AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Contents
I.

Evident Premeditation

People v Bacbac.............................................................................................................................. 2
People v. Ducabo............................................................................................................................. 7
II. Treachery
People v. Tubongbanua................................................................................................................. 14
Rivera v People............................................................................................................................. 20
People v Taan................................................................................................................................ 25
People v Casela............................................................................................................................. 30
People v Guzman.......................................................................................................................... 38
People v. Nabong.......................................................................................................................... 46
People v Centeno.......................................................................................................................... 53
People v. Abadies.......................................................................................................................... 55
People v Sapigao........................................................................................................................... 60
III. Cruelty
People v. Lucas.............................................................................................................................. 70
People v. Foncardas....................................................................................................................... 75
People v. Amadore........................................................................................................................ 83
People v Licyayo........................................................................................................................... 90
IV. Ignominy
People v. Fernandez...................................................................................................................... 97
V. Special Aggravating Circumstances
People v. Ladjaalam.................................................................................................................... 100
People v. Lorenzo........................................................................................................................ 117
People v. Celino........................................................................................................................... 122

People v Bacbac
In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in Purok
4, San Joaquin, Iloilo City in the company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio
(Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).1
Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions also left and
on their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups then
and there figured in a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the dance hall, noticed a
commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his
hands." Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick."2 He thus told the victim and his
companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo3
told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus thus left and proceeded to Edzel's
residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan
managed to flee.
The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of which they met Pat.
Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews, and
Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo
Streets. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying
a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively.
Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled
Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook
Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just bragging that you
are brave. You are only bullying small children."4 Petitioner, at that instant, fired his armalite into
the air, while Jose fired his armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the victim and
Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike [the
victim] with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so did the victim who was in a kneeling position,
and as he was raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him again.
Meanwhile, Melchor escaped.5
The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was pronounced
dead on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.
Post-mortem examination showed that the victim sustained two bullet wounds in the thoracoabdominal regions and one bullet wound in the extremities, and that he died due to "maceration
of the internal organs due to bullet wounds."6 Eduardo sustained two bullet wounds in the
thoraco-abdominal region, and died of "hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds."7
Two Informations for Murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against
Jose, Edzel, Jonathan, Jesus, and the herein petitioner. The accusatory portion of the first
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35783, reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of
Ilo-ilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose,
armed with two (2) M16 [a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of unknown make
and caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one HERNANI QUIDATO with the firearms they were
then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which
caused the immediate and instantaneous death of said Hernani Quidato.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The accusatory portion of the second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35784, reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose,
armed with two (2) M16 [a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of unknown make
and caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one EDUARDO SELIBIO with the firearms they were then
provided inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which
caused the immediate and instantaneous death of said Eduardo Selibio.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
The cases were jointly tried.
By Decision of April 30, 1993, Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC, finding the presence of conspiracy
among petitioner and his co-accused,10 convicted them of murder qualified by treachery.11 The
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 35783, all the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel Talanquines,
Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and there being no aggravating circumstances
with one mitigating circumstance [immediate vindication for Jose and Jesus; voluntary surrender
for Pat. Ricardo Bacabac12], and applying the indeterminate sentence law, accused Jose
Talanquines, Jr., Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby sentenced each to suffer
imprisonment for a period of 10 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
as maximum; while accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac who are entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a
period of four (4) years, 2 months, and 1 day, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day as maximum.
All the accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Hernani
Quidato, the amount of P50,000.00 for his wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral damages;
P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)
In Criminal Case No. 35784, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
All the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder and there being
no aggravating circumstance with one mitigating circumstance, accused Jose Talanquines, Jr.,
Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for
a period of 10 years and 1 day as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, as maximum;
while accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense, are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of 4
years, 2 months and 1 day, as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum. All the accused are
ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Eduardo Selibio, the amount of
P50,000.000 for his wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorney's
fees; and the costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)

Accused Jesus Delfin Rosadio, who is detained, is hereby credited with the number of days he
spent under detention, if he is qualified.
SO ORDERED.13
While petitioner and his co-accused filed a Notice of Appeal14 which was given due course,15
only petitioner filed a Brief, albeit beyond the extensions granted to him, drawing the Court of
Appeals to dismiss his appeal.16 The conviction of petitioner's co-accused had thus become final
and executory.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration17 of the dismissal of his appeal having been denied,18 he
filed a Petition for Review with this Court which, by Resolution of October 22, 1997, directed the
Court of Appeals to reinstate petitioner's appeal.19
By Decision20 of June 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Entry of
final judgment was made by the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1999.21
The trial court thereafter issued a February 7, 2000 Order directing the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused.22 Except petitioner, all were arrested.23
On February 24, 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, Order, and/or Denial of Appeal24 which was granted,25 hence, the Entry of Judgment
issued by the appellate court on July 22, 1999 was set aside. He thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration26 of the appellate court's June 28, 1999 Decision which was denied by
Resolution of August 8, 2001;27 hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.28
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' decision as follows:
First: Contrary to its conclusion on the basis of the facts of the case, Petitioner may not be
deemed to be in conspiracy with the other Accused.
Second: Contrary to its conclusion, there was no treachery.
Third: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner, assuming in gratis argumenti the correctness of the
pronouncement of guilt, should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner that the other Accused were so
credited.
Fourth: Contrary to its conclusion, the guilt of the Petitioner has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, by the equipoise rule, should have been acquitted.
Fifth: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner is not civilly liable.29 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court notes that the first, second, and fifth arguments of petitioner were, in the main, raised
before the appellate court.30
During the pendency of the present petition, petitioner, through counsel, filed before the trial
court an "Urgent Ex Parte Alternative Motions (Re: Pat. Ricardo Bacabac's Motion for
Reconsideration and/or to Vacate the Order dated February 7, 2000 [directing the arrest of the
accused] and to Recall the Warrant of Arrest Dated the Same Date in so far as the Accused Pat.
Ricardo Bacabac Only is Concerned)."31 The trial court denied32 the motion as it did deny33
petitioner's motion for reconsideration,34 drawing petitioner to file before this Court on October
5, 2006 a "Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued
by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 39) of Iloilo City."35

In his "Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by
the Regional Trial Court . . . ," petitioner argues that
[T]he basis of the RTC's Order of February 7, 2000 was the Entry of Judgment by the Court of
Appeals dated 25 November 1999.36 BUT THE SAID ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was ALREADY
VACATED and SET-ASIDE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF ON ITS RESOLUTION DATED 13
DECEMBER 2000. Therefore, the RTC's Order of 7 February 2000 was ipso facto vacated.37
(Emphasis in the original)
and that
[T]he second sentence of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cited by the Order of 13 July
2006 does not apply to the case at bench because the main case on the merits which originated
in the RTC as Criminal Cases Nos. 35783-84, went to the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 16348
and is now pending in the Supreme Court (Third Division) as G.R. No. 149372 because of the
Petition for Review On Certiorari filed by Movant herein x x x. THE MAIN CASE IS NO LONGER
PENDING IN THIS HONORABLE COURT [sic]. THEREFORE, THE RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
REITERATE AND EXECUTE THE ORDER OF 7 FEBRUARY 2000.38 (Emphasis in the original)
As this Court hereby affirms petitioner's conviction, resolution of his "Motion to Vacate . . ." is
rendered unnecessary.
Petitioner, denying the presence of conspiracy on his part, argues:
[The petitioner] affirms that he was at the scene of the incident and merely fired a warning shot
into the air to respond to a public disturbance, and his firing a warning shot into the air was
intended to avert further acts of violence; both circumstances, therefore, being merely and solely
in pursuance to his avowed duty to keep peace and order in the community and clearly not to be
part of any alleged community of design to kill the victims.
xxxx
Another indication that there was no unity of purpose and of execution in so far as the Petitioner
is concerned is his conduct after Jose Talanquines, Jr. shot the victims. Eyewitness accounts state
that after that lone warning shot, closely followed by Jose Talanquines, Jr. firing at the victims, the
petitioner merely stood there and did nothing and said nothing. This is obviously because he was
himself stunned by the fast happening of events. The investigating police officer, PO3 NESTOR
SANTACERA, on rebuttal, likewise, admitted to the facts that ten (10) minutes after the incident,
they (the police) responded and upon arrival thereat, learned that the Petitioner already reported
the incident to their station and that it was the Petitioner who first reported the shooting incident
officially to their office. The aforedescribed proven conduct of the Petitioner during and
immediately after the incident in question are, Petitioner respectfully submits, inconsistent with
what a co-conspirators is [sic] wont to do under the circumstances. It is submitted instead that
his conduct on the contrary underscores the lack or want of community of purpose and interest
in the killing incident to make him criminally liable under the conspiracy theory.
Finally, in connection with the conspiracy theory and anent the finding below that the Petitioner
and his Co-Accused waited for the victims' arrival at the corner of St. Domingo and M.H. del Pilar
Streets, it is asserted that the same runs counter to the natural and ordinary experience of things
and event [sic], and raises a cloud of doubt over the correctness of the lower Courts decision
which are based on the Prosecution's version of the incident. Since, according to the prosecution,
the Petitioner and the other Accused were armed with high-powered firearms (armalite rifles and
revolver); they waited at the stated street corner for thirty (30) minutes; the stated street corner
was well lighted; accompanying them were the wife and two (2) young daughters of Jose
Talanquines, Jr; and they stood there conversing with the group of Elston Saquian [a prosecution
witness who testified that he saw the petitioner and his co-accused waiting for the victims39 and

admitting that they were waiting for certain persons who mauled Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan
Bacabac.
In other words, the lower Courts gave credence to an improbable scenario painting the Petitioner,
known to the place as a police officer, and co-accused to have recklessly and uncaringly
displayed, for all and sundry to see, their alleged criminal intentions. It would indeed be the
height of foolishness for them to be by a well lighted street corner, perhaps even well traversed,
conspicuously fully armed, waiting for persons who were not even sure would pass by such place,
and apparently willing to admit to other passers-by that they were indeed waiting for the persons
who mauled Edzel and Jonathan, and consequently give out the impression that they were
intending to retaliate which is what the lower Courts regrettably observed.
xxxx
Likewise, the presence of the wife and two (2) young daughters of the accused Jose Talanquines,
Jr. at the scene of the alleged crimes, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and believed
by the lower Courts, assumes importance in the matter of determining which version of the
incident is correct.
The Prosecution places the wife and the daughters with the alleged fully armed Petitioner and
Co-Accused at Sto. Domingo Streets, also waiting during the same length of time as the men for
the (probable) arrival of the group of the victims. But such a scenario is, likewise, unnatural.
Because, will the male relatives unhesitatingly expose their defenseless womenfolk to imminent
danger?40 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original, and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's argument that it is improbable for him and his co-accused to have waited for the
victims at a well-lighted street corner does not persuade. Crimes are known to have been
brazenly committed by perpetrators, undeterred by the presence of onlookers or even of peace
officers, completely impervious of the inevitability of criminal prosecution and conviction.41
From the mode and manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, the conduct of petitioner
before, during, and after their commission,42 and the conditions attendant thereto,43
conspiracy, which need not be proved by direct evidence, is deduced.44 Petitioner's firing of his
armalite could not have amounted to none other than lending moral assistance to his coaccused, thereby indicating the presence of conspiracy.45
As the appellate court observed which is quoted with approval:
In the present recourse, when informed that Jonathan and Edzel were being manhandled and
assaulted by male persons, Appellant armed himself with an M-16 armalite. Jose Talanquines, Jr.,
the father of Edzel, followed suit and armed himself with an M-16 armalite gun. Jesus armed
himself with a revolver while Jonathan armed himself with a piece of wood. Jonathan and Edzel
were nephews of the Appellant who resided in the house of Jose Talanquines, Jr. All the Accused
including the Appellant then proceeded posthaste to the corner of M.H. del Pilar corner Sto.
Domingo Streets where the culprits would pass by and waited for the advent of the culprits. Even
as Hernani apologized for his and his companions' assault of Edzel and Jonathan, Jesus berated
Hernani and his companions. Almost simultaneously, the Appellant fired his gun into the air as
Jonathan lunged at Hernani and his companions to hit them with the piece of wood. Almost
simultaneously, Jose Talaquines, Jr. fired his gun at Hernani and shot Eduardo hitting them and, in
the process, hitting his nephew, Jonathan Bacabac. The Appellant did not lift a finger when Jose
fired at and shot Hernani and Eduardo. He stood by as Jose shot Hernani anew when the latter on
bended knees, raised his two (2) hands, in surrender. The Appellant and the other Accused then
fled from the scene, with their respective firearms and weapons. The overt act of the Accused
and the Appellant in conjunto, constitute proof of conspiracy.

The Appellant and Jose were armed with high-powered guns. Jesus was armed with a revolver.
The nature of the weapons of the Accused evinced a common desire to do away with the culprits,
not merely to scare them.
What is outrageous is that the Appellant was a policeman. He could very well have just arrested
the culprits as they sauntered by and brought them to the police station for the requisite
investigation and the institution of criminal complaints, if warranted. He could have dissuaded
Jose and Jesus and assured them that the culprits will be duly investigated and charged if
warranted. The Appellant did not. He armed himself with an M-16 armalite x x x. [T]he three (3)
positioned themselves at the corner of M.H. del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets for the culprits to
arrive. Hernani and his companions were doomed. It may be true that the Appellant did not aim
his gun at the deceased but the same is peu de chose. By his overt acts, in unison with the other
Accused and his kinship with Jonathan and Edzel, We are convinced that he conspired with Jose
Talanquines, Jr. and the other Accused to achieve a common purpose to kill Hernani and
Eduardo.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court's appreciation of
community of design between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. That it was he who
first officially reported the shooting to the police station47 does not make him any less a
conspirator. Voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively prove innocence.48 Besides, a
conspirator who wants to extricate himself from criminal liability usually performs an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony while the commission of
the felony is in progress.49 In petitioner's case, he reported the shooting incident after it had
already taken place. In legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated
since it had already materialized.50
Contrary to petitioner's assertion,51 the appellate court did not err in appreciating the presence
of conspiracy despite its finding that there was no evident premeditation. This Court's
pronouncement that conspiracy presupposes the existence of evident premeditation52 does not
necessarily imply that the converse that evident premeditation presupposes the existence of a
conspiracy is true. In any event, a link between conspiracy and evident premeditation is
presumed only where the conspiracy is directly established and not where conspiracy is only
implied, as in the present case.53
Neither did the appellate court err in finding the presence of treachery. Treachery, under Article
14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, is present "when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make."
What is decisive in treachery is that "the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it
impossible for the victim to retaliate."54 In the case at bar, petitioner, a policeman, and his coaccused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The victim and his companions
were not armed.55 The attack was sudden and unexpected,56 and the victim was already
kneeling in surrender when he was shot the second time. Clearly, the victim and his companion
Eduardo had no chance to defend themselves or retaliate.
Petitioner nevertheless argues that he not being the trigger man, it is not logical nor legal to hold
him guilty of treachery.57 This argument falls in the face of the settled doctrine that once
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all even if not all actually hit and killed the
victim.58
As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave
offense," it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following
Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants,

legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degree."59 The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick60 (according to
Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel).61 By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit at [his]
ear, not on [his] head."62 That act would certainly not be classified as "grave offense." And Edzel
is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated in
Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Ducabo
For review is the Decision1 dated 31 July 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01116, which affirmed the Decision2 dated 31 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Las Pias City, Branch 275, in Criminal Case No. 01-0055, finding herein appellant Junjun Ducabo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed against Rogelio Gonzales y
Factor, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but modified the amount
of damages awarded.
An Information3 dated 14 December 2000, charged appellant with the crime of murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about 24th day of October 2000, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], without justifiable motive with
intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with a gun the head of one ROGELIO
GONZALES Y FACTOR thereby inflicting mortal gunshot wound to the said victim which directly
caused his death.4
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
crime charged.
During the pre-trial conference held on 11 December 2003, the counsel for the appellant
admitted the written statement5 of Rolando Gonzales, Jr. y Factor (Rolando), but denied the
certificate of death6 of the victim. The counsel for the appellant reserved the marking of
evidence in the course of trial. In an Order7 dated 11 December 2003, the trial court considered
the pre-trial closed and terminated. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the victims brother, Rolando, to prove the material allegations in the
Information and to identify the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged. Conversely,
the defense presented the appellant to refute all the allegations in the Information.
In an Order8 dated 5 October 2004, the trial court, as stipulated upon by the parties, dispensed
with the testimonies of SPO1 George Gabriel, the Police Investigator who conducted the
investigation and prepared the Affidavit of Rolando, and Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, who performed
the Post-Mortem Examination on the victim, for they had no personal knowledge of the crime
charged.
The evidence for the prosecution consists solely of the testimony of Rolando, the victims brother.
He disclosed that on 24 October 2000, at around 5:45 in the morning, he saw the appellant
walking back and forth, twice, in front of their house at Simeon Street, Fatima Compound, Las

Pias City. At around 6:18 in the morning, while he was sweeping inside their house, his brother
Rogelio, the victim, went out in front of their house also to sweep. When the victim went out of
their house, the appellant was not there. He was five meters away from his brother. While the
victim was sweeping in a stooping position at almost 90 degrees, the appellant suddenly
appeared behind the victim. Appellant was one meter away from the victim. The appellant then
poked a gun and shot the victim once at the back of his head, a little higher on his nape, causing
the latter to fall on the ground. Thereafter, Rolando immediately called for help from their
neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced dead on
arrival at the Perpetual Help Hospital in Las Pias City. The victim died of hemorrhagic shock as a
result of a gunshot wound on his head.9
Rolando testified that it was the appellant who shot the victim because at the time of the
shooting incident, he was only five meters away from the victim and the appellant as he was
inside their house near the door. He also claimed that he had known the appellant for about 10
years as they were neighbors at Simeon Street, Fatima Compound, Las Pias City. He added that
prior to 24 October 2000, there was an altercation involving their neighbors. The victim tried to
pacify those who were involved in the said fight. Consequently, he was threatened by these
persons, one of them a relative of the appellant. Rolando considered the said incident to be the
motive for killing the victim.
On the other hand, the defense presented the appellant, who interposed the defense of denial.
The appellant denied he was the one who shot the victim because they were gangmates in
Simeon Street, Talon Dos, Las Pias City, for more than two years and he had no motive to kill
him. According to appellant, on 24 October 2000, at around 6:00 in the morning, he went to the
store of the victim to buy bread and cigarettes. After those items where handed over to him by
the victim, the latter followed him and sat in front of his store. Surprisingly, when he was about
two meters away, two persons appeared somewhere behind the victim. Appellant recognized
them as Joey Cuaderno (Joey) and Anicer Mingolio (Anicer). Joey immediately poked a gun at him
and told him not to run, otherwise, he will be hurt. Unexpectedly, Joey shot the victim on his
head. Anicer, on the other hand, served only as a lookout. Thereafter, Joey and Anicer ran away.
The appellant claimed that when he saw Joey shoot the victim, he was not able to move
(natulala) for 15 minutes. When the people arrived to help the victim, he went home.
Appellant averred that he did not report the killing incident to any police authority because the
police officers arrived instantaneously. He did not inform the police officers that Joey and Anicer
were the persons who shot the victim because of the death threats he and his family received.
The appellant maintained that Rolando was not at the crime scene.
Appellant also revealed that prior to 24 October 2000, there was an incident that happened in a
cockfight located in front of the house of Joey at Simeon Street, Talon Dos, Las Pias City. In said
incident, the victim did not pay his cockfight bet to his opponents, Joey and Anicer. The victim
ran amuck and punched Joey. Appellant claimed he witnessed the incident as he was only five
meters away from the place where it happened and considered the same as the motive for killing
the victim.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated 31 January 2005, finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [appellant] Jun Jun Ducabo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged and sentenced to undergo the prison term of
Reclusion Perpetua and suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Rogelio Gonzales y Factor the sum of P50,000.00 and pay the costs.10
(Emphasis supplied.)

Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal.11 Appellant
argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 31 July 2006, affirming with modification the RTC
Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant JUNJUN DUCABO
is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, ROGELIO GONZALES y FACTOR, the following
sums: (a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and (b) Twenty Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages. The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the
trial court is MAINTAINED.12
Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed the aforesaid Decision to this Court.
This court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs.
Both the Office of the Solicitor General and the appellant manifested that they were adopting
their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs.
After a meticulous review of the records, this court resolves to uphold the judgment of conviction
against the appellant.
The appellant alleges that the trial court merely relied on the bare testimony of Rolando, the
prosecutions alleged eyewitness, in convicting him of the crime charged. The appellant avers
that Rolando testified that he saw him shoot the victim; however, during Rolandos cross
examination, he categorically admitted that at the time of the shooting incident, he was looking
at the ground, as he was then sweeping inside their house. Furthermore, Rolando cannot even
describe the firearm allegedly used in killing the victim, which proved that he was not in the
crime scene and he did not actually witness the shooting.
The aforesaid arguments raised by the appellant hinges on the credibility of a Rolandos
testimony.
It is well-entrenched that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness deserve
great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial
evidence. We have recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies, because of their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These
are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the
truth.13 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained
by the Court of Appeals.14 Thus, except for compelling reasons, we are doctrinally bound by the
trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses.15
In the case at bar, this Court fully agrees in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court
that the testimony of Rolando is credible. As can be clearly gleaned from the records of this case,
Rolando positively identified the appellant as the person who shot the victim as he was just five
meters away from his brother and the appellant at the time of the shooting incident. Such
statements were repeatedly and consistently declared by Rolando even in his cross examination.
Likewise, Rolando clearly described the events that took place before, during, and after the
victim was shot by the appellant on 24 October 2000. Even the Court of Appeals stated that the
appellants criminal participation was proven with clarity and moral certainty because Rolando
had a full view of the appellants overt act while the startling event was taking place. Here we
quote the testimony of Rolando:
Q: Now, on the said date [24 October 2000] at around 6:15 in the morning, while you and your
brother [the victim] were sweeping[,] was there any untoward incident that took place?

