen Alviar died intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente
Alviar, and five (5) half brothers and sisters. Belen's estate consisted of two (2) parcels of
agricultural land and a residential lot.
The six brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente
Alviar the two parcels of agricultural land, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the
deceased the residential lot. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their
respective shares. Moreover, Clemente Alviar titles to said Lots 2 and 3. The residential land in
Pasay City was, in turn, partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided
into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and 223-D-2. The first was allotted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who
secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in their names, whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496
in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his sister Fabiana having renounced her share therein in his favor.
Their brother Castor had, likewise, waived his share in said residential land.
Over five years later, Clemente commenced the present action, against his half brother and
sisters, Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora
Erasga, to annul the deed of extrajudicial partition, upon the ground that, acting in bad faith and
conspiring, confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of
plaintiff's lack of education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing fully well that" the "children
by second marriage of Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the 3 lots
left by Belen Alviar, the defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch
as Clemente Alviar died soon thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children,
Ramon and Norma Alviar, substituted him as plaintiff in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased
Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father
by second marriage.
The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of
relationship HELD:
is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." In relation to
Belen Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is, therefore, in the same degree of relationship as
their half brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first
generation of descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization
is rendered superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Arts. 1003, 1004
and 1006 of our Civil Code, reading:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
[170]

ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit
in equal shares.
ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and
sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full
blood do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the
concurrence of both classes and the application of said Art. 1006.
More important than this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract
with his half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased
Belen Alviar and that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to
warrant the annulment or rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being
indubitable, there is absolutely no reason why the same should be disturbed.

LLB III-B
Celedonia Solivio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,

G.R. No. 83484
February 12, 1990
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Collateral Relatives
[171]
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister
of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. Salustia and her sister,
Celedonia brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties which she had

inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife but no
conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban,
Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only
child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she,
her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties
were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation
to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up the
foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to
do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from
whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in
their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She was declared sole
heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
[172]
Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the

court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she
too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was
denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
ISSUE:
Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of
Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from
whom he had inherited them.
HELD:
The Court heldthat the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia
Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his
inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative
within the third degree on his mothers side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited
by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother ora
sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of
the situation covered by Art. 891.
LLB III-B
[173]
In re Estate of Lao Sayco

21 Phil 815
Topic/Doctrine: Escheat
FACTS:
Lao Sayco died. The administrator of his estate requested that the property of the decedent be
delivered to his nephew (allegedly his sole heir). Notices were sent to interested parties to
establish the right of the alleged heir, and the notice of the date of the hearing was made thru
publication for three weeks prior to the date set. The municipality of Mambajao entered its
opposition, claiming that the property of the decedent should be delivered to it because the
decedent had no legal heirs. The lower court ruled in favor of Mambajao. The administrator
appealed the judgment.
ISSUE:
W/N the municipality of Mambajao was entitled to the property left by the decedent.
HELD:
No, for failure of Mambajao to comply with procedural requirements. In order that the property
which belonged to the decedent Lao Sayco may be decreed to have reverted to the Senate,
pursuant to the provisions of section 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is indispensable that
the requirements contained in the above-quoted section of the said code should have been
complied with. The municipality of Mambajao merely prayed for an order of reversion and for
the adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the property aforementioned; it did not comply
[174]

with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs in regard to the matters
hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of an investigation. It does not appear that
there was an inquisition provided by law, for the record is not accompanied by any certified copy
of the investigatory of the real andpersonal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a
statement of the places where the realty is located. Neither is it shown to have ascertained whether
the deceased Chinaman executed any will during his lifetime, or whether the deceased Chinaman
executed any will during his lifetime, or whether he left in Mambajao or in any other place any
relative entitled to inherit from him. Moreover, the notice summoning the persons who believed they
were entitled to his property should have been published for at least six consecutive weeks, and not
for three as was directed in the order.
TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB-IIIB
City of Manila vs. Archdiocese of Manila

36 Phil 815
Topic/Doctrine: Escheat
FACTS:
The City of Manila wants certain properties being administered by the Roman
Catholic Church to be declared escheated. It claims that the original owner of
said properties, a certain Ana Sarmiento, has died sometime in 1668
intestate with no heirs to succeed. The Archbishop contends that the church
has rightfully and legally succeeded to the possession and administration of
said property that it had been managing for more than 200 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said properties should be escheated.
HELD:
[175]
No. It was shown that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. Evidence
presented has shown a genuine will and codicils. It was further shown that
the heir named therein, her nephew, has religiously complied with the terms
of said will. Therefore, the properties cannot be escheated in favor of the
government.
TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB-IIIB
Municipality of San Pedro vs. Colegio de San Jos

65 Phil 318
Topic/Doctrine:Escheat
FACTS:
The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda,
assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants
to the remedy prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered
with Coelegio de San Jose, also intervened in the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to
the appearance and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled. Furthermore the
lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition for escheats should be dismissed?
HELD:
[176]
YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule 91), Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of
Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of
real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to, it
may order, after payment of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate the
personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last residence and the real property to the
municipality/ies where they are situated.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for and even
admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to proceed to the Inquisition
provided by law, an interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition
which is untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground the
petition may be dismissed unconditionally.
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and a
lessee of the property respectively.
The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal property
of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of Spain. From the moment it
was confiscated, it became the property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident
that the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no longer the case of real
property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may legally claim it (2 nd requirement
lacking).
TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB-IIIB
Manuel Torres and Luz Lopez de Bueno vs. Margarita Lopez

G.R. No. L-24569
February 26, 1926
Topic/Doctrine: Right of Accretion
FACTS:
This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas
Rodriguez y Lopez. Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila and leaving a
considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors
named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was
entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased. In the said will,
the testator instituted as his only heirs his cousin, and the latters daughter.
But the cousin was incapacitated.
ISSUE:
[177]
Whether or not the share of the cousin should go to the testators legal heirs, or should it go to
the co-heir, namely, the cousins daughter.
HELD:
The co-heir gets the share by accretion. It follows therefore that the instate heirs cannot claim by
intestacy said share, for accretion is preferred over intestacy. As has been stated by the Supreme
Court, intestate succession to vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
TUBO, MARK JOSEPH G.
LLB III-B
In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier.SULPICIO RESURRECCIONvs.

AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936
Topic/Doctrine: Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
FACTS:
Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpicio

Resurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of
P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The testatrix died and her
will was probated. The court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died before the
testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert
to the fund of the estate.
[178]
Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of
P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this
amount to the funds of the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Gil Javier be represented for his share in the legacy.
HELD:
No. The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or any part
thereof in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. Upon being instituted as legatee by the
testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and,
therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the subject of a
right. Consequently, his institution as a legatee had absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are not
now entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle of
representation because this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the legatee
died before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs.
TUBO, MARK JOSEPH, G.

LLB III-B
In the matter of the will of the deceased Eugenio Zuiga del Rosario.
VICENTE REYES VILLAVICENCIOvs. SANTIAGO QUINIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45248
April 18, 1939
Topic/Doctrine: Disposition of Property for Prayers and Pious Works
FACTS:
Eugenio Zuiga del Rosario died, leaving a will executed with all the legal
formalities, which was probated, over the opposition of some relatives.
The third clause of the said will translated from Tagalog into Spanish, reads as
[179]

follows:
TERCERO: Declaro que tengo bienes inmuebles, muebles, semovientes, casa y
camarin que he heredado de mis padres y hermanos y, no teniendo yo heredero
forzoso como ya he dicho mas arriba, he dispuesto que mis citados bienes sean
destinados solamente para la paz y felicidad de mi alma y de las de mis padres y
hermanos, y tambien para el beneficio de la iglesia, en la manera siguiente: x x x
Subsequently, Santiago Quinio and twenty-eight relatives of the testatrix within the
fifth degree in the collateral line, filed a motion with the conformity of the Bishop of
Lipa wherein they asked that they be declared heirs of said testatrix charged with
the duty to comply with its provisions and contended that after the deduction of the
amounts for the alms and masses provided for by the testatrix in her will, there will
still be a sizable balance left out of her properties, which, in the absence of any
disposition made by the said testatrix, must pass by operation of law to her legal or
intestate heirs. The executor Vicente Reyes Villavicencio opposed the foregoing
petition and the court denied the latter. The movants appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the relatives of the deceased are entitled to succeed as to the remaining properties
HELD:
No. Such contention on the part of the appellants is based on something entirely
inconsistent with what the testatrix has ordered in the third clause of her will. The
testatrix in said clause had disposed of her proportions in accordance with the
provision of Article 747 (now Art. 1029) of the Civil Code, a disposition absolutely
within her right, having no forced heirs.
The collateral relatives of the deceased, not being forced heirs, are not entitled to succeed her as
to the remainder of her properties, which does not exist, or as to the naked ownership of the
same. The provisions of the will disposing her properties for masses and pious works, the
validity of which is not questioned herein, should be complied with because the testatrix, not
having forced heirs, may dispose of her properties as she did in her will, for masses and pious
works for the benefit of her soul and those of her relatives.
TUBO, MARK JOSEPH, G.
LLB III-B
ALMEIDA VS. CARILLO
[180]

G.R. No. L-45320
January 26, 1939
FACTS:
Macario Carillo died in the City of Manila on May 17, 1931, leaving as next of kin, his widow,
Rosenda Almeida, the appellee, and his three children by his first marriage, Corazon Edelmira
Carillo, Romulo Carrillo and Gracia Carrillo, the appellants. With the consent of all the relatives,
the appellee caused the remains of the deceased to be buried in the private lot of the Intengan
family in the North Cementery, Manila, to be transferred later after a period of three years but
not more than five, upon paying P100 for the use of the lot. Later on, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the intestate proceedings of the decedent were commenced, special
proceedings No. 39632, and in the project of partition submitted by all the co-heirs, and
approved by the court. Sometime in January, 1963, the appellee built a mausoleum in Binan,
Province of Laguna, for the remains of her late husband. Shortly before the expiration of the
period of five years for the exhumation of said remains, the appellants secured the consent of the
appellee to have the remains of the deceased transferred to the Ermita Church in Manila.Such
transfer would only be a temporary and that it would be easier to transfer the remains from that
place to mausoleum, which she had built in Binan, the appellee gave her consent. Having been
informed by her lawyer that she should not have given her consent, she withdrew it, and
inasmuch as the appellants were about to remove and transfer the remains, the appellee moved
the court to enjoin the appellants from removing the remains to the Ermita Church. The motion
ws duly herd and thereafter the court made permanent the preliminary injunction which had been
issued, and ordered the ppellants to abstain from removing the remains of the deceased and
transferring them to another place. Thereupon, the appeal was perfected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they have a better right than the appellee to disinter the remains of the deceased
and transfer them to the place they had chosen.
HELD:
The Court held that the appellees right, as the widow, is preferred, as may be gathered from the
spirit of section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code and from some American cases. We
hold that the court correctly decided the case and did not commit any of the assigned errors. In
this jurisdiction there is no express law which determines the preference, among the next of kin
of a deceased, with regard to the disposition of his remains. Under the terms of said agreement,
the appellee has a better right than the appellants, and the latter cannot object to the transfer of
the remains of the deceased by the appellee to the mausoleum she built in Binan, Laguna. In this
jurisdiction there is no law that expressly dteremines the right care, possession and disposition of
the remains of the deceased. Section 1103 of the Revised Administratice Code of 1917, quoted
by the court, provides that the obligation to bury the remains of a deceased, falls, firstly, on the
surviving spouse; if the deceased was not married, the obligation falls upon the closest next of
kin; and if he dies with no surviving relative, the burial is the concern of the authorities of the
municipality where he died.
ABDURAJAK, PSAMIERA A.
[181]

LLB III-B
ARANETA VS. MONTELIBANO

G.R. No. 4177
September 15, 1909
FACTS:
On the 10th day of February, 1895, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Occidental Negros against the defendant, for the purpose of
compelling the defendant (1) to execute and deliver a deed in favor of the plaintiff, for a certain
parcel of land situated in the sitio of Malisburg, barrio of Tansa, in the municipality of Saravia, in
the Province of Occidental Negros; (2) to deliver the possession of the said property in question
is found in the complaint filed in said cause.No further steps were taken in the prosecution of
said cause until the 25th of April, 1907, when the defendant filed a demurrer to said complaint,
which demurrer was overruled by the court upon 30th day of April 1907. The original action was
commenced by Felix Araneta having died and Agaton Araneta having been appointed as
administrator of the said estate, he presented a motion in the Court of First Instance to be
substituted as plaintiff in said cause for Felix Araneta, which motion was granted. On the Ist day
May, 1907, the defendant, Braulio Montelibano, filed his answer. Upon the issues thus presented
the plaintiff went to trial. The letters do not show whether a demand was made for the payment
of the P6,000 in question or not. During the trial of the cause, the defendant offered proof. After
hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause. From the judgment of the lower court
the plaintiff appealed, making several assignments of error, all of which relate to the sufficiency
of the proof to sustain the plaintiffs claim. There was no proof whatever offered by the plaintiff
showing that the original indebtedness had not been paid.
[182]

ISSUE:
Whether an action can be brought against an administrator or tutor for the purpose of the
compelling him to carry out a contract for the conveyance of land under the circumstances
existing in this case.
HELD:
Under the provisions of article 661 of the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the right of
succession, are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased. The heirs are more
than the continuation of the juridical personality of their predecessor in interest. The heirs having
succeeded to whatever interest their ancestry had in the land and contract in question, they may,
by virtue of articles 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code, be compelled in a proper action to execute
the public instrument required under the contract between their ancestor and Araneta. All of the
heirs were not made parties defendant in the present action. A part of them can not be required to
execute the document prayed for by the plaintiff. They must all be made parties defendant. They
are all equally interested. Of course when they are all made parties they will be permitted to
show, providing they have evidence to justify it, that Leon Lopez was, by the consent of the said
Araneta, substituted for their ancestor in the contract which the representatives of the said
Araneta are now attempting to enforce. That is a question of defense. Whether Leon Lopez,
being actually in possession should be made a party defendant in the present action, we do not
decide. Therefore all of the heirs of the said Aniceto Montelibano were not made parties in the
present action, the judgment of the lower court is hereby revoked and the cause is hereby
remanded to the lower court, with permission on the part of the plaintiff to amend his complaint.
LLB III-B
JAYME VS. GAMBOA

[183]

G.R. No. L-47820
November 28, 1942
FACTS:
Fortunato E. Jayme claims the right to inherit from the deceased Antonio Jayme as the latters
legally acknowledged natural son. His claim is contested by the window and the legitimate
children and grandchildren of the deceased, who deny the status of acknowledged natural child
asserted by him. It is not disputed that Fortunato E. Jayme is the son of Antonio Jayme and
Efigenia Enriquez, who appeared to have known each other with intimacy in Manila. Antonio
brought her to his home town, Bacolod, where not long after her arrival she gave birth on April
17, 1883, to a child that was baptized on the 21 st of the same month as Fortunato Enriquez,
Lucio Jayme, a younger brother of Antonio, acted as the godfather of the child. He had been
commissioned by Antonio to arranged for the baptism. At the age of five or six years, when he
began to remember things, Fortunato came to know Antonio Jayme as his father, for the latter
used to visit him two or three times a week in the house where he live with his ,mother. In 1889
Fortunato and his mother moved from Bacolod to Pilr, Capiz where he stayed until 1899. In that
year her mother sent her back to Bacolod for education. The father supported the child until the
latter went to Manila in the early part of the American Occupation. He departed with the consent
of his father. In short time Fortunato secured employment as a room boy in Malacanan of one
Major Kinley. Eight monts later Major Kinley took Fortunato to the United States after Fortunto
had obtained the consent of his father. He stayed in the United States from 1901 to 1910 as a
self- supporting student. After Fortunatos return to the Philippines in the yer 1910 until Antonio
Jaymes death, which occurred on October 19, 1937, he continued to be recognized and treated as
a son not only by ntonio Jayme but also by the latters legitimate children. After hearing the
evidence Judge Soter Rods, in an order dated July 10, 1939, declared Fortunato Jayme an
acknowledged natural son of the deceased Antonio Jayme, with the right to inherit from him.
But upon motion for new trial filed by counsel for the oppositors, the same judge on September
21, 1939, modified the said order by holding that although Fortunto Jayme is a legally
acknowledges son of the deceased Antonio Jayme, he is not entitled to inherit from the latter
because his rights as a natural acknowledged son of the decedent cannot be enforced. From
that order both parties appealed-the oppositors attacking it insofar as it declares that the claimant
is a legally acknowledged natural son of the deceased, and the claimant insofar as it declares that
he is not entitled to inherit.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 1 or Rule 12 should be applied.
HELD:
Both reasons an authority sustain the contention of the claimant that rule 12 of the transitory
provisions is the one applicable. The circumstance that the claimant and the first two legitimate
children of the deceased were born before the present Civil Code went into effect constitutes no
legal obstacle against the exercise by the claimant of the right recognized by said Code. The
decedent died long after it entered into effect. Both the claimant and the oppositors base their
right to inherit upon the provisions of the Civil Code. The claimant and the oppositors acquired
no vested right to the decedents inheritance until the moment of his death. That is another reason
why rule 1 of the transitory provisions is not applicable. Article 657 and 661 of the Civil Code
read as follows Art. 657. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
[184]

moment of his death, Art. 661. Heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by
mere fact of his death. Rule 12 of the transitory provisions expressly ordains that the inheritance
of those who die after the Civil Code was in force shall be allotted and divided in accordance
with this code; even if a decedent made will under the prior legislation and the testamentary
dispositions should be harmonized with the latter; the legitimes, betterments, and legacies shall
be respected, but their amounts should be reduced when it is not possible in any other manner to
give each participant in the inheritance the share pertaining to him according to this code. We
find inescapable the application herein of rule 12 invoked by the claimant-appellant.
LLB III-B
QUISON VS. SALUD

G.R. No. L-4314
November 21, 1908
[185]

FACTS:
Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed, but the defendant claims that he
never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of evidence, principally parol, was
introduced upon this question, and after an examination thereof, we are satisfied that it clearly
preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below, and that it was proven at the trial that the
land in question belongs to the heirs of Quison. The defendant relied to a great extent upon the record
of an action brought by Claro Quison in 1887 against one Perdeguera. Quison alleged in his
complaint in that action that the defendant therein had in unlawfully possessed himself of a portion of
his, the then plaintiffs land. In executing this judgment the officers of the law apparently gave
Quison possession of the land. The defendant also claims that Fidel Salud was given judicial
possession of the property here in controversy in 1895. The plaintiffs asked leave to present a
supplementary complaint against Higina Salud. The court ordered the dismissal of the action so far as
the defendant Fidel Salud and Gregorio De Villa were concerned. The plaintiffs then presented a
complaint against Higina Salud as the only defendant. She is the only one who appealed from the
judgment. Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next
of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain this action
because there is no evidence that any proceeding have been taken in court for the settlement of the
estate of Claro Quison, and that, without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action.
ISSUE:
Whether, as to the land itself, it being the separate property of the wife, the husband of Lorenza
Quison could have any interest or right therein.
HELD:
It is very clear that as to the rents and profits of the land he does necessarily have such an interest or
right. The most that can be said in favor of the plaintiffs is that these lands were bienes parafernales.
In regard to the rents of such lands, articles 1385 and 1401 of the Civil Code shall be followed.
Therefore that the husband of Lorenza Quison was necessary party to this action. The court shall, in
furtherance of justice, and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any
pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First Instance or the
Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name or any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in
any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without
regards to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
LLB III-B
Riera vs. Palmaroli

G.R. No. 14851
September 13, 1919
FACTS:
On April 19, 1918, the respondent Vicente Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain
in the Philippine Islands, produced in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila
a document dated on March 16, 1918, purporting to be the will of Juan Pons y Coll,
and asked that it be admitted to probate. Publication was accordingly made, and on
May 20, 1918, order was entered admitting the will to probate.
[186]

Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of Manila
and to the lack of adequate means of communication between the two places a
difficulty then greatly exaggerated by conditions incident to the European War the
petitioner received no information of the probate proceedings until after November
14, 1918. She had, however, received information of the fact of her husbands death
on or before June 19, 1918, for upon that date an attorney employed by her in
Palma de Mallorca addressed a letter to Wolfson & Wolfson, attorneys in the city of
Manila, requesting them to look after the interests of the petitioner in the estate of
her deceased husband.
The present application was thereupon made to the Supreme Court on December
21, 1918, under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as already stated.
Issue:
Whether or not admitting the wills to probate will prosper.
Held:
In the course of the preceding discussion we have, for the purpose of
explaining the situation more clearly, permitted ourselves to refer to at least one
detail not stated in the petition, as where we state that the will purports to disinherit
the petitioner. This fact, however, if not admitted, is incontrovertible and apparent
from the copy of the will exhibited with the answer. Moreover, the point that no
decisive influence on the decision. Our opinion therefore is to be taken as an
expression of our opinion upon the legal sufficiency of the petition exclusively upon
the statements contained therein.
As will be discovered from the opinion, the inability of this court to grant relief
in the case before us is really due to the fact that the remedy conceded in section
513 admitting wills to probate. The defect from which the petition suffers is
therefore not curable by amendment and cannot be aided by the taking of proof.
The request for an order allowing proof to be submitted must therefore be denied,
and judgment absolute will be entered dismissing the petition with costs.
Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B
CASTANEDA vs. ALEMANY

3 PHIL 426
March 19, 1904
[187]
FACTS:
The appellant contends that the court erred inholding that all legal
formalities had been complied with in the execution of the will of Dona Juana
as the proof shows that the said will was not written by the testatrix.
ISSUE:
WON the will is valid.
HELD:
The mechanical act of drafting the will can be left to a third person. What is
important is the testator signs the will or he let another person to sign but
under his direction. ARTICLE 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation
of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of the portions which
they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to the discretion
of a third person. ARTICLE 786. The testator may entrust to a third person
the distribution of specific property or sums of money that he may leave in
general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of the
persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to
be given or applied. ARTICLE 787. The testator may not make a testamentary
disposition in such manner that another person has to determine whether or
not it is to be operative. ARTICLE 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the
disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.
Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B
[188]
Rivera vs. Dizon

33 SCRA 554
June 30, 1970
FACTS:
The testatrix distributed her properties to her heirs. It turns out that some of
the heirs were prejudiced of their legitime because the property actually
given to them were not approximate to their correct legitime. So these heirs
wanted that to complete their rightful share certain other properties should
be given to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property were given to the correct legitimes.
RULING:
But it is very clear in the will of the testatrix that she wanted to give certain
properties to certain persons and those dispositions or those persons should
be respected. If the legitime or the rightful shares of the other heirs are
prejudiced, then that should be completed by the delivery of cash in
accordance with the wishes of the testator.
Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B
[189]
Benedicto vs. Javella

10 Phil 198
FACTS:
The testator was a Visayan who lived in San Juan, Rizal. He executed his will
in Manila in the Spanish language. It was contended that the language
requirement of the law on wills ahs not been complied with in this case.
There was no expression in the body of the will itself or in its attestation
clause that the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is written.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there were a specific language in the will required by law.
HELD:
Where there is want of expression in the body of the will itself or in the
attestation clause that the testator knew the language in which the will was
written, proof thereof may be established by evidence aliunde. Although the
lack of such evidence may be cured by presumption of knowledge of the
language or dialect used in the will, no such presumption can arise where, as
in the case at bar, the will was executed in Spanish, while the testator was a
Visayan residing in San
Juan, Rizal at the time of his death.
Alawi, Muhaidir II
LLB III-B
[190]
In re Estate of Calderon 26 Phil 333

G.R. No. L-7856
December 26, 1913
FACTS:
Tthis case were made by the attorneys for Basilisa Salteras, Potenciana de la Cruz and Benigno
Calderon, the latter as the natural guardian of the minors Maria and Josefa Calderon, and also by
counsel for Mauro Sulat, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Benigno Calderon, and Calixto
Salteras, from the order of December 6, 1911, which directed that the administrator be authorized
to make a conveyance of the property, classed as urban, consisting of a house and lot situated on
Calle Anloague, Binondo, and designated, under the old numeration, as No. 29, and under the
new, as No. 173, to Petronila Eugenio, in accordance with the petition of Ramon Fabie, who is
made a party by the order.
ISSUE:
WON A testator cannot prohibit the contest of his will in the cases in which there exists nullity
specified by law
HELD :
The testator's will, as recorded in the above clause 12, is so clear and definite that,
in order duly to comply therewith, it needs but be determined who are the persons
that must be considered as the legatees on account of their having served and
cared for the testator's widow until her death.
From a due examination of the evidence, taken at trial on the petition of the
appellants, who appeared and claimed a share in the aforementioned estate and
legacy, it is concluded that those entitled thereto are Encarnacion Gutierrez
Calderon, Filomena Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa Salteras, Candida
Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria and Josefa Calderon, and Petronila Eugenio, and so the
trial judge also held in his order of September 23, 1911, except with respect to the
little girls Maria and Josefa Calderon, whom he considered to be too young to have
been able to serve the widow Maria Cristina Calderon as domestics; but the record
shows that these children, as the widow's protegees, lived in her house until her
death and, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, used to accompany her,
even when she went to church, and that, although they were minors, they could
have rendered the widow assistance and services sufficient and proportionate to
[191]

their respective ages; and we are of the opinion that, from the testator's intention
as expressed in his will, it is undeniable that the assistance and services rendered to
the widow, required as a condition for meriting the legacy in question, were
sufficient to the needs and conveniences of the testator's widow in respect many
chores in the house, and enough to fill the requirements of a woman sickly and
infirm in her already advanced age. The company of obliging and obedient little girls
is usually more agreeable and useful to elderly and sick persons than that of adults.
With the report of the testator's brother, Ramon Fabie, the testator's will is not
legally fulfilled, and it is not just that the other persons, besides Petronila Eugenio,
who rendered services to and assisted the widow Maria Cristina Calderon should be
deprived of the proportionate share of the legacy to which they are entitled.
Petronila Eugenio was already in the house serving the wife of the testator while the
latter was still living, and had he seen that Petronila alone could serve and attend
her during the widowhood of his wife and that the latter would not need other
servants, he would have bequeathed the whole of the said house to Petronila; and if
the deceased Miguel Fabie provided in his will that the property should be delivered
to the person or persons who should render useful services to and assist his widow
until her death, it was because he knew and was aware that there were other
servants in the house, and evidently imposed this condition in order that those who
were servants there might continue as such until his wife's death. Since some of
them did do so, as proven by the record, the law must be fulfilled in accordance
with the tenor of the last will of the testator.
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of December 6, 1911, and declare that Petronila
Eugenio, Filomena Calderon, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa
Salteras, Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria Calderon, and Josefa Calderon are entitled to
receive pro rata the sale value of the property situated at No. 173, formerly No. 29, Calle
Anloague, now Juan Luna. No special finding is made as to costs
Amilbahar,Nurulain L
LL-IIIB
[192]
Solla vs. Ascueta

G.R. No. 24955
September 4, 1926
FACTS:
Dona Maria Sollas will read: "I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson and I
desire him to comply with the obligation to give or to deliver to the parish priest of this town a
sufficient sum of money necessary for a yearly novena and for an ordinary requiem mass for the
1st to 8th days thereof and on the9th or last day, a solemn requiem mass with a vigil and
a largebier (a stand on which a corpse or coffin is placed before burial),- for these masses are for
the repose of my soul and those of my parents, husband, children, and other relatives. I
repeat and insist that my heir shall execute and comply with this request without fail. And at the
hour of his death, he will insist that his heirs comply with all that I have here ordered". In the
earlier part of the will, Dona Maria ordered the distribution of legacies to her brothers, nephew,
protges and servant.Leandro Serranos will on the other hand read: "I command my executor
to put all of my property in order. I order my son Simeonnot to forget annually all the souls
of the relatives of my grandmother and also of mine and to have a mass said on the 1stand 9th
days of the yearly novena and that he erect a 1st classbier. I sincerely desire that the property of
my deceased grandmother, Capitana Maria (Solla) be disposed of in conformity with all the
provisions of her will and of mine". Leandro named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of
his will and that he directed him to put all of his property in order and to separate.
ISSUE:
WON the facts proven by the documentary evidence, and in accordance with law, with the costs
against defeated party.
HELD:
It clearly appearing that it was Mari Sollas intention, in ordering her universal heir
Leandro Serrano in her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the compliance of
her orders by his heirs, that the latter should comply with her pious orders and that
she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies, the compliance of which she
[193]

had entrusted to Leandro Serrano, we are authorized to restrict the application of
the words all that I have here ordered used by the said Maria Solla and the words
all her orders used by Leandro Serrano in their respective wills limiting them to
the pious orders and substituting the phrase in regard to the annual masses after
the words used by both testators, respectively.
The trial court, therefore, committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro
Serrano mentioned in his will as applicable to the provisions of Maria Sollas will
relative to the legacies and not to pious bequests exclusively.
As to the remaining assignments of error, they being merely corollaries of the fifth
and sixth, the points raised therein are impliedly decided in our disposition of said
two assignments last mentioned.
With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants, the two assignments of error
made therein are without merit in view of the foregoing considerations and the
conclusions we have arrived at with regard to the assignments of error made by the
defendants-appellants.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from
must be, as hereby, reversed in all its parts and the complaint dismissed, without
special findings as to costs.
Amilbahar,Nurulain L
LL-IIIB
BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-39247
June 27, 1975
Topic/Doctrines: Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that
will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a
construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil
Code).
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr.,
and six legitimate children. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of
his mothers notarial will, which was written in English. In that will,
Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their
legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised
and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.
[194]

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the
will.There after, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and
renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate in favor of their 6
children.Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the
affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void; that the testatrix
illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal
lots and; that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating
portions of the nine lots to her children. She prayed that the will be declared
void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared. The probate
court declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment
of its provisions and not because of party's arguments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it
void.
HELD:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
before its formalvalidity had been established. But the probate court erred in
declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into
an intestate proceeding.The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein
may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the
legitimes. As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a
purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator
has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein
provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972,
46 SCRA 538, 565). To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix
is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs.
Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to
intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition
operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of
the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where

the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
[195]

practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy
should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that
sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it
effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762). As
far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be
followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld
(Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB
BONA VS BRIONES
G.R. No. L-10806
July 6, 1918
Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).
[196]

FACTS:
On September 16, 1911, Francisco Briones executed a will in the presence of three
witnesses, one of whom is the notary public, who also drafted the will and certifies
the will of the testator and the signatures of the testator as well as the witnesses.
He died on August 14, 1913. Monica Bona, his widow by the second marriage
applied for the probate of the will and present evidence that the will was executed
with solemnities prescribed by law at that time. Hospicio, Gregoria, and Carmen, all
surnamed Briones, the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator, by a
pleading dated March 5, 1915, opposed the probate of the will presented by the
widow of the deceased Briones, alleging that the said will was executed before two
witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon
the person of the testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and he prayed
that for that reason the said will be declared null and of no value, with costs against
the petitioners.
ISSUE:
The whole issue discussed by the parties and submitted for the decision of this
court resolves itself as to whether or not in the execution of the will in question the
solemnities prescribed by section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.
HELD:
The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says: "No will, except as provided in the
preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or
affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.
But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is
proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided".
Even though Domingo de la Fuente drafted the will and intervened in its preparation
as a notary, by the order and under the express direction of the testator, it is
nevertheless true that he did it as a witness to the execution of the said will with
positive and concrete acts, while the two other witnesses Gregorio Bustilla and Sixto
Barrameda merely attested all that appeared in the second of the four paragraphs
mentioned; for in its they certify that the foregoing testament contains the last will
of the testator Francisco Briones; that the latter told them that before and at the
time that he dictated his will, there was no inducement nor threat by anybody; and
that as he did not know how to write the Spanish language, said testator requested
Domingo de la Fuente to write the will, and he did it as it is now drafted, certifying
also, that the testator Briones signed his will voluntarily with his own hand, in the
presence of the declarants who, as witnesses, signed the instrument on the date
expressed. Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared that the two said witnesses
formally swore before him on the certification which precedes the said will and,
according to this testimony as shown in the records and the testimony of the abovementioned witnesses, the said Domingo de la Fuente wrote and drafted the said will
Exhibit A by the order and under the direction of the testator Francisco Briones, who
signed in the presence of the witnesses, Bustilla and Barrameda and of Notary
Domingo de la Fuente, all of whom immediately signed also in the presence of the
testator, each doing it in the presence of each other. So that, although it is not
shown expressly that Domingo de la Fuente was an attesting witness to the will, yet
it cannot be denied that it was he who wrote it by the order and under the direction
[197]

of the testator; that he was a witness to its execution from the first to its last line;
and that he was perfectly aware of the fact that all that he had written in the
document Exhibit A expresses the genuine and true will of the testator. He saw and
was present when the latter signed his will, as also when the two witnesses Bustilla
and Barrameda affixed their signatures; said witnesses also saw and were present
when Domingo de la Fuente signed at the end of the said document.
This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be inspired in the sense that it is
not defeated, and if the wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in the
instant case, it is not proper nor just to invalidate the will of Francisco Briones
merely because of some small defect in form which is not essential nor of great
importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente was also
a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood
the contents of the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really
was a witness and he attested the execution of the will during its making until it was
terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses, and by himself, even
though he did it in the capacity of a notary.
The last paragraph of section 618 of Act No. 190 supplies a legal basis to support
the validity of the will in question with the conditions for its probate because,
notwithstanding the existence of such defect merely in the form and not in the
substance, the certification of authenticity and the very text of the will show in a
clear and indubitable manner that the will Exhibit A contains the last will of the
testator, and that it was signed by the latter and attested as being true and
legitimate not only the two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda but also by the one
who wrote it, Domingo de la Fuente, who was also a truthful and reliable witness,
even though he be called a notary public.
The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section
618 cannot be required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document
was executed in September, 1911, five years before said amendatory law began to
take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died on August 14, 1913, two years and
some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so, the only law
applicable to the present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No.
190, and in accordance with the provisions of this section, the said will should be
probated; for it has been presented to the court many months before the
amendatory act went into effect.
AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB
[198]
In Re Will of Riosa
G.R. No. L-14074
November 7, 1918
Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law
in force at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).
FACTS:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the
date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls. Jose Riosa
died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000.
The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645,
amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and
attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing,
signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left
margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore,
went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the
testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid?
HELD:
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made
after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law.
(Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has
further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose
death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is
inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely
different question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death
occurred after the enactment of this law. The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that
the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its
execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. Retrospective laws
generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate
of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the
requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his
lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death.
(Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209)
This court, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on
[199]

technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for
the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. The act of
bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a
completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not
take effect on the property until a future time. The will of Jose Riosa is valid and section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is the applicable law.
AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON

G.R. No. L-12767
November 16, 1918
[200]

Topics/Doctrines: Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a
citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the
state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by
the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine
Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands ( sec.
636, Act No. 190)
FACTS:
Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he emigrated to the United States and
lived in Chicago, Illinois. In 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately
afterwards left for the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was
born a few months after their marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the
service of the United States he continued to live in the Philippines. In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was
granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a
certificate of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited family in Sweden. When this visit
was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila. In Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra
Ibaez: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also had 2 children with Simeona
Ibaez: Eleonor and Alberto. He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will. This will, signed by
himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses, was not executed in conformity
with Philippine law. A petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this will, on
the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and
hence could properly be probated here. The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks
publication of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were examined relative to the
execution of the will; and thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to
probate. Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator of the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine court had jurisdiction?
HELD:
YES. The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.
"The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of
things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice
to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be
an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his
property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the
state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably
short." (Citing In re Davis) Whether the order of probate can be set aside in this proceeding on
the other ground stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of
Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. - NO
The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was
executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly
[201]

admitted to probate.
Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of
which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own
state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have
the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.
AMING, RHASDY P.
LLB-IIIB
PCIB vs. Escolin

GR No.L- 27860 & L-27896
September 30, 1975
Topic/Doctrine: Nationality Principle
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary
of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain
[202]

testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as
to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her
death (for while one group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the
other group contended that no renvoi was possible).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of
her death and not said law at any other time.

