Basic Philippine law on libel

1. What is libel?
Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. (Art. 353, Revised
Penal Code, [RPC]).
2. What are the means by which libel is committed?
Libel is committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means. (Art. 355,
RPC).
3. What is slander?
Oral defamation is called slander. (Art. 358, RPC).
4. Is defamation made in a television program
considered libel?
Defamation made in a television program is libel. While the
medium of television is not expressly mentioned among the
means specified in the law, it easily qualifies under the general
provision or any similar means. (People vs. Casten, et al.,
CA-G.R. No. 07924-CR, December 13, 1974)
5. Who are the persons liable for the crime of libel?
Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or

business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof. (Art. 360, RPC).
Proprietors and editors of periodicals are responsible for the
appearance of defamatory matter contained therein, as
likewise are all persons who actually participate in the
publication of such matter. It is not necessary that the libelous
matter should have been seen or read by another. It is
sufficient that the accused knowingly parted with the
immediate custody thereof under circumstances which
exposed it to be read or seen by a person other than himself.
6. What are the penalties for libel?
a. For committed libel: Prision correctional in its minimum
and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 600 pesos,
or both. This is in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party. (Art. 355, RPC)
b. For threatened libel (blackmail): Arresto mayor or a
fine of from 200 to 2,000 pesos or both. (Art. 356, RPC)
7. Why is libel punished?
The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a
constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or
property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society
that underlie the whole scheme of civilization. The law
recognizes the value of such reputation and imposes upon him
who attacks it, by slanderous words or libelous publication,
the liability to make full compensation for the damages done
(Worcester vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42).

8. What court has jurisdiction over an action for

libel?
The Regional Trial Court has been specifically designated to
try a libel case. (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code; Jalandoni vs.
Endaya, 55 SCRA 260; Bacobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520)
9. Where is the venue for an action for libel?
Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by Republic Act No. 4363 laid
down the following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil
actions in written defamations:
1. General Rule: The action may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila
at the time the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or
the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office
outside of Manila, the venue is the province or the city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his
place of residence at the time of the commission of the offense
or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the
offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has

always the option to file the action in the Regional Trial Court
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or
first published. (Escribano vs. Avila, 85 SCRA 245)
10. What is the prescriptive period for filing a
criminal complaint for libel?
The crime of libel prescribes in one year from the date the
alleged libelous article was published. (Art. 90, RPC as
amended by Republic Act No. 4661; People vs. Gines, 197
SCRA 481)
11. What are the damages recoverable in an action for
libel?
Article 2219 (7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages
may be recovered in cases of libel, slander or any other form
of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is
given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages
for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive
or exemplary damages. (Occena vs. Icamina, 181 SCRA 328;
M.H. Wylie vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357)
12. In what court should the civil action for damages
be filed?
The civil action for libel shall be filed in the same court where
the criminal action is filed and vice versa and the court in
which the action is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction to
entertain the corresponding complaint for libel. (Art. 360,
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1289;
Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31 SCRA 552; Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89
SCRA 699; Cojuangco, Hr. vs. CA, 203 SCRA 620)
13. Who can file a complaint for libel?

A criminal action for defamation which consists in the

imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio
can only be filed by the offended party. (Art. 360, RPC).
But, a libel attributing a defect or vice, real or imaginary,
which does not constitute a crime but brings into disrepute,
scorn or ridicule, or tends to cause dishonor, discredit, or
contempt, can be prosecuted de oficio. In other words, the
complaint of the offended party is not necessary, and the
information filed by the prosecuting officer is enough to
confer jurisdiction upon the court to try the defendant
charged with the crime. (Santos, et al. vs. Guballa, No. L-7316
and L-7317, Dec. 19, 1955).
In other words, the provincial fiscal may file the information
upon his own initiative without the offended partys
complaint and even over his objection. (People vs. Pascual, et
al., 102 Phil. 503).
14. What are the crimes which cannot be prosecuted
de oficio?
The crimes of adultery, concubinage, abduction, rape or acts
of lasciviousness cannot be prosecuted de oficio. Accordingly,
a libel imputing any of these crimes can be filed by the
offended party.
15. Can an imputation of the crime of prostitution be
prosecuted de oficio?
Yes, an imputation of the crime of prostitution can be
prosecuted de oficio. (People vs. Orcullo, 111 SCRA 609).
Prostitution is not included among the crimes which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio.

