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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32030

July 2, 1930

SOFIA LAVARRO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,


vs.
REGINA LABITORIA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
M. H. de Joya and Enrique Tiangco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Mariano Escueta for defendants-appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:
Anastacio Labitoria, who died over thirty years ago, was the original owner of a tract of land divided
into three parcels and situated in the barrio of Mangilag, municipality of Candelaria, Province of
Tayabas. He left four children, Francisco, Liberata, Tirso, and Eustacio Labitoria. Francisco acquired
the shares of Tirso and Eustacio together with the greater part of that of Liberata, and thus became
the owner of nearly all of the land. After his death, his children, Macario and Regina Labitoria,
became the owners of his interest in the land.
Sofia Lavarro is the daughter of Liberata Labitoria, and in or about the year 1897, her first husband,
Crispulo Alcantara, borrowed P330 from Francisco Labitoria on the condition that Alcantara should
plant 3,300 coconut palms on the land to be divided in equal shares between the parties, the loan to
be paid back by turning over to the creditor 330 coconut palms out of the share of Alcantara and
Sofia. Under this agreement, about 1,700 palms were planted by Alcantara, but later on, further
plantings were made by his wife, Sofia Lavarro.
In July, 1916, the land was registered in the names of Macario Labitoria, Regina Labitoria, Bernardo
Labitoria, Vidal Labitoria, Ariston Lavarro, Sofia Lavarro, and Isidro Lavaris. Nothing seems to have
been said about the improvements on the land and no special mention of them appears in the
certificate of title. Neither were the respective shares of the persons to whom the land was
adjudicated definitely determined.
On October 31, 1916, Macario, Regina, and Bernardo Labitoria and Ariston Lavarro brought an
action against Sofia Lavarro and her then husband, Emeterio Pureza, for the partition of the land
with its improvements. The action is civil case No. 351 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. In
her answer in that case, Sofia Lavarro set up a cross-complaint alleging, among other things, that
she was a coowner of the land and was entitled to a large proportion of the coconut palms thereon.
The prayer of the cross-complaint reads as follows:
Wherefore, by this cross-complaint Sofia Lavarro and Emeterio Pureza, through their
undersigned attorney, pray the court to decree the partition of the three parcels of land

described above, with all the improvements thereon, allotting to Sofia Lavarro and Emeterio
Pureza their rightful portion, and ordering Macario Labitoria to render the proper accounts,
and to deliver to his coheirs their proportionate part of the fruits and products of said lands,
with costs against the cross-complaint defendants. (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon trial partition was ordered, and Sofia Lavarro was awarded 520 coconut trees and 43,391
square meters of land. She thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court, and a decision was rendered
by that court on March 24, 1927,1 in which it was held that Sofia Lavarro was entitled to 1/28 of the
land. In all the respects, the decision of the Court of First Instances was affirmed. The partition
seems to have been carried out in conformity with the decision of the Supreme Court, and Sofia was
awarded 6 hectares, 88 ares, and 77 centiares of land, together with 850 coconut palms instead of
520.
The present action was initiated by Sofia Lavarro and her daughters, Apolonia and Isabel Alcantara,
on August 15, 1927, against Regina Labitoria and Marciano Labitoria, the latter as administrator of
the estate of the deceased Macario Labitoria. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs allege that on
or about the year 1897, Sofia Lavarro and her husband, Crispulo Alcantara, planted 2,850 coconut
palms on the land above-mentioned, of which 1,970 trees were actually alive and bearing fruit; that
after the death of Crispulo Alcantara in the year 1910, Sofia Lavarro, being then a widow, planted
2,200 coconut palms on the same tract of land, 2,000 palms being still in existence and the greater
part of them bearing fruit; that from the year 1897, the plaintiffs had been in possession of the
above-mentioned plantings and had collected the fruits, but that the defendants were now
endeavoring to take possession of said coconut palms; and that each coconut palm was worth P12.
The plaintiffs therefore prayed that unless the defendants paid to the plaintiffs the sum of P47,640,
the value of the 3,970 palms planted, it be ordered that said plaintiffs be allowed to continue in
possession of said coconut palms in accordance with the law.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants set up as special defenses res judicata and
prescription.
Upon trial, the court below, basing its decision on the case of Bautista vs. Jimenez (24 Phil., 111),
and article 361 of the Civil Code, ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P4,820 for
1,205 coconut palms or to require the plaintiffs to purchase the land, the plaintiffs to retain the
coconut palms until the aforesaid sum was paid. From this judgment both the plaintiffs and
defendants appealed.
It is very obvious that the court below erred in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. This is an
action for compensation for improvements alleged to have been made by the plaintiffs on the land
awarded to the defendants and is brought notwithstanding the fact that the question of
improvements was put in issue in case No. 351 and that the portion of land due Sofia Lavarro, and
the improvements as well, were determined and adjudicated by the court in that case. Her rights in
regard to the improvements are consequently res judicata.
But it is intimated that, while in the earlier case the issues related to the ownership of the
improvements, the issue here is only a question of money payment and that therefore the causes of
action are different. Assuming, without conceding, that such is the case, the result would be the