LLB III-B
Amata vs. Tablizo

GR No.L- 23483
December 18, 1925
Topic/Doctrine: MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL
FACTS:
This is a proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay by a petition
[203]

filed by Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela, praying for the probate of the last will
and testament of the deceased Pedro Tablizo, and the issuance of letters of
administration to the petitioners. Juana Tablizo and others opposed the probate of
the will applied for on the following grounds: (1) That it was not signed by the
witnesses, nor executed by the deceased Pedro Tablizo, as prescribed by the Code
of Civil Procedure; (2) that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was not habitually of sound
mind, but on the contrary, was unconscious at the time of the execution of said
document; (3) that said document was not signed by the testator freely and
voluntarily, nor did he intend it to be his will on the date when it was executed; and
(4) that said document was maliciously and fraudulently prepared by the two
beneficiaries Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela, causing a date to appear thereon
which is not the true date of its execution. And they prayed that the petition be
denied, and it be held that Pedro Tablizo died intestate, and Tomas Tablizo be
appointed special administrator of the estate left by said deceased.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by the petitioners, as well as the
opponents, the court below entered an order declaring that the deceased Pedro
Tablizo was unconscious when the document Exhibit A was executed, and that said
document did not contain the last will of the testator, and denying the probate
thereof as the last will and testament of said deceased; and declaring, further, that
Pedro Tablizo died intestate.
From this order the petitioners took an appeal in due time and form, assigning the
following supposed errors as committed by the trial court, to wit: (1) Its declaration
that it entertains a reasonable suspicion that the document Exhibit A, the testament
of the deceased Pedro Tablizo, does not contain the will of the testator; (2) its
refusal to admit the will Exhibit A to probate and its finding that Pedro Tablizo died
intestate; and (3) it failure to render judgment against the opponents for the costs
of the action.
The opponents, who are all brothers and sisters and children of brothers and sisters
of the testator, attempted to prove that the will was clandestinely prepared by
Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela and signed on the midnight of June 19, 1924,
Pedro Tablizo then lying down on his bed, weakened by old age and his sickness,
lying down with his mouth upward and open, the eyes closed and the feet and arms
extended, being unable to move, see, speak or know those surrounding him, it
being necessary that Antonio Amata should, as he did, place the pen in his fingers,
hold him by the arm and guide him while signing the will upon a pillow.
ISSUE:
(1) When was the will made and signed?;
(2) Who drew and signed it?; and
(3) Was the mind of the testator perfectly sound when he made and signed the will?
HELD:
[204]

As to the first question, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the testator
dictated to Felipe Almojuela the rough draft of his will, the latter having typewritten
it clean, and finished the drawing thereof at midnight. Notwithstanding the distrust
with which the trial judge received the testimony of the petitioners, as they had
intervened in the preparation of the will, and are the ones most benefited, he could
not help giving credit to their testimony and that of their witnesses upon the date
when the will was made and signed, that is, from 3 oclock in the evening of the
third day up to 1 oclock in the morning of the 4th June, 1924. In view of the fact
that the testator did not die until June 20, 1924, in order to make credible the theory
that the testator was unconscious when his will was executed and signed.
Turning now to the second question, the very witness for the opponents, Father
Cecilio Penilla, testified that at 10 oclock approximately in the night of June 4, 1924,
the date when the will was signed, and on the 12th day of the same month and
year, the testator had sent for him in order to confess and on both occasions he
intelligently and intelligibly talked with him, relating his spiritual life coherently and
clearly although he was lying down on his bed and could not move or stand up
without assistance. It is a fact also uncontroverted that on June 9, 1924, he ordered
a carabao sold, designating it by its name Tibayong. On the 10th day of the same
month, he received the visit of Father Andres Tablizo and Mariano Surtida with
whom he has been conversing. All these prior, coetaneous and subsequent
circumstances show that Pedro Tablizo was perfectly of sound mind at the time of
making his last will.
With regard to the third question, the court have already seen that the will was
made on June 3, 1924, and signed immediately thereafter at an early hour in the
morning of the 4th day of the same month and year. The date of the execution of
the will is important in the determination of the mental condition of the testator. If
the opponents and their witnesses testified falsely upon this essential point, under
the rule falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, they are not entitled to any credit upon the
other essential points of their testimony, unless corroborated by other witnesses
whose credibility is beyond suspicion. On the other hand, the testimony of the
petitioners and their witnesses upon the making if the will is so clear, positive and
consistent, and the succession of facts upon which they testified and their incidents
is so natural, that it cannot but convince any one who should read it without bias. If,
as above stated, the petitioners and their witnesses are entitled to a greater credit
that the opponents and their witnesses, and if, as above seen, the testator was in
perfectly sound mental condition, there can be no doubt that it was the testator who
signed his signature on the will placed upon a book of music. The testimony of the
opponents and their witnesses is improbable that the will was signed upon a pillow.
A pillow being soft, as it is, cannot serve as a support for writing purposes.
For the foregoing reasons, the court are of their opinion that the order appealed
from must be, as is hereby, revoked with the costs against the appellees, and it is
ordered that the will of Pedro Tablizo be admitted to probate. So ordered.

LLB III-B
[205]

Garcia vs. Garcia, de Bartolome
GR No.L- 43367
September 9, 1936
Topic/Doctrine: Credibility of the subscribing witness
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila allowing
the probate of the will of Paulina Vazquez Viuda de Garcia. The will was executed on
June 12, 1934. The testatrix died on June 27, 1934. Testamentary proceedings were
commenced on July 25, 1934, in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the probate
of this will, the petitioners being Marieta, Luisa and Purifi-cacion Garcia who are
among the forced heirs instituted in the will and who are also named as the
universal heirs for the residue of the estate left undisposed in the will.
The probate of the will was contested on August 29, 1934 by the oppositor-appellant
called to the stand two witnesses to substantiate her averments. Asuncion Bartolome, a
daughter of the oppositor-appellant and who was living with the deceased at the time,
testified that in the afternoon of June 12, 1934, she did not see the deceased execute
any will; neither did she remember having seen any of the instrumental witnesses in the
house at the time. Luz Lopez corroborated Asuncion Bartolome by declaring that in the
afternoon of the said date, she went to the house of the testatrix to borrow some money
and that during her stay she did not see "a algunos hombres all".
These two witnesses for the appellant were, however, contradicted by the proponent
Luisa Garcia who was present when the will was signed. Luisa Garcia testified further
that Asuncion Bartolome was on June 12, 1934, confined in bed suffering from cough
and lung trouble and therefore could not have witnessed the execution of the will, and
that Luz Lopez was never in the house of the testatrix in the afternoon of said day. Of
Luz Lopez the trial judge observes that "era demasiado locuaz, habiendo, adems,
incurrido en serias contradicciones".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of the subscribing/attesting witnesses are credible?
HELD:
The court held that the subscribing witnesses are much relied upon to establish due execution of
the will; nor can the testimony of persons accidentally present, who had nothing to do with the
transaction, be entitled to equal consideration. Though strangers personally to the testator, their
concurring testimony alone may well establish the due execution in which they participated; and
even in a conflict of evidence great weight is given to their several statements. By signing a will
as witnesses, the persons who thus sign impliedly certify to the truth of the facts which admit to
probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testator, the absence of undue
influence and the like.
The judgment of the lower court admitting the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of
Paulina Vazquez Viuda de Garcia to probate is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the oppositor-appellant. So ordered.
[206]

LLB III-B
Neyra vs. Neyra
GR No.L- 8075
March 25, 1946
Topic/Doctrine: Test of SIGNING BY THUMBMARK; PRESENCE OF ATTESTING
WITNESSES
FACTS:
That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving
certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra
and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; that after the death
of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious
misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased father,
and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two
litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In the
first case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from
Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at
No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, which was finally decided in favor of the defendants, in
the court of first instance, and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and
confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession,
Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the
two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and,
at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942) the two sisters became
reconciled. only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2,1942, when
Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying
their agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her last will and
-testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as
the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza
beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two
documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the
morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942,
Attorney Panis read said document of compromise and last will and testament to
Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro
Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after
which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she
wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not
suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the
help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumb mark at the foot of each one of the two
documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis,
after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of
[207]

Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad
Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a proteg, as
witnesses. Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two
documents, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra.
The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by Trinidad
Neyra, who are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no interest in the final
outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while three of the
attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character, who had
known and seen and actually talked to the testatrix.
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter
Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo
Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the testimony of the witnesses presented
by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of
Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of November 3, 1942. Teodora Neyra,
Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however, that when the
thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated
November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting
witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.
ISSUE:
Is the contentions of the petitioners are tenable?
HELD:
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time E. N. thumbmarked the
agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the
caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the
signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was
lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the
signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to
do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it. all in this case, (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil.,
541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is
equivalent to her signature.
The petition for reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on November 23,
1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November
4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the
provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the
decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing
the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

LLB III-B
[208]
Bugnao vs. Ubag

G.R.No. 4445
September 18, 1909
Topic: Testamentary capacity.
Facts:
Before Domingo Ubag died, he allegedly executed a will while he was not of sound mind by
making his wife the sole heir of the said will. The appellant contend that the testator was so sick
that he was unable to speak and understand, or make himself understood and that he was
incapacitated to make a will.
Issue:
When a person can be considered of sound mind and capable of executing a will?
Held:
To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise. It is sufficient that a testator knows and appreciate the
nature and effects of the act he is engaged.
Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B
[209]
Bagtas vs. Paguio

G.R.No.L- 6801
March 14, 1912
Topic: Testamentary Capacity
Facts:
Pioquinto Pagiuo executed a will; the wife was propounded as executrix and opposed by the son
and grandchildren by a former marriage on the ground that the will was executed while the
testator was suffering from debility of the body and poor memory which allegedly lacks
testamentary capacity.
Issue:
Whether or not physical debility or poor memory constitutes incapacity to execute a will?
Held:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility will affect the capacity to make a
will, if sufficient intelligence remains, failure of memory is not sufficient to create incapacity.
Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B
[210]
Galvez vs. Galvez

G.R. No. L-6650
December 5, 1913
Topic: Testamentary Capacity
Facts:
Victor Galvez executed a will that he affix his signature by directing Lorenzo Galvez at his
request in his presence.
Issue:
Whether or not directing another person to affix testators signature affects the testamentary
capacity?
Held:
The formalities prescribed under the law where complied with as observed the writing transpired
under his direction and presence with the required number of witnesses, this requisites must
concur to comply with the statutory requirements in the affixing or writing of wills.
Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B
[211]
Lopez vs. Torres

G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
Topic: No Testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of a guardian
before final accounts of the latter have been approved.
Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will, instituting his cousin Vicente and daughter Luz. Prior to
the execution of the will Tomas was judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and
Vicente served as guardian.
Issue:
Whether or not Vicente as guardian is disqualified to inherit from Tomas?
Held:
Vicente was not only a general incapacity on his part, but special incapacity due to accidental
relation of guardian and ward relation existing between the parties.
Badeo, Michael J.
LLB III-B
[212]

ABQUILAN vs. ABQUILAN
49 Phil 450
October 13, 1926
Topic/ Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent
FACTS
This appeal has been brought to reverse an order of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Occidental Negros, refusing to legalize an instrument (Exhibit A)
purporting to be the last will and testament of Isidra Abquilan, deceased. It appears
that the deceased left no forced heirs, and her only heirs, in case of intestacy, are
her brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana Abquilan, a
sister.
Upon hearing the cause the trial court found that the document propounded as the
will of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to
the supposed will are forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not
executed by the deceased. He therefore denied probate, and the proponent
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid; whether or not the testatrix was capable of
executing a will
HELD:
The supposed testatrix was not in a condition such as to enable her to have
participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from paralysis to
celebral hemorrhage in such degree as completely to incapacitate her for intelligent
participation in the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the name of the
testatrix as signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic
signatures leads to the conclusion that the signatures to the supposed will were
made by some other person. Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato
and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in our opinion that no will at all was
made on November 6, the date attributed to the questioned document, and that,
instead an attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate another will,
which failed of completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to
[213]

the making of a will in which the testatrix took no part. The instrument before us
was undoubtedly fabricated later, probably on November 7, at a time when the
condition of the deceased was such as to make rational participation on her part in
the act of making a will impossible.ch

LLB-3B
LIM vs. CHINCO

55 Phil 891
March 31, 1931
FACTS:
This is a contest over the probate of a paper writing purporting to be the will of
Victorina Villaranda y Diaz, who died on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no
descendants or ascendants, and the document produced as her will purports to
leave her estate, consisting of properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to
three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname of Lim. This
[214]

instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as
executrix. Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased.
The purported will was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila,
whose wife appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in the will. In the
end three persons served as witnesses, all of whom were in friendly relations with
the lawyer, and two relatives of his wife. The intended testatrix was not able to affix
her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the
paper referred to was signed.
HELD:
The deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a comatose condition and
incapable of performing any conscious and valid act. The testimony of the witnesses
is convincing to the effect that the patient was in a continuous state of coma during
the entire period of her stay in the hospital, she did not have sufficient command of
her faculties to enable her to do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the physician from
Manila, testified that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but
from urmic trouble, and that, after the first attack, the patient was much relieved
and her mind so far cleared up. The attorney testified that he was able to
communicate with the deceased when the will was made, and that he read the
instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her whether it expressed her
wishes. He says that she made signs that enabled him to understand that she
concurred in what was written. But it is clear, even upon the statement of this
witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech. The paper offered
for probate was properly disallowed.

LLB-3B
[215]

HERNAEZ vs. HERNAEZ
1 Phil 689
February 10, 1903
FACTS:
The subject of this action is the will executed by Doa Juana Espinosa, widow of Don
Pedro Hernaez, before a notary public, and three witnesses, and with the aid of an
interpreter, the testatrix not understanding Spanish. The action brought is for the
annulment of the will upon the ground: (1) of the incapacity of the testatrix; (2) the
incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses, and the interpreter; and (3) a
substantial formal defect in the will.
The incapacity of the testatrix according to the complaint is alleged to consist in

this: That on the 5th of December, 1894, she was over 80 years of age and was so
ill that three days before she had received the sacraments and extreme unction,
and that two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she walked in a
stooping attitude, and gave contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility.
The incapacity of the notary is that he did not understand the Visayan dialect, the
language of the testatrix. The incapacity of the attesting witnesses is supposed to
consist in their not having a perfect knowledge of Spanish, and the incapacity of the
interpreter in that he was an amanuensis of the notary and was the person who
wrote out the will. The substantial formal defect of the will is supposed to consist in
the fact that two physicians were not present to certify to the sanity of the testatrix
at the time of its execution, and the absence of two interpreters to translate the will,
because it was executed in a foreign language.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid
HELD:
Yes, the will is valid and efficacious. It is sufficient to state that neither from the
facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the documents presented with the complaint
can the conclusion be reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental
faculties. The fact that on old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a
stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some
[216]

days before making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by
proof could no lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental
soundness of a person who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the
mental faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven. The notary in compliance
with the requirements of article 695 of the Civil Code certifies that in his judgment
the testatrix had the necessary legal capacity and the use of the necessary mental
faculties for the purposes of the execution of the will.
It has at no time been regarded as a ground for the annulment of a public
instrument executed before a notary public by a native of these Islands, ignorant of
Spanish, that the notary was not acquainted with the dialect of the party executing
the same. If this officer, upon whom the law imposes the obligation of drawing the
instrument in the official language, that is, Castilian, does not know the dialect he
can avail himself of an interpreter in accordance with the provisions of the law itself;
hence the fact that the notary who legalized the will in question did not know the
Visayan dialect spoken by the testatrix is by no means an argument in favor of the
nullity of this public instrument, nor has it been for the nullity of any one of the long
series of instruments executed before Spanish notaries, and even Filipino notaries,
unacquainted with the dialect or dialects of the locality in which they performed
their duties or the special dialect of the party.
With respect to the attesting witnesses it has been fully proven by the manner in
which they testified at the trial, "without the necessity of an interpreter," as to those
called as witnesses and by conclusive evidence as to the deceased attesting
witness whose signature and competency have been completely established, that
they knew the dialect of the testatrix in accordance with section 5, article 681, of
the Civil Code, and also understood Spanish. As alleged, but not proven, their
knowledge of the latter language may not have been perfect, but this does not
make them incompetent, nor is it a ground for annulment. Finally, the prohibition of
article 681, section 8, is not applicable to the interpreter, of whose services the
notary availed himself for the execution, drafting and legalization of the will, for the
simple reason that it does not refer to the interpreter but the witnesses, and there is
nothing to authorize the extensive interpretation attempted to be made of its
precepts.
The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered by article 665, was
not necessary. "This precept refers clearly and expressly to the conditions which
must be complied with in order that a demented person may make a will by availing
himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely distinct from the cases governed by article
685 when the testator has not been declared demented." (Judgment of June 10,
1897.)
Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required by article 648 of
the Civil Code. This is a requisite for the execution of a will in a foreign language,
and neither by the letter nor by the purpose of this article could it be required with
regard to the will in question. Not by the letter, because neither the testatrix nor the
notary expressed themselves in a foreign language. Neither the Castilian spoken by
the notary nor the Visayan spoken by the testatrix are foreign languages.
[217]

LLB-3B
[218]

AVELINO vs. DE LA CRUZ
21 Phil 521
February 21, 1912
FACTS
The present is an appeal from an order of the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge of
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, in which he had legalized the will of
the said Pascual de la Cruz, deceased.
The contention of the opponent is that at the time of the making of the will the said
Pascual de la Cruz was blind and had been for a number of years, and was
incompetent to make the will in question.
Against this contention of the opponent, all of the witnesses who signed the will
were called as witnesses, and each declared that the deceased was of sound mind
at the time said will was made and fully understood its contents and signed the
same in their presence and that they each signed the will in the presence of each
other, as well as in the presence of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decedents will is valid
HELD:
Yes, it is valid. The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was incompetent
to make his will because he was blind at the time the same was executed and had
been for several years theretofore. There is absolutely no proof to show that the
deceased was incapacitated at the time he executed his will. No presumption of
incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only requirement of
the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of age and of
sound mind and memory. (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) Section 620
of the same code prohibits blind persons from acting as witnesses in the execution
of wills, but no limitation is placed upon the testamentary capacity, except age and
soundness of mind.
[219]

LLB-3B
CUYUGAN vs. BARON

G.R. No. L-41947
January 16, 1936
DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity and intent
The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent
to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts
will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no
application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no
application, moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of the testator his mental
condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor obviously does it
apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in
question.
Facts:
Silvestra Baron died of heart failureand was eighty-six years of age. She left an estate exceeding
in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will. She died single without forced
heirs.The will appointed VivencioCuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The original of this will is
signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron" Both copies are written in the
Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David,
Valeriano Silva and ZacariasNuguid (known to the testator).The oppositorsGuillermo Baron,
brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first, that
at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically
incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to
the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who
affixed their signatures thereto.
ISSUE:
[220]

Whether or not Silvestra Baron, a woman of advanced years and in a critical state of health,
possesses testamentary capacity to make a will.
HELD:
NO.The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she
suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were
immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was
unable to do anything for herself. Silvestra had an attack and was in a serious condition and
requested that a doctor be sent immediately. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving,
VivencioCuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the house prepared to obtain the
will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the
proponent. EpifaniaSampang, testified that when she reached the house she found her grandaunt
lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only
groaned; that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen.
There is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation of the alleged
will except that when she was asked if she wished to include her sister Faustina in the will she
said "Yes" in Pampanga. There is no affirmative evidence that she understood the document
when it was read to her. Standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the
chief beneficiary, VivencioCuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word was
exchanged between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don't know what drug the
doctor administered but it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental
condition she had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not
even sign her name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted by
one of the astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign another copy which
was done.She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred
forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession
alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the
record that before her death she had denied to several persons that she made any will.This belief
on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation in the
forty-four days during which she lingered in this life.
De La Cruz, Fatima Nica Q.

LLB-3B
[221]
SAMSON vs.CORRALES TAN, ET AL

G.R. No. L-23729
December 5, 1925
TOPIC:Unless the acknowledgment is made in a will or other public

[222]

document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the
civil register.
FACTS:
Flaviana Samson was legally married to the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan,
that she and her children Arsenia, Gregoria, Santiago, Dativa, Aurelio, and
Amancio Corrales Tan y Samson, are his legal heirs, and the appellant
Vicente Corrales Tan, while a natural child of said Mariano Corrales Tan, has
not been legally acknowledged as such and is therefor not entitled to a share
in the inheritance beyond the amount bequeathed to him in the will of the
deceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not upon the facts found Vicente Corrales Tan can be considered
an acknowledged natural child of the deceased.
HELD:
The court below found that before his marriage to Flaviana Samson, Mariano
Corrales Tan was living with a woman by the name of Prudencia Santos and
with her had a child, the herein appellant, that in his certificate of baptism, it
is stated that he was the natural child of Mariano Corrales Tan and Prudencia
de los Santos; that in another document of the same date on file in the
archives of the parish church where the child was baptized, Mariano Corrales
Tan, in the presence of two witnesses, recognized Vicente Corrales Tan
Quintin as his natural child had with Florentina de los Santos.
Vicente Corrales became of age long before the death of his father. Hence,
paragraph 1 of article 137 above quoted is not applicable to his case and, in
order to establish his status as an acknowledged natural child, he must show
that he was so acknowledged during the life of the deceased. According to
article 131, such acknowledgment "must be made in the record of birth, in a
will, or in some other public document." The record of birth mentioned in
article 131 is that provided for in article 326 of the same Code and as the
application of that article to the Philippine Islands was suspended by decree
of the Governor-General dated December 29, 1889, and was never put into
[223]

effect, it follows that form of acknowledgment did not exist in this country in
the year 1894. Whether entries in the civil register provided for in section
2214 of the Administrative Code will meet the requirements of article 131,
we need not here decide.
But it is argued that article 327 of the Civil Code is applicable to the present
case. That article reads:
The records of the registry shall be evidence of civil status and no
other evidence thereof shall be admitted, unless such records have
never existed or the books of the registry have disappeared, or the
question arises in the course of litigation.
In our opinion that article only lays down a rule of evidence and has no
bearing on the formalities for a valid acknowledgment of a natural child; as
we have seen, article 131 requires that unless the acknowledgment is made
in a will or other public document, it must be made in the record of birth, or
in other words, in the civil register.
The fact that a person in the will of the deceased is named as one of the
legatees is an implied acknowledgment. There is, of course no merit in this
suggestion; legatees are as often as not unrelated to the testator.
It is also suggested that Exhibit B is a public document and, therefore, in

itself a sufficient acknowledgment. Assuming without conceding that it is a
public document, it would nevertheless not constitute an acknowledgment
unless duly approved by a court.
De La Cruz, Fatima Nica Q.

LLB-3B
[224]
ACOP vs. PIRASO

52 Phil 660
January 16, 1929
DOCTRINE:
The will must be executed in a language or dialectknown to the testator.If the testator resides in
ascertain locality, it can be presumed that he knows the language or dialect in said
locality.Naturally,it is useless to avail of this presumption if the willis not written in the dialect
of the locality. Moreover, the presumption is only prima facie, and therefore, the contrary may be
proved. Thus, it may be shown, for example, by proof in court that the testator was
reallyignorant of the language of the community or locality, or of the language in which the will
had been written.
FACTS:
The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso
because the will sought to be probated was written in English. Evidence showed that Piraso knew
how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in
that dialect. Proponent-appellant SixtoAcop alleged that the lower court erred in not holding that
the testator did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in said
dialect.
ISSUE:
Should the will be probated?
HELD:
NO.The will is not valid. The testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he
resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. The decedents alleged will, being written in
English, a language unknown to the decedent, cannot be probated because it is prohibited by the
law, which clearly requires that the will be written in the language or dialect known the testator.
Nor can the presumption in favor of a will established by the SC in the case of Abangan
vs. Abanganto the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he
resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. First, it was not proven that English is the language
of Baguio where the deceased lived and where the will was drawn. The record contains positive
[225]

proof that the testator knew no other language other than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering
of Ilocano. He did not know the English language in which the will was written.
De La Cruz, Fatima Nica
LLB-3B
PERRY vs. ELIO

G.R. No. L-9089
January 5, 1915
DOCTRINE:"If a party writes or prepares a will under which he takes a

benefit, that is a circumstance which ought generally to excite the suspicion
of the court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and zealous in examining the
evidence in support of the instrument, in favor of which it ought not to
pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that
the paper propounded does express the true will of the deceased
FACTS:
Upon the deceased of SoteraBarrientos, a resident of the municipality of
Mambajao, Province of Misamis, 68 years of age, the wife of Samuel Perry in
her third marriage, in the said municipality on August 31, 1912, two
documents were presented in the Court of First Instance of the said province,
each of which, according to those who respectively presented them, was the
last will and testament of the said deceased.
The first document was filed on September 4, 1912, that is, four days after
the death of the testatrix, by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and her
brother-in-law; and the second on December 20 of the same year, 1912, by
Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. Perry opposed probate of the first
document, and Elio, in turn, that of the second. By agreement of both parties
the two petitions were heard jointly, in order that the evidence introduced to
support the one might be used to impeach the other. Likewise the court, on
February 1, 1913, made one single order in both cases, whereby, after giving
due weight to the evidence introduced and setting forth the findings of fact
and of law that he deemed pertinent with respect to each of the said
[226]

petitions and to the documents to which they respectively referred, he held
that the said two wills were true and authentic, but that the one executed on
September 21, 1910, had been revoked by the one subsequently executed
on August 26, 1912. He therefore denied the probate of the first, that is, of
the one executed in favor of Samuel Perry, and ordered that the second will,
in favor of the other petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the last will and
testament of the said SoteraBarrientos, disallowing with costs the claim of
the respondent Perry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deceased understood the terms and knew the effects of
the document, the legalization of which as a will had been ordered by the
court.
HELD:
NO.Based from the testimony obtained from this case, on the occasion to
which the witnesses refer, that is, at the time they and Elio presented
themselves at the house of SoteraBarrientos with the document prepared by
Elio in order that it might be executed as her will, the weakness of the
testatrix was so great that not only was she unable to sign the said
instrument, all the means employed for that purpose having been in vain,
but she had also lost the power of speech, for, according to Matayabas, what
she said could no longer be understood, nor were the signs that she made
well understood. According to Sabido, she was no longer able to talk; she
merely made movements with her head, although, as all these witnesses
testified, she gave it to be understood that the document that had been read
to her was her will and expressed her wishes, because she replied to the
questions which were put to her ascertain whether such it was, by saying
yes; but, according to the witness Rivera, this reply was made with great
effort.
De La Cruz, Fatima Nica

LLB-3B
[227]
[228]
ABANGAN v ABANGAN
46 Phil 476
Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS
FACTS:
On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July,
1916. From this decision the opponents appealed. The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains
all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban and by three
witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by
the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the
testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to
appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.
HELD:
YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its
object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of
the testatrix. In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second
contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is
not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
[229]

guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in
such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight
of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustration of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

LLB III-B
GONZALEZ vs. LAUREL

G.R. No. L-19079
January 15, 1923
FACTS:
By an order dated December 16, 1921, the Court of First Instance of Batangas
allowed the document, to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased
Maria Tapia, thus granting the petition of Primitivo L. Gonzalez and overruling the
opposition presented by Jovita Laurel.
Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from that ruling of the court below, alleging
that court erred:
1. The supposed will of the deceased Maria Tapia y Castillo, was executed with the
solemnities prescribed by the law, notwithstanding that there was no proof of the
dialect known by the said deceased and of the fact that it was the same in which
said was written.
2. In not holding that the signatures of Maria Tapia appearing had been obtained
through deceit, surprise, fraud, and in an illegal and improper manner.
3. It was obtained through unlawful pressure, influence and machinations of the
applicant, Primitivo L. Gonzalez, one of the legatees, in connivance with Attorney
Modesto Castillo.
[230]

4. In not finding that the deceased Maria Tapia was physically and mentally
incapacitated at the time she is said to have executed.
5. A valid and authentic and allowing it to probate as the will and testament of the
deceased Maria Tapia y Castillo.
The deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog
region, where said deceased had real properties for several years. It also appears
that she requested Modesto Castillo to draw her will in Tagalog. From the record
taken as a whole, a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog
dialect, which presumption is now conclusive for not having been overthrown nor
rebutted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing
and signing the will.
HELD:
The preponderance of evidence in this respect is that said document was executed
and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without fraud, deceit,
surprise, or undue influence or machinations of anybody, she being then mentally
capacitated and free. Such is the fact established by the evidence, which we have
carefully examined.

LLB III-B
REYES vs. ZUIGA VDA. DE VIDAL

G.R. No. L-2862
April 21, 1952
FACTS:
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuiga
Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition based on several
grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties presented
[231]

their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will
on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not
genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish
language in which it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine,
the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed
the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are
genuine
2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the
language in which the will was written
3) Whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she
signed the will.
HELD:
1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law,
petitioner presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the
execution of the will. These witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero,
Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. These witnesses testified in
their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated
on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and
after she had signed it in the places where her signatures appear, they in
turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of each other. The
standards should, if possible, have been made by the same time as the
suspected document. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time
of the origin of the document, so that one part comes from the time after the
origin. If possible less than five or six signatures should always be examined
and preferably double that number.
2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will
is the failure of the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the
language in which the will in question appears to have been written.
According to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be written
in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been
proven, the probate of the will must fail. And the wIll was disallowed.
3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing
[232]

the will is the fact that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind
when she signed the will, and it reached this conclusion, not because of any
direct evidence on the matter, but simply because the deceased signed the
will in a somewhat varied form. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or
lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the
writings of old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are
indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of the writer. A comparison
of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression.
LLB III-B
Testate Estate of Pilapil

GR No. L-47931
[233]

June 27, 1941

FACTS:
The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that the will was not properly paged as it was
numbered with letters. At the foot of the 1st page appears pase ala 2 (pass on to the 2nd page).
The bottom of the 2nd page also has the phrase pase ala 3 (pass on the 3 rd page). The third page
contains the will is comprised of 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions and written in 3 pages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will must be duly admitted for probate.
HELD:
Yes, the will must be admitted for probate. The paging in this case was a sufficient compliance
with the law. It is sufficient that the number of pages can be identified. Indeed, the will in this
case, as stated in the 3rd page, contains no more, no less than 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions
and written in 3 pages.