16. Example of imputation of a crime which cannot be

prosecuted de oficio.
A published letter stating that a woman employee had illicit
relationship with another who is the formers paramour
imputes an adulterous relationship between the two. A
prosecution for libel based thereon cannot be made without
the sworn complaint of the offended party. (Fernandez vs.
Lantin, 74 SCRA 338)
17. Does the death of the offended party extinguish
the criminal liability of the accused in a crime of
libel?
If the death of the offended party occurred after the filing of
the complaint, the complaint previously filed by the offended
party will not be invalidated even if it is a crime which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio. (People vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718).
If the offended party shall die before he was able to file a
complaint for libel, his heirs or legal representatives have a
right to file the complaint, unless the libel charged in the
information is one which cannot be brought except at the
instance of and upon complaint filed by the offended party
there being an imputation of an offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.
18. What are the essential elements of libel?
There are four (4) essential elements of libel, namely:
a. The imputation must be defamatory;
b. The imputation must be made publicly;
c. The imputation must be malicious; and

d. The person defamed must be identifiable.

(People vs. Monton, 6 SCRA 801)
ELEMENTS OF LIBEL
FIRST ELEMENT: THERE MUST BE A DEFAMATORY
IMPUTATION.
19. What can the defamatory imputation cover?
The imputation can cover any of the following;
a. Crime allegedly committed by the offended party;
b. Vice or defect, real or imaginary, of the offended party; or
c. Any act, omission, condition, status of, or circumstance
relating to, the offended party which tend to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
20. Examples of imputations of a crime allegedly
committed by the offended party.
(a) An article which portrays the offended party as a swindler
who, prior to his election as municipal president, collected
money from several inhabitants of the town through fraud
and deceit and constructed a house worth P40,000 with the
money so collected, imputes the commission of the crime of
estafa to the offended party (People vs. Bailo, et al., C.A., 37
O.G. 2373).
(b) Branding somebody as having murdered his brother-inlaw, enriching himself at the expense of others who trusted
him, calling one a bigamist and becoming rich overnight

through questionable transactions and influence peddling,

winning in an election through mass fraud and rampant votebuying because of the influence of brother-in-law are
obviously libelous and slanderous for they are malicious
imputations of criminal acts tending to cause dishonor,
discredit and contempt of the complainant, punishable under
the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
(People vs. Dianalan, 13 C.A. Rep. 34).
21. Is an imputation of criminal intention libelous?
No, the imputation of criminal intention is not libelous. Such
imputation is not libelous because intent to commit a crime is
not a violation of the law. This is more so, when it is a mere
assertion or expression of opinion as to what will be the future
conduct of another. (People vs. Baja, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 5,
206).
22. Examples of imputations of vice or defect, real or
imaginary, of the offended party.
(a) When a person, in an article, imputes upon the persons
mentioned therein, lascivious and immoral habits, that article
is of a libelous nature as it tends to discredit the persons
libeled in the minds of those reading the said article (People
vs. Suarez, G.R. No. 35396, April 11, 1932).
(b) Calling complainant who was a barangay captain
ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation
of defects in complainants character sufficient to cause him
embarrassment and social humiliation. (Occena vs. Icamina,
181 SCRA 328)
(c) One who grabs anothers husband does not
necessarily mean an adulteress. At most, it may imply that the