same. The issues in both cases arose from the same source or transactions and should have been
determined in the same case (sec. 97, Code of Civil Procedure). A judgment upon the merits bars a
subsequent suit upon the same cause, though brought in a different form of action. (White vs. Martin,
1 Port. [Ala.], 215.) "The principle is firmly established that a party will not be permitted to split up a
single cause of action and make it the basis for several suits. If several suits be brought for different
parts of such a claim, the pendency of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a
recovery of any part of the cause of action will be a bar to an action brought upon the other part. Not
only is it a bar to suit, but the plaintiff in the former action cannot subsequently avail himself of the
residue by way of offset in an action against him by the opposite party." (15 R. C. L., 965) In passing,
it may be noted that a close examination of the facts in the case of Bautista vs. Jimenez (24 Phil.,
111), will show that it differs materially from the present case; the case of Berses vs. Villanueva (25
Phil., 473), is more in point.
As to the other plaintiffs, Apolonia and Isabel Alcantara, it is sufficient to say that if they had any
claim to the property or improvements, such claims should have been presented in the registration
proceedings in 1916; trees and plants annexed to the land are parts thereof and unless rights or
interests in such trees or plants are claimed in the registration proceedings by others, they become
the property of the persons to whom the land is adjudicated. By timely proceedings in equity, matters
of that character, if fraudulent, may sometimes be corrected, but in the present case, the plaintiffs
Apolonia and Isabel Alcantara did not prosecute their alleged rights until eleven years after the
registration of the property, and it is obvious that whatever rights they may have had are now lost by
prescription.
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and the case is dismissed with the costs in
both instances against the plaintiffs, jointly and severally. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 45297. July 16, 1937.]
JOSE DE BORJA, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO JUGO, Judge of First Instance of Rizal; QUINTIN DE
BORJA, administrator of the Intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja; GREGORIO J. DE BORJA,
administrator of the Intestate estate of Bernardo de Borja, and FRANCISCO DE
BORJA,Respondents.
Benedicto M. Javier for Petitioner.
M. H. de Joya, Mariano Melendres and Jose D. Villena for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. JURISDICTION; INTERVENTION; JUDICIAL DISCRETION. The respondent judge did not abuse his
discretion in not permitting the petitioner to intervene in the case for partition of property mentioned in the
decision. In this jurisdiction the right to intervene in an action is not absolute. It depends upon the sound
discretion of the court and when there is no evidence that the person who desires to intervene as such has
an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, his right thereto should not be recognized (Joaquin v.

Herrera, 37 Phil., 705).


