ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners, vs.

THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Political Law; The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial
power; It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts
of the political departments; Requisites for the exercise of judicial power.The 1987 Constitution is
explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in
an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in
terms of duty. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power:
First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second,
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity
of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
Same; Same; Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute;
Grounds to strike down acts of the political departments of government.In seeking to nullify acts of
the legislature and the executive department on the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. As held in Taada v. Angara, where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. But in deciding to take jurisdiction over this
petition questioning acts of the political departments of government, the Court will not review the
wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Definition of Legal Standing or Law Stands; Petitioner must show that he has been, or is
about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.Legal standing or
locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from a
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A party challenging the
constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He must show that he has
been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
Same; Same; Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement
of legal standing when paramount interests are involved.Following the new trend, this Court is
inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people.

Same; Same; Petitioners can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant
case.As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent
danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and
substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such
injury is direct and immediate.
Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
Same; Statutes; The organic acts are more than ordinary statutes hence the provisions thereof
cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as R.A. 8999.The ARMM Organic Acts are
deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic
Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the
provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The
amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. [Disomangcop vs. Datumanong, 444 SCRA
203(2004)]
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA
10153); While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution.While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has
to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from
the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections.272
Same; Same; An autonomous region is considered a form of local government in Section 1, Article
X of the Constitution.From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered
one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local
Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this
Articlethe article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a
form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the
National and Local Elections (RA 10153); The Presidents certification exempted both the House and
the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.In the present case,
the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national
and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
Same; Same; The House of Representatives and the Senate gave full recognition to the Presidents
certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.The House of Representatives and the Senatein
the exercise of their legislative discretiongave full recognition to the Presidents certification and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.

Same; Same; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the
National and Local Elections (RA 10153); The supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under
Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of
an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.Even assuming that RA
No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving
RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Same; Same; The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but
enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well
the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the
supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of
the Constitution.
Same; Same; What RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments and is technically a
reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local
elections by express constitutional recognition.RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization
of local elections with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is
an old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan
elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is
already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express
constitutional recognition.
Same; Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power
for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. Except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends
to all matters of general concern or common interest.
Same; Election Laws; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,
with one being as compelling as the other.In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,
with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in
their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy
as the term suggestsdirectly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be
discounted.
Same; Same; Same; Since elective Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials are
local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution;
they cannot extend their
274 term through a holdover.Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term

through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991): It is not
competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until
their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication
prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,
there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors
fail to qualify within the time.
Same; Same; Same; Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing
this provision.Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in
the exercise of its plenary legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of
special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.The constitutional power of the
COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is
limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a
specific statutory grant.
Same; Same; Same; In the same way that the term of elective Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands.In the
same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution
itself commands. This is what will happena term of less than two yearsif a call for special
elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation
of an express provision of the Constitution.
Same; Same; The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed.The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power
should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Since the Presidents authority to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) emanates from RA
No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution.Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA
No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
Same; Same; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA 10153); RA No.
10153 provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail.The legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in
the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be readin the manner it was written

and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and
simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Same; Same; While autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution
never equated autonomy with independence.While autonomous regions are granted political
autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as
a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to
the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the
Constitution for regional autonomous determination. (for CONCOM)
Same; Same; Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate.We
find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an
array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of
the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands.276
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA
10153); View that the synchronization of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
elections with the national and local elections under RA 10153 is constitutional.I vote to declare RA
9333 constitutional, and RA 10153 partly unconstitutional. The synchronization of the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections under RA 10153 is constitutional. However, Sections 3, 4
and 5 of RA 10153 authorizing the President to appoint OICs in place of elective ARMM officials are
unconstitutional. Save in newly created local government units prior to special or regular elections,
elective officials of local government units like the ARMM cannot be appointed by the President but
must be elected in special or regular elections. Hence, respondent COMELEC should be ordered to
hold special elections in the ARMM as soon as possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that pending the assumption to office of the elected Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor, the President, under his general supervision over local
governments, may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM Governor.Pending the
assumption to office of the elected ARMM Governor, the President, under his general supervision over
local governments, may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM Governor. Such
appointment is absolutely necessary and unavoidable to keep functioning essential government services
in the ARMM.
Same; Same; Same; View that the second sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054 authorizing
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elective officials to hold over until the election
and qualification of their successors is unconstitutional.On the other hand, I vote to declare
unconstitutional the second sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054 authorizing ARMM
elective officials to hold over until the election and qualification of their successors. Such hold over
violates the fixed term of office of elective local officials under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; View that RA 9333 and RA 10153 are separate, stand-alone statutes that do not
amend any provision of RA 9054.To fix the date of the succeeding regular elections, Congress
passed several measures, moving the election day as it deemed proper. Like RA 9333 and RA 10153,
these enactments merely filled a void created by the narrow wording of RA

2776734. RA 9333 and RA 10153 are therefore separate, stand-alone statutes that do not amend any
provision of RA 9054.
Same; Same; Same; View that the 2/3 vote threshold in Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 effectively
ensures the near immutability of RA 9054, in derogation of Congress plenary power to amend or
repeal laws.The 2/3 vote threshold in Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 effectively ensures the near
immutability of RA 9054, in derogation of Congress plenary power to amend or repeal laws. Unless
the Constitution itself mandates a higher vote threshold to enact, amend or repeal laws, each House of
Congress can do so by simple majority of the members present who constitute a quorum.
Same; Same; Same; Synchronized Elections; View that Congress power to provide for the
simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials does not encompass the power to
authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective local officials.Congress
power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials, however,
does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of
elective local officials, canceling in the process scheduled local elections. To hold otherwise is to
sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature.
Same; Same; Same; View that the appointment by the President of officers-in-charge (OICs) in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 is not
authorized under the Constitution.In ratifying the Constitution, the Filipino people authorized the
President to appoint sectoral representatives for a limited period. However, the appointment by the
President of OICs in the ARMM under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 is not authorized under the
Constitution but is in fact in violation of the Constitution that the Filipino people ratified
overwhelmingly.
Same; Same; Same; View that the President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor pending the holding of special local
elections in the ARMM.The President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM
Governor pending the holding of special local elections in the ARMM. The appointment of such
officer-in-charge is absolutely necessary and unavoidable because someone must insure that essential
government services continue to function in the ARMM.278
Same; Same; Same; View that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials to be
elected in the special ARMM elections shall hold office until 30 June 2013.The ARMM officials to
be elected in the special ARMM elections shall hold office until 30 June 2013, when the terms of office
of elective national and local officials covered by the synchronized elections also expire.
VELASCO, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA
10153); View that the Congress power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national
and local officials does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-incharge in place of elective officials.That the [C]ongress power to provide for the simultaneous
holding of elections for national and local officials x x x does not encompass the power to authorize the
President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective officials x x x. To hold otherwise is to
sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature, and so sustain the
holdover of the incumbent ARMM officials pending the election and qualification of their successors.