LLB III-B
ANDALIS VS. PULGUERAS

59 Phil 643
Date:
FACTS:
The alleged will of Victor Pulgueras was admitted to probate. The testimony of only one to the
[234]

attesting witnesses was taken. The testimony was: a) that the 6 pages of the will were signed on
the margin by the testator and two of the witnesses on January 4, 1931; b) the remaining three
pages were signed by the testator and the three attesting witnesses on January 11, 1931, and that
the third attesting witness then signed the first six pages.
ISSUE:
Was the will executed properly?
HELD:
Such an execution of the will was not in conformity with the law. Under our statute, the
execution of a will is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if the various
participants sign on various days and in various combinations of those present.
FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
MAMERTO GILLESANIA, ET ALvs NICOLAS MENASALVAS, ET AL

13 Phil 116
FACTS:
On the 27th day of June, 1903, GracianoFadrigon executed his last will and testament. On the
5th day of November, 1905, the said Fadrigon died. Later the said will was presented to the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Antique for probate. The probation of the will was
[235]

opposed by some of the relatives of the deceased. The opposition seems to be based upon two
grounds:
First. That the witnesses who signed the will did not all sign in the presence of the testator and in
the presence of each other as required by section 618 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions;
and
Second. That the said testator was mentally incapable of making said will at the time the same
was authorized and made.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate
HELD:
An examination of the evidence shows that each of the six persons who signed the said will were
examined as witnesses and it appears, beyond peradventure of doubt, that five of the six
witnesses signed the said will at the request of the testator, in the presence of the testator and in
the presence of each other. It is true that one of the witnesses, Mateo Mena, who was the first
witness to sign the will, immediately left the room where the will was executed, and did not see
the other witnesses sign the said will. We are of the opinion and so hold, that, when three of all
the witnesses who signed the will, signed at the request of the testator and in his presence and in
the presence of each other, the requirements of the law were thereby complied with. The mere
fact that there six witnesses to the said will and that one of them did not see the others sign is not
sufficient to invalidate the said will when the other requirements of the law are satisfied.
FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
YAP TUA vs YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA LLU

27 Phil. 579
FACTS:
[236]

One Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be
admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It
appears that the said Tomasa died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909.
Accompanying said petition and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears
that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and
Timoteo Paez. Said petition, after due notice was given, was brought on for hearing. Timoteo
Paez declared that he was 48 years of age; that he had known the said Tomasa; that she had died
on the 11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament;
that he was present at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a
witness; that Anselmo and Severo had also signed said will as witnesses and that they had signed
the will in the presence of the deceased. Pablo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that he
was 40 years of age; that he knew Tomasa during her lifetime; that she died on the 11th day of
August, 1909, in the city of Manila; that before her death she had executed a last will and
testament; that he was present at the time said last will was executed; that there were also said
will. The court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. Gabriel La O
accepted said appointment, took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his
duties as guardian ad litem of said parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not decedent complied with the requirements in making a will.
HELD:
Yes. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of
the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the
presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is
not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the
necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will. Where there
is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the courts to reach conclusions that are
absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or
hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity. Upon a full
consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties,
the will dated August 11, 1909.
FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
In the matter of the estate of REMIGIA SAGUINSIN
vs.
RUFINA SAGUINSIN
[237]

41 Phil. 875
FACTS:
There was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance an
instrument which the petitioner calls the will of Remigia Saguinsin. It is a manuscript signed by
the alleged testatrix and three witnesses on October 3, 1918, these three signature together with
that of the alleged testatrix are written also on the left margin of the first page or folio and on the
third page or second folio, but not on the second page or reverse side of the first page where, as
is seen, the manuscript is continued, the second folio not containing anything but the date and the
and of the manuscript.
Under these, conditions the instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged testatrix and after
the taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear three times and in
different parts of the manuscript, the court declared that the document attached to the record
could not be allowed as a will. Certain person who allege themselves to be legatees appealed
jointly with the lawyer for the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the making of the will complied with the requirements prescribed by law.
HELD:
No, Two pages constitute one leaf. One page represents only one-half of one leaf. The English
text requires that the signature which guarantees the genuineness of the testament shall be placed
on the left hand margin of each page and that each page should be numbered by letter in the
upper part This requirement is entirely lacking on the second page that is, on the reverse side of
the first. The first folio and the reverse side, should have been stated, and the second page would
then have been included in the citation. By the failure to comply with this requisite the law has
been obviously violated. This failure to comply with the law also vitiates the will and invalidates
it, as the second page is lacking in authenticity. It may very well be that it was subsequently
added thereby substituting the will of the testatrix, a result for the prevention of which this
manner of authenticity by affixing the signature on each page and not merely on each folio was
provided for by law. This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that
the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages
having been written, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed with the signature
of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
FALCATAN, GARY
LLB III-B
[238]

AVERA vs. GARCIA.
G.R. No. 15566
September 14, 1921
Topic/ Doctrines: Forms of Will
FACTS:
In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the
will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez,
the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia.
Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of
the three attesting witnesses who testified - with details not necessary to be here
specified - that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and
that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the
latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the
request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was
their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will. When the proponent
rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony
tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was
made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was
about. After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof thus
presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the
will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly
executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate. law library
ISSUE:
a. whether or not a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon
the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the
absence of the other two;
b. whether or not the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that
the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the
right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
HELD:
a. When the petitioners for probate of a will is contested the proponent should introduce all three
of the attesting witnesses, if alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the execution
[239]

of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one, without
satisfactory explanation of the failure to produce the other two.
b. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirement of existing law is not
rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses
appear in the right margin instead of the left.
Fernandez, Elaine Joy

LLB III-B
NAYVE vs. MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755
December 29, 1924
FACTS:
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his
surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar,
sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased. The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried
the case, overruled the objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the
document in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in
accordance with law. From this judgment the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of
the court allowing the will to probate and overruling their opposition. The will in question,
Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side of each, that is, four pages
written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1,"
"Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued,
was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the
third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side
of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the
page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of
the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the
signature of the testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid for: (a) not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses
on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being
paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or
pages actually used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all
the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the
sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other.
[240]

HELD:
a. The rule laid down in that case is that the document contained the necessary signatures on each
page, whereby each page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible
alteration. In that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to
probate.
b. paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit
of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.
c. attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will; but when, as in
the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of
the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then
there can be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of
which the will is composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets
of the will from being unduly increased or decreased.
d. The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one
which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document.
And this fact is expressly stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the
testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere
examination of the document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact,
as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid,
does not exist.

LLB III-B
[241]
MARTIR vs. MARTIR

G.R. No. 46995
June 21, 1940
FACTS:
On December 22, 1936, Hermogenes Martir filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros for the probate of the will of his deceased father,
Hilarion Martir, the document being then identified as Exhibit AA. The said
document appears to have been prepared by attorney and notary public, Esteban H.
Korral, in the Visayan dialect, with one original and two carbon copies. On August
14, 1935, the will was signed by said testator and the three attesting witnesses:
Valeriano Gatuslao, Dionisio Gonzaga, and Olimpio de la Rama. It was decided that
one of the witnesses read the will to the testator, and for this purpose Dionisio
Gonzaga was selected. This was done. After the reading to the document the
testator wrote on the space immediately beneath the last paragraph of the
instrument on page 3, the following: "Murcia, Occidental Negros - Agosto 14. 1935."
This addition in the handwriting of the testator appears both in the original Exhibit
AA and in the carbon copy Exhibit AA-1. The testator than proceeded to sign the
original on the left margin of the four pages and at the foot of its body over his
typewritten name and surname on page 3 thereof in the presence of the abovenamed attesting witnesses. Then the witnesses, one after another and in the
presence of the testator and of each other. signed each and every one of the four
pages on the left margin, Olimpio de la Rama also signing at the foot of the
attestation clause on page 3, and Valeriano Gatuslao and Dionisio Gonzaga likewise
affixed their signatures at the foot of the same clause, but, for lack of conveniently
sufficient space on page 3, on the upper part of page 4. Below the signatures of the
witnesses Gatuslao and Gonzaga on the upper part of page 4 there appears a
"Nota" over the signature of the testator containing certain instruction to his
children. Under this note appears the declaration signed by the oppositor Salvacion
Angela
expressing
conformity
to
the
conditions
set
forth
above.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library. On January 26,
1937, an opposition was entered to the probate of this will by Salvacion Angela,
daughter of the testator. The opposition was amended on February 12, 1937,
alleging as principal grounds that the will was not executed and signed by the
witnesses in accordance with law; that the signatures of the testator were obtained
through deceit and fraud and that undue influence was used by the proponent
[242]

Hermogenes Martir over the testator. After hearing, the trial court allowed the will to
probate and, as stated, confirmed the appointment of Hermogenes Martir as
executor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid because: ( a) the first sheet is not numbered as
required by law; ( b) Arabic numerals, instead of letters, were used in the pagination
of the other sheets of the will.
HELD:
a. The first sheet of the will bears no number and the oppositor claims that this
circumstance is fatal to its validity. The authenticity of this unnumbered page,
however, is not questioned, nor the genuineness of the signatures of the testator of
the witnesses on this sheet. There is no suggestion either that the deceased had
executed another will either before or after the execution of the controverted will.
The principal object of the requirement with reference to the numeration of the
pages of the will is to forestall any attempt to suppress or substitute any of the
pages thereof. In the absence of collusion or fraud and there being no question
regarding the authenticity of the first page and the genuineness of the signatures
appearing thereon, we hold that the mere fact that the first, sheet is unnumbered is
not sufficient to justify the invalidation of the will.
b. The opposition to the attestation clause is based on two grounds: (1) the
statement of the attestation clause that the will consists of four pages when it is
written on sheet and (2) the said clause does not recite that the testator signed
each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses. An examination,
however, of Exhibit AA shows that the will really consists of four pages, the first
page bearing no number and the other three pages correlatively numbered in
Arabic numerals. The attestation clause as follows:This will is composed of four
pages and had been made and published by Hilarion Martir who was the testator
therein named, and that will was signed at the foot and on the left margin of each
and every page thereof in the presence of the said witnesses. We are of the
opinion that when the witnesses certified in the attestation clause that the same
was signed in their presence, they could not probably refer to another person than
the testator himself.

LLB III-B
[243]
VILLAFLOR vs. TOBIAS

G.R. No. L-27440
December 24, 1927
FACT:
This is an appeal from the judgment denying a petition for the probate of a will
alleged to have been executed by one Gregoria Villaflor who died in the municipality
of Santo Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur on October 7, 1925. The petition was
presented by Jose Villaflor, one of the testamentary heirs of the deceased. Pilar
Villaflor, Deogracias Tobias, and several others whose names do not appear in the
record, contested the will upon the following grounds: (1) That it was not signed by
the alleged testatrix personally though she was able to do so at the time of the
execution of the document; (2) that said testatrix did not authorize any one to sign
the alleged will in her name; (3) that both before and after the execution of the
document, Gregoria Villaflor signed various documents by thumb marks; (4) that
although it is true that the testatrix requested that the will be prepared, she
nevertheless refused to sign it because it was contrary to her desires and
instructions; (5) that subsequent to the date upon which the alleged will was
executed, Gregoria Villaflor on several occasions stated that it was not her
testament; (6) that the alleged will was not executed or signed in conformity of the
law.
ISSUE:
[244]
HELD:
That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not on the
last page of the body of the document is, in our opinion, a matter of minor
importance and is explained by the fact that if the clause had been written on the
eight page of the will in direction continuation of the body thereof, there would have
been sufficient space on that page for the signatures of the witnesses to the clause.
It is also to be observed that all of the pages, including that upon which the
attestation clause is written, bear the signatures of all the witnesses and that there
is no question whatever as to the genuineness of said signatures. Held, that is these
circumstances the writing of the attestation clause on a separate page did not
invalidate the will and that the writing of the name of the testatrix by another
person at her request was in sufficient compliance with the law.

LLB III-B
NAYVE vs MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755
December 29, 1924
Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills- If the page of the will are numbered by Arabic
numerals, there is sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement.
FACTS:
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal
instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by
Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased.
The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the objections to
the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the document in controversy
was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law.
From this judgment the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court
allowing the will to probate and overruling their opposition.The will in question,
Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side of each, that
is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written
matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first
two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three
witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the
signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of the reader,
but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the
page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page,
the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of
the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the margin,
[245]

left side of the reader.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters
invalidate the will
HELD:
No. Where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as
in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging
with letters.
LLB III-B
SAO vs QUINTANA
G.R. No. L-24556
December 18, 1925
Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will- Under the rule of strict interpretation, the contents
of the attestation clause were mandatory, and noncompliance therewith invalidated
the will.
FACTS:
The judgment appealed from allowed the probate of the will of the deceased
Victoria Quintana executed on March 22, 1924. Without going into discussion of the
points raised by the parties as to the formalities of this will we find a sufficient
reason for reversing the judgment appealed from and denying the probate thereof.
In the attestation clause there is no statement that the witnesses to the will have
signed on the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of the testatrix.
Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645, provides that he
attestation clause shall state the fact that the testator signed the will and all the
pages thereof, or caused another persons to place his name thereon at his
expressed direction in the presence of the three witnesses to the will, and that the
latter signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
[246]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the instrumental witnesses to state one or some of the
essential facts, which according to law, must be stated in the attestation clause,
would be fatal to the validity of the will
HELD:
Yes. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), this court has held
that the requirement that the attestation clause must contain the statement that
the witnesses signed in the presence of each other is imperative and non-comfort in
said case in support of this doctrine may be adduced for holding that the will is also
null and void when in the attestation clause it does not appear that the witnesses to
the will signed it and every page thereof on the left margin and in the presence of
the testatrix. In order to insure the authenticity of a will, which is the object of the
law, it is just as important, if not the most important, that the witnesses should sign
in the presence of the testator and of each other.

LLB-IIIB
GUMBAN vs GORECHO
G.R. No. L-26135
March 3, 1927
Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will- Under the rule of strict interpretation, the contents
of the attestation clause were mandatory, and noncompliance therewith invalidated
the will.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the widow, Inocencia Gorecho, and eighteen other opponents,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo probating the document
presented by Petronilo Gumban as the last will and testament of the deceased
Eustaquio Hagoriles. Among the errors assigned is included the finding of the trial
court that the alleged will was prepared in conformity with the law, notwithstanding
it did not contain an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses
signed all the pages of the will. In the case of Sao vs. Quintana, supra, it was
[247]

decided that an attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed
the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the
testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs.
Sioca, supra, was cited, but the case ofNayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, was not
mentioned. In contrast, is the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar,supra, wherein
it was held that the attestation clause must state the fact that the testator and the
witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved
by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. It was also held that the
fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can
be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the
document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the
will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to contain an attestation clause stating that the testator
and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will invalidate the will
HELD:
Yes. The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law
of the case is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended
by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended. It is part
provided in section 618, as amended, that"No will. . .shall be valid. . .unless. . . ." It
is further provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the number
of sheets or pages used, upon which the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that "
The will shall be disallowed in either of the following cases: 1. If not executed and
attested as in this Act provided." The law not alone carefully makes use of the
imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce
legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts to disregard the
legislative purpose so emphatically and clearly expressed. We adopt and reaffirm
the decision in the case of Sao vs. Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary,
modify the decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra.
LLB-IIIB
QUINTO vs MORATA
G.R. No. L-31732
February 19, 1930
Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will - Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed
in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page
1097, "A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance
and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will.
No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or
[248]

dispense with those enumerated in the statutes."
FACTS:
The application for probate was filed on October 26, 1928 by Carmen Quinto,
executrix of said will. It was a joint and mutual will of Gregorio Pueblo and his said
wife Carmen Quinto and contained a provision that the surviving spouse shall take
charge of the properties therein described and that they shall pass to the heirs and
legatees at the time of the death of the surviving spouse. To said application an
opposition was filed by Mateo Pueblo, a brother of the deceased, on the following
grounds: (1) That the attestation clause of said will does not state the number of
pages of which the will is composed, and (2) that the attestation clause does not
state that each and every page of the will was signed by the testators in the
presence of the witnesses, and that the latter signed the same in the presence of
the testators and in the presence of each other. Upon the issue thus raised, and
after hearing the evidence, the court rendered a judgment denying the petition on
the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the witnesses signed the
will in the presence of the testators, or that both the testators and the witnesses
signed the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of each other. From
the judgment the petitioner appealed .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court committed an error in denying the application of the
petitioner for the probate of the will of the deceased Gregorio Pueblo
HELD:
No. In the case of Sao vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that "an
attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each
and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is
defective, and such defect annuls the will." This doctrine was restated and
reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30).

LLB-IIIB
Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714
May 31, 1922
Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will
FACTS:
[249]

Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the
requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned
to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's
presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident
wherein
he
replied
that
the
will
has
already
been
destroyed.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will?
HELD:
Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change
the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the
witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The
original will which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated
as the last will and testament of testator.

LLB III-B
TIMBOL VS. MANALO

G.R. No. L-2696
May 5, 1906
Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Dispositions
[250]

FACTS:
On the 17th of May, 1898, Adolfo Garcia Feijoo, a resident attorney and notary
public, by request of the party interested was called to the house of Sixto Timbolfor
the purpose of taking the acknowledgment of Cesarea Manalo y Manalo, the mother
of the plaintiff, Sixto Timbol, to her last will and testament which contained wherein
she named the said Sixto Timbol as one of her heirs. Timbol was also appointed as
executor of the said will, without bond, and given full power to do all things
necessary in connection with the execution of its provisions, the testatrix declaring
that any prior or subsequent will executed by her which did not comply with the
legal requirements should be considered null and void. The will in question was
attested by the witnesses Eugenio Ayuyao, Ignacio Sugay, and Pablo Torres. Sugay
interpreted the will into Pampango and Torres signed the will at the request of the
testatrix who could not write.Counsel for Januaria, Alejandra, Lino Lacson, and
Sinforoso Manalo objected to its being admitted to probate, alleging that the will
was not executed in accordance of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the said will was executed in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Yes. The will in question seems to have been executed in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code that is, in the presence of a notary public and in the
presence of three competent witnesses, residents of the same place, who saw the
testatrix, witnessed the execution of the will, and understood everything she said to
the notary public in regard to her last will. The will further contains the place, year,
month, day, and hour of its execution and it recited therein that after being drawn
up it was read to the testatrix in the presence of the witnesses, by one of whom it
was interpreted to her; that one of the witnesses signed for the testatrix because
she was unable to sign her name; that the will was executed at one time, without
interruption; that the notary was acquainted with the testatrix; that she has legal
capacity to execute the same, she being in the full enjoyment of her mental
faculties, and that all the other solemnities required by law in the execution of wills
were complied with.

LLB III-B
[251]
LIPANA VS. CFI

G.R. No. 47174
June 28, 1940
Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Disposition
FACTS:
One Eliodora Lipana filed in the respondent court an application for the probate of a will
supposedly executed by the deceased, Manuela Lipana, a carbon copy of which was attached to
the application. Natividad Lipana filed an opposition, and her "oposicion supletoria" she claimed
that evidence was unnecessary upon the facts alleged in the application, the copy of the will
attached thereto showing, in itself, that the will had not been executed in accordance with law.
The respondent court, after inspecting the copy of the will but without a hearing, dismissed the
application on the ground that such copy could not be admitted to probate, it not having been
signed by the testatrix and the attesting witnesses at the end thereof and on the left margin of
each page. It is against this order of dismissal that the petition for certiorari has been filed with
this court.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction?
HELD:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
rendering a judgment upon the merits of the case without a previous hearing. The pronouncement
made by the respondent court that the will had not been executed in accordance with law, is
founded undoubtedly on the erroneous assumption that the probate of the carbon copy of the will
was being applied for, It is apparent from the application that what is sought to be admitted to
probate is the original of the will. Such copy was attached to the application merely to
corroborate the allegation as to the existence of its original and not to establish a full compliance
with the requirements of the law as to the execution of the will. Such requirements are alleged in
the application to have been complied with and may proved at the hearing.

LLB III-B
[252]
Gago vs. Mamuyac

G.R. No. L-26317
January 29, 1927
Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will
FACTS:
Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac
executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and
revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court
denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will. Another
petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second
will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly
revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document.
Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the
testator. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and
revoked.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will
HELD:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the
original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the
possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other
competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption
applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be
found after his death.

LLB III-B
[253]
BALUYUT vs. PAO

G.R. No. L-42088
May 7, 1976
Topic/Doctrine: Section 4-Executors and Administrators
FACTS:
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six. On February 20 of the
same year, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a
verified petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his
widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the
decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be
appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special administrator.
On February 24, 1975, the lower court appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator
with a bond of P100,000.
The deceaseds surviving spouse alleged that she was unaware that her deceased husband
executed a will and characterized as libelous the allegation of Alfredo Baluyut as to her mental
incapacity. She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G.
Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.
On March 24, 1975, the lower court cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator
and its order noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while on the witness
stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified".
Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. On March 31, 1975 appointed
Baluyut and Jose Espino as special administrators.
On November 12, 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed
administratrix. which was opposed by Alfredo G. Baluyut
Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a natural child of
Sotero Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses Elino Espino and Josefa de Guzman.
Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an incompetent by the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in its order of September 25, 1975 in Special
Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. That proceeding was instituted
by her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez-Viray.
At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion on November 17, 1975 no oral and documentary
evidence was presented. The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut.
On November 27, 1975, the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrators was terminated and Mrs. Baluyut was then appointed as regular administratrix
with a bond of P20,000. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari.
[254]
ISSUE:
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court has held that, while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs.
Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec.
6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named administratrix
without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as
executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the
issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as
executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening
circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to
be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and
affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.
The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely
raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court assumed that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no
interest in the decedent's estate.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy
(Art. 838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98
Phil. 249).
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as
executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an adequate
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing
Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested
party. That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the
decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition
his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate
court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in
this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.
[255]
JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B
MANG-OY VS CA
G.R.144 SCRA 35
SEPTEMBER 12, 1986
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8-Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a
second wife but without issues. However she had adopted 2 children according to the practice of
Igorots. On September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he called last will and testament
which were read to and thumb mark affixed by all of the beneficiaries who at the time were
already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old Tumpao, the
parties remained to be in possession of the lots assign to them which was in accordance of the
wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed upon by the parties in a public document.
On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-judicial partition in which they divided the
property of Old Tumpao among the three of them only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance ,
sustained by trial court but reversed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will and testament of Old Tumpao be duly allowed even without being
proved in the court
RULING:
In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved or allowed in court.
However the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the Old Civil Code which was the law in
force at the time the document was made. The law says: If the testator should make a partition
of his properties by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter vivos, which is a
consequence of its special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is sustained
by the provision of Art 1056, Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when the
beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and confirmed with the disposition made by Old Tumpao.
[256]
JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B
MANINANG v CA
114 SCRA 478
June 19, 1982
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills
FACTS:
Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will saying that all her real properties
located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all her personal properties
shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have lived with.- Soledad
Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the CFI.- Bernardo
Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta,
instituted intestate proceedings.- The two cases were ordered consolidated.- Bernardo then filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void
because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case. MR denied. Maninang resorted to a
certiorari Petition before CA.
ISSUE:
WON the Courta quoa quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case.
HELD:
YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look
into its intrinsic validity.- The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than
the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate
because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case,
the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case
"shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the
case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on
the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.- Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that
the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the
instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's
Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a
[257]

valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.- By virtue of the
dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been
thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion
was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face
of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable
JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B
Cayetano v. Leonidas
G.R. No. L-54919
May 30, 1984
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills
GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court
EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia,
Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is
Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire
estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that
Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in
Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as
the executrix. Hence, this case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the will was valid
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings
HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.
[258]

In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law
which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the
decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national
law of the decedent must apply.
As to the issue of jurisdiction:
The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where
she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.
JAAFAR, KAIZER
LLB III-B
[259]
De Guzman vs. Angeles

No. L-78590.
June 20, 1988
Topic/Doctrine:
Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and
the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must
allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or
circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the
person who had custody of the will to be probated.
Facts:
On March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro Manila. At the time of his death,
the decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro Manila. He left personal and real properties as part
of his estate. These properties were acquired after the marriage of the private respondent to the
decedent and therefore are included in their conjugal partnership. His estate has a probable net
value which may be provisionally assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less. The possible creditors
of the estate, who have accounts payable. and existing claims against the firm C. SANTOS
Construction are also listed. The compulsory heirs of the decedent are the surviving spouse and
their two (2) minor children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de
Guzman, 9 years old. A diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left a last
will and testament, none has been found and according to the best knowledge information and
belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died intestate and the petitioner as the survey
surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of
administration.
The private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) vehicles registered
under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's
but which are at present in the possession of the private respondent's father-inlaw, herein
petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent
must have the possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late husband.
The private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Her as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman." When the motion was set, no
notice of the order was given to the petitioner. The lower court granted the private
respondent's motion to be appointed as special administratrix.
The petitioner contends that the order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not
having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition
for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for hearing
and published for three consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules of Court.
[260]

Issue:
Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a
writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the
estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased
person even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested
parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[261]

Held:
Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the
administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the
residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is
the executor named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction
over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate
estate by the private respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional
facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for letters
of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a
time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be
given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other
persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in
sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through
publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to
bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment
therein becomes binding on all the world.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting
other persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment.
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the
motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue
a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's
favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de
Guzman.
Jajurie, Fatima Badria

LLB III-B
Salazar vs CFI
[262]

No. 45642.
September 25, 1937
Topic/Doctrine:
A Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is
shown by evidence before it: (1) That a person has died leaving a will; (2) in
the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the province where the
court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of a nonresident, that he
has left a estate in the province where the court is situated and (4) that the
testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the court and is
in the possession thereof.
Facts:
The petitioner instituted special proceeding No. 3109 in the court of First
Instance of Laguna and, in the petition filed by him, prayed for the probate of
the will allegedly made on May 13, 1924, by his deceased mother Damiana
Capistrano, who died in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on December
21, 1936. The petition was opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera, who
filed a pleading entitled "Opposition and Counter-Petition." In her pleading
the respondent, after opposing the probate of said will for the reasons stated
therein, prayed for the probate of the will of the deceased alleged made on
May 11, 1930, copy of which was attached thereto, and for the issuance, to
that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof and directing such
publications as required by law. The court denied the motion for publication
and ordered the respondent to institute another proceeding and apply
separately for the probate of the alleged will. The respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and the court, on March 31, 19937, issued an order
setting aside the former one and directing that the will presented by the
respondent be set for hearing, that the publications required by law be made
and that said will be heard jointly with the will presented by the petitioner in
the same proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court
ordered that the expenses for the publications made in the newspapers be
defrayed by the respondent. The petitioner filed two motions for
reconsideration which were denied and, finally, instituted this certiorari
proceeding. In order that the hearing and publications ordered by the court
may be carried out, the respondent, on July 20, 1937, deposited P24 and
filed the original of the will the probate of which had been sought by her.
Issue:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counterpetition for the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing of
said will to be held in the same proceeding jointly with the first will.
Held:
According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that
the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, presented by
[263]

the respondent, in view of the presence of all the jurisdictional facts. The
respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be considered as a petition
for the probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her on
July 20, 1937. The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to
be rendered by him in connection with the probate of the second will and for
the successive proceedings to be conducted and orders to be issued, in
accordance with section 788, as amended, is not jurisdictional in the sense
that its omission does not deprive the court of its authority to proceed with
the probate of a will, as expressly provided for by section 630. It is the
inevitable duty of the court, when a will' is presented to it, to appoint hearing
for its allowance and to cause notices thereof to be given by publication. The
duty imposed by said section is imperative and non-compliance therewith
would be a mockery at the law and at the last will of the testator.

LLB III-B
[264]
United States vs Guimco

No. 12184.
September 27, 1917
Topic/Doctrine:
A court cannot make a valid order committing a person to jail for failure to produce
the will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure
except when acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the estates of deceased
persons.
Facts:
The testator, Joaquin Cruz, having executed his will, confided it to the keeping of
Chiu Guimco, one of the executors named therein. After the death of the testator
this Chiu Guimco failed to present the instrument to the court within the time
provided by law; and a criminal prosecution was thereupon instituted against him
under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice and
make the order in question under section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
provides the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the
court having jurisdiction, after notice by the course so to do, he may be committed
to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in
close confinement until he delivers the will.
Chiu Guimco appealed to this Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of First
Instance.
Issue:
Whether or not a court may make an order committing a person to jail for failure to
produce the will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil
Procedure
Held:
No. It is in the opinion of this court that this provision can only be applied when a
court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the
estates of deceased persons; and where administration proceedings are not already
pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that there
be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make
action by the court under this section appropriate.
The proceedings in this case, under section 628 of the Code of the Civil Procedure,
is an ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section (628) is a
special statutory offense and is properly prosecuted upon complaint or information
as other criminal offenses created by law. The fact that this penal provision is
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure does not make the proceeding to enforce
the penalty a civil proceeding in any sense. The remedy provided in section 629 of
[265]

the Code of Procedure is evidently a totally different remedy, having no relation with
that provided in section 628; and it is in our opinion not permissible in a prosecution
under the last mentioned section to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed in section 629.

LLB III-B
De Aranz vs. Galing
No. L-77047
May 28, 1988
Topic/Doctrine:
Civil Law; Wills and Succession; The requirement of the law for the allowance
of will was not satisfied by mere publication of notice of hearing; Notice of
hearing to the designated heirs, legatees and devisees, required.
Facts:
private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a
petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the
late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees the probate court
issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied by the probate court. On appeal,
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It is the view of petitioners that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate proceedings
to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the
probate of a will. Petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court, notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is mandatory and
its omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave
abuse of discretion
Issue:
Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known
legatees and devisees is a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will
Held:
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail
or personally. The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
[266]

resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in
the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20)
days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy
of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as
executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as coexecutor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal
service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the
hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their
places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no
question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees
were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will
itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the
testator, But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies
of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the
allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of
hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
LLB III-B
[267]
Paras Vs Narciso
G.R. No. 10959
November 2, 1916
Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
FACTS:
An appeal denying probate of a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of the deceased named Mariano Magsino, on the ground that the
signature thereto was forged; and that the instrument had been prepared
and signed by the witnesses after the death of the alleged testator. The
alleged error in the admission of certain testimony as to the handwriting of
the deceased, the appellants assignment of errors deals exclusively with
alleged errors of the trial court in accepting as true or declining to believe
the testimony of certain witnesses. The trial judge saw and heard these
witnesses testify, and there is nothing in the record which would justify us in
disturbing his findings as to the respective credibility or lack of credibility of
the various witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not certain witnesses who testified as to the genuineness of
certain signatures of the deceased were properly qualified as handwriting
experts.
HELD:
[268]

The genuineness of the signatures in question was duly established in the
manner and form prescribed in section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
and, indeed, these signatures appear to have been admitted in evidence as
genuine signatures of the deceased without objection by the appellant. In
like manner the other matters testified to by the alleged handwriting experts
appear to have been established by other evidence in the record, and it is
quite clear from the opinion filed by the trial judge that he relied rather on
his own opinion, after comparison of the undoubtedly genuine signature of
the deceased with the signature attached to the alleged will as authorized in
the section of the Code of Civil Procedure just mentioned, rather than upon
the statements of the alleged experts. It is to be observed further that the
judgment of the court below, denying probate to the instrument propounded
as the last will and testament of Mariano Magsino, deceased, was based on
the evidence introduced at the hearing on the probate proceedings. That
evidence, as we have said, fully sustains the findings of the probate judge
that this instrument is not the last will and testament of the deceased.

LLB-3B
Asinas Vs CFI
G.R. No. L-29038
March 10, 1928
FACTS:
An application for the probate of what purports to be the will of the deceased
Mauricio Asinas, a resident of the municipality of Looc of the Province of Romblon
was filed in the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Romblon.
Opposition was entered to said application by the respondent Felisa Asinas, alleging
that she is an acknowledged natural daughter of Mauricio Asinas, and by Justo
Asinas, brother of said deceased. In view of the fact that the petitioner Catalina
Asinas denied Felisa Asinas' right to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of
said alleged will.
ISSUE:
[269]

Whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in authorizing Felisa
Asinas to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of the alleged will of the
deceased Mauricio Asinas and the administration of his estate.
HELD:
The Court of First Instance does not exceed its probate jurisdiction in authorizing
one claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a decedent to intervene in the
probate of the alleged will of said decedent, upon presentation of prima facie
evidence of such civil status. Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in requiring
the publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, for three
consecutive weeks, of the date fixed by the competent court for the probate of a
will, in order to afford all those interested an opportunity to appear and oppose said
probate, does not specify who are the interested parties who may appear, nor what
proof they must submit to show such interest. A person alleging an interest in
opposing the probate of a will as an acknowledged natural daughter need not
conclusively prove the existence of such a civil status, or that such status has been
judicially declared; it is sufficient that there be prima facie evidence to that effect.

LLB-3B
Rodelas v. Amparo
G.R. No. L-58509
December 7, 1982
[270]
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. The petition was opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine
Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. With the several grounds
of their opposition that the appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased
left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the
testator. That the alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property
after death and was not intended to take effect. That the original must be presented
and not the copy thereof and lastly the deceased did not leave any will. The
appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved
by means of photostatic copy.
HELD:
Yes. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the
case of Gam V. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeograped or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
may be exhibited and tested before the probate court. Evidently, the photostatic or
xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.

LLB-3B
[271]
Limpin vs Yalung
G.R. No. L-19077
January 23, 1923
Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wils
FACTS:
The first error assigned by the appellant to the order of probate of the alleged will of
Genoveva Yalung, which is the subject-matter of this proceeding is made to consist,
among other things, in that all the witnesses who attested said will were not called
to testify. That is really the fact.
HELD:
Of course three attesting witnesses, only two testified at the hearing of the case,
Cirilo Lacsamana not having done so, notwithstanding that said will was contested.
It is a rule well settled and adopted by the courts and applied by this court in the
case of Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), that "the attesting witnesses required
by statute must be called to prove a contested will or a showing must be made that
they cannot be had." The applicant has not shown that the witness Cirilo Lacsamana
could not be found, nor is there any circumstance whatever in the record
satisfactorily accounting for the proponent's omission to introduce his testimony as
evidence. We deem it unnecessary to examine the other points raised by the
appellant, the one above indicated being sufficient for the purposes of this decision.
The order appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the record be remanded
to the court of origin for the holding of a new trial whereat the applicant shall have
opportunity to complete her evidence, and the opponent to rebut what may be
offered, it being understood that the evidence already introduced by both parties
shall subsist, without special pronouncement as to costs.

