Title: Public Private Partnerships and Competitive Advantage of Indian Dry

Ports.

Abstract

In the present global economic situation, oversupply of shipping, ports and related dry
port services is ubiquitous. This has resulted in drastic cost cutting measures being
adopted by the stake holders on one hand and a coordinated rationalization of supply
on the other. The combined measures and slight improvement in demand has resulted
in bringing a semblance of respectability to the freight rates charged by the service
providers. However this is unsustainable in the long run as the root causes of the
financial meltdown have yet to be addressed. In such circumstances this paper argues
that the coordinated rationalization of supply should be institutionalized for the
benefit of all stakeholders by way of public private partnerships. The alternative
scenario is too depressing to contemplate which could set back the industry as a whole
for a long time to come.

Key words: Dry Ports, India, Public Private Participation.

Introduction:

The development of dry ports is one of the several important instruments, deployed by
the government for the consolidation and distribution of goods with functions
analogous to those of a seaport. Completing necessary documentation and procedures
at these facilities helps reduce congestion and delays at border crossings and ports, by,
reducing transaction costs for exporters and importers. The container or the ‘box’ has
lent a new dimension to logistics, and provided meaning and substance to integrated
intermodal concept. The shippers/consignees of goods not only look for speed,
reliable door-to-door services, but also for a complete logistics solution, which
necessitates multimodal integration. (Haralambides, H., 2005). However according to
a recently conducted study by the World Bank the Indian Logistics cost is one of the
highest in the world mainly due to an imbalance of demand and supply of competitive
dry port services.

A dry port is the inland equivalent of a marine container terminal. The only difference
for an inland intermodal terminal is that the transfer between modes does not require
sea access. “The dry ports are directly connected to seaport(s) with high capacity

1
transport mean(s), where customers can leave/pick up their standardized units as if
directly to a seaport.” (V. Roso and P. Lévêque, 2002). There are many examples of
historic inland ports based on rivers, such as Duisburg in Germany. The primary
reason for their creation and development was, of course, the existence of a navigable
river or lake. However, Indian dry ports have often been located due to their easy
access to established hinterland rail and road routes (Ng and Gujar, 2007). One of the
chief advantages of dry port is reduction of “Transportation-related waste” associated
with inefficient supply chains can be eliminated or at least reduced. This is achieved
primarily through better linkage between different modes (e.g., intermodal rail
facilities) or within modes (e.g., connections between different major road routes);
and increased collaboration between different institutions undertaking such functions
as distribution, warehousing, and manufacturing, providing a “shared location for
partners”. In other words, this is a benefit of clustering. (Chakravorty & Lal, 2005)

The number of dry ports within a region or a country would depend on geography as
well as diversity and extent of economic activity. The indicative norm suggested by
UNESCAP Secretariat for one dry port per million TEU handled at the country’s
seaports may, in effect, vary in different situations. In Europe, one dry port is
generally observed for each city with annual output exceeding $ 2.5 billion. (Hesse, M
& Rodrigues, J). The size of ICDs and CFSs would likewise vary according to the
industrial production and commercial transactions in the area served by the facility.
The average size of dry ports in European Union is seen to vary from a yearly
throughput ranging from 40,000 to 1.9 million TEU, their land area similarly ranging
between 30 and 200 hectares, the number of enterprises between 25 and 100, and the
number of employees between 7,000 and 37,000. (Ecorys, 2009)

On realizing the importance and potential of containerization and intermodal business,

Government of India decided to set up a separate Government-owned corporate body
for the facilitation and promotion of multimodal transport in the country. Container
Corporation of India Ltd (CONCOR) was incorporated in March 1988. With the
objective to manage change in India’s logistics architecture, to spearhead the
container revolution in the country, build and operate infrastructure linkages for rapid
and accelerated inland penetration of containerized international trade traffic; develop
and promote use of ISO containers for intra-country domestic general goods, duly
aggregating them for unit train operation on specified routes and encompassing the
flexibility of road transportation along with robust and economical unit train
advantage of countrywide rail network. Rail and road links were established with six
of the eleven major ports in the country, with dedicated container liner services