person to whom it is addressed is a flirt, a temptress, or one

who indulges in enticing other husbands hence, it is more of
an imputation of a vice, condition, or act not constituting a
crime. (Gonzales vs. Arcilla, 203 SCRA 609)
23. Example of an imputation of an act of omission of
the offended party.
An article signed by the accused and published in the
Philippines Herald says that the offended party used to
borrow money without intention to pay; that he had ordered
the fixing of his teeth without paying the fees for the services
rendered by the dentist; etc., contains an imputation of an act
and omission which is defamatory (People vs. Tolentino, C.A.,
37 O.G. 1763).
24. Examples of an imputation of condition, status of,
or circumstance relating to the offended party.
(a) Calling a person a bastard or leper within the hearing of
other persons is defamatory, because there is an imputation of
a condition or status which tends to cause dishonor or
contempt of the offended party. (U.S. vs. Ortiz, et al., 8 Phil.
752)
(b) Writing and publishing an article containing the words
coward, vile soul, dirty sucker, savage, hog who always
looks toward the ground which refer to the offended party,
thereby exposing the latter to public contempt and ridicule
(U.S. vs. Ortiz, et al., 8 Phil, 752).
(c) The word fool or crazy becomes defamatory if
used to connote mental aberration. (People vs. Lladoc, CAG.R. No. 01432-CR, April 16, 1962)

(d) The word mangkukulam is undoubtedly an epithet of

opprobrium. To
say that complainant is a witch and sorceress is to impute to
her a vice, condition or status that is dishonorable and
contemptible. (People vs. Carmen Sario, G.R. No. L-20754
and G.R. No. L-20753, June 30, 1966)
25. In determining whether certain words are
defamatory, is the intent of the writer material?
In matters of libel, the question is not what the writer of an
alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of the words he
has used. The meaning of the writer is quite immaterial. The
question is not what the writer meant, but what his words
conveyed to those who heard or read them. It is not the
intention of the speaker or writer, or the understanding of the
plaintiff or of any hearer or reader by which the actionable
quality of the words is to be determined, but the meaning that
the words in fact conveyed on the minds of persons of
reasonable understanding, discretion and candor, taking into
consideration the surrounding circumstances which were
known to the hearer or reader. (People vs. Encarnacion, C.A.
48 O.G. 1817).
26. Is it necessary that the defamatory imputation be
in certain and express terms?
No. Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly
made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to
induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person
against whom they were uttered was guilty of certain offenses,
or are sufficient to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation,

or to hold him up to public ridicule. (U.S. vs. OConnell, 37

Phil. 767)
Where the comments are insincere and intended to ridicule
rather than praise the plaintiff, the publication is libelous.
Praise undeserved is slander in disguise. (Jimenez vs. Reyes,
27 Phil. 52)
Publication, even if intended for humor, may be libelous when
the language used passed from the bounds of playful jest and
intensive criticism into the region of scurrilous calumniation
and intemperate personalities (Oliver, et al. vs. La
Vanguardia, Inc. 48 Phil. 429).
27. How do you construe an allegedly libelous article?
The alleged libelous article must be construed as a whole.
(Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52; U.S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666).
The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence
into component phrases with the meticulous care of the
grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed of the entirety
of the language to the ordinary reader. (U.S. vs. OConnell,
37 Phil. 767). In other words, the article must be construed in
its entirety including the headline, as they may enlarge,
explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened
or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous
depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication
taken in its entirety. (Imperial, et al. vs. The Manila
Publishing Co., Inc., et al., 13 C.A. Rep. 990).
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any
publication alleged to be libelous that construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is
natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which

the public would naturally understand what was uttered. The

published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a
whole. In applying these rules to the language of an alleged
libel, the court will disregard any subtitle or ingenious
explanation offered by the publisher on being called to
account. The whole question being the effect the publication
had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been
assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it
comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any
there be, from the word used in the publication. (U.S. vs.
Sotto, 38 Phil. 666).
When neither party endeavors to show a hidden meaning nor
latent ambiguities in the publication complained of, it is for
the court to determine whether its contents are libelous, after
giving to the article as a whole such meaning as is natural and
obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the
publication would naturally be understood. Opinions of
witnesses upon this point are immaterial (Jimenez vs. Reyes,
21 Phil. 52).
The defamatory words are to be construed in their entirety,
and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons
reading or hearing them, unless it appears that they were used
and understood in another sense. In short, the language used
must be understood in its plain and popular sense to
read the sentences as would the man on the street. The
intent or purpose then of the speaker or writer is not relevant.
(Gonzales vs. Arcilla, 203 SCRA 609).
28. What is the innocent construction rule?