LLB-3B
[272]
ESCUIN v ESCUIN
11 PHIL 332
September 24, 1908
Topic/Doctrine: PRETERITION
FACTS:
On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed a will
before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that he was a native of Cavite, the son
Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter being deceased; thathe was married about
six months previously to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and thathe had no lawful descendants; the
testator, however, stated in clause three of his will,that in case he has a duly registered
successor, his child would be his sole anduniversal heir; but that if, as would
probably be the case, there should be no such heir, then in clause four he named his said
father Francisco Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and his universal heirs, they to
divide the estate in equal sharesbetween them.- The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were appointed toconsider claims
against the estate- On the 10th and 12th of July 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de Leon,
andthe attorneys who represented the guardian to the minor, Emilio Escuin y
Batac,a p p e a l e d t o t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e f r o m t h e f i n d i n g s o f
t h e a f o r e s a i d commissioners.- I t a p p e a r s i n t h e p r o p o s e d p a r t i t i o n t h a t ,
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e administrator by whom it was signed in the result of the
proceedings, the property leftby the estator, in accordance with the accounts passed upon by the
court, amountedto P8,268.02- From said sum the following must be deducted the credit alluded
to be admitted bythe commissioners, 10% remuneration due to the administrator, all
legal expensespaid and approved. Deducting the abovementioned amounts, there
remains abalance of P5,014.81.- The partition and adjudication was proceeded with of
the sum of P5,014.81 intothree shares of P1,671.60 to each one of the parties in
interest, that is, the natural son, Emilio Escuin y Batac, in full control as general heir; the
widow, Teresa Ponce deLeon, as legatee of one-half of the two-thirds of the funds of free
disposition; and thesaid widow the usufruct of the other half of the aforesaid two-thirds of free
disposition,the bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct by the widow being adjudicated
toFrancisco Escuin, as legatee taking into account the provisions of article 817 of theCivil Code
upon making the division.- The representative of the minor natural child of the testator objected
in writing tothe partition proposed by the administrator, and for the reasons he set
[273]

forth askedt h a t t h e s a m e b e d i s a p p r o v e d , a n d t h a t i n l i e u t h e r e o f t h e e n t i r e
e s t a t e b e adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac, the said minor.- It was also presented that
in a certified proceeding, plaintiff asked on the 12th of January, 1905, that an allowance
be granted to him for subsistence for account of the estate of the late testator, Emilio Escuin de
los Santos, and that the same be paid him monthly in advance; that judgment be entered
declaring that the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is a natural child of the testator; that the said
minor, as the only natural son of the same is his general heir; that it be held that the said testator
had died without either lawful ascendants or descendants; that the designation of heirs made
under his a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d w i l l b e d e c l a r e d n u l l a n d v o i d ; a n d t h a t t h e
d e f e n d a n t s b e sentenced to pay the costs in case they did not conform to the
complaint, with any further remedy that the court might consider just and equitable.- The
administrator, Ricardo Summers, in answer to the complaint denied all and every one
of the facts alleged in all and every one of its paragraphs.- The court below found that Escuin y
Batac was the recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin de los Santos, had by
Julia Batac; that the testator was also the natural son of the defendant Francisco
Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and was recognized by his father; and that the plaintiff
minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is one of the heirs of the late testator.- By an order of the lower
court, the judge expressed an opinion that a natural child is only entitled to one-fourth of the
hereditary property, the clause in the will being annulled only in so far as the
amount to be divided should be reduced, taking into account the share due to the natural
son and the right of the father and the widow of the testator, each to one-half of the remainder of
the property of the estate.
ISSUE:
1. WON there was preterition
2. WON the testator could be considered to have died intestate
HELD:
1. YES There is preterition to 1/3 of the estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a
natural child; and for the reason that mino9r was ignored in the will, the designationof heirs
made therein was, as a matter of fact annulled by force of law, insofar as thelegal portion of the
said minor was thereby impaired. Legacies, and betterments shallbe valid, insofar as they are not
illegal, for the reason that a testator cannot deprivethe heirs of their legal portions, express in the
cases expressly indicated by law.
2. NO. Notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of heirs was annulled and that thelaw
recognizes the title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the property of hisnatural father,
as his lawful and general heir, it is not proper to assert that the lateEmilio Escuin de los Santos
died intestate in order to establish the conclusion that hissaid natural recognized child is
entitled to succeed to the entire estate under theprovisions of article 939 of the Civil
Code, inasmuch in accordance with the law a citizen may die partly testate and partly
intestate (art. 764, Civil Code). It is clear andunquestionable that it was the wish of the testator to
favor his natural father and hiswife with certain portions of his property which, under
the law, he had the right todispose of by will, as he has done, provided the legal portion of
[274]

his general heir wasnot thereby impaired, the two former persons being considered as legatees
under thewill.
Jimenez, May Marie Ann

LLB-3B
Tolentino v Francisco
G.R. No. L-35993
December 19, 1932
Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of a Will
FACTS:
A petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Adelaida
Tolentino de Concepcion, for the purpose of procuring probate of the will of
Gregorio Tolentino. Opposition was made to the probate of the will by Ciriaco
Francisco, Natalia Francisco, and Gervasia Francisco. the trial court overruled
the opposition, declared the will to have been properly executed, and
allowed the probate thereof. From this order the three opponents appealed.
Gregorio Tolentino was had been married to Benita Francisco (predeceased),
The pair had no children. Tolentino contemplated leaving his property mainly
to these kin of his wife, he had kept a will indicating this desire. However,
strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between
Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will.
To this end, Tolentino went to an attorney Repide and informed him that he
wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. Tolentino
stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repides office, with Repide
himself as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses
Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the office. Tolentino
returned to him the draft of the will with certain corrections. Among the
changes thus made was the suppression of the names of Monzon, Sunico,
[275]

and Repide as attesting witnesses, these names being substituted by the
names of Jose Syyap, Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. Tolentino
further stated to his attorney that he had arranged with the three intending
witnesses to meet at five oclock in the afternoon of the next day, for the
purpose of executing the will.
It is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive pages of
a will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being
left to the testator himself. Arriving at the place, the three entered the office
of Legarda. Tolentino asked Legarda to permit the will to be signed in his
office, and to this request Legarda acceded.
Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saying that it was
his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the
original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself
took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who
thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will. He
then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next
proceeded to sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his name
G. Tolentino in the proper places. Following this, each of the three
witnesses signed their own respective names at the end of the will, at the
end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the
instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of
attestation were present together, and all fully advertent to the solemnity
that engaged their attention.
ISSUE: whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:
Yes. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or
more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in
proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs.
Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof
that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law. The
order appealed from will therefore be affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.

LLB-3B
[276]
NABLE JOSE vs USON
G.R. No. L-8927

March 10, 1914
Topic/Doctrine: Codicil
FACTS:
The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first and
second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson.
first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that after her
husband's death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named,
shall succeed him as heirs."
the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one
of her heirs then living, in each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed
her husband in the property. Among those mentioned specially are the nieces as
well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters.
[277]

Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other
and under exactly the same conditions.
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only
that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at
the time the will was made; that the property should be divided into six equal parts
corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living sister should take one-sixth,
and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one- sixth
to be divided among said children equally.
appellants asserted that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the
codicil above-quoted the property should be divided equally between the living
sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece
taking the same share that a sister receives.
ISSUE:
WON the appellants contention is correct.
HELD:
Yes. it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her
sisters and nieces. the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it
seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph of the codicil,
is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she
names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that
they must take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires
shall become the owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among them
we find the names of the nieces as well as of the sisters. We have also the final
declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and the nieces shall take
and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that the
testatrix's intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in
extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended.

LLB-3B
ACAIN vs IAC
G.R. No. 72706,
October 27, 1987
Topic/Doctrine: Preterition
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of
[278]

the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died
leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted
as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia
Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the
deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains
motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prefudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption
gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in
the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.
[279]

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because
the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written.

LLB-3B
Azuela vs. CA
GR No. 122880
April 12, 2006
[280]

Topic/Doctrine: Formal requisites of a Will
Facts:
Will was two pages long. The number of pages were also not stated in the
attestation, only a blank was there. The will was not properly acknowledged.
(Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 Hunyo, dito sa Manila.) The witnesses
also did not sign under the attestation clause but on the left hand margin of the
page.
Issue:
Is the will valid?
Held:
Invalid will.
Issue of number of pages: no substantial compliance in this case because no
statement in the attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as to the
number of pages which comprise the will.
Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause: the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself. The attestation clause is separate and
apart from the disposition of the will. They should sign below it.
Issue of not properly acknowledged: contrary to Art 806. Acknowledgement is the
act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and
declaring it to be his act or deed. Moreover, will must be acknowledged and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

LLB-3B
AUSTRIA VS. HON. ANDRES REYES

G.R. No. L-23079
[281]

February 27, 1970
Doctrine: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the CivilCode, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown to be false;and third, it must appear from the face of the
will that the testator would not havemade such institution if he had known the falsity of the
cause.
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda.de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her
last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are nephews
and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate designated
for respondents, all of whom were Basilias legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to
be the nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the
decedent in accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and
without any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the
whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into believing
that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as the
latter's legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have instituted the respondents as
heirs had the fact of spurious adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the
use of the terms, "sapilitangtagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitangmana" (legitime),
the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that
under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby,
the statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written,
unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of such cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in
her will.
HELD:
NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the
will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the
cause. The decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such
institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other considerations. The decedents disposition of
the free portion of her estate, which largely favored the respondents, compared with the
relatively small devise of land which the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a
perceptible inclination on her part to give the respondents more than what she thought the law
[282]

enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the respondents from the inheritance, considering that
petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy,
would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this
case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be allowed to prevail.
Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the decedent possessed
testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or
undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to her will must be in order.
LLB III-B
[283]
REYES-BARRETO VS. BARRETO-DATU

G.R. No. L-17818
January 25, 1967
Doctrine: If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in thewill, and the
testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime,there is no preterition. There
is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir receivedsomething from the inheritance. The remedy is
for completion of legitime under Articles 906 and 907.
FACTS:
BibianoBarretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When BibianoBarretto died he left his share in a
will to SaludBarretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two
sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond
was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project
of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in
the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the
second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The
later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes,
as guardian of the children of SaludBarretto, the LC held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband BibianoBarretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC,
which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria
Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased BibianoBarretto,
which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of
one-half portion, thereof. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and
delivered to SaludBarretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of
BibianoBarretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of
the decision of the court based thereon as well.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud
did not acquire valid title to it.
HELD:
NO. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late BibianoBarretto's last will and
testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be
one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not
[284]

null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of
heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud
happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs
expressly named in his testament; for BibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of
his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the
legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of
BibianoBarretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total omission of
a forced heir.
LLB III-B
[285]

RESURRECCION VS. JAVIER
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936
Doctrine: A legatee should be capacitated to inherit. A person who was already dead not only
before the death of the testator but even before the will was madecannot be a legatee/devisee.
Principle of representation takes place only in intestate inheritance.
FACTS:
On October 18, 1932, Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband
SulpicioResurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in
favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The testatrix died on January 22, 1933, and her will
was probated on March 8th of said year.
On October 12, 1933, the court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in August, 1930, even
before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund
of the estate.
Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of
P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this
amount to the funds of the estate.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier is capacitated to be a legatee who was already dead not
only before the death of the testatrix but even before the will was made.
2. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier can be represented by his heirs and entitled to the amount
of legacy.
HELD:
1. NO. The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or any part
thereof in favor of any person qualified to acquire it (art. 763, Civil Code). Upon being instituted
as legatee by the testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by
death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the
subject of a right (art. 32, Civil Code).
2. NO. Gil Francisco Javiers institution as a legatee had absolutely no legal effect and his heirs
are not now entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle
of representation because this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the
legatee died before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs (Art. 766, Civil Code).
LLB III-B
[286]
TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ VS. VDA. DE RAMIREZ

G.R. No. L-27952
February 15, 1982
Doctrine: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validate a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." One degree
means one generation. The second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first
heir.
FACTS:
The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2 grandnephews and his companion
Wanda.The widow is French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who
lives in Spain.Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain
with only his widow as compulsory heir. A project partition was submitted wherein one part shall
go to the widow and the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez, the
grandnephews. It was provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct
and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. The grandnephews opposed the project
of partition and one of the grounds was that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not fideicommissary substitution is valid.
HELD:
The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second
heir mustbe related to and be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the
fideicommissary can only be either a child ora parent of the first heir. Therefore, the estate of
Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:1/2 thereof to his widow as her
legitime and 1/2 of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in
naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, the substitutes.
LLB III-B
[287]
NATIVIDAD VS. GABINO

G.R. No. L-11386
March 31, 1917
Doctrine:A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him,
provided the testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose
conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and,
when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of
those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules
therein prescribed for conditional obligations.
FACTS:
Tiburcio Salvador executed a notarial will and instituted his grandchildren Emilio and
Purificacion as sole heirs. However, clause six is as follows: I bequeath to BasiliaGabino, the
ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a house and lot in CalleLavezares
If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver the same to my
grandson Emilio, upon payment of the latter to the former P4,000.00. Executor Emilio presented
a project of partition wherein it was stated therein that the clause six should be interpreted as
giving the right of usufruct only to Basilia, and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of
P4,000 whenever Basilia should die, but that the ownership belongs to Emilio. Basilia, through
counsel, opposed claiming ownership over the legacy. The trial judge decided ownership and
dominion should be given to legatee Basilia, subject to reservation made in behalf of Lorenzo
and Emilio.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a testator can validly imposed a condition on the legacy.
2. Whether or not the testator meant to bequeath to BasiliaGabino the mere usufruct of the
property.
HELD:
1. YES. A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him,
provided the testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose
conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and,
when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of
those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules
therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and 791.). In the sixth clause
of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to BasiliaGabino
[288]

the ownership and dominion of the property therein specified as to its location and other
circumstances, on condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged,
upon the payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over
this property to the latter.
The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the
happening of the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee BasiliaGabino,
a perfectly legal condition according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of
performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code.
The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver
the property to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee
Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth
clause of the will, the first of these legacies being the voluntary reservation to BasiliaGabino of
the ownership of the said house, and the second, the conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo
Salvador.
2. NO. If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be
understood that the testator meant to bequeath to BasiliaGabino the mere usufruct of the
property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable language employed in the said sixth clause, he
bequeathed her the ownership or dominion of the said property language which expresses
without the slightest doubt his wishes which should be complied with literally, because it is
constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last wills and testaments the testator's will is the
law.
LLB III-B
[289]
MICIANO vs. BRIMO

No. 22595.
November 1, 1924]
Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY

TO LAW; NULLITY OF.If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the
testators order that his property be distributed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and
not in accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to
article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being illegal,
shall be considered unwritten, thus making the institution unconditional.
Facts:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The
judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said scheme of
partition; (2) the denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by
Pietro Lanza of the deceaseds business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the
approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceaseds business to Pietro Lanza
until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellants opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so
much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme
of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the
[290]

matter. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error, It is discretionary with the trial court. and, taking into consideration that the
oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G.
Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our
laws in force must be complied with.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in approving the scheme of partition of the estate of Joseph G.
Brimo?
Held:
No. The approval of the scheme of partition in respect was not erroneous. In regard to the first
assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch
as he is one of the persons designated as such in the will, it must be taken into consideration that
such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testators will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws
of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is
expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor
who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed,
is prevented from receiving his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code. And said condition is contrary to law because it
expressly ignores the testators national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and
the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even
as to the herein oppositor. Gomez vs. North Negros Sugar Co.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the
remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testators national laws.
The orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be
made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B
[291]
MACARIO MACROHON ONG HAM vs. JUAN SAAVEDRA

No. 27531
December 24, 1927
Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSION; MIXED SUCCESSION.A person having executed a will

may die partially intestate. The rule of indivisibility of the testator's will is not in force in this
jurisdiction.
CONDITIONAL LEGACY; INTESTATE SUCCESSION.The conditional legatee does
not acquire the legacy, if the event on which it depends has not occurred, in which case the
legacy will pass to the persons named to succeed the testator in accordance with the law, that is
to say, legal or intestate succession will take place as to that legacy.
SUBSTITUTION.When a will executed jointly by husband and wife provides that in
case of the death of the husband before the wife certain relatives will inherit specified property,
and if any of said relatives die before the husband the survivor will inherit all, the acquisition of
the property by said relatives depends upon the husband's dying before the wife, the last part of
said testamentary provision being a substitution of legatees in case some of them die before the
husband.
Facts:
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will and testament of
Victoriana Saavedra and himself, presented said will for probate, which was ordered by the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga in its decree of February 21, 1924.
This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the property in accordance with
the terms of the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor
rejoined insisting upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan
Saavedra and others be overruled.
On March 25, 1926, the parties submitted a statement of facts, which reads as follows:
"1. That Victoriana Saavedra died in the municipality and Province of Zamboanga, P. I., without
descendants or ascendants, being at that time married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of
them having executed a joint will, which joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this
court.
"2. That the only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate
[292]

are her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel
Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josef a Saavedra,
Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or
did not dispose of her property in said will.
"3. That aside from the estate mentioned in the said last will and testament, duly probated by this
Honorable Court, there exists another parcel of land, acquired by Ong Ham the year 1920, by
purchase from Ong Tah, and adjudicated to the said Ong Ham in Expediente No. 6 (Cadastral).
"Lot No. 3057, with the improvements thereon in favor of the persons named below in the
following proportions: Ong Ham, aged 65 years, married to Victoriana Saavedra, 19/20 parts;
Crispulo Macoto Cruz, of legal age, 1/40 part; and Juan Mocoto, 1/40 part.
"4. That the interested parties in this proceeding herewith submit to this Honorable Court the
rights of the respective parties in this estate, in accordance with the terms of this joint last will
and testament of the spouses, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and of Victoriana Saavedra,
deceased.
"5. That the parties representing Macario Macrohon Ong Ham admit that he sold lots Nos. 34
and 35, of Expediente No. 8196, for the sum of P1,900, believing in good faith that he could sell
the same for his personal uses.
"6. That the party representing Juan Saavedra, and the other relations heretofore named hereby
withdraw their opposition which they have presented to the final account of the surviving spouse,
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and conform to the same, and ask that the Court approve the said
final account."
The lower court solving the question raised by the parties in their agreement of facts, held that
one-half of the property described in the will, all of lot No. 3057, cadastral case No. 6; one-half
of the cash balance of the final account to be rendered by the executor, and half of the proceeds
of the sale of lots Nos. 34 and 35 of Proceeding No. 8196, belong to Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham; and as it appears from the will quoted, as well as from the agreement dated March 25,
1926, that Victoriana Saavedra left no legitimate ascendants or descendants at the time of her
death, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, her widower, is, according to the provisions of article 837
of the Civil Code, entitled to the usufruct of one-half of the estate of the said Victoriana
Saavedra, consisting of onehalf of the property described in the will, excluding lots Nos. 817 and
768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda Saavedra with the consent of Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham; of one-half of the cash balance of the executor's final account, and of half of the
proceeds of the sale of lots Nos. 34 and 35 in proceeding No. 8196, and said estate is adjudicated
as f ollows: one-half of the same belongs in usuf ruct to the widower Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham, and the naked ownership of this half as well as the full ownership of the other half is
adjudicated to Victoriana Saavedra's heirs, named in the said agreement dated March 25, 1926, in
the following manner: sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and
sixteenths of the other half in f ull ownership, -to Juan Saavedra; sixteenths of the naked
ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, to
Segunda Saavedra; and, sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and
sixteenths of the other half in full ownership to Teofilo Saavedra, Manuela Saavedra, Victoriana
Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra and Josefa Saavedra, children of Mateo Saavedra,
deceased brother of Victoriana Saavedra, in equal parts; and to Encarnacion Carpio and Macra
Carpio, daughters of Petrona Saavedra, deceased sister of Victoriana Saavedra, sixteenths of the
[293]

naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, in
equal parts.
"As regards lots Nos. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda Saavedra, the court
adjudicates the same to the said Segunda Saavedra, in accordance with the clauses on lines 99111 of the will.
"Finally, the court orders that the executor, after paying the inheritance tax, distribute among
Victoriana Saavedra's heirs named in the agreement of March 25, 1926, the part belonging to
each of them as hereinabove stated, and after this delivery is made and the inheritance tax, if any,
is paid, this proceeding is to be considered closed ipso facto."
Counsel for the executor appealed from this decision and assigns in his brief the following
alleged errors as committed by the lower court:
"I. In holding in its auto, of November 26, 1926, that the deceased, Victoriana Saavedra, died
partially intestate, and did not dispose of all her' property by the joint last will and testament
executed by herself and her husband, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and in not finding that under
the terms of the aforesaid joint will the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, named therein,
were entitled to receive her estate and participation in the sixteen parcels of land devised under
the said joint will, by the said spouses.
"II. In holding that the brother and the sister of Victoriana Saavedra, by name, Juan Saavedra and
Segunda Saavedra, and her nephews and nieces, by name, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuela Saavedra,
Victoriano Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio
and Macra Carpio, her next of kin were entitled to receive any part of her estate and participation
in the said sixteen parcels of land, devised to the above named legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong
Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint last will and testament."
According to this, there are three ways in which succession may be effected: by the will of man,
by the law, or by both at the same time. In the first case the succession is called testamentary,
because it is based on the last will and testament, which is the orderly manifestation of the
testator's will; in the second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by operation of the law; and
the third is called mixed, because it partakes of the character of both testamentary and legal
succession.
Commenting on the third mode of effecting succession, Mr. Manresa says: "The rule of
indivisibility and incompatibility was transferred to our laws from pure Romanism, and it
remained in them until the XV Century, when the law of the Ordenamiento previously cited
repealed the maxim nemo pro parte testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest. This same repeal
is confirmed in paragraph 3 of the article under consideration (658), which prescribes that it may
also be effected partly by the will of man and partly by operation of law, and in articles 764 and
912 above cited which call the legal heirs to the enjoyment of the part of the inheritance not
disposed of by the testator in his will."
This is a refutation of the appellant's argument that no one who has executed a will can die partly
intestate. That the rule of indivisibility of the testator's will invoked by the appellant does not
hold good in this jurisdiction, is shown, moreover, by articles 764 and 912 of the Civil Code.
According to the first of these articles, a will is valid even though it does not contain any
institution of an heir, or if such institution does not include the entire estate, and even though the
person instituted does not accept the inheritance or is disqualified to inherit; according to the
[294]

second, one of the ways in which legal succession may take place is when the will does not
institute an heir to all or part of the property, or does not dispose of all that belongs to the
testator, in which case legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property which
the testator has not disposed of.
Assuming that the joint will in question is valid, it follows that the deceased Victoriana Saavedra
specified therein that parcels 187 and 768 in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered as a legacy to her
sister Segunda Saavedra, the first parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and the second on
the condition that the legatee devote the products of the same to having masses said for the
repose of the testatrix's soul. As to the remaining sixteen parcels, the testatrix disposed of her
part in them conditionally, that is to say, in case her husband Macario Macrohon Ong Hamdied
before she did, said parcels were to be awarded to her husband's nephews, or to either of them in
case one should have died before the said Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The condition imposed
in the will as precedent to the vesting in the alleged legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of
the right to the legacy, not having been complied with, the trial court found that the part of said
property belonging to the testatrix should be partitioned among the persons called on to succeed
her under the law. We are of the opinion that this finding is in accordance with the law, since,
under article 791 of the Civil Code, conditions imposed upon heirs and legatees shall be
governed by the rules established for conditional obligations in all matters not provided for by
this section (articles 790 to 805). And, in accordance with article 1114 of the Code, in conditional
obligations the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinction or loss of those already acquired,
shall depend upon the occurrence of the event constituting the condition.
Another error assigned by the appellant consists in the trial court not having found that, under the
terms of the joint will, the legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian were entitled to receive the
testatrix's share in the sixteen parcels of land mentioned in said will.
The part of the will invoked by the appellant, states:
"In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, we hereby
order that the properties hereinafter described be jointly given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian, and should either of the two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that all the
said properties be given to the survivor."
The trial court, in interpreting this paragraph of the will in regard to legatees Ong Ka Chiew and
Ong Ka Jian, reached the right conclusion, and rightly, in our opinion, that it provides for the
substitution of legatees in case either of them should die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham;
and that the acquisition by these legatees of any right to the property described in the will
depended on the condition that Macario Macrohon Ong Ham died before Victoriana Saavedra.
The appellant also assigns as error the holding of the trial court that the opponents, the brother,
sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen
parcels of land, given to the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the
said joint will. Such a contention is untenable. As we have said, the acquisition of right by the
alleged legatees depends on the occurrence of the event constituting the condition, that is, the
death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham prior to that of his wife; and this condition not having
been complied with, the' said Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and
therefore the testatrix's estate is to be divided among her heirs in accordance with the law.
To the sixteen parcels of land to which reference is here made, that is, those given to the nephews
[295]

of the testator, should be added lot No. 838-A, proceeding No. 7880, certificate 1257, which the
testatrix had reserved to herself (together with lots 817 and 768), in case she survived her
husband Macario Macrohon Ong Ham.
One-half of these seventeen parcels of land belong to the widower, Macario Macrohon Ong
Ham, and the trial court shall order the division of the other half, that is, the estate of the
deceased Victoriana Saavedra, being onehalf of the conjugal property, between the widower and
the opponents, as provided for in articles 945, 948 and 953 of the Civil Code. With this
modification, the order appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. So ordered.
Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B
Madarcos vs. De la Merced

G.R. No. 39975
June 30, 1989
Topic/Doctrine: The term legal heirs is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the
succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.The term legal heirs is used in
Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the
succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both
testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by
law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a
legitime for them.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by section 119
as entitled to redeem the homestead.Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed
under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the
absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be
considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the
homestead.
Facts:
At issue in this petition for review on certiorari is the proper construction of the term legal
heirs as used in section 119 of the Public Land
Petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain are the niece and nephew respectively of
the spouses Benito Catain and Andrea Madarcos. Francisca is the daughter of the deceased
brother (Joaquin) of Andrea Madarcos while Telesforo is the son of a deceased brother
[296]

(Gregorio) of Benito Catain.
The Catain spouses died without issue and ab intestato. They left a tract of land situated in
Salvacion, Roxas, Palawan, covered by Homestead Patent and Bureau of Lands No. H-27580
and described in Certificate of Title G-25 issued in the name of Benito Catain on September 28,
1925 by the Register of Deeds of Palawan.
The only heirs of the deceased homesteaders were their nephews and nieces. In their duly
registered Affidavit of Adjudication, said heirs divided the above parcel of land into several lots.
The rest of the lots were adjudicated to the other nephews and nieces of the deceased couple. On
1972, Francisca Madarcos sold her share of the inheritance to respondent Loreto Sta. Maria for a
consideration by reason of which the latter was issued Transfer Certificate of Title by the
Register of Deeds of Palawan. Subsequently, petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo
Catain demanded the reconveyance of Lot B pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.1
Respondent vendee Loreto Sta. Maria having refused; they instituted an action for repurchase
with damages in the Court of First Instance of Palawan.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioners had no legal
capacity to sue because they are not the legal heirs contemplated in Section 119 of the Public
Land Act. The trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the action in its order of
August 30, 1974. That order is the subject of the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in interpreting legal heirs to mean compulsory heirs as
enumerated in Article 887 of the New Civil Code, thus excluding petitioners, who are collateral
relatives of the grantees, from the operation of Section 119.
Held:
The term legal heirs is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any
person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.2 Thus,
legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the
will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so
if the law reserves a legitime for them.
As the decedents had left no will, the law supplanted their intention. Their estates were
distributed by intestate succession. Under the rules of intestacy in the Civil Code, the following
inherit successively and exclusively:
1. Legitimate children and their descendants (Art. 979);
2. Legitimate parents and ascendants (Art. 985);
3. Illegitimate children (Art. 988) and their descendants (Art. 990);
4. Surviving spouse (Art. 995) without prejudice to rights of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the deceased (Art. 1001);
5. Collateral relatives within the fifth degree (Art. 1010); and
6. The State (Art. 1011).
Since the Catain spouses were childless and were survived only by their nephews and nieces, the
[297]

latter succeeded to the entire estate of the deceased. Article 975 states that when children of one
or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions.
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to
succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step
into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs
contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
But even as both are decidedly legal heirs of the Catain spouses, only petitioner Francisca
Madarcos can invoke the right of repurchase. The other petitioner, Telesforo Catain, cannot claim
that prerogative as an heir of his deceased uncle because the homestead had already been
partitioned and distributed among the nieces and nephews
The questioned dismissal order of the trial court dated August 30, 1974 in Civil Case No. 945
entitled Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain vs. Loreto Sta. Maria is MODIFIED.
Respondent Loreto Sta. Maria is hereby ordered to execute a deed of resale of Lot B, Psd 37486
in favor of petitioner Francisca Madarcos upon payment by the latter of the redemption price.
The dismissal of the complaint as to the other petitioner, Telesforo Catain, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B
Maria Uson vs. Maria del Rosario
No. L-4963
January 29, 1953
Topic/Doctrine: Descent and Distribution; Husband and Wife; Rights of Lawful Wife as
Affected by the New Civil Code.The right of ownership of the lawful wife of a decedent who
had died before the new Civil Code took effect became vested in her upon his death, and this is
so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights of succession
are transmitted from the moment of death (Art. 657, old Civil Code; Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children
of the deceased can not be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of the lawful wife
over the lands in dispute. While article 2253 of the new Civil Code provides that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so only when the new rights do
not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.
Renunciation of Inheritance Made by Lawful Wife; Future Inheritance, Not Subject to
Contract.Although the lawful wife has expressly renounced her right to inherit any future
property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such renunciation cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor
can it be renounced.
Donations by Deceased; Essential Formalities of Donation.Assignments, if any, made
by the deceased of real property for which there was no material consideration, should be made
in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Art.
[298]

633, old Civil Code). Assignments or donations which lack this essential formality have no valid
effect.
Facts:
This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
situated in Labrador, Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson agakist Maria del Rosario and her four
children who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife
Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession
and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife
and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of
alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by
her husband upon his death. After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence,
the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and
possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants
interposed the present appeal.
Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children
of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional
rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given
the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law
accords to the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not successional rights that were declared for the first time in the new
code shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation?
Held:
No. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first
time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice
any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should
be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior
legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of
the same origin."
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner
of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario,
one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she
had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death
to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
[299]

moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she
expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in
the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason
that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. The right of ownership of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted
from the moment of death based on Article 657, old Civil Code.
The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over
the lands in dispute. As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying
in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor
children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother
and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be
said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if
any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material
consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be
accepted either in the same document or in a separate one. Inasmuch as this essential formality
has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Kinang, Jezrill
LLB III-B
PISALBON vs. BEJEC
G.R. No. 48430
January 30, 1943
FACTS:
Hipolito Manuel, who dies on April 26, 1926, left two widows and a homestead. The widows are
Floretina Pisalbon and Placida Bejec, whom he married on June 23, 1903, and November 9,
1914, respectively. In his homestead application which was filed on September 3, 1917, and
approved by the Director of Lands on August 23, 1918, Hipolito Manuel named Placida Bejec as
his lawful wife; and in fact he and she were the ones who cleared and worked in the land from
the date the homestead application was filed until the death of Hipolito Manuel on April 26,
1926. In view of the conflicting claims of the two widows, the Director of Lands, on August 23,
1934, ordered that the homestead patent be issued in favor of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel, and
accordingly the register of deeds of Pangasinan subsequently issued original certificate of title
No. 1749 in favor of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel. No child was born to the second marriage, but
a daughter was born to the first, namely, Margarita Manuel, one of the original plaintiffs herein,
who died on August 17, 1939, during the pendency of this action, leaving two children named
Cristeta and Esmedia Ancheta. This action was instituted on June 28, 1938, by Florentina
[300]

Pisalbon and her daughter Margarita Manuel, the latter assisted by her husband Pedro Ancheta,
against Placida Bejec to recover from her the ownership and possession of the homestead above
mentioned. Upon a stipulation of facts the substance of which has been set forth above, the trial
court held that in view of the fact that Placida Bejec together with Hipolito Manuel cleared and
worked the land in question, and considering that homesteads are granted to actual occupants of
the public land, she is entitled to the homestead both in law and in equity, and dismissed
plaintiffs' action with costs against the plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
WON the doctrine laid down in Lao and Lao vs. Dee Tim (45 Phil,. 739),won their prayer "that
the decision of the lower court be reversed and another entered in lieu thereof declaring that the
plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to and own one half () pro indiviso of the land described in
homestead patent title No. 1749 issued by the registered of deeds of Pangasinan in the name of
the heirs of Hipolito Manuel.
HELD:
This Court, applying the Laws of the Partidas, held that where two women innocently and in
good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be
regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one half of the estate of the
husband upon the distribution of his estate. Under that doctrine, the half of the homestead in
question corresponding to Hipolito Manuel belongs to his heirs, Cristeta Ancheta and Esmedia
Ancheta, the children of his now deceased legitimate daughter Margarita Manuel, subject to the
usufruct of the two widows over one third thereof. (Article 834, Civil Code.) The right to
usufruct of the defendant Placida Bejec may equitably be considered compensated by the
legitimate claim of the plaintiffs for one-half share in the products of the homestead in question
from June 28, 1938, the date of the filing of the complaint.
LLB III B
[301]
RIOSA vs.ROCHA
G.R. No. L-23770
February 18, 1926
FACTS:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her
first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named
Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two
survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married
Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion
Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child
who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left
a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving
the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of
Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only
heir. It appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were
acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that
after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria
Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are
reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9
still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were
successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo
[302]

Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives
within the third degree of the line from which this property came. This action was
brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against
Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo
Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was
also bound to make the reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to
join as plaintiff.
ISSUE:
WON that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reserves.
HELD:
As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a
reservation by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the
reserva troncal provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in
some respects, these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as
the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal
the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the
reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse
there are two distinct stages, one when the property goes to the widower without
being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a second marriage,
whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free of any
encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the
transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold during the first
stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to the
purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is,
when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to
the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the
reason why the law provides that should the property be sold before it becomes
reservable, or before the widower contracts another marriage, he will be compelled
to secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon contracting a new marriage,
so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those for
whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not required by
law when the sale is made after the reservation will follow the property, without
prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent
purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the property since it is liable
for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value of the
property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable are not applicable to the
reserva troncal where the property goes to the ascendant already reservable in
character. A sale in the case of reserva troncal might be analogous to a sale made
by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the case of a reservation by
the widowed spouse.
[303]

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, it cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far
as it is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the
reservable character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the
questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.
LAGBAS, HJA.
LORMALYN
LLB III B
[304]
CONDE VS ABAYA
GR L- 4275; 13 PHIL 249
MARCH 23, 1909
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiffappellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of
the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya,
brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as
legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.
ISSUE:
May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the acknowledgment of the
natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance
from the deceased natural father.
HELD:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole
life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of
his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception,
be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death
of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument
of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which
was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
LLB III B
Del Val v Del Val

G.R. No. L-9374
February 16, 1915
[305]

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing
the complaint with costs. The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at law and next of kin
of Gregorio del Val, who passed away intestate. An administrator was appointed for the estate of
the deceased, and, after a partial administration, it was closed. During the lifetime of the
deceased he took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to Andres
del Val as sole beneficiary. After his death, the defendant Andres collected the face of the policy.
He paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third
persons with a right to repurchase. The redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of
the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor.
Andres, on death of the deceased, took possession of most of his personal property and that he
has also the balance on the insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased
and not to the defendant personally, hence they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and
personal property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all
the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased, and that the defendant account for
P21,634.80. They also wanted to divide this equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along
with the other property of deceased.
The defendants claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made in the
name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent.
He also averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the
benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and is the sole owner thereof and that it
is his individual property.
The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action due to the argument
that the action for partition failed to comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec. 183, in that it
does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which partition is demanded.'
ISSUE:
Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?
HELD:
No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his individual
and separate property. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the
beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are
the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose
life was insured, is the doctrine in America. The doctrine is embedded in the Code of Commerce
where:
The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the
[306]

contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or
creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor of the
former.
The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:
An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must bring
into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the deceased
during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in order to
compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.
They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are not
betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."
The court didnt agree because the contract of life insurance is a special contract and the
destination of the proceeds is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that
subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life- insurance
contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That was under the Code of Commerce.
The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance proceeds belongs to the
heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. This wasnt agreed upon by the court unless the
facts appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the other heirs should enjoy
with him the ownership of the estate.

