ENISA - Annex I - ICT Interdependencies of The Smart Grid

Smart Grid Security
Annex I. General Concepts and Dependencies with ICT

[Deliverable 2012-04-19]
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I
Annex I. General concepts and dependencies with ICT
This document is Annex 1 (of 5) to the ENISA study Smart Grid Security: Recommendations
for Europe and Member States, June 2012.
Contributors to this report

ENISA would like to recognise the contribution of the S21sec1 team members that prepared
this report in collaboration with and on behalf of ENISA:
Elyoenai Egozcue,
Daniel Herreras Rodrguez,
Jairo Alonso Ortiz,
Victor Fidalgo Villar,
Luis Tarrafeta.
Agreements or Acknowledgements
ENISA would like to acknowledge the contribution of Mr. Wouter Vlegels and Mr. Rafa
Leszczyna to this study.
S21sec, the contractor of ENISA for this study is an international security services company with offices in several countries.
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About ENISA
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is a centre of network and
information security expertise for the EU, its member states, the private sector and Europes
citizens. ENISA works with these groups to develop advice and recommendations on good
practice in information security. It assists EU member states in implementing relevant EU
legislation and works to improve the resilience of Europes critical information infrastructure
and networks. ENISA seeks to enhance existing expertise in EU member states by supporting
the development of cross-border communities committed to improving network and
information security throughout the EU. More information about ENISA and its work can be
found at www.enisa.europa.eu.
Contact details
For contacting ENISA or for general enquiries on CIIP & Resilience, please use the following
details:
E-mail: resilience@enisa.europa.eu
Internet: http://www.enisa.europa.eu
For questions related to Smart Grid Security: Recommendations for Europe and Member
States, please use the following details:
E-mail: Konstantinos.Moulinos@enisa.europa.eu
Legal notice
Notice must be taken that this publication represents the views and interpretations of the
authors and editors, unless stated otherwise. This publication should not be construed to be a
legal action of ENISA or the ENISA bodies unless adopted pursuant to the ENISA Regulation (EC)
No 460/2004 as lastly amended by Regulation (EU) No 580/2011. This publication does not
necessarily represent state-of the-art and ENISA may update it from time to time.
Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate. ENISA is not responsible for the content of the
external sources including external websites referenced in this publication.
This publication is intended for information purposes only. It must be accessible free of charge.
Neither ENISA nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made
of the information contained in this publication.
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 2012
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Contents
1
Smart grid basic concepts ..................................................................................................... 1

1.1
Definition of the smart grid ............................................................................................ 1
1.2
Objectives of the smart grid ........................................................................................... 2
1.3
Drivers for the adoption of the smart grid ..................................................................... 3
1.3.1
Europe ..................................................................................................................... 4
1.3.2
US ............................................................................................................................ 4
1.3.3
Japan ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.3.4
China ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.3.5
South Korea ............................................................................................................. 5
1.3.6
Brazil ........................................................................................................................ 6
The smart grid architecture .................................................................................................. 7

2.1
Quick overview on related standardisation efforts ....................................................... 7
2.2
The smart grid along the electricity value chain ............................................................ 8
2.2.1
Electricity generation in the smart grid .................................................................. 9
2.2.2
Electricity transmission ......................................................................................... 10
2.2.3
Electricity Distribution........................................................................................... 10
2.2.4
Customers ............................................................................................................. 11
2.2.5
Markets ................................................................................................................. 12
ICT in the smart grid ............................................................................................................ 13

3.1
IT in the generation domain ......................................................................................... 13
3.2
IT in the operation of transmission networks .............................................................. 14
3.2.1
Substations: types and basic components ............................................................ 14
3.2.2
Automation of electricity transmission ................................................................ 15
3.2.3
Smartening the transmission grid ......................................................................... 16
3.3
IT in the operation of distribution networks ................................................................ 16
3.3.1
Basic aspects of distribution grids......................................................................... 16
3.3.2
Automation of power distribution ........................................................................ 17
3.3.3
Advanced Distribution Automation ...................................................................... 19
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3.4
IT in Advanced Metering and Energy Management Automation ................................ 20
3.5
Communications networks in the smart grid ............................................................... 22
3.5.1
Communication networks at the customer premises .......................................... 23
3.5.2 Communication networks supporting distribution-related information

technologies and applications ............................................................................................ 24
3.5.3 Communication networks supporting transmission-related information
technologies and applications ............................................................................................ 25
3.5.4
Common Communication networks supporting transmission and distribution .. 25
3.5.5
Communication networks at the generation domain .......................................... 26
3.5.6
The role of the Internet in the smart grids ........................................................... 26
3.6
Communication technologies ...................................................................................... 27
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 30
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... 46
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List of Tables
Table 1 Chief objectives of the smart grid in the EU and in the USA. Sources: EC Task Force for
Smart Grids Expert Group 1 (5) and US DoE Smart Grid System Report (6) ............................... 3
Table 2 Application level communication protocols and related standards in the smart grid .. 28
Table 3 Communication media and low-level protocols ............................................................ 29
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List of Figures
Figure 1 Past, present and future of the Smart Grid. The drawing is based on IEAs Smart Grids
Roadmap (4) .................................................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2 Relationship between NIST SP 1108 and IEEE 2030 concepts. The drawing is based on
IEEE P2030 standard (14) .............................................................................................................. 8
Figure 3 The smart grids power transport domains .................................................................... 9
Figure 4 Substations and customer types in the power grid ...................................................... 14
Figure 5 the power system and its underlying communication infrastructure (based on (14)) 23
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1
Smart grid basic concepts
1.1 Definition of the smart grid

The European Commission adopted the Communication COM(2011) 202, Smart Grids: from
innovation to deployment (1) where it defines the smart grid as an upgraded electricity
network to which two-way digital communication between supplier and consumer, intelligent
metering and monitoring systems have been added. Additionally, the European Smart Grid
Task Force (2) and The European Smart Grid Technology Platform (Smart Grids ETP) define the
smart grids as electricity networks that can efficiently integrate the behaviour and actions of
all users connected to it generators, consumers and those that do both in order to
ensure an economically efficient, sustainable power system with low losses and high quality
and security of supply and safety.
In the USA, the Office of Electricity Transmission and Distribution, which belongs to the
Department of Energy (DoE) defines the grid of the future as one that will incorporate digital
technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric system through
information exchange, distributed generation, and storage sources (3). Moreover, the
Department of Energy, describes the smart grid as a class of technology people are using to
bring utility electricity delivery systems into the 21st century, using computer-based remote
control and automation. These systems are made possible by two-way communication
technology and computer processing [...].
From the definitions above, it is clear that from a broad perspective, the smart grid is the term
used to refer to the upgraded electricity network of the 21 st century, for which information
and communication technology is of paramount importance (e.g. computer-based remote
control, monitoring and processing; system automation; two-way digital communications
between supplier and consumer; intelligent metering; etc.) in order to achieve efficiency,
sustainability, quality, reliability, safety and security as well as to manage distributed
generation, energy storage, and integrate generators, consumers and prosumers.
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Figure 1 Past, present and future of the Smart Grid. The drawing is based on IEAs Smart Grids
Roadmap (4)
1.2 Objectives of the smart grid

When analyzing the high level objectives of the smart grid, both the EU and the USA (and
other countries) mostly coincide. In the table below it is shown a comparison between these
two regions. In both cases it is agreed that the smart grid will facilitate greater customer
participation, allow for all types and sizes of generation, provide adequate power quality,
efficiency, security and reliability, and will create opportunities for new services and market
integration. The main difference is that the EU considers a strategic objective the reduction of
the environmental impact of the whole electricity supply system. On the other hand, the US
stresses the need for optimizing asset utilization and operation efficiency. However, despite
the fact that the US does not consider the environmental impact of the electricity supply
system as a primary objective, it is understood that this is an underlying goal.
EU
USA
Better facilitate the connection