A: Nothing, sir, except when my brother was shot by him.

Q: Who shot your brother?
A: [appellant].
Q: When did [appellant] shot (sic) your brother?
A: 24 October 2000.
Q: What time?
A: Around six, sir.
Q: Where was [appellant], when he shot your brother, [the victim]?
A: At Simeon.
Q: Now, from the place where your brother [the victim] was standing, where was [appellant]?
A: When my brother [the victim] was sweeping, he was shot by [appellant], while he is at the
back.
Q: What was the relative position of your brother, when he was shot by [appellant]?
A: Stooping down while sweeping.
Q: Will you please stand up and demonstrate the position of your brother at that time he was
shot by [appellant]?
Court Interpreter:
The Witness demonstrated wherein the Witness stoop-down almost his head parallel to the waist.
Pros. Castillo:
Almost ninety degrees to his body.
Court Interpreter:
Stipulate, Atty.?
Atty. Gaite:
Yes, almost ninety degrees to his body.
Q: In relation to your brother [the victim], where was [appellant] at the time the latter shot the
former? Will you again stand up and show to the Honorable Court?
A: Directly behind.
Q: How far was [appellant] from your brother [the victim], when your brother was shot by him?
A: More or less one meter. It is MALAPITAN.

Q: And how far were you from the two at that time?
A: About five meters, because I was inside the house near the door.
Q: Now, what happened to your brother [the victim], after he was shot by [appellant]?
A: He fell down.
xxxx
Q: Now, when you show (sic) [appellant] for the first time on [15 October 2000]16 at around 6:15
in the morning, what was he doing?
A: He is (sic) walking back and forth in front of the house.
Q: What time was that?
A: 5:45.
Q: And, how many times did you see him, how many times did he walk back and forth in front of
your house?
A: About two times.
Q: And after that what did he do?
A: And then after that, sir, my brother went out to sweep and after that I saw he shot my brother.
Q: In that particular instance, what was [appellant] doing when you saw him?
A: Sir, because my brother went out of the house, [appellant] was not there. And then, while my
brother was already sweeping, I saw he came near and poke a gun and shot my brother.17
(Emphasis supplied.)
Cross Examination:
Q: Now, on the morning of [24 October 2000], when for the first time did you see [appellant]?
A: At 6 in the morning.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He is walking to and fro in front of the house.
Q: When you say walking back and forth, how many meters did he move back and forth?
A: About seven meters.
Q: And, you said this was in front of your house?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How many times did he walk back and forth in your house?
A: About two times.

Q: And, where were you, Mr. witness, when you saw him walking back and forth?
A: In front of our house but inside our premises.
xxxx
Q: Now, when your bother (sic) was standing in front of your house, you testified that you saw
[appellant] shot your brother, now, where were you in the house when you saw that incident?
A: Somewhere at the door.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, this Court finds Rolandos testimony plausible. His positive identification of
the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged was categorical and consistent; hence, we
cannot cast any doubt on his credibility as prosecution witness. Also, there was no indication that
he was improperly motivated when he testified against the appellant. As a rule, absent any
evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full
faith and credit.19 It bears stressing that Rolando was the brother of the victim and it would be
unnatural for him, being a relative and interested in vindicating the crime, to implicate someone
other than the real culprit lest the guilty go unpunished. The earnest desire to seek justice for a
dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence, and blame one
who is innocent of the crime.20 In this case, Rolandos act of testifying against the appellant was
motivated only by no other than his strong desire to seek justice for what had happened to his
brother.
While it is true that in Rolandos cross examination he stated that he was sweeping during the
time that the alleged incident transpired and his attention was more or less focused on the
ground; however, in his re-direct examination, he clearly disclosed that he noticed the presence
of the appellant in front of their house because when he saw the appellant he was not yet
sweeping but was about to sweep.21 In this regard, this Court also deems it necessary to quote
the discussions made by the appellate court, which states:
To stress, Rolandos credibility was not tainted by any modicum of doubt. He was certain that
appellant was the lone assailant. Rolando had known appellant as a neighbor in the same
compound spanning seven years since 1993 until that dreadful incident. His favorable condition
of visibility that early morning enabled him to see the commencement and consummation of
appellants nefarious act. Rolando first saw appellant walking back and forth in front of their
house. While he was sweeping, there was no noted obstruction that could have prevented him
from noticing the sudden arrival of appellant. Rolando, stationed at their door at that time, from
five (5) meters distance, saw appellant come within one meter at the back of the victim, after
which appellant shot the victim at close range, hitting him on the nape. Significantly, Rolando
identified appellant in court as the malefactor, to which the latter did not object.
Once a person gains familiarity with another, identification becomes an easy task even from a
considerable distance. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a
lasting impression on the victims and eyewitness minds which cannot be easily erased from
their memory.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
The argument of the appellant that Rolandos failure to identify the firearm used in killing the
victim strengthened the fact that he did not witness the shooting incident deserves scant
consideration. It is already well established that the identification and the presentation of the
murder weapon are not indispensable to the prosecutions cause when the accused has
positively been identified.23 Since Rolando has positively identified the appellant, his failure to
identify and present the firearm used in killing the victim cannot be considered fatal to his
testimony.

The appellant likewise denies having committed the crime charged because the victim was his
gangmate for almost two years and he had no motive to kill the victim. Instead, he imputed the
commission of the crime charged to some other persons, who, according to him, had the motive
for killing the victim. The said contentions of the appellant stand on hollow ground.
This Court had previously said that aside from its intrinsic weakness, the defense of denial
cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the prosecution witness who had no
improper motive whatsoever to falsely testify against the accused. Between the self-serving
testimony of the accused and the positive identification by the prosecution witness, the latter
deserves greater credence.24 Moreover, in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the
offense. Motive becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and
there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has
committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the
culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and
satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial
in the successful prosecution of a criminal case. Hence, whether or not appellant had any motive
in killing the victim, his conviction may still follow from the positive and categorical identification
made by the witness.25
In the case under consideration, it must be noted that the appellant immediately left the scene
of the crime after the victim was shot. He also admitted during trial that he did not report to the
police authorities that Joey and Anicer were the persons who shot the victim. He merely kept
silent for a long period of time allegedly because of the death threats made by the alleged
culprits. It is noteworthy that the appellant was apprehended three years after the commission of
the crime charged because he cannot be located by the authorities. Likewise, he simply
mentioned the name of Joey and Anicer as the persons responsible for killing the victim when he
was already detained for almost one year in a detention cell in Las Pias City. The sole reason
given by him for his late confession was because of the threats made upon him by Joey and
Anicer. To our mind, these are lame excuses posited by the appellant only to exonerate himself
from his criminal liabilities and responsibilities. The fact that he immediately went home after the
killing incident and was nowhere to be found thereafter are clear indications of guilt on his part. If
the appellant was not the person responsible for killing the victim, he could have reported it right
away to the police authorities who, according to him, immediately arrived at the scene of the
crime.26 The alleged fear for his life was also inexistent at such point in time because the police
authorities were already there at the scene of the crime and the alleged culprits had already
escaped. In the wordings of the trial court, "the presence of the police itself was an assurance
that they were there to serve justice. The assailants he pointed to were no longer there and
could not made (sic) any threat against him. Any proclaimed fear by the [appellant] to report the
supposed assailants is thus more of a concoction rather than a fact."27
Having been positively identified by Rolando as the author of the crime, appellants defense of
denial and lack of motive, being self-serving and unsubstantiated, cannot be given any
evidentiary value.
This Court agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a circumstance qualifying the
killing of the victim. As we have consistently ruled, there is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist,
namely: (a) the employment of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and
consciously adopted.28
In the case at bar, the attack on the victim was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. The
appellant, surreptitiously and without warning, shot the victim who was at that time unarmed
and completely unaware of any impending danger to his life. He had no opportunity to offer any

defense at all against the surprise attack by the appellant with a deadly weapon. All these
indicate that the appellant employed means and methods which tended directly and specially to
insure the execution of the offense without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
victim might have.
The Information also alleged that evident premeditation attended the killing.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the
time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that
he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.29 Like any other
circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by
clear and positive proof; that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.30 The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment.31 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show the presence of
any of these elements.
Appellant is guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, for the wrongful death of the victim. Under
Article 24832 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 233 of
the Revised Penal Code. The prison term imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals is therefore correct.
We now go to the award of damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages
may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.34
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.35 We affirm the award of civil indemnity given by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. Under prevailing jurisprudence,36 the award of P50,000.00 to the
heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is proper.
As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto because said damages
were not duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty.37 However, the award of P25,000.00
in temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.38 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.39 Thus, the award of
temperate damages by the appellate court is in order.
Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.40 The award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is likewise in order.
The heirs of the victim are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established.41
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 01116 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant Junjun Ducabo is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Rogelio

Gonzales y Factor the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
appellant.

People v. Tubongbanua
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended
Information 1 that reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with
intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua
on the different parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said
Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed
inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked
as the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm operated as a sole
proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M.
Accused was initially paid P6,000.00 a month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and
extra pay, which he received when he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Khos family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to
her condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After
handing his employers bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen
where he drank a glass of water. Also in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Khos three year
old daughter Issa and her nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter
for a few minutes, Atty. Sua-Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly
thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with
their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued
to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile, Nelie also heard her employers screams, and locked herself
with Issa in the masters bathroom. When she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw
Marissa, whom she signaled to go downstairs for help. The latter did so, and sought help from
the security guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty. Sua-Khos father, Marcelino Sua, and husband,
Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.
When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the condominium
unit. When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on
the floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where
doctors tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims car. He
was arrested soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victims body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she suffered
eighteen (18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The stab
wounds on her chest were considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood vessel of
the heart and the heart itself. There were four stab wounds on the heart, one on the right lung
and four on the left lung. According to the doctor, the wounds could have been caused by a

sharp single-bladed object and that the incise wounds found on the left forearm, right wrist and
left leg could have been inflicted while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, where the victim worked, related
that prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided to her about his grudges
against the victim, such as being given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that
he worked long hours of the day and served many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent
the day at her boarding house where he told her he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho
treated him. Later he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He
would hit her at the back, very deep, and he would make sure that she would die. Then he would
go to the province, his territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyers Advocate Circle, also testified that before the
killing, the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his being scolded for being
late, and being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names. On February 12,
2001, the accused also told him not to get too close, as he might get involved in what was going
to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified,
didnt want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a certain
Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. She warned the accused that
something bad would happen to him if her husband would learn about it. In the evening of
February 12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged accused to go to her fathers house, because her
husband Daniel Kho would be arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson,
the former got a knife and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to
wrest control of the knife, and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbed
her he was shocked and left the place using the victims car. He fled to Mindoro where he
allegedly surrendered to the police. 2
On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to
suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection with all the accessory penalties provided by
law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual,
moral, nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums of P298,202.25,
P50,000.00, P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the victims
heirs P50,000.00 for the loss of the victims life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6
percent per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 3
The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, pursuant
to our ruling in People v. Mateo, 4 the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals.
5
On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
the following:

(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision and the
complete records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the Supreme Court on
automatic review, immediately upon the promulgation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for
being incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his
flight from the crime scene. It also noted that treachery did not attend the commission of the
crime as there were no particulars as to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established
which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an
aggravating circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the
victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to
the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same
should not be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental briefs. The
Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a supplemental brief. On
the other hand, appellant insisted on his theory of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellants claim of
self-defense is self-serving hence should not be given credence. In Cabuslay v. People, 7 we ruled
that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of
proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by
clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or
a stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self defense must
be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person claiming self defense.
Appellants version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was Atty.
Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. Appellants alleged use of
reasonable means to repel the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number
of wounds inflicted on the victim which demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not
just defend oneself. 8 We note that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to
her chest, heart and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted while she was
parrying the blows coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified that Atty. Sua-Kho was
running away from him but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:

Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and that
was the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir. 9
Moreover, appellants act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the incident to the
police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly indicative of guilt and
negate his claim of self defense. 10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
present. Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the
deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions
must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the
offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to
defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of the execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the offender. 11 Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. 12
In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no particulars
are known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in
the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere
suppositions that the killing was perpetrated by treachery. 13
We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength attended
the killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be
established by clear and positive evidence; 14 that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 15 The
essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflections upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he
has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 16
Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to appellants state of
mind and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses
testified on appellants ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Absent evidence

showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to falsely testify against the appellant, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies should be
accorded full faith and credit. Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He
killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several
times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act
without employing physical superiority over the victim. In People v. Espina, 17 we have ruled that
an attack by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act
afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the
information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the
respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an
amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave
of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A
substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. 19
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and
formal amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the
following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4)
an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his
right to invoke prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the
accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if
the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a
substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense
different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They
relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction.
The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. 22 Besides, appellant
never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank,
age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her
elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately
intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive
for the murder was his grudge against the victim and not because she was a lawyer and his
employer. Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact that
she is a woman when he killed her.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, 25 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, 26 prescribes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and
taking advantage of superior strength without any mitigating circumstance, the proper
imposable penalty would have been death. 27
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006 28, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua,
thus:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest,
in proper cases. 29
We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the amount of actual
damages and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need
of proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the
award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury
or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the
wrong done. 30 To be recoverable, actual and compensatory damages must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. 31 In the present case, the award of actual damages of
P298,210.25 32 is correct, considering that the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of
the violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case. Moreover,
as an example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of
P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no mitigating
circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without
possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from this date until fully paid.

Rivera v People
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite,
Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of the Philippines. v. Esmeraldo Rivera,
et al.
On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault
and hit with a piece of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury
on his head and on the different parts of his body, the accused thus commenced the commission
of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder by reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran (sic) away and the timely response of
the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April 1998 after
a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as a Bayaning Pilipino by the
television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out a living as a
manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador II, Dasmarias,
Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for
being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled
invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look for
his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers,
Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael
mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit
Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued
mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: Awatin sila! Awatin sila! Ruben felt dizzy

but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen
on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr., signed a
medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal
area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions
on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital left.[4] The doctor declared that the lacerated
wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from one to seven days.[5]
The doctor prescribed medicine for Rubens back pain, which he had to take for one month.[6]
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house and
banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he went
out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each other. He
fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and he was pulled
away and brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but Ruben
grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled. He went
home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front of
their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged
the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him. His brother
Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was.
A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the
ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardos shirt and hair, and, in the process, Rubens
head hit the lamp post.[7]
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
and are sentenced to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of
prision mayor as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of the
accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and severally, civil indemnity to the private
complainant in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and their witnesses.
The accused appealed to the CA, which rendered judgment on June 8, 2004 affirming, with
modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is MODIFIED in
that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the
CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they
had the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Petitioners
aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in
the parietal area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only. Even if

petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove treachery; hence, they
should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.
On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners intent to kill
Ruben:
On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound inflicted
and the kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil in his testimony
as follows:
Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a piece of hollow block xxx
and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.
Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit with a hollow block by
Dagol?
A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while Dagol was hitting, Sir.
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block
directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered
away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each other maul the
defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them even
picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three times;
and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist from their
concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of the CA is
correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption of innocence
raised by petitioners. The crime has been clearly established with petitioners as the perpetrators.
Their intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and categorically declared
that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St. Peter Avenue when he was suddenly boxed by
Esmeraldo Baby Rivera. They further narrated that, soon thereafter, his two brothers Ismael and
Edgardo Dagul Rivera, coming from St. Peter
II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that they saw
Edgardo Dagul Rivera pick up a hollow block and hit Ruben Rodil with it three (3) times. A careful
review of their testimonies revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of
petitioners. In this case, the victim did not even have the slightest warning of the danger that lay
ahead as he was carrying his three-year old daughter. He was caught off-guard by the assault of
Esmeraldo Baby Rivera and the simultaneous attack of the two other petitioners. It was also
established that the victim was hit by Edgardo Dagul Rivera, while he was lying on the ground
and being mauled by the other petitioners. Petitioners could have killed the victim had he not
managed to escape and had the police not promptly intervened.
Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim was superficial
and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of the injury does not negate the intent to kill. The
Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block
directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered
away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is
attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three (3) brothers helped each other

maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that one of
them picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the head with it three
times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist from
their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[11]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or
attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by
direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission
of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim,[12] the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.
If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the
intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows.
Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained
assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben
on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a
lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder. Even if
Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony,
thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.[13]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.[14]

The Court in People v. Lizada[15] elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense. The raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of
cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to
be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of
being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the
crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal
quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary
that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design.
It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made. The act done need not constitute the
last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal
relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.[16]
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting
the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
We reject petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission
of the felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was
walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no
chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the
three siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim.[17]
Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to
repel it or defend himself, there would be treachery.[18] Obviously, petitioners assaulted the
victim because of the altercation between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There
being conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.[19]
The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of
prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua
to death. Since petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced
by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2 of
Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. In
the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the felony (other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery), the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of
prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a range of six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer

an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. No costs.

People v Taan
Accused-appellant Eduardo Taan @ Bebot was found guilty of murder aggravated by the use of
an unlicensed firearm and sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. U-10383 in the Decision1
dated 19 July 2000 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered, CONVICTING EDUARDO TAAN OF the crime of
Murder aggravated with the use of unlicensed firearm and the Court sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law; Taan is likewise
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages and
another sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mitimus and to transmit the whole records of
the case to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta
City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Eduardo Taan alias "BEbot" [sic] to the
National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.2
The relevant antecedents are as follows:
The Information3 in Criminal Case No. U-10383 for murder alleged:
That sometime in July, 1999, at Barangay Canarvacanan, Binalonan, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO TAAN, alias "BEBOT", in
conspiracy with DANNY DOE, whose true name has not yet been fully established, armed with a
big stone and an unlicensed short firearm, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully unlawfully, and feloneously [sic] attack, assault, hold,
hit, strike, tie and shoot Ricardo Ladaga, inflicting upon him the following injuries:
-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo-parietal area; Right.
-Fracture, 1 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, mid-posterior aspect of the hard palate, most
probably of a gunshot wound entrance.
-Skull Fracture, 1.3 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, upper third of the occipital area, most
probably of a gunshot wound exit, Right.
-Avulsion, teeth, Left and Right Lower Central Incissors. [sic]
-Avulsion, tooth, Left Lateral Lower Incissor [sic].
which caused the instantaneous death of said Ricardo Ladaga, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 7659 and 8294.4

During his arraignment, Taan, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter,
trial ensued.5
The prosecutions evidence consist of the testimonies of (1) Juanito Ochinang, a relative of the
victim, Ricardo Ladaga (Ladaga), and an eyewitness to the shooting incident;6 (2) Dr. Danilo
Rebugio, Municipal Health Officer of Laoac, Pangasinan, who conducted the autopsy on the body
of Ladaga;7 (3) Cipriano Culiao, Jr., member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Binalonan,
Pangasinan, who entered into the police blotter the report that Ladaga was missing since 18 July
1999;8 (4) SPO2 Wilfredo Tagala, member of the PNP Records Section of the Firearms and
Explosives Division, who identified in court the certification that Taan is not a licensed firearm
holder;9 (5) Dave Fronda, PNP-CIDG, who took down the statement of Ochinang and found
Ladagas body on 15 September 1999 buried at the nearby irrigation canal at Barangay
Canarvacanan, Binalonan, Pangasinan;10 (6) Silvino Ladaga who testified that the white t-shirt
and slippers he last saw his brother, Ladaga, wearing were found ten (10) meters away from
Taans house after the fateful incident;11 and documents consisting of (1) the Autopsy Report
dated 17 September 1999 on Ladaga;12 (2) the Sworn Statement dated 14 September 1999 of
Ochinang;13 (3) the Certification dated 25 April 2000 of the Firearms and Explosives Division of
the PNP, showing that Taan does not possess any authority or license from the government to
possess the subject firearm;14 (4) the Police Blotter with the entry regarding the disappearance
of Ladaga;15 (5) the Radio Message for Transmission accomplished by the Police Superintendent
in September 1999, reporting that Ladaga was last seen by witnesses accosted by Taan,
Ochinang, and a certain Danny, and that Ochinang has vowed to pinpoint the location where
Ladaga was shot four (4) times in the head and buried by Taan;16 and (6) the Memorandum
prepared by the Team which investigated the incident reporting that Taan poked a revolver inside
Ladagas mouth and simultaneously a gunshot rang four (4) times.17
The prosecution sought to prove that on 18 July 1999, the witness Ochinang, a Barangay
Kagawad and relative of the deceased, was at Mariano Domaoals (Mariano) house in Sitio
Obbog, San Maria, Binalonan, Pangasinan having a "drinking spree" with Mariano, Romeo
Domaoal, Mario Rivera, Eduardo Taan, Danilo Marquez, Marlon Ruar and Romeo Tacadena.18 At
around 4:30 p.m., Taan invited the group to continue their drinking session at his house in Sitio
Obbog, Barangay Dumayat of the same town.19 Ochinang, Marquez, Tacadena and Ruar
accepted the invitation and on their way to Taans house, they met Ladaga. Surprised, Taan told
his godfather, Tacadena, "this is the one we are looking for, he was the one who robbed the
school." Taan continued to say, "Take him, Ninong, Danny because I have been looking for that
guy."20 Tacadena and Marquez took hold of Ladaga and carried him towards a mango tree. To
force Ladaga to confess to the crime of stealing, which he later did, Marquez tied Ladagas hands
with a palm leaf while Taan held the latters legs.21 Marquez then struck Ladagas forehead with
a big stone.22 Taan removed Ladagas shirt to wipe the blood off the latters face.23 At around
8:00 p.m., Ladaga was brought inside Taans house.24 Afterwards, Taan asked Tacadena and Ruar
to go home.25 Between midnight to 1:00 a.m., Marquez, who had with him a shovel, and Taan,
armed with a gun, brought Ladaga to a two (2) foot-deep irrigation canal at Barangay
Canarvacanan. Thereat, Ladaga was made to lie down and Taan poked a gun in his mouth and
fired it four (4) times. Ochinang, then at the dike of the irrigation canal, about a meter away from
the scene, witnessed the incident and how Taan buried Ladaga in the irrigation canal.26
Two days later, Taan summoned Ochinang to dig a deeper burial site for Ladaga because of the
foul odor coming from the original gravesite. Nonetheless, it was Taan who dug a deeper site
which was more or less six (6) meters from the original site. Taan removed Ladagas body from
the original gravesite and transferred it to the new excavation.27
On 14 September 1999, Ochinang reported the matter to the Central Intelligence Division Group
(CIDG), Dagupan City. Thereat, he executed a sworn statement28 asserting Taans authorship of
the crime and indicating the place where Ladaga had been buried. Subsequently, Ladagas body
was recovered from the place pointed to by Ochinang.29

