Policy Brief

Europe Program

Vol. 2, No. 6

July 2015
Policy Challenge: The EU
has been trying to develop a
foreign and security policy in
the midst of calls for Brussels
to step up its international
engagement. But the EU gets
stuck on institutional, capability,
strategic, and political matters.
Now European leaders have
asked their high representative
for foreign and security policy to
devise a strategy. A new sense
of purpose is a necessary but
politically challenging task; the
process will be as important as
its substance.
Policy Recommendations: The
necessary cognitive shift among
EU states and institutions in
understanding global challenges
that may lead to a new foreign
and security policy requires
more than persuasive analyses
and calls for common action.
States need to address whether
their attachment to national
sovereignty is relevant in a
context of interdependence
and to identify how the socalled national interest can
be pursued collectively. The
political challenge for the
high representative will be
to keep the member states
deeply involved while avoiding
a consensus-focused process
that produces yet another
meaningless document.
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Europes Patchwork Foreign Policy Needs

More Than a Few New Stitches
by Rosa Balfour
Introduction
Once upon a time, there was an
ambition about the EU having a
single voice on global issues. Today,
the single voice debate is a thing of
the past; the challenge is to make the
pieces of the foreign policy machinery
work together to be more than the
sum of its parts. To help this along,
on the margins of the Greek crisis,
the European Council of June 25-26
gave High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (HR)
Federica Mogherini the mandate
to devise an EU global strategy on
foreign and security policy in close
cooperation with the member states
to be submitted to the heads of state
and government by June 2016.1
This initiative comes after over two
decades of cooperation in foreign
policy, successive treaty changes, the
creation of new structures and posts,
and the launch of multiple strategies and approaches, in which the
central theme has been the struggle to
move beyond the common minimum
denominator upon which consensus
was built. Put simply, member states
remain attached to the idea of national
1 European Council (2015), European Council meeting
Conclusions, EUCO 22/15, Brussels: June 26, http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-22-2015INIT/en/pdf.

sovereignty and divided on foreign

and security matters. The hybridity
of the new system introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which brought
together the intergovernmental heart
of cooperation among the member
states on foreign and security matters
and the supranational executive arm
of Commission-managed tools into
the European External Action Service
(EEAS), headed by the HR, has not
produced sufficient incentives for its
parts to come closer together. Instead,
the politics behind EU foreign policy
cooperation has over the past few
years seen a drift toward mini-lateral
initiatives, which, in themselves, do
not provide incentives for further
cooperation on foreign and security
matters. Thus, the review of the EUs
foreign and security strategy currently
being undertaken by the high representative (or the EEAS) must give a
new political steer to the EUs global
role.
The review comes at a time when the
daily struggle is to avoid breaking up
the EU and the deeper picture is the
choice between mending the fractures
of seven years of crisis or unravelling the EU. For the exercise to be
successful, it needs to push beyond
the hybridity of the past years and

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Policy Brief
initiate a fundamental shift in the capitals toward seeing
unity not as a choice or process, but as a necessity. It must
provide solid analysis and persuasive strategy as much as
political incentives to overcome some of the deeper cleavages that have historically gotten in the way of a more
collective foreign and security policy.
Patchwork Patterns of Cooperation
Moving away from the single voice aspiration potentially
opens prospects for different forms of cooperation driving
foreign and security policy from within the EU. Rather
than focus on the divergences, one could examine the
instances of cooperation within the EU to explore whether
mini-lateralism can lead toward greater cooperation on
foreign affairs. European diplomats and even some pragmatic EU officials increasingly argue that with 28 member
states, it is very hard to get any initiative off the ground;
mini-lateral initiatives from within are often seen as the
only way forward. Some cases have indeed been effective
in terms of impact, still others have brought countries
closer together in regular consultations, others have made
their national preferences or pet projects an EU initiative,
bringing in less interested member states.2