LLB III - B
MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. L-57848
June 19, 1982
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:
Disinheritance
FACTS:
Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate of the holographic
will of Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. Later on, Bernardo
Aseneta(herein private respondent), claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her sole
heir instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI-Rizal. The two cases were consolidated with
[307]

the latter court. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will
was null andvoid because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy
should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred that the courts area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of andresolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by thedecedent. The motion was granted. The motion for reconsideration
by Soledad Maninang wasdenied for lack of merit. In the same order, the court appointed
Bernardo Aseneta as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to
perform the trust.Soledad Maninang filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It was
denied. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case is proper?
HELD:
No, it was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and public
policy.Ordinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity; but on the
extrinsicvalidity which includes the capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance
with therequisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.However,
when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic validity of the will may be passedupon like
when on its face there is really preterition or invalid disinheritance making the will void.The
probate might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Suchwould shorten the proceedings if the issues are decided as early as during the probate
proceedings.In the instant case, there is still doubt to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of
the privaterespondent cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further
determination which canonly be made if the will is allowed to be probated.
LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B
PECSON VS MEDIAVILLO
G.R. No. 7890
September 29, 1914
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:
Disinheritance
FACTS:
The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of
[308]

the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation
of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. After
hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir (judge) found that the will had been
signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition .
Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion averring:
That Rosario is and Joaquin was the grandchild of the testator, Florencio Pecson
That Rosario, was disinherited by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the will, because
she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states:

I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter
named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, Rosario, because
she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not
remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario
Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.
That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to
the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which
she now suffers in periodical attacks.
It also appears from the evidence that Teresa (daughter of Florencio, mother of Rosario) also
died. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator.
The lower court found out that the evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when
she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this
date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she was 14
years old, and shortly afterwards became insane, she was not responsible for her acts and should
not have been disinherited by her grandfather.
The court therefore decreed that clause 3 of the will is contrary to law and is set aside for being
of no force or value whatever.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of
the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance.
HELD:
Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the
causes expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can
only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for
such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was
sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the
Civil Code. Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of
which, if contradicted, should not be proven shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it
prejudices the person disinherited.
[309]
In the case, It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age,
she had received some attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from him
and that her grandfather, Florencio, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her
and the said young man. It was upon that occasion when the disobedience and disrespect were
shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The
record shows that after said event, she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never
regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time.
The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her tender years, that she was probably not
responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or
1895.
LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B
EDUARDA BENEDICTO, administratrix of the estate of Maximino Jalandoni

vs.
JULIO JAVELLANA
[310]
Title/Doctrine:
10 Phil. 197
February 21, 1908
Legacies and Devises
FACTS:
The will of the testator provided, among other things: On my entire estate I impose the
obligation that out of the products thereof, all my debts shall be paid, the same being about 2,300
pesos which I owe Francisco Villanueva, without interest, and 2,550 pesos which I received on
loan from Julio Javellana, with interest thereon at the rate of 10 percent per annum, provided,
however, that one-half of the products which each parcel of land pertaining to the estate may
yield this year shall be devoted to the payment of said debts, and should the said one-half not
prove sufficient to meet the liabilities, two-thirds of the said products, or the total amount
thereof, shall be applied; and provided, further, that in any case, the balance of such products
shall remain in charge of the administrator for the settlement of such other charges as the estate
may be subjected to.
And further on Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni I particularly impose the obligation to pay
Teodora Berola, for a period of ten years, an annuity of 300 pesos, Mexican currency, or the
equivalent thereof in Philippine currency; said obligation becoming extinguished by the death of
the said Teodora, in case of her demise before the expiration of the said period of ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased was imposed upon the entire
inheritance, or on any particular property or party in interest named in the will?
HELD:
Yes. The testator has imposed on his entire estate the obligation to pay his debts with the
products of the same, and has prescribed the manner in which the same shall be done untill all
obligations are extinguished.
LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B
SANTOS VS MANARANG
G.R. No. L-8235
[311]

March 19, 1914
Title/Doctrine:
FACTS:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal
property which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children.
The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they
may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed
upon with my creditors.
Among the debts, two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos. In his petition, asking that the
committee be reconvened to consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to present the said
claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact
that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid.
He alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim
against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a
debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor, or to a third person. But this case can only arise
when the debt is an asset of the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testator intended to leave the plaintiff a legacy or a debt?
HELD:
The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has
no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim
of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law and once
established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. Debts are demandable and must be
paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property
and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as
due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already
attempted to show that this sum represents a debt.
The testator left the total net assets of his estate, without reservation of any kind, to his children
per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to any other
person. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave
plaintiff any thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a simple debt, the
present action was improperly instituted against the administratrix.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy
and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after
all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of
[312]

view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to
determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing,
in the first instance, cannot be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such
debtors must present their claims to the committee; otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B
Chingen vs Arguelles and wife, et al.

G.R. No. 3314
January 3, 1907
Topic/Doctrine:
FACTS:
[313]

The object of the action brought by the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen was to recover one half of the
jewels mentioned in his complaint and one half of the rent accruing from a certain property,
which said property, as well as the jewels in question, were delivered as part of their legacies to
the legatees, Carmen Reyes, Jose Reyes, and Pedro Reyes, under the will of the deceased
Raymunda Reyes.
The plaintiff insists to recover the remainder of the property which belonged to him in usufruct
under the law as the surviving spouse of the testatrix, citing to this end article 815 of the Civil
Code.
The testatrix left no legitimate descendants or ascendants. Her surviving husband was therefore
entitled to the usufruct of one half of the estate, where the surviving husband is also an heir
under the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Chingen is entitled to recover the remainder of the property in usufruct.
HELD:
No. It is absurd and contrary to all justices that the plaintiff should received his share as an heir
under the will from one half of the estate and be further entitled to the usufruct of the other half
to the prejudice of his coheir and the various legatees under the will. There is no law or article of
the code which authorizes such an iniquitous privilege. In any event the portion of the estate
subject to the usufruct must be claimed from the heir or heirs in due time, and in the manner and
form prescribed by law. We are of the opinion that judgment should be affirmed, and the
defendants are hereby absolved of the complaint of the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen.
LIM, EKEENA O.
LLB III-B
Delos Santos vs. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. L-29192
February 22, 1971
[314]
Facts:
Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la
Cruz, alleging she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial
partition agreement over a certain portion of land with and that the parties thereto had agreed to
adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition
that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate but in spite of
demands the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold
the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his
obligation while the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action against
him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was
not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the
extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots
adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and
improve properly the subdivided estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee can inherit from decedent Pelagia de la Cruz
Held:
The plaintiff-appellee, Gertrudes de los Santos cannot inherit from the decedent as she is not an
heir of the latter.Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not
inherit from the latter by right of representation. Article 972 provides that the right of
representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the
collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be
of the full or half blood. Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right. Article 962
further added that in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. In the present case, the
relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is
defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the
inheritance.
Luyao, Rodelo D.
LLB-IIIB
[315]

Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte
G.R. No. L-2599
October 27, 1905
Facts:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde asked that she
be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the
estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented
herself as a collateral descendant that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased which
was granted by the court. But later, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed
one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same
time that Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased
a fact which this new relative did not deny be required to render an account of the property
of the estate. The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria
Juana Ugarte yIturralde. The court entered judgment declaring that the petitioner had the same
right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter
to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same time, from disposing of any part
thereof until such accounting had been made and the estate distributed. Maria Juana
Ugarteexcepted to the judgment and has brought the case to this court.
Issue:
Whether or not grandniece is entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is entitled to.
Held:
A grandniece is not entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is entitled to. The court
holds that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate with a niece
in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is
excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and
daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father
of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.
Luyao, Rodelo D.
LLB-IIIB
[316]
Salao vs. Salao

G.R. No. L-26699
March 16, 1976
Facts:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio begot four children named Patricio,
Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio,
died in 1886 survived by his only child, ValentinSalao. After the death of the spouses their
estate was administered by their daughter Ambrosia and partitioned extrajudicially and
the deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan
and Ambrosia, and her grandson, ValentinSalao, in representation of his deceased father,
Patricio. The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina
Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title in
their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at SitioCalunuran, Lubao,
Pampanga. Ambrosia Salao sold and redeem twice the Calunuranfishpond. Juan Y. Salao,
Sr. and his nephew, ValentinSalao, died and the intestate estate of ValentinSalao was
partitioned extrajudicially between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and
VictorinaSalao-Alcuriza. Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao,
three lots and asdonee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation and to Juan S. Salao, Jr. At
her old age, Ambrosia also donated the Calunuran fishpond.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond.
Held:
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the
reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the
donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two
fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation. Even if the
donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to
Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest
relative within the third degree. ValentinSalao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would
have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao,
the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of
Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil
Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the
plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).
[317]

Luyao, Rodelo D.
LLB-IIIB
Intestate Estate of Pablo Luce vsPabellon

GR No. L-1367
Aug 16, 1949
Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Ascending Direct Line
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon holding that upon the
death of Pablo Luce, "all his properties were inherited by his legitimate daughter Cristeta Luce
who survived him for at least half an hour, she having died about half an hour after" the death of
her father.The maternal grandparents are claiming inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta
Luce while the appellants are claiming the inheritance by right of representation.
ISSUE:
W/N a right of representation accrues to the appellants
HELD:
Reliance is placed on article 925 of the Civil Code providing that the right of representation shall
always take place in the direct descending line but never in the ascending, and that in the
collateral line it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters, whether they
may be of the whole or half blood. It is intimated that because the oppositors-appellees are not in
the direct descending line, but are only maternal grandparents of Cristeta Luce, they cannot
inherit by representation. Aside from the fact that the trial court correctly withheld any
adjudications as to the estate of Cristeta Luce, because it is not included in the intestate
proceedings instituted by the petitioner-appellant, said oppositors-appellees are claiming
inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta Luce in their own rights as ascendants, and not merely
by right of presentation, it appearing that the said Cristeta Luce did not leave any legitimate
children or ascendants.
[318]

LLB III-B
Uson vs. Del Rosario

GR No. L-4963
Jan 29, 1953
Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Illegitimate Children
FACTS:
Maria USON (petitioner) is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who died in 1945. Nebreda left
5 parcels of land in Labrador Pangasinan, which lands are thesubject of an action for recovery of
possession and ownership filed by USONagainst Maria DEL ROSARIO.DEL ROSARIO is the
common law wife of Nebreda to whom he begotten four illegitimate children. USON contends
that DEL ROSARIO deprived her of the possession andenjoyment of the lands in question. The
latter, meanwhile, argues that Uson andNebreda executed a public document whereby they
agreed to separate ashusband and wife. USON was given an alimony in consideration of which
shegave up her rights to inherit any property from Nebreda. DEL ROSARIO contends that the 4
illegitimate children she had with Nebreda areentitled to successional rights by virtue of the new
civil code promulgated on 1950.The CFI ruled in favor of USON.
ISSUE:
W/N the renouncement of inheritance executed before the decedents death is valid and
enforceable
W/N the illegitimate children have the right to inherit from the decedent
HELD:
No. When Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land passed from themoment of his
death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old CivilCode). As this Court aptly
said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely
as if the ancestor had executed anddelivered to them a deed for the same before his death"
(Ilustre vs. AlarasFrondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance
of Maria Usonover the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria
Uson had relinquished her right over thelands in question because she expressly renounced to
inherit any future propertythat her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of
separationthey had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simplereason
that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it berenounced.
[319]

No. The court ruled that while it is true that rights first declared in the newcivil code are to be
given retroactive effect, the same is subject to the condition thatthe said rights will not prejudice
vested or acquired rights. Hence, given thebackground of the case, the children cannot have
successional rights since USONsrights would be prejudiced.
LLB III-B
Leonardo vs. CA
120 SCRA 890|G.R. No. L-51263
February 28, 1983
FACTS:
Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria
and SilvestraCailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles
who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while SilvestraCailles died in 1949 without
any issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the
late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and
accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the
lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, the name of the child described in the
birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation,
plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in
the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Granting the Cresenciano is the son of Sotero, as
found by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he
was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married,
and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.
ISSUE:
W/N an illegitimate child can inherit by right of representation from the legitimate relatives of
his father
HELD:
No. An illegitimate child cannot inherit from his great grandparent for being an illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines states that:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child.
[320]
LLB III-B
Centeno vs. Centeno

52 Phil 322|G.R. No. L-28265
November 5, 1928
FACTS:
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were husband and wife who brought no property to the
marriage but acquired much property during their married life. Isaac Centeno died on October 7,
1905, and was survived by his wife Melchora Arroyo, and their three son, Valentin, Faustino and
Antonio Centeno. Before his death, that is, on June 30, 1904, Isaac Centeno executed a will, one
of the clauses of which contained the following provision: "I hereby named and institute as my
sole and universal heirs my three sons Antonio, Valentin and Faustino Centeno or their heirs, if
any, to one-half of the above-named property, provided, that the same be divided equally among
my three said sons."
On October 30, 1907, Antonio Centeno died leaving a widow, Gabriela Fernadez, and a will
executed on October 9, 1907, clauses 3 and 8 of which are as follows:
Third. I declare that I was married once, being still married to Dna. Gabriela Fernandez y
Bribiesca, and during our union we had not a single child; I also declared that although I said I
have no child, the God of pity has given me eight, who are my children by another woman, three
of whom are called natural, who are Martina, Jose (alias Pepe), and TelesforoCenteno, because
they were born even before I married my aforesaid wife, Dna. Gabriela the five are Sisenando,
Antonina, Gregorio, Jose (alias Peping), and Gabriel Centeno, and are called illegitimate,
because they were born after my marriage; nevertheless I acknowledge them all for I have had
them since theit birth supporting and bringing all of them, up until now.
Eight. Of my portion from my deceased father Isaac CentenoPurugganan, and of my future
portion from my mother Dna. Melchora Arroyo, I institute as my universal heirs my three
children called natural, to have and to hold in fee simple during their lives, under God's blessing
and my own.
Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on December 8, 1909, leaving one son named
ValentinCenteno, and a will executed on November 3, 1909, clause 3 of which provides:
(c) The third part shall be divided equally, neither more nor less, among my sons Antonio
and Faustino Centeno, may they rest in peace, and ValentinCenteno. (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and
Exhibit 5 of defendants.)
[321]
ISSUE:
1. Are the defendants entitled, as acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to inherit
from his legitimate father Isaac Centeno?
2. Are said defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to
the reservation of one-half of said hereditary portion which Melchora Arroyo inherited from her
legitimate son Antonio Centeno which hereditary portion the latter had inherited from his
likewise legitimate father Isaac Centeno?
3. Are the defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to
represent their natural father Antonio Centeno in the inheritance of their natural grandmother
Melchora Arroyo, legitimate mother of Antonio Centeno?
HELD:
Articles 843 and 941 specifically provide that the portion corresponding to natural children in the
hereditary estate of the parents who acknowledged them, is transmitted upon the death of these
children to their legitimate or natural descendants. The latter's right, however, to represent their
natural father in the hereditary estate of their grandfather is not admitted, because they are not
called by law to participate in their grandfather's estate.
Hence,
(1) That the defendants, as acknowledged natural children and named heirs of Antonio Centeno
in his will, are entitled to inherit the one-half of hereditary portion which their deceased natural
father had inherited from his legitimate father by will; (2) that said defendants, though they are
acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entiltled to the reservation of the
one-half which Melchora Arroyo received as her legitimate from the hereditary portion which
her son had received from his father, Isaac Centeno also legitimate; (3) that the defendants,
thought they are acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to represent
the latter in the inheritance of his legitimate mother Melchora Arroyo.
LLB III-B
[322]
ANSELMA DIAZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-66574
February 21, 1990
FACTS:
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were
the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union
were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3)
that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero
and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only
legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in
1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of
his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code
of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines)
constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain
successional rights.
ISSUE:
[323]

Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
HELD:
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter.
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of
Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an
illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at
naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article
992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article
982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B
TOMAS CORPUS vs RAFAEL CORPUS
G.R. No. L-22469
October 23, 1978
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will
dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision
in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half
brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia
Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus,
and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in
October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of
Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children
with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
[324]

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He
alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon
alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is
invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on
intestacy.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners has cause of action for the recovery of hereditary share of Teodoro Yangco.
HELD:
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since
Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that
appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share
of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal
heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.
Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that
"an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child"
Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B
EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-44051
June 27, 1985
FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale,
and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and
damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of
sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao
[325]

in favor of respondent Mallillin.
ISSUE:
WON herein plaintiff can inherit from Lutgarda Capiao.
HELD:
The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in quintessence
or in substance the following: 'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one
Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda)
Capiao who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970
and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' (paragraph 5 of the
amended complaint); That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at
Cauayan, Isabela, without any children and/or immediate forced heir and without any will
therefore inestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil
degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs
and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extrajudicial partition.
The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda is
undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad,
retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao Article 992 of the
Civil Code, cited by the movant, the defendant, provides:
Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.'
Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an
illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992
of the New Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia
Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case.
Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B
Intestate estate of Julia de la Pea vs. RUFINO SEVILLA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-21570
August 30, 1924
[326]
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order dated July 20, 1923, of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija denying the petition both of the petitioners and of the opponents for
declaration of heirs and denying also the authority to sell certain property, which
was applied for by the former. Both parties have appealed from this order, each
assigning errors thereto.
This case is concerned with the inheritance of the deceased Julia de la Pea.
The evidence shows that this Julia de la Pea was daughter of Julio Sevilla and
Catalina de la Pea, who were not married. The petitioners have introduced
evidence to the effect that Julia de la Pea was an adulterous child because Julio
Sevilla was married with Josefa Gutierrez who was alive at the time. The fact is that
Julia de la Pea was a child of unmarried parents, and therefore she was not a
legitimate child, nor does she appear to have been legitimated, and is, at most, an
acknowledged natural child, supposing it not to have been proven that she was an
adulterous child, as alleged by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners and opponents herein are entitled to hereditary estate of Julia
HELD:
Now, the persons entitled to succeed a natural child in an intestate succession are
the father or mother who acknowledged it (art. 944, Civil Code), and in default of
either, its natural brothers (art. 945, Civil Code). It was not proven nor it is
contended that the petitioners or the opponents are parents or brothers of the
deceased Julia de la Pea; and with the exception of the relatives mentioned in said
articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code, no other relative of the natural child has the
right to succeed it, as is clearly provided by article 943 of the same Code.
It is, therefore, clear that neither the petitioners nor the opponents can be declared
heirs of the deceased Julia de la Pea without a will.
Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B
[327]
BERCILES v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

L-57257
March 05, 1984
Topic/Doctrine: Premiums are presumed conjugal without proof of payment though exclusive
funds
FACTS:
GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural child and other private
respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as
illegitimate children of Judge Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his
retirement benefits
This was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and their children.
ISSUE:
WON GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a natural child and illegitimate children
HELD:
NO, Art 287 pf NCC illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support and such
sucsessional rights are granted in the code, but for this article to be applicable there must be
admission or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child.
No evidence of admission:
1. There was no evidence that he intervened when his name was put in the birth certificate of
Pascual Berciles, thus his part in the birth certificate is null and void
2. Baptismal certificate has no weight as well
3. Living together does not prove filiations
4. Pictures are not proof of filiations
Their mother was not recognized to be married to the deceased
RESULT: retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five recognized heirs from his
marriage to Iluminda Ponce who is also an heir.
Art 966 of NCC if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving
spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children
Art 980 of NCC children of deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal shares.
Molejon, Jayson
LLB III-B
[328]
Delrosario v Delrosario
2 Phil 321
Doctrine: Construction: In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions the
intent of the testator controls.
Facts:
Testator Nicolas declares in his will the following:
Eight. The testator declares that the P5000 which he brought to his marriage he hereby bequeaths
to his nephews Enrique and Ramon, natural children of his brother Clemente, notwithstanding
the fact that they purport to be the issue of the marriage of Escolastico and Rosendo,
successively.
Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of P5000 is to be divided , P3000 to the first named
and P2000 to the second named, the delivery of the sum is to be effected by the wife of the
testator, provided that this young men behave themselves as they have done up to the present
time, and do not cease to study until taking a degree of Bachelor Arts and then take a business
course, if their health will permit, their support to paid out of the testamentary estate and they to
live in the house of the widow.
Issue:
WON the description of the legatees make the legacy conditional?
Held:
No. where legatees are appointed out by name in the will the fact that they are referred to as
natural sons of third person does not make the legacy conditional upon proof of such relationship
but is descriptive merely.
Jhemahar Indasan Ombra

III-B
[329]
Resureccion v Javier
63 Phil 599
Doctrine: Incapacity to inherit from the deceased person.
Facts:
On Oct. 18 1932, Felisa Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpiccio universal heir and
among other things, left a legacy of P2000 in favor of her brother, Gil.
The testator died on Jan 22, 1933 and her will was probated on March 4 of said year.
On Oct. 12, 1933, the court finding that Gil died on August 1930, even before the testatrix made
her will, and ordered that the legacy of P2000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate.
Gils children claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2000 in favor of their
father.
Issue:
WON Gils children are entitled to such legacy?
Held:
Not. Gil, now deceased, upon being instituted a legatee by the testatrix, lacked civil personality,
which is extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground
that he could not been subject of the right.
Jhemhar Indasan Ombra

III-B
NEPOMUCENO v CA (GOMEZ)
139 SCRA 206
October 9, 1985
[330]
FACTS
Martin Jugo died with last Will and Testament with all the formalities required bylaw. In the
said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as
his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Willthat the testator was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had twolegitimate children, Oscar and
Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged fromhis lawfully wedded wife and had been
living with petitioner as husband and wife. Infact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo
and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.Nepomucenowere married in Victoria, Tarlac before the
Justice of the Peace. Thetestator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and hischildren Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion
thereof to hereinpetitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will
and Testament of thedeceased Martin Jugo in the CFI Rizal and asked for the
issuance to her of letterstestamentary. The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the
ground that as the testatoradmitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from
December 1952 until hisdeath on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will
be an idle exercisebecause on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is
evident. The case reached the CA and the respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI
of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The CA declared the Will to be valid except thatthe
devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article
1028.
ISSUE
WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring thelast Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to passupon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
HELD
NO. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry
islimited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,however,
is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probatecourt is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions
of the Will.
Reasoning:
a.InNuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, nom a t t e r
how valid it may
a p p e a r e x t r i n s i c a l l y, w o u l d b e n u l l a n d v o i d . Separate
or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of thetestamentary provisions
would be superfluous.b . T h e p r o h i b i t i o n i n Ar t i c l e 7 3 9 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e i s
a g a i n s t t h e m a k i n g o f a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is thedonation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that
therecipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
[331]

legacybecausethe testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a personwith whom he
had been living in concubinage.
OPAY, EMMAE ROSE ROSE B.

LLB III-B
Villavicencio vs. Quino

G.R. No. 45248.
April 18, 1939
FACTS:
Considering theprovisions of the will of the deceased E. Z. del R. in their entirety, her collateral
relatives, not being forcedheirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the remainder of her
properties, which does not exist, as to the naked ownership thereof. Said testamentary provisions,
whose validity is not here questioned, should be complied with because the testatrix, not having
[332]

forced heirs, may dispose of her properties as she did in her will, formasses and pious works for
the benefit of her soul and those of her relatives, as provided in article 741 of thecivil
Code.EugeniaZuiga del Rosario died in Batangas, , on December 19, 1934, leaving a will
executed with all the legal formalities, which was probated on February 1, 1935, over the
opposition of some relatives.Subsequently, Santiago Quino and twenty-eight relatives of the
testatriz within the fifth degree in the collateral line, filed a motion with the conformity of the
Bishop of lipa wherein, after stating how the said deceasedEugenia Zuiga del Rosario has
disposed in her will of her properties by way of masses and alms, etc., theyasked that they be
declared heirs of said testarix charged with the duty to comply with its provisions, as towhich
compliance, so they stated, they had already reached an understanding with the Bishop of Lipa
wherebythe said movants, within ninety days from the adjudication to them of the properties
constituting the inheritance,would deposit with the said Bishop the necessary amount to defray
the masses for three years, and wouldlikewise deposit in any bank designated for the purpose an
amount the interest of which would be sufficient tocover the other expenses for the annul masses
and alms ordained in the will. The executor Vicente ReyesVillavicencio opposed the foregoing
petition and the court denied the latter by its order of March 30, 1936. "The lower erred in not
recognizing as proper and lawful under the circumstances, the compromise entered intoby and
between the Bishop of Lipa and the herein oppositors-appellants, with regards to the matter by
whichParagraph III of the will may be carried out and given effect, it being understood that the
said mutualunderstanding will best promote and safeguards the manifest and premordial
intention of the testatrix."cralawvirtua1awlibraryThe appellants contend that even after full
compliance with the will of the testatriz, a substantial balance wouldstill remain after deducting
the necessary expenses for masses and alms and the amount of the allowance forsupport of
Eulalia del Rosario, and excluding the legacy left to UbaldoMagbuhat and Eugracioalegria. As
tothat balance, the appellants contend that the deceased Eugenia Zuigadel Rosario died partly
intestate and thatthey are entitled to succeed her with respect to that part.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the will are valid.
HELD:
Such contention is based on something entirely inconsistent with what the testatrix ordered in the
third clause ofher will. As will be seen, the appellants proceed on the false assumption that for
every mass celebrated for thesoul of the testatrix and those of her parents, brothers and sisters,
something or a determinate amount from thefruits of her properties had to be given. Proceeding
on this assumption, it is possible that the fruits of saidproperties would leave an excess which the
testatrix has not disposed of. However, as we have stated, such anassumption is untenable
because the testatrix has not provided that a certain amount be taken the fruits of herproperties
for the celebration of the masses ordered by her, but has said: "I have that may said properties
bedevoted only for the peace and happiness of my soul and those of my parents, brothers and
sisters, and also forthe benefit of the church, etc." ; and, continuing, she ordered "that the fruits
of the lands and the income of thehouse and warehouse, be spent for masses. . . ." Hence, the
testatrix has provided, not that something out of thefruits and income of her properties be paid
for the masses which she has ordered to be celebrated for her souland those of her parents,
[333]

brothers and sisters, but that all the fruits of the lands and all the income be spent formasses. For
this purpose, and doubtless foreseeing that the income of her properties would be insufficient
tocover the amount of the masses and of its other provisions, the testatrix has ordered in the sixth
and nightparagraphs of her will that, if necessary, her properties be sold with leave of court.
Considering the provisionsof the will of the deceased Eugenia Zuiga del Rosario in their
entirely, her collateral relatives not being forcedheirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the
remainder of her properties, which does not exist, or as to thenaked ownership thereof.Said
testamentary provisions, whose validity is not here questioned, should complied with because the
testatrix,not having forced heirs in the present case, may dispose of her properties for masses and
pious works for thebenefit of her soul, as provided in article 747 of the Civil Code. The
circumstances that the appellants had a n understanding with the Bishop of Lipa as to show they
(not theexecutor) were to comply with the provisions made by the testatrix after they had been
declared heirs and afterthe properties left by the deceased relative had been adjudicated to them,
does not support their contentions inthe slightest, because the Bishops intervention in this case
cannot validate any arrangement calculated to defeatthe testamentary provisions inasmuch as the
testatrix did not leave anything to the Roman Catholic under theadministration or supervision of
the Bishop.The appealed order is affirmed with hecosts of both instances to the appellants.

LLB III-B
CAYETANO v LEONIDAS
129 SCRA 524
May 30, 1984
[334]

FACTS
Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, Hermogenes and her sisters, NenitaPaguia,
Remedios Lopez and MarietaMedina as the surviving heirs.- As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby headjudicated unto
himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion- Eleven months after, NenitaPaguia filed
a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedlyexecuted in the US and
for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.- An opposition to the
reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes alleging among other things, that he has
everyreason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the
will are null and void; and thateven if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are
invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they wouldwork injustice and injury to him.Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating
that he "has been able toverify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be
truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence
for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.- Respondent judge issued an order admitting
the Last Will and Testament of Adoracion and allowed probate in thePhilippines, and
NenitaPaguia was appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.- Hermogenes filed a
petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that
thewithdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. He filed
another motion entitled"Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.- Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the
petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof.Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also deniedthe
motion to vacate for lack of merit.
ISSUE
WON the provisions of the will are valid.
HELD
NO. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the
will, the due executionthereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been dulyauthenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.- Although on its face, the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should havedenied its reprobate outright,
the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death,
an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.- Capacity to
succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. The law which governs
AdoracionCampo'swill is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards theintrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national lawof the decedent must
apply.- The settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of
Manila where she had an estatesince it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her
death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, and not a "usual resident of Cavite"
[335]

as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is estopped fromquestioning the jurisdiction of
the probate court in the petition for relief.

LLB III-B
Pimentel vs. Palanco

5 Phil 436, 439-440
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his
[336]

late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former
and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the
lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow
of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain
has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and
Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due
to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
HELD:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not
apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D.
No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance
of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration
that nothing at all was written.
[337]
Opay Emmae Rose B.

LLB III- B
TORRES vs. JAVIER

34 Phil. 382;
March 24, 1916
FACTS:
Two women are claiming to be the legal wife of deceased Tan Po Pic.Marta Torres objected to
the appointment of any except herself. Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman Yu
Teng New, opposed the appointmentof Marta Torres.-The probate court being unable to
determinewho, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third
[338]

person(Juan L. Javier) to act as administrator.-This appeal is taken by Marta Torres from tha
torder of appointment.
ISSUE:
WON the probate court may validly appoint adisinterested third person as the administrator of
the estate
HELD:
YES, the court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name adisinterested
third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settledin the
administration proceedings at the propertime.-The probate court did not find as a fact thatthere
was a wife in China. The court consideredthe facts and circumstances as they werepresented in
the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concernedto appoint as
administrator a disinterested thirdperson, particularly in view of the fact that therewas likely to
be litigation between Marta Torresand the Chinese wife as to which is in fact hislegal wife and
entitled to an interest in the estateof the deceased Tan Po Pic.
Opay Emmae Rose B.

LLB III- B
Valeriana Quion vs. Vicente Claridad et al.

74 Phil. 100
January 30, 1943
FACTS:
[339]

In the intestate proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the latter knowingly
concealed the fact that the said deceased left a second wife with whom he had two children,
namely, herein appellees.
ISSUE:
W/N the appellees is entitled to recover one-half of decedents estate.
HELD:
YES. That the trial court, in a subsequent action brought by appellees to recover their legal
participations in the deceaseds estate, correctly declared said appellees co-owners of the estate
in question to the extent of one-half thereof, with right to its possession.

LLB III-B
Ramirez vs. Gmur

42 Phil. 855
August 5, 1918
[340]

FACTS:
Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, native of the Republic of Switzerland, but for many years a
resident of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Iloilo leaving a valuable estate of which he
disposed by will. A few days after his demise the will was offered for probate in the CFI of Iloilo
and upon publication of notice was duly allowed and established by the court. His widow, Doa
Ana M. Ramirez was named as executrix in the will, and to her accordingly letters testamentary
were issued. By the will everything was given to the widow with the exception of a piece of real
property located in the City of Thun, Switzerland which was devised to the testators brothers
and sisters. However, the children of Leona Castro which was the natural child of the deceased,
claims that theyre entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased. There are two sets of children
of Leona, the children by her first marriage and in the second marriage.
ISSUE:
W/N the claimants filed within the period as prescribed by law.
HELD:
Sec. 41 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by
occupancy, grant, descent, or otherwise shall vest title in the possessor (now the applicable
law, Art. 1040 of the New Civil Code). This would indicate that a decree of distribution under
which one may be placed in possession of land acquired by descent, is not in itself conclusive,
and that the action of revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put in
possession by decree of the probate court at any time within the period allowed by the general
statute of limitations. The SC concludes that the children by first marriage presented its case in
ample time and that the judgment entered in their favor was correct. As to the children by second
marriage, are debarred from participation in the estate on other grounds.
LLB III-B
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Anastacia Abadilla

46 Phil. 642
December 10, 1924
Topic/Doctrine: Acceptance and Repudiation of the Inherictance
[341]
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment in cadastral land registration case in which case lots nos.
3464, 3464, and 3470 are claimed by the municipality of tayabas and the governor of the
province on one side and by the Palads on the other. Lot no. 3470 is also claimed by Dorotea
Lopez. The court below ordered the registration of all three lots in the name of the governor of
tayabas in trust for a secondary school to be established in the municipality of tayabas. The
claimants Palad and Lopez appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N the governor may receive a devise in trust without previous approval.
HELD:
YES. A provincial governor cannot be regarded as public establishment within the meaning of
the Civil Code and may therefore accept and receive a testamentary devise in trust without the
previous approval of the central government.

LLB III-B
Vda. De Tupas v. RTC

G.R. No. L-65800
October 3, 1986
[342]
FACTS:
Among the assets listed in the will of the deceased were several lots, admittedly his
private capital. However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned
by him, he having donated them the year before to the Tupas Foundation, Inc.
Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donation
declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible.
HELD:
The fact that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of
the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought
to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and
particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.
Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been
made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law chargeable to the freely disposable
portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious.
If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference,
then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the
excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any
excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the
sole compulsory heir of the deceased.