Dr. Danilo Rebugio, Municipal Health Officer of Laoac, Pangasinan, conducted an autopsy of the
victim and made the following post-mortem findings, viz.:
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- An [almost] decomposed body of a male cadaver.
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo-parietal area; Right.
-Fracture, 1 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, mid-posterior aspect of the hard palate, most
probably of a gunshot wound entrance.
-Skull Fracture, 1.3 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, upper third of the occipital area, most
probably of a gunshot wound exit, Right.
-Avulsion, teeth, Left and Right Lower Central Incissors [sic].
-Avulsion, tooth, Left Lateral Lower Incissor [sic].
CAUSE OF DEATH: MASSIVE
INTRA-CRANIAL INJURIES MOST
PROBABLY SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT
WOUND.30
The prosecution likewise presented a certification dated 25 April 2000 from the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the PNP stating that Taan is "not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and caliber per verification from available records with this office as of this date."31
Taan, as sole witness for the defense, interposed the defense of denial. He alleged that Ochinang
falsely accused him of the crime because he had previously imputed against the latter the
stealing of three (3) of his uncles goats and he had refused to help Ochinang in his bid for the
position of barangay kagawad.32
Taan testified that on 18 July 1999, after attending a wedding celebration, he and Marlon Ruar
went to Marianos house and had a drinking session with Mariano, Rogelio Dumali, Romeo Pulido,
Luding and Romeo Domaoal. While thereat, Taan saw Ochinang pulling a person whose identity
Taan did not know and whose hands were tied with "buri." Taan and the rest of the group were
shocked to see the person with a blackeye. Afterwards, Taan left for home with Marlon Ruar,
Rogelio Dumali, Romeo Tacadena and Danny Marquez.33
At his house, Taan again saw Ochinang with the person who had a blackeye and whose hands
were tied with "buri." Taan asked who the person was. Ochinang replied that he is "[m]y nephew
who is a theft [sic] whom I cannot control." Taan then ordered Ochinang and the man to leave to
avoid involvement in the situation.34
Several days after, Ochinang dropped by Taans house while the latter was having a drink with
Romeo Tacadena and Danny Marquez. Taan invited Ochinang to join them. Ochinang acceded.
During their conversation, Taan asked Ochinang whether he had heard about the disappearance
of the man he had previously been with. Ochinang, in response, told them not to talk anymore
and to just keep silent. Taan and the group proceeded to tell Ochinang, "You again killed a
person." Ochinang replied, "Just keep your cool and shut up your mouth."35

Taan was found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for
automatic review. In a Resolution36 dated 14 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. No. 145508,37
the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v. Efren
Mateo.38
Before the Court of Appeals, Taan argued that the trial court erred in: (1) convicting him of the
crime of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; (2) giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while
completely ignoring the defenses evidence; (3) appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
treachery where none existed; (4) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify
the heirs of Ladaga the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.39
The Court of Appeals in a Decision40 dated 30 March 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00257,
affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, The 19 July 2000 Decision of Branch 46, Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City in
Criminal Case No. U-10383, finding appellant Eduardo Taan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder and imposing upon him the penalty of death, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Ricardo Ladaga, the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.41
The Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to deviate from the trial courts observation
that Ochinang was clear and categorical in identifying Taan as the assailant and that his
testimony is sufficient to support a conviction.
Taan is now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the Court
of Appeals. Through his Manifestation and Motion dated 9 January 2006, Taan stated that there is
no more necessity to file a supplemental brief and prayed that the case be resolved on the basis
of the records and the brief earlier filed.42 Earlier, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested
that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief.43
The Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court affirms the judgment of conviction but reduces the sentence of death to reclusion
perpetua.
Settled is the rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial
evidence of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the
unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range the conduct,
demeanor and deportment of the witnesses as they gave their testimonies before the trial
court.44 Unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated
certain facts and circumstances which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case,
appellate courts are bound by the findings of facts of the trial court.45
The trial court gave credence and full probative value to the testimony of Ochinang. The trial
court characterized Ochinangs testimony as "positive, categorical and straightforward."46 The
trial court also found Ochinangs testimony to be adequately supported by documentary

evidence. Ochinangs testimony that Marquez struck Ladagas face with a stone was confirmed
by the Autopsy Report, to wit:
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
-Depressed Fracture; 3 cm. x 4 cm.; oblong in shape; mid-temporo- parietal area; Right.
Ochinangs allegation that Taan put the barrel of the gun inside Ladagas mouth and fired it,
causing the latters death, was likewise established by the Autopsy Report, viz:
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
xxxx
-Skull Fracture, 1.3 cm. in diameter, circular in shape, upper third of the occipital area, most
probably of a gunshot wound exit Right.
Thus, leading the trial court to declare that:
Between the positive, clear, unequivocal and specific declarations of Ochinang, who was in the
company of the accused Taan and Marquez on July 18, 1999, and defense contention that it
could have been that the person who could have killed Ricardo Ladaga was Juanito Ochinang
because of his reputation. The declaration of Ochinang prevails over the denial of Taan. The
Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was Taan, with the assistance of Marquez,
who inflicted injuries to the face of the victim. Likewise, Taan was the one who shot the victim by
putting the barrel of his gun to the mouth of Ladaga.47
Evidently, Ochinang testified in a clear and convincing manner leaving no room for doubt that
indeed it was Taan who killed Ladaga.
That Ochinangs testimony is at variance with his Sworn Statement48 does not persuade us to
rule that Ochinang should be discredited as a witness. Taan points out that on the witness stand,
Ochinang testified that after the drinking spree, he was with the rest of the group when they met
Ladaga; while in his Sworn Statement, Ochinang stated that after parting ways with his drinking
mates, he was about to cross a river by means of a foot bridge when he saw Taan and Marquez
holding Ladaga.49 We believe, however, that the alleged inconsistencies are trivial and
insignificant and refer only to minor details and as such, do not impugn Ochinangs credibility.
Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witnesss affidavit and testimony do not
necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or
inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.50 Between
the ex-parte affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the latter commands greater
weight particularly when the defense had the full opportunity to cross-examine the witness.51
Next, Taan contends that Ochinangs failure to protect his relative, Ladaga, from harm and to
immediately report the matter to Ladagas family erode Ochinangs credibility.52
We are not persuaded. Ochinang testified that he had tried to stop Taan and Marquez from tying
Ladagas hands,53 but could not because Taan was holding a gun and he had taken shabu.54
Ochinang also implored Taan and Marquez four (4) times not to kill Ladaga to no avail.55 The
reason Ochinang failed to immediately report the incident to the authorities was his fear of Taan,
who had warned him not to disclose the incident, and his several bodyguards.56 Pertinently, we
have ruled in People v. Hernandez,57 that:
Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are
sufficient explanations for a witness delay in reporting the crime to the authorities. Such failure
in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the

complaint. Likewise, the natural hesitance of the witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case, and their unwillingness to be involved or dragged into a
criminal investigation is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect their
credibility.58
The supposed grudge Ochinang had against Taan which provoked the filing of the criminal case is
flimsy to be believed. Even assuming that the allegation were true, the existence of a grudge
does not automatically render Ochinangs testimony bereft of credibility.59
All told, pitted against the categorical and positive testimony of Ochinang, Taans defense of
denial miserably fails. Denials, as negative and self-serving evidence, do not deserve as much
weight in law as positive and affirmative testimonies.60 Remarkably, Taan did not any present
corroborating witness, i.e. his drinking buddies, to strengthen his testimony that Ladaga, the
previously unidentified individual who had a blackeye and whose hands were tied, was last seen
with Ochinang.
With respect to the non-presentation of the subject firearm, such is not fatal to the prosecution of
an illegal possession case as long as the existence thereof can be established by testimony.61 In
this case, Ochinang testified that he saw Taan in possession of a ".38 caliber revolver"62 which
the latter used to shoot Ladaga.63 Significantly, this was corroborated by the testimony of Dr.
Rebugio, who conducted the post-mortem examination on Ladaga. He reported that Ladaga
sustained a gunshot wound the entry of which is a hole 1.3 cm. in diameter located in the midposterior aspect of the hard palate while the exit thereof is another hole 1.3 cm in diameter in
the upper third of the occipital area.64
In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial court correctly appreciated the circumstance of
treachery. For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of
means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate;
and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.65 Treachery clearly
attended the killing as Ladaga, pinned down by Taan, was tipsy when he was killed, and thus was
enfeebled and did not have full control of his senses.66 Previously, Ladagas hands had been tied
and his forehead had been struck with a stone.67 With Marquez carrying a shovel and Taan
armed with a gun, the unarmed, weakened Ladaga was clearly defenseless. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape.68
Article 24869 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,70
prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm,71 which was proven through Ochinangs testimony and the Certification that
Taan is not a licensed holder of a firearm, the proper imposable penalty would have been death.
However, in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty, the penalty that should be imposed is reclusion perpetua.72
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest,
in proper cases.73
We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the awards of civil
indemnity ex delicto to P75,000.00 and moral damages to P50,000.00 for the heirs of Ladaga,
based on recent jurisprudence.74
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00257 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Eduardo Taan @ "Bebot" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as

defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
aggravated with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The proper imposable penalty is death.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim, Ricardo Ladaga, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages; all with
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from this date until fully paid. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

People v Casela
Appellant Artemio Casela (Casela) assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 15
March 2006, affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
13 of Carigara, Leyte,[3] dated 10 February 2004, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder.
In an Information[4] dated 31 March 2003 filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Cesar M. Merin,
appellant and his co-accused Felibert Insigne (Insigne) were indicted before the RTC for the crime
of murder against Ronaldo Rain (Rain),[5] committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of January, [sic] 2003, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one RONALDO RAIN with the use of a bladed weapon, which the accused
have provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following
wounds, to wit:
1.
Stabbed (sic) wound 5 cm x 2 cm x 13 cm (R) anterior chest at level of manubrium sterni
with sternal fracture.
2.
Stabbed (sic) wound 3.5 cm x 1.4 cm x 15 cm (R) anterior chest at level of 4th ICS along
sternal line.
3.
Stabbed (sic) wound 2.2 cm x 1 cm x 13 cm (R) anterior chest along anterior axillary line at
level of 9th ICS.
4.
Stabbed (sic) wound 10 cm x 2.5 cm x 6 cm (L) arm middle 3rd, lateral aspect.
which wounds caused the death of said Ronaldo Rain.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

On 6 January 2003, appellant was placed under the custody of law. His co-accused Insigne,
however, remains at large. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.[7] The case forthwith
proceeded to trial with the prosecution presenting the following witnesses: (1) Dr. Bella VegaProfetana (Dr. Profetana), Municipal Health Officer of Carigara, Leyte; and (2) Reynaldo
Makabenta (Makabenta), the alleged eyewitness to the attack on the victim.
The prosecution espoused the following version of the incident, as established by the testimony
of Makabenta:

At around 10:00 oclock in the evening of 2 January 2003, Makabenta, the victim Rain and three
(3) other friends started their drinking spree in Barangay Sawang, Carigara, Leyte. Later, at
around 3:00 oclock the following morning, Rain excused himself from the ongoing drinking
session in order to buy cigarettes from Naglor Videoke in the next barangay as all the stores in
Barangay Sawang were already closed. When the victim did not return, Makabenta decided to go
to Naglor Videoke himself. As he approached that establishment, located within the premises of
the public market of Barangay Baybay, Makabenta saw Rain being attacked by Insigne and
appellant as Rain was about to ride his bike.[8] Makabenta was about three (3) meters away from
Rain when he witnessed the latter being successively stabbed by both malefactors.[9] Although
Rain was able to run away after the initial assault, he was pursued by Insigne and appellant.[10]
In the course of the chase, Makabenta testified, Insigne was able to grab the back neckline of
Rains shirt, turning the latter towards him as the two accused proceeded to deliver more
stabbing blows Rain until Rain fell to the ground. Afraid to get involved, witness Makabenta left
the scene and reported the incident to the nearest police station. Thereafter, he returned to
Barangay Sawang and told their friends about what had transpired, including the fact that Rain
had died.[11]
Dr. Profetana, who conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim, testified that she found
four (4) stab wounds on the victim. The first wound, directed backwards, was fatal as it likely hit
the heart. The second one was likewise fatal, hitting vital organs such as the lungs and heart.
The third stab wound was also fatal, hitting the liver. The fourth wound, which only lacerated the
victims arm, was not fatal. She identified the cause of death to be hypovolemic shock secondary
to blood loss. Thus, the victim died due to the decrease in the volume of blood secondary to
bleeding caused by the multiple wounds he sustained on the anterior chest. In light of the extent
of the injuries suffered and the vital organs damaged, Dr. Profetana opined that the victim could
not have survived the attack.[12]
In his defense, appellant avers that he had no participation in the attack on Rain which resulted
in the latters death. He testified that at about 1:00 oclock in the morning of 3 January 2003, he
was at Naglor Videoke Bar on a drinking spree with Insigne. Rain allegedly entered the bar,
immediately approached their table and asked who their other companions were.[13] Appellant
maintained that he did not reply to the Rains query because it was public knowledge that there
was a feud between the families of Rain and Insigne, and this being so, he was apprehensive that
trouble might erupt inside the bar.[14] Thereafter, according to appellant, Insigne stepped out of
the bar and he followed suit. As appellant headed home, about three (3) stores away from the
videoke bar, he turned back and saw Insigne stabbing Rain who was holding his bicycle.
Appellant purportedly yelled at Insigne to stop but his advice was not heeded, thus appellant ran
home.[15] Appellant alleged that the only person in the vicinity at the time of the incident was
his younger sister, who was on her way to fetch him.[16] He asserted that Makabenta was not
then present.[17]
Appellant also presented SPO4 Teofilo Lucelo (SPO4 Lucelo) to refute the assertions of Makabenta
that he had reported the incident to the police and, consequently, to cast doubt on his claim that
he had personally witnessed the events that led to the death of Rain. SPO4 Lucelo testified that
from 2 January 2003 until about 8:00 oclock in the morning of the next day, he was officer of the
day at the police station of Carigara, Leyte. At about 3:00 oclock in the morning of 3 January
2003, an unidentified caller from the market compound reported that there had been a
commotion therein. While SPO4 Lucelo did not notice if anyone had gone to their office that
morning to inform them of the incident, he was certain that he did not see Makabenta in their
office. He admitted, however, that he had an alert team of seven (7) men and an assistant
investigator also then on-duty.[18]
Finding that the prosecution had proven the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against appellant on 10 February 2004. With the
appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of conspiracy, treachery and nighttime, and

without any mitigating circumstance, appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and
to pay: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P75,500.00; (2)
P18,500.00 as actual damages; (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) cost.[19]
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic
review. However, pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,[20] the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals.[21]
On 15 March 2006, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming with modification
appellants conviction. The penultimate paragraph and dispositive portion of the decision states:
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Having discounted the appreciation of conspiracy and nighttime as generic aggravating
circumstances, the crime in the case at bench was not aggravated, and there being no mitigating
circumstance, in accordance with Article 61, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed. Thus, for the murder of Ronaldo Rain, we reduce the penalty of accused-appellant
Artemio Casela from death to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING
the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING with MODIFICATION the Decision dated February 10,
2004 of the RTC of Carigara, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 4253 such that the accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. All other dispositive portions of the
assailed Decision are hereby AFFIRMED by us.
SO ORDERED.[22]
On 13 September 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire.[23] On 14
November and 22 November 2006, appellant and appellee filed similar manifestations that they
are adopting the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.[24] Thus, appellant raises the
following errors in this petition for review:
I
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTIONS ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.
II
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE COURT A-QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER
INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.[25]
Simply put, the Court is called upon to determine whether or not the guilt of appellant for the
crime as charged has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The determination of the

sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to sustain a conviction hinges primarily on the credibility
of its sole eyewitness.
Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to have relied mainly on Makabentas
testimony that he positively identified appellant as the victims assailant considering that the
latters claim that he personally reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities was
categorically disputed by SPO4 Lucelo. He further avers that a certain Maimai Aguillon (Aguillon)
was the actual eyewitness to the incident but that the prosecution failed to present her during
the trial, thus leaving the testimony of Makabenta doubtful.[26]
After carefully sifting the evidence on record, we find no reason to depart from the findings of the
RTC on the credibility of Makabenta. As a general rule, the trial court is in the best position to
determine facts and to assess the credibility of witnesses as it is in a unique position to observe
the witnesses deportment while testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate court.[27] Hence,
the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal, unless: (1) it is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some
substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was
overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted; or (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her
discretion.[28]
That Makabenta was the sole eyewitness to the killing of Rain presented against appellant is not,
by itself, determinative. Criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses against them
but on the quality of the testimony given under oath. Even one witness will suffice provided he or
she succeeds in convincing the court of the
guilt of the accused with moral certainty.[29] The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
sustain a conviction, even of a charge of murder, if it is positive and credible.[30]
Moreover, the prosecution is under no duty to present a definite number of witnesses. The
discretion to decide whom it wants to call to the witness stand lies with the prosecution. It is
axiomatic that witnesses are weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may
suffice for conviction if otherwise trustworthy and reliable for there is no law which requires that
the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except where the law expressly mandates
otherwise.[31] Accordingly, the prosecutions decision to forego the presentation of Aguillon as
corroborating witness is a matter of discretion and does not by itself militate against the
credibility of Makabenta. Curiously, if the defense found Aguillons testimony to be of such
consequence, it is a wonder why it did not so present her to bolster appellants assertions.
Ultimately, the presentation of Makabenta at the trial as the sole eyewitness to the whole event
should not by itself erode his credibility. It is worthy to note that Makabenta testified with candor
and consistency in recounting the material events of the crime. A witness who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a credible
witness.[32] What is more, where conditions of visibility are favorable and the eyewitness
assertion as to the identity of the assailant is not tainted with bias, said assertion as to the
identity of the malefactor can very well be accepted.[33] There is no evidence to show any
dubious or improper circumstances or motive why Makabenta would prevaricate against
appellant and his co-accused or falsely implicate them in a heinous crime as he was friends not
only with the victim, but with appellant and Insigne as well.[34] Hence, appellants bare denial
cannot overcome his positive identification by the prosecution witness.[35]
On record, Makabenta declared
distance of approximately three
accused had attacked the victim.
co-accused as the perpetrators
incident, viz:

under oath and in unequivocal terms that he saw, from a

to six meters, in a well-lit place how appellant and his coHe was unambiguous and positive in naming appellant and his
of the killing, and in narrating the specifics of the criminal

xxxx
Atty. Canamaque:
Q Do you know the accused Artemio Casela, Jr.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Because he is my barkada.
Q How long have you been a barkada with (sic) Artemio Casela, Jr.?
A Long time.
xxxx
Q How about Felibert Insigne, do you know him personally?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A He is also my barkada.
Q How long have you been a barkada of Felibert Insigne?
A Long time, sir.[36]

xxxx
Q And did you know where Onie go (sic) to buy cigarette(s)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At the Videokes place.
Q Did Onie Rain return back to the place where you were drinking?
A No, sir.
Q So, what did you do?
A So, I went there at (sic) the place where there is a Videoke and I used my bike in going there
and I saw Onie who was about to ride his bike too.
Q Where is this Videoke located?
A Naglor Videoke.
Q Where is that?
A At Brgy. Baybay, Carigara, Leyte.
Q Where particularly in Baybay, Carigara, Leyte?
A Within the premises of the public market.
Q Were you able to reach that place?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell this Honorable Court whether that place is well lighted since it is a market?
A Yes, sir there (sic) was.

Q Now, you said Onie Rain was about to ride on his bike, what happened?
A He was successively stabbed by Felibert.
Q Was Onie Rain hit by the stabbing blow of Felibert Insigne?
A Yes, sir.
Q After Felibert Insigne stabbed [sic], what happened next?
A He was again stabbed.
Q By whom?
A That person. [(]Witness pointing to a person in the courtroom who when asked of his name
identified himself as Artemio Casela, Jr.[)]
Q After Artemio Casela, Jr.[,] the accused herein [,] followed the stab (sic) of Felibert Insigne,
what happened?
A Onie ran.
Q Towards what?
A To the place of his mother.
Q Now, when he was running, what happened?
A He was chased by them.
Q Was he overtaken by the two accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the two accuse overtook Onie Rain, what happened?
A He was stabbed again.
Q Was Onie Rain hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And particularly Felibert Insigne was able to hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about Artemio Casela, Jr. was he able to hit also Onie Rain?
A Yes, sir.
Q After hitting by the two stabbing blow (sic) by these two accused, what happened to Onie?
A He fell to the ground.
x x x x[37]
Appellant contends that Makabentas testimony is rendered dubious by the testimony of his
witness SPO4 Lucelo. There is nothing contradictory between the eyewitness account of
Makabenta and the testimony of SPO4 Lucelo. Makabenta makes no declaration that he reported
the incident to Lucelo himself. In fact, in SPO4 Lucelos own testimony, he admits that there were
other police officers then on-duty, including his assistant investigator. In the end, SPO4Lucelos
claim that he did not see Makabenta reporting the incident does not detract from the positive
assertions made by the prosecution witness on the matter of the killing of the victim.
After weighing the clashing versions of the prosecution and the defense, we agree with the trial
courts conclusion that the prosecutions version is more credible.[38] However, was the offense
committed murder or only homicide?