Words capable of being read innocently must be read

innocently and declared not libelous under the rule of
innocent construction.
Where the alleged libelous matter is susceptible of two or
more interpretations, one libelous and the other not libelous,
courts of justice are not justified in holding that the real
purpose of the writer was to have the public understand what
he wrote in light of the worst possible meaning. There must be
clear evidence that such was the case. (People vs. Madamba,
47 O.G. 3553).
SECOND ELEMENT: THERE MUST BE PUBLICATION OF
THE DEFAMATORY IMPUTATION.
29. What constitutes publication?
Publication is the communication of the defamatory matter to
some third person or persons (People vs. Atencio, CA-G.R.
Nos. 11351-R to 11353-R, Dec. 14, 1954). Libel is published not
only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made
known or brought to the attention or notice of another person
other than its author and the offended party. (U.S. vs.
Ubinana, 1 Phil. 471).
The communication of libelous matter to the person defamed
alone does not amount to publication, for that cannot injure
his reputation. A mans reputation is the estimate in which
others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of
himself. (People vs. Atencio, CA-G.R. Nos. 11351-R to 11353-R,
Dec. 14, 1954).
30. Examples of publication.

(a) Writing a letter to another person other than the person

defamed is sufficient to constitute publication, for the person
to whom the letter is addressed is a third person in relation to
its writer and the person defamed therein (Orfanel vs. People,
30 SCRA 819)
(b) Sending to the wife a letter defamatory of her husband is
sufficient publication (U.S. vs. Ubiana, 1 Phil. 471). The
person defamed is the husband and the wife is the third
person to whom the publication is made.
(c) One of the typesetters of the paper testified that the
defendant handed to him, to be set in type, the article in
question, and that the manuscript thus delivered was in the
handwriting of the defendant. It was held that delivering the
article to the typesetter is sufficient publication. (U.S. vs.
Crame, 10 Phil. 135)
(d) There is publication of defamatory letter not shown to be
sealed when sent to the addressee. If sending a letter not
shown to be sealed is publication, sending of an unsealed
letter should a fortiori be held to be publication (U.S. vs.
Grin-o, 36 Phil. 738; People vs. Silvela, 103 Phil. 773).
However, sending a letter in a sealed envelope through
messenger, is not publication (Lopez vs. Delgado, 8 Phil. 26).
31. What is the multiple publication rule?
Each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a
distinct offense. Stated more succinctly for purposes of
ascertaining jurisdiction under Article 360 of the RPC, as
amended, every time the same written matter is

communicated such communication is considered a distinct

and separate publication of the libel.
It is a settled jurisprudence that each separate publication of a
libel constitutes a distinct crime of libel, although two libelous
publications arose out of the same controversy and even if one
was partial reiteration of the first. (People vs. Sotto, 36 Phil.
389; Montinola vs. Montalvo, 34 Phil. 662; Soriano vs. IAC,
167 SCRA 222)
THIRD ELEMENT: THERE MUST BE MALICE.
32. What is malice?
Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed (U.S. vs. Castaete, 38 Phil. 253).
33. What are the types of malice?
There are two types of malice, i.e. malice in law and malice in
fact.
34. What is malice in law?
Malice in law is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the
proof of malice when words which raise the presumption are
shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive
malice, legal malice, or implied malice.
35. What is malice in fact?
Malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy or
injure. It may denote that the defendant was actuated by ill
will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual
malice, real malice, true malice, or particular malice.