Accommodate all generation and
and operation of generators of all
storage options.
sizes and technologies.
Allow consumers to play a part in Enable informed participation by
optimising the operation of the customers.
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system.
Provide consumers with greater
information and options for how
they use their supply.
Significantly
reduce
the
environmental impact of the
whole electricity supply system.
N/A
N/A
Optimize asset utilization and

operating efficiently.
Provide the power quality for the

Maintain or even improve the range of needs.
existing high levels of system
resiliently
to
reliability, quality and security of Operate
disturbances,
attacks,
and
natural
supply.
disasters.
Maintain and improve the existing
services efficiently.
Enable new products, services, and
Foster market integration towards markets.
European integrated market.
Table 1 Chief objectives of the smart grid in the EU and in the USA. Sources: EC Task Force for
Smart Grids Expert Group 1 (5) and US DoE Smart Grid System Report (6)
Even though the high level objectives of the smart grid are mostly the same in all countries,
the drivers for the adoption of the smart grid (see 1.3) can vary. These drivers will determine
where the largest investments will focus on, as well as the technologies, system architectures,
initiatives and research actions that will be undertaken in each country or region. For
instance, in the EU there are many initiatives on microgrids since renewable energy sources
(mainly wind-based) are very well adopted among several European countries (e.g. Denmark
already receives 40 percent of its electricity from wind (7)). The EU is fostering the use of
microgrids as a way to improve the reliability of the network. Microgrids can maintain service
by islanding during outages of large systems and at the same time reduces the dependence on
large generators and the regional and national grid. On the other hand, the U.S. focuses more
on reliability benefits from technology tools for sensors, greater automation, and monitoring
(e.g. use of synchrophasors) (8).
1.3 Drivers for the adoption of the smart grid

The main drivers for the adoption of the smart grid can differ from one country or region to
another. This is not a minor issue, since the main priorities might be different even though the
main objectives might remain the same. Moreover, the starting point of each country might
also differ. Some countries might consider their infrastructure reliable already while others
will need to heavily invest to improve it. Likewise, the current grid architecture might be
different depending on historical, geographical or demographical factors. As a result, the
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implementation paths (e.g. policies or regulatory initiatives, standardisation efforts,
technologies, and architectures) might be different resulting in different security challenges,
central topic of this study.
In order to better understand where each country will focus its activities (policies, initiatives,
regulation efforts, standardisation efforts, etc.) in the following lines we will roughly describe
the main drivers for the adoption of the smart grid.
1.3.1 Europe
The EU has established three core policy objectives on Energy which were agreed by the
European Council in March 2007 (9): i) increasing the security of supply, ii) ensuring the
competiveness of European economies and the availability of affordable energy, and iii)
promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change. Regarding the climate
change policy objective, the Europe 2020 growth strategy for the coming decade further
establishes three major goals (10): i) renewable sources have to contribute 20% to Europes
final energy consumption, ii) greenhouse gas emissions have to fall by 20% (or even 30%, if
the conditions are right), and iii) energy efficiency gains have to deliver 20% savings in energy
consumption.
One of the EUs measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is the massive use of the
Electric Vehicle (EV). The EUs Smart Grid needs to support them, and need to be smart to
deliver power at the right moment and at the same time maintaining the reliability of the
network. For instance, cars could be charged during the night or during the day while they are
parked in the parking lots.
Reliability in the EUs grid is of high importance for Telecommunication infrastructures. EUs
telecommunications operators are used to a reliable grid and, as a result, many
telecommunication infrastructure operators do not have back-up generators. Reliability
metrics varies among different Member States but most of EUs countries have an average
disconnection time under 100 minutes per year and customer. However, there are other EU
Member States that do not provide such good figures (e.g. Poland average disconnection time
in 2007 was around 550 minutes/year/customer).
1.3.2 US
Title XIII of the Energy Independence Security Act of 2007 (EISA) (11) is a statement of policy
on modernization of the US electricity grid. This Act states that the US policy aims to support
the modernisation of the electricity transmission and distribution system to maintain a
reliable and secure electricity infrastructure that can meet future demand growth.
The US grid is plagued by ever more and ever worse blackouts over the past 25 years. The US
grid spans vast geographical areas, and the long distances between the power plants and the
final customers render the infrastructure unstable and prone to cascading effects. The
average disruption time per customer is 214 minutes (excluding hurricanes and strong storms)
in the Northeast coast, while Japan averages 4 minutes of interrupted service each year (12).
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There is a need for TSOs and DSOs to understand faster how many outages are there, what
are the areas affected, how many customers are affected, which customers reconnect first
which last. DSOs also expect from the Smart Grid to balance and steer power from local
generation plans in order to supply minimum energy to local towns and communities.
Moreover, the USs transmission grid systems are overloaded and this has resulted in many
brown-outs lately. Examples like Californias, Texas, and other incidents back up this idea.
In addition to improving the reliability of the grid, the US very much like in the EU also
aims to integrate all sources of energy, including renewable into the grid (solar energy, wind
power, nuclear, etc.)
A major concern in the US is that there are over 3600 utilities (power companies), and each
state together with 3 territorial Public Utility Commissions are in charge of their regulation.
This could lead to multiple different paths for smart grid implementation, which means that
there might appear a collection of solutions that do not interoperate, limiting their value and
the opportunity for nation-wide innovation. As a result, the US entrusted the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop a framework of standards to reduce
the implementation paths to a manageable number, increasing market sizes, stimulating
innovation, and speeding deployment by lowering prices and increasing reuse (11).
1.3.3 Japan
Japans electricity grid is considered to be highly reliable. For this reason more efforts will be
made to accommodate renewable energy sources and to create new infrastructures,
standards and services for the Electric Vehicle (EV).
Additionally, Japan has planned reducing CO2 emissions by 25% compared to the level in 1990
(5). To this respect, the administration will be supporting economically the introduction of the
next-generation power distribution grid.
1.3.4 China
Chinas demand for Energy is rising very quickly. In order to keep the pace China will highly
invest on increasing capacity, reliability, efficiency and the integration of renewable sources.
A secondary objective is the reduction of energy consumption per unit of GDP by a cumulative
20% by 2010 (5). With Chinas GDP growing at two digits rate under normal circumstances,
this objective seems less ambitious when compared with other regions (e.g. Europe)
1.3.5 South Korea
South Korea aims at building for 2030 the worlds first nationwide smart grid system. They
intend to increase the use of green energy in order to reduce greenhouse emissions, which
include not only CO2, but also CH4 (methane), N20 (nitrous oxide), and fluorinated gases (5).
Another main objective is efficiency by lowering the peak load for electric power and reducing
the overall energy use.
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1.3.6 Brazil
Brazil, as China, is currently undergoing a great change in its power grid. Only between 2007
and 2017 it is expected a 60% growth with 16-34% increase in renewable from hydro, biomass
and wind (12). However, the current grid is aging and it is a one-way power flow.
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The smart grid architecture
The adoption of smart grids will dramatically change the grid as we know it today. Traditional
energy services and markets will also undergo a significant transformation. To this regard, it is
envisioned that customers will have a much more active role; they will be efficient energy
consumers and electricity producers at the same time.
2.1 Quick overview on related standardisation efforts

Even though the objectives of the smart grid are well defined, there is no clear reference
architecture. This is changing however, and standardisation efforts are already in place trying
to fill this gap.
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) presented in 2010, the NIST SP
1108 (13), which include a high-level framework for the smart grid and defines seven
important domains: Bulk Generation, Transmission, Distribution, Customers, Operations,
Markets and Service Providers. It helps stakeholders understand the building blocks of an endto-end smart grid system, from Generation to (and from) Customers. Moreover, it shows all
the communications and energy/electricity flows connecting each domain and how they are
interrelated. Additionally, each individual domain is further analysed and the most relevant
smart grid elements and interconnections (e.g. energy/electricity paths and two-way digital
communications) are identified.
NIST is assigned the primary responsibility of coordinating the development of a framework
that includes protocols and model standards for the smart grid. IEEE supports EISA, the NIST
framework coordination effort. As a result, the IEEE started the IEEE P2030 project which has
recently delivered the IEEE 2030-2011 standard. This guide views the smart grid as a large,
complex system of systems and provides guidance to navigate the numerous smart grid
design pathways throughout the EPS, loads, and end-user applications (14).
This guide expands each domain defined in the NIST conceptual reference architecture into
three smart grid foundational layers: i) the Power and Energy Layer, ii) the Communication
Layer and iii) the IT/Computer Layer. The IEEE considers that layers (ii) and (iii) are the
enabling infrastructure of the Power and Energy Layer and which make the grid "smarter. For
each one of these foundational layers, this guide presents a reference model which is based
on multiple use case scenarios. For instance, the Communication layer includes the
identification of the interfaces between systems, data-flows, potential communication
technologies and protocols, security objectives, etc. This standard considers security and
privacy as a foundational principle, and makes use of the NISTIR 7628 as a reference for this
purpose. As an example, it is worth noting that each type of data flow identified is assigned a
security category which consists of an impact level for each of the three security objectives of
data confidentiality, data integrity, and data availability.
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Figure 2 Relationship between NIST SP 1108 and IEEE 2030 concepts. The drawing is based on
IEEE P2030 standard (14)
On the other hand, the EU is following a similar approach for the European Smart Grid. The
Commission issued mandate M490 (15) to European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) (i.e.
CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) whereby they are requested to develop a reference framework on
smart grids. The expected framework will include a smart grid reference technical architecture
and a set of consistent standards which will support the information exchange
(communication protocols and data models) among other objectives. The first results are
expected by the end of 2012.
2.2 The smart grid along the electricity value chain