Same; Same; Same; View that neither Sec. 2, Art. XVIII or Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution contains
any provision against a holdover by an elective local official of his office pending the election and
qualification of his successor.Neither Sec. 2, Art. XVIII or Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution contains
any provision against a holdover by an elective local official of his office pending the election and
qualification of his successor.
Same; Same; Same; View that a holdover is not technically an extension of the term of the officer but a
recognition of the incumbent as a de facto officer.It should be considered that a holdover is not
technically an extension of the term of the officer but a recognition of the incumbent as a de facto
officer, which is made imperative by the necessity for a continuous performance of public functions.
Same; Same; Same; View that the alternative choice to allow the President to appoint the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor pending the holding of the special elections is not
only intrinsically infirm but also constitutionally invalid.The alternative choice to allow the President
to appoint the ARMM Governor pending the holding of the special
279 elections is not only intrinsically infirm but also constitutionally invalid for violating the only
limitation provided by the Constitution when it conferred on Congress the power to create the local
offices of the ARMM.
Same; Same; Same; View that an approval of the holdover of the incumbents pending the election and
qualification of their successors is a ratification of the constitutional right of the people of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to select their own officials.The appointment of
a person by the President thwarts the popular will by replacing the person who has been previously
elected by the ARMM electorate to govern them. On the other hand, an approval of the holdover of the
incumbents pending the election and qualification of their successors is a ratification of the
constitutional right of the people of the ARMM to select their own officials.
Same; Same; Same; View that the authority granted the President to appoint the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor cannot be excused by an expanded interpretation of the
Presidents power of general supervision over local governments.The authority granted the
President to appoint the ARMM Governor cannot be excused by an expanded interpretation of the
Presidents power of general supervision over local governments in Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution,
as it is basic that general supervision does NOT authorize the President or any of his alter egos to
interfere with local affairs.
Same; Same; Same; View that the President cannot fill the executive and legislative Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Offices by appointment, even temporarily and pending the
holding of the special elections.The President cannot fill the executive and legislative ARMM
Offices by appointment, even temporarily and pending the holding of the special elections. Such action
will not only be outside the scope of his constitutional authority to do so, but also further violates the
principle of local autonomy, nullifies the will of the electorate, and contravenes the only limitation set
by the Constitutionthat the offices of the executive and legislative ARMM officials be elective and
representative. [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270(2011)]
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Writs of Prohibition; The writ of prohibition is appropriate to test the
constitutionality of election laws, rules and regulations.The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test
the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and Regulations. The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is
to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions. On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.
True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the
votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema
also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper
for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.
Same; Delegation of Powers; There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority
in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units.There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and
provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local
Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Same; Election Laws; Each City with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least have one representative in the House of Representatives.There is no
provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the
power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or
any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.
Same; A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.A
province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same
reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the
power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000,
the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a
province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Same; Congress; Delegation of Powers; The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily
includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.Section 5(1), Article VI of the
Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The
power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts
out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through
a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the
power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,
and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
Same; Same; An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive
power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any
increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
Same; Same; Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.Nothing in Section
20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power
x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a
legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a
law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next national
elections from the effectivity of the law.
Same; Same; The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress
but must be exercised by Congress itself.Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the
provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or
intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government
under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly
recognizes this.
Same; Local Autonomy; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); It is axiomatic that
organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the constitution.It is axiomatic that
organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin
its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The
Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established
within the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution
which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Same; Same; The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Assembly cannot
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province
shall have a legislative district.We rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the
office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 declared
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.Wherefore, we declare Section 19, Article VI of
Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
TINGA, J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
Courts; Appeals; It is cardinal that the Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in
constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with: 1) the existence of an actual
and appropriate case or controversy; 2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; 3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and 4)
the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.It is clear that both petitioners rely on
constitutional issues in support of their petitions as they posit that under the Constitution Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to its own separate legislative district. It is cardinal that the Courts power of
judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Election Laws; Semas prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district, belie the existence of injury on her
part caused by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed that very legislative district.It would indeed
be difficult to assess injury for purposes of locus standi on the part of Sema by reason of the assailed
COMELEC Resolution, which after all, reaffirms the very legislative district whose seat in Congress
she had sought to be elected to. Her standing to raise the present petition is materially affected by her
express consent and active campaign for election from the legislative district which she now seeks to
invalidate. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act or statute must show not only that the
law is invalid, but also that he or she has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, that party has been or is about to be, denied some
right or privilege to which he or she is lawfully entitled. Semas prior avowal that she was running for

the Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City legislative district, and her campaign for election to that
district, belie the existence of injury on her part caused by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed that
very legislative district.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The COMELEC does not have the requisite power to
call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power.Marquez does not have a valid
cause of action before this Court. His prayer is to compel the COMELEC to provide for new
congressional elections for Cotabato City.The relief sought does not lie simply because Rep.
Dilangalen, by virtue of his electoral victory, lawfully represents the City in addition to the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan. From another perspective, the COMELEC does not have the requisite power to call
elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power. Only Congress, which was not impleaded
as a party to Marquezs petition, has the power to set congressional elections only for Cotabato City, if
ever. Even assuming that Congress was impleaded, it would be improper for this Court to compel
Congress by judicial fiat to pass a law or resolution for the holding of such elections.
Constitutional Law; Delegation of Powers; A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is
the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non
delegare potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated).The Constitution expressly vests
legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. Traditionally, the delegation of Congress of its legislative powers had been frowned
upon. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of
powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what has been
delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his
own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
Same; Same; The strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has in recent times, been relaxed, if
not minimized altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction of administrative
agencies.The strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has, in recent times, been relaxed, if
not minimized altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction of administrative
agencies. In every industrialized nation, administrative agencies, which are generally part of the
executive branch, have been granted considerable lawmaking power. Given the volume and variety of
interactions in todays society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal
adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodiesthe principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fieldsthe
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
In the context of delegation of legislative powers to local governments, a noted authority on the subject
has this to say: The state legislative powerthat is, the exercise of the policy-making judgment and
discretion on state matters that state constitutions vest and recognize in the legislaturecannot be
delegated to some other person or body but must rest with the legislature itself. Thus, the legislature
cannot delegate to a commission the power to determine the form of government, powers and functions
of proposed municipalities since these matters require legislative judgment. But the details of
organization of its own government can be left to a municipality, limited only by general state law; and
such basic state powers as the police power, taxing power, and power of eminent domain can be, and
almost always are, delegated to local governments for their use for local purposes. The rule against
delegation of state legislative authority is no barrier to the delegation of powers of local self
government to local units. x x x

Same; Same; Nothwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of non-delegation, it
bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows legislative powers to Congress it also
specifically conditions the emergence of certain rights, duties and obligations upon the enactment of a
law oriented towards such constitutional predicate.Notwithstanding the exceptions that have been
carved to the rule of non-delegation, it bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows
legislative powers to Congress it also specifically conditions the emergence of certain rights, duties and
obligations upon the enactment of a law oriented towards such constitutional predicate. These include
the prohibition of political dynasties as may be defined by law, the reasonable conditions prescribed by
law relating to full public disclosure of all the States transactions involving public interest; the manner
by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired; the date of regular elections for members of
Congress; the manner of conduct of special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the
authorization of the President to exercise emergency powers; the system for initiative and referendum;
the salaries of the President and Vice-President; the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower
courts; and on many other matters of grave import.
Same; Same; As to those powers which would normally fall within the plenary legislative power, the
Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform
such tasks.May these specified functions be delegated by Congress to another body? These specific
functions are non-delegable, for they are textually committed by the Constitution to Congress. Perhaps
it is possible to segregate these particular functions to those which would, even absent constitutional
definition, anyway fall within the plenary legislative power, and those which are not plenary in nature
but were especially designated to Congress by the Constitution. Still, in either case, only Congress, and
no other body, can carry out that function. As to those powers which would normally fall within the
plenary legislative power, the Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize that it is the Congress
which is so empowered to perform such tasks. With respect to the non-plenary functions assigned to
Congress, it is clear that the assignment implies the delegation by the Constitution to Congress of
specific, wholly original functions.
Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized through a local
government code that delineates the structure and powers of local governments, and through
constitutional measures that entitle local government units to generate their own revenue stream and
assure the same to their fair share in the national internal revenue.Section 2, Article X guarantees that
the territorial and political subdivisions in the Philippines shall enjoy local autonomy. The guarantee of
local autonomy is actualized through a local government code that delineates the structure and powers
of local governments, and through constitutional measures that entitle local government units to
generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share in the national internal
revenue. Local government rule, in constitutional contemplation, is a live being that exists to
counterbalance the rule of the national government, and is not a mere palliative established in the
Constitution to soothe the people with the illusion of having a more direct say in their governance.
Same; Local Autonomy; The idea behind the constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to
allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.In Disomangcop v.
Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203 (2004), the Court explained at length the vital constitutional purposes of
local autonomy: x x x According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the Committee which
drafted the provisions, it is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary system that, to my mind,
has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country . . . our varying regional characteristics are
factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through decentralization. The idea behind the
Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with
distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.