36. How is malice proved?

Malice is established either by presumption or by proof.
37. How is malice in law proved?
Malice in law is presumed from a defamatory imputation.
Proof of malice is not required, because it is presumed to exist
from the defamatory imputation (1st paragraph, Art. 354,
RPC). Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution or the plaintiff need not prove malice on the part
of the defendant. The law presumes that the defendants
imputation is malicious.
38. How is malice in fact proved?
Malice in fact may be shown by proof of ill-will, hatred, or
purpose to injure. Thus, a republication of defamatory matter
subsequent to the commencement of an action based thereon
is admissible to establish malice in fact (U.S. vs. Montalvo, 29
Phil. 595).
39. Example of how malice in fact is proved.
There is express malice or malice in fact, because it
clearly appears that the accused Topacio was actuated by a
desire to impeach the reputation, integrity and honesty of
Secretary Perez as a government official and to force him to
resign because of the alleged misfeasance and malfeasance in
office (People vs. Topacio, et al., 59 Phil. 356).
40. When is malice in law not presumed?
The presumption of malice does not arise in the two cases of
privileged communications mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2
of Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e.:

a. A private communication made by any person to another in

the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.
Where the communication is privileged, malice is not
presumed from the defamatory words. The plaintiff or the
prosecution must prove malice in fact, whenever the
defamatory imputation appears in a privileged
communication. (U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731; Lu Chu Sing, et
al., vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669).
41. Does proof of good intention and justifiable
motive negate the existence of malice?
Malice in law is not necessarily inconsistent with an honest or
even laudable purpose. For that reason, even if the publication
is injurious, the presumption of malice disappears upon proof
of good intention and justifiable motive.
But where malice in fact is present, justifiable motives can not
exist, and the imputations become actionable (People vs.
Peregrino, 11 C.A. Rep. 803, citing U.S. vs. Bustos, 13 Phil.
600; Liu Chu sing, et al. vs. Lu Tiong Ciu, 76 Phil. 609)
FOURTH ELEMENT: THE PERSON DEFAMED MUST BE
IDENTIFIABLE.
42. Should the person defamed be identifiable?

Yes. In order to maintain a libel suit it is essential that the

victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be
named.
43. How is the identity of the person defamed
determined?
It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or
if the publication contains matters of description or reference
to facts and circumstances from which others reading the
article may know that the plaintiff was intended, or if he is
pointed out by extraneous circumstance so that persons
knowing him could and did understand that he was the
person referred to (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr., 16 SCRA 807).
The obnoxious writing need not mention the libeled party by
name. It is sufficient if it is shown that the offended party is
the person meant or alluded to (Causin vs. Jakosalem, 5 Phil.
155), the prosecution being permitted to prove by evidence
that the vague imputation refers to the complainant (People
vs. Silvela, 103 Phil. 773).
44. Does the fact that the offended party recognized
himself as the person defamed sufficient for
purposes of complying with the fourth element of
libel, i.e. that the person defamed must be
identifiable?
Where no one is named or accurately described in the article
complained of, it is not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed; it must
be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication (Kunkle vs. CablenewsAmerican, 42 Phil. 757).

Where the article is impersonal on its face and interpretation

of its language does not single out individuals, the fourth
essential requisite of the offense of libel does not exist (People
vs. Andrada, C.A., 37 O.G. 92; Uy Tioco, et al. vs. Yang Shu
Wen, et al., 32 Phil. 624).
45. Are defamatory imputations directed at a group of
persons actionable?
Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons is not
actionable unless the statements are all-embracing or
sufficiently specific for the victim to be identifiable.
Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each
individual in that class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be. (Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 171).
46. Can libel published in different parts be taken
together to establish the identity of the person
defamed?
Yes. In U.S. vs. Sotto, 36 Phil. 389, there were two
publications. The first publication mentioned no names. It
employed, however, certain words and phrases which are
defamatory. The second publication consisted of a cartoon in
which the persons referred to in the first publication are
caricatured by name and to each one of them is attached one
of the defamatory words or phrases. The two publications
were considered together to establish the identity of the
offended party.

DEFENSES IN LIBEL
47. What are the possible defenses in an action for
libel?
The possible defenses in an action for libel include the
following:
(a) Privileged communications;
(b) Fair comment on matters of public interest;
(c) Fair comment on qualifications of candidates for public
office;
(d) Apology or retraction;
(e) Rectification;
(f) Proof of truth; and
(g) Self-defense.
A. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
48. What are privileged communications?
Privileged communications are those which, were it not for
the occasion on which or the circumstances under which they
are made, would be derogatory and actionable.
49. What are the classes of privileged
communications?
A privileged communication may either be absolutely
privileged or conditionally or qualifiedly privileged.