The trial court and the appellate court, in convicting appellant of murder, ruled that the killing
was qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.[39] To establish treachery, two elements must
concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and
(2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed.[40] The RTC
made the following observations on the matter
With the number, location and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim Ronaldo Rain, there
is apparent treachery in the execution of the dastardly acts by the perpetrators. The victim was
unarmed and totally defenseless, without any opportunity to defend himself or retaliate against
the accused, could be gleaned from the fact that accused Artemio Casela, Jr. and Felibert Insigne
did not suffer even a single scratch on their body after the stabbing incident.[41]
In concurring with the RTC that the killing was qualified by treachery, the appellate court made
this pronouncement, thus
x x x Gleaned from the testimony of Makabenta, the deceased was unarmed and about to ride
his bicycle when he was suddenly and successively stabbed by Insigne and then the accusedappellant also joined in the stabbing of the deceased. The deceased tried to run but he was
chased and was successfully overtaken by the two assailants. Insigne and the accused-appellant
successfully stabbed the deceased until the latter fell to the ground.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the deceased was clearly not in any position to defend
himself from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused-appellant and Insigne. These
circumstances are manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery
may be appreciated, i.e., the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.[42]
We find the rulings of the RTC and CA amply supported by the evidence on record. Treachery
attended the stabbing of Rain because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and
sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him to defend himself. The prosecution was
able to establish that appellants attack on the victim was without any slightest provocation on
the latters part and that it was sudden and unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery. There
being treachery, appellants conviction for murder is in order.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. In this case, treachery
was already present when appellant and Insigne, armed each with a bolo, approached the victim
and suddenly stabbed him. Rain did not have the faintest idea that he was vulnerable to an
attack, considering that he was boarding his bicycle, oblivious of the sinister intent of appellant
and Insigne. The fact that the victim was facing his malefactors at the time of the latters attack
did not erase its treacherous nature. Even if the assault were frontal, there was treachery if it
was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no time to prepare for his defense.[43] Even
more, the fact that appellant and Insigne chased the victim to inflict more stabbing blows after
the latter had already been gravely wounded clearly exhibits the treacherous nature of the killing
of the victim.
The attendance of treachery in the slaughter of Rain can be plainly deduced from the following
excerpts of Makabentas testimony

xxxx
Q Now, you said Onie Rain was about to ride on his bike, what happened?
A He was successively stabbed by Felibert.
Q Was Onie Rain hit by the stabbing blow of Felibert Insigne?
A Yes, sir.
Q After Felibert Insigne stabbed, what happened next?
A He was again stabbed.
Q By whom?
A That person. [(]Witness pointing to a person in the courtroom who when asked of his name
identified himself as Artemio Casela, Jr.[)]
Q After Artemio Casela, Jr. the accused herein followed the stab (sic) of Felibert Insigne, what
happened?
A Onie ran.
Q Towards what?
A To the place of his mother.
Q Now, when he was running, what happened?
A He was chased by them.
Q Was he overtaken by the two accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the two accused overtook Onie Rain, what happened?
A He was stabbed again.

Q Was Onie Rain hit?

A Yes, sir.
Q And particularly Felibert Insigne was able to hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about Artemio Casela, Jr.[?] was he able to hit also Onie Rain?
A Yes, sir.
Q After hitting by the two stabbing blow (sic) by these two accused, what happened to Onie?
A He fell to the ground.
x x x x[44]
In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and
the Court of Appeals should be sustained. With respect to the civil liability of appellant, the award
should be modified in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Ronaldo Rain in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P18,500.00

as actual damages for funeral expenses, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[45]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 00248, finding
appellant ARTEMIO CASELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. As
modified, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Ronaldo Rain the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P18,500.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No pronouncement as to costs.

People v Guzman
Man is subject to innumerable pains and sorrows by the very condition of humanity, and yet, as if
nature had not sown evils enough in life, we are adding grief to grief and aggravating the
common calamity by our cruel treatment of one another. Joseph Addison.
The passage depicts the tragic fate of the deceased victim in the case at bar. His ultimate dream
was to become a pilot so that he would have enough money to shoulder the schooling and
education expenses of his younger siblings. Sadly, however, this dream will never become a
reality as his young life was brutally snuffed out by certain violent individuals. He was a minor at
the time of his death. Now his family is seeking justice for his untimely and senseless killing.
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00095, dated 28
February 2005,1 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-88737, dated 12 November 2001,2 finding
accused-appellant Nicolas Guzman y Bocbosila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the
heirs of Michael Balber (Michael) the amount of P35,470.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On 29 November 1999, appellant was charged in an Information3 with Murder allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of November 1999 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with two other persons, whose true names/identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one MICHAEL ANGELO BALBER
Y CASTILLON, a minor, 17 years of age, by then and there stabbing him on the trunk with the use
of a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his untimely death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Michael
Angelo Balber y Castillon.
When arraigned on 21 January 2000,4 appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge therein. Trial
on the merits thereafter ensued.
In building its case against appellant, the prosecution relied on the testimonies of its witnesses,
namely: Ronald Santiago (Ronald), Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo), Danilo Balber (Danilo), Police
Inspector Alberto Malaza (Inspector Malaza), SPO3 Samuel Quinto (SPO3 Quinto), and Dr.
Francisco Supe, Jr. (Dr. Supe). Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
Ronald is a jeepney driver and resident of Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. He testified
that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he stopped by and ate at a carinderia
located at the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City.
After eating, he sat on a bench just beside the carinderia and rested. He noticed appellant and

two other persons having a drinking spree in a nearby grocery store. He also saw Michael walking
towards the direction of the same grocery store. When Michael was passing in front of the
grocery store, appellant and his two companions suddenly approached and surrounded Michael.
Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael while his two companions stood in front of
Michael. Suddenly, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of
appellants companions, whom he described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and
repeatedly stabbed Michael at the stomach. Afterwards, the appellants other companion, whom
he described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife from the companion with long hair, and
also stabbed Michael at the stomach. Later, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife
from the companion with flat top hair, and likewise stabbed Michael at the stomach. Appellant
also kicked Michael when the latter was already lying on the ground. He witnessed this stabbing
incident at a distance of five arms length.5
Afraid and confused, he immediately went home. The next day, however, he went to the house of
Michaels family and narrated the incident to Michaels father, Danilo. Subsequently, he was
accompanied by Danilo to the Batasan Hills Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about
the incident.6
Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo) is also a tricycle driver and resident of Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon
City. He narrated that on 25 November 1999, at around 9:00 in the evening, he was standing at
the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he
heard a female voice shouting "Sinasaksak!" When he glanced at the direction of the said shouts,
he saw, at a distance of about five arms length, appellant and the latters two companions
taking turns in stabbing Michael. One of the appellants companions, whom he described as a
toothless male with a long hair, was the first one to stab Michael. Afterwards, the appellants
other companion, whom he described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife from the
toothless male with a long hair and stabbed Michael. Subsequently, appellant also took the knife
from his companion with flat top hair and stabbed Michael too.7
Thereafter, he immediately ran and proceeded to the house of Michaels family and informed
Michaels parents about the incident. Michaels parents rushed to the crime scene and took
Michael to a hospital. The next day, he was accompanied by Danilo and a certain Ramiro Alfaro
to Batasan Hills Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about the incident.8
Danilo, Michaels father, testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he
was walking on his way home along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy.
Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he saw Michael lying along Sto. Nino Street. He also saw
appellant and the latters two male companions near Michaels body. When he was about to
approach them, they immediately ran away. He chased and threw stones at them. Appellant and
his two companions proceeded to the formers house and locked the door. He tried to follow
them all the way to the house but appellants relatives blocked his way to the door and told him
to leave. Thereafter, he went back to Michael and took the latter to Fairview Hospital.9 He was
later informed by the doctors that Michael was already dead.
The next day, he went to Batasan Hills Police Station 6 and gave a statement about the incident.
In an effort to settle the instant case, appellants wife and daughter told Danilo that they would
sell a bus which they owned and would turn over to him the proceeds thereof. He also stated that
Michael wanted to become a pilot so that, as the eldest of the children, he would be the one to
shoulder the education of his siblings.10
Inspector Malaza is a member of the police force assigned at Police Community Precinct No. 1,
Batasan Hills, Quezon City. He testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening,
he was on his way home on board his owner type jeep. Upon reaching the corner of Sto. Nino
Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, he noticed a commotion nearby. He
slowed down his vehicle and saw, at a distance of five to ten meters, appellant stabbing and
kicking Michael. He also noticed that the appellants two companions were armed with bladed

weapons. He alighted from his vehicle and approached appellant and his two companions. After
introducing himself as a police officer, appellant and his two companions scampered away. He
ran after them but caught only appellant. The two other companions of the appellant
successfully escaped. Thereafter, he handcuffed appellant and brought him to Batasan Hills
Police Station 6. He turned him over to a police investigator therein and executed an affidavit of
arrest.11
SPO3 Quinto is a police investigator at the Batasan Hills Police Station 6. He was the one who
investigated the incident. After the incident was reported to his station on 26 November 1999, he
immediately went to the crime scene upon the advice of the desk officer. Since Michael was
already brought to Fairview Hospital at that time, he proceeded thereto. Upon arriving at the
Fairview Hospital, he was informed that Michael was already dead. He then went back to the
station and took the statements of the prosecution witnesses.12
Dr. Supe is a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City. He
conducted the post mortem examination on Michaels body. His testimony evolved on the
matters stated in the Medico-Legal Report No. M-3112-99,13 viz:
"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic. Needle
puncture mark is noted on the dorsum of the right hand. There is fungal infection covering the
entire groin and extending to the buttocks.
"HEAD AND NECK:
1.) Abrasion, left superior orbital region, measuring 0.2 x 0.7 cm, 3.7 cm, from the anterior
midline.
2.) Lacerated wound, left lateral orbital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.8 cm, 5 cm from the anterior
midline.
3.) Abrasion, right inferior orbital region, measuring 0.6 x 2 cm, 1 cm from the anterior midline.
"CHEST AND ABDOMEN:
1.) Abrasion, left inferior or mammary region, measuring 0.5 x 8.5 cm. along the anterior midline.
2.) Stab wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left coastal region, measuring 1 x 4 cm, 8 cm from
the anterior midline, directed posteriorwards and medialwards making a point of exit at the left
inferior mammary region, measuring 0.7 x 2.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline, superficial.
3.) Stab wound, left subcostal region, measuring 0.7 x 2.3 cm, 14.2 cm from the anterior midline,
9 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, slightly upwards and medialwards, lacerating the
mesentery, small intestine, left hemidiaphragm.
4.) Lacerated wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left inferior clavicular region, measuring 2 x 7
cm, 4.5 cm from the posterior midline, extending to the right inferior clavicular region and
making a point of exit thereat, measuring 1 x 3 cm, superficial.
5.) Two and a half liters of blood and blood clots were evacuated from the abdominal cavity.
6.) The stomach is 250 ml full of billous fluid.
"Extremity:

1.) Lacerated wound, distal third of the right arm, measuring 0.4 x 1 cm, 2.5 cm lateral to its
anterior midline.
"CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is hemorrhage and shock secondary to multiple stab wounds of the trunk."14
On the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant and Antonio Sulficiencia
(Antonio) to disprove the foregoing charges.
Appellant testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he was inside his
store located at No. 886 Mactan St. Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he heard shouts
outside. He peeped through the window of his store and saw Danilo and Ronald pulling out a
certain Jesus de Guzman (Jesus) from the latters tricycle. Danilo and Ronald punched Jesus but
the latter retaliated. Thereafter, a rumble ensued. At the height of the brawl, he shouted Hoy!
ano ba yan? Tama na yan! Itigil na ninyo yan! Awatin na ninyo yan." Minutes later, Michael
passed by his store and inquired as to what was happening. He told Michael "Yung tatay mo at si
Santiago (Ronald) pinagtulungan si Rommel." Michael rushed to Danilo and pacified the latter.
Edgardo, one of the participants therein, threw stones at Michael. At this point, a certain Lemuel
Grans Querubin (Lemuel) arrived and tried to join the fracas. Michael, however, blocked Lemuels
way. The two wrestled and both of them fell to the ground. Moments later, Lemuel stood up.
Lemuel was holding a knife and his hands were bloodied. Michael, on the other hand, was still
lying on the ground. Lemuel then chased Danilo and Ronald but the two were able to escape.
Afterwards, Danilo, Ronald and five other persons returned to the scene. Danilo was carrying a
big bolo while the others were armed with stones and lead pipe. Lemuel and Jesus ran towards
the direction of Sto. Nino in order to escape.15
Appellant went outside his house to observe the situation. Five minutes later, the group of
Danilo, together with two policemen, proceeded to appellants house. The policemen forcibly
entered appellants house and pushed the latter against the wall. They inquired as to the
whereabouts of Lemuel and Jesus, who happened to be appellants bus conductor and driver,
respectively. When they could not find the two, the policemen invited him to the police station.
Appellant told them "Bakit ninyo ako dadalhin? wala naman akong kinalaman diyan." From then
on, the policemen held appellant in custody.16
Antonio was a former bus driver of appellant and a resident of Paranaque City. He narrated that
on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he parked a bus owned by appellants
cousin named Juanito Palmares (Juanito) just beside the appellants store. He went to appellants
store and conversed with the latter who was inside the same store. Thereafter, he saw a rumble
nearby. He ran and hid inside the parked bus while appellant stayed inside his store. Later, the
participants of the rumble began to stone them. He alighted from the bus and went inside
Juanitos house. He noticed that appellant was still inside the store. Subsequently, he saw Lemuel
running and carrying a knife. He also heard Lemuel saying "Tapos na ang laban, manahimik na
kayo." Thereupon, he saw appellant being apprehended by policemen in civilian clothes.17
On 12 November 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of murder.18 It
sustained the "clear, direct and positive" testimony of the prosecution witnesses who all declared
that they saw appellant stab Michael. It found no ill-motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses in testifying against appellant. It also ruled that there was treachery in the killing of
Michael since the latter was unarmed, unsuspecting and very young at the time of the attack. In
ending, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Nicolas Guzman Y Bocbosila guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and further ordered to pay the heirs of the late

Michael Angelo Balber the sum of Thirty-Five Thousand Four hundred Seventy Pesos
(P35,470.00), Philippine Currency, as actual damages, excluding the Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) Bagbag Cemetery as there was no evidence to justify the award of the same; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), as moral damages and the additional civil indemnity of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 26 November 2001.19 On 28 February 2005, the Court
Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision.20 The
modification pertains only to the penalty imposed by the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, in Criminal Case
No. Q-99-88737 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects except that the sentence be RECLUSION
PERPETUA only.
On automatic review before us, appellant assigned the following errors of the lower court:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
[DOUBT] OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE PALPABLE DISCREPANCIES AND
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE DEFENSE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO PRODUCE
SUBSTITUTE OR ADDITIONAL WITNESSES FOR HIS DEFENSE.
IV.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
THE VICTIM, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY.21
Anent the first issue, appellant claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should
not be given any weight as the same are filled with discrepancies and inconsistencies. According
to him, Ronald and Edgardo testified that appellant and his two companions used only one knife
in stabbing Michael. Inspector Malaza, however, declared that appellant and his two companions
were armed with separate knives during the stabbing incident. He also avers that Inspector
Malaza gave contradicting versions of how the latter apprehended him after the incident. Further,
Edgardo testified that after the incident, he immediately went to the house of Michael and
informed Danilo of what he witnessed. Danilo, however, declared that while he was on his way
home, he saw Michael lying at the corner of Sto. Nino St. and Mactan St., and, that the
malefactors were running away.
Appellants contention is bereft of merit.
A witness testifying about the same nerve-wracking incident can hardly be expected to be
correct in every detail and consistent with other witnesses in every respect, considering the
inevitability of differences in perception, recollection, viewpoint, or impressions, as well as in
their physical, mental, emotional, and psychological states at the time of the reception and recall
of such impressions.22 Thus, we have followed the rule in accord with human nature and

experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather
than destroy the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience
and numbing to senses.23
The inconsistencies cited by appellant refer to minor and unimportant details which do not
adversely affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Although the testimony of Ronald
and Edgardo as to the number of knives used in the stabbing incident differs with that of
Inspector Malaza, all of them declared under oath during the trial that appellant stabbed Michael.
Thus, as aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, such inconsistency should not be considered as a
"fatal error," since what is important and decisive is that they had seen appellant stab Michael
and that they testified on the fact during the trial.
Besides, their testimonies on material and relevant points are substantially consistent with each
other. They testified that three persons, among whom was the appellant, had stabbed Michael.
Their descriptions of the faces, physical attributes, and respective positions of appellant and his
two companions during the attack are compatible. They also stated that appellant was the last
person who stabbed Michael.
As regards the alleged inconsistent testimony of Inspector Malaza as to how the latter
apprehended the appellant, it should be borne in mind that the weight of the eyewitness account
should be on the fact that the witness saw the accused commit the crime and was positive of the
latters physical identification.24 Inspector Malaza had seen appellant stab Michael, and, in fact,
apprehended him right after the incident. Hence, the details on the manner by which Inspector
Malaza apprehended the appellant would be immaterial and irrelevant.
Appellant asserts that the testimony of Danilo runs counter to the testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses. Even if we were to disregard as evidence for the prosecution the
testimony of Danilo, the categorical and credible testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses
are sufficient to support the finding of guilt on the part of appellant. It should be emphasized that
the testimony of one eyewitness would be enough to support a conviction provided it is positive,
credible, clear and straightforward.25
Apropos the second issue, appellant denied any liability and invoked alibi. He argued that he was
inside his store when the stabbing incident occurred, and, that it was Lemuel who stabbed
Michael. He also presented Antonio to corroborate his testimony.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it is physically impossible for him to be
present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.26 If appellant
was, as he claimed, inside his store at the time of the incident, then it was not physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene or in its immediate vicinity. His store is located just
beside Mactan Street,27 and that he witnessed the incident at a distance of merely five arms
length from his store.28 Therefore, his defense of alibi must fail.
Antonio testified that he and appellant, who was inside his store, were having a conversation
when the incident occurred. A perusal of the records, however, shows that appellant did not
mention anything about such conversation. In fact, appellant did not even mention the name of
Antonio in his entire testimony. Given the foregoing, the testimony of Antonio cannot be
considered as credible.
In arguing the third issue, appellant avers that his constitutional rights to produce evidence on
his behalf and to due process were violated when the trial court denied the motion of his counsel
to present substitute witnesses.

In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000, the defense named only four witnesses,
to wit: Antonio, Lizardo Dedase, Eduardo Bidia, and accused himself.29 In the same order, the
RTC stated the following:
All parties are informed that witnesses and documents which were not mentioned in this pre-trial
order shall not be entertained during the trial on the merits.30
During the trial, only appellant and Antonio were able to testify. When the two other witnesses in
the pre-trial order, namely, Lizardo Dedase and Eduardo Bidia, failed to appear and testify in
court several times, the defense counsel moved to substitute them explaining that they were
hesitant to testify, and, that one of them went home to his province.31
The RTC was correct in denying the defense counsels motion for substitution of witnesses since
Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the matters
agreed upon in the pre-trial conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind the parties,
to wit:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit
the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice (Italics supplied).
The pre-trial order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000 clearly shows that the defense named only
four witnesses. The parties were also informed therein that witnesses who were not mentioned in
the pre-trial order will not be entertained during the trial on the merits. Thus, pursuant to the
afore-stated provision and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the disposition of criminal
cases and ensuring fair trial, the denial of the defense counsels motion for substitution of
witnesses is justified. Moreover, if appellants motion for substitution of witnesses is given due
course, it will amount to an unreasonable disregard of solemn agreements submitted to and
approved by the court of justice and would make a mockery of the judicial process.
This is not to say, however, that such provision is absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater
interest of justice. Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of appellant as the RTC
had observed that his motion for substitution of witnesses appears to be a "fishing expedition" of
evidence which is clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution.32 Moreover, as aptly stated by
the Solicitor General, if the two other witnesses of appellant were indeed afraid or hesitant to
testify, he should have moved the RTC to subpoena the said witnesses to testify in court33
pursuant to his constitutional right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of his
witnesses.34 Unfortunately, appellant did not avail himself of this remedy.
As to the fourth issue, appellant contends that even if he were held liable for the death of
Michael, there was no treachery which will qualify the killing as murder. According to him, there is
no evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had deliberately and consciously
adopted their mode of attack to ensure its execution without risk to themselves. The stabbing
incident occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people in the area then
walking in different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions wanted to ensure
that no risk would come to them, then they could have chosen another time and place to attack
Michael.
Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim
unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack.35 It is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article
14, paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential elements of
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus:
ART. 14. The following are aggravating circumstances:

xxxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required in order
that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of
execution that would ensure the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the
offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; (2) deliberate or
conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it must always be alleged
in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered.36
In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant.37 Moreover, all
the essential elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial.
After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael
proceeded home. While Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and
Mactan Street, appellant and his two companions, who were drinking nearby, suddenly
approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael while
his two companions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the shoulders of
Michael and overpowered the latter. One of the appellants companions, whom the prosecution
witnesses described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael
on the stomach. Unsatisfied, the appellants other companion, whom the prosecution witnesses
described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife and stabbed Michael on the stomach. As the
finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife and also stabbed Michael on the
stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him at the body. Upon noticing that
the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and his two companions fled the scene.
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant
and his two companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape.
It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely
seventeen years of age then.38 In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely impossible for
Michael to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two companions.
Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like appellant and his
two companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three assailants, and, was
unarmed when he was stabbed to death. Appellant and his two companions took advantage of
their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They also deliberately adopted means and
methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael by first surrounding him, then grabbing his
shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a
knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the ground. The stab wounds sustained by
Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged the latters large intestine.39
The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking
then in different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the
slightest provocation on his part.40 This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the
victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put
up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.41 As we
earlier found, Michael was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone to a fight when he was
stabbed to death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the time
of his death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.