Same; Same; On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy
and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.On the other hand, the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.
Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal,
family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
Same; Same; It should be emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in denigration of the Constitution.
Unfortunately, the majority gives short shrift to the considerations of local autonomy, even as such
paradigm partakes of a constitutional mandate. If anything, these provisions should dissuade against a
reflexive dismissal of the provisions of the Organic Acts. It should be emphasized that local autonomy
cannot be in denigration of the Constitution. It is repeatedly emphasized within Article X that the grant
of local autonomy and the subsequent exercise of powers by the autonomous government must remain
within the confines of the Constitution. At the same time, if there is no constitutional bar against the
exercise of the powers of government by the autonomous government in Muslim Mindanao,
particularly by the Regional Assembly, then there is no basis to thwart the constitutional design by
denying such powers to that body.
Same; Same; Delegations of Powers; Considering the constitutional mandate of local autonomy for
Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is in furtherance of the constitutional design.
May such power be delegated by Congress to a local legislative body such as the Regional Assembly?
Certainly, nothing in the Constitution bars Congress from doing so. In fact, considering the
constitutional mandate of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is
in furtherance of the constitutional design.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 9054; Attuned with enhanced local government rule, Congress had,
through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of delegating to a local legislative assembly the power
to create provinces, albeit prudently withholding any ability to create legislative districts as well.It
bears reemphasizing that the Constitution also actualizes a preference for local government rule, and
thusly provides: The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. Attuned with
enhanced local government rule, Congress had, through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of
delegating to a local legislative assembly the power to create provinces, albeit prudently withholding
any ability to create legislative districts as well.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9054; The subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054 granted to the
Regional Assembly the power, function and responsibility to create provinces and other local
government units which had been exercised by the National Government.Section 17, Article X states
that [a]ll powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. The original Organic Act for Muslim
Mindanao did not grant to the regional government the power to create provinces, thus at that point,
such power was properly exercised by the National Government. But the subsequent passage of Rep.

Act No. 9054 granted to the Regional Assembly the power, function and responsibility to create
provinces and other local government units which had been exercised by the National Government.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the
creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code (LGC), thus this aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be
material to the petitions at bar.It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the
creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, thus this
aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the petitions at bar.
Same; Congress; Congress does not have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative
districts, except by reapportionment.How exactly does a legislative district come into being? In
theory, Congress does not have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative districts,
except by reapportionment. Under the Constitution, such reapportionment occurs within three years
following the return of the census, but this Court has likewise recognized that reapportionment can also
be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. Still, even in exercising this limited
power through the constitutionally mandated reapportionment, Congress cannot substitute its own
discretion for the standards set forth in Section 5, Article VI. And should general reapportionment made
by Congress violate the parameters set forth by the Constitution, such act may be invalidated by the
Court, as it did in Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 (1961).
Same; Same; The Constitution clearly provided that the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than 250 members unless otherwise provided by law.The Court has previously recognized
that such law increasing the membership of the House of Representatives need not be one specifically
devoted for that purpose alone, but it may be one that creates a province or charters a city with a
population of more than 250,000. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), the Court pronounced
that the law converting Mandaluyong into a city could likewise serve the purpose of increasing the
composition of the House of Representatives: As to the contention that the assailed law violates the
present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250
members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable import
of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; The power to increase the composition of the House of
Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which may not delegate
such law-making power to the Regional Assembly.I have already pointed out that when the
Constitution specifically designates a particular function to Congress, only Congress may exercise such
function, as the same is non-delegable. The power to increase the composition of the House of
Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which may not delegate
such law-making power to the Regional Assembly. If we were to rule that Congress may delegate the
power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives, there would be no impediment for
us to similarly rule that those other specific functions tasked by the Constitution to Congress may be
delegated as well. To repeat, these include gravely important functions as the enactment of a law
defining political dynasties; the enactment of reasonable conditions relating to full public disclosure of
all the States transactions involving public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be
lost or reacquired; the date of regular elections for members of Congress; the provision for the manner

of conduct of special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the authorization of the President to
exercise emergency powers; the prescription of a system for initiative and referendum; the salaries of
the President and Vice-President; and the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act 9054 constitutionally authorizes the
Regional Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of that
body to exercise such power.Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 9054 constitutionally authorizes the
Regional Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of that
body to exercise such power. I had earlier identified as unconstitutional the discretion of the Regional
Assembly to create local government units based on a lower standard than that prescribed under the
LGC. Another clear limitation is that the creation of provinces cannot be authorized without the
ratification through a plebiscite by the people affected by such act, a requirement imposed by the
Organic Act itself and by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. [Sema vs. Commission on
Elections, 558 SCRA 700(2008)]
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Power of
Inquiry; Executive Privilege; Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation
while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.Senate cautions that while the above
provisions are closely related and complementary to each other, they should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while Section 22 pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its
committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22.This distinction gives birth to another distinction
with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Courts pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita,
488 SCRA 1 (2006), is clear: When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads
are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as
that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is
consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is broad; To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House
duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected.The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This
is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence

of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has
limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly
published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized
in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President such as the area of military and foreign relations.In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), this Court held that there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security
matters. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 360 SCRA 132 (2001), there is also a recognition of
the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the concept of presidential communications
privilege is fully discussed. As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of presidential communications privilege.
Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power. 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be
in operational proximity with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by the presidential communications privilege.Using the above elements, we are
convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and nondelegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of Congress or any of its committees to
obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public information.
The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be
equated with the peoples80

80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the
peoples right to information.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information must be balanced with and
should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts.The members of respondent
Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to
the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials
and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should
give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate
interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by
numerous decided cases.
Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter.We now
proceed to the issuewhether the claim is properly invoked by the President. Jurisprudence teaches
that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head
of the department which has control over the matter. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege
requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality. The Letter dated November
17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of
privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In
Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect.With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds relied upon
by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark
on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only
requires that an allegation81
VOL. 549, MARCH 25, 2008
81
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even
intended to be comprehensive. The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement: The
context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed

might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Given
the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide
the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege
is designed to protect. At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 481 SCRA 1 (2006), the
Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect
to a coordinate and co-equal department.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent committees actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for
being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law.A fact worth highlighting is that
petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify before
respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was ordered by the
President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of
executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing
his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, respondent Committees actions constitute grave
abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality
afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioners motion for reconsideration alleging that
he had filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioners repeated request for an
advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; The Courts mandate is to preserve the constitutional principles at
all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds.In this present
crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles which
underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary
interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and
supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent
unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all
times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their
respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can
preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.
PUNO, C.J.,Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; The separation
of powers between the branches is not absolute.The 1987 Constitution separates governmental power
among the legislative, executive and judicial branches to avert tyranny by safeguard(ding) against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other. However, the principle of
separation of powers recognized that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from
one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively;
hence, the separation of powers between the branches is not absolute.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; One device of the legislature to review, influence and direct
administration by the executive is legislation and the corollary power of investigation; The standard
justification for an investigation is the presumed need for new or remedial legislation, hence,
investigations ought to be made in aid of legislation.Patterned after the U.S. Constitution, the
Philippine Constitution structures the government in a manner whereby its three separate branches
executive, legislative and judicialare able to provide a system of checks and balances. The
responsibility to govern is vested in the executive, but the legislature has a long-established power to

inquire into administrative conduct and the exercise of administrative discretion under the acts of the
legislature, and to ascertain compliance with legislative intent. This power of congressional oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Oversight may be undertaken through review or
investigation of executive branch action. One device of the legislature to review, influence and direct
administration by the executive is legislation and the corollary power of investigation. The standard
justification for an investigation is the presumed need for new or remedial legislation; hence,
investigations ought to be made in aid of legislation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Contempt; Legislative power of investigation includes the power
of contempt or process to enforce; The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power
to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to
punish for contempt any other person.Included in the legislative power of investigation is the power
of contempt or process to enforce. Although the power of contempt is not explicitly mentioned in the
provision, this power has long been recognized. In the 1950 landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, 87
Phil. 29 (1950), the Court held, viz.: Although there is no provision in the Constitution, expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquirywith process to enforce
itis an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite informationwhich is not infrequently truerecourse must be had to others who do possess
it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. ed, 580; 50 A.L.R., 1)
The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for
disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any
other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242) (emphasis supplied)84
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for the Valid Exercise of the Legislative Power of
Investigaton and Contempt of Witness for Contumacy.There are two requirements for the valid
exercise of the legislative power of investigation and contempt of witness for contumacy: first, the
existence of a legislative purpose, i.e., the inquiry must be in aid of legislation, and second, the
pertinency of the question propounded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; The privilege is strongest when used not out of a
personal desire to avoid culpability, but based on a legitimate need to protect the Presidents
constitutional mandate to execute the law, to uphold prudential separation of powers, and above all, to
promote the public interest.The history of executive privilege shows that the privilege is strongest
when used not out of a personal desire to avoid culpability, but based on a legitimate need to protect the
Presidents constitutional mandate to execute the law, to uphold prudential separation of powers, and