50. When is a communication considered absolutely

privileged?
A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is
not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad faith. This
class includes statements made by members of Congress in
the discharge of their functions as such, official
communications made by public officers in the performance
of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the
parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or
during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the
answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded
to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said
allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the
answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions
propounded to said witnesses. (Orfanel vs. People, L-26877,
Dec. 26, 1969, 30 SCRA 819).
51. When is a communication considered
conditionally or qualifiedly privileged?
Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are
those which, although containing defamatory imputations,
would not be actionable unless made with malice in fact or
bad faith. It has, moreover, been held that there is malice
when the defamer has been prompted by ill-will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed. (Orfanel vs. People, L26877, Dec. 26, 1969, 30 SCRA 819).
52. Distinguish absolute privileged communications
and qualified privileged communications.
In absolute privileged communications, the occasion is an
absolute bar to the action, whereas, in the case of conditional

or qualified privileged communications, the law raises only a

prima facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the
former, the freedom from liability is absolute, regardless of
the existence of express malice, as contrasted with the
freedom in the latter class where it is conditioned on the want
or absence of express malice.
In qualified privileged communications, there must be both
an occasion of privilege and a use of that occasion in good
faith, whereas, in absolute privileged communication, only an
occasion of privilege is necessary. (Sison vs. David, No. L1128, January 28, 1961)
53. What do qualifiedly privileged communications
include?
The qualifiedly privileged communications include the
following:
a. A private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral or social duty (No. 1, Art.
354, RPC);
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions (No. 2, Art. 354, RPC).
54. Examples of a private communication made by
any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty.

(a) A communication sent by an official to his immediate

superior in the performance of a legal duty, as an explanation
of a matter contained in an indorsement sent to him by his
superior officer, although it employed a language somewhat
harsh and uncalled for, is excusable in the interest of public
policy, and is considered a privileged communication, for
which the writer is not liable for damages. (Deano vs.
Godinez, 12 SCRA 483).
(b) Complaint made in good faith against a priest to his
ecclesiastical superior
allegedly for drunkenness, taking indecent liberties of women,
illicit relations with a woman, and general immoral and
indecent behavior, is privileged, even if the proof fails to
establish the truth of the charges. The members of a religious
organization have a moral duty to bring to the attention of the
church authorities the misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or
of fellow members. (U.S. vs. Canete, et al., 38 Phil. 253)
55. Example of a fair and true report, made in good
faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
A newspapers faithful and accurate summary of what was
testified to by a witness in a pending rape case is not libelous.
No libel exists where the heading or title of a news item
deemed not libelous, merely portrayed with accuracy what
was in the news item. Nor is a different conclusion called
for just because the heading of the news item arising from the

testimony of Jaime Jose was worded thus: LINK

CRISOLOGO SON TO PASAY RAPE CASE. How else could
it have been expressed? That was to portray with accuracy
what was contained in the news item. What was testified to
was to that effect. It succinctly set forth the facts. There was
no attempt to sensationalize. The tone is both neutral and
objective. (Elizalde vs. Gutierrez, 76 SCRA 448).
56. What public records may be published?
The privilege has been strictly limited to cases in which the
right of access is secured by law, and in which the purpose and
object of the law is to give publicity to the contents of the
record or document in the interest, or for the protection, of
the public generally (U.S. vs. Santos, 33 Phil. 533).
57. Is the publication of a record or document of a
confidential nature privileged?
No. If the contents of the record or document, involved in any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, are of
confidential nature, they should not be published. Hence, the
publication of confidential record containing libelous matter
is not privileged.
58. Does the fact that a communication is privileged
make it not actionable?
No. The fact that a communication is privileged does not
mean that it is not actionable; the privileged character simply
does away with the presumption of malice, which the plaintiff
has to prove in such a case. (Lu Chu Sing, et al., vs. Lu Tiong
Gui, 76 Phil. 669).
The character of the privilege is a matter of defense which
may be lost by positive proof of express malice. In other