Moving away from the single

voice aspiration potentially opens
prospects for different forms of
cooperation driving foreign and
security policy from within the EU.
Examples of mini-lateral cooperation that have been
brought under the EU hat include the U.K. and France
teaming up on defense cooperation pushing forward
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The U.K.,
France, and Germany (EU-3) have played a key role in
negotiations with Iran on nuclear proliferation, teamed up
2 Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik (2013), Equipping the European Union for the 21st
century. National diplomacies, the European External Action Service, and the making of
EU foreign policy, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

with the United States, Russia, and China (E3+3, or P5+1)

and brought in the EU by giving the previous HR the role
of facilitating negotiations. France, Germany, and Poland
have also cooperated in what is known as the Weimar
Triangle, in the early weeks of the crisis in Ukraine or in
drafting proposals for the European Neighbourhood Policy.
The Normandy format composed of Germany and France
negotiating at the highest level with Russia on the Minsk
Agreements. In the Balkans, Germany and Britain are
cooperating more frequently, the latest instance through
the initiative on Bosnia-Herzegovina last winter.
EU member states have at times managed to push their
pet projects in Brussels to make them EU initiatives. The
Eastern Partnership was initiated in 2009 by Sweden and
Poland when their respective foreign ministers worked
together on many issues, such as the creation of the
European Endowment for Democracy and the European
Institute of Peace in 2014. More longstanding cooperation has also existed, cementing relations within the group
but arguably of lesser consequence in terms of impact on
foreign policy matters, such as between Visegrad 4 (Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics). The
BENELUX and Nordic states have deeper levels of cooperation and integration, some of which have, in the past, been
brought into the European fold. For greater cooperation
among Southern European states, one has to look back to
the initiatives toward North Africa and the Middle East
such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the 1990s.
Alongside this mini-lateral drift, the heads of states
and governments have been playing a growing role in
responding to international crises at the expense of the
foreign ministers.3 The debate on defense is now conducted
at the highest level through European Council meetings,
which, according to the Lisbon Treaty, should also shape
external policy. Since this change has been in place, the
European Council has only met three times to discuss
strategic matters, as the agenda has often been hijacked
by the economic crisis. But it does require, on the interinstitutional level, that the HR and the EEAS focus on
ensuring good cooperation with the European Council,
not just with the Commission. Officials report that the
connection between the Normandy duo and the European
3 Stefan Lehne (2015), Are Prime Ministers Taking over Foreign Policy?, Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
prime_min_for_policy.pdf.

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July 2015

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Policy Brief
Council on dealing with the crisis in Ukraine is working
and that the latter is coordinating with the Foreign Affairs
Council, which is chaired by the HR, a necessary condition
for the execution of the agreed sanctions policy. But this
coordination has related to a specific issue and may not be
replicated on a regular basis without the good will of the
people involved.
These shifts toward ad hoc mini-lateral cooperation and
the growing role of heads of state or government may be
necessary to overcome decision-making hurdles with 28
members, especially at times of crisis. However, without
further incentives to ensure that these initiatives are maintained under the EU umbrella, there are risks of fragmentation. They have mostly been limited to specific issues or
to promote interests particular to a group of countries. In
themselves, these examples have not created the incentives to build further on the successful model. As argued
below, the cleavages among the member states inhibit
more regular patterns of cooperation that could provide
the missing entrepreneurship. Indeed, some argue that
the different directoires could decrease the incentives for
further cooperation.4
Britains problematic relationship with the EU and its
defense spending cuts have in recent years changed the
incentive for Paris to seek cooperation with London.
Together France and Britain have not spurred further EU
cooperation despite the optimism around CSDP after St.
Malo. On occasion, the two have even undermined EU
unity, such as when they obliged the EU to drop the arms
embargo on Syria in May 2013. The original trio (Poland,
Germany, France) that first responded to the Ukraine crisis,
was dropped in favor of Franco-German cooperation. The
Swedish-Polish initiatives were tied to the personal relations between the former foreign ministers. The E3 group
currently negotiating with Iran does not appear to be a
prelude to further cooperation. The Visegrad 4 group has
not achieved more than consultation and a few declarations. Small states have never coalesced into groupings
to put pressure on the so-called big three. Peripheral
countries continue to seek alliances with the core countries
rather than forming an alliance to persuade those members
4 As argued, in the defence sector, by Alicia von Voss, Claudia Major, and Christian
Mlling (2013), The State of Defence Cooperation in Europe, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/WP_DefenceCooperationEurope_Voss_Major__Moelling_Dez_2013.pdf.

without external borders of the nature of the challenges

they face. Collective pet projects do not add up to a strategic vision. It might conversely reflect patterns of fragmentation rather than lead toward greater integration or
cooperation on foreign and security policy.