above all, to promote the public interest. Under these circumstances, both the Congress and the
judiciary have afforded most respect to the Presidents prerogatives.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.As enunciated in Senate v. Ermita,
488 SCRA 1 (2006), a claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. The ground involved in the case at bar, as
stated in the letter of Secretary Ermita, is Presidential communications privilege on information that
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The scope of Presidential communications privilege is clear in U.S.
vs. Nixon.The scope of Presidential communications privilege is clear in U.S. v. Nixon, 415 US 613
(1974). It covers communications in the performance of the Presidents responsibilities of his
office and made in the process of shaping policies and making decisions. This scope was affirmed
three years later in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential communications are presumptively privileged.In
U.S. v. Nixon, the High Court alluded to Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, which held that Presidential
communications are presumptively privileged and noted that this ruling was accepted by both parties
in the case before it. In Nixon v. Sirica, the D.C. Court of Appeals, without expounding, agreed with
the presumptive privilege status afforded to Presidential communications by its precursor case In re
Subpoena for Nixon in the D.C. District Court. The latter case ushered the birth of the presumption in
the midst of a general disfavor of government privileges.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To overcome the qualified presumption, there must be sufficient
showing or demonstration of specific need for the withheld information on the branch of government
seeking its disclosure; Standards to show the specific need.The Nixon Court held that to overcome
the qualified presumption, there must be sufficient showing or demonstration of specific need for the
withheld information on the branch of government seeking its disclosure. Two standards must be met to
show the specific need: one is evidentiary; the other is constitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of executive privilege must be balanced with the specific
need for disclosure of the communications on the part of the other branch of government.The claim
of executive privilege must then be balanced with the specific need for disclosure of the
communications on the part of the other branch of government. The function impairment test was
utilized in making the balance albeit it was not the term used by the Court. By this test, the Court
weighs how the disclosure of the witheld information would impair the Presidents ability to perform
his constitutional duties more than nondisclosure would impair the other branchs ability to perform its
constitutional functions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court cannot assess the validity of the claim of the Executive
Secretary that disclosure of the withheld information may impair our diplomatic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China; No absolute explanation offered on how diplomatic secrets will be
exposed at the expense of our national interest if petitioner answers the three disputed questions
propounded by the respondent Senate Committees.In the case at bar, we cannot assess the validity of
the claim of the Executive Secretary that disclosure of the withheld information may impair our
diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. There is but a bare assertion in the letter of
Executive Secretary Ermita that the context which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the

Peoples Republic of China. There is absolutely no explanation offered by the Executive Secretary on
how diplomatic secrets will be exposed at the expense of our national interest if petitioner answers the
three disputed questions propounded by the respondent Senate Committees. In the Oral Argument on
March 4, 2008, petitioner Neri similarly failed to explain how diplomatic secrets will be compromised
if the three disputed questions are answered by him. Considering this paucity of explanation, the Court
cannot determine whether there is reasonable danger that petitioners answers to the three disputed
questions would reveal privileged diplomatic secrets. The Court cannot engage in guesswork in
resolving this important issue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The three assailed questions are pertinent to the subject matter of the
legislative investigation being undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees.It is self-evident that
the three assailed questions are pertinent to the subject matter of the legislative investigation being
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees. More than the Arnault standards, the questions to
petitioner have direct relation not only to the subject of the inquiry, but also to the pending bills thereat.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The motive of respondent Senate Committees in conducting their
investigation and propounding their questions is beyond the purview of the Courts power of judicial
review.In the Oral Argument held on March 4, 2008, petitioner, through counsel, argued that in
propounding the three questions, respondent Senate Committees were seeking to establish the
culpability of the President for alleged anomalies attending the consummation of the NBN-ZTE
Contract. Counsel, however, contended that in invoking executive privilege, the President is not hiding
any crime. The short answer to petitioners argument is that the motive of respondent Senate
Committees in conducting their investigation and propounding their questions is beyond the purview of
the Courts power of judicial review. So long as the questions are pertinent and there is no effective
substitute for the information sought, the respondent Senate Committees should be deemed to have
hurdled the evidentiary standards to prove the specific need for the information sought.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It appears by tradition, custom and practice, the Senate does not republish its rules especially when the same has not undergone any material change.The Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is assailed as invalid allegedly for failure to be
re-published. It is contended that the said rules should be re-published as the Senate is not a continuing
body, its membership changing every three years. The assumption is that there is a new Senate after
every such election and it should not be bound by the rules of the old. We need not grapple with this
contentious issue which has far reaching consequences to the Senate. The precedents and practice of
the Senate should instead guide the Court in resolving the issue. For one, the Senators have
traditionally considered the Senate as a continuing body despite the change of a part of its membership
after an election. It is for this reason that the Senate does not cease its labor during the period of such
election. Its various Committees continue their work as its officials and employees. For another, the
Rules of the Senate is silent on the matter of re-publication. Section 135, Rule L of the Rules of the
Senate provides that, if there is no Rule applicable to a specific case, the precedents of the Legislative
Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to x x x. It appears that by tradition, custom and
practice, the Senate does not re-publish its rules especially when the same has not undergone any
material change. In other words, existing rules which have already undergone publication should be
deemed adopted and continued by the Senate regardless of the election of some new members. Their
re-publication is thus an unnecessary ritual. We are dealing with internal rules of a co-equal branch of
government and unless they clearly violate the Constitution, prudence dictates we should be wary of
striking them down. The consequences of striking down the rules involved in the case at bar may
spawn serious and unintended problems for the Senate.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Respondent Senate Committees have good reasons in citing Neri
for contempt for failing to appear in the November 20, 2007 hearing.It is worth noting that the letter
of Executive Secretary Ermita, signed by Order of the President, merely requested that petitioners
testimony on November 20, 2007 on the NBN Contract be dispensed with, as he had exhaustively
testified on the subject matter of the inquiry. Executive privilege was invoked only with respect to the
three questions Neri refused to answer in his testimony before respondent Senate Committees on
September 26, 2007. But there is no basis for either petitioner or the Executive Secretary to assume that
petitioners further testimony will be limited only on the three disputed questions. Needless to state,
respondent Senate Committees have good reasons in citing Neri for contempt for failing to appear in
the November 20, 2007 hearing.
YARES-SANTIAGO, J.,Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Executive Privilege; The doctrine of
executive privilege applies only to certain types of information of a sensitive character that could be
against the public interest to divulge.The doctrine of executive privilege applies only to certain types
of information of a sensitive character that would be against the public interest to divulge. As held in
Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the doctrine is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Considering that the
privilege is an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, the necessity for non-disclosure
must be of such high degree as to outweigh public interest.
CARPIO, J.,Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Executive Privilege; The
Constitution does not expressly grant executive privilege power to the President but courts have long
recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying out powers and functions
expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution.Executive privilege is the implied
constitutional power of the President to withhold information requested by other branches of the
government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long
recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying out powers and functions
expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege is not absolute; Interest of protecting military,
national security and diplomatic secrets as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed
against other constitutionally recognized interests.Exe-89
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cutive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military, national security and
diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other
constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public

concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to
secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature involving
executive privilege, the Judiciary encourages negotiation between the Executive and Legislature as the
preferred route of conflict resolution.The Judiciary, however, will consider executive privilege only
if the issues cannot be resolved on some other legal grounds. In conflicts between the Executive and the
Legislature involving executive privilege, the Judiciary encourages negotiation between the Executive
and Legislature as the preferred route of conflict resolution. Only if judicial resolution is unavoidable
will courts resolve such disputes between the Executive and Legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Information covered by executive privilege remains confidential
even after the expiry of the terms of office of the President, Cabinet members and presidential advisers.
Information covered by executive privilege remains confidential even after the expiry of the terms of
office of the President, Cabinet members and presidential advisers. Thus, a former President can assert
executive privilege. The character of executive privilege attaches to the information and not to the
person. Executive privilege is for the benefit of the State and not for the benefit of the office holder.
Even death does not extinguish the confidentiality of information covered by executive privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege cannot be invoked to hide a crime because the
President is neither empowered nor tasked to conceal a crime; It cannot also be used to hide private
matters, like private financial transactions of the President.Executive privilege must be exercised by
the President in pursuance of official powers and functions. Executive privilege cannot be invoked to
hide a crime because the President is neither empowered nor tasked to conceal a crime. On the
contrary, the President has the90
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
constitutional duty to enforce criminal laws and cause the prosecution of crimes. Executive privilege
cannot also be used to hide private matters, like private financial transactions of the President. Private
matters are those not undertaken pursuant to the lawful powers and official functions of the Executive.
However, like all citizens, the President has a constitutional right to privacy. In conducting inquiries,
the Legislature must respect the right to privacy of citizens, including the Presidents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege must be invoked with specificity sufficient to
inform the Legislature and the Judiciary that the matter claimed as privileged refers to military, national
security or diplomatic secrets or to confidential Presidential communications.Executive privilege
must be invoked with specificity sufficient to inform the Legislature and the Judiciary that the matter
claimed as privileged refers to military, national security or diplomatic secrets, or to confidential
Presidential communications. A claim of executive privilege accompanied by sufficient specificity
gives rise to a presumptive executive privilege. A generalized assertion of executive privilege, without
external evidence or circumstances indicating that the matter refers to any of the recognized categories
of executive privilege, will not give rise to presumptive executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege must be invoked after the question is asked by
the legislative committee, not before.Executive privilege must be invoked after the question is asked
by the legislative committee, not before. A witness cannot raise hypothetical questions that the
committee may ask, claim executive privilege on such questions, and on that basis refuse to appear
before the legislative committee. If the legislative committee furnished in advance the questions to the
witness, the witness must bring with him the letter of the President or Executive Secretary invoking
executive privilege and stating the reasons for such claim. If the legislative committee did not furnish
in advance the questions, the witness must first appear before the legislative committee, wait for the
question to be asked, and then raise executive privilege. The legislative committee must then give the
witness sufficient time to consult the President or Executive Secretary whether the President will claim
executive privilege. At the next hearing, the witness can bring with him the letter of the President or
Executive Secretary,91
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
and if he fails to bring such letter, the witness must answer the question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Powers of Inquiry; The Legislature can conduct inquiries not specifically to
enact laws, but specifically to oversee the implementation of laws.The Legislature can conduct
inquiries not specifically to enact laws, but specifically to oversee the implementation of laws. This is
the mandate of various legislative oversight committees which admittedly can conduct inquiries on the
status of the implementation of laws. In the exercise of the legislative oversight function, there is
always the potential, even if not expressed or predicted, that the oversight committees may discover the
need to improve the laws they oversee and thus recommend amendment of the laws. This is sufficient
reason for the valid exercise of the power of legislative inquiry. Indeed, the oversight function of the
Legislature may at times be as important as its law-making function.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitution imposes two other limitations on the power of
legislative inquiry.Aside from the purpose of the inquiry, the Constitution imposes two other
limitations on the power of legislative inquiry. One, the rules of procedure for the inquiry must be duly
published. Publication of the rules of the inquiry is an essential requirement of due process. Two, the
rights of persons appearing before the investigating committees, or affected by such inquiries, must be
respected. These rights include the right against self-incrimination, as well as the right to privacy of
communications and correspondence of a private nature. The power of legislative inquiry does not
reach into the private affairs of citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; To avoid doubts on whether there is fair notice, the
witness must be given in advance the questions pertaining to the basic nature of the inquiry.Also
protected is the right to due process, which means that a witness must be given fair notice of the
subject of the legislative inquiry. Fair notice is important because the witness may be cited in contempt,
and even detained, if he refuses or fails to answer. Moreover, false testimony before a legislative body
is a crime. Thus, the witness must be sufficiently informed of the nature of the inquiry so the witness
can reasonably prepare for possible questions of the legisla-92

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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
tive committee. To avoid doubts on whether there is fair notice, the witness must be given in advance
the questions pertaining to the basic nature of the inquiry. From these advance questions, the witness
can infer other follow-up or relevant questions that the legislative committee may ask in the course of
the inquiry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The two principal means of enforcing the power of inquiry are for
the Legislature to order the arrest of a witness who refuses to appear, and to detain a witness who
refuses to answer.The Legislature has the inherent power to enforce by compulsion its power of
inquiry. The Legislature can enforce its power of inquiry through its own sergeant-at-arms without the
aid of law enforcement officers of the Executive or resort to the courts. The two principal means of
enforcing the power of inquiry are for the Legislature to order the arrest of a witness who refuses to
appear, and to detain a witness who refuses to answer. A law that makes a crime the refusal to appear
before the Legislature does not divest the Legislature of its inherent power to arrest a recalcitrant
witness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Legislature can cite in contempt and order the arrest of a witness
who fails to appear pursuant to a subpoena ad testificandum.The Legislature can cite in contempt and
order the arrest of a witness who fails to appear pursuant to a subpoena ad testificandum. There is no
distinction between direct and indirect contempt of the Legislature because both can be punished motu
proprio by the Legislature upon failure of the witness to appear or answer. Contempt of the Legislature
is different from contempt of court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege applies only to protect official acts and functions of the
President, never to conceal illegal acts by anyone, not even those of the President.Executive
privilege can never be used to hide a crime or wrongdoing, even if committed by high government
officials. Executive privilege applies only to protect official acts and functions of the President, never
to conceal illegal acts by anyone, not even those of the President. During the oral arguments on 4
March 2008, counsel for petitioner admitted that executive privilege cannot be invoked to hide a crime.
Counsel for petitioner also admitted that petitioner and the President discussed a scandal, and that the
scandal was about bribery.93
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The bare claim that disclosure might impair diplomatic relations with
China, without specification of external evidence and circumstances justifying such claim, is
insufficient to give rise to any presumptive executive privilege.The Ermita Letter merely raises a
generalized assertion of executive privilege on diplomatic matters. The bare claim that disclosure

might impair diplomatic relations with China, without specification of external evidence and
circumstances justifying such claim, is insufficent to give rise to any presumptive executive privilege.
A claim of executive privilege is presumptively valid if there is specificity in the claim. The claim of
impairment of economic relations with China is invalid because impairment of economic relations,
involving foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines, is not a recognized ground for invoking
executive privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Impairment of economic relations is not a recognized ground.The bases
for the claim of executive privilege are what the Ermita Letter states, namely, confidential Presidential
conversations and impairment of diplomatic and economic relations. However, impairment of
economic relations is not even a recognized ground. In short, this Court can only consider confidential
Presidential conversations and impairment of diplomatic relations as grounds for the invocation of
executive privilege in this petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body; Rules of
Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.The
present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present
Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years
each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires
a majority of Senators to constitute a quorum to do business. Applying the same reasoning in Arnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority
of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must
be re-published by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Failure of the Senate to publish its rules of Procedure as required in
Section 22, Article VI of the 94
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
Constitution renders the Rules of Procedure void.Due process requires that fair notice be given to
citizens before rules that put their liberty at risk take effect. The failure of the Senate to publish its
Rules of Procedure as required in Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution renders the Rules of
Procedure void. Thus, the Senate cannot enforce its Rules of Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Contempt; The Senates Order of 30 January 2008 citing petitioner in contempt
and ordering his arrest is void due to the non-publication of the Rules of Procedure.The Senate and
its investigating committees have the implied power to cite in contempt and order the arrest of a
witness who refuses to appear despite the issuance of a subpoena. The Senate can enforce the power of
arrest through its own Sergeant-at-Arms. In the present case, based on the Minutes of Meetings and
other documents submitted by respondents, the majority of the regular members of each of the
respondent Committees voted to cite petitioner in contempt and order his arrest. However, the Senates
Order of 30 January 2008 citing petitioner in contempt and ordering his arrest is void due to the nonpublication of the Rules of Procedure. The arrest of a citizen is a deprivation of liberty. The