The smart grid is a concept that spans all along the electricity value chain. It encompasses the
power generation domain, the electricity transmission and distribution systems and
associated operations, the metering and billing processes and other end-user services, and
even power markets. Figure 3 provides an overview of these concepts.
All of these domains (generation, transmission, distribution, etc.) already existed before the
concept of smart grid was envisioned. However, it is also acknowledged that a smarter grid is
necessary to deal with todays energy challenges.
In the following lines an overview of the different domains affected by the smart grid is
presented, by comparing the current situation of all to how they will look like in the coming
years.
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Figure 3 The smart grids power transport domains

2.2.1 Electricity generation in the smart grid
The first years of the twenty-first century have seen renewed emphasis on new and
renewable sources of electricity. These sources of energy are being deployed massively and
will have to be accommodated efficiently in todays electric grid, complementing other energy
sources such as the old and decreasing combustion-based technologies, nuclear energy,
etc.
Smart grids will integrate traditional, renewable energy sources as well as the concept of
distributed generation. These sources will feed different parts of the electricity super-system,
including: i) bulk generators connected to the transmission levels, such as nuclear power
plants; ii) medium scale generators at the distribution level, such as small-scale combined
heat and power or wind farms; and iii) small scale on commercial and residential buildings,
such as solar panels and small wind mills.
Bulk generation plants generate electricity from renewable and non-renewable energy
sources in bulk quantities. These sources can also be classified as renewable, variable sources,
such as solar and wind; renewable, non-variable, such as hydro, biomass, geothermal and
pump storage; or non-renewable, non-variable, such as nuclear, coal and gas (16). Bulk
generation plants, are large centralized facilities that have excellent economies of scale.
However, electricity has to travel long distances to reach customers and as a result a good
amount of energy is lost.
In contrast to bulk generation, the smart grid will also accommodate the concept of
distributed or dispersed generation, where many energy sources of small size called
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) will be dispersed along the transmission, distribution
and customer domains. As it is stated in (17), a DER may be owned by either a consumer or
supplier of electricity and can operate either independently or interconnected with the grid.
In many cases, distributed generation implies (but it is not mandatory e.g. peaking
generation units connected to the transmission system) that electricity is generated very close
to where it is used, which reduces the amount of energy lost in transmission and the size and
number of power lines that must be constructed. Some examples of distributed energy
resources include: solar panels on the roofs of building, small wind turbines, fuel cells, and
10
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distributed cogeneration sources. Moreover, a source of potential DER in the future will be
the electrical vehicle (17). Smart grids will support greater deployment of variable generation
technologies by providing operators with real-time system information that enables them to
manage generation, demand and power quality.
2.2.2 Electricity transmission
Transmission is the bulk transfer of electrical power from generation (and storage) sources to
the distribution grid through multiple substations which are typically operated by
Transmission System Operators (TSO). The main goal of a TSO is to maintain stability on the
electric grid by balancing generation (supply) with load (demand) across the transmission
network (13).
In todays electrical grids, the generation, transmission and sub-transmission segments are
performing at a high level and are equipped with automation systems. Even though this will
be further explained in future sections, this has been done by installing Remote Terminal
Units (RTUs) and other control devices in substations and generation plants, connected to a
Distributed Control System or to a centralising SCADA/EMS system.
Companies around the world are already investing in making the transmission network
smarter, with renewed ICT for enhanced control and monitoring. According to the IEA
Technology Roadmap on Smart Grids (18) many transmission systems already use some
smart grid technologies and are operating robustly, allowing for adequate competition among
generators and therefore ensuring appropriate electricity prices. Other transmission systems
are plagued by congestion and concerns over ageing infrastructure. [] New transmission
capacity and interconnections with other electricity systems are also needed. The smart grid
will bring a whole range of new specific applications and technologies to improve the
transmission system. Some examples are the High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC), Phasor
Measurement Units (PMU), Dynamic Line Rating and Wide Area Measurement System
(WAMS).
2.2.3 Electricity Distribution
An electricity distribution network carries electricity arriving from the transmission system, as
well as from some generators connected to the distribution network, to industrial,
commercial and domestic users. The distribution grid is the electrical interconnection
between the transmission domain, the customer domain and the metering points for
consumption, distributed storage, and distributed generation (13). The electricity distribution
systems are normally operated by Distribution System Operators (DSOs). Furthermore, the
traditional main goal of a DSO is not only to operate, but also to maintain and develop an
efficient electricity distribution system.
Even though this will be further explained in the following sections, historically, distribution
systems have included little telemetry, and almost all communications within the domain
were performed by humans. It is considered that the primary installed sensor base in the
distribution domain is the customer with a telephone, whose call initiates the dispatch of a
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field crew to restore power, (13). It was common that distribution substations were rarely
connected to a central SCADA system, and even sometimes they were not automated at all.
Electrical substations required manual switching or adjustment of equipment, and manual
collection of data for load, energy consumption, and abnormal events. In contrast, as already
mentioned, TSOs have had extensive control over transmission-level equipment which is now
being enhanced with a smarter transmission grid. Nevertheless, control over distribution-level
equipment is increasing via distribution automation. However, with the advent of the smart
grid, distribution systems are facing a paradigm shift. As it is acknowledged by industry major
players (19) distribution networks are under high pressure to meet requirements for
converting their conventional static grids into modern and dynamic smart grids. In particular,
the increasing occurrence of decentralized generation (DER) is influencing this trend, as well
as the need to improve the quality and reliability in MV and LV networks. Due to this
paradigm shift, there are new requirements on the automation, monitoring control and
protection of distribution substations and transformer stations/centres. A more advanced
automation is expected at the distribution grid with the upcoming smart grid. Literature refers
to this extra automation as smart distribution system or Advanced Distribution Automation
(ADA). The goal of Advanced Distribution Automation is the real-time adjustment of the
distribution system to changing loads, generation, and failure conditions, usually without
operator intervention in order to dramatically improve system reliability, power quality, and
efficiency. In order to achieve this, substation and feeder automation and control will play a
central role, and will allow DSOs to make the most of Distributed Energy Resources (DER),
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and Demand-Response strategies, making these
three new concepts an essential part of the toolbox of ADA (20). All these new concepts will
be explained in detail in the following sections.
2.2.4 Customers
The smart grid is a compilation of concepts, technologies, and operating practices intended to
bring the electric grid into the 21st century. However, the smart grid could not be understood
without the increasing automation of energy management at households, buildings and
industry. This is one of the reasons why the frontier between the smart grid, and the smart
cities, smart industry, smart buildings and smart houses is blurry.
Once the electricity reaches the client side, the electricity is consumed. In order to gather the
necessary consumption readings for billing, DSOs personnel traditionally made and still
make periodic roundtrips to each physical location to manually read meters. The evolution
towards smart grids will allow DSOs for smart billing, a solution for dynamic pricing and
enhanced customer relationship management. According to the IEA Technology Roadmap
(18), smart grids will enable increased interaction between DSOs and customer through the
provision of real-time energy usage information and pricing. [...] Moreover, Market
unbundling has changed the ownership and operating arrangements of distribution networks
and, in many countries, the role of the distribution system operator (DSO). In some countries,
an electricity retailer or energy service provider entity is placed between the customer and
the DSO. The end-user, but also the DSO will benefit from this change.
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These new electricity retailers or energy service providers are envisioned to provide a whole
new range of added-value services, such as supporting the Electric Vehicle (EV), integrated
energy management services, a more efficient electricity consumption or integrated home
automation, real-time power quality monitoring, premium power options, etc. The use of
batteries or local electricity generation technologies mainly based on renewable sources will
be also a main topic, as already described in previous sections. Smartening the customer
premises will be based on ICT technology that will provide grid operators with increased and
better informed control over grid operations. This new source of information and control
capabilities will allow grid operators to better manage demand, for instance by allowing
islanding sections of the grid when an outage occurs, or signalling real-time tariffs to reduce
consumption rates.
2.2.5 Markets
The electricity market includes all those operations related to the purchase and sale of power
energy. It encompasses stakeholders such as power suppliers, traders, balance responsible
parties, settlement and power exchange agents, etc.
The Markets domain will communicate with the Distribution domain in ways that will affect
localized consumption and generation. This will turn Markets to be more dynamic. To this
regard, the innovations that bring the smart grid are(21): extending price and distributed
energy resources (DER) signals to each of the Customer sub-domains; making more simple
market rules; managing the growth (and regulation) of retailing and wholesaling of energy;
and evolving communication mechanisms for prices and energy characteristics between and
throughout the Markets and Customer.
The liberalisation of the electricity sector, together with the smartening of the distribution
grid and customer households and industry, will also allow Markets to become more flexible
than they are today. Customers are envisioned to have more options, such as being able to
choose for the best power supplier. Besides, markets will play an important role, by providing
incentives, with last minute energy offers when in a sudden wind allows for renewable
generation to contribute to the grid. Besides, situations such as if you comply with your load
forecast you get good tariffs will be generalised.
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ICT in the smart grid
Robust, open and secure Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are at the core
of a successful smart grid implementation. As explained in the previous chapter, all processes
across the whole value chain (i.e. energy generation, transmission, distribution, consumption,
marketing, retailing, etc.) are heavily based on ICT infrastructures.
Thanks to ICT, the grid of the future will become smarter so as to improve reliability, security,
and efficiency of the electric system through information exchange, distributed generation,
storage sources, and the active participation of the end consumer. The development of smart
grids exemplifies the increasing dependency of European economy and society on Information
and Communication Technologies.
In the following lines the dependence of the current and future smart grids of different
Information and Communication Technologies will be explained. Firstly, an introduction on
how the grid is currently operated will be presented. Then this explanation will be followed by
the description of how new technologies and applications will enhance the current
automation of the grid operations. Finally, this chapter will provide an overview of the
underlying communications infrastructure supporting these existing and new applications.
3.1 IT in the generation domain