2. ID.; ID.; ID. The fact that the petitioner has brought an action for the recovery of possession against
the respondent F. de B. and others and that he has in his possession a document of the nature of Annex A-1
of Exhibit A, which was categorically denied by the respondent, characterizing it as spurious, is insufficient to
show that his interest to intervene in civil case No. 4565 is legal, clear and positive.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. Intervention may be permitted only in cases where the intervening party desires to join
the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the claimant, or to unite with the defendant in resisting the claims
of the plaintiff, or to demand anything adverse to both the plaintiff and defendant, and in the case under
consideration the petitioner joined neither of said parties. Furthermore, such step may be taken only during
the trial or hearing of the case and never after judgment had been rendered (Felismino v. Gloria, 47 Phil.,
967).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS. The petition filed is without merit. In order that a person may be compelled,
by mandamus, to perform a particular act, it is imperative that the right had for that purpose be clear, not
doubtful. The duty the performance of which is demanded, must be as clear as the right itself to demand
such performance (Tabigue v. Duvall, 16 Phil., 324; Gonzalez v. Board of Pharmacy, 20 Phil., 367; Lamb v.
Phipps, 22 Phil., 456; Walter E. Olsen & Co. v. Herstein and Rafferty, 32 Phil., 520; Sanson v. Barrios, 63
Phil., 198).

DECISION

DIAZ, J.:

The petitioner, basing his opinion upon what he deems an abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge, which abuse, according to him, consists in having denied his motion filed in civil case No. 4565 for
partition of property, entitled "Quintin de Borja, as administrator of the Intestate estate of Marcelo de
Borja, Plaintiff, v. Francisco de Borja Et. Al., Defendants, seeking permission to intervene in said case,
instituted mandamus proceeding to compel said judge to grant him the permission applied for and to admit
his complaint in intervention.
The facts pertinent to the question to be decided are as follows: The petitioner is the son of the respondent
Francisco de Borja. On May 11, 1928, Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja, by
instituting land registration case No. 528 of the Province of Rizal, succeeded in having themselves declared,
as they in fact were declared, owners of the real property known as Hacienda de Jalajala. Two years later, or
in 1930, Quintin de Borja, as administrator of the Intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja, instituted civil case
No. 4565, for the partition of the property of which said deceased, Francisco de Borja and Bernardo de Borja
were undivided owners. On October 29, 1931, the court which tried the case decided it, adjudicating onethird of the property under partition to the respondent Francisco de Borja. However, in view of the fact that
the order of partition failed to specify the areas and boundaries of the portions and boundaries of the
portions allotted to each of the three co-owners, the court ordered the survey thereof by some surveyors
commissioned for that purpose. To this date, or at least until August 19, 1936, when the petitioner instituted
civil case no. 6598 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled "Jose de Borja, Plaintiff, v. Hermogena
Romero, Francisco de Borja, Josefa Tangco, and Crisanto de Borja, Defendants," for the recovery of the
portions of the Hacienda de Jalajala, which, according to him, had been sold to him by the respondent
Francisco de Borja, the survey, which should have been made by the commissioners, as ordered by the
court, has not been carried out due to last minute differences arising among the parties. The petitioner had
been appearing as attorney for Francisco de Borja in collaboration with Attorneys Sumulong and Lavides, in
all incidents of the two cases above-stated (registration case No. 528, commenced long before the month of
May, 1928; and civil case No. 4565, brought, in turn, in 1930). On no occasion during the trial of said two
cases, or during the period from May, 1928, to august, 1936, did the petitioner show signs of having rights
and interest contrary to those of his father, the respondent Francisco de Borja. On the contrary, he made it
understood and maintained that the (Francisco de Borja) was the owner of one-third of the Hacienda de
Jalajala. Civil case No. 6598, brought by the petitioner for the recovery, as already stated, of the portions of
the Hacienda de Jalajala which he claims to have been sold to him by the respondent Francisco de Borja, is
still pending decision to date. It appears from the complaint, which gave rise to the case, that the alleged
right of the petitioner is based only upon the document attached thereto, being no other than Annex A-1 of