Constitution prohibits deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Senate or its investigating
committees can exercise the implied power to arrest only in accordance with due process which
requires publication of the Senates Rules of Procedure. This Court has required judges to comply
strictly with the due process requirements in exercising their express constitutional power to issue
warrants of arrest. This Court has voided warrants of arrest issued by judges who failed to comply with
due process. This Court can do no less for arrest orders issued by the Senate or its committees in
violation of due process.
CORONA, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Power of Inquiry; Limitations on the
Power of Congress to Conduct Legislative Investigation.Section 21, Article VI regulates the power
of Congress to conduct legislative investigations by providing a three-fold limitation: (1) the power
must be exercised in aid of legislation; (2) it must be in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure and (3) the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.95
VOL. 549, MARCH 25, 2008
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules of procedure are required to be promulgated and published
not so much to impose a duty on the witness appearing in a legislative inquiry but to enforce
restrictions on Congress regarding the manner it conducts its inquiry.The rules of procedure are
required to be promulgated and published not so much to impose a duty on the witness appearing in a
legislative inquiry but to enforce restrictions on Congress regarding the manner it conducts its inquiry.
Thus, the Senate or any of its committees are bound to observe the very rules they themselves
established to govern their own conduct. Since this obligation is imposed by the Constitution itself, it
cannot be ignored, trifled with or violated without transgressing the fundamental law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of a rule of procedure on any matter which is the
subject of a legislative inquiry, any action which impinges on substantial rights of a person would be
unconstitutional.Congress has the inherent power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. However,
as a condition for the exercise of this power, the Constitution requires Congress to lay down and
publish specific and clear rules of procedure. No action which affects the substantial rights of persons
appearing in legislative inquiries may be taken unless it is in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure. In other words, before substantial rights may be validly affected, Congress or its committees
must faithfully follow the relevant rules of procedure relating to it. This will ensure the constitutional
intent of respect for the rights of persons appearing in or affected by legislative inquiries. In the
absence of a rule of procedure on any matter which is the subject of a legislative inquiry, any action
which impinges on substantial rights of persons would be unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue
Ribbon Committee speak only of a power to order the detention of a contumacious witness, it cannot be
expanded to include the power to issue an order of arrest.Since the Rules of Procedure of the Senate
and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee speak only of a power to order the detention of a
contumacious witness, it cannot be expanded to include the power to issue an order of arrest.

Otherwise, the constitutional intent to limit the exercise of legislative investigations to the procedure
established and published by the Senate or its committees will be for naught.96
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Power to punish for contempt is not limitless; Strict
compliance with procedural guidelines governing the contempt power is mandatory.In relation to
legislative investigations, the contempt power of Congress or its committees is recognized as an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. However, the power to punish for
contempt is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation
and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. Strict
compliance with procedural guidelines governing the contempt power is mandatory. Pursuant to the
Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee, the proper subject of
the contempt power is any witness before the concerned committee(s) of the Senate. This means that
the witness must be in attendance or physically present at the legislative inquiry. It is in this context
(and this context alone) that the respective provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the
Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee speak of the witnesss disobedience of any committee order,
refusal to be sworn or to testify or to answer a proper question and giving of false or evasive testimony.
Likewise, it is only in accordance with such premise that a witness may be ordered detained. In this
case, Neri was not before the respondent Committees. That was why respondent Committees ordered
his arrest. Indeed, the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Neri commanded him to appear and testify
before the Blue Ribbon Committee on November 20, 2007. The December 2, 2007 show cause order
was issued because he failed to appear in the November 20, 2007 hearing while the January 30, 2008
arrest order was issued on account of his failure to appear and testify.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.,Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Executive Privilege; Power of Inquiry; Following the ruling in Senate
vs. Ermita that when Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, petitioner has no legal bases for failing to
appear in the November 20 hearing.Insofar as petitioner can still provide respondent Committees
with pertinent information on matters not involving his conversations with the President, he is
depriving them of such information without a claim of privilege to back up his action. Following the
ruling in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), that [w]hen Con-97
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
gress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege, petitioner had no legal basis for failing to appear in the November 20

hearing. He should have appeared in the hearing and refused to answer the three questions as they were
asked. On that score alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Same; Same; Same; When Claim of Executive Privilege May be Overcome.A claim of privilege,
even a legitimate one, may be overcome when the entity asking for information is able to show that the
public interest in the disclosure thereof is greater than that in upholding the privilege. The weighing of
interests that courts must undertake in such cases was discussed by the Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488
SCRA 1 (2006), to wit: That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however,
necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity
of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information
falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
given procedural setting.
Same; Same; Same.The claim of privilege in this case should not be honored with respect to the
fundamental query mentioned above. Nonetheless, petitioners conversations with the President on all
other matters on the NBN project should still be generally privileged. On matters not having to do with
the apparent overpricing of the NBN project and the alleged bribe offer, respondents no longer have a
showing of need sufficient to overcome the privilege. The intrusion into these conversations pursuant to
this opinion would thus be a limited one. In that light, it is hard to see how the impairment of the public
interest in candid opinions in presidential decision-making can, in this case, outweigh the immense
good that can be achieved by well-crafted legislation reforming the procurement process.
TINGA, J.,Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Executive Privilege; Power of Inquiry; The purpose of legislative inquiry is
constitutionally and jurisprudentially linked to the function of legislation i.e., the task of formulating
laws.The purpose of legislative inquiry is constitutionally and jurisprudentially linked to the function
of legislation, i.e., the task of98
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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
formulating laws. The method of enacting sensible laws necessarily requires a legislature that is wellinformed of the factual background behind the intended legislation. It is for such purpose, morally or
politically neutral as it may be, that the function exists as a constitutional principle.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If what was involved was a criminal investigation, attendant as that function
is to the right of the State to punish wrongdoing, then any claim of executive privilege designed to
countermand the investigation could easily be quashed.In view of the differing constitutive purposes
and constitutional considerations between legislative inquiries and criminal trials, there can be differing
applicable standards that the courts may appreciate between these two processes. In the case at bar, if
the question involved were a claim of executive privilege invoked against a criminal investigation, my
analysis would be vastly different. If what was involved was a criminal investigation, attendant as that
function is to the right of the State to punish wrongdoing, then any claim of executive privilege
designed to countermand the investigation could easily be quashed. After all, our democracy is founded

on the consensual rule of a civilian president who is not above the law, rather than a monarch who, by
divine right, is the law himself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the claim of executive privilege is invoked against a legislative inquiry,
run by a body that bears vastly different attributes from those tasked with conducting criminal inquiries
and one which is quite frankly, politically animated by constitutional design, then the claim deserves
greater deference.If the claim of executive privilege is invoked against a legislative inquiry, run by a
body that bears vastly different attributes from those tasked with conducting criminal inquiries and one
which is, quite frankly, politically animated by constitutional design, then the claim deserves greater
deference. After all, such claim at that instance cannot result in evasion of wrongdoers from
punishment by the State. At most, it would retard the ability of Congress to acquire information that
may be necessary for it to enact informed legislation. It is against such constitutional purpose of
Congress that the claim of executive privilege should be tested.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The conversations between the president and petitioner Neri should enjoy
the presumptive privilege, on the same level as any other official conversation or correspondence99
VOL. 549, MARCH 25, 2008
99
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
between the president and her executive officials.At bar, the conversations between the president and
petitioner Neri should enjoy the presumptive privilege, on the same level as any other official
conversation or correspondence between the president and her executive officials. They enjoy the same
presumptive privilege as the conversations or correspondence between the members of this Court who
used to work for the executive branch of government and the presidents under whom they served.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unless petitioner informs the Court the contents of his questioned
conversations with the president, the Court would have no basis to accept his claim that diplomatic and
state secrets would indeed be compromised by divulging the same in a public Senate hearing.
Petitioner Neri also cites diplomatic and state secrets as basis for the claim of executive privilege,
alluding for example to the alleged adverse impact of disclosure on national security and on our
diplomatic relations with China. The argument hews closely to the state secrets privilege. The problem
for petitioner Neri though is that unless he informs this Court the contents of his questioned
conversations with the president, the Court would have no basis to accept his claim that diplomatic and
state secrets would indeed be compromised by divulging the same in a public Senate hearing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no demonstration on the part of respondents that legislation will be
rendered necessary or unnecessary should petitioner Neri refuse to answer those questions.I submit,
with respect to the three questions asked of petitioner Neri, that the Senate will not be impeded from
crafting and enacting any legislation it may link to the present inquiries should the privilege be upheld.
There is no demonstration on the part of respondents that legislation will be rendered necessary or
unnecessary should petitioner Neri refuse to answer those questions. If respondents are operating under
the premise that the president and/or her executive officials have committed wrongdoings that need to
be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the answers to those three questions