Bulk generation and DER operations are heavily automated by Industrial Control Systems
(ICS), including mainly PLCs and DCS and other controllers, but also SCADA systems in certain
cases. These systems also help human operators to start and stop the generators depending
on the need. They play an important role in synchronizing and adjusting the voltage level with
regards to the power grid to which they are connected.
In order to address the peculiarities of the integration of renewable energies in the power
grid, different approaches are being followed. For instance, in 2006 Spain established a
Control Centre of Renewable Energies (CECRE), a pioneering initiative set up by Red Elctrica,
the national TSO. This centre is in charge for controlling and managing the electricity
generation obtained from renewable energy producers, primarily wind farms, making it
possible to integrate the maximum production of renewable energy into the electricity system
whilst maintaining the levels of quality and guaranteeing the security of supply.
According to (22), by means of 23 control centres belonging to several generation companies,
which act as interlocutors, CECRE receives, every 12 seconds, real time information about
each facility regarding the status of the grid connection, production and voltage at the
connection point. This data is used by a sophisticated tool which makes it possible to verify
whether the total generation obtained from renewable energies can be integrated at any
moment into the electricity system without affecting the security of supply.
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3.2 IT in the operation of transmission networks

3.2.1 Substations: types and basic components
As it has already advanced in the previous sections, the basic elements of electricity
transmission are power lines, transmission towers, and sub-stations. Transmission
substations connect two or more power transmission lines. Normally transmission substations
include step-up and step-down substations. TSOs operate step-up generation substations
which are normally located close to a power plant and which use transformers to raise the
voltage level before delivering it to the transmission network. On the other hand, TSOs also
operate step-down transmission substations which use transformers as well but in this case to
reduce the voltage level between the transmission and sub-transmission levels. High voltage is
used in the transmission network to reduce propagation power losses due to the Joule effect.
The last substation type operated by TSOs includes those substations where all transmission
lines have the same voltage level. This is the simplest substation type, where high-voltage
switches allow interconnecting two or more electric circuits, improving the transmission
system reliability by creating nodes in meshed topologies. They also facilitate lines to be
connected or isolated for fault clearance or maintenance. Likewise, step-up and step-down
substations might also include switching gear for this same purpose.
Figure 4 Substations and customer types in the power grid
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Substations might include switching, protection and control equipment as well as the
aforementioned transformers. Substation switching consists of connecting and disconnecting
transmission lines or other components to and from the system . As already mentioned,
switching equipment allows improving the transmission system reliability by creating nodes in
meshed topologies. Moreover, they are of key importance for maintenance purposes. For
instance, isolator switches (also known as disconnectors) are used to make sure that an
electrical circuit can be completely de-energised for service or maintenance purposes like
adding or removing a transmission line or a transformer. Switching gear is also an important
component for the protection of the transmission system, particularly high-voltage circuit
breakers. Circuit breakers are automatically operated electrical switches designed to protect
an electrical circuit from damage caused by overload or short-circuit. When a fault develops in
a transmission line or any other component due to a lightning that hits a line or a
transmission tower which is blown down by strong wind the substation has to isolate the
faulted portion of the system in order to: avoid the whole system destabilization, or the
burning of the line/the blowing up of the transformer. Breakers may be operated by power
system protection relays2, or through a manual command from power system operators in the
TSOs control centre.
3.2.2 Automation of electricity transmission
The automation of the transmission power grid requires the use of Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for the local control of each substation, as well as for the
management of the entire network. Substations include a local control room where a Human
Machine Interface (HMI) and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) computer provides substation local
control and supervision to local operators. Furthermore, the whole transmission network is
typically monitored and controlled through a SCADA system which remotely interacts with
these local control systems at each substation. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
systems (SCADA) are used for power system switching. SCADA systems in charge of
monitoring and control of the whole transmission, in combination with the ancillary
applications provided by the Energy Management System (EMS) system, analyze and operate
the transmission power system reliably and efficiently (23). From a central control centre
room, operators are able to supervise network topology, connectivity and loading conditions,
including circuit breaker and switch states, and control equipment status. The SCADA/EMS
monitors the open/closed status of all circuit breakers, to create bus/branch topology
configurations of the power system, allowing for optimal power flow calculation, state
estimation, contingency analysis, outage scheduling, voltage or stability analysis, alarm
processing, etc. Moreover, the SCADA/EMS systems also monitor substation metering
technology, to retrieve data on line current and voltage levels at substations.
Protective or protection relays are substation devices that allow to detect faults (e.g. over-current, over-voltage, reverse
power flow, or over- and under- frequency) on the system and identify the appropriate breakers needed to be open in order to
isolate the faults and enable the rest of the system to function normally. They can be either electromechanical or the more
modern microprocessor-based digital instruments.
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3.2.3 Smartening the transmission grid
As already mentioned in the previous chapters, the smart grid will bring a whole range of new
specific applications and technologies to improve the transmission system. The most relevant
examples are the High-Voltage Direct Current (HVDC), Phasor Measurement Units (PMU),
Dynamic Line Rating and Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS).
In the following lines we will briefly explain each one of these applications and technologies:
HVDC transmission systems use direct current for the bulk transmission of electrical
power, in contrast with the more common alternating current systems. For longdistance transmission, HVDC systems may be less expensive and suffer lower electrical
losses.
Dynamic Line Rating (DLR) uses sensors to identify the current carrying capability of a
section of network in real time to optimise utilisation of existing transmission assets,
without the risk of causing overloads (18).
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are devices that provide high quality
measurements of bus angles and frequencies using a common time source for
synchronisation (i.e. GPS radio clock) (24). PMUs might be autonomous systems or
part of a protective relay or other device in a substation. They increase the reliability
of the power grid by detecting faults early, increasing the power quality, enabling load
shedding and other load control techniques, etc. PMUs are considered the initial data
source for Wide Area Monitoring and control (WAMS) applications, essential in
regional transmission grids (and also in wide are super grids and local distribution
grids).
WAMS evolved as an advanced measurement technology to collect information not
available from contemporary supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
technology (24). WAMS technologies, as SCADA systems, acquire field data and
process them to extract value. Data acquisition is accomplished with a new generation
of data recording hardware (e.g. PMU) that produces high quality and high volume
recordings that are virtually continuous. Measurements are synchronised against a
GPS, and are readily merged to form integrated views of the behaviour of power
transmission systems. Furthermore, it is envisioned that WAMS can be included as an
ancillary application of the SCADA/EMS system, sometimes referred to as the WAMS
server.
3.3 IT in the operation of distribution networks