words, the onus of proving actual malice is placed on the

plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender
was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished,
the defense of privilege is unavailing. (Santos vs. CA, 203
SCRA 110).
59. How can the prosecution or plaintiff prove malice
in fact, i.e. actual malice?
The existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic
evidence that the defendant bore a grudge against the
offended party, or that there was rivalry or ill-feeling between
them which existed at the date of the publication of the
defamatory imputation, or that the defendant had an
intention to injure the reputation of the offended party as
shown by the words used and the circumstances attending the
publication of the defamatory imputation.
60. Examples of the existence of malice in fact.
(a) The accused admitted that he was motivated by hate and
revenge because the offended party instigated the filing of
criminal cases against him, without which he would not have
sent the communication at all. Malice in fact being present in
this case, justifiable motives cannot exist and the
communication becomes actionable. (People vs. Hogan, C.A.,
55 O.G. 1597).
(b) Had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty, and
not because of
malice, the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat
made against an American, should have been filed with the
Senate or any of its Committees. The defendant did not do so
but instead made the accusations publicly by causing them to
be given widest publication by all the metropolitan

newspapers, obviously in retaliation to the charge filed against

him by the plaintiff with the Blue Ribbon Committee of the
Senate. (Antonio vs. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70).
(c) Even if the letter report was in the nature of a qualified
privileged
communication, such privilege is lost by proof of actual malice
as in the case at bar. Moreover, said letter report lost its
character as a qualified privileged communication the
moment petitioner furnished copies thereof to several
provincial and national government agencies which had no
interest, right or duty in the prosecution of said charges and
the general rule is that any written or printed statement
falsely charging another with the commission of a crime is
libelous per se. (Bravo vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 531).
(d) Another circumstance which militates against the
petitioners pretensions of good faith and performance of a
moral and social duty was his irresponsible act of letter
writing to expose his alleged discovery of what he perceived to
be an anomaly. When he saw the unsigned minutes of the
associations Board of Directors, he immediately sent out
the assailed letters eventually culminating in the publication
of the subject newsletter sans the verification which ordinary
prudence demands. (Lacsa vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 427).
61. Is actual malice necessarily present if the
statements are found to be false?
No. Even when the statements are found to be false if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge
is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover
the mistake of the individual. But the statement must be made
under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is
destructive. The duty under which a party is privileged is

sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in

good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although
in fact he is mistaken. (U.S. vs. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731)
But when the defendant admitted that he had personally
made no investigation with reference to the truth of many of
the statements made in the communication to the Secretary of
Justice, especially with reference to the statements based on
the rumors that a judge and a fiscal received a bribe for
dismissing a murder case, he had no reasonable ground for
believing the charge made by him to be true. (U.S. vs. Bustos,
13 Phil. 690).
B. FAIR COMMENT ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
62. What is the rationale in making fair comment on
matters of public interest privileged?
A matter of public interest is a common property, and hence
anybody may express an opinion on it. Thus, it is a defense to
an action for libel or slander that the words complained of are
fair comment on a matter of public interest.
The conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the
discharge of their official duties are matters of public interest.
Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of
public officers which are related to the discharge of their
official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves
the truth of the imputation. Public acts of public men may
lawfully be made the subjects of comment and criticism. If
made in good faith, such criticism is privileged.
But any attack upon the private character of the public officer
on matters which are not related to the discharge of their