Exhibit A, which is a deed of sale purporting to have been signed by Francisco de Borja and the petitioner,
two of the paragraphs of which reads as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"That on this date, we, my son Jose de Borja and I, have made a liquidation of all his disbursements for the
expense of the Hacienda de Jalajala, which is under my administration. As a result of said liquidation, I
remain indebted in the sum of Ten Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos and Seventy Centavos
(P10,293.70). In addition to this sum, I have already received from my said son other sums amounting to
Twenty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P29,500). Adding all these sums my indebtedness amounts to
Forty Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P40,423.70), which amount I
acknowledge as my debt because it is the truth.
"That in consideration of said amount of Forty Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos and Seventy
Centavos (P40,423.70), and due to the fact that I now find myself my share of said Hacienda, for the
purpose of not paying said debt, I hereby make an ABSOLUTE SALE to my said son Jose de Borja of my
entire share of the said Hacienda de Jalajala described and mentioned by me in the first paragraph of this
deed, promising likewise to prosecute the registration proceeding in my name and to defray all the expenses
until the title of said property is obtained, and also until partition thereof is made among my co-owners and
heirs, after obtaining the title thereto. After all these proceedings, then another formal deed will be executed
should there be any necessity thereof."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The sworn answer of the respondent Francisco de Borja to the petitioners complaint, filed in civil case No.
6598, contains the special defense that the alleged deed of sale (Annex A-1 of Exhibit A) upon which the
petitioner bases his right of action, is spurious. Said answer states, among the other things, the following:

jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"(a) That the document annex A is forged, fabricated, spurious and not genuine; that the defendant
Francisco de Borja has never sold his right and participation in the Hacienda de Jalajala to the plaintiff; that
said defendant has neither signed nor authorized anybody to sign the Annex A or other document of the
same nature; that the plaintiff has never advanced or disturbed any sum of money from his own pocket for
the administration of the Hacienda de Jalajala; that the defendant Francisco de Borja has not taken any sum
of money or any thing of value from the plaintiff, either as loan or in any other concept; that the plaintiff,
within the time stated in the complaint, could not have amassed said fabulous amount of P40,423.70 which
he claims to have loaned to the defendant Francisco de Borja for the administration of the Hacienda de
Jalajala or for any other purpose; and that the plaintiff, from his birth until after the year 1927, had been
living under the care and protection of the defendant Francisco de Borja, who had defrayed the expenses for
his education."
cralaw virtua1aw library

It will be noted that the facts heretofore stated do not show that the respondent judge has committed an
abuse of discretion. In this jurisdiction the right to intervene in action is not absolute. It depends upon the
sound discretion of the court and when there is no evidence that the person who desires to intervene as
such has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, his right thereto should not be recognized
(Joaquin v. Herrera, 37 Phil., 705). The fact that the petitioner has brought an action for the recovery of
possession against the respondent Francisco de Borja and others and that he has in his possession a
document of the nature of Annex A-1 of Exhibit A, which was categorically denied by the respondent,
characterizing it as spurious, is insufficient to show that his interest to intervene in civil case No. 4565 is
legal, clear and positive.
On the other hand, intervention may be permitted only in cases where the intervening party desires to join
the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the claimant, or to unite with the defendant in resisting the claims
of the plaintiff, or to demand anything adverse to both the plaintiff and defendant, and in the case under
consideration the petitioner joined neither of said parties. Furthermore, such step may be taken only during
the trial or hearing of the case and never after judgment had been rendered (Felismino v. Gloria, 47 Phil.,
967). When the petitioner filed his motion to intervene (August 19, 1936), more than five years had already
elapsed from the time judgment had been rendered in the case for partition, and the only thing then lacking
was some incidental proceedings precisely to give effect to said judgment. For all these considerations, the
conclusion that must be arrived at is that the petition filed is without merit. This is no because in order that
a person may be compelled, by mandamus, to perform a particular act, it is imperative that the right had for
that purpose be clear, not doubtful. The duty the performance of which is demanded, must be as clear as
the right itself to demand such performance (Tabigue v. Duvall, 16 Phil., 324; Gonzalez v. Board of
Pharmacy, 20 Phil., 367; Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456; Walter E. Olsen & Co. v. Herstein and Rafferty, 32
Phil., 520; Sanson v. Barrios, 63 Phil., 198). In view of the present status of said action for the recovery of
possession (civil case No. 6598), it is still to be determined whether or not the alleged contract of sale
between father and son existed, which proves that the alleged right of the petitioner is not clear but