3.3.1 Basic aspects of distribution grids
The elements that compose the electricity distribution are middle/low voltage lines or feeders
and step-down distribution substations and transformer stations/centres3 which respectively
In literature, transformer stations/centres are sometimes named distribution substations, not distinguishing from what we
call distribution substations in this document.
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convert high voltage to medium voltage or medium voltage to low voltage. The input for a
distribution substation is typically two transmission or sub-transmission lines and the output is
a number of feeders. The feeders run along streets overhead (or underground, in some cases)
and normally4 power the distribution transformers (i.e. at transformer stations or centres) at
or near the customer premises (see Figure 4). Transformer stations are then responsible for
delivering electricity to the end-user. Distribution substations, in the same way as
transmission substations, might include switching, protection and control equipment as well
as voltage transformers. These substations isolate faults in either the transmission or
distribution systems. In downtown areas of large cities it is easy to find complicated
distribution substations which directly feed a large number of low voltage customers. They
make use of high-voltage switching, and switching and backup systems on the low-voltage
side. On the other hand, transformer centres5, which feed a much smaller number of clients,
simply have an isolator switch (disconnector), one transformer, and minimal facilities on the
low-voltage side.
Distribution systems normally present radial or open/closed loop6 topological configurations,
in contrast with the meshed configurations of transmission systems.
3.3.2 Automation of power distribution
As already mentioned in previous sections, in todays electrical grids, the generation,
transmission and sub-transmission segments are performing at a high level and are equipped
with substation automation systems. This is done by the installation of Remote Terminal Units
(RTUs) connected to a central SCADA/EMS system. On the other hand, it was common that
distribution substations were rarely connected to a central SCADA system, and even
sometimes they were not automated at all. As it was mentioned earlier, electrical substations
required manual switching or adjustment of equipment, and manual collection of data for
load, energy consumption, and abnormal events. However, distribution systems are facing a
paradigm shift nowadays. Distribution networks are under high pressure to meet
requirements for converting their conventional static grids into modern and dynamic smart
grids. In particular, the increasing occurrence of decentralized generation (DER) is influencing
this trend, as well as the need to improve the quality and reliability in MV and LV networks,
(19). Due to this paradigm shift, there are new requirements on the automation, monitoring
control and protection of distribution substations and transformer stations/centres.
Nowadays, the most common approach on distribution automation is to focus on feeder
automation. Feeder automation aims at four main goals (25): automatic fault detection on
4
It is possible to find distribution substations which deliver electricity right to final customers. This usually happens in
downtown areas of large cities.
5
In the US, where the number of households per square meter is much lower than in Europe, it is quite normal to find that the
transformer stations/centres are replaced by simple transformers at the electric pole which only feed one or two residential
customers.
6
Closed-loop configurations are also called ring topologies. In such topologies as well as in open-loop topologies, each
transformer stations/centre can be fed by two electrical paths, improving service reliability and simplifying maintenance tasks.
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feeders, fault isolation and service restoration; scheduled feeder section outage for
maintenance; main transformer and feeder load transferring and balancing; and main
transformer and feeder phase load balancing. To achieve these objectives, RTUs and sensors
are distributed all along the distribution grid at the distribution substations and transformer
centres. By monitoring digital signal status and thanks to distributed control algorithms, faults
can be confined and alarms can be triggered in case of short-circuits, undercurrents and
under-voltage contingencies (26). This is sometimes referred as Fault Detection, Isolation and
Restoration (FDIR). The monitored signals normally include voltage, currents, instant
power/load and losses at each transformer centre. These signals could also be brought to a
local SCADA system at the head distribution substation or even directly at the distribution
grids central SCADA/DMS system for monitoring the whole distribution system status. A
Distribution Management System (DMS) is a collection of ancillary applications that, in
combination with the central SCADA system, monitor and control the entire distribution
network efficiently and reliably. DMSs act as a decision support system to assist the control
room and field operating personnel improving the reliability and quality of service in terms of
reducing outages, minimizing outage time, maintaining acceptable frequency and voltage
levels, etc. (27). Moreover, it is considered that a DMS improves classical Outage
Management Systems7 (OMS) by automating service restoration sequences and providing an
end to end, integrated view of the entire distribution system status on a single console at the
control centre.
In addition to RTUs and SCADA/DMS monitoring and control systems, reclosers are an
essential element for prompt and efficient service restoration. Reclosers or auto-reclosers are
circuit breakers equipped with a mechanism that can automatically close the breaker after it
has been opened due to a fault, (28). They are meant to detect and interrupt momentary
faults and automatically restore service, since many short-circuits tend to clear themselves.
This could be the case of a tree branch falling on a feeder resulting in briefly short-circuiting
two phases cables or phase and ground cables. In such a case, a recloser could trigger two or
three fast reclose operations until the short-circuit condition disappears and service can be
restored. Reclosers controls may range from the original electromechanical systems to digital
electronics with metering and SCADA functions.
In addition to feeder automation, in the last years utilities have also started to collect data
from protection relays at distribution substations where numerical relays were installed.
These data is brought to the central SCADA/DMS system for visualization and remote control
(25). However, levels of automation vary in different countries depending on the strategies of
the local DSOs. Likewise, the level of automation and functionality for distribution substations
An Outage Management Systems (OMS) is a computer system which makes use of other systems like Customer Information
System (CIS), Geographical Information System (GIS) and Interactive Voice Response System (IVRS) to assist in restoration of
power. An outage management system has a detailed network model of the distribution system developed through its GIS. By
combining the locations of outage calls from customers, a rule engine is used to predict the locations of outages. Based on
this, restoration activities are charted out and the crew is dispatched for the same. (61) (27).
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and transformer centres could differ among centres in the same grid or feeder because of
different equipment in place or communication infrastructure availability.
3.3.3 Advanced Distribution Automation
As it is clear from the above description, distribution automation provides DSOs with an
increasing control over distribution-level equipment. However, a more advanced automation
is expected at the distribution grid with the upcoming smart grid. Literature refers to this
extra automation as smart distribution system or Advanced Distribution Automation (ADA).
The goal of Advanced Distribution Automation is the real-time adjustment of the distribution
system to changing loads, generation, and failure conditions, usually without operator
intervention in order to dramatically improve system reliability, power quality, and efficiency.
In order to achieve this, substation and feeder automation and control will play a central role,
and will allow DSOs to make the most of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and Demand-Response strategies, making these three new
concepts an essential part of the toolbox of ADA (20). As it is stated in (17), traditional
distribution automation has been principally concerned with automated control of basic
distribution circuit switching functions. ADA is concerned with complete automation of all the
controllable equipment and functions in the distribution system to improve strategic
operation of the system.
In order to achieve the goals of ADA new applications and technology are expected to be
developed. Applications such as Fault Detection Isolation and Restoration (FDIR), Topology
Processor (TP), Distribution Power Flow (DPF), Integrated Voltage/Var Control (IVVC), Optimal
Feeder Configuration (OFC), Distribution Contingency Analysis (DCA), Distribution State
Estimation (DSE), Distribution Load Forecasting and Estimation (DLF/DLE), etc. will be part of
the revolution of distribution automation towards ADA. Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED)8
are key enablers of these applications. Being distributed all along the distribution system,
including substations and feeders, IEDs will receive and send data from/to electronic
multifunction meters, digital relays, controllers, etc. (17). An example of an IED could be nextgeneration transformers with an interface providing communication about load, temperature,
voltage, etc. IEDs will need to interact and cooperate with RTUs, SCADAs and distributed
control systems to add intelligence to the distribution system.
We already discussed the current status of Fault Detection Isolation and Restoration (FDIR) in
distribution systems. Probably this feature is more advanced than any other in todays
distribution automation. However, ADA will bring new sophisticated algorithms providing
more intelligence and coordination at the central SCADA/DMS systems as well as distributed
field control capabilities, aiming at reducing restoration time in what is called to be the selfhealing capacity of the grid. An advanced FDIR system will be able to dynamically react to
continuously define the most appropriate settings of reclosers, sectionalizers/isolator
IEDs are any device incorporating one or more processors with the capability to receive or send data/control from or to an
external source/sensors.
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switches and other intelligent relays taking advantage of DER applications or demandresponse strategies, and considering system topology changes, or changing load
characteristics (17).
In addition to aiding in outage recovery, ADA, and specifically the close control and
automation of DER, could be useful for grid reliability and power quality. Lets imagine a
situation where heavy load conditions threaten the stability of the whole distribution system.
By intentionally islanding parts of the system (e.g. single house up to a small city) the resulting
microgrid might operate independently of the bulk generation with limited or even with a full
service level by taking advantage of its own DER resources.
Based on the previous paragraphs the reader should have already noticed that smartening the
distribution networks requires considerably more effort than smartening transmission
networks. Since distribution networks have many more nodes to be instrumented and
managed, ADA will impose much higher ICT requirements. Moreover, distribution systems
connect to nearly all electricity customers (excluding large industrial customers connected to
the transmission system), as well as distributed generation, variable/dispatchable resources
and new loads such as electric vehicles. Therefore, smart grid technology must be strategically
deployed in order to manage this complexity (18).
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), which is already being deployed by many DSOs
will connect smart homes, industries and entire buildings with the utility. It is worth
highlighting the importance of AMI for ADA. In addition to its conventional roles in accounting
and customer billing, AMI will play a major role in smartening the distribution network. The
AMI data from individual customers, including the historical load profiles as well as real time
information (e.g. consumption patterns), can also be used to enhance the distribution system
operation and management, including for instance load forecasting and estimation in DLF/DLE
applications (20). Furthermore, AMI will play a central role in Demand-Response (DR) by
extending control systems to smart buildings and smart homes. The current power grid is
designed to have generation sources respond on-demand to user needs by incorporating as
much power to the network as estimated by load forecastings. However it is envisioned that
ADA can allow the DSO to raise the thermostats of houses to temporarily decrease electrical
demand from a large number of customers without significantly affecting their comfort. Such
customers are usually compensated for being enrolled in a load reduction program which
allows the DSO to be intrusive in their lives. Likewise, it would also be possible for DSOs to
send homes, businesses, and even electric vehicles Real-Time Pricing (RTP) signals so that they
can dynamically adjust their energy consumption patterns as a way to minimize costs and at
the same time preserve autonomy and mitigate privacy issues (29). This will allow customers
to shift to a 24/7 based demand response paradigm where the customer sees incentives for
controlling load continuously.
3.4 IT in Advanced Metering and Energy Management Automation