Collective pet projects do not add

up to a strategic vision.
Understanding Disunity
If a single reason were to be identified for the travails of
EU foreign policy, it is to be found in the disunity among
the member states the logic of diversity.5 EU member
states are spontaneously disunited. Unity, when reached,
is seen as a point of arrival rather than of departure. The
actors in the system understand the notion of success
through this prism, rather than in terms of the impact or
consequence of EU action. For this reason, European diplomats and politicians do not fail to underline the remarkable
achievement of unity over the crisis in Ukraine and in the
sanctions policy toward Russia.
In European capitals, cooperation at the EU level is seen
as being led by choice, to be activated selectively and
where necessary, often on a transactional basis, rather
than instinctively; member states hold on to the intergovernmental model of cooperation, which gives them the
illusion of national sovereignty. This perception persists
notwithstanding the reality that the politics of scale
ultimately force member states to cooperate on foreign
policy far more than they might like. The coming together
over the sanctions policy toward Russia, despite the deep
divisions among the member states, is just an illustration
of the recognition that the European states can only have a
forceful message together.
The cleavages among the member states are based on
differing perceptions of risks, priorities, and consequent
means and actions to address the challenges. One important perceived difference is between the large and small
member states, with the latter complaining about their
5 Stanley Hoffman (2000), Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy?, Journal
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 189-198.

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Policy Brief
lack of influence in shaping EU foreign and security policy
vis--vis the so-called big three. As a bloc, there is no big
three, though each of the three has a global network and
outreach to which no other member state alone can aspire,
and the U.K. and France each have foreign and security
strategies and ambitions. Indeed, one gap is between the
U.K. and France as former empires, nuclear powers, and
UN Security Council permanent members and the rest.6

crisis in the Mediterranean are revealing how deep the

fractures are in perceptions of threats from Russia and in
the struggle to find pan-European solidarity to manage the
refugee and irregular migration challenge.

Other dividing lines and differences are between Northern

European states, traditionally more rights-oriented, and
the more pragmatic South Mediterranean states as well
as East versus West, especially as far as relations with
Russia are concerned. Here, the geographical cleavage
and energy dependence are insufficient to understand the
mapping of perceptions of Russia: history, business, and
political connections lie behind the difficulties in shaping a
common EU position toward Russia. Central/Eastern and
Southern member states have always had different perceptions of geographical prioritization and burden-sharing
with respect to the EUs so-called neighborhood, and this
has had consequences on how policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, are designed and on how
financial resources for foreign policy are distributed.

A recent analysis of the national security strategies of the

EU member states showed not just the poor state of strategic thinking in most of the European capitals, but also
the persistence of numerous strategies in the EU. The study
classed countries in a number of categories: apart from the
strategists in Britain and France, the globalists seem to
understand shifts in world power but are not necessarily fit
to address their consequences, and the others fall in unflattering boxes of localists, abstentionists, and drifters.8
Germany is frequently looked at as a potential driver of
EU foreign policy to match its internal political importance, yet has its own internal blockages including a public
opinion that is against its country engaging in foreign and
security matters. In the absence of a strategic tradition,
its leadership has only just started to reflect on Germanys
global role.9 The pitiful state of defense cooperation is at
the root of the sinking of the EUs CSDP, which in over 20
plus years of existence has lost the confidence of its initial
proponents and its raison detre.10

The gap between new and old member states has been
narrowing in recent years, showing patterns of adaptation
as a consequence of membership in the EU in most but
not all countries.7 At the same time, the differences
between the geographical core and peripheral countries
have grown especially since turbulence on the doorstep of
the EU has increased, with the periphery being exposed to
the geopolitical and human pressures of being the frontline
border of the EU. Today, the crisis in Ukraine and refugee

In essence, the strategic differences are underpinned by

different understandings of global developments and
about the role states can play in addressing them. In other
words, the divergence is rooted in cognitive differences
in the mindsets of decision-makers who shape policies.
Ultimately, when action is required, collective action is
frequently resorted to, but the mismatch between divergent
mindsets and the responses adopted often results in ineffective compromises.

The gap between new and

old member states has been
narrowing in recent years.
6 Rosa Balfour, Caterina Carta, and Kristi Raik (eds.) (2015), Conclusion. Adaptation
to the EU or to the Changing Global Context?, in The European External Action Service
and National Foreign Ministries: Convergence or Divergence?, Farnham: Ashgate, pp.
195-208.
7 Hungary in recent years has diverged significantly from the typical pattern of Europeanization. For further analysis on the relationship between the EU and member states
diplomacies, see the individual chapters in Balfour, Carta, and Raik (2015).