2
between Delhi and the ports of Mumbai, Nhava Sheva (JNP), and Chennai. CONCOR
would utilize extensive rail network for long hauls, while road vehicles would be
involved for door-to-door deliveries and short lead movements. Modal choice would
be dictated by the efficiencies and economies of transportation. In order to further
augment the dry port capacity the government of India has on the anvil an ambitious
multimodal project. The $ 90 billion Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC)
project stretches over about 436,500 sq. km. in six of the states in India,
encompassing some 20 potential high-growth economic zones to serve as
manufacturing services and export-oriented hubs. DMIC will inter alia, create a chain
of free trade warehousing zones and freight logistics parks with rail network and road
connectivity. Hinterland potential for export-import container traffic handled at ports
in India is estimated to be at least 70%; actual movement of full containers from and
to hinterland locations is currently less than 35%. Rail-borne container movement
between ICDs and gateway ports currently is in the 25% range; with growing
incidence of outsourcing and offshore manufacturing, the market for containerizable
cargo in intermodal transport has changed radically in recent years. Major
manufacturers now go farther and farther offshore to capture low labor cost, low
taxes, better market accessibility, and other advantages.

In 2005, RITES a multi disciplinary consultancy organization under the

administrative control of Ministry of Railways was accorded the responsibility to
undertake a study on rail container movement in India. The main objective of the
study was to identify capacity constraints and formulate policy guidelines for opening
this sector to private operators. According to the report the government expected
quadrupling of volumes within ten years. The report also stated that the capacity of
the public sector operator viz CONCOR had reached a saturation point and would not
be able to bring about desired level of efficiency and growth. It further went on to
state that a level playing field vis-à-vis CONCOR was essential for further growth and
development of this sector.

Acting on the guidelines mentioned in the report prepared by RITES the private sector
logistic service providers were granted licenses to operate block container trains on
pan India basis in 2006. Expecting a sustained economic growth 14 logistic service
providers commenced operations in 2007-2008. However right from the beginning the
new entrants were handicapped due to lack of adequate infrastructure such as rail
terminals and container rail wagons. They were forced to enter into alliances with the
public sector competitor and also had to pay a charge for usage of the rail terminals.

3
The proverbial last straw for the new entrants manifested itself by way of collapse in
demand as a result of financial meltdown resulting in capacity under utilization. It
may eventually lead to reestablishment monopoly of the public sector. The
elimination of the private sector will lead to the erosion of the country’s competitive
advantage. This paper argues that in order to avoid such a predicament the
government should actively encourage partnership between the public and the private
sector. It could result in spreading of risk, optimal utilization of assets, sharing of
information and a rational pricing policy ensuring benefits for all stake holders.

Theoretical Background:

Chance/
Random Firm Strategy,
Factors Structure
and Rivalry

Factor Demand
Condition Condition

Related and
Supporting
Industries Government
Influence

Michael Porter (Porter, 2000) in his seminal work on the competitive advantage
theory has argued that, rather than static focus on cost minimization, competition is
dynamic and rests on innovation and the search for differentiation. According to him,
a firm’s competitive position depends on two major aspects, operational effectiveness
and strategies. Thus in order to remain competitive, a firm must maintain operational
effectiveness while at the same time creating strategies which can distinguish itself
from existing/potential competitors (Porter, 2000).