official functions may constitute libel (People vs. Del Fierro

and Padilla, C.A. G.R. No. 3599-R, July 27, 1950). The right to
criticize public officers does not authorize defamation. No one
has the right to invade anothers privacy.
In defamation, where the acts imputed concern the private life
of the individual, criminal intent is presumed to arise from the
publication of defamatory matters, because no one has a right
to invade anothers privacy; but where the imputation is
based upon a matter of public interest, the presumption of
criminal intent does not arise from the mere publication of
defamatory matter. A matter of public interest is common
property, and hence everybody may express an opinion on it.
The public conduct of every public man is a matter of public
concern. Libelous remarks or comments connected for one
thing, with any speech or acts performed by officers in the
exercise of their functions are not actionable, unless malice is
proved. If it is shown that the imputation is either a false
allegation of fact, or the expression of an opinion based upon
mere conjecture, malicious intent is established. In order that
a discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must be either a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of an opinion, based upon proven facts, then it is
no matter that the opinion happens to be mistaken so long as
it might be reasonably inferred from the facts. Comment may
be fair, although wrong. So that the discreditable imputation
may not be actionable, the fact upon which the comment is
reasonably based should be actual facts, and not mere
suppositions. (People vs. Velasco, C.A., 40 O.G. 3694)

C. FAIR COMMENT ON QUALIFICATIONS OF

CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
63. What is the rationale in making fair comment on
qualifications of candidates for public office
privileged?
The mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates for
public office may be the object of comment and criticism, the
very fact of candidacy putting these matters is issue and the
public having a right to be informed as to the qualification of
those who seek election, and perhaps appointment to public
office. But if it appears that it was actuated by actual or
express malice, and is defamatory in its nature, the comment
or criticism constitutes a criminal libel. The freedom to such
criticism is necessarily limited to fair comment, the latter
being comment which is true, or which if false, expresses the
real opinion of the author which is formed with a reasonable
degree of care and on reasonable ground. (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14
Phil. 338)
D. APOLOGY OR RETRACTION
64. What is the effect of apology or retraction in an
action for libel?
A retraction published to correct the mistake does not wipe
out the responsibility arising from the publication of the
libelous photograph or article, although it may and should
mitigate it (Lopez vs. CA, 34 SCRA 116).
In order to have the desired effect, the retraction should
contain an admission of the incorrectness or the falsity of the
libelous publication and evince a desire to repair the wrong

occasioned thereby. (Sotelo Matti vs. Bulletin Publishing Co.,

37 Phil. 562)
A publication however of a retraction or apology on an
agreement with the injured party that the aforesaid
publication shall constitute a complete accord and satisfaction
will bar the right of plaintiff to an action for damages.
E. RECTIFICATION
65. What is the effect of rectification?
Rectification or clarification does not wipe out the
responsibilities arising from the publication of the first article,
although, it may and should mitigate. (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27
Phil. 52; Policarpio vs. Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., 55
SCRA 148).
F. PROOF OF TRUTH
66. When is proof of truth a defense in libel?
Proof of truth is admissible as a defense in any of the
following:
a. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime
regardless of whether the offended party is a private
individual or a public officer;
b. When the offended party is a government employee, even if
the act or omission does not constitute a crime, provided it is
related to the discharge of his official duties. (Art. 361, RPC)
But when the imputation involves the private life of a
government employee which is not related to the discharge of

his official functions, the offender can not prove the truth
thereof.
67. Is proof of truth sufficient to acquit an accused in
an action for libel?
No, proof of the truth is not enough. It is also required that
the matter charged as libelous was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. (Art. 361, RPC)
G. SELF-DEFENSE
68. What is the prerequisite before self-defense
can be invoked by an accused in an action for libel?
To justify ones hitting back with another libel, there must
be a showing that he has been libeled. (Fieldmans
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Ku Nung, CA-G.R. No. 31559-R, May
26, 1964).
69. What is the rationale in allowing a person charged
with libel to invoke self-defense?
In an honest endeavor to vindicate himself and his own
interests a person is often privileged to make statements
which would otherwise be regarded as defamatory. Thus, if
ones good name is assailed in a newspaper, he may reply
defending himself, and if his reply is made in good faith,
without malice and is not necessarily defamatory of his
assailant, it is privileged. (People vs. Baja, CA, 40 O.G. Supp.
5, 206).
70. What are the limitations to self-defense in
libel?
While a person may be legally justified in defending himself or
his near relatives against libelous articles, nevertheless, he

may not use offensive language against the libeler. And

though a person may defend himself from charges made
against him, he cannot make against his libeler a
counterattack which contains libelous statements not
pertinent to the matters charged in the attack. If he does, then
he has exceeded his privilege and the law shall afford him no
protection.