8 Olivier de France and Nick Whitney (2013), Europes Strategic Cacophony, ECFR
Policy Brief, London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
9 See Review 2014 A Fresh Look at Germanys Foreign Policy, a consultation process
launched in 2014 by the German Foreign Affairs Minister, http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/en/topics.html. See also Thomas Bagger (2015), The German Moment in
a Fragile World, The Washington Quarterly, Winter, pp. 25-35.
10 See the chapters on member states and CSDP and in Daniel Fiott (ed.) (2015),
The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives, Egmont Paper 79,
Brussels: Royal Institute of International Affairs, May, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/
wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ep79.pdf. On defense cooperation, see von Voss, Major
and Mlling (2013).

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The Endurance of National Sovereignty
Why has it been so hard for member states to cooperate
on foreign policy? Foreign and security policy is one of the
few areas in which governments insist on retaining control
and national sovereignty. The strength of the attachment to national sovereignty is paradoxical in light of the
constraints to and gains from individual state action. The
attachment to it obscures the deeper challenges that are not
in protecting sovereignty per se, but in identifying where
power lies11 and in the governments ability to influence
power shifts. The diffusion of power from traditional state
actors to transnational market and societal actors make
states alone far less able to shape their surrounding environment and respond to international events.12 Interdependence makes individual governments less able to control
developments in many policy fields because barriers
between domestic and international politics have been
broken down. This also means that traditional patterns of
democratic control and accountability are also affected in
all policy areas, not just for foreign and security matters.

Interdependence makes individual

governments less able to control
developments in many policy
fields.
National autonomy has been maintained in areas that
European citizens find central to their identity, such as
health and education, though liberalization and privatization processes have divested the state of its assets
and governments of their discretion. By contrast, public
opinion surveys consistently show high numbers in favor
of a stronger EU role on global matters, indicating that
Europeans are less concerned about national sovereignty
on foreign and security matters than their governments

at least in times of peace. Furthermore, ultimately EU

governments do cooperate with each other out of necessity. Doing so without a strategic vision and a more deeply
shared spirit of cooperation hampers effectiveness and
results in ad hoc actions of limited impact.
The geostrategic myopia13 of EU states is compounded by
the Byzantine nature of decision-making procedures in the
EU, which are focused on internal negotiation and politics
rather than the result of a commonly shared world view.
None of these are sufficient reasons to explain the resilience
of national sovereignty; this is a question that requires
further investigation. Suffice it to say in this context that
institutional change, external shocks, the overall relative
decline of Europe, and the irruption of the international on
the domestic agenda together have not created sufficient
incentives to make the EU member states move on a shared
understanding of the world and of ways to shape it. Having
embraced interdependence as a strategy to ensure peace on
the continent, the member states struggle to see this as the
best means to deal with the rest of the world.
From Review to a Cognitive Shift
There is no quick fix to the messy politics of European foreign and security policymaking. If the single
voice aspiration is a thing of the past, those who want
to strengthen the EUs role need to focus on the single
message and collective responses. Flexible arrangements
and pioneering formats can potentially be a way forward, if
firmly tied to the EU framework to prevent member states
fragmenting into different directions. If mini-lateralism is
seen as the only way to achieve results, mechanisms need
to be devised to ensure the centrality of the EU institutions
in coordination. Politics, performance, trust among the
actors, and institutional mechanisms are key, but to get to
the sources of the logic of diversity, the ways in which the
EU and its member states interpret world developments
need to be changed, and this is where the review process
offers opportunities.

11 I am grateful to Christopher Hill for this observation.

12 Moiss Nam argues that power is decaying; Charles Kupchan argues that no-one
is in charge. See Moiss Nam (2013), The End of Power, New York: Basic Books; and
Charles Kupchan (2012), No Ones World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming
Global Turn, New York: Oxford University Press. There is, of course, a lively debate on the
changing nature of global power that goes beyond the purpose of this brief.

13 Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon (2015), Wake up Europe!, Global Affairs, Vol. 1,
No. 1, pp. 11-20.