4
Porter (1990) argued that there is no one common strategy or management theory
which can explain all the behavior of firms in a sector because different management
ideologies exist like personal beliefs and company culture. Rather than static, a firm is
actually an evolutionary creature where past experiences and personnel have direct
implications on future strategies and development. Nevertheless, empirical evidence
suggested market factors are not necessarily the only attributes which can manipulate
the direction of the “Competitive Diamond” fully. As suggested by Porter, even
within a typical market economy, its competitive structure is often influenced by
random/unexpected factors such as the recent financial Tsunami and, perhaps more
importantly, the government. Rather than a core player, however, Porter insisted that
government should only play a catalytic role through promotion of a favourable
economic environment for firms to compete at a fair platform, e.g., enforcing
standards in service quality, encouraging competition, introducing and enforcing
antitrust policies, providing necessary aid, etc. He further adds that the government
should not participate in company’s management and competitive strategies because
direct participation of government will lead to ineffectiveness and bureaucratic culture
(Porter, 1990). According to Juhel (2001), in the port industry, government should
achieve three missions, namely catalyst mission (e.g. finances transport assets which
are unlikely to get access to private or alternative financing sources, creates regulatory
enabling environment, etc.), statutory mission (e.g. ensures navigation safety, coastal
management, etc.) and facilitation mission (e.g. public governance, helps trade
facilitation process, initiates trade integration, etc.) Indeed, governmental influence
within the industry can still be found worldwide, either in regional or national scales
(Slack B, 1999). For example, state aids can still be found in many European ports
(Heaver, T, 2002) while the public sector is also often involved in port projects like
dredging and widening river channels1. In Western Europe, for example, the role of
government in ports differs considerably between countries, where the Benelux
countries, France, Germany and the UK all have port policies.

Porter’s theories have largely explained the competitive structure of an industry, with
the roles of firms and market environment being clearly defined. However, its
emphasis on whether government should only play a complementary role within the
market is certainly an issue which is highly debatable especially in the current
1

5
circumstances. As will be discussed in the case of Indian dry ports in this paper, the
role of government should not only be restricted to the backseat, but should be
modified by playing a pivotal role in deciding the ‘balancing point’ within the
‘Diamond’.

Research Methodology:

Before getting on, it is necessary to note that, given the exploratory nature of the
study, apart from desk research and documental review, the authors had also
conducted on-site in-depth interviews with various relevant personnel. The interviews
have been done either telephonically or in person. For each question, the interviewer
has summarized, when necessary, the answer and transcribed the results of the
interview. More than 30 interviews had been conducted, with interviewees including
dry port operators, government officials, and consultants who were involved in Indian
dry port construction and development. Although the details of different interviews
differed, the core questions asked were as under;

1. The impacts of government’s policies on dry port sector

2. The competitive structure of the industry.
3. The objectives for entering the industry.
4. Major recommendations for improvement of dry port policy.
(For the sake of simplicity and illustration the information and opinions of these
interviewees will be referred as ‘anecdotal information’).

The Rationale for Modified Government Policy

Given the uneven distribution of dry ports within the country, with about 40%, 30%
and 30% being located within the southern, western and northern regions respectively
(the central and eastern regions are conspicuous by the almost negligible presence of
dry ports) (CONCOR, 2007), it led to congestion of a few dry ports and breakdown of
infrastructure on one hand, but massive under utilization of most dry ports on the
other. Unlike European dry ports the Indian dry ports due to scarcity in financial
resources, lack of technological and management know-how, have never been
innovative and long term efficiency-enhancing investments and R&D like RFID and
GPS systems were often not considered. This situation was further aggravated by the

6
government’s policies on labor protection which bred inefficiency, sloth and
indiscipline and the cost of such inefficiency was often borne by the manufacturing
and service sector.

Indeed, the special considerations shown to public sector companies like CONCOR
and CWC in the sector had also contributed to the problems as mentioned above. The
public sector dry ports often provided generic solutions in solving non-standardized
demands in different regions, thus raising the question on whether dry port services
were really customer-oriented (UNESCAP, 2009).

To resolve this problem the Indian government set up an inter ministerial committee
for approval of applications for dry ports was set up to facilitate single window
mandatory clearances, payments, incentives, certifications, customs presence etc. The
legal and liability framework too has been improved by implementing the Multimodal
Transportation of Goods Act and refining the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government
also accepted the World Bank proposed concept of landlord ports and have handed
over the terminal operations of ports of JNPT, Chennai, Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam
and Kochi. Based on similar principles, the Indian government had recently
encouraged the private sector, often foreign, to operate dry ports at numerous
locations within the country, often through the sale/lease of facilities to the private
sector under attractive terms. It had also through its commercial organization like
Central warehousing Corporation entered into several joint ventures with private
sector companies to manage facilities on BOT basis. Indeed, apart from enhancing the
efficiency of the supply chain, the government also anticipates the participation of
foreign firms in the operation and management of dry ports as a means of increased
foreign incomes (through various means like land rents and taxes) and the transfer of
technology and know-how. As a response to this initiative, in the past few years,
several multinational logistic service providers like Schenkers, Kuhne & Nagel and
Prologis, along with the shipping companies like APL, MSC and Maersk, had entered
this sector2. Referring back to Porter’s Competitive Diamonds, the participation of
foreign investments was to enhance the quality of the ‘Diamond’, so as to boost the
quality of the supply chain within the country, and thus the competitiveness of Indian
manufactured products in the global market. It should be emphasized once again that
2