With regard to the allegation in the Information that the killing of Michael was attended by an
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were
correct in disregarding the same against appellant. The essence of evident premeditation as an
aggravating circumstance is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.42 It implies a deliberate planning of the crime before
executing it. It must also be shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time
elapsed before it was carried out.43 Further, there must be proof that the accused meditated and
reflected on his intention between the time when the crime was conceived by him and the time it
was actually perpetrated.44 In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that appellant and
his two companions had previously planned and reflected in killing Michael. When appellant and
his two companions saw Michael on that fateful night, they immediately pounced on him. The
thought of killing Michael came into the minds of appellant and his two companions only when
they saw Michael walking on the road. Indeed, the killing of Michael was sudden and unplanned.
On another point, we agree with the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code states that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of
the same Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the
instant case, and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the present case, and,
treachery cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was already taken as a
qualifying circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. As regards
the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals, we rule that the sum of P35,470.00 as actual
damages should be reduced to P25,670.00 since the receipts on record amounts only to
P25,670.00.45 It is well-settled that only expenses supported by receipts will be allowed for
actual damages.46 Furthermore, exemplary damages should also be awarded to the heirs of
Michael since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established by the
prosecution.47 If a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or
generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New
Civil Code.48 This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings,
and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured person or
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.49lawphil.net
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00095 dated 28
February 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which, he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Michael P25,670.00
as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for Michaels
death; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Nabong
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00731 which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, finding accused-appellants
Celino Nabong y Ocenar (aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka
Roel Salutario) guilty of the complex crime of attempted rape with homicide and imposing upon
them the death penalty.
On 5 April 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City an Information for the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide against the
appellants and a certain Arnel Miraflor y Awitan.

On 21 April 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information on the ground
that certain material evidence arose subsequent to the filing of the original information which
necessitated its amendment. Said motion was granted on the same date.3
An Amended Information was filed on 21 April 1999, indicting appellants and Arnel Miraflor for
the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide, punishable under Republic Act No. 8357, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused men conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other and taking advantage of nighttime, superior strength and by
means of treachery, evident premeditation, force and violence, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attempt to have sexual intercourse with a woman AAA,4 against her
will and consent, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of rape as a
consequence by reason of causes independent of their own spontaneous desistance, that is, AAA
resisted; and by reason or on the occasion of the attempted rape the accused, with intent to kill,
attack, assault and stabbed with a bladed weapon AAA on the different parts of her body thereby
inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.5
Upon arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty6 of the crime charged. Hence, trial
ensued.
The prosecution proved the following facts.
The four accused, Celino Nabong (Nabong), Alvin Laguit (Laguit), Nolfe Ladiao (Ladiao) and Arnel
Miraflor (Miraflor), were all construction workers employed as steelmen by EEI, a construction
firm, and assigned at its OCW-RCBC Plaza Project located at Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
The victim, AAA was a 22-year old accountant employed as junior auditor at the Alba and Romeo
Auditing Firm.
Reynaldo Patenio, a steelman of EEI construction and a co-worker of the accused, testified that
on the fateful night of 23 March 1999, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening, he and the four
accused, together with their co-workers, Rogelio Amit, Lilia and Ariel Cortez, were inside the
workers barracks at the OCW-RCBC Plaza when they decided to go out for a drinking session.
They walked from their barracks and at about 9:15 p.m. reached a nearby videoke bar in
Amorsolo Street in Makati City, just across the Makati Medical Center. There, each of them
consumed six bottles of Colt 45 beer.
By 11:30 p.m., they stopped drinking when the videoke bar closed for the night.1a\^/phi1.net
Rogelio Amit, Lilia and Ariel Cortez left ahead of the group. The four accused proceeded to Ayala
Avenue and stopped at a vacant lot in front of the Makati Medical Center, where concrete pipes
used for construction were lying around. Reynaldo Patenio, who decided to call it a day, also
stepped out of the videoke bar and was just about five meters away from the four accused, when
they invited him to join them. When Reynaldo Patenio joined the group, they taunted him and
made fun of him by pushing him around like a ball being tossed from one man to another.
Patenio was able to extricate himself from the group and was about to leave when he heard one
of the accused saying loudly "Huwag nayan, lagas nayan," which was directed at a woman who
was then boarding a jeepney. The word "lagas" means old in the Visayan dialect. At about the
same time, AAA was walking towards the center island near the corner of Buendia Avenue and
Ayala Avenue with her officemate Minerva Arguelles Frias. Laguit and Ladiao, who were then
standing by the corner of Ayala Avenue and Buendia Avenue, spotted the two women. Therefrom,
Laguit and Ladiao crossed the street and waited at the island for the two women. Minerva
Arguelles Frias then boarded a bus, leaving AAA alone with Laguit and Ladiao.

Laguit took his shirt off and was laughing while waving his shirt in the air. Ladiao, who was
between Laguit and AAA, had a smirk on his face. Nabong then appeared from the dark portion
of the vacant lot holding a "kabilya," a 7-inch pointed metal bar, sort of an improvised iced pick,
and approached Laguit, Ladiao and AAA. Nabong suddenly stabbed AAA on the right thigh using
the pointed metal bar. Simultaneously, Ladiao jumped at AAA and covered her mouth. The victim
slumped on the pavement while Ladiao, Laguit, Nabong and Miraflor crowded around the woman.
Miraflor, upon seeing what his companions were doing, hurriedly left and went to the barracks.
Patenio also left the scene and went back to the barracks about the same time Miraflor did.
Witness Ofelia A. Camba, a vendor at the RCBC Plaza, testified that on that same night between
11:00 and 11:30, while she was walking towards a creek to urinate, she overheard a group of
men talking. Upon hearing their voices, she changed her mind and instead continued to walk
towards her house at the Botanical Garden, near Urban Avenue. When she passed by the group
from where the voices emanated, she noticed two men who were seated and a man who was
standing. She later identified the man standing as Nabong. She heard Nabong, who was two
meters away from her saying "Huwag yan, lagas na yan." Having understood the remark, she
suddenly felt scared.
For her part, Virginia Mabayao, another vendor in the area, testified that at or before midnight of
23 March 1999, while she was walking along Buendia Ave., she saw three men who told her, "Hi,
ate pakape ka naman." She responded by telling them to go to her vending place located at
Ayala Avenue near RCBC. They did not follow her. She noticed that one of them who was standing
held a piece of metal while swaying his head from left to right. The other two were seated. At
around 1:00 a.m. the next day, she heard from the barangay captain of the killing incident. Later,
at the Makati police station, she saw the same men again whose identities she subsequently
learned as Nabong, Miraflor, and Laguit. She recalled that Nabong was the man who was
standing.
Minerva Arguelles Frias, through her sworn statement, disclosed that she was with the victim that
night. They walked from their office until they reached Ayala Avenue where she boarded a bus,
leaving the victim on site.
PO3 Libretto Buisan testified that on the night of the incident, he, together with PO1 Elmer
Garcia, was on a patrol duty at the Pasong Tamo, Buendia Avenue and Makati Avenue area from
8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. the following day. At around 11:45 that night, they noticed a commotion
along Buendia Avenue near Tindalo Street. As they went closer, they discovered the body of a
woman, later identified to be that of the victim, lying on the pavement on her back, her
undergarment pulled down almost exposing her private parts. Her brassiere was torn off leaving
her left breast exposed. Her dress was torn and raised showing her belly. PO3 Buisan found the
left side of the victims body heavily bloodied. The center part of the street was splattered with
blood. There were also drops of blood on the vacant lot where the concrete pipes were located as
well as on the extension of Tindalo Street. He asked the barangay tanod to bring the victim to the
hospital.
Arnel Marzan, a traffic enforcer and a Bantay Bayan at Barangay San Lorenzo, testified that at
past midnight, on 24 March 1999, he received a call for assistance. He proceeded to the scene
and found the victim still breathing and moaning. He carried the victim to a tricycle that passed
by, and together with a certain Joven Lopez, took her to the Makati Medical Center.
PO2 Rico S. Bulacan, the investigator assigned to the case, narrated that in the early morning of
24 March 1999, he conducted a spot investigation at the scene of the crime. There, he found six
concrete pieces of culvert pipes at the dark side portion of Tindalo Street corner Buendia Avenue.
He also found out that the nearby traffic post which was about 200 meters away from the corner
of Tindalo St. was stained with freshly dried blood. The bloodstains, upon laboratory examination,

tested positive for human blood. Later, he found an earring belonging to the victim near one of
the concrete culvert pipes. It was to him that witness Mabayao first confided that she saw
Nabong holding onto the traffic sign post the previous night.
Pastor Maghamil, the security guard on duty at the workers barracks said that Patenio and
Miraflor entered the barracks at around 1:30 a.m. of 24 March 1999. He also saw a man wearing
a bull cap, in white "cheleko" vest and pants walking normally toward Ayala Avenue Extension. At
round 9:00 a.m. of the same day, he learned of the incident from the construction workers. Later
in the evening, policemen arrived at the barracks to inquire as to who among the workers arrived
at dawn. He informed them that Patenio and Miraflor did.
Police inspector Thomas C. Sipin, the team leader of the group who apprehended the accused,
testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of 24 March 1999, he went to the crime scene at Buendia
Avenue. He discovered bloodstains at the back of the parking sign located at the sidewalk along
Buendia Avenue. He took samples of said bloodstains, which, upon NBI laboratory examination,
turned out to be Type O human blood. He proceeded to the RCBC barracks then to the RCBC
construction site. There, he was able to talk to two vendors, Mabayao and Camba, and the
security guard. On the morning of 25 March 1999, he came back to the barracks and invited
Nabong, Miraflor and Patenio. At the police station, PO2 Bulacan conducted an investigation of
the three invited persons.
Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, the medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that the victim was stabbed six
times with the use of sharp, pointed, single-bladed instrument, three on the left chest, one on
the right chest, one on the back right side chest level, and one on the right thigh. He said that
the cause of death of the victim was hemoperigonio or collection of blood at the abdominal
cavities caused by the stab wounds.
BBB, the mother of AAA, testified specifically on the civil liability of the accused.1awphi1.nt
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of the four accused who denied
having committed the crime and offered the defense of alibi.
The four accused admitted that they went on a drinking spree at the videoke bar at around 9:00
p.m. of 23 March 1999 with Patenio and the other co-workers. They all claimed that they left the
bar at past midnight, after which they proceeded to the nearby Burger Machine to drink coffee.
They also admitted that they never had any quarrel with Patenio.
According to Nabong, after drinking coffee with the group they parted ways. He went home to
Marikina and arrived there at around 2:00 a.m. He slept and woke up at 6:00 a.m., got his bag
then went to the barracks, arriving there at 8:00 a.m. where he slept again. When he woke up at
12 noon, he left the barracks to see a movie and returned at 2:00 p.m. He said he chose to start
to work at 6:00 p.m. that day since it was very hot to work at daytime.
For his part, Laguit testified that he consumed four bottles of Colt 45 beer at the videoke bar.
They left at past midnight and stayed at the Burger Machine for a few minutes. From there, he
proceeded to the barracks with Miraflor and Patenio. He heard of the killing on 24 March 1999,
from the guard. The whole day he stayed in the barracks. At 9:00 a.m. of 25 March 1999, he was
arrested and brought to the police station where the police asked him to confess to the killing,
but he refused.
According to Ladiao, the videoke bar was only less than five minutes walk from the barracks. He
returned to the barracks after dropping by the Burger Machine. On 25 March 1999, the police
took him to the police station.
Miraflor testified that after drinking coffee at the Burger Machine, he returned to the barracks
with Patenio, while Laguit followed them. Upon reaching the barracks, he slept. The following

morning, 24 March 1999, he proceeded to work. At around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, the
security guard assigned in the barracks told him and Patenio about the incident and that some
policemen were looking for them. The following day, he and Patenio did not report for work and
waited for the policemen to arrive. When the policemen arrived, they were told that they will be
investigated. They were later brought to the police station where two vendors arrived and
identified them as the ones responsible for the death of AAA.
The trial court subsequently rendered a decision dated 18 June 2002, finding Celino Nabong, in
conspiracy with Alvin Laguit and Nolfe Ladiao, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997." For insufficiency of
evidence to sustain his conviction, Arnel Miraflor was acquitted. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the three accused Celino Nabong y Osenar
(aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka Roel Salutario) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide who are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), as exemplary damages, one hundred eleven thousand two
hundred thirty-nine pesos (111,239.00) as actual damages, one million five hundred eight
thousand one hundred thirty pesos (P1,508,130.00) for loss of earning capacity and fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. Arnel Miraflor Awitan is acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.7
Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellants, the case was directly elevated to this Court
for review. This Court, however, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate
review, conformably with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.8
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on 9 September 2005 affirming the conviction of
appellants, with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated June 18, 2002 of the RTC, Branch
66, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 99-569 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) be awarded to the heirs of AAA as civil indemnity.9
Appellant Nabong filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution dated 23 January 2006.
Hence, the instant case.
Appellant Nabong assigns the following errors:
I. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate witness Reynaldo Patenios motive to perjure himself.
II. There is no evidence on record that accused conspicuously adopted the alleged surprised
attack as a means of executing the crime.
III. There is sufficient basis on record to justify the appreciation of intoxication and low degree of
instruction as mitigating circumstances in favor of accused.
IV. The fundamental right of accused to legal counsel was violated.
For their part, appellant Laguit and Ladiao assign the following error:
BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ALVIN B. LAGUIT AND NOLFE LADIAO OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED HEREIN.

Appellants contend that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of attempted rape with homicide. They claim that
the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution is meager to sustain their convictions
and that reasonable doubt exists in their favor.
We say that, contrary to appellants posture, the prosecution has discharged, through
circumstantial evidence, the burden of proving beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellants
are guilty of the charge.
This Court cites with approval circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution on the crime
of attempted rape as found by the trial court:
Ofelia Camba xxx testified that at about 11:30 p.m. of March 23, 1999, shortly before the
commission of the crime, she passed by a place near where she sold cigarettes and some food
items. She was about to proceed to the foot of a bridge at a nearby creek to urinate when she
heard some voices from a group of three persons, two of who were seated while the other was
standing. She distinctly heard one of them- the person standing- say softly to the other two:
Huwag na yan, lagas na yan." She was only two meters away when she heard the words uttered
by one of the three person. "Lagas," according to Camba, meant old. Obviously she was the one
being referred to. She positively identified Nabong as the one who uttered the aforequoted
words.
May it be recalled at this juncture that Patenio had also testified that he heard one of the three
accused Ladiao, Laguit and Nabong- utter the same words. He said he was just a few yards
away from the three accused and heard distinctly one of them say: "Huwag na yan. Lagas na
yan."
When the body of the victim was found by PO3 Liberato Buisan and PO1 Elmer Garcia, of the
Makati City Police Mobile Unit, her undergarment was "nakababa" (pulled down) and her private
parts were almost exposed. Her brassiere was torn off leaving her entire left breast open to view.
Her dress was torn apart that her belly was likewise exposed.
Such conditions were highly suggestive of force or violence applied upon the victim that is
normally preparatory to sexual attack. Moreover, there was effort on the part of the attackers to
keep the victim from screaming or shouting for help. Patenio saw Ladiao cover the mouth of the
victim.
The words of injunction against taking interest in an old woman which can only mean that
Camba, at 46, was not worth their while, give an inkling of what the three accused had in mind.
Such words gave away their mischievous intent which, coupled with the conditions that were
found in the sprawled body of the victim when discovered, may well prove the complex crime of
attempted rape with homicide even in the absence of direct evidence.10
Likewise, the fact of the victims killing by the appellants was sufficiently established with moral
certainty by the prosecution. As aptly discussed by the trial court:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the fact of killing have not been successfully
refuted by the defense. Patenio saw Nabong as he struck the first blow- the stab on the victims
thigh. While he did not see the succeeding five strikes upon the woman with the sharpened
pointed (sic) "kabilya", there can be no doubt that it was made by Nabong or any of the two
others or both. That it could not be ascertained if the succeeding stab wounds were inflicted by
one or the other of the accused, it would not make any difference anyway since there was
unquestionably conspiracy among the three accused in the commission of the crime.

Patenio gave testimony with details only an eyewitness could have given. He was candid even to
admit he felt a bit resentful that the accused made fun of him. His testimony clearly showed that
Nabong, Laguit and Ladiao performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design which is to rape the victim- and kill her, as
they did. Laguit and Ladiao gave the victim no chance to escape nor to shout for help. They
blocked her way at the slightest indication she would escape. They covered her mouth so she
could not call for help. Then Nabong appeared and stabbed her in the thigh to prevent her even
more from running away.11
In an attempt to discredit witness Patenios testimony, appellant Nabong insists that the formers
testimony is unreliable based on the following: (a) Patenio has an ax to grind against appellants
for making fun of him; (b) since Patenio was initially taken as a suspect, he was compelled to
offer perjurious testimony against the appellants to save himself from being included as one of
the perpetrators of the crime; (c) even as Patenio allegedly saw Nabong stab the victim in the
thigh, he did not lift a finger to dissuade Nabong from his supposed act, or at least report the
incident to the police.
As a rule, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded the
highest degree of weight and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
unique opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses while testifying.12
In the case under consideration, appellant Nabong imputes ill motive to the prosecution witness
Patenio, alleging that the latter has a score to settle with the appellants for making fun of him.
However, such fact does not conclusively establish that the prosecution witness, in testifying
against the appellants, was moved by a desire to retaliate against the latter. In the absence of
sufficient proof of improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness was not so moved
and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.13 Besides, it must be recalled that it
was witness Patenio who admitted before the trial court that he felt a bit resentful that the
appellants made fun of him. This candid admission of the prosecution witness in fact bolsters his
credibility and fortifies his testimony against the appellants.
The fact that Patenio was one of the first suspects in the commission of the crime does not make
his testimony less credible. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Granting that Patenio was initially taken as a suspect in the crime, this fact does not affect his
credibility as a witness. Not all persons invited for questioning by the police turn out to be the
real culprits. It is but normal that the police will have several suspects for initial investigation.
This procedure helps the authorities to determine with clarity the real perpetrators. Some of
these witnesses even turn out to be state witnesses or eye-witness as in the case of Patenio.14
Witness Patenios failure to report immediately to the proper authority does not impinge on his
credibility. This Court has ruled that, when confronted with startling occurences, behavioral
responses of witnesses are diverse.15 Indeed, there is no uniform reaction or standard
behavioral response to grisly events.16 In numerous instances, this Court has declared that the
reluctance of eyewitnesses to testify on a crime and to get involved in a criminal investigation
are but normal and do not by themselves affect the witnesses credibility.17 The sealed lips of
said witnesses are but a natural and spontaneous reaction.18 They may opt to remain silent
rather than to imperil their own lives.19
In the instant case, witness Patenio, fearing for his safety, kept silent about the incident. This is
understandable because the witness has no relatives residing in the metropolis who may be able
to lend him a safe abode in case the appellants would retaliate against him for his testimony. In
the same vein, being an ordinary mortal, the witness, who may not have the virtues of fortitude
and altruism, cannot be expected to risk his life by preventing the appellants from completing
their criminal objective.

Appellants assert that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating treachery
since the evidence is bereft of proof that appellants plotted to carry out the attack on the victim.
Appellants contention is unmeritorious.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.20 Thus, this Court has ruled that even
frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed.21 Treachery can still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the
danger to his/her person.22 What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate.23 In the present case, the
victim did not even have sufficient warning of the danger that was looming, since the attack
against her came from behind and was so sudden and unexpected, thus giving the victim no
time to flee or to prepare her defense or enable her to offer the least resistance to the sudden
assault.
Appellant Nabong faults the lower courts in not appreciating intoxication and low degree of
instruction in his favor.
For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the
intoxication impaired the will power of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing
or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.24 The person pleading intoxication must
prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as
would blur his reason.25 This, the appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence
that the quantity of liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties.
On the contrary, the fact that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their
drinking session is the best proof that they knew what they were doing during that occasion. The
deception, the device, the place and manner of perpetrating the crime all point to the fact that
appellants had complete control of their minds.
Neither can appellant Nabongs alleged lack of instruction be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy
alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient
intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of ones act.26 Besides, one does not have to
be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another
person.27
In a desperate effort to exculpate himself from the charge against him, Nabong clutches at
straws. He argues that his fundamental right to legal counsel was violated when his counsel did
not bother to secure the attendance of witnesses in his defense, particularly Nabongs cousin,
whose supposed testimony would support his defense of alibi.
This argument deserves scant consideration. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, this
issue was raised belatedly by appellant Nabong for the first time before the Court of Appeals in a
motion for reconsideration. The rule is that an issue not raised in the trial cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal, much less in a motion for reconsideration.28
At any rate, the records do not show that Nabongs counsel had been remiss in his duty. Defense
witnesses were presented in the person of the four accused and cross-examination had been
conducted by the defense counsel.
As to the award of actual damages, the trial court ordered the appellants to pay the heirs of the
victim the following amounts: (a) P6,499.00 as medical expenses; (b) P35,000.00 as burial
expense; (c) P25,740.00 cost of the burial lot; and (d) P44,000.00 expenses incurred during the
wake.