doubtful.
Wherefore, the remedy applied for is denied with costs to the petitioner. So ordered

Del Val v. Del Val


29 Phil 535
Facts:
> Petitioners and private respondents are brothers and Sisters and are the only heirs and next of kin of
Gregorio del Val who died intestate.
> It was found out that the deceased took out insurance on his life for the sum of 40T and made it
payable to private respondents as sole beneficiary.
> After Gregorios death, Andres collected the proceeds of the policy.
> Of the said policy, Andres paid 18T to redeem some real property which Gregorio had sold to third
persons during his lifetime.
> Said redemption of the property was made by Andres laywer in the name of Andres and the
petitioners. (Accdg to Andres, said redemption in the name of Petitioners and himself was without his
knowledge and that since the redemption, petitioners have been in possession of the property)
> Petitioners now contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased
and not to Andres personally.
> Pet filed a complaint for partition of property including the insurance proceeds
> Andress claims that he is the sole owner of the proceeds and prayed that he be declared:
> Sole owner of the real property, redeemed with the use of the insurance proceeds and its remainder;
> Petitioners to account for the use and occupation of the premises.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have a right to the insurance proceeds?

Held:
NOPE.
The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is
determined by special laws which deal exclusively with the subject. Our civil code has no provisions
which relate directly and specifically to life-insurance contracts of to the destination of life-insurance
proceeds that subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce. Thus, contention of petitioners
that proceeds should be considered as a dontation or gift and should be included in the estate of the
deceased is UNTENABLE.

Since the repurchase has been made n the names of all the heirs instead of the defendant alone,
petitioners claim that the property belongs to the heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. The
SC held that if it is established by evidence that that was his intention and that the real estate was
delivered to the plaintiffs with that understanding, then it is probable that their contention is correct and
that they are entitled to share equally with the defendant. HOWEVER, it appears from the evidence that
the conveyances were taken in the name of the plaintiffs without the knowledge and consent of Andres, or
that it was not his intention to make a gift to them of real estate, when it belongs to him.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
February 16, 1915
G.R. No. L-9374
FRANCISCO DEL VAL, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANDRES DEL VAL, defendant-appellee.
Ledesma, Lim and Irureta Goyena for appellants. O'Brien and DeWitt
for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
dismissing the complaint with costs.
The pleadings set forth that the plaintiffs and defendant are brother and sisters; that
they are the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio Nacianceno del Val, who
died in Manila on August 4, 1910, intestate; that an administrator was appointed for

the estate of the deceased, and, after a partial administration, it was closed and the
administrator discharged by order of the Court of First Instance dated December 9,
1911; that during the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance on his life for the
sum of P40,000 and made it payable to the defendant as sole beneficiary; that after his
death the defendant collected the face of the policy; that of said policy he paid the sum
of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third
persons with a right to repurchase; that the redemption of said premises was made by
the attorney of the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of
the deceased vendor; that the redemption of said premises they have had the use and
benefit thereof; that during that time the plaintiffs paid no taxes and made no repairs.
It further appears from the pleadings that the defendant, on the death of the deceased,
took possession of most of his personal property, which he still has in his possession,
and that he has also the balance on said insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the
deceased and not to the defendant personally; that, therefore, they are entitled to a
partition not only of the real and personal property, but also of the P40,000 life
insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all the property, both real and personal,
left by the deceased; that the defendant account for P21,634.80, and that that sum be
divided equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of
deceased.
The defendant denies the material allegations of the complaint and sets up as special
defense and counterclaim that the redemption of the real estate sold by his father was
made in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his
knowledge or consent; and that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the
insurance policy for the benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and
is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual property. He, therefore, asks that
he be declared the owner of the real estate redeemed by the payment of the
P18,365.20, the owner of the remaining P21,634.80, the balance of the insurance
policy, and that the plaintiff's account for the use and occupation of the premises so
redeemed since the date of the redemption.