7
the stated objective of the government for the construction of a dry port is not only to
make profits from operations but also to reduce the risk of non reliable performance in
the supply chain.

Indeed, given the massive number of such dry ports established within the country
(and the number of employees being employed) as mentioned earlier, it would
potentially pose a political tragedy to the Indian government if these dry ports were
forced to close down due to the competitive advantages derived by the newly
established private sector operated dry ports. In such circumstances the government
while attempting to display impartiality has ignored the reality of the early startup
advantages granted to the public sector dry ports.

One also has to bear in mind about the low value of most of the cargoes handled by
dry port operators, where almost 50% of the imports comprise of waste paper, iron
scrap and cotton waste, while there was hardly any significant value addition to
exports such as handicrafts, brassware, raw cotton, tea and other agricultural products
(CONCOR, 2007). International trade of such products is highly competitive and
slightest addition to costs can render the goods uncompetitive especially where goods
are price sensitive. It should also be taken into consideration the fact that most of the
goods handled by the operator are seasonal in nature especially the agricultural
products like tea. As such the volume also fluctuates with the festive seasons,
fluctuations in the currency markets, increase in cost of credit and other inputs.

The core dilemma of the Indian government lies about how it can balance the dry port
‘Diamond’, enhancing its efficiency on the one hand, while at the same time
maintaining the survival of public sector dry ports before any fundamental but long
term solutions, i.e., significant structural reforms, can take place. Indeed, the
competitive structure of the dry port industry does not only have an economic aspect,
but political and social aspects would also pose equally (if not more) significant
implications. Given the problems as discussed in this section, it seemed to indicate
that, in some cases, within the Indian dry port ‘Diamond’, it was the government
which brought in foreign players as an attempt to ‘imbalance’ the Diamond, while at
the same time, as will be discussed below, it is also the government which plays a
pivotal role in ‘rebalancing’ the Indian dry port ‘Diamond’ but without neutralizing

8
the early startup advantages derived by public sector ports operated by state-owned
corporations, notably CONCOR.

The Conundrum of Dry Port Pricing:

In order to conduct the various activities, land resources are essential for dry port
operators. A dry port is essentially a land intensive industry especially where the land
is located in a central market place and is connected to a railway network. This is the
first issue where the pricing policy encounters a major hurdle: what is the value of the
land? Under what terms and conditions is it made available to the dry port operators?
A piece of land located in a central place is a scarce commodity and has a fairly high
opportunity cost and several potential claimants. Such a land can be used for
residential or commercial purposes in addition to tourism, recreation etc. There is also
the issue of environmental and health hazards. This important land aspect demands
harmonious reconciliation by authorities and other stakeholders.

As dry port related infrastructure was considered a public good serving collective
interest of the entire nation by assisting in expansion of markets, it was considered to
be the sole duty of the state. This was entirely true in the past when India followed a
central plan model of socialist form of governance. It also allowed for mass
production, low marginal costs and achieving of international competitive advantage.
With some exceptions dry port capacity was developed ahead of existing demand
from industry, agriculture or commerce. This was done in the hope that the industry
and trade activities would pick up subsequently in the wake of the dry ports. As large
capital requirement and long gestation period was expected, the development of dry
port infrastructure was nationally considered to be the prerogative of the public sector.