Appellant Nabong questions the award of P44,000.00 spent for the wake of the victim claiming
that the prosecution did not present official receipts for said expenses. The mother of the victim
testified that she expended the said amount for the wake of her daughter. Said expenses were
reduced into writing and marked as Exh. "V". The defense did not object to this during the direct
examination of the witness for the prosecution nor in the formal offer of evidence. Thus, the rule
stating that "evidence not objected to is deemed admitted" finds application in the case under
consideration.29 For this reason, the trial court can take into account such evidence in arriving at
the judgment.30 Hence, the trial courts judgment ordering appellants to pay P44,000.00 for the
expenses incurred during the wake is correct.
Also assailed is the certification of the victims monthly salary from her employer. It is contended
that said evidence is hearsay since nobody from the office of the victims employer testified on
the said document.
Again, this contention is unavailing. Failure on the part of the appellants to object to the
presentation of such evidence during the direct examination of the prosecution witness and the
formal offer of the certificate of employment dated 25 October 1999 issued by the victims
employer and marked as Exh. "W" makes the said evidence admissible and one that can be
considered by the trial court in its verdict.
The computation of the trial court with respect to lost earning capacity is correct. At the time of
her death, the victim was 22 years old. She had been earning P6,500.00 monthly. Loss of earning
capacity is computed by applying the following formula:31
Net Earning
Capacity
=
life expectancy
[2/3(80-age at death)]
x
Gross Annual
Income (GAI)
living expenses
(50% of GAI)
X
=[
2
3
(80-22)
]x
GAI

[50% of GAI]
X
=[
2
3
(58) ] x
P78,000

P39,000
X
=[
116
3
]x
[P39,000]
=
[38.67]
[P39,000]
Net Earning
Capacity
of the victim =
P1,508,130.00
Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, it must be noted that the penalty for the crime of
attempted rape with homicide is "reclusion perpetua to death." Since the penalty is composed of
two indivisible penalties, then for the purpose of determining the imposable penalty, Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code must be considered.32 It provides in part:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
With the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery and there being no mitigating
circumstance, the higher penalty of death should be imposed.33
In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.34 Thus, the penalty imposed upon
appellants should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.35

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00731, dated 9 September
2005 as well as its Resolution dated 23 January 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the
conviction of appelllants and the amount of damages are concerned. The sentence that shall be
imposed upon appellants, however, is MODIFIED. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without
parole. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

People v Centeno
It all started, innocuously enough, with a drinking spree. On that afternoon of December 1, 1968,
Rolando Santos was enjoying himself with some friends and plenty of beer that he eventually
could not carry. Within the hour, he would be dead of a massive brain hemorrhage. The venue
would be the municipal building itself. And the police chief himself, together with one of his
policemen, would be accused of murdering him.
How Santos died is the question we have to settle. The prosecution says he was killed with
karate blows dealt by the accused-appellant. The defense denies this. It says Santos drunkenly
staggered and fell and hit his head and bled to death.
The trial court believed the prosecution and convicted the police chief while absolving his coaccused. 1 Rolando Centeno is now before us on appeal of his conviction.
The medical evidence is not disputed. It is accepted that Santos died as a result of internal
bleeding in the brain due to trauma. The victim's head showed various contusions and abrasions
but not in the nape of the neck where the karate blows were allegedly delivered. 2
Besides Dr. Plaridel F. Vidal, the NBI medico-legal officer who testified on the autopsy of Santos,
two important witnesses who gave a first-hand version of how Santos was allegedly killed by the
accused-appellant were presented by the prosecution. These were Dionisio Violago and Eulogio
Villanueva, who were both friends of the victim.
According to Violago, he and Santos, together with their other companions, were in the store of
one Aling Goreng when Patrolman Valeriano Reyes approached Santos and told the young man to
come with him. Santos demurred, protesting that he had done nothing wrong, whereupon Reyes
boxed him in the chest and forcibly brought him to the police station. There Santos loudly
objected to his detention, prompting Police Chief Centeno to say, "Matigas ka yatang talaga,"
although he relented later and allowed him to go home. But as Santos was leaving, Centeno had
a change of mind and asked Reyes to bring Santos back. Reyes was holding Santos's arm when
Centeno administered the first karate blow on the nape of Santos's neck that made the victim fall
forward on the backrest of a bench. This was followed by two more karate blows that crumpled
him to the cement floor where he lay prostrate and motionless. On Centeno's order, two
policemen then picked up Santos and took him inside the locker room adjacent to the municipal
jail. 3
Villanueva corroborated Violago and said he cried out, "Why are you doing this to my friend?"
when he saw Santos being mauled by Centeno. He also declared that Santos was felled with
three karate blows from Centeno. This witness claimed he got a glass of water and gave it to
Santos, who could not drink it any more as he was already dying then. He felt Santos's pulse but
there was none. He opened Santos's shirt and put his ear to his chest but could hear no

heartbeat. He said that the other persons who witnessed the killing, besides the policemen, were
Violago, Romy Salao and Serafin Punzalan. 4
The theory of the defense was that Santos was so intoxicated that he reeled and fell and hit his
head and suffered the internal brain hemorrhage that killed him. To support this claim, it
introduced Mercedes Bautista, chief forensic chemist of the NBI, who testified that at the time of
Santos's death he had 0.21% of alcohol in his blood. She declared on cross-examination that the
effect of such quantity would vary according to the person's physical condition although there
would surely be emotional instability in every case. 5
The defense conjectured that as a result of his inebriation, Santos must have crashed down and
hurt his head, resulting in internal bleeding. Valeriano Reyes, the other accused, testified that
after they had brought Santos to the locker room, they heard a noise ("kalabog") suggesting that
Santos had hit something; and sure enough they found him dying on the floor when they went in
to investigate. 6 It is doubtful though how they could have heard the alleged sound, considering
the thick concrete walls of the room and the fact that they were then some ten meters away. 7
There is also the argument that no external injuries were found on the nape of the neck, where
the karate blows were administered although there were abrasions and contusions elsewhere in
the victim's head. As Dr. Vidal explained, however, even if no marks were left on the neck, karate
blows thereon could cause the generalized and extensive bleedings that caused the victim's
death. Thus:
Q
Will you please explain, if a karate blow delivered on the nape of a person without
necessarily producing contusions or abrasions will cause brain hemorrhage?
A
Depending on the position of the fist that one will apply on the person. A karate blow will
produce inner injury but without any outside injury especially this portion of the hand, (witness
pointing to the hypothenar) unlike this portion (witness pointing to the knuckles) and especially
when the karate blows delivered with the hypothenar on a muscular portion of the body like the
nape, there will be no external injuries but the injury is internal. To further explain, I will cite to
you an example. The boxers who use gloves on their hands and when they will deliver blows on a
person, that person will not sustain external injuries but there is severe injury inside the brain
and that could justify that karate blows will not produce external injuries but internal injuries. 8
The defense itself submitted that Santos shouted drunkenly within hearing distance of Centeno
and Reyes, "Putang inang mga pulis iyan! Walang kuwenta sa akin iyan!" 9 They claimed to be
tolerant and simply admonished him to go home, but subsequent events showed they were
really annoyed by his remarks. This was the motive that prompted Reyes to drag Santos to the
municipal building and led Centeno later to kill him.
We are satisfied that Violago and Villanueva were telling the truth about the killing of their friend
although there were indeed inconsistencies in their statements. These were minor lapses only
and did not impair the essential truthfulness of their narrations. As for the defense, its
explanation of the death of Santos while he was in the custody of the police is hardly plausible
and mainly speculative. Murder cannot be excused on such improbable conjectures
Murder it was indeed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There was alevosia because
Santos was suddenly attacked from behind when in his weakened and intoxicated condition,
coupled with the fact that his arm was then being held by Reyes, he could not defend himself.
The accused-appellant had employed means aimed at achieving his purpose without risk to
himself from any defense the victim could have made.
Even assuming there was abuse of superior strength, on which issue we do not have to rule here,
this aggravating circumstance is deemed absorbed by treachery. As for the mitigating
circumstances claimed by the defense, the Court holds that they cannot be allowed. The

derogatory statement made by Santos which so irritated Centeno did not constitute such a grave
provocation as to warrant the lessening of his penalty for reacting as he did in punishing the
victim to death. Neither can Centeno argue now that he had not intended to commit so grave a
wrong as the actual killing of Santos as he knew, or should have known, that the karate chops on
the nape of the neck would have a lethal effect upon the defenseless and drunken victim.
There being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the term of imprisonment was
correctly fixed at reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty for murder. The civil indemnity is,
however, increased to P30,000.00 consistent with present policy.
It was not only Rolando Santos who was intoxicated when he died at 22 on December 1, 1968.
There was another kind of drunkenness that afflicted the chief of police, who misused his power
and lawlessly took a life.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED except as to the civil indemnity, which is
increased to P30,000.00. Costs against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

People v. Abadies
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, in
Criminal Case Nos. 0658-SPL to 0661-SPL, dated May 26, 1999, finding accused-appellant Jose
Abadies guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of violation of Republic Act No. 7610 or
the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,"
penalized under Section 5 (b), Article III and Section 31, Article XII thereof, and sentencing him
for each count to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
Accused-appellant Abadies was charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 7610 in five separate
Informations[2] which, except for the dates of commission, are similarly worded as follows:
That on or about July 1, 1997, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused actuated by lewd design did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with force and intimidation commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of his 17-year old daughter ROSALIE ABADIES Y MANUNGHAYA by
kissing, mashing her breast and touching her private parts against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other incidents were allegedly committed on July 2, 3, 7 and 26, 1997. In an Order[3] dated
July 16, 1998, the trial court, upon motion of the public prosecutor, dismissed Criminal Case No.
0657-SPL on the ground that the crime charged appears to have been committed in Las Pias
City, hence, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
During the arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty and hence, trial ensued.
The facts show that accused-appellant has been living for the past twenty years with his
common-law wife, Catalina Manunghaya, at Bgy. Pulo, Landayan, San Pedro, Laguna, together
with their two children, Jonathan and complainant Rosalie. The family sleeps together in one
room and usually Catalina wakes up early in the morning to buy bread. It was during these short
periods of time while Catalina was out of the house that the abuses took place. On the dates
material to these cases, complainant was 17 years old, having been born on July 29, 1980.[4]
Complainant testified that on July 1, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., she was sleeping in their house
when she was awakened by somebody touching her breast and other private parts of her body.

She was startled to see her father, accused-appellant, and she covered her breast with a pillow.
Complainant struggled with accused-appellant as he persisted in mashing her breast. She could
not shout as fear overcame her when she saw anger from accused-appellants face. Accusedappellant was forced to stop only when complainant's mother arrived from the store.
Complainant did not tell her mother about the incident for fear of accused-appellant.
The following day, July 2, 1997, at about the same time, complainant was again jolted from her
sleep by accused-appellant who was touching her breast. She covered herself with a blanket and
with her hands. She fought accused-appellant when he tried to remove her hands. Again,
accused-appellant desisted only when complainant's mother arrived from the store. Complainant
ran to the bathroom where she shed tears.
The next day, July 3, 1997, complainant was once more roused from her sleep by accusedappellant mashing her breast. She started to cry and asked accused-appellant why he was
abusing her. Accused-appellant simply continued touching her. Again, he stopped only when his
wife arrived from the store.
Complainant was again awakened in the early morning of July 7, 1997 by accused-appellant
touching her breast. This time, accused-appellant straddled her, inserted his hand inside her
shorts and touched her private part. Complainant resisted and removed accused-appellants
hand. She reached out for the blanket of her brother, Jonathan, who was sleeping beside her in a
bid to wake him up. When accused-appellant saw that Jonathan was about to turn, he stopped.
However, he warned complainant not to tell her mother about the incident.
On July 26, 1997, complainant was brought by accused-appellant to the house of her stepsister in
Las Pias. Nobody was in the house and strangely, accused-appellant started to sharpen his
sickle. He ordered complainant to write a letter to her mother and revealed that he was planning
to kill himself and complainant. When complainant refused, accused-appellant forced her inside
the bedroom where he threatened complainant to choose whether he would kill her or rape her.
Accused-appellant started kissing complainant but the latter was able to run away from him.
Complainant reached their house and saw her mother. Crying and looking very pale, she narrated
to her mother her ordeal. She likewise disclosed the past abuses of accused-appellant.
Complainant and her mother then proceeded to the barangay office where they made a report.
On the strength of their complaint, accused-appellant was arrested.
Complainant further testified that on December 6, 1997, accused-appellant wrote her a letter
from his detention cell asking for forgiveness.
Accused-appellant proffered the defense of denial and alibi. He denies having committed acts of
lasciviousness against complainant. He testified that on the dates of the alleged incidents, he
woke up between 7:00 to 7:30 a.m.; that complainant and her mother were already preparing
breakfast; and after eating breakfast, he would leave for work. He also testified on the reason
why the charges at bar were filed against him. Allegedly, on July 26, 1997, he asked complainant
what was happening to their lives as his children were aloof with him. Complainant threatened to
end her life because she felt she was to be blamed for their problems. Accused-appellant also
declared he was too strict with his children, and even inflicts physical harm on them when they
disobey him.
In the present appeal, accused-appellant asserts that the court a quo erred in finding the
prosecution's version more credible and in convicting him despite the implied pardon given by
complainant. Accused-appellant likewise contends that there exists no factual basis for the trial
court to consider his plea of forgiveness in his letter to complainant as an implied admission of
guilt.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.

Accused-appellant stands charged with violation of Republic Act No. 7610 or The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, specifically
Article III, Section 5 (b) thereof which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; x x x.
The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force or intimidation or (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex.[5]
The testimony of complainant that accused-appellant touched and mashed her breasts and other
private parts of her body against her will, and that she could not shout or fight back because she
was afraid of accused-appellant, sufficiently constitute acts of lasciviousness under the foregoing
provision. Although accused-appellant was not armed nor did he threaten complainant, his moral
ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation.[6]
Accused-appellant faults the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of complainant. He
contends that it is difficult to comprehend why complainant did not shout or do anything to ask
help from her brother who was sleeping beside her. He also claims that if the charges were true,
it is inconceivable why complainant did not immediately tell her mother. The argument is
specious.
The Court has probed into the records to assess complainant's credibility and we find that her
testimony deserves full faith and credit. Complainant's testimony was straightforward and free
from contradiction as to any material point. We also accord great weight to the findings of the
trial court having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial.[7]
Complainant's failure to disclose about her misfortune to her mother does not destroy her
credibility. Complainant explained that she did not tell her mother about her ordeal because she
was afraid of accused-appellant. Accused-appellant admitted that his children were afraid of him
because he was very strict with them, and that there were occasions when he would hit them
with anything that he could get hold of or inflict physical punishment whenever they disobeyed
him.[8] This is enough reason for complainant to be cowed into silence.
It is of no moment that complainant failed to shout for help while she was being molested with
her brother sleeping beside her in the same room. Accused-appellant was complainants own
father, who exercised moral ascendancy over her.[9] Indeed, it is now hoary jurisprudence that
lust is no respecter of time and place for rape has been committed in places where people
congregate, even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping.[10]
Moreover, we have also ruled that no standard form of behavior has been observed when a
person is confronted by a shocking or a harrowing and unexpected incident, for the workings of
the human mind, when placed under emotional stress, are unpredictable. Some people may cry

out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may yet appear to
yield to the intrusion.[11]
On the other hand, accused-appellant's simple denial of the crime charged is inherently weak. It
is negative evidence which cannot overcome the positive testimonies of credible witnesses. For
accused-appellants denial to prevail, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability
and there is none.[12]
Accused-appellant further contends that there is no factual basis for the trial court to conclude
that the plea for forgiveness contained in his letter is to be deemed as an implied admission of
guilt. We do not agree.
A cursory reading of the relevant parts of the letter will readily show that accused-appellant was
indeed seeking pardon for his misdeeds. Some of the pertinent portions read as follows: "I made
this letter to ask your 'forgiveness. x x x Alam mo bang sobra-sobra na ang pagsisisi ko sa
ginawa kong iyon. x x x Parang awa mo na Ne hirap na hirap na ako at ang lahat ay buong puso
ko ng pinagsisisihan. Patawarin mo na ako anak. x x x." There is no iota of doubt that accusedappellant was asking forgiveness for having committed the acts with which he now stands
charged. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those
allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[13] Evidently, no one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered
as analogous to an attempt to compromise.[14] Under the circumstances, accused-appellants
plea of forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.
Accused-appellant likewise contends that he was impliedly pardoned by the complainant. He
deduced the purported implied pardon from complainants testimony that she did not disclose to
her mother the dastardly acts committed by accused-appellant on July 1, 2, 3 and 7, 1997 and
that she had not intended to file charges against him. He alleged that the present charges were
filed against him only after the Las Pias incident which happened on July 26, 1997. Accusedappellant posits the thesis that the failure of complainant to report the first four acts of
lasciviousness is tantamount to an implied pardon. He relies on Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides:
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness.
xxxxxxxxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian,
nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as
the case may be. x x x.
The argument will not hold. First, the supposed pardon cannot be implied from the fact that the
complainant did not immediately reveal to her mother her defloration. As earlier stated, it was
her fear of accused-appellant which restrained complainant from reporting the incidents to her
mother. Second, Article 344 of the RPC and Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that the pardon must be express and cannot be based on hazy deduction.[15]
The imposable penalty prescribed under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 7610 is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Section 31 (c), Article XII thereof provides
that the penalty in its maximum period shall be imposed when the perpetrator is an ascendant,
parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity. In the cases at bar, the relationship of complainant and accused-appellant is established
by the birth certificate of complainant which shows that accused-appellant is her father. This

relationship is further supported by the testimonies of complainant and her mother, as well as
that of accused-appellant. Hence, the trial court did not err in appreciating the generic
aggravating circumstance of relationship and in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count of lascivious conduct committed by accused-appellant against his daughter.
It will be noted that Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 7610 provides for the penalty of
imprisonment. Nevertheless, Section 31 (f), Article XII (Common Penal Provisions) thereof allows
the imposition of a fine subject to the discretion of the court, provided that the same is to be
administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and
disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the
latter is the perpetrator of the offense. This provision is in accord with Article 39 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the Philippines became a party on August 21,
1990, which stresses the duty of states parties to ensure the physical and psychological recovery
and social reintegration of abused and exploited children in an environment which fosters their
self-respect and human dignity.
In the case of People vs. Jaime Cadag Jimenez[16] where a minor victim was sexually molested
by her own father, the accused was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 as cash fund for the
rehabilitation of the victim and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of
lascivious act committed by the accused. Hence, in the cases at bar, the trial court correctly
imposed a fine of P30,000.00 for each count of lascivious conduct committed by accusedappellant. In addition, moral damages should be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 for each
count.
As a final note, we deem it relevant to stress the escalating awareness and concern for the
protection of the rights of children. The need of children for special protection was given
recognition by the nations of the world as early as 1924 when the assembly of the League of
Nations endorsed the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (commonly known as The Declaration
of Geneva) which focused on children's welfare, specifically their economic, psychological and
social needs. Reaffirming the fact that children need special care and protection because of their
vulnerability, and the vital role of international cooperation in securing children's rights, the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on November 20, 1989 the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), which incorporates the full range of human rights - civil, political,
economic, social and cultural - of children. The Convention stresses the duty of the state to take
all the necessary steps to protect children from being sexually abused (as in rape, molestation
and incest) or exploited (forced or induced into prostitution, pornographic performances and
others).[17] It is reassuring to note that we are not lagging far behind on the domestic front.
Over the past years, Congress has enacted a number of laws relating to the protection of
children's welfare and rights,[18] while the executive department has issued various executive
orders and proclamations in order to give teeth to the implementation and enforcement of these
laws.[19] These international instruments and national legislation emphasize that the primodial
consideration in deciding issues and cases involving children is the welfare and best interests of
the child.[20] For its part, the Supreme Court has issued Administrative Circular No. 23-95
enjoining trial courts to act with dispatch on all cases involving children, including but not limited
to pedophilia, child labor and child abuse cases. To date, procedural rules applicable specifically
to cases involving children have already been approved by the Court such as the Rules on
Examination of a Child Witness, on Commitment of Children, and on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law. Our duty does not end here though. As the highest court of the land, it is incumbent upon
us to give life to all these covenants, agreements, and statutes by enriching and enhancing our
jurisprudence on child abuse cases, bearing in mind always the welfare and protection of
children.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, in
Criminal Case Nos. 0658-SPL to 0660-SPL, finding accused-appellant JOSE ABADIES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four counts of violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P30,000.00, for each count, is

hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

People v Sapigao
On 24 December 1998, around eleven oclock in the evening, full-swing preparations for the
Christmas Eve festivities among the residents of Barangay Carusocan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan,
were just about in their final stages. Neighbors and friends had by then gathered together in
anticipation of the much-awaited noche buena to be partaken at the strike of midnight. The
Christmas air, however, gave no warning of an impending bloody incident which would shatter an
otherwise pervading yuletide festivity.
Emmanuel Sapigao and his brother Gem Sapigao were on their way on board a motorcycle,
driven by Gem Sapigao, towards Zone III of the barangay to collect a compadre's contribution for
the Christmas party. When the two brothers reached the place fronting the residence of barangay
captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr., his nephew Reynaldo Sapigao and Elpidio Mamerto blocked their
path. Minutes later, Reynaldo Sapigao, then holding a carbine rifle, began firing at them.
Alarmed, the brothers jumped off the motorcycle. Gem Sapigao promptly parked the vehicle on
one side of the street, and the two scampered for safety. Emmanuel hid behind a concrete wall,
approximately ten to twelve meters away, while Gem Sapigao hid in the nearby house of a
certain Shirley Pisalvo. From their hiding places, the brothers saw Reynaldo running and
shouting, "Uncle, uncle, sinugod si Kapitan." Almost immediately, they then saw Elpidio Mamerto,
Verson Mamerto, and Robert Obillo, all armed trooping into the house of the barangay captain
obviously in response to Reynaldos call. Elpidio Mamerto and Robert Mamerto were both holding
M-16 armalite rifles. Verson Mamerto had a carbine. The barangay captain, Arturo Mamerto, Sr.,
was armed with a Caliber .45 pistol. Emmanuel Sapigao heard Arturo Mamerto giving instructions
to the group to shoot anyone who would come near the abandoned motorcycle. Momentarily,
Emmanuel Sapigao saw from his hidden perch his cousin Lauro Sapigao passed by in an ownertype jeepney. About half an hour later, Lauro Sapigao, together with George Cabanilla and Puroy
Valdez, returned and stopped near the abandoned motorcycle. Emmanuel wanted to warn Lauro
but he was too afraid of being seen. Moments after they alighted from the jeepney, the group
composed of Elpidio Mamerto, Arturo Mamerto, Sr., Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Amador
Sapigao, Jose Sapigao, Reynaldo Sapigao, Francis Sapigao and Samuel Sapigao rained fire on
Lauro Sapigao. Gem Sapigao saw Jose Sapigao fire the first shot. Amador Sapigao approached
the fallen Lauro Sapigao, got hold of the latter's Caliber .45 and, with it, again shot the hapless
victim. One of those in the group shouted - "One is gone, many more will follow."
Terrified at what they had seen, the two brothers, Emmanuel and Gem, ran towards the rice field
and proceeded to the north where they flagged down a tricycle, which took them to the Asingan
police station. Fearing for their lives, the two subsequently went into hiding. It was only two
months later when they finally decided to report the incident to the National Bureau of
Investigation office in San Fernando, La Union.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Leonardo Guerrero, the rural health physician of Asingan, showed
that Lauro Sapigao sustained seven gunshot wounds. The cause of death was severe intracranial
injury and hypovolemic shock secondary to gunshot wounds. The 39-year old Lauro Sapigao, a
member of the Philippine marines with a rank of corporal, was survived by his wife and two
minor children.
On 14 July 1999, following an investigation, an accusatory information for murder was filed
against the several accused -

"That on or about 24 December 1998, in the evening, at Barangay Carusocan Sur, Asingan,
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with each other, armed with long and short firearms, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, lay in wait, attack,
assault and shoot LAURO SAPIGAO, inflicting upon him fatal gunshot wounds in the vital parts of
his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659."[1]
On 12 January 2000, the information was amended to state that the killing was committed with
the use of unlicensed firearms. Except for Elpidio Mamerto, the eight other accused remained at
large and yet to be brought to justice.
Against the evidence submitted by the prosecution, heretofore narrated, Elpidio Mamerto raised
the defense of alibi. He said that he was in his house the entire fateful evening with numerous
friends and relatives preparing for the noche buena. While his house was but twenty meters from
the place of the incident, he, however, was unaware of the shooting that took place because he
and his relatives were busy enjoying themselves. He denied having seen Lauro Sapigao on the
date of the incident. Corroborating Mamertos alibi were his neighbors and relatives who gave
testimony to the effect that Mamerto did not, even for a second, leave his residence around the
time when Lauro Sapigao was shot to death.
On 17 July 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46, rendered its decision
holding Elpidio Mamerto guilty of murder and imposing on him the extreme penalty of death; it
concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, CONVICTING ELPIDIO MAMERTO of the crime
Murder qualified with aggravated murder, and the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty
DEATH to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law; ordering Elpidio Mamerto
indemnify the heirs of Lauro Sapigao the sum of P70,000.00 as actual damages, another sum
P75,000.00 for moral damages and the further sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

of
of
to
of

The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mitimus and to transmit the entire records of
the case to the Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review.
The jail warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta
City, is hereby ordered to deliver the living body of Elpidio Mamerto to the National Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this decision."[2]
In the instant automatic appeal, Elpidio Sapigao has raised, by way of issues, his assignment of
errors thusly:
WHETHER, NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES,
THE PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
KILLING OF LAURO SAPIGAO
WHETHER THERE IS PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT MAMERTO
PARTICIPATED IN THE SHOOTING OF LAURO SAPIGAO WITH THE USE OF AN UNLICENSED
FIREARM.[3]
The defense of alibi, like denial, is easily rendered dubious and weak where, such as in this
instance, positive identification has been made by eyewitnesses.