will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They could
easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondents failed to demonstrate how the refusal of petitioner Neri to
answer the three subject ques-100
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
tions would hamper its ability to legislate.At bar, respondents failed to demonstrate how the refusal
of petitioner Neri to answer the three subject questions would hamper its ability to legislate. As such,
the general presumptive privilege that attaches to the conversations of the president with executive
officials supersedes the right of respondents to such information for the purpose of its legislative
inquiry.
VELASCO, JR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Steps to Follow in Claiming
Executive Privilege.In Ermita, the Court, citing US case law, outlined the steps to follow in claiming
executive privilege. Foremost of these are: (1) it must be clearly asserted, which petitioner did, and by
the Government to which the privilege belongs; (2) there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged
by the head of the department having control over the matter; and 3) the statement of the claim must be
specific and the claim must state the reasons for withholding the information.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements to be Complied with Before Respondents Committees Can
Exact Faithful Compliance from a Summoned Official Claiming Executive Privilege over the Matter
Subject of Inquiry.It may be stated at this juncture that respondents committees have certain
obligations to comply with before they can exact faithful compliance from a summoned official
claiming executive privilege over the matter subject of inquiry. Again, Ermita has laid out the
requirements to be met under that given scenario. They are, to me, not mere suggestions but mandatory
prescriptions envisaged as they are to protect the rights of persons appearing or affected by the
congressional inquiries. These requirements are: First, the invitation or subpoena shall indicate the
possible questions to be asked; second, such invitation or subpoena shall state the proposed statute
which prompted the need for the inquiry; and third, that the official concerned must be given
reasonable time to apprise the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking
executive privilege. For the purpose of the first requirement, it would be sufficient if the person invited
or subpoenaed is, at least, reasonably apprised and guided by the particular topics to be covered as to
enable him to properly prepare. The questions need not be couched in precise details or listed down to
exclude all others.101
VOL. 549, MARCH 25, 2008
101

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Arrest Orders; It behooves the Court to now strike the said order down,
not only because its existence is the by-product of or traceable to, a legally infirm subpoena, but also
because the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation does not authorize the
arrest of unwilling or reluctant witness not before it.The perceived obstructive defiance of the
subpoena (Annex B, Petition) triggered the issuance of the assailed contempt and arrest order. It
behooves the Court to now strike the said order down, not only because its existence is the by-product
of or traceable to, a legally infirm subpoena, but also because the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation does not authorize the arrest of unwilling or reluctant witness not before
it. Surely, respondents cannot look to Sec. 18 of the rules of procedure governing legislative inquiries
as the arrest-enabling provision since it only speaks of contempt in the first place.
NACHURA, J.,Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Separation of Powers; Power of Inquiry; Executive Privilege; The
right of government to withhold certain types of information from the public knowledge.A survey of
relevant jurisprudence is useful. Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744 (1998) and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384
SCRA 152 (2002), acknowledged the right of government to withhold certain types of information
from the public. In the Chavez cases, there was already recognition of privileged information arising
from separation of powers, commonly understood to include Presidential conversations,
correspondences and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. But it was in Senate v. Ermita that
the matter of the Presidents presumptive privilege was explicitly discussed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the President invokes the privilege, announcing the reasons therefore
x x x then the presumptive privilege attaches; Burden to overcome the presumption rests on the
shoulders of whoever demands disclosure.My own view of the process is quite the opposite. When
the President invokes the privilege, announcing the reasons thereforein this case, the possible rupture
of diplomatic and economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, and the chilling effect that
disclosure of confidential information will have on the Presidents policyand decision-making
responsibilitiesthen the presumptive privilege attaches. At102
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
this point, the burden to overcome the presumption rests on the shoulders of whoever demands
disclosurein this case, the Senate Committeesand to discharge this burden requires a showing that
the public interest will be better served by the revelation of the information.
BRION, J.,Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Executive Privilege; The types of
Presidential conversations are presumed privileged once it is established that they refer to official
policy or decision making.These types of Presidential conversations are presumed privileged once it

is established that they refer to official policy or decision making. The operative words for the
presumption to arise are official policy or decision making. To be sure, the presumption is not
absolute as the purpose is not to shield the President from any and all types of inquiries. Where a higher
purpose requiring disclosure is present and cited in the proper proceeding, then the privilege must fall
and disclosure can be compelled. As the oral arguments on the case showed, all parties are agreed that
the privilege cannot be used to shield crime as disclosure will then serve the higher purpose of bringing
injustice to light. [Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
549 SCRA 77(2008)]
ON TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE:
No definition of the term in our jurisprudence
Transcendental importance has been another elusive term that recurs and resonates in cases involving
standing or locus standi in constitutional and legal challenges before the courts. It made its debut in that
famous Emergency Powers Cases led by Araneta vs. Dinglasan,supra, and companion petitions penned
by Justice Pedro Tuason. This oft-quoted and tired passage (owing to repeated use since 1949 to the
present and counting) is found in the opening lines of this decision:
Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on
other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is
decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the
personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners x x x x x x x x x Above all, the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure (Emphasis supplied).
Now, about fifty-seven (57) years later, this term is alive and well and in constant harness either by the
bar or bench. Lawyers usually allege in their petitions transcendental importance of the issues they
raise to catch the attention of the courts. This term had often cropped up whenever standing or locus
standi was discussed (Kapatiran, etc. vs. Tan, supra, Osmea vs. Comelec, supra, KMU vs. Garcia,
supra, Basco vs. PAGCOR, supra, Association of Small Landowners vs. Sec. of Agriculture, supra,
Bayan vs. Zamora, et al., Chavez vs. PEA, supra, Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra, etc.). Thus,
it has also become another mischievous concept in law because if the court did not like to hear the case,
it downgrades or ignores the claim of importance and sets up standing or locus standi as a barrier. On
the other hand, if the court wants to hear the case, regardless of the standing or locus standi of
petitioner, it simply comes up with the following magic incantation or words to the effect: Above all,
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra).
b) "Determinants of Transcendental Importance
It is surprising that no definition of transcendental importance has been attempted since it was first used
in Araneta vs Dinglasan, supra, in 1949 and thereafter in numerous decisions of the High Court.
Francisco vs. Nagmamalasakit, etc. supra, confirmed that there has been no doctrinal definition of
this term yet. However, in this same case, certain instructive determinants supposedly of
transcendental importance were formulated by Justice Florentino Feliciano in his Concurring Opinion
in Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra: (1) the character of the funds, or other assets involved in
the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition, etc.;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.

These so-called determinants were reiterated in the case of Jumamil vs. Cafe, supra. But actually,
Justice Feliciano merely referred to them as considerations of principle which, in the present case
appear to me to require an affirmative answer to the question of whether or not petitioners are properly
regarded as imbued with the standing necessary to bring and maintain the present petition (Emphasis
supplied).
Assuming they were intended by Justice Feliciano to be determinants of transcendental importance
of the issues or the case, they are incapable of accurately defining its real nature. They do not focus on
the nature or value of the issues to the country or the people but on matters that do not actually accord
significance to them. Let us examine: a) character of the funds, or assets involved in the casethe
character of the funds or assets does not necessarily elevate the level of importance of the case.
Besides, character is vague. How about those cases which do not involve funds or assets like the
Emergency Powers Cases led by Araneta vs. Dinglasan, supra? b) clear disregard of the Constitution or
the law by public authoritythis does not also elevate the level of importance of the case since this
must obtain and be alleged as a requisite for a petition to be accorded due course; and c) lack of party
with direct or specific interest to pursue the casethere are always petitioners that can plausibly claim
such interest. Besides, our jurisprudence is replete with crusading souls ready to undertake
constitutional and legal challenges, unmindful of the expenses, risks, and sacrifices.
c) Attempt at definition
Transcendental is an adjective. Its verb is transcend, which means in reference to this discussion, to go
beyond the limits of; overstep; exceed (a story that transcends belief). The other adjective is
transcendent which means transcending; surpassing; excelling; extraordinary; and transcendental is
synonymous with transcendent (Websters New World College Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1519).
Other meanings of transcendental, however, pertain to philosophical concepts and not relevant here.
Hence, transcendental importance means the level of significance or value of constitutional and legal
issues raised which go beyond parochial concerns whose resolution will have an impact upon the
governance of the country and/or national existence. Perhaps, the pronouncement of the High Court in
the first Kilosbayan case is along this definition:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of
paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being
of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it
is expected to raise. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., supra. Emphasis supplied).
[Locus Standi: A Mischievous Concept in Law?, 507 SCRA 181(2006)]
ame; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Transcendental Importance, Explained; There being no
doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants are instructive
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality
of the government, and, (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising
the questions being raised; In not a few cases, the Supreme Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude
on locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.There
being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of

the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and, (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised. Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein
are indeed of transcendental importance. In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the
matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it
not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
[Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 415
SCRA 44(2003) ]
ON CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OR TERRITORIASL INTEGRITY AGAIN

Tan v COMELEC G.R. No. 73155. July 11, 1986.