As already mentioned in this document, in order to gather the necessary consumption
readings for billing, DSOs personnel traditionally made and still make periodic roundtrips
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to each physical location to manually read meters. The evolution towards smart grids, and
specifically thanks to the Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) and the introduction of
smart meters in households, buildings and industry will allow DSOs to get these readings
remotely and in an automated way.
The AMI infrastructure provides a two-way communication infrastructure between customers
and utilities (i.e. DSOs) and it is one of the main ICT components to smarten the power grid.
Such an infrastructure heavily depends on the installation of automated meter reading (AMR)
devices, also simply known as smart meters. These devices, which basic objective is
measuring energy consumption, as their traditional analog counterparts, are also able to
perform operations such as:
Measuring power usage in real-time or at least, quite often , recording it, and
sending these registers to the DSO or other third party providing energy services.
Monitoring and informing the DSO, the customer and third parties about power
quality.
Track customer usage parameters, such as total energy consumption, and keep a
historical record.
Remotely connect and disconnect customers from the power grid.
Send out alarms to the DSO in case of technical issues such as component failures or
loss of power notifications.
React to real-time pricing signals received from the DSO or energy retailer.
Energy prepayment.
Remotely receive and install firmware upgrades so as to incorporate new functionality.
Anti-tampering and fraud detection.
Remotely customizable load limit feature.
There are other elements that are a basic part of the AMI, such as the underlying
communication infrastructure, the central Meter Data Management systems or the
intermediate meter data concentrators. The AMIs underlying communication infrastructure
will be further explained in section 3.5. Meter data concentrators, or just data concentrators,
are Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) similar to RTUs that act as a gateway between MDM
and smart meters. On the other hand, the Meter Data Management (MDM) system is a
system comprised of several components, of which the customer records database is one of
the most important. This database allows the DSO to manage large amounts of data
generated by the meters under the control of the utility. Other processes which are managed
by the MDM include managing the transmission of data records from the smart meters up to
the back-office where the MDM is located, the storage process, protecting their privacy and
integrity, as well as making all these data accessible to third parties such as energy marketers
and retailers or energy services providers. To this respect, the MDM has to validate and
provide the necessary mechanisms to guarantee that AMI data is complete and accurate
despite disruptions in the communications network or at customer premises.
Some of the main features that are defined in the smart grid are the chance for customers to
not only consume power but also to produce it (i.e. installing local energy generators such as
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solar panels), what is called prosumers, the possibility of having an Electric Vehicle (EV)
which can be connected to the grid anywhere and anytime, and allowing for demand
response applications based on dynamic tariff signalling and connection/disconnection
features (also called load shedding). AMI together with local energy management systems are
key elements for achieving these objectives. Energy Management Systems (EMS) are related
with the concepts of Smart Home/building/business/industry. These systems are becoming
directly interdependent with the automation of the home, business, building or industry
activity. For instance, home and building automation may include centralized control of
lighting, HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning), appliances, and other systems, to
provide improved comfort, energy efficiency and security. Home Energy management systems
might connect electric smart meters with smart appliances such as television, washing
machines, dishwasher, as well as to home automation systems or even to future smart meters
targeting the heating, gas and water sectors. The key objective here is to efficiently manage
energy aspects, by for instance turning off/on an appliance, switching off lights and raising
blinds, etc.
3.5 Communications networks in the smart grid