The learned trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action.
It says in its opinion: "This purports to be an action for partition, brought against an
heir by his coheirs. The complaint, however, fails to comply with Code Civ., Pro. sec.
183, in that it does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which
partition is demanded.' Because of this defect (which has not been called to our
attention and was discovered only after the cause was submitted) it is more than
doubtful whether any relief can be awarded under the complaint, except by agreement
of all the parties."
This alleged defect of the complaint was made one of the two bases for the dismissal
of the action.
We do not regard this as sufficient reason for dismissing the action. It is the doctrine
of this court, set down in several decisions, Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24
Phil. Rep., 504, that, even though the complaint is defective to the extent of failing in
allegations necessary to constitute a cause of action, if, on the trial of the cause,
evidence is offered which establishes the cause of action which the complaint
intended to allege, and such evidence is received without objection, the defect is
thereby cured and cannot be made the ground of a subsequent objection. If, therefore,
evidence was introduced on the trial in this case definitely and clearly describing the
real estate sought to be partitioned, the defect in the complaint was cured in that
regard and should not have been used to dismiss the action. We do not stop to inquire
whether such evidence was or was not introduced on the trial, inasmuch as this case
must be turned for a new trial with opportunity to both parties to present such
evidence as is necessary to establish their respective claims.
The court in its decision further says: "It will be noticed that the provision above
quoted refers exclusively to real estate. . . . It is, in other words, an exclusive real
property action, and the institution thereof gives the court no jurisdiction over chattels.
. . . But no relief could possibly be granted in this action as to any property except the
last (real estate), for the law contemplated that all the personal property of an estate be
distributed before the administration is closed. Indeed, it is only in exceptional cases
that the partition of the real estate is provided for, and this too is evidently intended to

be effected as a part of the administration, but here the complaint alleges that the
estate was finally closed on December 9, 1911, and we find upon referring to the
record in that case that subsequent motion to reopen the same were denied; so that the
matter of the personal property at least must be consideredres judicata (for the final
judgment in the administration proceedings must be treated as concluding not merely
what was adjudicated, but what might have been). So far, therefore, as the personal
property at least is concerned, plaintiffs' only remedy was an appeal from said order."
We do not believe that the law is correctly laid down in this quotation. The courts of
the Islands have jurisdiction to divide personal property between the common owners
thereof and that power is as full and complete as is the power to partition real
property. If an actual partition of personal property cannot be made it will be sold
under the direction of the court and the proceeds divided among the owners after the
necessary expenses have been deducted.
The administration of the estate of the decedent consisted simply, so far as the record
shows, in the payment of the debts. No division of the property, either real or
personal, seems to have been made. On the contrary, the property appears, from the
record, to have been turned over to the heirs in bulk. The failure to partition the real
property may have been due either to the lack of request to the court by one or more
of the heirs to do so, as the court has no authority to make a partition of the real estate
without such request; or it may have been due to the fact that all the real property of
decedent had been sold under pacto de retro and that, therefore, he was not the
owner of any real estate at the time of his death. As to the personal property, it does
not appear that it was disposed of in the manner provided by law. (Sec. 753, Code of
Civil Procedure.) So far as this action is concerned, however, it is sufficient for us
to know that none of the property was actually divided among the heirs in the
administration proceeding and that they remain coowners and tenants-in- common
thereof at the present time. To maintain an action to partition real or personal property
it is necessary to show only that it is owned in common.
The order finally closing the administration and discharging the administrator,
referred to in the opinion of the trial court, has nothing to do with the division of
either the real or the personal property. The heirs have the right to ask the probate