LLB III-B
Buhay De Roma v. CA
G.R. No. L-46903
[343]

July 23, 1987
Facts
Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She diedintestate. When
administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointedadministratrix and filed
an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on theground that certain properties donated by
their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled
P10,297.50 and the value is notdisputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when
Candelariadonated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa pamamagitanng
pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli which the TC interpreted as a prohibitionto collate and
besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. Onappeal, it was reversed as
it merely described the donation as irrevocable not anexpress prohibition to collate.
Issue:
Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held:
The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, mustbring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have receivedfrom the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
othergratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of thelegitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place
among compulsory heirs if the donor shouldhave so expressly provided, or if the donee should
repudiate the inheritance, unlessthe donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036) The SC
affirmed the appellate courts decision and that it merely described thedonation as irrevocable.
The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarilyexempt the donated properties from
collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed
of donation the decedent donorwould have included an express prohibition to collate if that
had been the donorsintention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the
exemptionshould be applied.-MJA

LLB III-B
[344]
Lesaca vs Lesaca
FACTS:
Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on November 8, 1946. He was survived by his
second wife (Juana Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and
three acknowledged natural children by a third woman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and
Consuelo F. Lesaca, his children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. It appears that the deceased
and his widow, Juana Felix, had lived together martially since 1924 but were not married until
December 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his death. Issues and Holdings.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the allowances for support granted by the court tolegitimate minor children of the
deceased pending liquidation of his estate are subject to collation and deductible from their share
of the inheritance?
Obviously, the answer should bethe affirmative.
2. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land solda retrovendendo
before such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property or not.
HELD:
In our opinion the question calls for a negative answer.
Whether a standing crop of palay planted during covertures, and harvested after the death of the
one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil
Code, and one-half of such crop should be delivered to the surviving spouse.
It should belong to the conjugal partnership

LLB III-B
Adan vs. Casili

[345]

76 Phil 279
March 18, 1946
FACTS:
The plaintiff Felix Adan commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
against his sister Victoria Adan and the latter's husband, Agapito Casili, to secure the judicial
partition of the estate left by their deceased mother, Simplicia Nepomuceno, alleged to consist of
six parcels of land which are specifically described in the complaint. Parcels 1 and 3, however,
were subsequently discarded, the first having been sold by the parties to the municipality of
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the second being admittedly the property of Maria Adan, a half
sister of the parties litigant. The remaining four parcels, referred to in the record as lots Nos. 2, 4,
5, and 6, are valued by both parties at P2,783.55.
The defendants interposed the following defense: That the four lots in question were ceded by
the deceased Simplicia Nepomuceno to her daughter Victoria Adan as her share of the
inheritance; and that the plaintiff has received more than his share consisting of money,
livestock, palay, and real property, namely:
Expenses of the plaintiff as a student from 1918 to 1925
P8,000.0
0
Twelve carabaos received by the plaintiff from his mother,

at P30 each
9;360.00
Three hundred cavans of palay, at P4.20 a cavan
1,260.00
Cash taken by the plaintiff from his mother in 1927
1,110.00
Two parcels of land bought by the plaintiff with money he

received from his mother
1,220.00
ISSUE:
Whether or not record to disprove or impeach the testimony of the defendants to the effect that
the plaintiff took and received from his mother during the latter's lifetime?
HELD:
We find no competent evidence in the record to disprove or impeach the testimony
of the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff took and received from his mother
during the latter's lifetime P1,110 in cash and 300 cavans of palay in the manner
and under the circumstances narrated by the defendant spouses as witnesses in
their own behalf. The 300 cavans of palay was taken by the plaintiff from the
granary of his mother in 1927. The cash consisting of twenty-peso and five-peso
[346]

bills and amounting in all to P1,110 was taken by the plaintiff from his mother's
trunk on an occasion when she suffered a collapse and when the plaintiff took some
money from the same trunk with which to pay for injections. As we have said, the
plaintiff did not testify to deny the testimony of the defendants. It is admitted in the
brief for the plaintiff and appellant that the latter took 300 cavans of palay from his
mother's granary, but it is claimed that said palay belonged to him. In the absence
of plaintiff's testimony to support such claim, there is no basis upon which to sustain
it. It was also proved during the trial that the plaintiff took possession of twelve
carabaos belonging to his mother and that the value of said animals was P30 a
head.
It was also established during the trial that the plaintiff studied surveying in Manila
and that during his studies his mother and sister sent him money for his support
and expenses, amounting to approximately P500 a year. Although the defendants
claim that his studies lasted from 1918 to 1925, we sustain the contention of the
plaintiff and appellant in his brief that it took him only two years to finish the course
of surveying, because it is a matter of common knowledge that surveying is a twoyear course, and it is probable that the rest of the time was spent by him in
acquiring a high-school education.
Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education,
attendance in illnesses, even though unusually expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary
equipment, or customary presents are not subject to collation. But article 1042 of
the same Code provides that expenses which may have been incurred by the
parents in giving their children a professional or artistic career shall not be brought
to collation unless the parent so orders or they encroach upon the legitimate. It also
provides that in cases in which it is proper to collate them, the money which the
child would have spent if it had lived in the house and company of its parents shall
be deducted there from. Since the career of surveyor is a professional one, and
since the expenses incurred by plaintiff's mother in giving him that career
encroached upon the legitimate, it is proper to collate one-half of the amount spent
by her for him during the two years he studied surveying, the other half being
considered as the amount which the plaintiff would have spent if he had lived in the
house and company of his mother.

LLB III-B
[347]
Guinging vs. Abuton

G.R. No. L-23035
October 13, 1925
FACTS:
In the course of the administration of the estate of Ignacio Abuton, it appeared that the deceased
died testate on March 8, 1916, leaving two sets of children by two different wives, the first of
whom was Dionisia Olarte, who died about twenty years ago, and by whom the deceased had
twelve, children, three of whom died without issue. The second wife was Teodora Guinguing, to
whom the testator was married on July 14, 1906, and by whom he had four children, all still
living. . In this inventory he included only the lands which the testator had devised to the
children of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed by him at the time of his death
and which were claimed by the children of the first marriage as having been derived from their
mother. Accordingly, on March 14, 1922, Teodoro Guinguing, in representation of herself and
her four minor children, presented a motion in court, asking that the administrator be required to
amend his inventory and to include therein all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia Olarte, including property actually in the hands of his children by
her which (the motion alleged) had been delivered to said children as an advancement. The
purpose of the motion was to force the first set of children to bring into collation the properties
that had been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the Civil Code
ISSUE:
Whether or not the first set of children should bring into collation the property received by them?
HELD:
As we gather from the record, the crux of the controversy consists in the fact that among the
properties remaining in possession of Ignacio Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land
covered by a composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of Dionisia Olarte. At the
same time that this title was issued, Agapito Abuton procured two other titles, Nos. 11651 and
11654, covering adjacent properties to be issued in his own name. From the circumstance that
title No. 11658 was issued in the name of Dionisia Olarte the opponents appear to believe that
this land was her particular property and should now vest exclusively in her heirs. This
conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to show that the land covered by title No. 11658 was
not acquired by the spouses during their marriage, and the circumstance that the title was taken
in the name of the wife does not defeat its presumed character as ganacial property. Therefore, in
liquidating the ganacial property of the first marriage it was within the power of the surviving
husband to assign other property to the first set of children as their participation in the estate of
their mother and to retain in his own hands the property for which a composition title had been
issued in the name of the wife. Upon the whole we are unable to discover any reversible error in
the appealed order, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
[348]
SALA, Reeny B.
LLB III-B
Hernaez vs. Hernaez
G.R. No. L-10027
November 13, 1915
FACTS:
The spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa, died, leaving several legitimate descendants.
Neither of their estates had been divided up to the date of the institution of this action, but were
both under administration. Their son, Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa, sold all his interest in both
his father's and mother's estate to his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. Domingo Hernaez y
Espinosa had thus parted with all his interest in the estates of his two parents, he executed a
document of sale in favor of Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. . On the same date he executed
another document of sale in which he purported to convey to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana foureighteenths of his interest in his mother's estate. Both of these sales were made with the
connivance of his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. On August 19, 1912, Jose Montelibano UyCana sold his interest in the estate to Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. By this transfer, the latter
stood owner of all the interest of Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of Pedro Hernaez,
and five-eighteenths of his interest in the estate of Juana Espinosa as against Vicente Hernaez y
Espinosa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-heirs heir may exercise this right of subrogation upon the payment to the
purchaser of another heir's interest.
HELD:
Article 1067 of the Civil Code provides that the co-heir may exercise this right of
subrogation upon the payment to the purchaser of another heir's interest, "el precio
de la compra" (the purchase price). Obviously, if the interest had not been resold,
the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, would have had to pay only the price for
which Uy-Cana acquired it. The purpose of the article cannot be evaded by a
reconveyance of the interest to a third person at a higher price. Subsequent
purchasers of the interest acquire it burdened with the right of subrogation of coheirs at the price for which the heir who sold it parted with it. It is urged that the
prices in some of the deeds of sale by which Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos
purchased the interest of various heirs in the estates are fictitious. This is a question
of fact upon which both parties adduced evidence, and we concur in the opinion of
the trial court that there is no basis to the charge. For the foregoing reasons, the
[349]

judgment of the court is modified by substituting, as the price of subrogation of the
interest originally purchased by Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana, the sum of P4,500, as
set out in Exhibit 7, for the sum of P10,000, the consideration expressed in Exhibit
10. As modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
SALA, Reeny B.
LLB III-B
Guerrero vs. De la Cuesta

59 PHIL 464
February 8, 1934
FACTS:
The herein plaintiffs and defendants are relatives, all being direct descendants of the spouses
Hilarion de la Cuesta and Valentina Zumel both of whom died intestate, Hilarion in 1873 and
Valentina in 1921. The original complaint in this case filed July 24, 1923 was for the partition of
199 parcels of land. The remaining 14 parcels described in the amended complaint, filed July 5,
1932, were not included in said agreement due to irreconcilable differences arising among the
parties. In this amended complaint the plaintiffs pray that the remaining 14 parcels of land be
divided among all the parties herein in the same proportion and manner adopted in the partition
agreement above-mentioned. In the original decision of the trial court, which is dated August 24,
1932, it was held that the defendant Jose de la Cuesta, who had received, by way of gift from his
mother Valentina Zumel, parcels 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the amended complaint, should collate said
parcels, and not their value at the time of the gift, for the of the purpose of the partition among all
of the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property to be collated should be valued at the time of its donation?
HELD:
Article 1045 of the Civil Code provides:
"The same things bestowed as a gift or given in dowry need not be brought to
collation and division, but only their value at the time of the gift or dowry, even
though they should not have been appraised at the time.
"Their subsequent increase or decrease in value and even their total loss or
destruction, whether casual or intentional, shall be for the account and risk or for
the benefit of the donee."
[350]

The above provisions of the Civil Code together with the commentaries of Manresa are very
clear on the point: that the donee can in no case be compelled to collate the same things donated
in view of the fact that what was really donated at the time was only their value. What Manresa
really says is that in the French Civil Code the coheir may demand not only the fictitious but also
the material collation of real property. But in this jurisdiction the project of the Civil Code in
1851 in its article 887 and finally embodied in article 1045 of the present Civil Code radically
departed from this viewpoint and made it simpler in the sense that whether the property donated
is real or personal there shall be only fictitious collation.
SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B
Beltran vs. Doriano
32 PHIL 66
October 26, 1915
FACTS:
Counsel for Modesta Beltran and her minor children Ignacio, Jose and Eliodoro, surnamed
Guintu, filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in which he alleged
that his clients were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of mangrove swamp land. The
defendants unlawfully took possession of and continue to occupy the said land of the plaintiff,
cutting nipa thereon, in violation of plaintiffs' rights and causing the latter damages to the extent
of P500. Feliciano de la Rosa, the husband of Rosario Lim, sold outright and in perpetuity a
parcel of mangrove swamp land to Doroteo Guintu and his wife Modesta Beltran. Feliciana
Doriano, the widow of the late Francisco de la Rosa, their children Maria de la Rosa
(accompanied by her husband, Leonardo Fernandez) and Feliciano de la Rosa, both of legal age,
and Eugenio Fernandez, guardian of the minor Ramon de la Rosa, have declared that the said
deceased, Francisco de la Rosa, husband and father of the deponents, left at his death property
consisting mostly of mangrove swamp land which has not yet been judicially petitioned. By
virtue of the acquisition by the spouses Guintu and Beltran of the land referred to in the notarial
instrument Exhibit A, they entered into the possession of the property and took steps to improve
it and increase the number of plants in order to secure the greatest benefit therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-heir can dispose his share even before partition which make the petitioner
the lawful owner of the land in dispute.
HELD: There is no provisions of law whatever which prohibits a co-heir from selling his share
of the estate, or legal portion, to a stranger, before the partition of the hereditary property is
approved by the court, for article 1067 of the Civil Code prescribes: "If any of the heirs should
[351]

sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the co-heirs may subrogate
themselves in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the value of the purchase, provided
they do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time they were informed
thereof." In law, the rule governing property held by various co-owners in common is analogous
to that which obtains where the estate of a deceased person is held pro indiviso by several coparticipants, for, pursuant to article 450 of the Civil Code, "each one of the participants in a thing
possessed in common is considered as having exclusively possessed the part which may be
alloted to him on the distribution for the entire period during which there is no division."
SALA, Reeny B.
LLLB III-B
Wenceslao vs. Calimon

46 Phil. 906
December 20, 1923
Topic/Doctrine
Legal Redemption
FACTS:
This is a case of a legal redemption sanctioned by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, to the
effect that the defendant should resell to the plaintiffs a four-fifth part of a parcel of land situated
in the barrio of Baluarte, municipality of Bulacan, described in the complaint.
Three principal questions are raised by the appellant in his brief, the first relating to the period of
nine days for the redemption, the second to the price of the repurchase, and the third to the
capacity of the redeemers.
ISSUE:
Whether the offer to redeem made by UrbanoWenceslao on behalf of his children, the herein
plaintiffs, is valid.
HELD:
As to the offer to redeem made by UrbanoWenceslao on behalf of his children, the herein
plaintiffs, we think it is valid. He is the natural guardian of his children whom he represents in
court and out of court. Such an offer was not an act of administration of property but of
representation of his children in their rights.
[352]

SALI, EL-SHAL S.
LLB III-B
Marcelino vs. Antonio

70 Phil. 388
June 29, 1940
FACTS:
Despus de legalizado el testamento de la finada Arcadia (Leocadia) Santos por el Juzgado de
PrimeraInstancia de Ilocos Norte, susherederosFelisa Antonio y otros, presentaron, dos
mocionespidiendo en una de ellasque se ordenase a los albaceas o administradores:1.To submit
an inventory of the property, real and personal, comprised in the estate of the deceased
Leocadia;2.To separate from said inventory the property, real and personal, pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of Leocadia Santos and Modesto Marcelino; 3.To render an accounting of
said conjugal partnership from 1905, death of Modesto Marcelino, to date, and liquidate the
same;
4.To designate a day in court whereby petitioners may present evidence on the existence of a
conjugal partnership, the properties of which have been illegally included and disposed in the
will of Leocadia Santos; to the facts of non-liquidation, but of disposal;5.And for such other
remedies as this Honorable Court may grant in the premises.
En la otramocin se pedaque se declarasenulo el testamento de la finada en cuanto a
cualquierlegado o intersdado en dichaltimavoluntad a Calixta Peralta, hija de Casimiro Peralta,
uno de los testigosdeltestamento.
En el memorndumpresentado con fecha 31 de octubre de 1938 por el abogado de
lasemocionantes, pedantambin la particin de la herenciadejadapor la finadaLeocadia Santos
excluyendociertaspropiedadesque no le perene-cian. El Juzgadososteniendo la oposicin de
MaximinoMarcelino y Calixta Peralta, desestimolasmocionesporsuorden de 31 de enero de 1939,
sobre el fundamento de que en ellas se suscitabancuestionesquedebanventilarse en
accinordinariaporseparado. Las emocionantesapelaron de dichaorden.
ISSUE:
En cuanto a la otramocin, en que se solicita se declare nulo el testamento en relacin con el
legadohecho a favor de Calixta Peralta, y en cuanto al memorndum de lasemocionantesrespecto
a la exclusin de ciertaspropiedades del inventario de la testamentaria, la
ordenapeladatampocopuedesostenerse.
[353]
HELD:
Despus de pagadastodaslasdeudas de unatestamentaria o intestado, el tribunal
tienejurisdiccinparaproceder a la particin y distribucin de la herencia entre los interesados. En
el ejercicio de esajurisdiccin, el tribunal puederespetar o no la distribucinhecha en el
testamento, segnqueesadistribucineste o no de acuerdo con lasdisposiciones de la ley. La
facultad, portanto, de determinar la legalidad o ilegalidad de lasdisposicionestestamentarias,
esinherente a la jurisdiccindel tribunal al proceder a unadistribucinjusta y legal de la herencia.
Porotra parte, declararqueunaaccinindependiente y separadaesnecesariaaese fin, esir contra la
tendencia general de la jurisprudencia de evitarmultiplicidad de pleitos, yes, adems, costoso,
dilatorio y nada practico.
En cuanto a la exclusin del inventario de ciertaspropiedades, sibienescierto, comoregla general,
que el tribunal, en esasactuaciones, no tienefacultadparadecidircuestionessobrettulo de
propiedad, yahemosdeclarado, sin embargo, quepuedehacerlo, de un modo provisional, cuando el
propsitoessolamenteparadeterminarsideben o no excluirse del inventarioalgunaspropiedades en
particular.
SALI, EL-SHAL S.
LLB III-B
[354]
Guidote vs. Bank of the P.I

67 Phil 391
FACTS:
The intestate proceedings are pending, the judicial administratrix thereof filed a
project of partition suggesting that the properties to be partitioned be adjudicated
to the heirs of the deceased ValentinGuidote named Mauricio, Eugenia, Anita,
Concepcion, Raymunda, Catalina, Pacita, Josefina, Caridad, and Jose, all surnamed
Guidote, in the proportions indicated in said project, but declaring them subject to
the mortgage which the said deceased had executed in favor of Vicente A. Rufino,
Mercedes P. Vda. de Rufino, and Ernesto D. Rufino, with the exception of the land
situated in Ibayo-Tanag of the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, which is
uneffected by any lien.
One month after filing the said project of partition, that is on August 12, 1937, the
Bank of the Philippine Islands appeared in the case to oppose the approval thereof
on the ground that it has an unpaid credit amounting to P20,000.
ISSUE:
WON BPI can rightfully represent guidote?
HELD:
The unpaid credits was agreed by both as unpaid, While these credits, and possibly
other indebtedness and obligations of the intestate, have not been paid, the project
of partition filed by the administratrix cannot be approved, and still less can the
properties to be partitioned be delivered to the heirs, unless the latter give the
security required by section 745 of Act No. 190 which reads as follows:
SEC. 745.Parties interested may have order. Such order may be made on
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in
the estate; but the heirs, devices, or legatees, shall not be entitled to an
order for their share, until the payment of the debts and allowances
mentioned in the preceding section, and the several expenses there
mentioned have been made or provided for, unless they give a bond with
such surety or sureties as the court directs, to secure the payment of such
debts, expenses, or allowances, or any part thereof as remain unpaid or
unprovided for, and to indemnify the executor or administrator against the
same.
[355]
Sing, Marc Eric

LLB III-B
Estate of Manuela Perez

62 Phil 641
FACTS:
Flora Castillo, one of the heirs of the deceased Manuela Perez, appealed from the
order of the court of March 26, 1934, approving the amended project of partition
presented by the attorney for the administrator on December 29, 1933.
These testamentary proceedings have been pending settlement and distribution in
court, due to incidents brought about by the only two heirs, daughters of the
deceased testatrix. Various projects of partition were presented but all of them were
opposed by the co-heir Flora Castillo. In order to arrive at a definite solution, her
sister Jovita, on November 7, 1933, filed a petition offering to pay all the lawful
obligations of the estate on condition that she be awarded the parcel of land in
Talahiban and two-thirds (2/3) of the land in Laiya, as provided in the probated will.
The proposition was approved without opposition in an order of November 15, 1933,
and in which administrator presented them with plans. Which constitutes the net
legitime to be prorated between the two heirs. In accordance therewith, each of
them should receive properties worth P819.485. To carry out the distribution
provided in the will and give each heir her share of the estate, adjudication was
made as follows: To Flora Castillo, 16 hectares, 38 ares and 97 centares of the land
in Laiya, on the eastern part thereof, from north to south, the value of which, at P50
a hectare, is P819.485; and to Jovita Castillo, 23 hectares, 61 ares and 3 centares of
the land in Laiya, on the western part thereof, from north to South, the value of
which, at P50 a hectare, is P1,180.515, and the entire parcel of land in Talahiban
with an area of 40 hectares, 82 centares, the value of which at P200 a hectare, is
P8,165.46.
ISSUE:
WON mortgage is valid?
HELD:
[356]

Yes. Because the appellant had consented to it and hold that the estate should now
make payment thereof and, consequently, the item of P2,000 was correctly entered
in the liabilities. The assessed valuation of the land is reasonable and there is
nothing of record justifying otherwise.
The provisions of the will have been taken into consideration and the shares
adjudicated to each of the heirs, with the exception of the betterments, constitute
the legitime corresponding to each of them.
Sing, Marc Eric

LLB III-B
Javelosa vs. Barrios

66 Phil 107
FACTS:
The subject land, with an area of 2,061 square meters, situated in Jaro, Iloilo City,
was originally owned by petitioner Gregorio Javelosa. Sometime in the 70s,
petitioner , mortgaged said land to Jesus Jalbuena to secure several loans.
Petitioner failed to pay his loans and Jalbuena, as mortgagee, foreclosed on the land
and purchased it as highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.
In the early part of December 1986, the mortgagee divided the subject land among his married
daughters (private respondents herein). On December 27, 1986, the mortgagee died. He was
substituted by his heirs, private respondents, in the pending RTC case for annulment of mortgage
and foreclosure sale. On January 19, 1987, title to the subject lot was issued in the names of
private respondents.
On June 1, 1993, private respondents, as registered owners, sent a letter to petitioner-mortgagor
demanding that he vacate the subject premises within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Despite
receipt of the demand letter on June 4, 1993, petitioner-mortgagor refused to vacate said lot.
Thus, on August 6, 1993, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal detainer before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cities, Iloilo City, and sought to eject petitioner from the
premises.
ISSUE:
WON complaint is valid?
[357]
HELD:
It held that the complaint was filed out of time for under Section 1, rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
and unlawful detainer case must be filed within one year from the time title was issued in private
respondents name. From January 19, 1987, and not from the last demand to vacate made by
private respondents (plaintiffs therein). Thus, the ejectment case initiated on August 6, 1993 was
filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period and that prior physical possession is indispensable
only in actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer.
Sing, Marc Eric
LLB III-B
Cu Unjieng vs. Tiaoqui

64 Phil 566
FACTS:
Tiaoqui, during his lifetime, instituted civil case against Cu Unjieng for the recovery of money.
Upon posting of a bond, the Court ordered attachment of the property of the latter. Yioaqui died
during the pendency of the case. Cu Unjiengs set up counterclaim for the lossses they suffered
and damages because of the attachment.
In the meantime, the instestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Tioaqui followed
their ordinary course, no claims were presented against the deceased. The court ordered the final
accounting of the estate, the administrators asked for extension, in view of the fact that the
balancing of the business would be made in a few months and that certain credits and properties
were under pending litigation.
After a few more motions to extend, the finall accounting was finally delivered to the court,
estate taxes were paid and the properties delivered to the heirs. The instestate proceeding was
ordered closed.
The administrators filed a motion to reopen the intestate proceedings because of the pending
litigation with the Cu Unjiengs. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for the annulment of the delivery of
[358]

the properties in favor of the heirs.
ISSUE:
W/N Cu Unjiengs were entitled to have the deed of delivery cancelled despite their failure to file
their claim in the intestate proceeding
HELD:
NO. Probate court alone had acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the settlement, payment of
debts and distribution of the estate of the deceased, to the exclusion of all other courts, it cannot
be denied that if the defendants-appellants wanted some remedy from said court for the
protection of their rights, they should timely apply to it and ask for the retention of properties
sufficient to pay for the counterclaim in case it should prosper.
The administrators were also in duty bound to inform the probate court of the existence of the
counterclaim, which duty was partly complied with by them when they reiteratedly informed the
court that it was not possible to present a final account or project of partition on the ground that
there were pending litigations, and when they applied for the reopening of the intestate
proceedings and for authority to continue the pending suit. Cu Unjiengs were not relieved thereof
by the conduct that might have been observed by the administrators, which conduct, on the other
hand, cannot be considered improper.
The court was not informed of said counterclaim, it understood that the inheritance was ready for
distribution, it appearing from the report of the committee that there were no debts to be paid and
it being inferable form the record that the expenses of administration, including the inheritance
tax, had already been paid. Appellants have available the remedy afforded by section 731 of the
Code of Civil Procedure under which they may, after having obtained favorable judgment, ask
that the heirs contribute in proportion to the value of the properties received by them, to pay their
counterclaim.
Moreover the attachment obtained by Tioaqui was nominal, being the fifth attachment, it seems
unnecessary to adopt so drastic a measure as to result in depriving the heirs of their possession of
the properties received by them by order of the court
Sing, Marc Eric

LLB III-B
[359]
Del Val v Del Val

G.R. No. L-9374
February 16, 1915
Fatcs:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing
the complaint with costs.
The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio del Val, who
passed away intestate. An administrator was appointed for the estate of the deceased, and, after a
partial administration, it was closed. During the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance on
his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to Andres del Val as sole beneficiary. After
his death, the defendant Andres collected the face of the policy. He paid the sum of P18,365.20
to redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third persons with a right to
repurchase. The redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of the defendant in the
name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor. Andres, on death of the
deceased, took possession of most of his personal property and that he has also the balance on
the insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased
and not to the defendant personally, hence they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and
personal property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all
the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased, and that the defendant account for
P21,634.80. They also wanted to divide this equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along
with the other property of deceased.
The defendants claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made in the
name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent.
[360]

He also averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the
benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and is the sole owner thereof and that it
is his individual property
The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action due to the argument
that the action for partition failed to comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec. 183, in that it
does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which partition is demanded.'
Issue:
Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?
Held:
No.The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his
individual and separate property. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to
the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds
are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person
whose life was insured, the doctrine is embedded in the Code of Commerce where:
The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the
contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or
creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor of the
former.
The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:
An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must bring
into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the deceased
during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in order to
compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.
They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are not
betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."
The court didnt agree because the contract of life insurance is a special contract and the
destination of the proceeds is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that
subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life- insurance
contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That was under the Code of Commerce.
The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance proceeds belongs to the
heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. This wasnt agreed upon by the court unless the
facts appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the other heirs should enjoy
with him the ownership of the estate.
Sing, Marc Eric
LLB III-B
[361]
SANTIESTEBAN vs SANTIESTEBAN
G.R. No. L-45217
June 30, 1939
Topic/Doctrine: Probate Proceeding,

FACTS:
On February 3, 1932, there was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
the intestate of the deceased Benita Lambengco who died on January 29th of the
same year. On May 3rd, Ambrosio Santiesteban, surviving spouse of the deceased,
was named judicial administrator. As the deceased left no unpaid debts or other
obligations, her heirs Ambrosio Santiesteban, husband of the deceased, Perfecto
Guadalupe, Rosa and Clara, surnamed Santiesteban, who are her children, executed
an extrajudicial partition on September 13 and 14, 1932, which was approved by
the court on October 18th of the same year. In the deed of the partition, the
widower received the best portion of the inheritance, including therein eight parcels
of land which the spouses, in life, had acquired by purchase from the spouses
Baltazar Raymundo and Agapita San Juan. Ambrosio Santiesteban conveyed the
eight parcels of land to his daughter, Guadalupe, and the latter, in turn, applied for
the registration thereof under Act No. 496; which application, however, was
opposed by Macondray & Co., Inc., on the allegation that it was the owner of the
lands by virtue of an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the
original owners thereof. On February 27, 1935, the court adjudicated the lands in
the registration case to the oppositor Macondray & Co., Inc.
On September 10, 1934, more than two years after the closure of the intestate,
Ambrosio Santiesteban conveyed the eight parcels of land to his daughter,
Guadalupe, and the latter, in turn, applied for the registration thereof under Act No.
496; which application, however, was opposed by Macondray & Co., Inc., and that it
was necessary to reopen the intestate and to appoint a new administrator, to which
position she proposed Mariano de la Paz. The petition was vigorously opposed by
Rosa Santiesteban and the heirs of the deceased Perfecto Santiesteban argue that
this last order, having become final, was not subject to modification or reversal.
[362]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case which became final may reopened modified and reversed?
HELD:
We find no merit in the assignment of error because the order of November 12,
1934, did not finally determine the action and was interlocutory in nature (section
123, Code of Civil Procedure). By said order the court did not determine or
adjudicate any right or controversy and it had no other object than to open the way
for the hearing and resolution of the rights to alleged damages which one of the
parties claimed to have suffered.
SORRONDA, NIA MAY TILDE

LLB III-B
BORJA vs. ENCARNACION,

G.R. No. L-4681
July 31, 1951
Topic/Doctrine: Probate Proceeding,
FACTS:
It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the commissioners appointed
by the court submitted on February 8, 1944, a project of partition, in which the land
in question, which is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was
included as property of the estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco, one of
Marcelo de Borja's heirs. Over the objection of the petitioners, surviving children of
Quintin de Borja who was one of Marcelo's children, the proposed partition was
approved in February, 1946, and the order of approval on appeal was affirmed by
this Court in 1949. Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja's estate was the
[363]

party named in the partition in behalf of the estate, the proceeding for the reason
that they had been declared their father's sole heirs in the settlement of their
father's estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the duly appointed
administratrix of the last named intestate estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action to recover property may be included in the intestate
proceeding?
RULING:
The probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most
logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding, said
proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the
court can be exercised and performed without the necessity if requiring the parties
to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and
litigate an entirely different action. There can be no question of the share to be
delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate
proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person entitled thereto,
and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same power to the
probate court to be exercised within the same estate proceeding if the share to be
delivered happens to be in the possession of 'any other person,' especially when
'such other person' is one of the heirs themselves who are already under the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate proceeding."
The partition here had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the
court, but distribution of the petitioners had received the property assigned to them
or their father's estate
A party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a
partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him.
The court had only the partition to examine, to see if the questioned land was
included therein. The inclusion being shown, and there being no allegation that the
inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners'
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to
bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper
disposition according to the tenor of the partition.
[364]

SORRONDA, NIA MAY TILDE
LLB III-B
Bautista vs. Grino-Aquino
G.R. No. 79958
October 28, 1988
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Extrajudicial Partition of Property
FACTS
The parties admit that the land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel
Bautista under T.C.T No. 2210 and the latter inherited the land from his father, Mariano
Bautista. On Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents
were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner was supposed to appear in that
document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed the said deed. Both parties
admit that upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, T.C.T.-T-14182 was issued. They also admit that the private respondents executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property. Subsequently, a Deed of
Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and the T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista.
On August 7, 1969, the latter executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private respondents
and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T.C.T. Nos. T-15665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T15669, T-15670, T-15671, were issued to private respondents, parties admit that petitioner
Manuel Bautista married to his second wife Emiliana Tamayo. It was allegedly declared that
spouses Bautista had only a child, Evangeline Bautista. December 22, 1966, the property in
question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition and among the heirs of the late Juliana
Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista. The latter denied participation in the Extrajudicial
Partition of Property.
On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of
Manuel Bautista. The NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic. The
petitioners instituted an action in the CFI of Rizal to declare the deed of extra-judicial partition,
deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates of Title to be declared null an void. However the
latter court dismissed the petition. Then petitioners seek a review of said decision alleging the
following: (1) The findings of facts of public respondents are manifestly absurd and mistaken;
(2) The public respondents authorized the Extrajudicial partition of future inheritance in clear
violation of Article 1347 of the New Civil Code;
(3) The public respondents authorized the preterition of petitioner Evangeline Bautista in
violation of the Law on Succession.
ISSUE
Whether or not the property of the surviving husband (Manuel Bautista) be the subject of an
[365]

extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife (Juliana Nojadera)?
HELD
NO. The deed of extrajudicial partition is void ab initio for including in the partition property
which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased wife and which deprives the lawful owner
thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent
which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive
owner of the property. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement
of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no
creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be
the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. Thus, all subsequent transactions involving the
property between and among the private respondents are also null and void. Likewise, the said
partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a
compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult
to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter
Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said
document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be
a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said
partition must be rescinded.
The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the signature
of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined by
the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting that the
signature of Manuel Baustista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an
examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts renders the document fatally
defective.
Tanjusay, Maria Katrina S.

LLB III-B
[366]
Ralla vs. Untalan

G.R. No. 63253-54
April 27, 1989
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: There can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has
been probated
FACTS
On January 27, 1959, Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his own will
in the CFI (now RTC) of Albay. In his will, he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (the
petitioner herein who, upon his death during the pendency of this petition, was substituted by his
heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro Ralla. In the same year, the latter filed an action
for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella. In a special proceeding, Pablo Ralla
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested
in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosend, for its probate would no longer be
beneficial and advantageous to him. This motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower courts conclusion that, indeed, the
petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not
be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo of 149 parcels of
land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and
prejudice of his brother, Pedro Ralla, who was being deprived of his successional rights over the
said properties.) The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by this Court. On the
scheduled hearing on November 3, 1966, the petitioner Pablo reiterated his lack of interest in the
probate of the subject will. Cosequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared
Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who shoud share equally upon the
division of the latters estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of
intestacy. On December 18, 1967, the brothers entered into a project of partition whereby sixtythree parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, were
amicably divided between the two of them and was approved on December 19, 1967 by Judge
Ezekiel Grageda. Eleven years later, or on February 28, 1978, Joaquin Chancoco, brother-in-law
of the petitioner Pablo filed a petition for the probate of the same will of Rosendo on the ground
that the decedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo then filed a manifestation stating that he had no
objections to the probate. Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Intervene as Petitioner for the
[367]

Probate of the Will. This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite the written opposition of
the heirs of Pedro. Likewise, the petition for probate was granted. Teodorico Almine, son-in-law
of the petitioner was appointed special administrator, again, over and above the objection of the
heirs of Pedro. However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to the estate of
Rosendo Ralla, Teodorico Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered
by the project of partition. Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents
herein) moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land. Then
respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan ruled that the sixty-three parcels of land should be included
in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla and that said proceedings
which were ordered consolidated by this Court should proceed as probate proceedings. About
two years later, the private respondents filed a Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of
The Court The Exclusion Of 67 Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition. Judge
Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order that The Project of Partition should, therefore, be
respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty-three (63) parcels referred to therein should be excluded
from the probate proceedings and, likewise from the administration of Special Administrator
Teodorico Almine, Jr. The petitioner Pablo filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
order but the same was denied by respondent Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes.
ISSUE
Whether or not the sixty-three (63) parcels of land should be excluded in the Project of Partition
from the probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla?
HELD
YES. The rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been
probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will. Thus, the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where
there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564
originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella
and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but
distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs
had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its
validity or any part of it. Likewise: Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and
there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the
petitioners knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to
bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according
to the tenor of the partition . . . They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to
do in this case. In fine, the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon the
petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as this was accompanied by
delivery of possession to them of their respective shares in the inheritance from their mother, the
late Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and
embodied in the document of partition. Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the
exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the settlement of the
[368]

estate of Rosendo Ralla.