As already mentioned in 1.1, the smart grid can be defined as an upgraded electricity network
to which two-way digital communication between supplier and consumer, intelligent
metering and monitoring systems have been added. As it might be already clear from the
previous descriptions, the smart grid is intrinsically dependant on a unified network platform
which interconnects all devices within the electric power infrastructure.
The underlying communications infrastructure should be able to connect different elements,
such as smart meters and substations to the back office (e.g. operation centres). Besides it
should support control and management functions as well as smart grid applications such
advanced metering, demand response, ADA, etc. To this respect, the communication layer
should enable both remote control from grid control centres and retrieval of data on loads,
interruptions and other electrical events from all substations in the grid. Moreover the
communication layer must also allow the data transmission to the back office departments for
protection engineering, maintenance and for planning and asset management.
The smart grids envisioned communication infrastructure spans the different domains,
including transmission, distribution and even the customer premises. In the following figure
the reader will find a schematic representation of how the communication layer will support
the operations of the power system.
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Figure 5 the power system and its underlying communication infrastructure (based on (14))
According to the literature the smart grid underlying communication infrastructure can be
further divided into different components. The following lines try to present a consensusbased overview of the most common terms used to name this components as well as their
main role in the whole architecture.
3.5.1 Communication networks at the customer premises
Inside the customer premises, and depending if this is a big industry, a small business or
regular home end user, or even if it is a smart building (e.g. modern office buildings), it can be
distinguished between the Home Area Network, the Business/Building Area Network and the
Industrial Area Network.
The Home Area Network (HAN) effectively manages the on-demand power requirements of
the end-users. This network is envisioned to interconnect smart electric appliances such as
television, washing machine, dishwasher, smart meters, energy management systems, etc. It
is the supporting infrastructure for demand-response applications (i.e. switching smart
appliances on or off in order to make an efficient use of electric tariffs) and advanced energy
services provided by DSOs and retail energy or new energy services providers. This network
can also provide the integration between home automation equipment and energy
management systems and is directly related to the concept of Smart Home.
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The Business/Building Area Network (BAN) also known as Commercial Area Network is a
communication infrastructure intended to support the needs of a regular business (e.g. office
building). The power demand of businesses and/or smart buildings is significantly higher than
those from households and its pattern follows a different curve, with peaks in the morning
and afternoon. Business Energy Management Services and Building Automation as well as
other advanced energy services such as the management of local generation (i.e. solar panels
on the roof) are some of the applications that need to be supported by the BAN. On the other
hand, a group of HANs is sometimes also called a BAN. In this case, the network includes all
communications in one Building due to its size. The BAN network is directly related with the
concept of Smart Building.
To end up with the different networks present at the customer premises, the Industrial Area
Network (IAN) can be defined as the communication infrastructure that allows the
interconnection and supports the control of all machines and devices necessary in a particular
industry, including regular ICT stuff such as computers, printers and servers, but also Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) such as PLCs, assembly robots, Distributed Control Systems, etc.
3.5.2 Communication networks supporting distribution-related information technologies
and applications
The last mile communication infrastructure of the smart grid is a two-way communications
network generally overlaid on top of the power distribution system, which allows for
advanced metering services, distribution automation, substation automation, etc. In the
literature this segment of the smart grid underlying communication infrastructure can be
named as Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN), Field Area Networks (FAN), or Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), depending on the devices it interconnects and the supported
applications. For instance, FANs are considered to connect the distribution substations, the
distributed/feeder/transformer centre field devices, and DERs/microgrids, including the utility
scale electric storage, to the utility control and operation centre (14). In addition to these
systems, NANs also include smart meters in households, industry and businesses. Likewise,
the AMI term can be used interchangeably with NANs but might also only interconnect smart
meters with back-office systems, excluding distribution substation automation or transformer
centres systems and DER-related elements.
The last mile networks (i.e. AMI, NAN, FAN) as well as DERs/microgrids and other distribution
substation networks are interconnected with utility control and operations via the backhaul
network. The backhaul can be owned and managed by the utility (i.e. DSO) or by a third party,
such as a public telecommunications service provider. Typically, last mile networks have
access to more than one backhaul network. Backhaul networks can use wireline or wireless
technologies and enable the aggregation and transportation of customer-related smart grid
telemetry data, substations automation critical operations data, relevant field data of
microgrids and DER, and mobile workforce information.
Another relevant communication infrastructure is the distribution substation network. This
infrastructure interconnects devices within a distribution substation. It is comprised of LANs
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that contain the local SCADA, IEDs, Remote Terminal Units, PMUs, and other field devices that
need to be remotely controlled and monitored. At the same time the distribution substation
network provides connectivity to the backhaul network, either by directly connecting to
backhaul network connection point or indirectly via de the FAN network, which in turn can
interconnect several distribution substations before accessing the backhaul. Transformer
centres networks can be seen as a reduced version of a distribution substation network and
might typically include RTUs, PMUs or even smart meters concentrators. The LANs
interconnecting these devices might have direct communication with the backhaul network or
indirect connection via the FAN.
The last relevant communication infrastructure supporting power distribution operations
DER/microgrids will be addressed in 3.5.5 is the feeder network. This network help
exchanging information with field devices such as reclosers, switches, capacitor banks and
other sensors and IEDs supporting distribution automation and which are distributed along
the power lines, substations and transformer centres. It might be considered as an overlay on
the electrical grid and can make use of wireless and wireline communication technologies.
The name given to this network intrinsically bounds it to the distribution domain. Besides, the
IEEE P2030 standardisation (14) describes it in this way. However, it might also be extended
analogously to the transmission domain, where PMUs and other IEDs will be deployed for
WAMs and other monitoring and control applications.
3.5.3 Communication networks supporting transmission-related information technologies
and applications
One of the most relevant communication infrastructures exclusively related to the
transmission domain is the transmission substation network. There are other communication
infrastructures as important but these will be explained in section 3.5.4 since they can be
found either in distribution or transmission operations. Similarly to the distribution substation
networks, transmission substation networks are normally LAN networks interconnecting
devices such as a local SCADA, IEDs, RTUs, PMUs, and other field devices that need to be
controlled and monitored via the WAN/backhaul network.
3.5.4 Common Communication networks supporting transmission and distribution
There are several communication infrastructures that share similar purposes either if the
utility is a Distribution System Operator (DSO) or a Transmission System Operator (TSO). The
most relevant of these infrastructures will be explained in the following lines.
The Utility Local Area Network can be seen as a network which is comprised of utility
operations and enterprise LANs to manage operations, control and enterprise processes and
services (14). This is where the back-office infrastructure such as the utility control centres or
the AMI head-end is located. The Utility LAN interconnects either to the public Internet or to
Wide Area Network (WAN) through secure communications so as to exchange customer data
to third party providers.
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Another important infrastructure common to both TSOs and DSOs is what might be called
Regional Interconnection Networks. These networks connect the utilities communications
networks to other utilities networks, either through their own proprietary networks or
through public carrier backbones. For instance, these networks might interconnect several
control centres of one the same DSO.
As it has been already introduced, and spanning and sometimes even superseding the
Regional Interconnection Network and the backhaul networks one could find Wide Area
Networks (WAN). Wide Area Networks are comprised of the core network/backbone that
connects to major service provider backbones or inter-utility backbones. These networks
might provide secure interconnection to the public Internet network, transmission substations
and utility control and enterprise/IT networks.
3.5.5 Communication networks at the generation domain
Inside this category two different communication infrastructures can be identified, those
networks inside plants devoted to bulk generation, and those supporting microgrids and DERs.
Bulk generation networks facilitate large-scale power generation. These networks normally
include isolated PLC-based networks, Distributed Control System networks, field buses, SCADA
LANs and interconnecting infrastructures. Moreover, business-related regular ICT gear can
also be found in bulk generation networks, which might include servers devoted to supporting
corporate services, personal computers, WiFi networks, etc.
On the other side, DER or microgid networks are communication infrastructures devoted to
supporting the integration in the smart grids of all renewable and non-renewable sources
(e.g., wind, solar, diesel), not part of the centralized energy generation and normally in the
range of low-medium power. According to (14) these energy resources could be
interconnected through a LAN. Access communications gateways can then connect these
DERs and storage LAN networks to the main grid, creating grid-connected energy sources.
3.5.6 The role of the Internet in the smart grids
The public Internet may be the primary communication path between utility enterprise data
centres, market, and third-party energy providers. For instance, utility contractors and
vendors are used to provide support to the utility via VPN networks traversing the public
Internet. Moreover, data exchange among DSOs and between DSOs and TSOs might also
make use of secure channels over the public Internet.
On the other hand, energy management services may be offered to customers by third-parties
(e.g. retailers, energy service providers, etc.), utilities, via the Internet. Moreover, thanks to
the Internet it is also expected that end users may monitor and control many integrated home
automation and energy management services from their work-place or mobile phones.
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27
3.6 Communication technologies

The previous section introduces the most relevant networks of which the smart grid
communication architecture is comprised. This section provides an overview on the
technologies used to transfer data, commands, and other necessary information for the
proper operation of the smart grids.
The information is presented in a table format, where two different tables provide the most
relevant information about communication technologies in the smart grid. Table 2 provides an
overview on the main application-level communication protocols and related standards for
each of the different smart grid applications (i.e. Energy management automation, advanced
distribution and transmission automation, microgrids, and control centres). This information is
greatly based on the draft version of the deliverable of WP 2.3 from the DG CONNECTs AdHoc EG on smart grids security (30). On the other hand, Table 3 presents the most relevant
communication technologies, focusing on the media used (i.e. power line, fibre optics, etc.) as
well as on the communication protocols at all the low levels defined by the ISO reference
communication model. This information is presented based on the most relevant network
components defined in section 3.5. It is important to highlight that none of the following
tables include proprietary protocols, which by the way, are quite common in domains such as
distribution automation or power generation.
Smart Grid Application
Horizontal protocols
Advanced Metering and

Energy Management
Automation (HAN, BAN, IAN)
App. level comm. protocols and related standards

Management: Telnet, SSH, HTTP/HTTPS, SNMP
Time synchronisation: SNTP, NTP, IEEE 15888
Redundancy: IEC 62439, RSTP, MRP, PRP, HSR, CRP, BRP
Metering: DLMS/COSEM (IEC 62056), OpenHAN
Energy Management Automation: ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4,

BACnet, LonWorks
Note: ZigBees application profiles for Energy Management

Automation include HA (Home Automation), Building
Automation (CBA).
Advanced Distribution
Automation/Transmission
Automation
IEC 61850 (with MMS for client-server communications

and GOOSE for real-time communications)
IEC 60870-5 (IEC 101, 104 and DNP3)
ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4 Smart Energy (SE) application

profile
Note: IEC 62351 defines the security aspects of IEC 61850.