The discussions of harmonizing pricing policies tend to overlook the fact that past
investments were not market driven. Massive amounts of public monies either directly
or indirectly by way of overt and covert subsidies were funneled into dry port
development enabling the public sector operators to consolidate such a strong market
position. This strength of theirs allows them to adopt pricing policies which would
deter new entrants on one hand while bankrupting existing competitors. If this trend is
allowed to continue, it will lead to oligopolies at best and monopolies at worst.

9
 • The buildup of large well spread dry port capacities with the help of public
funds and helpful government policies has led to discouraging new
competitors from making additional investment in the sector. This is because
creation of large capacity has a direct impact on the pricing policy; as such it
would be interesting in ascertaining the parameters which are considered while
planning the size of the dry port and deciding upon the pricing tariff.
Establishing the optimum size of a Dry Port is an iterative decision which has
to satisfy a number of techno-commercial-legal requirements. The optimum
size of dry port is derived from projections of existing and future demand for
dry port services. The aspect of optimum size becomes important because of
the investment factor and competing demand for urban land from other sectors
such as residential, commercial etc. Another important factor to consider when
planning the requirement of stacking area is the “peak-factor”.

The facility also has to be economically viable for the management and attractive to
users, to the railways for full train load movements; to other transport operators;
seaports; shipping lines; freight forwarders etc. must have certain minimum amount of
traffic.

Pricing of services depends on the norms for financial evaluation of each project.
Each organization follows its own norms. Some organizations do not consider the cost
of land as a cost of the project, but consider the cost of land as an investment. Indeed,
the value of land usually appreciates significantly once the Dry Port is up and
running, making this venture an attractive proposition. Rail transport pricing is
dependent on the haulage rate charged by Indian Railway. Movement of empty
containers, as well as empty (naked) wagons is also charged. Operators have to pay
stabling charges if the rakes are detained outside the Dry Ports for want of space
inside the ICD. The operator has to keep aside some amount for underload running
and for contingencies such as force majeure. Road operators are a force to reckon
with in India. This sector is characterized by highly fragmented ownership of goods
vehicles. But this is also their strength. The operators are nimble footed and rush in

10
where the returns are favorable. They impose a ceiling beyond which rail operators
can not raise their prices.

CONCOR began its operations from Dry Ports which were built on land leased from
railways at attractive terms. In its early years, CONCOR had to pay lease charges
based on the number of containers handled, with no correlation with the area had
leased. This resulted in CONCOR cornering as large a terminal as it could and
developing it in phases. This not only provided them with adequate room for
expansion, but generated huge cash surpluses for fuelling its rapid growth. In several
instances the ground rent received from stacking of containers was more than the total
operating expense of the terminal, which also included the land lease charges paid to
the government.

In order to recover the costs such as land acquisition, leveling, paving, access roads
etc, if the dry port operator charges a price higher than its competitor with the
assumption that its competitors will also follow suit and the additional income would
offset the loss due to fall in demand, then its assumption might be proved wrong. As
price setting in consultation together by all operators is impractical and also
considered illegal, it does not occur at least officially. Thus the dry port operator
might loose a bigger portion of the total market than it had bargained for increasing
bigger losses. Hence, most of the operators do not increase their prices in tandem. As
such the user is left with no alternative but to accept whatever service is available at a
price stated by the operator. This results in the user not being able to achieve
competitive advantage.

About 60% of the containers handled by the gateway port are transported to
hinterland dry ports with the balance 40% being handled locally. It should also be
noted that the level of containerization is only 18% in India against a global level of
over 70%. It is not only profitable for the rail operator to transport containers by train,
but it is also very cost effective for the dry port user. It costs less than 0.05 USD per
ton km to transport a container by railways as against 0.15 by roadways. As such,
with rising demand, low costs and good returns on capital, it is not surprising that
CONCOR enjoys a very healthy competitive advantage. In order to maintain its

11
dominance of the market, CONCOR constructed 57 dry ports with a total of combined
area of 5 Million square meters. About 40% of this area is paved and suitable to stack
containers. Based on the capacity utilization formula developed by Dr.Itsuro
Watanabe, the combined dry port capacity of CONCOR is over 10 Million TEUS. At
present, it handles only 2 Millions TEUS. This huge excess capacity allows it to
completely dominate the market quite effectively resulting in driving out the
competition from the market.