court to turn over to them both the real and personal property without division; and
where that request is unanimous it is the duty of the court to comply with it, and there
is nothing in section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits it. In
such case an order finally settling the estate and discharging the administrator would
not bar a subsequent action to require a division of either the real or personal property.
If, on the other hand, an order had been made in the administration proceedings
dividing the personal or the real property, or both, among the heirs, then it is quite
possible that, to a subsequent action brought by one of the heirs for a partition of the
real or personal property, or both, there could have been interposed a plea of res
judicata based on such order. As the matter now stands, however, there is no ground
on which to base such a plea. Moreover, no such plea has been made and no evidence
offered to support it.
With the finding of the trial court that the proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong
exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate property, we agree. That
the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to
the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate
and individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose
life was insured, is the doctrine in America. We believe that the same doctrine obtains
in these Islands by virtue of section 428 of the Code of Commerce, which reads:
The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of
the contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the
legitimate heirs or creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the
insurance in favor of the former.
It is claimed by the attorney for the plaintiffs that the section just quoted is
subordinate to the provisions of the Civil Code as found in article 1035. This article
reads:
An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession
must bring into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received
from the deceased during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good

consideration, in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of
the division.
Counsel also claim that the proceeds of the insurance policy were a donation or gift
made by the father during his lifetime to the defendant and that, as such, its ultimate
destination is determined by those provisions of the Civil Code which relate to
donations, especially article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children
which are not betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."
We cannot agree with these contentions. The contract of life insurance is a special
contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is determined by special laws
which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which
relate directly and specifically to life- insurance contracts or to the destination of life
insurance proceeds. That subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce
which provides for the terms of the contract, the relations of the parties and the
destination of the proceeds of the policy.
The proceeds of the life-insurance policy being the exclusive property of the
defendant and he having used a portion thereof in the repurchase of the real estate sold
by the decedent prior to his death with right to repurchase, and such repurchase
having been made and the conveyance taken in the names of all of the heirs instead of
the defendant alone, plaintiffs claim that the property belongs to the heirs in common
and not to the defendant alone.
We are not inclined to agree with this contention unless the fact appear or be shown
that the defendant acted as he did with the intention that the other heirs should enjoy
with him the ownership of the estate - in other words, that he proposed, in effect, to
make a gift of the real estate to the other heirs. If it is established by the evidence that
that was his intention and that the real estate was delivered to the plaintiffs with that
understanding, then it is probable that their contention is correct and that they are
entitled to share equally with the defendant therein. If, however, it appears from the
evidence in the case that the conveyances were taken in the name of the plaintiffs
without his knowledge or consent, or that it was not his intention to make a gift to
them of the real estate, then it belongs to him. If that facts are as stated, he has two

remedies. The one is to compel the plaintiffs to reconvey to him and the other is to let
the title stand with them and to recover from them the sum he paid on their behalf.
For the complete and proper determination of the questions at issue in this case, we
are of the opinion that the cause should be returned to the trial court with instructions
to permit the parties to frame such issues as will permit the settlement of all the
questions involved and to introduce such evidence as may be necessary for the full
determination of the issues framed. Upon such issues and evidence taken thereunder
the court will decide the questions involved according to the evidence, subordinating
his conclusions of law to the rules laid down in this opinion.
We do not wish to be understood as having decided in this opinion any question of
fact which will arise on the trial and be there in controversy. The trial court is left free
to find the facts as the evidence requires. To the facts as so found he will apply the law
as herein laid down.
The judgment appealed from is set aside and the cause returned to the Court of First
Instance whence it came for the purpose hereinabove stated. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., and Carson, J., concur. Torres, J., concurs in the result.

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