Distributed Energy Resources
and Microgrids
IEC 61850 (with the data model extension defined in IEC

61400 for windmills and of IEC 61850-7-420 for all the
Smart Grid Security
28
Control Centres
rest of distributed energy resources, and IEC 61850-7410 for hydro power plants)
IEC 60870-5-101/104, DNP 2.0 can also be used, but the
aforementioned are preferred.
Note: IEC 61850 is based on MMS (therefore IEC 62351 is

also applicable here). On the other hand IEC 61400 can be
based on OPC and Web Services.
Inter-control centre communication: IEC 60870-6
TASE.1 and TASE.2 variants.
Transmission control centres: IEC 61698-13 CIM RDF
Model exchange format for distribution, IEC 61670-5xx
series.
Distribution control centres: IEC 61670-452 CIM RDF
Model exchange format for transmission.
Note: TASE.1 is also known as ELCOM, while TASE.2 is also
known as ICCP. Besides, IEC 62351 part 3 describes the
basic security aspects of TASE.1 and TASE.2.
Table 2 Application level communication protocols and related standards in the smart grid
Smart Grid Application

Customer Premises
Networks (HAN, BAN, IAN)
Last mile networks (FAN,

NAN, AMI)
Communication media and low-level protocols

Wired: Power Line, HomePlug, Ethernet, serial,
TokenRing.
Wireless: ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4
Medium independent protocols: TCP/IP suite, BACnet/IP.
Wired: BPL (PLC), DLC (PLC), fibre, twisted pair, PDH,

SONET/SDH, xDSL, POTS, PRIME, Meters&More, ANSI
C12.18, ANSI C12.21.
Wireless: radio frequency, microwave, cellular, GPRS,
UMTS, LTE, IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX).
Medium independent: TCP/IP suite, ANSI C12.22.
Wired: Satellite, Ethernet, xDSL.
Wireless: radio frequency, cellular, LTE, UMTS, GPRS.
Medium independent: TCP/IP suite.
Substation Networks
(Distribution and
Transmission)
Backhaul Network
Wired: twisted pair, cable, fibre optic, POTS, SDH/SONET,

PPP.
Wireless: cellular, microwave, radio frequency, 3G,
Smart Grid Security

29
Regional Interconnection
Networks/WAN networks
Utility LAN
Bulk Generation Networks

and DER/Microgrids
networks
WIMAX, LTE, paging.

Medium independent: Frame Relay, ATM, MPLS, TCP/IP
suite, IPSec.
Wired: fibre rings, leased lines, SONET/SDH, WDM, PPP.
Wireless: satellite.
Medium independent: ATM, Frame Relay, MPLS, TCP/IP
suite, IPSec.
Wired: fibre, twisted pair, serial, Token Ring, Ethernet,
xDSL, PPP.
Wireless: radio, paging, IEEE 802.11, IEEE
802.15.4/ZigBee
Medium independent: TCP/IP suite
Wired: serial, Ethernet, PPP.
Wireless: radio, IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee
Medium independent: TCP/IP suite
Table 3 Communication media and low-level protocols
Smart Grid Security
30
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Abbreviations
ADA
AMI
AMR
ANSI
ATM
BAN
BPL
BRP
CBA
CECRE
CEN
CENELEC
Advanced Distribution Automation

Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Advanced Metering Reading
American National Standards Institute
Asynchronous Transfer Mode
Building Area Networks
Broadband over power line
Beacon Redundancy Protocol
Building Automation
Control Centre of Renewable Energies
European Committee for Standardization
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
CH4 Methane
CIIP Critical Information Infrastructure Protection
CIM RDF Common Information Model Resource Description Framework
CO2
COSEM
CRP
DCA
DCS
DER
DG
CONNECT
DLC
DLF/DLE
DLMS
DLR
DNP
DoE
DPF
DR
DSE
DSL
DSO
EC
EG
EISA
EMS
Carbon dioxide
COmpanion Specification for Energy Metering
Cross-network Redundancy Protocol
Distribution Contingency Analysis
Distributed Control System
Distributed Energy Resources
Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology
Data Link Control
Distribution Load Forecasting and Estimation
Device Language Message specification
Dynamic Line Ratings
Distributed Network Protocol
Department of Defense
Distribution Power Flow
Demand-Response
Distribution State Estimation
Digital Suscriber Line
Distribution System Operators
European Commission
Expert Group
Energy Independence Security Act
Energy Management System
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47
ENISA
ESO
ETP
ETSI
EU
EV
FAN
FDIR
GDP
GOOSE
GPRS
HA
HAN
HMI
HSR
HTTP
HTTPS
HVDC
IAN
ICCP
ICS
ICT
IEA
IEC
IED
IEEE
IP
IPSec
ISO
IT
IVVC
LAN
LTE
LV
MAN
MDM
MMS
MPLS
MRP
MV
European Network and Information Security Agency

European Standardisation Organisations
European Technology Platform
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
European Union
Electric Vehicule
Field Area Network
Fault Detection Isolation and Restoration
Gross domestic product
Generic Object Oriented Substation Events
General Packet Radio Service
Home Automation
Home Area Network
Human Machine Interface
High-availability Seamless Redundancy
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
High-Voltage Direct Current
Industrial Area Networks
Intercontrol Center Communications Protocol
Industrial Control Systems
Information and communications technology
International Energy Agency
International Electrotechnical Commission
Intelligent Electronic Devices
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Internet Protocol
Internet Protocol Secure
International Organization for Standardization
Information Technology
Integrated Voltage/Var Control
Local Area Network
Long Term Evolution
Low Voltage
Metropolitan Area Network
Mobile Device Management
Microsoft Media Server
Multiprotocol Label Switching
Multiple Registration Protocol
Medium Voltage
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48
N 20
NAN
NIST
NTP
OFC
OMS
PDH
PLC
PMU
POTS
PPP
PRIME
PRP
RSTP
RTP
RTU
SCADA
SDH
SE
SNMP
SNTP
SONET
SP
SSH
TASE
TCP
Telnet
TP
TSO
UMTS
USA/US
VPN
WAM
WAMS
WAN
WiFi
WiMAX
Nitrous Oxide
Neighbourhood Area Network
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Network Time Protocol
Optimal Feeder Configuration
Outage Management System
Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy
Power Line Communications
Phasor Measurement Units
Plain Old Telephone Systems
Point-to-Point Protocol
PoweRline Intelligent Metering Evolution
Parallel Redundancy Protocol
Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
Real-Time Pricing
Remote Terminal Units
Supervisory Control and Data Acqusition
synchronous digital hierarchy
Smart Energy
Simple Network Management Protocol
Simple Network Time Protocol
Synchronous optical networking
Special Publication
Secure Shell
Telecontrol Application Service Elements
Transmission Control Protocol
Telecommunications Network
Topology Processor
Transmission System Operators
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
United States of America
Virtual Private Network
Web Application for Management
Wide Area Monitoring System
Wide Area Networks
Wireless Fidelity
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
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50
Smart Grid Security

Smart Grid Security

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Smart Grid Security

Annex I. General Concepts and Dependencies with ICT

Smart Grid Security

Contributors to this report

Smart Grid Security

Annex I. General concepts and dependencies with ICT

Smart Grid Security

Smart grid basic concepts ..................................................................................................... 1

Definition of the smart grid ............................................................................................ 1

Objectives of the smart grid ........................................................................................... 2

Drivers for the adoption of the smart grid ..................................................................... 3

South Korea ............................................................................................................. 5

The smart grid architecture .................................................................................................. 7

Quick overview on related standardisation efforts ....................................................... 7

The smart grid along the electricity value chain ............................................................ 8

Electricity generation in the smart grid .................................................................. 9

Electricity transmission ......................................................................................... 10

ICT in the smart grid ............................................................................................................ 13

IT in the generation domain ......................................................................................... 13

IT in the operation of transmission networks .............................................................. 14

Substations: types and basic components ............................................................ 14

Automation of electricity transmission ................................................................ 15

Smartening the transmission grid ......................................................................... 16

IT in the operation of distribution networks ................................................................ 16

Basic aspects of distribution grids......................................................................... 16

Automation of power distribution ........................................................................ 17

Advanced Distribution Automation ...................................................................... 19

Smart Grid Security

Annex I. General concepts and dependencies with ICT

IT in Advanced Metering and Energy Management Automation ................................ 20

Communications networks in the smart grid ............................................................... 22

Communication networks at the customer premises .......................................... 23

3.5.2 Communication networks supporting distribution-related information

Common Communication networks supporting transmission and distribution .. 25

Communication networks at the generation domain .......................................... 26

The role of the Internet in the smart grids ........................................................... 26

Communication technologies ...................................................................................... 27

Smart Grid Security

Smart Grid Security

Annex I. General concepts and dependencies with ICT

Smart Grid Security

Smart grid basic concepts

1.1 Definition of the smart grid

Smart Grid Security

1.2 Objectives of the smart grid

Better facilitate the connection

Smart Grid Security

Optimize asset utilization and

Provide the power quality for the

1.3 Drivers for the adoption of the smart grid

Smart Grid Security

Annex I. General concepts and dependencies with ICT

Smart Grid Security

Smart Grid Security

Annex I. General concepts and dependencies with ICT

Smart Grid Security

The smart grid architecture

2.1 Quick overview on related standardisation efforts

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2.2 The smart grid along the electricity value chain

Smart Grid Security

Figure 3 The smart grids power transport domains

Smart Grid Security