LLB III-B
Evangelista vs. Bonilla

G.R. No. L-852
March 19, 1949
TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Nature and Effect of Judicial Partition in Probate Proceeding
FACTS
Casimiro Evangelista is a registered owner of a parcel of land (homestead) as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. 4905 of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, consisting of
7.0652 hectares, more or less situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. He was married
to Leonida Mari, (plaintiff) on February 7, 1920 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and during their marriage
and while living together as spouses, they begot two children, Caridad and Deogracias
Evangelista. Casimiro died intestate on or about 1938 at Platero, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. The
property in litigation was acquired on January 23, 1935, as per original certificate of title No.
4905, homestead patent. On January 10, 1944, Deogracias alleging to be the only heir of
Casimiro Evangelista, executed a declaration of heirship known as Doc. No. 9, Page 30, Book
No. 18, of Notary Public, Carlos M. Ferrer, herein incorporated and made a part of these
agreement of facts as Exhibit A for the sum of P2,400. Deogracias Evangelista sold on the same
date, January 10, 1944, the property in question to the defendant spouses, Isaac Bonilla and
Silvina Ordanez, in Doc. 10, Page No. 31, Book No. 18, series of 1544, of Notary Public, Carlos
M. Ferrer incorporated and attached herein as Exhibit B, as part of this agreement. The certificate
of marriage of Casimiro Evangelista and Leonida Mari is attached as Exhibit C and made a part
of the agreement. After the said sale, on January 10, 1944, original certificate of title No. 4905
was cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 19991 was issued in the spouses
Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordanez. Thereafter, the defendant spouses assumed possession of the
land, and the harvest for the year 1944-1945 was seventeen cavanes, (17). At present the land
[369]

was planted with palay (1 hectare), sugar cane (1/3 hectare), and camoting kahoy, (1/3 hectare
included in the 1/3 planted with sugar cane), now still in the possession of the defendant. The
defendant begun to live in Platero, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija on March 1938, and that the
plaintiffs lived in Platero, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija since the year 1920 up to the present time.
However, the defendant spouse did not know that Leonida Mari is the mother of Deogracias
Evangelista at the time when he bought the land since Deogracias was living with his
grandfather, Matias Evangelista, and that Caridad Evangelista was living with her mother,
Leonida Mari.
The plaintiff, Caridad, who was Deogracias sister and co-owner brought an action to recover
her combined 3/4 share in a parcel of land sold to defendant spouses by Deogracias Evangelista.
ISSUE
Whether or not Deogracias Evangelista has exceeded on his right to convey more than his own
share of the subject property to defendant spouses Bonilla?
HELD
YES. A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not
parties
thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the
interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a
conveyance of ownership, and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more
than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive,
and not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has
been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an
action for reinvindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be
situated. Broad perspectives of public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of
the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition,
judicial or extrajudicial, has been had.
Good faith affords protection only to purchasers for value from the registered owner. Deogracias
Evangelista, defendants' grantor, is not a registered owner. The land was and still is registered in
the name of Casimiro Evangelista. In no way does the certificate of title state that Deogracias
owned the land. Consequently defendants cannot summon to their aid the theory of
indefeasibility of Torrens title. There is nothing in the certificate and in the circumstances of the
transaction which warrant them (in supposing that they needed not looked beyond the title. If
anything, it should have put them on their guard, cautioned them to ascertain and verify that the
vendor was the only heir of his father, that there was no debt, and that the latter was the sole
owner of the parcel of land.

LLB III-B
[370]
DIMAYUGA v CA
129 SCRA 110
April 30, 1984
FACTS:
Genaro Dimayuga is married to SegundaGayapanao in 1915 acquired a Torrens title for that
homestead in 1928. Segunda died intestate in 1940, survived by her son, Manuel, and her
husband, Genaro. During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named EmerencianaPanganiban
by whom he begot five children, named Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaida, Remedios and Socorro. A
sixth child, NeliaDimayuga, was born in 1944 or after Segunda's death Emerenciana cultivated a
homestead adjoining the thirteen-hectare homestead in question. So, it was not surprising that
she became the paramour of Genaro.
Genaro, 56, married Emerenciana, 37, on February 26, 1947. That marriage legitimated Nelia,
who had been a duly acknowledged natural child, but it did not improve the status of her brother
and four sisters who were adulterous or spurious children. On September 16, 1948, or about a
month before Genaro's death a "partition of real property" was executed in English. It was duly
notarized. It was signed by Genaro, Manuel, Filomeno and Pacita and thumbmarked by
Emerenciana, in representation of her minor children Adelaida, Remedios, Socorro and Nelia,
[371]

though Emerenciana had not been appointed judicial guardian of their property.
In that partition, which the petitioners also regard as a donation, Genaro treated the homestead as
his sole property and not conjugal, which it actually was. Manuel was even as share five and
one-half hectares of the homestead (southern portion adjoining Emerenciana's separate
homestead). The six illegitimate children were given seven and seven-tenth hectares (northern
portion also adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead). The partition was not registered.
Nineteen years later, or on May 28, 1970, Manuel having been advised that the entire homestead
was inherited by him from his parents and freed from his father's moral ascendancy, executed an
affidavit of adjudication which he registered. He obtained a Torrens title for the thirteen-hectare
homestead. About two months later, the six illegitimate children filed a complaint for the
annulment of Manuel's title and for the division of the homestead equally among Genaro's seven
children including Manuel. The trial court annulled Manuel's title, decreed that about one-half of
the homestead should be divided equally among the six illegitimate children and ordered Manuel
to pay them P2,500 as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Manuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which adjudicated to him three-fourth of the homestead
and the other one-fourth to Nelia. The six illegitimate children appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manuel should be awarded three-fourth of the homestead and only one-fourth to
Nelia.
HELD:
Yes. No portion of the homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by prescription. "No title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession."
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator should make a partition of
his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand insofar, as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean that a
person who makes an inter vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is void, the
partition is void.With more reason would the partition be void if there was no will. The
1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the owner of the
entire homestead which is wrong. One-half of the homestead, subject to the husband's
usufructuarylegitime, was inherited in 1940 by Manuel upon the death of his mother who was
married to Genaro for twenty-five years. Genaro could dispose by an act inter vivos only onehalf of the homestead. In that one-half portion, Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced
heirs, had a two-third legitime.
In "donating" the said one-half portion to his six illegitimate children, Genaro deprived Manuel
of his legitime in his estate or, in effect, made him renounce his future inheritance. The 1951
affidavit cannot be construed as a repudiation of his inheritance in his father's estate because the
document does not have that tenor. For this reason, Manuel is not estopped to ignore that
partition. The rule in Alforque vs. Veloso, 65 Phil. 272, cited by the petitioners, does not apply to
Manuel. The facts in the Alforque case are radically different from the facts of the instant
[372]

homestead case. The five illegitimate children (the sixth child Nelia was legitimated) have no
rights whatsoever to the said homestead. As already said, they were adulterous or spurious
children.
As such, they are not entitled to successional rights but only to support (Art. 139, old Civil Code)
Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, are entitled to inherit Genaro's one-half
portion. It cannot be said that the five adulterous children have no resources whatsoever. Their
mother, Emerenciana, has a homestead adjoining Genaro's homestead in question.
Fajardo vs. Fajardo
There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act inter vivos, or
by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed. If the partition was made
by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing in a public instrument, because it
was a conveyance of real estate. If by last will and testament, the legal requisites should have
been observed.

LLB III-B
Legasto vs Versoza
G.R. No. L-32344
March 31, 1930
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:
Partition
FACTS:
Sabina Almadin executed a will, devising certain parcels of land belonging to her, to
her four nieces, Maria Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma,
daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to
each.
[373]

Sabina partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces, executing a
deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels of
her land therein described. Maria Verzosa and Sabina Almadin appeared before the
deputy provincial assessor and municipal secretary, and made two sworn
statements, wherein the former stated that she had purchased the parcels of land
from Sabina, and the latter in turn declared that she had sold them to Maria
Verzosa.
On the same day, Sabina executed a deed in favor of her niece Oliva Verzosa,
assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument. Sabina also
executed a deed in favor of her niece Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the four
parcels of land. Again on the said day, Sabina executed a deed to her niece Ruperta
Palma assigning to her three parcels of land.
Sabina Almadin passed away, her sister Catalina Almadin, propounded her will for
probate. Said will was not admitted to probate. Vivencio Legasto, then, the special
administrator appointed the court filed the complaint which originated this case,
claiming the delivery of the parcels of land.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces
was valid enforceable.
HELD:
A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be
no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his
property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the
word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who freely donates his
property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.
LLB III-B
Fajardo vs Fajardo
G.R. No. L-32195
August 19, 1930
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:
Partition
[374]
FACTS:
Appellant and appellee are brother and sister, and the sole heirs of the decedent spouses whose
succession now engages our attention. While the appellant alleges that his father had long before
death divided his estate between his children, the parties herein, the latter entering upon the
possession and enjoyment thereof, the appellee denies any such partition.
The evidence shows that the appellant took possession of certain lands belonging to his deceased
father before the latter's death, paying the land tax and appropriating the fruits thereof for his
own personal use. While the appellee, too, now holds certain land from the same predecessor, it
has not been shown that such tenure dates back to her father's lifetime. And both she and her
husband have testified that they took possession thereof only after her father's death. The record
does not bear out the allegation that the late Magdaleno Fajardo divided his estate between his
two children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition made is enforceable.
HELD:
No. It does not appear that if such a partition was made, it was made in accordance with law and
is therefore enforceable. There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made:
By an act inter vivos, or by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed.
Manresa thus comments on articles 1056 et seq. of the Civil Code:
A testator may therefore partition his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will;
that is, following the proper formalities of one, or the other of these acts.
(Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, vol VII, p. 694, 5th edition.)
If the partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing in a public
instrument (article 1280, Civil Code) because it was a conveyance of real estate. If by last will
and testament, the legal requisites should have been observed. Neither appears in the record to
have been done.
No application can therefore be made of the doctrines laid down in Fule vs. Fule (46 Phil., 317);
Fule vs. Fule (52 Phil., 750); and Garcia vs. Tolentino (25 Phil., 102), where, neither the
existence nor the formalities of the partition being in issue, the court was under the necessity of
holding that the partition was enforceable.

LLB III-B
BALANAY vs MARTINEZ
64 SCRA 452
June 27, 1975
[375]
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:
Partition and Distribution of the Estate
FACTS:
-Leodegaria Julian died leaving her husband Felix Sr., and six legitimate children, Felix, Jr.
Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina, Delia, and Emilia.
-She left a notarial will and in paragraph 5 of the will she said that after the death of Felix Sr. her
land and all conjugal lands should be divided in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned of in the will her husbands one-half share of the conjugal assets.
-Felix Sr and Avelina opposed.
-Subsequently, Felix Sr withdrew and he conformed and renounced his hereditary rights.
However, Avelina continued on with her opposition.
-The lower court declared the will as void and converted the testate proceeding to an intestate
proceeding.
-Felix, Jr. appealed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the will should first be determined to be intrinsically valid prior to the determination of
its allowance or formal validity
2. WON the declaration that the will was void is proper
3. WON the renunciation of Felix, Sr. of his hereditary rights is valid
4. WIN Felix, Sr. will was intrinsically void because it preterited him
HELD:
1. Yes, it was correct in passing upon the question of intrinsic validity first. The court was of the
opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will (i.e. paragraph 5), which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate. It was correct to
pass upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its formal validity is established. The probate
of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical consideration demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before
it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
2. No, it was not proper. The invalidity of one of the several dispositions does not affect the
validity of the other dispositions. Except if the other dispositions is dependent on the first invalid
disposition that has been made. The valid parts should be upheld if they can be separated from
the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general scheme,
or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
3. Yes, it was valid. Art. 793 of the Civil Code states that Property acquired after the making of a
will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will,
should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention and Art. 930 The legacy or
[376]

devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the
thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he
made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. The
partition then has become valid.
4. No, Felix, Sr.s case In the case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition
did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wifes will and renounced
his hereditary rights. Thus it is different from the Nuguid case because where the testatrix as heir
her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her
compulsory heirs in the direct line. Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides, The preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted
compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation. Since the preterition of the parents annulled the
institution of the sister as testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy
resulted.
Moreover, testacy is preferable to intestacy. Doubts are resolved in favor of intestacy. As far as
legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions in the
will should be followed.

LLB III-B
[377]

Delos Santos vs Santa Teresa
44 Phil 811
January 8, 1918
TOPIC/DOCTRINE:
Partition and Distribution of the Estate
FACTS:
Gregorio Santa Teresa, the predecessor in interest of the parties herein, died about thirty years
ago, leaving the plaintiffs and the defendant as his heirs. That said predecessor in interest,
Gregorio Santa Teresa, left no other property than that described in paragraph 3 of the complaint.
Since the death of the deceased, Gregorio Santa Teresa, the defendant Fernando Santa Teresa had
always been in quiet and peaceful possession of said property. That since the death of the
deceased Gregorio Santa Teresa, the defendant had been paying the land tax of the lands
described in the complaint and enjoying them as sole owner thereof, said enjoyment not having
been interrupted at any time by any other person claiming any interest therein. Both parties
allege that the trial court erred in not taking into consideration, in deciding the case, the
provisions of article 1965 of the Civil Code, according to which "as between coheirs, coowners,
or proprietors of adjacent estates, the action to demand the partition of the inheritance, of the
thing held in common, or the survey of the adjacent properties does not prescribe." and in not
granting the motion for new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for partition between the co-heir has prescribed.
HELD:
No. As long as the co-ownership exists, there is a right on the part of every co-heir to demand the
partition of the estate. Even if the estate is held only by one co-owner, but he holds it in the
common interest, any other co-owner will always have a right to ask for partition. But if the coheir having possession of the hereditary property holds the same in his own name, under claim of
exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by prescription if his possession meets all the
requirements of the law; and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heirs or coowners lose their right to demand partition.

LLB III-B
[378]
Garcia vs. Calaliman

172 SCRA 201
Topic/Doctrine: COLLATION
FACTS:
Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land. On his death the property
was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of his late
brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos. In 1954, the heirs, Juanit Bertomo et al
signed a document entitled, "Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Sale. On December 17, 1954
another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia et al, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and
Paciencia Trabadillo their shares, rights, interest and participation in the same parcel of land. The
Deed of Sale was registered in the Register of Deeds. The Petitioners came to know that their coheirs were selling the property when one of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked Petitioner Paz
Garcia to sign a document. On December 26, 1954 Francisco Garcia wrote the respondents
giving them notice of his desire to exercise the right of legal redemption and that he would resort
to court action if denied the right. The respondents did not reply. Hence, Francisco Garcia went
to the Office of the Register of Deeds and there found two documents of sale regarding the same
parcel of land. In 1955, Francisco Garcia and the other heirs (Petitioners) filed a case for legal
redemption claiming that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 of NCC had already
elapsed.
ISSUE:
WON, the 30-day period prescribed in article 1088 of the new civil code for a co-heir to exercise
his right of legal redemption, had already elapsed?
HELD:
The issue had been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v. Samonte, where the SC observed:
"Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of
the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal
or by registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means
of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said notice be
made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient. He or she
is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale,
its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not
having provided f or any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the
Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for
written notification of redemption.
[379]

TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB III-B
Castillo vs Samonte
L-13146, January 30, 1960
Topic/Doctrine :Section 6. Sub-section 1 (Partition)
FACTS:
Romualda Meneses was, during her lifetime, the owner of the unregistered residential land. Upon
her demise, she left as compulsary heirs the plaintiff herein and his brothers and sister. Said
property remained undivided, as the heirs did not partition the inherited estate either judicially or
extrajudicially. On July 13, 1953, one of the heirs, Gregorio Castillo, without giving any notice
in writing to his co-heirs, including plaintiff herein, sold for P1,000.00 his undivided interest in
the property to defendant who, on July 16, 1953, succeeded in registering the deed of sale the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Sometime in September, 1956, when the place was surveyed
cadastrally, plaintiff learned for the first time about the sale he offered to redeem the property
from defendant, but the latter refused to resell the same to him. Plaintiff, therefore, filed a
complaint in the above-mentioned court praying the defendant be ordered to resell the property
to him. the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
ordering the latter to reconvey or transfer the portion of the property in question to the plaintiff
herein, upon the payment by the latter to the former of the amount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), which is the consideration of the sale made by Gregorio Castillo in favor of the
defendant.
ISSUE:
WON, plaintiffs right to redeem the property subject of the controversy is tenable as a
compulsory heir?
HELD:
Yes. An action seeks to assert a fundamental, primary right of which the plaintiff has been
unlawfully deprived, or to redress a wrong which has been inflicted; legal redemption is in the
nature of a mere privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the
benefit and convenience of the redemptioner to afford him a way out of what might be a
disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been trust. In conformity with the
above ruling and, since in the instant case, it does not appear that defendant had acted in gross
and evident bad faith in refusing plaintiff's offer to redeem the property in question, or that there
are in the text of their appealed decision reasonable or equitable reasons for allowing the award
of attorney's fees to plaintiff, we are constrained to disallow the same.
[380]
TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB III-B
Gerona et al vs. De Guzman

11 SCRA 153
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman.
Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz.
After the death of Teodora, Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their children are herein
respondents de Guzman heirs. Marcelo died sometime in September 1945 and respondents
executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein
that they were the only surviving heirs of Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also
his forced heirs. They were able to cause the transfer the certificates of 7 parcels of land each in
their names. The petitioners discovered the fraud only the year before the institution of the case.
Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as have their shares in the said
properties reconveyed to them.
ISSUE:
WON Placida de Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo as she was an
illegitimate child and that the action of the Petitioners is barred by the statute of limitations.
HELD:
The rule holds true only when the defendants do not hold the property in question under an
adverse title. The statute of limitations operates from the time the adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property. The defendants excluded the petitioners from the estate of Marcelo
when they executed the deed of extra-judicial settlement claiming that they are the sole heirs thus
setting up an adverse title to the estate. An action for reconveyance of real property based upon a
constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations and
the action may only be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the
discovery was made on June 25, 1948 when the deed was filed with the Register of Deeds and
new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents exclusively. Plaintiffs
complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than 10 years after. Ignacio Gerona as
[381]

well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of majority in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of
discovery within which to file an action. Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority
in1952 and 1954, thus had 2 years after removal of legal incapacity within which to commence
their action.
TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB III-B
Santos vs. Mendoza

69 Phil 155
FACTS:
Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is the
mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several coheir s including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely
for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots of Maximo, in
addition to his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and
subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure
to comply with his obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos
answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement
was void with respect to her ,for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included
in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to
the extrajudicial partition agreement, was stopped from raising in issue the right of the
plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. Maximo
filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grand niece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter and
therefore entitle for representation?
HELD:
Plaintiff -appellee being a mere grand niece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit from
the latter by right of representation. In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to
Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant.
Necessarily plaintiff -pellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance
[382]
TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB IIIB
Broce vs Dela Vina

20 Phil 423
Topic/Doctrine :Section 6. Sub-section 1 (Subrogation)
FACTS:
The record in this case discloses that Placida Agraviador, the grandmother of the plaintiff
Eusebia Broce, died intestate February 14, 1907; that the time of her death she was a widow; that
she was the mother of nine children, including the defendants Ignacio Damaso Apurado, Zacarias
Apurado, and Filomeno Apurado and also Hipoita Apurado, who died before her mother; that the
latter was the mother of several children, including Eusebia Broce, one of the plaintiffs in this
action, now married to her co-plaintiff, Silverio Vicente; that a tract of land containing some 45
hectares, situated at a place called Tiboco, in the jurisdiction of San Carlos in the Province of
Occidental Negros, and fully described in the complaint, constitutes a part of the intestate estate
left by Placida Agraviador, deceased; that this intestate estate has never divided between the
heirs, judicially or extra judicially, and that up to the time of the trial it had not been made the
subject of judicial administration; that on the 24th day of November, 1909, the defendants,
Ignacio Damaso Apurado, Zacarias Apurado and Filomeno Apurado, sons of Placida Agraviador,
each sold his interest in this land, which was claimed to be a one-sixth part thereof, to the
defendant Pedro de la Vina for the sum of P800.
ISSUE:
WON, Plaintiff's claim of a right to be subrogated in place of the defendant as the purchaser of
the interests of some of her coheirs in the intestate estate of her grandmother.
HELD:
[383]

Plaintiff's claim of a right to be subrogated in place of the defendant as the purchaser of the
interests of some of her coheirs in the intestate estate of her grandmother is based upon this
article, and the real contention of the defendant in this court is that she failed to exercise her
rights of subrogation within the period of a month from the time when she was informed of the
sale of the interests of her coheirs to the defendant; indeed, defendants claim that these sales
were made with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs. There is nothing in the record,
however, which sustains or even tends to sustain defendant's contention. The sales were made on
the 24th day of November, 1909, and an attempt was made to prove that Silverio Vicente, the coplaintiff and husband of the plaintiff Eusebia Broce, had knowledge of the sales before the end of
that month or early in the month of December. This is denied by the husband and we think it is
quite clearly established that if he knew anything whatever in regard to the transaction, his
information was based wholly on current rumor, and was so indefinite and uncertain that it could
not have imposed upon him any obligation to exercise or to decline to exercise a right of
subrogation under the provisions of the above cited article of the Civil Code, even had he himself
been the directly interested party. There is no proof whatever in the record as to the time when
Eusebia Broce, herself, had notice of the sales of the shares of her coheirs to the defendant De la
Vina.
TORRES, ROMEL G
LLB III-B
CARMEN ZAMORA GONZAGA Y PILAR vs. PEDRO MARTINEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-3196
January 6, 1908
Topic/Doctrine: Effects of Partition
FACTS:
Francisco Martinez sold and delivered to the plaintiff in this action an undivided onehalf interest in the real estate set out in the complaint for the sum of $3,000. In the
contract of sale, the vendor reserved the right to repurchase the said real estate
within a term of twelve months from the date thereof. In the same contract the
purchaser agreed to rent the said real estate to the vendor for the sum of 30 pesos
per month. The said contract was inscribed in the registry of property of the City of
Manila. The right of repurchase was never exercised, and the proper consolidation
entry was entered in the said registry of property in the City of Manila. The said
defendant, Pedro Martinez, and the above-mentioned Francisco Martinez are
respectively son and husband of one Germana Ilustre, who died, the said Pedro
Martinez and Francisco Martinez being her only heirs, each being entitled to an
undivided one-half of her estate, of which the property in question constituted a
part. In the course of the administration of the estate of Germana Ilustre, the said
Pedro Martinez and Francisco Martinez executed a partition agreement of the said
real estate. This partition agreement was approved by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and in accordance with its terms all of the real estate in question in this
action was allotted to the defendant Pedro Martinez. The rental value of the said
[384]

property since the date of the consolidation entry, is 120 pesos per month.
Upon these facts the trial court held that the sale by Francisco Martinez of his one-half undivided
interest in the property in question clothed the purchaser with title thereto which was not affected
by the partition agreement that was afterwards entered into between Francisco Martinez, and
Pedro Martinez, and judgment was rendered in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
From this judgment the defendant appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale was valid.
HELD:
Yes. The precise question involved in the contention of the appellants was decided
in the case of Montano Lopez vs. Martinez Ilustre (5 Phil. Rep., 567). The syllabus of
the opinion of the court in that case is as follows:
M. and the defendant were owners as tenants in common of twenty-eight separate tracts of land.
M. sold to the plaintiff his undivided one-half interest in two of these tracts by contracts
with pacto de retro. Before the right to repurchase had expired M. and the defendant made a
voluntary partition between themselves of the twenty-eight tracts, by which partition the two
tracts in which the plaintiff was interested fell to the defendant. M. did not exercise his right of
repurchase. Held, That the partition between M. and the defendant did not affect the plaintiff, and
that he was the owner of an undivided one-half of the two lots in question.
LLB III-B
GENEROSA TEVES DE JAKOSALEM vs. NICOLASA RAFOLS, ET ALS.
G.R. No. L-48372
July 24, 1942
Topic/Doctrine: Effects of Partition
FACTS:
The land in question described in the appealed in the decision originally belonged to Juan
Melgar. The latter died at the judicial administration of his estate which was commenced in 1915
and came to a close on 1924, only. During the pendency of the said administration, Susana
Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro
Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in
possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. The partition of the estate left by the deceased
Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. She
[385]

conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendantappellee Nicolasa Rafols, who, entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in
possession thereof up to the present. Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said half of the land
from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and while that case was
pending, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land conveyed to him
by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half but express acknowlegment
of the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the judgment which is favorable
to Nicolas Rafols.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale while in custodial legis is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis, does not
mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he
has or might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of
property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the
possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance,
subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of
such administration.
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is
deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the
death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with
reason states upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided." And according to article 399 of the
Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common
property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the
portion which may be alloted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the
community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs, Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of
the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their
deceased father, this Court, said that the sale was valid, but that effect thereof was
limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the
estate.
It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was
valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor
upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father Juan Melgar. And upon
the partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to Susana
Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of Pedro Cui was
entirely confirmed.
[386]

Upon the confirmation of the sale in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by Susana Melgar in
favor of Nicolasa Rafols could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double sale, where
neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession namely, Pedro Cui, should
be referred. When the sale made in the latter's favor was confirmed, Susana Melgar was in
possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered as that of Pedro Cui.
The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced only subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.

LLB III-B
PILAR SALUNGA, ET AL. vs. EMILIANO C. EVANGELISTA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-53142
October 2, 1911
Topic/Doctrine: Rescission and Nullity of Partition
FACTS:
[387]

The object sought by the complaint filed in this suit is the annulment of the partition of an estate,
agreed upon and signed and recorded in a public instrument of the same year. The estate is
shown to have been left by Santiago Evangelista, who, during his lifetime, contracted three
marriages; with Eusebia Sangco, Antonia Alonso, and Pilar Salunga. The first marriage did not
last long because the wife died and there was no issue. The second marriage lasted six years and
they have eight children. By the third marriage, they have five children. Twelve years after the
partition have been made, a complaint was filed attacking it as null and void by Pilar Salunga.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition is null and void as alleged by Pilar Salunga.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, adopting opinions contained in the judgment of the trial court, held: that
it was a legal doctrine that contracts could not be set aside by the will of but one of the
contracting parties, and that no one may go counter to his own acts; that on the
hypothesis that the said instruments did contain some defect, the same
would be ascribable to the mother herself, who is the person who ought to
have seen that they were executed in conformity with all the required
formalities; and there existed no legal provision whereby, on account of the
failure to apply for judicial approval of the transactions effected, an
annulment might be obtained of the settlement and partition of the estate
wherein a minor is interested.

LLB III-B
TORRES vs ENCARNACION
GR No. L-4681
July 31, 1951
[388]

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection I - Relationship
FACTS:
The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal under Special Proceeding No. R-2414. It pertains to a certain parcel of land, which is in
the possession of the petitioners and which they assert exclusive ownership. They contend that
the administrators remedy to recover the property is through an action of law and not by motion
in the interstate proceeding.
A court appointed commissioners submitted on February 8, 1944 a project of partition, the land
in question, which is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included as
property of the estate and assigned to Miguel B. Dayco, one of the heirs of the decedent
Marcelo de Borja. On February, 1946 the partition was approved over the objection of the
surviving children of Quintin de Borja one of Marcelos children and affirmed by the Court in
1949. It should be noted that one of these children was herself the duly appointed administratrix
of her fathers estate.
As the administrator refused to turn over their fathers share, on technical grounds, however,
when elevated the case to the High Court on certiorari as respondents to the petition, the
probates court action was otherwise defended and their non-execution was long overdue.
Hence, this petition to determine the rightful owner of the question parcel of land.
ISSUE:
-Whether or not the parcel of land is in the possession of the Administratrix of the estate of
Marcelo de Borja;
-Whether or not the partition, which includes the parcel of land is in custodia legis.
HELD:
Yes. The parcel of land which is in the possession of the Administratrix of the estate of Marcelo
de Borja as contained in an order of the probate court through a partition on the share of their
father.
Yes. The question parcel of land was indeed in under control and jurisdiction of the court for its
proper disposition
The petition is denied with costs against the petitioners.
CUALBAR, MA. ISABEL
LLB III-B
SANSON vs ARANETA
[389]

Reference: GR No. 43482
Date: July 28, 1937
Topic/Doctrine: Section 5 - Collation
FACTS:
On August 23, 1932, an action was brought by the plaintiff for the rescission of the agreement of
partition entered by him and the defendants on June 10, 1927 to terminate the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Roque Sanson in a Civil Case No. 1055 in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo.
In the decision, the defendant Isabel Araneta, wife of the decedent was ordered to file within
thirty days a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties, furniture, jewelry, credits
and actions left by the deceased with the respective value thereof and to present within the period
a project of partition of said properties among the heirs. However, she failed to comply with the
requirement so that the plaintiff asked for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the
custody and administration of the properties in question, which was granted by the court with the
appointment of Sabas Gustilo - his father-in-law of the plaintiff. In the brief filed by the plaintiff
among the errors committed by the lower court was the appointment of the provincial sheriff of
Iloilo as judicial receiver vice, the plaintiffs father-in-law; approving the amended inventory
presented by the defendant failing to include all other properties of the deceased subject to
partition and to bring to collation a part of the properties turned over to them as inheritance.
On February 25, 1935 allegedly approved by the court, an agreement was entered into by the
parties to sell all the properties left by the deceased at public auction for the purpose of
distributing the proceeds thereof among themselves, however the courts appealed order on
March 15, 1935 failed to order the sale as earlier agreed upon.
The court in its decision approving amendments to the inventory presented by the defendant; as a
consequence a rescission of the portion of the agreement was ordered. The same decision was
affirmed by this Court, which an appeal was brought by the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not all properties left by the deceased subject to the partition were all properly
included and accounted for;
- Whether or not in the partition of the properties of the deceased it is necessary to sell them at
public action.
HELD:
Yes. All properties left by the deceased which are subject to the partition were all properly
included and accounted for as court have chosen to believe the explanation and inventory
presented by the defendant as the same court ordered the defendant to submit an amended
inventory of all other properties, income and fruits from the time each and every one of the
parties.
[390]

No. As stated in the courts order that it is not necessary that the properties of the deceased be
sold at public auction as the parties have agreed upon, doing so would openly disregard the
orders of the deceased contained in his probated will.
In a decision of the court provides that when partition takes place the necessary collation and
compensation should be made so that the most equitable and just possible, in conformity with the
provisions of the deceased. Let the costs be taxed against the appellees.
CUALBAR, MA. ISABEL

LLB III-B
[391]
Africa vs Africa
GR No. 15031
September 29, 1920
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 2 Effects of Partition
FACTS:
An action for the partition of the property of an inheritance worth more than P30,000. A
complaint was filed on February 1, 1918 at the Court of First Instance of Batangas. As allege the
petitioners and defendants are descendants in a direct line of the spouses Galo Africa and
Valentina Macarandang, who died on April 25, 1889 and June 17, 1896, respectively. The said
properties in question came from said spouses and since their death they have been administered
by their sons the defendants Benito and Lino Africa. The plaintiffs petitioned that the
defendants be ordered to render a true and proper accounting of their administration and the
courts direction make a just and equitable distribution of the aforementioned properties among
the heirs and pay the costs.
In a decision made by the Court on July 23, 1918, declaring the properties in question still
undivided and ordered the defendant Benito Africa to render accounting of the properties left by
Galo Africa and Valentina Macarandang; file an inventory within 45 days after the decision
became final and among other directives from the court. From the decision of the lower court the
defendants appealed its decision.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not there has been a partition made on the subject property by the spouses Galo
Africa and Valentina Macarandang;
- Whether or not heirs who have been in possession and enjoyment of the hereditary properties
are susceptible to prescriptibility of the ownership of the properties.
HELD:
Yes. The Court is of the opinion that a partition has already been made by the spouses Galo
Africa and Valentina Macarandang and its delivery to their successors in interest, effected nearly
a quarter of a century ago.
Yes. The heirs have already been in the possession and enjoyment of the question properties, as
exclusive owners, for more than twenty-years and any right that the plaintiff might have had to
these properties has prescribed.
The Plaintiffs complaint seems to be anchored on the injustice due to the disproportionate and
unequal distribution of the estate made by their common predecessors in interest, so that their
action should have been for the rescission of the partition, however, the action would still
prescribed on account of the length of time lapsed.
The Court in its decision concluded and opined that the judgment appealed from should be and is
hereby reversed, without finding as to costs.
[392]