07/14/2010
0 Comments
Facts: Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the
Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was filed by
petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was
held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant case
affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed
upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, namely:
the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of
the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the
prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they have raised in the action
will be ventilated and given final resolution."
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the prayer
in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead,
nevertheless, that ". . . a writ of Prohibition be issued directed to Respondent Commission on
Elections to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3,
1986."
Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros
Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte to

be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of Mandamus be issued, directed to the
respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the
qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the
same time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being
a patent legal nullity; "And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent
Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses
incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by the Court."
Complying with said resolution, public respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute
Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is
not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable
demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of
the Batasang Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have
been complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and academic with
the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros
Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, do not fall within the
meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our
Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate
the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable
Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61),
particularly the pronouncements therein
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in the above
provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the
proposed new province which are the areas affected."
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and
its officials appointed, the case before us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic.
Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to
have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality
attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for
perpetuation of such wrong.
Issue: The petitioners pray for the following:
1. That BP blg. 885 is unconstitutional
2. That a new plebiscite will be held
Held: WHEREFORE, BP Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the
new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also declared
null and void.

Ratio: The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void
and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however,
disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because we find no legal basis to do so. With
constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and also because the creation
of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which
should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in
this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly,
reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the
waters over which the political unit exercises control.
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or
strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their
plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or
unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing
the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of
the statutory scheme is not to be favored.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be
first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted
from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. We find no way to
reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but
eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units.

In view of unchallenged facts

In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to be agreed to
by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros
Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in connection with the
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by the
respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus,
the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to desist from
ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not longer deserve further
consideration.
Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the
aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, however; when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very

quickly enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del
Norte were defined therein and its boundaries...
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by Provincial Treasurer
Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as
follows... Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new
municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the area
comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the new province, was derived
from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added
thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia, Negros Occidental. No
controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitioners that the
original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644.
In view of mootness
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and academic
considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof,
the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite,
164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it; and because "the
affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of
the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte".
Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the
appointments of the officials of said province created were announced. On these considerations,
respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as
the creation of the new province is now a " fait accompli."
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the unusually
rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this
Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the
mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our government. This Court gives notice
that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of
legislative measures and then implement the same with indecent haste, even if such acts would violate
the Constitution and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be
blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is done.
In view of economic progress
The Act provided for the partitioning of the province of Negros Occidental and would substantially
alter its boundaries by lopping off the progressive cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and
municipality of Victorias with seven other municipalities to constitute the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte. Negros Occidental would thereby lose 4,019.95 square kilometers in area and seven
of fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economic progress and welfare of the whole province.
In view of the requirement of publication
This was learned by petitioners through an item in the printed media one day before they filed the
present rush petition on December 23, 1985 to seek a restraining order to atop the plebiscite, even as
no printed copies of the Act as finally enacted and approved were available to them and the Act had

not been published, as required by law, for its effectivity. As petitioners ruefully state: "it was in vain
hope" for everything had apparently been timed for the Christmas holidays; the Court was in
Christmas recess and "there was no chance to have their plea for a restraining order acted upon
speedily enough." In fact, it was only on January 7, 1986 that the Court took cognizance of the petition
and required respondents' comment.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Local Governments; Moot and Academic; Fact that the
plebiscite which the petition at bar sought to stop had already been held and officials of the new
province appointed does not make the petition moot, as the petition raises an issue of
constitutional dimension.It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision
makes it imperative that there be first obtained the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected whenever a province is created, divided or merged and
there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the
boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially
altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed
new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political
units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those
in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros
del Norte.
Same; Same; Same; A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of
the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the constitutional
requirements.We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to
said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component
political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in
the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the
challenged
_______________
* EN BANC.
728
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Commission on Elections
statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local
government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept
that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first
be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a
supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government
units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in

Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from one who hurries to pray at
the temple but then spits at the idol therein.
Same; Same; Same; A petition that raises the issue of compliance with Constitutional
requirements is proper subject of judicial inquiry.We find no merit in the submission of the
respondents that the petition should be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the
law may not be challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the
wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper
subject of judicial inquiry.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Evidence; Courts; Motives behind enactment of a statute are
factual in nature that the Supreme Court cannot try.Petitioners discussion regarding the
motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say the least, are most enlightening and
provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by
petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644
and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious manner of passage and
approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles
regarding the questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as
interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of
this case.
Same; Same; Same; Ruling in the case of Paredes vs. Hon. Executive Secretary (128 SCRA 6) is
not a doctrinal, binding precedent where the Supreme Court is not sure of itself and the decision
itself says that that case gives considerable leeway for the Court to exercise its discretion in
resolving the issue of whether or not residents of a mother barangay should participate in the
plebiscite to create a new barangay.This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to
by respondents. What is, however, highly significant are the
729
VOL. 142, JULY 11, 1986
729
Tan vs. Commission on Elections
prefatory statements therein stating that said case is one of those cases where the discretion of
the Court is allowed considerable leeway and that there is indeed an element of ambiguity in
the use of the expression unit or units affected. The ruling rendered in said case was based on a
claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve
the question of how the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al.
(supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged
therein that it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated
from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected.
Same; Same; Same; When the law says the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected
this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be economically dislocated by the

separation of a portion thereof have the right to participate in said plebiscite.It is a well
accepted rule that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to
doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari
materia. Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros
del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected
within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. As this draft
legislation speaks of areas, what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to
participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people
living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This
assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Where the law authorizing the holding of a plebiscite is unconstitutional, the
Court cannot authorize the holding of a new one.The Court is prepared to declare the said
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3,
Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new
plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the
subject Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del
Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the
factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of
another plebiscite does not exist.
730
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Use of the word territory in Sec. 197 of the Local Government
Code refers only to the land mass, not to the waters, comprising a political entity.The last
sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The use of the word territory in this
particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly
reflects that territory as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes
the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the territory
need not be contiguous. Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most
of one side; (c) near, next, or adjacent (Websters New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307).
Contiguous, when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it
describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of
particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related
to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the
context of the sentence above, what need not be contiguous is the territorythe physical
mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they
had intended that the term territory embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It
can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to
be synonymous with land area only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given

the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used
furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court will not pass upon the claim that
enactment of a law is marred by dirty tricks and undue haste.It is not for this Court to
affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case can be resolved without
need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper
challenge on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this
Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative powers. Repudiation of
improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent
events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a vigilant people.
731
VOL. 142, JULY 11, 1986
731
Tan vs. Commission on Elections
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Local Governments; Statutes; Courts; As petitioners asserted the intent in
enacting the law at bar was to create a new province before the Presidential elections on Feb. 7,
1984 so that the resources of the new entity can be used for political purposes.The scenario, as
petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the
time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the
new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for
purposes of the election for President and Vice-President. Thus, the petitioners reported after
the event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and
proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by
Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February
7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos.
The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the electionsthe unashamed use
of naked power and resourcescontributed in no small way to arousing peoples power and
steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be
a Filipino today.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The challenged B.P. 885 is unconstitutional as it excluded the voters of
the mother province from participating in the plebiscite.The challenged Act is manifestly void
and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite,
the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are
equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province
(as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the
integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota
and the Municipalities of La Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,
Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Hog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and
Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of

the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary
substantially altered without the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros
Occidental, not merely those of the pro732
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tan vs. Commission on Elections
posed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire
province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite,
because the whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its
boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded
from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the
secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle
of majority rule.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Courts may issue a mandatory writ to restore matters at status
quo ante.The argument of fait accompli, viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of January 3, 1986
was held and can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has been
constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always held that it
does not look with favor upon parties racing to beat an injunction or restraining order which
they have reason to believe might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and
pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where the restraining order or preliminary
injunction are found to have been properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall be
issued by the Court to restore matters to the status quo ante. (Banzon v. Cruz, 45 SCRA 475,
506 [1972]). Where, as in this case, there was somehow a failure to properly issue the restraining order
stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue the mandatory writ or judgment to
restore matters to the status quo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the province of Negros
Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid
proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and the equally invalid appointment of
its officials. [Tan vs. Commission on El ections, 142 SCRA 727(1986)]