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Without a cognitive shift in
Europe, a stronger and more
global EU will not emerge.
Without a cognitive shift in Europe, a stronger and more
global EU will not emerge.14 The initiative to devise an
EU strategy is a first and needed step. The challenge for
the HR is at least two-fold. The first step was to produce
a compelling analysis of the global state of affairs and
persuasive arguments in favor of collective action. Here
the writing is on the wall, backed by wide consensus in
the international community about the current state of the
world.15 The analysis presented by the HR to the European
Council was not endorsed but was seen as a basis to give
her the mandate to continue, in close cooperation with the
member states.
Here lies the greater political challenge: to ensure that
the member states take the exercise seriously and view it, in
itself, as a process of learning and adaptation in a vicarious
effort together with all the EU institutions. Member states
need to discuss more thoroughly their differences, argue
over them, make their cost-benefit analyses, and negotiate
their areas for compromise and their red lines. The process
needs to be managed by the center of the EUs diplomatic
network the HR and the EEAS but with a participatory approach that ensures buy-in from all the parts of the
system. This tricky balance will not be easy to achieve. And
the outcome would need to translate not just into a global
strategy for foreign and security policy, as the European
Council worded the mandate, but into an operationalizable
strategy, a plan for action, which will provide dividends
to the member states early on.
So far, and in contrast with her predecessor, Catherine
Ashton, who had chosen three priority areas, Federica
Mogherini has focused on identifying the right processes
14 Rosa Balfour (2014), Renewal through international action? Options for EU foreign
policy, in European Policy Centre, Challenges and new beginnings: priorities for the EUs
new leadership, Challenge Europe, Issue 22, Brussels: September, http://www.epc.eu/
documents/uploads/pub_4855_challenge_europe_issue_22.pdf.
15 The team of the high representative has already delivered a report: European
External Action Service (2015), The European Union in a changing global environment. A
more connected, contested and complex world, Brussels: June 30, http://eeas.europa.
eu/docs/strategic_review/eu-strategic-review_strategic_review_en.pdf.

to move debates forward, such as improving the relations

between the EEAS and the Commission. She has avoided
prioritizing some geographical areas above others. With
the right approach, the EU together with the member states
does have the bandwidth for global relations. Her analysis
suggests she will continue to strive toward comprehensive
and whole of government approaches. This will require
concerted action between institutions and states, based on
a more nuanced understanding of developments around
the world, which will in turn require the know-how spread
across institutions and states.
She now needs to move her attention to the European
capitals. It will not be easy for the HR and her team to
find a balance between an inclusive process and avoiding
a consensus-driven exercise in which all contribute their
priorities. Already back in the early 2000s, the first HR of
the EU Javier Solana warned against the Christmas
tree approach so typical of the EU.
The exercise will require strong political steering from the
HR. To have this strength and authority, the HR should
seek allies across the EU system to back her work. A group
of like-minded policy entrepreneurs can help persuade
the various parts of the system to take the review process
seriously and create a favorable context. Among these are
some smaller member states that have a stronger sense of
the added value from EU cooperation on international
matters and that benefit from the system the Lisbon Treaty
has set up. They will have to accept, however, that the large
countries with a strong tradition of independence in international politics will require special treatment: a shift from
key capitals toward a greater commitment to a more shared
analysis of world developments will be necessary for any
strategy to take shape.
If consultations between 28 members are burdensome,
breaking down into smaller groups of variable composition
and innovative techniques to facilitate confrontation could
break the mold of the usual negotiations. Most importantly, the member states need to explore their differences
directly and in depth. The divisive issues should be picked
for a fight. For example, Russia, Egypt, and China are three
countries that challenge EU consensus; important thematic
challenges have come in the fields of asylum policy, energy,
and security and human rights. These discussions are
unlikely to lead to solutions, but they will help member

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states better understand each others perceptions and
differences.
The HR is already planning broad consultations during
the process leading to the EU global strategy involving the
expert community beyond the decision-makers. Bringing
in like-minded opinion-shapers and broadening the scope
for policy-entrepreneurship to other EU actors, such as the
European Parliament, is certainly welcome. This year could
also be an opportunity to reach out to an even broader
audience of opinion-shapers outside the small community
international experts. National debates could be encouraged through contacts with parliaments, the media, political parties and activists, and civil society organizations,
beyond the usual network of experts, constituting a rare
opportunity for more informed debates and confrontation
with public opinion on international matters. The review
process may not be a panacea to solve all ills of the EUs
patchwork foreign policy, but it opens the door to a change
in attitudes, analysis, and a way of cooperating in Europe
on foreign and security policy.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the author alone.

About the Author

Rosa Balfour is a senior fellow with the Europe Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

About the Europe Program

The Europe Program at GMF enhances understanding of the challenges facing the European Union and the potential implications
for the transatlantic relationship. It contributes to the European and
transatlantic policy debate through policy-oriented research, analysis,
and convening to help improve the political, economic, financial, and
social stability of the EU and its member states. The Europe Program
focuses on the following key areas: integration and disintegration in
the EU; Germanys role in Europe and the world; challenges in the
EUs neighborhood; reconnecting Southern European member states;
migration; the rise of populism; and EU energy security.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in
1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

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