CUALBAR, MA. ISABEL
LLB III-B
ALFORQUE vs VELOSO
GR No. 43607
February 16, 1938
Topic/Doctrine: Action to Rescind Partition; Prescription Of Action; Prescription of
Ownership
FACTS:
The properties which originally belong to the deceased Rafael Veloso and had passed on to his
wife Josefa Garces and upon her death had passed on to the later heirs, is the subject matter of
the litigation. The couple contracted marriage on January 16, 1892 and the union borne nine
legitimate children and had a natural child whom he later acknowledge as such namely Arsenio
Veloso or Arsenio dela Cerna. Before his death on October 6, 1897, Rafael Veloso executed an
open will under the then existing laws, instituted his wife and legitimate children and his
acknowledged natural child. On August 20, 1906, a deed of partition was executed to divide the
properties left by the deceased without judicial intervention as provided in his will.
On July 1927, Josefa Garces died and left a will duly probated by the court. A competent court
confirmed the appointment of an executor which she made in favor of Gabino Veloso, one of her
son who survived her. The plaintiffs commenced an action in the CFI that the said properties be
declared those of Rafael Veloso and should automatically passed and partitioned among his heirs
correspondingly the defendants contended the allegation otherwise that the widow is the sole and
only owner of the questioned properties; she had become the owner by prescription; that other
defendants have expressly renounced and acknowledge the widow as the sole owner. However,
the lower court decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants to convey
portion of the question properties, should they failed to agree the court will appoint three
commissioners to make the partition.
The defendants appealed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
-Whether or not the ownership of the properties in question in the possession of the widow were
conveyed in usufruct only;
-Whether or not the properties, which were partitioned on August 20, 1906 between the heirs of
the decedent and the widow Josefa Garces were not conjugal properties but the private property
of the former;
-Whether or not Josefa Garces has effectively took possession and ownership thru prescription
the properties in question.
[393]

HELD:
No. The ownership of the properties in question could not have been conveyed to the widow Josefa Garces because while it may not have been stated in the agreement it is an established fact
that the one-half of the conjugal properties acquired during their marriage she is by law entitled
to.
No. Facts and evidence shows that the properties which were partitioned on August 20, 1906
were considered conjugal properties as they were acquired during the marriage of the decedent
Rafael Veloso and Josefa Garces.
Yes. Josefa Garces has effectively took possession and ownership of the properties in question
thru prescription because for more than twenty-four years she exercises acts of ownership over
the same, publicly, peacefully and uninterruptedly, the same as the heirs, which have exercise
similar acts with respect to their adjudicated partitioned properties.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the defendants are absolved from the complaint
of the plaintiffs and appellees, with costs of both instances to the latter. So ordered.
CUALBAR, MA. ISABEL

LLB III-B
[394]
DE TORRES vs DE TORRES
G.R. No. 9234
September 19, 1914
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 1 - Relationship
FACTS:
An appeal was raised through the counsel of the defendants from the decision made on 8 January
1913 written by Judge Herbert D. Gale, which held that the agreement of partition executed
between the plaintiff and the defendants on 10 January 1912, was null and void and sentenced
the defendants to deliver and return to the plaintiff the particular four parcels of land in the
agreement and to pay her the costs of the suit, including the fees of the receiver for the deposit.
On January 10, 1912 executed an instrument of partition by virtue of the property left by her
father divided among her paternal uncle-defendant-appellant and the sons of her fathers sister
making her believe that the appellants enjoy the same right as hers to the inheritance of the
decedent, for the reason that the plaintiff was not a daughter of his father. However, the
allegation was proved that the plaintiff was born a natural daughter of Sulpicio de Torres, who
was single at the time of her birth and her mother who was also single and subsequently married,
by reason thereof the plaintiff came to enjoy the same rights that pertained to her parents two
other legitimate children born in wedlock however, died in infancy.
Since she was recognized by her father and he had no other legitimate descendant or ascendant,
this other descendants or ascendants, however does not apply to the present case because it
pertains to a natural daughter legitimized by a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the agreement of partition executed between the plaintiff and the defendants
was valid;
- Whether or not the plaintiff is solely entitled to succeed and inherit the estate of her late father
Sulpicio de Torres.
HELD:
No. The agreement of partition executed was declared null and void. The earlier judgment was
affirmed by the Higher Court declaring the agreement executed by the plaintiff null and void and
sentenced the defendants-appellants to deliver and return to the plaintiff the four parcels of land
concerned in the agreement and to pay her the costs of the suit including the fees of the receiver
[395]

for the deposit.
Yes. The plaintiff is solely entitled to succeed and inherit the estate as provided for under Article
939 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the provision of Article 921 of the Civil Code prescribes
that in inheritance the relative nearest in degree excludes the most remote excepting the right of
representation in proper cases and in the case at bar the right of representation cannot be
invoked by the defendants. Article 1081 of the same Code provides that a division made with a
person who was believed to be an heir without being so shall be void. The plaintiff being
ignorant and not so well informed as the defendants was erroneously believed that the defendants
were entitled when in fact while she is living she alone is entitled under the law to succeed to the
estate of Sulpicio de Torres, to the exclusion of all her other relatives in remote degree.
It is held that the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been refuted, and this latter
being in accord with justice and in harmony with the merits of the case.
CUALBAR, MA. ISABEL

LLB III-B
[396]
CENTENO vs CENTENO
GR No. 28265
November 5, 1928
Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 2 Right of Representation
FACTS:
In an appeal filed by the plaintiffs in behalf of herself Natividad Centeno and as an administratrix
of the estate of her deceased father Isaac Centeno and the intervenors. The dispositive portion
provides that the agreement of partition in question is hereby upheld, with the adjudications to
the parties thereto, and therefore the partition prayed for in this civil case by plaintiffs and
intervenors respecting the realty described in the sixth paragraph of the original complaint is
denied. The other petition filed that said partition be held void and of no effect in so far as it
refers only to the said portion adjudicated to defendants was also denied.
The action instituted by the plaintiffs and the intervenors, respectively, is for the recovery of
property through the annulment of the partition and to have another partition. In the course of
the proceeding, it was to determine who should inherit and share to the action for recovery of the
property and partition of an inheritance, once the court has declared that the property belongs to
the parties in common and pro indiviso.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not that the defendants are entitled to inherit the properties sought to be recovered
and are subject of the agreement of partition;
- Whether or not the parties in the possession and acquired ownership over the undivided
conjugal properties left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo declared by
the lower court to be pro indiviso;
- Whether or not the plaintiffs and intervenors are entitled to inherit the undivided conjugal
property which belongs to Melchora Arroyo equivalent to one-half.
HELD:
Yes. The defendants are entitled to inherit the properties subject of the action for recovery and
agreement for partition as they are acknowledge natural children of the estates of spouses Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo and the heirs are legitimate brother and children of the deceased
son of the former.
[397]

Yes. The parties that are in possession of the properties have acquired ownership and title
thereto by prescription, which are included in the inventory on the undivided conjugal properties
of the deceased spouses.
Yes. The plaintiffs and intervenors are the only ones entitled to inherit the one-half of the
undivided portion of the conjugal properties of Melchora Arroyo.
The Court in its decision with the sole modification of ordering the partition of the conjugal
property left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora declared by the lower court to
be pro indiviso, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
CUALBAR, MA. ISABEL
LLB III-B
[398]
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
19 SCRA 85; GR No. L-17818,
January 25, 1967
Topic/Doctrine: Capacity to Succeed By Will or By Intestacy
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share in a will to Salud
Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa
Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo.
Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed
and the shares delivered.
Upon the death of Maria Gerardo died, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in the first, she instituted
Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all
her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting
the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower Court held that
Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo,
plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in
usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.
Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof. This action afforded the defendant an
opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the
estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud
did not acquire valid title to it.
HELD:
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a
party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept
(Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced,
voluntary or intestate ones), and despite the fact that Salud does not happened to be a daughter of the testator
does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at
liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud
impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano
Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the
institution of Salud as heir, since here there was no preterition, or total commission of a forced heir.
CUALBAR, MA. ISABEL

[399]

LLB III-B
GARCIA vs. TOLENTINO
G.R. No. L-8560
August 20, 1913
Topic/Doctrine: Rescission and Nullity of Partition, Art. 1098
FACTS:
Twelve years after Eulalia Flores death, it was brought to the cognizance of
the courts that she had died intestate so that judicial administration was
requested of the property left by her. Further, it was demanded that the
possession of some of it be taken away from certain grandchildren of the
deceased who had been holding the same quietly and peaceably during all
the length of time. Antonino Garcia is the administrator named, and it is he
who presented a complaint on the date last named.
The decedent had five children, two of whom survived her: Irene Tolentino
and Bonifacio Tolentino. By another son, named Alejandro, she had three
grandchildren, one of these is named Eulogio, who was a witness in the case
and, together with his aunt, Irene Tolentino, appears to be the principal
plaintiff. By still another son, Lucio, she also had a granddaughter, named
Gregoria; and, finally, from the son already mentioned, Bonifacio Tolentino,
who subsequently died, three years afterwards it appears, there descended
the grandchildren, six in number, who are the herein defendants.
The object of the suit is to obtain a judicial declaration that the fourteen
parcels of land alleged to be in the possession of the Bonifacios descendants
belong to the decedents intestate estate and must be returned thereto,
doubtless in order that such land may be the subject of division through
special intestate proceedings. The defendants deny holding all the parcels of
lands specified in the complaint, and those that they have they claim to hold
through a division already made and as an inheritance from their father and
predecessors in interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition can be validly rescinded.
HELD:
Without need of examining the testimony of the defendants nor the
documentary evidence adduced by them, and merely from a perusal of the
testimony given by the plaintiffs, Eulogio Tolentino and Irene Tolentino being
classed as such, it is very evident that a division was made of the property
[400]

that belonged to Eulalia Flores and that what the real plaintiffs seek, through
special intestate proceedings, is a rescission of the division made, because in
it they received property of less value than that which the defendant's
predecessor in interest had awarded to himself, whereby they claim to have
been injured. The action prosecuted is really a rescissory one of division, and
not an action for partition of inheritance.
In order that an action for rescission of partition made may lie, the lesion
must exceed the fourth part of the value of the property awarded and the
action must be brought within four years counting from the time the division
was made.
Such are the real grounds upon which the plaintiff's claim was denied, and it
is also upon them that the judgment appealed from has been affirmed, with
the costs against the appellants.
VILLANUEVA, JHULIE ANN L.
LLB III-B
[401]
GEMORA vs. YAP TICO

G.R. No. L-29757
December 29, 1928
FACTS:
Catalina de la Cruz and her deceased husband Susano Gemora, acquired as
conjugal property the lands which are the subject matter of the complaint.
The plaintiffs are children of said spouses. When Susano died, proceedings
for the settlement of his intestate estate were had, in the course of which
Catalina alleged that she was the owner of one-half of the property left by
her husband as being her half of the conjugal property. Catalina owed a large
sum of money to defendant F. M. Yap Tico & Co., Ltd. Then she made a
simulated sale of her portion of the conjugal property to her brother-in-law,
Jose Gemora, and the latter resold said property.
In the course of the aforesaid intestate proceedings of Susano Gemora, the
court adjudicated to the herein plaintiffs, children of Catalina de la Cruz, all
the property of the estate without awarding to said Catalina her half of the
conjugal property. Although Catalina de la Cruz had previously claimed in
such proceedings that half of the conjugal property, she did not appeal from
the said order of the court depriving her of her aforesaid portion of the
marriage property. The lots in question were also adjudicated to the plaintiffs
in the proper cadastral proceeding.
The plaintiffs allege that said land belongs to them. The defendants, on the
other hand, contend that the land claimed in the complaint does not belong
to the plaintiffs in its entirety, because one-half thereof belongs to said
Catalina as her share in the conjugal property. However, it appeared that
sometime later, plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the latter would sue
Catalina for the collection of her debt; that she would not answer the
complaint and would allow judgment be default to be rendered against her
so that the property described in the complaint would be attached and sold
at auction; that if defendants, purchased such properties at the auction, it
would return to the herein plaintiffs one-half of lots, executing a sale to that
effect in favor of said plaintiffs for the price of P8,000; that any other person
bought said property would pay the present plaintiffs P5,000. Yet, plaintiffs
[402]

retained possession and ownership of lands in question.
ISSUE:
Whether, as the plaintiffs allege, they are the owners of the whole of these
lots for having been adjudicated to them by the court, both in the intestate
proceedings of their deceased father Susano Gemora, and in the cadastral
proceeding.
HELD:
The adjudication to the herein plaintiffs of the whole estate of the deceased
Susano Gemora is void, for, according to the evidence of record, the same
was procured by fraud, inasmuch as in the proceedings in which the order of
said court was issued there appears the allegation of the surviving spouse
that one-half of said estate belongs to her as her share of the conjugal
property. That the property in question is conjugal property has been
sufficiently and satisfactorily proven as in the record. And such a judicial
adjudication procured by fraud may be assailed and vacated in a collateral
proceeding such as is the present one.
With respect to the adjudication of the title to said lots made in the cadastral
proceeding, considering all the circumstances of the case, the possession by
the plaintiffs of one-half of said property pertaining to the widow Catalina de
la Cruz, and the registration of said half in favor of the herein plaintiffs,
should be understood to be in the nature of a trust for the said Catalina de la
Cruz. A receiver, trustee, attorney, agent, or any other person occupying
fiduciary relations respecting property or persons, is utterly disabled from
acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for
management.
LLB III-B
[403]
GERONA vs. DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. L-19060
May 29, 1964
FACTS:
The petitioners herein are Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin,
all surnamed Gerona. They alleged that they are the legitimate children of
Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died, was a
legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la
Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married
Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents
Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed
De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died after Placida; that subsequently,
respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that
they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman,
although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that
respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer
certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said
deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued
in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that
such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the
institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents
their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest
thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby
causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that
judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement,
insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/8th of the properties in
litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to petitioners their
aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of deeds to
cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above
[404]

stated and to issue new certificates of title in the name of both the
petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former and
7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the
income of said properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share
therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees. In
their answer, respondents maintained, among others, that petitioners' action
is barred by the statute of limitations. On the other hand, petitioners
maintained that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is
not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said
statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run
until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action has already prescribed.
HELD:
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for
partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the
defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The
statute of limitations operates as in other cases; from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. When respondents
executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating
therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and
secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby
excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently,
set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this
action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is
tainted with fraud. It is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for
reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust,
resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Inasmuch
as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial
settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action
therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was
filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in
the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of
extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.

LLB III-B
[405]
TOMIAS vs. TOMIAS

G.R. No. L-3004
May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Eustaquio Tomias died intestate leaving 7 children named Leon, Benita,
Monica, Bernabela, Toribia (alleged to known also as Enrica), Agustina, and
Josefa, all surnamed Tomias. Possessed of property at the time of his death,
he was succeeded in the possession and enjoyment thereof by his 7 children.
Two of these, however later died, Leon and Josefa. It is claimed that the latter
was survived by a daughter named Josefa or Filomena Tomias. Leon, who had
married twice, was survived by 4 children Conrado Magdalena, Dolores,
and Anicetas the first two, by the first marriage, and the other two by the
second marriage. It is claimed, however, that he has also had natural son
named Filemon Tomias.
Conrado Tomias and Magdalena Tomias (two of the children of the deceased
Leon Tomias), in conjunction with their cousin Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only
daughter of the deceased Josefa Tomias), filed a complaint against their
aunts Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, alleging that their
deceased grandfather Eustaquio Tomias was the absolute owner of the 15
parcels of land (in Occidental Negros) and that since the death of Leon
Tomias the defendants had continued in possession of said land and had
[406]

been refusing to divide it among the heirs and to give plaintiffs their share of
the products. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and accounting, to
which the trial court granted. But some 5 months thereafter the defendants,
together with Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural son Leon Tomias, sought to
annul it by filing an action for that purpose on the grounds (1) that the court
did not have jurisdiction over the case because some of the parcels of land
partitioned among the heirs did not belong to the deceased Eustaquio Tomias
but to other persons not made parties to the suit, and (2) that not all of the
heirs were represented in the suit because Filemon Tomias, an alleged
natural child of Leon Tomias, had not been made a party therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition may be validly annulled.
HELD:
In affirming the decision of lower court, the Court held:
1. The judgment in the partition case may not be voided on the mere
allegation that some of the parcels of land partitioned were the
property of persons not made parties to the suit when none of those
persons has come to the court to protest.
2. There is no showing that Toribia Tomias has been prejudiced by the
adjudication of one-seventh of the inheritance to Enrica Tomias, the
court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same
person. There is no claim that Toribia is entitled to more.
3. The claim of Filemon Tomias for a share in the inheritance as an alleged
natural son of Leon Tomias does not call for the annulment of the
decision in the partition case. That claim should be asserted in
separate action against the four legitimate children of Leon Tomias to
whom the latter's share in the inheritance was adjudicated in the
partition.
LLB III-B
[407]
VDA. DE LOPEZ vs. LOPEZ

G.R. No. L-23915
September 28, 1970
FACTS:
On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of
the estate of the deceased, filed with the lower court a project of partition
adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the
deceased. In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the
project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and
closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, the minors Dahlia
and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, represented by their mother, Lolita B.
Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition
claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez,
born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that
their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to
them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground
that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the
estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of
[408]

the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an
independent action against the individual distributees. Trial court denied the
petition to reopen the intestate proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether it should have been an independent action against the individual
distributees to annul the partition and recover appellants' shares in the
estate.
HELD:
Taking up the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the appellants'
motion, it must be remembered that in Benedicto vs. Javellana (10 Phil. 197)
this Court held that demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in
interest to a testate or intestate succession, shall be acted upon and decided
in the same special proceedings, and not in a separate action, and the judge
who has jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance, and who,
when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the
interested parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.
In the Courts opinion the court that approved the partition and the
agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is alleged,
the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed
in the course of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that
the probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment
procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it
was issued are pending, but even, as in this case within a reasonable time
thereafter.
The order of the trial court sought to be reviewed cites the case of Tomias, et
al. vs. Tomias, et al., 89 Phil. 216. That case is not here applicable, since it
involved the annulment of the decision in ordinary action for partition, which
had already become final. The alleged natural child's remedy, said the court,
was to file a separate action against the children to whom the estate had
been adjudicated.

LLB III-B
[409]
GATMAITAN vs. MEDINA

G.R. No. L-14400
August 05, 1960
FACTS:
On March 10, 1956, Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition, seeking his
appointment as administrator of the property of his wife, Veronica Medina,
who died intestate. On April 2, 1956, Gorgonio Medina and Dominica Medina,
as heirs of the deceased (she being their full-blooded sister), filed an
opposition, praying that Gorgonio Medina, or a neutral third party, or
Felicisimo Gatmaitan and Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as
administrator or administrators of the estate. In an order dated July 18, 1956,
the court appointed Felicisimo Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate.
On April 2, 1957, the heirs of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion
[410]

for Partial Partition and Distribution," stating that the estate had no debts
and the heirs were all of legal age; that some of them were necessitous and
in need of cash; and praying that the share corresponding to each of the
heirs in the palay produce for the agricultural year 1956-1957, as well as the
cash deposit in the different banks, be ordered partially distributed among
the heirs pending the final distribution of the estate. The court heard counsel
for administrator Gatmaitan and for the heirs or oppositors, but without
receiving any evidence whatsoever, promulgated on April 5, 1957 the order
subject-matter of the instant appeal, which grants partial partition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not partial distribution of estate is valid pending finality of the
estate proceedings.
HELD:
The Court believed that the lower court erred in rendering the order
appealed from. A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the
final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such
form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for
this strict rule is obvious courts should guard with utmost zeal and
jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be
adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the
inheritance.
LLB III-B
VIADO vs. CA
G.R. No. 137287
February 15, 2000
FACTS:
During their lifetime, spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces
of property, among them a house and lot located Isarog Street, Quezon City.
Virginia died on 1982. Julian died three years later. Surviving them were their
children -- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca
Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo and Leah died on 1987. Nilo
Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia
[411]

Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado. Petitioners and
respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property.
Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner
Rebecca and respondent Alicia after the former had asked that the property
be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing
children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire
property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the
latter. On 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in
question, filed a case for partition. Respondents predicated their claim of
absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents --- a deed of
donation executed by the late Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of
the Isarog property in favor of Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in
which Julian, Leah, petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo their rights and
interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia. Both
instruments were registered by virtue of which old TCT was cancelled and
new one was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado. Petitioners, in their action for
partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that
the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce deceased
Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca added that the
exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement,
resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not preterition justifies partition of estate.
HELD:
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This
kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateral attack on the Transfer Certificate of Title. The
relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on
Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. The fact
alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their
execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance
alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a
ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents
against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained
completely valid and binding.
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal
property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her
heirs --- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado,
[412]

Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment
of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the
heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among coheirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial
settlement. In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among
the parties in this case, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed
of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the
trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the
court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly
wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies.

LLB III-B
CHAVEZ v. IAC
G.R. No. L-68282
November 08, 1990
FACTS:
[413]

Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso
among her 6 children, while possession of such property still remains with
her. Three of her children sold each their share to private respondent
Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor
executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter
sold the entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel
Chavez. Respondent sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel which
was denied by the trail court but which later decision overturned by the
Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has
left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.
ISSUE:
Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last
will supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?
HELD:
Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such
partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on
wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act
inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in
the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime
of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into
with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated
during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her
consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner
herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de
Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she
herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor
of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of
the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.

LLB III-B
THE CITY OF MANILA
vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA and THE ADMINISTRATOR
FOR THE ESTATE OF MARIA CONCEPCION SARMIENTO
[414]

G.R. No. L-10033
August 30, 1917
FACTS:
This case was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the aim to declare escheated
to the city of Manila certain property situated in and around said city. The theory of the Plaintiff
is that, a certain Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without
leaving "her or person entitled to the same with the basis of Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides
when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of
real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and
in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may
declared escheated.
But after a careful examination of evidence, it was proven that That Ana Sarmiento resided, with
her husband, in the city of Manila sometime prior to the 17th day of November, 1668; that on
said date she made a will; that on the 23d day of November, 1668, she added a codicil to said
will, that on the 19th day of May, 1669, she made another will making a part thereof the said
codicil of November 23d, 1668; that said will contained provisions for the establishment of a
"Capellania de Misas;" that the first chaplain of said capellaniashould be her nephew Pedro del
Castillo; that said will contained a provision for the administration of said property in relation
with the said "Capellania de Misas" succeeding administration should continue perpetually; that
said Ana Sarmiento died about the year 1672; that for more than two hundred years the
intervener, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies, has
administered said property; that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila has rightfully and
legally succeeded in accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
ISSUE:
Whether or not deceased Ana Sarmiento died without a will?
HELD:
This what the Supreme Court held in their decision, which was based in the
preponderance of evidence, the proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die
intestate. The will provides for the administration of said property by her
nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the same. She did
not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate.
It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled
to inherit her property.
In view of the facts, therefore, the property in question cannot be declared
escheated as of the property of Ana Sarmiento. If by any chance the property
[415]

may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons
subsequent to Ana Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir or person
by law entitled to the same.
ABDULLA , SHEHERASZADE K.
LLB III-B
[416]
In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier. SULPICIO RESURRECCION

vs.
AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-42539
October 23, 1936
FACTS:
[417]
Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpicio

Resurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of
P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The court, finding that Gil
Francisco Javier died in August, 1930, even before the testatrix made her
will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund of the
estate. Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are
entitled to receive the legacy of P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from
the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this amount to the funds of
the estate. The only witness who testified to this effect was Agustin Javier,
Gil's brother, who alleged that he was in the house of the testatrix in May,
1931, and in a conversation with her he informed her that their brother Gil
had already died, leaving a widow and children. But against this testimony
was presented that of Sulpicio Resurreccion.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of a legacy made in favor of a person who was already dead not only before
the death of the testatrix but even before the will was made?
HELD:
Furthermore, if the testatrix, in making her will, knew that Gil was already
dead and that he had left children, it cannot be explained why she left the
legacy to Gil and not to his children, if such was her intention, particularly
because, according to the evidence for the appellants, she knew one of said
children named Jose.
Consequently, in either case, whether the testatrix knew that Gil was already
dead or she was ignorant thereof, as she had left the legacy in favor of Gil,
there is no reason to admit that it was, nevertheless, her intention to leave it
to his children. Appealed judgment is affirmed. SO ORDERED
[418]

LLB III-B
In re estate of the deceased Chinaman

BERNARDO RAFANAN LAO SAYCO, alias SAYA. LAY CHUYTING,
appellant.
G.R. No. L-4824
February 13, 1912
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama, administrator of the estate of

the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, aliasSaya, and guardian of the
minor Lay Chuyting, from the judgment rendered in these special
proceedings.
the municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the said proceedings and

prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in that pueblo without leaving any
known legitimate successor, the real and personal property left by the said
decedent within the district of the property left by the said decedent within
the district of the aforementioned municipality be awarded to the latter,
pursuant to the provisions of section 571 (sic) of Act No. 190.
On the other hand, the administrator, Lao Chiaman, filed a written petition
wherein he alleged that there were no longer any debts to pay any debts to
[419]

pay and therefore requested that, upon the approval of his final account, his
administration be closed, and, as the guardian of the Chiaman Lay Chuyting,
requested that the property referred to be delivered to the latter as the son
and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan, and opposed the claim of municipality
of Mambajao.
In view of the dispositions of witnesses presented at the trial, the court ,

rendered judgment ordering that the property left by the decedent, Bernardo
Rafanan Lao Sayco, known by the name of Saya, be assigned to the
municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, to be administered by its
municipal council and placed at the disposal of the school in the same
manner as other property intended for the same use.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property left by the decedent will be given to the
municipality of Mambajao since he died intestate and no known legal heirs?
HELD:
Section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the case, reads as
follows:
When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the
Philippine Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the
same, the president and municipal council of the municipality where
the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or
of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the
Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, file a petition with the
Court of First Instance of the province for an inquisition in the
premises; the court shall thereupon appoint a time and place of
hearing and deciding on such petition, and cause a notice thereof to be
published in some newspaper of general circulation in the province of
which the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within the Philippine
Islands, and if not in some newspaper of general circulation in the
province in which he had estate. The notice shall recite the substance
[420]

of the facts and request set forth in the petition, the time and place at
which persons claiming the estate may appear and be heard before the
court, and shall be published at least six weeks successively, the last
of which publications shall be at least six weeks before the time
appointed by the court to make inquisition.
From the record of these proceedings it does not appear that there was
made, at the request of counsel for the president and the municipal council
of Mambajao, the inquisition provided by law. In order that the property
which belonged to the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, situated in
these Islands, may be decreed to have reverted to the Senate, pursuant to
the provisions of section 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is
indispensable that the requirements contained in the above-quoted section
of the said code should have been complied with by making the inquisition
with regard to the matters specified, at the instance of the interested
municipality. Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by
the decedent at death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his
identity and rights.
For the reasons aforestated, it is proper, in our opinion, to reverse the
judgment appealed from, and we dismiss those proceedings, without
prejudice to any rights that may pertain to the parties with respect to the
property in question. No express finding is made of the costs. SO ORDERED.
LLB III-B
[421]
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL

TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir,
appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
FACTS:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas
Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the
intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz
Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character of
universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of
controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
Tomas Rodriguez executed a will and he declared Vicente F. Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as his universal heir.
Vicente F. Lopez died before the testator, at the time the will was made
Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no
such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not intestate succession will govern in the transfer of estate of
[422]

decedent since the instituted heir was disqualified to succeed?
HELD:
The SC held that the kind of succession took place in this case was
Accretion, which was defined by Article 982 of the Civil Code. It further
reiterated that the conflict bewtween the two provisions of the law which are
Art. 982 and Article 912. A
rt. 982 says, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first
when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the
same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly,
when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it.
Article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal succession
takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir
instituted is disqualified to succeed.
As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more
general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate
succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions
under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the
provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter.
Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate
succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and
(if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express
qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so
understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which
the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation
supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In
addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that
intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is
impossible.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs
against the appellant.SO ORDERED.
[423]
LLB III-B
[424]
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicantsappellants,

vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL.,oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-45460
February 25, 1938
FACTS:
This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf
of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat as enunciated in Articles 750
and 751.
Colegio De San Jose, Inc.,et. Al opposed this claim.Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and
Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San
Pedro Tunasa. Lower court declared escheat on the properties left by a decedent,
hence this appeal.
[425]
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipal Council of San Pedro Laguan is the rightful claimant of
the said property under controversy, since the owner thereof died intestate without
any known heir?
HELD:
The hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to be
escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already passed to
the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the
petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said municipality,
because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who
has not left any heirs or person who may legality claim it, these being the conditions
required by section 750 and without which a petition for escheat should not lie from
the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same
ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the
Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris,
alleged in the petition. If the municipality of San Pedro believes that it has some
other right to the hacienda, distinct from the escheat relied upon in its petition
which gave rise to this proceeding, it should bring the proper action, but it cannot
avail itself successfully of the remedy provided by section 750 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. We, therefore, hold that the court did not commit the error assigned in
ruling that the petition does not allege sufficient facts justifying the escheat of the
hacienda in favor of the municipality of San Pedro and in finally dismissing the
same. Having reached this conclusion we do not believe it necessary to go into
further considerations regarding the personality of the municipality of San Pedro
and the court's lack of jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order and resolution are affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the petitioners and appellants. SO ORDERED.
LLB III-B
[426]
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.who
died a bachelor, without descendants, only surviving relatives are: (1) his
maternal aunt, petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to SalustiaSolivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties. Salustia died,

leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and
lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time,
the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to
do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from
whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in
their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. So,
Celedonia file a petition to Reopen/Reconsider the order, and in this Special
proceeding she stated the ff:
[427]

That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately
preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased
within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban
Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the
petition they (petitioner CeledoniaSolivio and movant Concordia Javellana)
have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they
have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they
have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for each other.
RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties
of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and
proceeded to set up the foundation Esteban wished.
On the other hand, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion that shed
be included as one of the heirs of decedent. Bu the motion was denied; she
then filed a case against Celedoniafor partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reservatroncal in favor of

Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from
whom he had inherited them
HELD:
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased
was subject to reservatroncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reservatroncal provision of
the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
[428]

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees(reservatarios)relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the
line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous
title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit
by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother, SalustiaSolivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of
his aunt, CeledoniaSolivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9
brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant
from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with
the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
[429]

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of
the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each,
therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction
of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by
the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share
alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is
declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his
estate.
SO ORDERED.
LLB III-B
[430]
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI
and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS
OANES, respondents.
G.R. No. 163707
September 15, 2006
[431]
FACTS:
Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and KamilleOanes Wei,

represented by their mother RemediosOanes (Remedios), filed a petition for
letters of administration. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati
City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00
consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving
spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a
regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They
likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the
decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without
securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established
their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant
to Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents opposed this claim.
ISSUE:
Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents
from claiming their successional rights?
HELD:
Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a
[432]

waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms
do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and
in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x xx
against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." 15 Considering that the
document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share
in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional
rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044
of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may
accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be
accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians
may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by
judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the
persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and
distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article
1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their
wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there
is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact
negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under
a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
[433]

successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has
consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus
be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's
invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
LLB III-B
EMILIANA BAUTISTA, as Heir of the late MANUEL BAUTISTA and

EVANGELINE BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUSTICES CAROLINA C. GRINO-AQUINO, MANUEL T. REYES, AND
JAIME M. LANTIN in their capacity as Justices of the Special First
[434]

Division of the Court of Appeals, HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch III, Pasay City, MANOLITO BAUTISTA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN,
BETTY N. BAUTISTA alias BEATRIZ BAUTISTA, NELIA N. BAUTISTA,
GLORIA N. BAUTISTA, CLARITA N. BAUTISTA and ROSALINA
BAUTISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 79958
October 28, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to

declare the deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer
Certificates Title Nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void.
The land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel

Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from his
father, Mariano Bautista. Both petitioners and private respondents admit that
on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private
respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner
Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although
petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition;
Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife
Emiliana Tamayo, it was admitted that Manuel Bautista and his second wife,
Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, and the property in
question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property.
Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property.

On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned
signature of Manuel Bautista; That the NBI concluded that the questioned
document was authentic.
[435]
The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a preterition on the Evangeline Bautista as a child of

the deceased?
HELD:
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of
Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the
latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista
would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to
share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said
document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is
their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition
was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.
Decision of CA is reversed. SO ORDERED.
LLB III-B
[436]
[437]
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and
JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reservatroncal,which was submitted for judgement.
Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de

Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs
being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common

ancestor the late BalbinoTioco (who had a sister by the name of
RomanaTioco),
father
of
plaintiffs
and
great
grandfather
of
defendant.RomanaTioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece ToribiaTioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs).
ToribiaTioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, EustacioDizon,
[438]

and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother
of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned
four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal
pro-indiviso shares.
BalbinoTioco died intestate, owning 3 parcel of land and survived by his

legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon.
Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half
(1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to
his father, EustacioDizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reservatroncal.
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the
parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of
her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of
the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the
reservatroncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under
the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice,
oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half
pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by
EustacioDizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of
land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant DalisayTongko-Camacho, entitled, as
reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are

[439]

reservatarios
HELD:
Had the reversionary property passed directly from thepraepositus, there is

no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the
defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no
reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission
of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6i.e., the
property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant DalisayTongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set
aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffsappellants.
SO ORDERED.
LLB III-B
[440]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 113725
June 29, 2000
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla,
was instituted as a devisee to most of the properties of the decedent with the
condition that she will subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every year.
[441]

However, there was no compliance. Lower court dismissed the case on the ground
of prematurity. Appealed CA but they were not satisfied since the settlement on Art.
882 was not satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simple substitution exists?
HELD:
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the

place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator
may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property
shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, 12 or (2) leave
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. 13 The
Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first
heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. 14 In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
LLB III-B
[442]
[443]

Case Digests of Jurado, Tolentino and Balane

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digests of Jurado, Tolentino and Balane

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

WESTERN MINDANAO STATE

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

CENTENERA VS. SOTTO

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Pavia vs. De la Rosa

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Montelibano vs. Cruz,

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.

LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.

Uson vs. Del Rosari

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21,

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

On July 6, 1928, Simplicio Baun, the administrator of the estate, filed a

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Cuison vs. Villanueva

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

On August 16, 1949, Elisa, Ricardo, Josefina, Luis, Hermenigilda, all

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Enriquez vs. Abadia

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Osorio vs. Osorio

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Topic/Doctrine: THE DONATION CANNOT INCLUDE FUTURE PROPERTY

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Tinsay vs. Yusay

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Arroyo vs. Gerona

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Tordilla vs. Tordilla

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Allison Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippines

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Bacayo vs. Borromeo

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Michael C. Guy vs. Court of Appeals

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

Quison vs. Salud

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

ILUSTRE vs. FRONDOSA

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.

[SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS]

BAUTISTA vs. Justices of the Special First Division of the Court of

The parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated December 15,