Emmanuel Sapigao, at the witness stand, detailed the participation of Elpidio Mamerto in the
killing of Lauro Sapigao. He testified:
Q. And after hiding yourself in that cemented wall, what happened next?
A. I tried to peep and I saw Reynaldo Sapigao running towards the South shouting something, sir.
Q. What did he shout?
A. He shouted, `Uncle, uncle, dinarop da ni kapitan, meaning `uncle, uncle, sinugod si kapitan.
Q. Do you know who this uncle Reynaldo was calling?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who?
A. It was Elpidio Mamerto, sir.
Q. Who is this Kapitan?
A. Arturo Mamerto, Sr., sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. After Reynaldo Sapigao called `uncle, uncle, sinugod si Kapitan, what happened next?
A. I saw Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto, and Robert Obillo going [towards] the house of the
barangay captain, sir.
Q. You mean Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you notice with Verson Mamerto, Elpidio Mamerto, and Robert Obillo when they were
going towards the house of Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
A. They were all armed with a long rifle.
Q. Will you please describe to the Honorable Court what Elpidio Mamerto was holding at that
time?
A. M-16 armalite, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. So what happened next when you saw Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo and Elpidio Mamerto
going towards the house of Brgy. Captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
A. They were met by the barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr. in front of their house, sir.
Q. What did you notice with barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr. when he met them in front of
his house?
A. He was also armed, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. So, what transpired then when barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr., met Verson Mamerto,
Robert Obillo and Elpidio Mamerto in front of his house?
A. I heard him instructing them, he was telling them in Ilocano, `if anyone gets near the
motorcycle, shoot him.
Q. So what happened next after the barangay captain instructed the three to shoot anyone who
gets near the motorcycle?
A. That was the time I saw my cousin riding on his owner type jeep going towards south, towards
Villasis, sir.
Q. You saw your cousin passing by?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. What was the name of your cousin?
A. Lauro Sapigao, sir.
Q. So, what happened next when you saw your cousin driving his owner type jeep going towards
Villasis?
A. I was about to get near him but I was afraid because they might shoot me.
COURT:
Q. You did not stop him?
A. No sir, I did not stop him.
Q. So, he passed by?
A. Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC:
Q. What transpired next after your cousin Lauro Sapigao passed by driving his owner type jeep?
A. After a few minutes, Lauro Sapigao came back, sir.
Q. So, where did he return at that time?
A. Going to North towards Asingan, sir.
Q. And while your cousin was going North, what happened?
A. He suddenly stopped his jeep, sir.
Q. Where?
A. At the western side of the street, sir.

COURT:
Q. How far was it from the house of Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
A. More or less 10 meters, sir.
Q. So, what else transpired after your cousin Lauro Sapigao stopped his jeep?
A. When Lauro Sapigao stopped his jeep, he alighted from the jeep, sir.
COURT:
Q. Was he alone?
A. No, sir, with two companions.
Q. Do you know who were these companions of Lauro Sapigao in that jeep?
A. Yes, sir, they were George Cabanilla and Puroy Valdez, sir.
Q. After Lauro Sapigao alighted from the jeep, what else happened?
A. Lauro Sapigao walked around towards the back of the jeep, sir.
Q. What happened next?
A. After having three steps, that was the time he was shot, sir.
Q. Who shot Lauro Sapigao?
A. The group of Arturo Mamerto, Sr., sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Who composed the group?
A. Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Amador Sapigao, Jose Sapigao, Reynaldo
Sapigao, Francis Sapigao and Samuel Sapigao, sir.
Q. You mean all of them [fired a] shot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the firearm used by Elpidio Mamerto?
A. Baby armalite, sir.
Q. About Reynaldo Sapigao?
A. Carbine rifle, sir.
Q. About Verson Mamerto?
A. Carbine rifle, sir.

Q. About Robert Obillo

A. Armalite, sir.
Q. About Amador Sapigao?
A. Armalite, sir.
Q. About Jose Sapigao?
A. Armalite, sir.
Q. About the barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr.?
A. Cal. .45, sir.
Q. You have mentioned Amador Sapigao, Jose Sapigao, Reynaldo Sapigao, Francis Sapigao and
Samuel Sapigao. When for the first time did you notice them before Lauro Sapigao was shot?
A. When Elpidio Mamerto went to the house of barangay captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr., they were
already there, sir.
Q. Mr. Witness, what happened then to Lauro Sapigao when he was shot?
A. He fell to the ground, sir.
Q. At that time, Lauro Sapigao fell to the ground, what happened?
A. I saw Lauro Sapigao fall to the ground and he tried to crawl but Amador Sapigao got near him
and got the Cal. .45 of my cousin and shot him with it, sir.
COURT:
Q. You mean Lauro Sapigao had a gun?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. How was his body positioned?
A. He remained on the ground, facing down, sir.
Q. How about the group of Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Elpidio Mamerto, Jose Sapigao,
Reynaldo Sapigao, Francis Sapigao, Samuel Sapigao after Amador Sapigao shot Lauro Sapigao?
A. They remained in front of the house of the barangay captain, sir.
Q. How about you, what did you do then?
A. We ran with Gem Sapigao going to the rice field, sir.[4]
Gem Sapigao corroborated the testimony of his brother and described with equal clarity the
participation of Elpidio Mamerto in the killing of Lauro Sapigao. He declared:
Q. What did you do when Reynaldo Sapigao blocked your way holding a carbine firearm?

A. We were surprised when we were met by Reynaldo Sapigao with carbine being carried by him
and my brother jumped from the motorcycle while I was left because I had my motorcycle stand
at the side of the road.
Q. After that, what happened next?
A. After having my motorcycle stand at the side of the road, a jeep passed by and after the jeep
passed by that was the time Reynaldo Sapigao hit me, sir.
Q. Were you hit?
A. No, sir.
Q. About the jeep, do you know who owned that jeep that passed by?
A. No, sir.
Q. After that, what happened next when you were not hit?
A. Of course, I hid myself, ran to a culvert and passed over the culvert going the house of a
certain Shirley Pisalvo.
Q. x x x. Did you notice your brother Emmanuel?
A. My brother went ahead of me and sought cover in the same compound, because I was
cornered, I hid myself to a wall.
Q. After seeking cover in the compound of Shirley Pisalvo, what happened next?
A. Reynaldo Sapigao came out shouting going to the south.
Q. What was he shouting at that time?
A. He was shouting that we attacked the house of Captain Mamerto.
Q. To whom was Reynaldo Sapigao directing those shouts?
A. The shouts were directed to the cousins of Reynaldo Sapigao because their names were being
mentioned.
COURT:
Q. Who were the cousins he mentioned?
A. What I heard was, `Cousins, you come.
xxxxxxxxx
FISCAL TOMBOC;
Q. After that Mr. Witness, what happened after Reynaldo Sapigao shouted, `cousins, you come?
A. I saw coming from the south Elpidio Mamerto, Verson Mamerto, Robert Obillo, Jose Sapigao,
Amado Sapigao, Francis Sapigao, Samuel Sapigao and Michael Orines.
Q. Who else, Mr. Witness?

A. Brgy. Captain Arturo Mamerto, Sr.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. So after you saw these persons you mentioned coming from the south, what transpired next?
A. At that time, the jeep of my cousin passed by.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. What was the name of your cousin who passed by?
A. Lauro Sapigao, sir.
Q. Did you notice how many persons were on board that jeep?
A. I did not notice because the jeep was closed.
Q. So, where did that jeep proceed?
A. It proceeded to Villasis.
Q. After the jeep passed by, what happened next?
A. About 30 minutes, more or less, the jeep of my cousin returned because we cannot come out
from where we were because persons were still there.
Q. When that jeep returned, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A. The owner jeep stopped near the place where I left my motorcycle.
COURT:
Q. Does your cousin Lauro know your motorcycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, your cousin stopped because he saw your motorcycle?
A. I do not know, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC:
Q. So when that jeep stopped, what happened next?
A. Lauro Sapigao alighted from the jeep, sir.
Q. Where did he go?
A. He moved three to four steps behind the jeep, sir.
Q. While your cousin Lauro was proceeding behind the jeep taking about 3 to 4 steps, what
happened next?
A. There was a series of gunfire, sir.

Q. Where did the gunfire come from?

A. The gunfire came from the persons that I noticed coming from the south.
Q. You mean these persons have firearms when you saw them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said you saw that Elpidio Mamerto [was] one of those persons who came from the south
direction, what was Elpidio Mamerto holding at that time?
A. Armalite, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. You mentioned that the gunfire came from these persons who were holding firearms. Will you
name those persons whom you said the gunfire came from?
A. The first one who [fired] his gun was Jose Sapigao.
Q. Whose direction was he firing at?
A. To my cousin Lauro Sapigao, sir.
Q. Do you know how many gunshots were fired by Jose Sapigao?
A. I cannot count how many because the gunshots were numerous.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. How about Elpidio Mamerto what was he doing then?
A. Almost all of them simultaneously fired their guns.
Q. To whom were they directing their fire?
A. To my cousin Lauro Sapigao, sir.
Q. What happened to Lauro Sapigao when you saw these persons fired their firearms at him?
A. When I saw Lauro Sapigao was hit at both of his legs, he fell facing the ground.
Q. Were these persons still firing at him when he fell down?
A. Yes, sir, they continued firing at him when he fell down.[5]
Appellant would call attention to the supposed discrepancy in the statements of eyewitness
Emmanuel Sapigao. During direct examination, Emmanuel Sapigao stated that eight persons had
fired shots at Lauro Sapigao.[6] This inadvertence, however, might be explained by the fact that
the name of the ninth malefactor, Arturo Mamerto, Sr., whose name Emmanuel missed to give,
was earlier mentioned by him as being the leader of the group. On cross-examination, Emmanuel
Sapigao made it clear that Arturo Mamerto, Sr., was one of the group of nine malefactors.[7]
Emmanuel remained unwavering in pointing to appellant Elpidio Mamerto as among those who
had fired at Lauro Sapigao. His testimony was similar to the account given by Gem Sapigao that

also undeniably placed appellant at the scene of the crime acting in concert with the other
members of the group.
The conspiracy to kill Lauro Sapigao was implicit from the conduct of the assailants. Upon the call
made by Reynaldo Sapigao, the malefactors, including appellant Elpidio Mamerto, immediately
converged at the latters residence. All were carrying firearms. Appellant Elpidio Mamerto, as well
as the rest of the conspirators, appeared to be acquiescent to the instructions of Arturo Mamerto,
Sr., the brother of Elpidio, to shoot at anyone who would come near the abandoned motorcycle of
Gem Sapigao. The succeeding events bespoke of a unity of and singularity in the design to kill.
While it might be doubtful that appellant Elpidio Mamerto himself had hit Lauro Sapigao,
considering that the slugs which caused the latter's death were not examined nor matched with
the firearms from which they were fired, the act of one being the act of all in conspiracy,
appellant Elpidio Mamerto was equally liable with the rest of the group. Undeniably, all of the
suspects made themselves scarce from the clutches of the law. Elpidio Mamerto himself was
arrested more than a year after the incident, on 12 January 2000, and only after attempting to
evade capture by fleeing to a cornfield. This conduct would not bespeak well of the character of
an innocent man.
In the amended information filed against him, appellant Elpidio Mamerto was charged with the
Murder of Lauro Sapigao, with the aggravating and qualifying circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation and use of unlicensed firearms.
Apparent from the testimony of the witnesses was the bad blood between the families of the
victim and the perpetrators of the crime. Emmanuel Sapigao ran against, but lost to, appellant
Arturo Mamerto, Sr., for the position of barangay captain of Carusocan. Mariano Sapigao, Jr.,
brother of Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao, was incarcerated in Muntinlupa for the murder of the
son of Romeo Torralba, a nephew of appellant Elpidio and Arturo Mamerto. Elpidio Mamerto had
accompanied the police in raiding the house of witnesses Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao in
connection with the murder case which led to the filing of charges of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Assault against the brothers before the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City. It was
appellant, as barangay kagawad, and his brother, Arturo Mamerto, as barangay chairman, who
monitored the movements of the brothers. The incident that fateful night of 24th of December
1998, from all indications, was not an isolated occurrence but that it was another scenario in a
deep-seated history of violence between two warring factions in barangay Asingan. Reynaldo
Sapigao, upon seeing Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao, called his cousins and shouted, "Uncle,
Uncle, sinugod si kapitan," apparently convinced that the two brothers had come to do them
harm. At Reynaldo's alarm call, the cohorts immediately converged, each with a firearm, in a
defensive posture, as if expecting and readying for an armed attack from Emmanuel and Gem
Sapigao. Lauro Sapigao later stopped near the abandoned motorcycle to possibly render succor
to his cousins. No less than Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao had admitted that Lauro was also
armed at that time. It was more likely than not that he somehow anticipated an armed
encounter. These circumstances render doubtful the attendance of treachery in the killing of
Lauro Sapigao.
Evident premeditation may be appreciated when the execution of the criminal act is preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space
of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[8] As its name suggests, evident premeditation
must be clearly shown. Before it can be considered, its elements, i.e., 1) the time when the
accused has decided to commit the crime, 2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused
has clung to his determination to commit the crime, and 3) sufficient lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow for reflection upon the
consequences of the act,[9] must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal
act itself.[10] The existence of conspiracy notwithstanding, evident premeditation cannot be
presumed. Only where conspiracy is directly established, as opposed to its being merely implied,
can this aggravating circumstance itself be possibly assumed to be attendant.[11]

It was unlikely that the assailants knew beforehand that Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao would pass
through the residence of Arturo Mamerto, Sr., that fateful night, let alone that the deceased
Lauro Sapigao would come to their aid. Their response to what was perceived to be a dangerous
situation was immediate, virtually allowing them no sufficient time to coolly reflect on the
consequences of their action. Evident premeditation was not adequately shown.
Republic Act No. 8294, which took effect on 06 July 1997, would allow the use of an unlicensed
firearm to be taken as an aggravating circumstance "if homicide or murder was committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm." The use of unlicensed firearms was proved by the testimony of
prosecution witness SPO4 Elmer Dedicatoria, Sr., from the Firearms and Explosives Division at
Camp Crame, Quezon City. SPO4 Dedicatoria testified and presented before the court a
certification that appellant was only licensed to carry a pistol, Armscor, caliber .45 with Serial No.
7662248 covered by computerized license issued on 08 May 1998 with expiration date on
December 2000. It was clear from the testimony of Emmanuel and Gem Sapigao, however, that
appellant Elpidio Mamerto shot at Lauro Sapigao not with a pistol but with an unlicensed
armalite.
The killing of Lauro Sapigao, not having been attended by any circumstance qualifying the act to
murder, appellant Elpidio Mamerto can be held liable for the crime of homicide, defined by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:"Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article,
shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal."
There being one aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms, the penalty of reclusion
temporal is to be applied in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty to be imposed is anywhere within the penalty one degree lower than the
prescribed penalty, without regard to the modifying circumstances, or prision mayor. Appellant
could thus be held subject to the penalty of anywhere from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to anywhere from seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum.
Consistently with the prevailing jurisprudence, the award made by the trial court of civil
indemnity should be reduced to P50,000.00 and the award of actual damages not having been
sufficiently proved is deleted and, in lieu thereof, an award of P25,000.00 temperate damages
would be in order.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds appellant Elpidio Mamerto GUILTY of the crime of homicide and
imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years, ten (10) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen (18) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum. The award by the trial court of civil liability is modified by reducing the
civil indemnity to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and, in lieu of actual damages which is
deleted, an award of P25,000.00 temperate damages is made in favor of the heirs of Lauro
Sapigao. Costs de oficio.
The Court, in passing, expresses the hope that the law-enforcement agencies have not relented
in their efforts to have all the suspects in the killing of deceased Lauro Sapigao ultimately
brought to justice.

People v. Lucas

Once again this Court is called upon to review a case involving the heinous crime of rape, made
even more so because it was committed by a father against his own flesh and blood.
On March 10, 1986, Mauricia Lucas filed a complaint accusing appellant, her own natural father,
with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of September, 1985, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, father of the undersigned complainant, with lewd designs and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, to wit: by tying her legs, undressing her, burning her face with a
lighted cigarette, poking a knife at her body and threatening to kill her should she tell the matter
to her mother or anybody else, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant, 13 years of age, against her will and consent.
[Record, p. 1.]
Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, accused pleaded "not guilty." Trial ensued,
whereupon the lower court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of the crime charged with
the aggravating circumstances of relationship and cruelty. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that accused JOVENCIO LUCAS y
PARCUTELA is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and he is hereby sentenced
to RECLUSION PERPETUA (Art. 335, RPC); to indemnify Mauricia Lucas the sum of P30,000 as
moral damages, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs . . . [RTC Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 14.]
The victim testified that this was in fact not the first time she was sexually abused by appellant.
The trial court noted in its decision that
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mauricia Lucas testified that she had already been raped by her father, once in Romblon, some
three (3) months before September 1985, and again in Manila before the third rape that was
committed in September 1985. It was the THIRD act of rape committed in Manila in September
1985 that is the subject-matter of the instant criminal prosecution. After this third two (2) more
rapes were allegedly committed on her person by the accused in Manila sometime in September
1985 . . . [T]he evidence will be concentrated on the THIRD RAPE committed in the City of Manila
in September 1985, for which the victim made her move and complained to the authorities on
March 3, 1986 . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

[RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 12].

In this appeal, appellant raises the following assignments of error, mainly challenging the lower
court's evaluation of the witnesses' testimonies and the evidence:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE LACK OF EVIDENCE SHOWING HE IS THE PERPETRATOR
OF THE CRIME;
II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON

THE BASIS OF PRESUMPTIONS AND SELF-SERVING TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES [Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 42].
Ultimately, the only issue presented in this case is whether or not the appellant was proven
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
After a careful review of the record, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, aggravated by the
circumstances of relationship and cruelty (ensanamiento).
The trial court's decision is amply supported by evidence proving to a moral certainty the guilt of
the appellant. We find that the record sufficiently establishes that, indeed, as held by the trial
court, appellant had carnal knowledge of Mauricia, through force and intimidation, against the
latter's will.
The prosecution's version of the case as adopted by the lower court is as follows: Sometime in
September 1985, thirteen-year old Mauricia, then working as a housemaid, was fetched by her
father from her place of work at 1171 Batanes Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Mauricia asked
appellant where they were going, but the latter simply did not answer. Father and daughter
boarded a jeepney and alighted in a dark place which Mauricia found unfamiliar. Mauricia was
then brought to a dark room where her father tied both her hands and feet to a bed, undressed
her, lighted a cigarette and burnt her face with it, kissed her, fondled her private parts, and
finally, pointing a knife approximately eight (8) inches long at her neck, consummated the sexual
act. All throughout the forced sexual intercourse, appellant was laughing. He then threatened to
kill Mauricia if she revealed the incident to anyone. Despite such warning, Mauricia told her
paternal grandfather about her terrible experience. Her grandfather, angered, confronted the
appellant, but the latter only threatened to harm the old man. About six months after the alleged
rape took place, Mauricia decided to report the incident to the police. On March 3, 1986, a
physical and genital examination was conducted on Mauricia by Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal
Officer of the Evidence-Laboratory Division of the Western Police District. The fact of defloration
is supported by the findings of the Medico-Legal Officer [Exhibit "C", Record, p. 35] which reads:
1.
Breasts are fairly developed, hemispherical in shape and with small brownish nipples and
areolae;
2.