The creation of excess capacities and adoption of suitable pricing policies can act as
entry barrier to competition. This fact can be illustrated by the following example.
Assume dry port A as a government owned (incumbent) facility which has dominant
market position. This has been established over several years with the help of public
expenditure both in the dry port itself and also in the related infrastructure like access
roads rail lines etc. As it has developed capacities well in excess of existing demand,
it is able to meet substantial part of the trade. The dry port A is also a strong
proponent of cost recovery pricing policies in general but, at the same time it is
allowed to ignore historical costs and

D1

d1
Cost/price

A
P
AC2
C B CC
C2
AC1
0
Q1 Q2 D2
d2

Throughput

Cost Recovery Pricing Model.

thus its prices, both current and future, do not reflect nor do they take into
consideration the actual and real costs of past investments. The demand for its
services is given by D1D2 and its costs are pegged at OC while its price is OP. Its

12
average cost curve is given by AC1. The economic surplus of dry port A is given by
ABCP.

Now consider a privately owned dry port B (entrant). It has entered the field of dry
port logistics operation recently because it foresees a good profit opportunity for itself
due to the rapidly increasing trade. In addition to its late entry the dry port B cannot
expect any subsidies from government either, because it is privately owned. But the
government recognizing the importance of competition as well as the necessity of
private sector investment, (as it will reduce its own burden) welcomes the private
sector. However the dry port B hopes that in near future the demand for its services
would be d1d2. Its average cost curve is given by AC2. The dry port’s throughput is
OQ1 at price of OP. The balance traffic Q1Q2 is left for dry port A.

But the dry port B is forced to match the pricing policies of dry port A and peg the
price for services charged by it at P. However the dry port B is unable to reduce its
costs and as a consequence its average cost curve remains at AC2. At this price level
the new entrant will only incur losses and will be driven out of the market. On the
other hand the public sector dry port is able to keep its own prices low and can also
reclaim its market share. Such pricing policies would indeed act as entry barriers for
new entrants.

Need for Public Private Partnerships:

While many governments have reformed their utilities without private participation,
some seek finance and expertise from private companies to ease fiscal constraints and
increase efficiency. By engaging the private sector and giving it defined
responsibilities; governments broaden their options for delivering better services.

The range of options for public-private partnerships has expanded enormously over
the past 30 years. Agreements between public and private entities take many shapes
and sizes for both new and existing services. At one end of the spectrum is a
management or service contract wherein a company is said to pay a fee for a service.
At the other end is full privatization or divestiture (outright sale), where a government
sells assets to a private company. Outsourcing has become another popular option;

13
here a private company might handle an aspect of service, such as billing, metering,
transport or even cleaning. Hybrid models of private-public partnership have seen
explosive growth in recent years, especially with the development of a more
diversified pool of emerging market investors and operators with local expertise.
These models often rely on simpler contractual agreements and blend public and
private money to diversify risks.

It is obvious that the dry port operators will not voluntarily adopt rational pricing
policies. The eventual result would be oligopolies at best or monopoly at worst. Thus
there is a need for a tariff regulator. But is it possible to impose pricing discipline and
would be fair to all competitors? The main question is how an efficient pricing system
can be implemented taking unto account variety of individual constraints and different
input costs. At the most it would be possible to impose a top ceiling on prices. But it
is definitely not implementable nor desirable to impose a lower limit on prices. On the
other hand, if the government sets the prices, then it will end up biting more than it
can chew and will be accused of partiality by all stakeholders. This is because
government administered pricing policies cannot benefit everybody equally. As such,
no policy intervention on pricing matters would be acceptable to the operators. There
is also the issue of transparency of accounting systems and legalities which the
government will have to take into consideration before it decides upon pricing
policies. Thus the role of a tariff regulator would be only ornamental.
A public private partnership (PPP) involves the private sector in aspects of the
provision of infrastructure assets or of new or existing infrastructure services that
have traditionally been provided by the government.

In the present circumstances where the very survival of the private sector dry port
operators is at stake and which also jeopardizes the future growth of the dry port
service industry, the most viable and practical solution should be the further coming
closer of the public and private sector dry port operators by forming public-private
partnerships. In this regard the government should not only act as a facilitator but
should actively encourage the formation of public-private partnerships which could be
done in various manners. It would not only lead to optimal usage of assets,
rationalization of pricing policies and enhance efficiencies but will also pave the path
for future growth and achievement of sustainable competitive advantage.

14
Conclusion:

The role of dry ports in developing the international trade of the country is critical. It
is also connected with the provision of infrastructure, public investments, fiscal policy
and overall economic development. The issue of rational pricing policy of dry ports
has arisen due to the need felt by all the concerned stakeholders including the
government. It is a result of the growing intensity of competition and lightening of
fiscal constraints.

The pricing policy addresses the user rather than the tax payer at large who is also
affected as a final consumer. It is the gateway port operator who will have to bear the
burden of higher prices for inefficient services. There is also the issue of appreciating
asset prices especially land and alternate uses to be considered. Though the effect on
the consumer is not obvious at first sight, it will definitely be felt by the nation as a
whole. It will depend upon the percentage of services cost in the final consumer prices
as well as international trade and integration with global supply chains. The
government through the active encouragement of public private partnerships can set
guiding principles on pricing policies and prevent cartelization on one hand and
creation of monopolies / oligopolies on the other. It would necessitate compilation of
relevant statistics, adoption of standardized account system, greater transparency and
equitable dispersal of relevant information to the citizenry.

It would result in enhanced efficiency of dry port operations which will eventually
benefit the user by imparting competitive advantage to the country’s international
trade and its seamless integration in global supply chains.

References:

1. Chakravorty, S. and Lall, S. (2005): “Do local economics matter in cluster

formation”, Environment and Planning, vol. 37, pp 331-353.

2. CONCOR’s official website: http://www.concorindia.com, last accessed on January

2009.

3. Dayal, Raghu. (2006): Promoting Dry Ports as a Means of Sharing the Benefits of
Globalization with Inland Locations, No. E/ESCAP/CMG (3/1)1 (Bangkok,
UNESCAP).

15
4. Haralambides, H.E., Behrens, R., 2000 “Port restructuring in a global economy: an
Indian perspective. International Journal of Transport Economics 27 (1), 19-39.

5. Heaver, T. (2002): “The evolving role of shipping lines in international logistics”,

International Journal of Maritime Economics, vol. 4, pp. 210-230.

6. Hesse, M. and Rodrigue, J.P. (2004): “The transport geography of logistics and
freight distribution”, Journal of Transport Geography, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 171-184.

7. Juhel, M., H, 2001. Globalization, Privatization and restructuring of ports.

International Journal of Maritime Economics 3, 139-174

8. Ng, K.Y.A. and Gujar, G.C. (2009): “The spatial characteristics of inland transport
hubs: evidences from Southern India”, Journal of Transport Geography (in press,
forthcoming, available online: doi:10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2008.07.010).

9. Notteboom, T.E. and Rodrigue, J.P. (2005): “Port regionalization: towards a new
phase in port development”, Maritime Policy and Management, vol. 32, pp. 297-313.

10. Porter, M.E. (1996): The Competitive Advantage of Nations (London,

Macmillan).

11. Raghuram, G. (2005): Policy Issues in Port Development- A case study of India’s
Premier Port, accessible at: http://www.ficci.com.

12. www. RITES.com

13. Roso, V. (2008): “Factors influencing implementation of a dry port”, International

Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, vol. 38, no. 10, pp. 782-
298.

14. Rutten, B.C.M. (1998): “The design of a terminal network for intermodal
transport”, Transport Logistics, vol. 1, pp. 279-298.

15. Slack, B. (1999): “Satellite terminals: a local solution to hub congestion?”, Journal
of Transport Geography, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 241-246.

16. Watanabe, I. (2001): Container Terminal Planning – A Theoretical Approach,

World Cargo News (WCN) Publishing, Great Britain, pp 58-61.

17. UNESCAP (2009) “Monograph series on Dry Ports”

16