Abdomen is flat, soft and without striae of pregnancy;

3.
Hymen is relatively thin, narrowed with a deep old healed gaping laceration at 6 o'clock
position extending to the base;
4.

Introitus vagina admits two (2) examining fingers with relative ease; and

5.

Last menstrual period Menarche has not started as of this date.

OPINION: The above findings is consistent with a girl who is no longer a virgin.
The Medico-legal officer further testified that the findings are consonant with a woman who has
had "several experience with sexual intercourse" [t.s.n., October 7, 1986, p. 3]. However,
because the physical and genital examination was conducted about six months after the rape,
evidence of violence, whether external or internal, can no longer be established. Be that as it
may, the absence of any evidence of force does not negate a finding that forcible sexual
intercourse actually took place [People v. Domen, G.R. Nos. L-47675-76, January 31,1983,120
SCRA 486].
I.

An accusation for rape can easily be made because the nature of the crime is such that it is
difficult to prove or disprove its veracity. In such an offense where it is usually only the accused
and his victim who can testify as to its occurrence, conviction or acquittal hinges almost solely
upon the credibility of the witnesses [People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L-38449, November 25, 1982,
118 SCRA 705]. In the present case, only the complainant herself had testified as to the details of
the rape. However, although the evidentiary rule in such crimes is that the testimony of the
victim should not be received with precipitate credulity [People v. Estacio, G.R. No. 54221,
January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 537], nonetheless, even the uncorroborated testimony of the
offended party in an accusation for rape is sufficient to justify conviction if said testimony is
"credible and positive, and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt" [People v. Galicia, G.R.
No. L-39235, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 550].
In the case under review, we find no reason to doubt the victim's credibility. The trial court,
having had the opportunity of hearing firsthand the witnesses of both prosecution and defense
and of observing their demeanor and manner of testifying during the trial, noted that during
cross-examination the victim showed "sincerity and conviction" and appeared to be truly
"aggrieved" [t.s.n., December 18, 1986, p. 17]. In its decision, the trial court further regarded the
defense's theory of revenge as "absurd . . . puerile and childish" [RTC Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 13].
Indeed, scrutinizing the record, we find that there exists no cogent reason to disturb the trial
court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. This Court finds it noteworthy that instead of
testifying in open court in order to defend himself against the victim's accusation, appellant
simply chose not to rebut the charges, but remained silent, and relied solely on the testimonies
of his wife and friend, thus inhibiting himself from personal scrutiny of the judge.
The defense anchors its case mainly on alibi. As stated in the trial court decision, the defense
relied only on the testimonies of Venancia Lucas (wife of appellant and natural mother of the
victim) and of Clarita Monsale and on a letter written by the Barangay Captain of Matutuma, San
Andres, Romblon, but did not present the accused himself who "pointedly and purposely did not
testify in his behalf" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 12]. Appellant's wife Venancia, mother of the
victim, claimed that her husband was with her in Romblon in September 1985, and that it was
only in February 3,1986 that, together, they decided to try to make a living in Manila [t.s.n.,
March 13, 1987, p. 5]. Another witness, Mrs. Clarita Monsale, a friend of the appellant, testified
that whenever appellant and his wife visited Manila, they would always stay with her in an old
sunken barge which served as her house. The couple, she further alleged, left for Romblon in
1984 and returned to Manila only in February, 1986 when they came to live with her again [t.s.n.,
May 14, 1987, pp. 7-8]. A note handwritten by the barangay captain, one Pedro Taladtad, Jr.,
alleging that, as far as he can remember, appellant left for Manila only in February, 1986, was
likewise submitted in evidence. These testimonies, however, are insufficient to establish alibi
without the testimony of the appellant. By themselves, these testimonies do not convincingly
establish that it was impossible for appellant to have been in Manila at the approximate date that
the offense was committed.
But the appellant himself, the only person who could make a positive and categorical statement
of his whereabouts at the time of the commission of the crime, did not even testify in order to
refute the accusations against him and support his defenses. With his silence, there is, strictly
speaking, no evidence of alibi which the defense witnesses could corroborate. It was held in the
case of People v. Resano [G.R. No. 57738, October 23, 1984, 132 SCRA 711, 717-718] that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . [The witness], of course, has a right not to do so and his failure and/or refusal to testify shall
not in any manner prejudice or be taken against him. But where the prosecution has already
established a prima facie case, more so when the offense charged is grave and sufficient enough
to send accused behind bars for life . . ., then in order to meet and destroy the effects of said
prima facie case and so as to shift the burden of producing further evidence to the prosecution,

the party making the denial must produce evidence tending to negate the blame asserted to
such a point that, if no more evidence is given, his adversary cannot win the case beyond a
reasonable doubt. In such a situation, it may be necessary for the accused to have a complete
destruction of the prosecution's prima facie case, that he take the stand since no hardship will in
any way be imposed upon him nor advantage be taken of him. . . . If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things he has to do,
then he is hardy indeed, if he demands and expects that same full and wide consideration which
the state voluntarily gives to those who, by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Alibi is generally a weak defense, and cannot prevail over positive identification of the appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, in order to establish an alibi, the accused must be
able to show that it was impossible for him to have been present at the time of commission and
in the place where the crime was committed [People v. Quidilla, G.R. Nos. 79369-70, October 28,
1988, 166 SCRA 778; People v. Sambangan, G.R. No. L-44412, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA
726]. Where a claim of alibi is supported only by testimony of relatives and friends, it deserves
scant consideration, more so in the light of positive identification [People v. Baniaga, G.R. No. L14905, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 283]. In the present case, there is no showing that appellant
never returned to Manila from Romblon since the time he left the city, allegedly in 1984, save for
the statements of his wife and friends. It was not impossible for him to have made occasional
visits to Manila in order to see his daughter. Besides, the fact that Mauricia identified appellant as
her rapist belies his denial and defense of alibi. It only shows that the appellant had, on at least
one occasion, left for Manila during the time that he was allegedly in Romblon.
To buttress its argument, the appellant contends that the failure of Mauricia to shout for help
from bystanders prior to the rape while they were still in public view casts doubt on the
prosecution's case. The contention deserves no consideration. The appellant, being the victim's
father, had some moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter which, in itself, was
sufficient to intimidate and force her to submit to his desires [People v. Robles, G.R. No. 53569,
February 23, 1989; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; U. S.
v. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434, (1905)]. Besides, the victim testified that she offered resistance to her
father's sexual advances [t.s.n., February 20, 1987, p. 2]. It is hard to believe that any daughter
would simply give in to her father's lascivious designs had not her resistance been overpowered
[People v. Erardo, G.R. No. 32861, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 250].
Appellant would argue further that "[t]he unexplained silence of complainant for six (6) months
despite her allegations of several rapes committed against her (even before September 1985)
renders doubtful the truth of her charge," claiming that "such silence on her part could be
construed as an implied condonation of what her father had done to her" [Appellant's Brief, pp.
9-10]. Again, the contention is unmeritorious. It has repeatedly been held that the delay in
reporting a rape incident due to death threats, as in this case, can not be taken against the
victim [People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 51034, May 29,1987,150 SCRA 405; People v. Ibal, G.R. Nos.
66010-12, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 317] nor can the fact of delay alone be taken as implied
consent [People v. Seculles, G.R. No. 52348, October 23, 1984,132 SCRA 653]. This Court had
occasion to note that "it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on
their virtue because of the rapists' threat on their lives" [People v. Oydoc, G.R. No. 61679,
October 26, 1983, 125 SCRA 250]. It should be borne in mind that this case involves a victim of
tender age and limited schooling (Grade V) whose actions under such difficult and trying
circumstances are dominated more by fear than by reason. She cannot be expected to have such
exceptional courage as to disregard a threat on her life [People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 71462, June 30,
1987, 151 SCRA 609; People v. Valdez, supra; People v. Ibal, supra], especially where her
aggressor was her own father. The fact that the victim was finally able to muster enough courage
to report the incident is, in fact, commendable. As held in the case of People v. Molero [G.R. No.
67842, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 397, 413], "an intimidated person cowed into submitting

to a series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage as she grows older and finally state that
enough is enough, the depraved malefactor must be punished."
The defense finally alleges that the complaint for rape was filed by Mauricia because of
resentment against her father who scolded and boxed her when he caught her in the embrace of
her boyfriend [t.s.n., March 13,1987, p. 3]. These allegations, however, were never
substantiated. Even assuming that there existed some resentment on the part of the victim
against appellant, allegedly an irresponsible parent and habitual drunkard [t.s.n., December 18,
1986, p, 16], it is nevertheless hard to believe that a young and naive lass could so be motivated
by feelings of revenge as to fabricate a story of rape, to have her private parts examined and to
subject herself to the indignity of a public trial, against her very own father, if there be no truth
to the same. In this case, Mauricia, repeatedly apprised by the trial court of the possible
consequences that may befall the appellant if convicted, remained steadfast in her
determination to see that the wrong against her is vindicated, even if it would mean the tragedy
of seeing her own father brought to jail [t.s.n., Feb. 20, 1987, p. 2].
As correctly held by the court a quo: "No daugther, especially one of tender age, would accuse
her own father of this heinous crime of rape had she really not been aggrieved. No amount of
intercession could batter down her determination that justice be meted to her father. She
underwent public trial and admitted her shame only with the objective that her father be sent to
prison, if that be his fate for having repeatedly assaulted the womanhood of his own flesh and
blood, one who he was supposed to defend with his own life in the first place" [RTC Decision, pp.
3- 4; Rollo, pp. 13-14].
Anent the aggravating circumstances of relationship and cruelty, We find that, as correctly
appreciated by the trial court, both existed in the present case.
The alternative circumstance of relationship is taken into consideration when, as in this case, the
victim is the descendant of the offender [Art. 15, Revised Penal Code]. In crimes against chastity,
relationship is aggravating. The gravity of a crime attended by abuse of relationship was
emphasized in the case of People v. Porras [58 Phil. 578, 579 (1933)], which likewise involved the
rape of a daughter by the father, wherein it was held that: "[t]he crime in this case was so
monstrous that no punishment which is in the power of this or any other human tribunal to
decree, could possibly be a sufficient expiation of the offense." In this case We find that, indeed,
appellant abused the filial trust reposed in him by his daughter in order to carry out the crime to
his every advantage. He personally fetched the victim, his daughter, at her place of work, took
her to the scene of the crime, and forced himself sexually.
Likewise, cruelty attended the commission of the crime. There is cruelty when the offender
enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing unnecessary
physical pain in the consummation of the offense [People v. Gatcho, G.R. No. L-27241, February
28, 1981, 103 SCRA 207; People v. Dayug, 49 Phil. 423 (1926)]. Cruelty is present in this case
where appellant tied the victim to a bed, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette while raping her
and laughed as he did all these.
III.
Under the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly
weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death [Art. 335], and where the commission
of an offense punishable by two indivisible penalties is attended by at least one aggravating and
no mitigating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be imposed [Art. 63 (1)]. In this case, the
commission of the rape was with the use of an eight-inch long knife, undoubtedly a deadly
weapon. Since the crime is a tended by two aggravating and no mitigating circumstances, would
ordinarily merit the imposition of the death penalty. However, in the light of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of
the Constitution providing that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless Congress for

compelling reasons involving heinous crimes provides for capital punishment, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is imposed instead.

People v. Foncardas
From the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City finding appellant Reyman
Foncardas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Napoleon Erno (the victim) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, appellant comes to this Court on appeal.
Appellant, together with Ranil Duetes, Basilio Quijada alias "Kokoy" and Ritchie Dequia, was
indicted for murder under an information dated September 1, 1997 which reads:
The undersigned accuses the above named accused of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about May 14, 1997, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, with several unidentified companions, with treachery and evident
premeditation, armed with a piece of wood, and with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and struck with the piece of wood one Napoleon Erno, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
As Duetes, Quijada and Dequia remained at large, only appellant, assisted by his counsel, was
arraigned. He entered a plea of not guilty,3 whereupon trial commenced.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.
At around 12:00 midnight of May 14, 1997, after having a drinking spree at Romeo's Videoke
located at Trading Boulevard, Duetes, Quijada, Dequia, Marco Mariaca (Mariaca) and appellant
(the group) walked some 50 meters to the corner of Trading Boulevard, fronting Rizal Extension,
where it stayed for five minutes. Realizing that it had run out of cigarettes, the group proceeded
to Carol's Store,4 but returned to the corner of Trading Boulevard, fronting Rizal Extension, to sit,
smoke and while the time away.
Soon after, the victim who had just purchased a bottle of Coke from Carol's Store, repaired to the
corner of Trading Boulevard, fronting Rizal Extension where he bought balut from a vendor. About
5 meters away from the group, the victim ate balut and drank the coke. Quijada then approached
the victim, and the two started talking while Duetes, Dequia, Mariaca, and appellant just
watched and smoked.
Minutes later, Duetes approached the victim and Quijada and sat down behind the two. Not long
after, Quijada was heard shouting something in the Visayan dialect, allegedly angered by the
victim's not acceding to his demands for money.
Without any warning, Duetes pulled the victim from behind, causing the latter to fall down on his
back. Appellant and Dequia rushed to join their companions Duetes and Quijada. Apparently,
the victim was able to rise. Appellant, Quijada, Duetes and Dequia, however, pummeled him
with their fists while Mariaca looked on in shock and disbelief. The mauling of the victim
continued even as Quijada left the scene momentarily. When Quijada returned bearing a piece of
wood about two and half feet long, appellant and Duetes who were standing behind the victim,
held the latter, rendering him helpless, as Quijada struck the victim's nape with the piece of

wood. The victim fell down after being struck. Duetes then told Mariaca, who was merely looking
at his companions, to run. Mariaca did as he was told and immediately ran away from the scene.
Seeing that a person was struck by a piece of wood, garbage collectors Quirino Cabag (Cabag),
Ronil Viilano, Roman Tajo, and the driver of the garbage truck, who were 50 meters away,
shouted at the assailants and approached them. Quijada thereupon told his companions to move
away from the victim, who was already sprawled helplessly on the ground. Quijada continued to
strike at the victim's head, however. When the garbage collectors were about 7 meters away,
appellant, Duetes and Dequia scampered away even as Quijada continued to assault the victim
with the piece of wood. Before the garbage collectors could apprehend him, however, Quijada
speedily left the scene of the crime.
Gathered from the postmortem examination conducted on the victim by Dr. Gene. L. Gulanes, a
medico-legal officer at the Davao City Health Office, are the following:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, marked generalized
Body in Rigor Mortis
Lacerated wound located at frontal area midline 2.5 x 1.3 cms; 3.5 x 1.3 cms, located at
supraorbital area, left; 3.2 x 0.8 cms, located at left lateral canthus; 2.5 x 1.0 cms, located at
right lateral canthus.
Hematoma, 2.0 x 4.5 cms, periorbital area, right; 6.0 x 5.0 cms, periorbital area, left; 10.0 x 6.0
cms, zygomatic area, left.
Fracture, comminuted: FACIAL BONE EXCLUDING MANDIBULAR, frontal; parietal; temporal bone;
left, occipital; base of the skull.
Hemorrhage, intracerebral, intracranial, meningeal, generalized.
Stomach 1/4 filled with partially digested food particles.
Other visceral organs pale
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage Secondary to skull fracture.5
Hence, appellant and his co-accused's indictment.
Denying the accusation, appellant claimed that although he was seated at a bench outside
Carol's store, smoking, he did not participate in any manner in the mauling of the victim, as he
was merely an innocent bystander.6
Discrediting appellant's denial in favor of the positive and categorical testimony of prosecution
witnesses Cabag and Mariaca that they saw him as part of the group that mauled the victim and
that he held the victim as Quijada struck the victim with the piece of wood, the trial court
convicted him of murder by Decision7 of May 12, 2000 the dispositive portion of which is quoted
verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient to prove the guilt of
accused, Reyman Foncardas of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, without any
aggravating circumstance proved by the prosecution, attendant in the commission of the offense
charged of murder, with inherent attending circumstance of treachery and conspiracy among all

his co-accused, on the resultant offense, accused, REYMAN FONCARDAS, is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, together with all accessory penalty as provided for by law.
Pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity,
accused Reyman Foncardas, is moreover ordered to pay the mother of the deceased, Fedelina
Erno-Ignacio, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as
moral damages, for all the sorrow and worries she suffered, as a result of the death of her son,
Napoleon Erno.
On account of this judgment, issue warrant for the immediate arrest of the other accused, Ranil
Duetes, Basilio Quijada and Ritchie Dequia, for their prosecution and immediate trial of the
offense charged, after their arrest.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, the present appeal which ascribes the following errors to the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE ACCUSED REYMAN FONCARDAS WAS
TOGETHER IN THE GROUP OF QUEJADA, DUETES AND DEQUIA."
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING "THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE
MARCO MARIACA WAS MOTIVATED WITH PERSONAL AND MALICIOUS INCLINATION IN TESTIFYING
AGAINST ACCUSED REYMAN FONCARDAS."
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED
WHICH INCLUDES REYMAN FONCARDAS [AND]
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVINCTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT.9
In his brief, appellant argues that the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of Mariaca upon
a finding that there was no evidence on record to prove that Mariaca was motivated by malice in
testifying against appellant just to avoid being himself implicated in the death of the victim.
Additionally, appellant argues that the testimony of Cabag should not be believed due to poor
visibility in the locus criminis and the improbability that, as claimed by Cabag, the assailant
stared at the garbage collectors for such length of time to enable Cabag to remember his face.
In bolstering his case, appellant highlights the inconsistency between the testimonies of Mariaca
and Cabag as to the number of persons during the incident.
Once again, this Court is confronted with the issue of credibility of witnesses. The rule is well
settled that the findings of fact and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a matter
best left to the trial court.
The rationale for this doctrine as explained in People vs. Cayabyab is that the trial judge is able
to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt
and innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the
impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will

affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insistent assertion; or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie; or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer; or the forthright
tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion, or looked down
in confession, or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record
will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations
arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.10 (citations omitted)
Such settled rule aside, a close scrutiny of the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses reveals
that appellant was categorically and positively identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Mariaca testified thus:
Q: And what did this actually (sic) Foncardas and Dequia do when they approached Napoleon
Erno?
A: They helped one another in mauling him.
Q: Now, for how long more or less was the mauling?
A: About 5 minutes because he fell down and he was able to stand-up again.
Q: What happened next to Napoleon Erno?
A: He was held and again Duetes mauled him.
Q: How about Foncardas, what else did he do?
A: He also helped in mauling Napoleon Erno.
Q: After that what did Foncardas do if any?
A: Napoleon Erno became dizzy or he was groggy, it appear to me he held on to a table.
Q: What did Foncardas do?
A: They again approached him at the back of Erno, and they held both hands of Erno.
Q: Who held the hands of Napoleon Erno?
A: Duetes and Foncardas.
Q: And after that what did Foncardas do?
A: At that instance Cocoy arrived.
Q: Who is this Cocoy?
A: Quijada.
Q: You are referring to Cocoy who is one of the accused in this case, but he is at large?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did Cocoy come from?
A: I don't know because all of a sudden he appeared.

Q: When he appeared did he join the group?

A: He was already carrying a piece of wood.
Q: You are referring to Quijada?
A: Yes, sir.11
xxx
Q: With that wood, what did Quijada do?
A: He struck Erno with that wood. 12
xxx
Q: While accused Quijada struck Napoleon Erno with this piece of wood, what was accused
Foncardas doing at that time?
A: The two of them, Foncardas and Duetes, held both hands of Napoleon Erno.[13] (Emphasis
supplied)
And Cabag testified thus:
Q: On the part of the assailant you said that you saw them when they attacked the victim,
Napoleon Erno. Would you be able to identify all of them or any one of them if they are in court?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please do so, please point at him?
A: That one sir (witness pointing to a person Reyman Foncardas).
Q: If the other persons whom you saw helped with (sic) each other, would be here next time,
could (sic) you be able to identify them?
A: Yes, sir, I can identify if they will be present sir.
Q: You pointed out the accused Reyman Foncardas as one of those who participated in the
commission of the charge (sic) in the incident involving the death of Napoleon Erno, now tell the
court, what was the participation of this accused in that incident?
A: He was one of those who mauled the victim, sir.
Q: Now tell the court, can you still recall who was the accused who used that piece of wood next
time?
A: I can point him when I see him by face, sir.
Q: If I show you a picture of that person who used that piece of wood while that person in killing
(sic) that victim, what was this Reyman Foncardas using (sic)?
A: He was at the back of the victim holding the victim, sir. 14
xxx

Q: At what distance were you were from the group mauling the victim when you shouted at
them?
A: About 50 meters, sir.
Q: And that (sic) at that very incident you shouted at the group, three of them immediately run
(sic) away?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: So on what incident and at what distance that (sic) these three or four alleged maulers ran
(sic) away when you shouted?
A: Three three (sic) ran away only at that time when we were reaching towards (sic) them, sir.
Q: At that (sic) distance of (sic) these three scampered (sic) away, about 30 meters?
A: We were already near them because we were already in the middle of the road, sir.
Q: Could it be 20 meters more or less?
A: Very near already, sir.
Q: Or 10 meters?
A: I think 7 meters away, sir.15
xxx
Q: And then when they scampered away, the only thing that you saw among the three were only
their backs?
A: Actually, before they ran away, they stared at us before they ran way, sir.16 (Emphasis
supplied)
For personal motives on the part of a witness to testify against the accused to be appreciated as
showing bias, its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.17 The records do not yield
any satisfactory proof, however, of any such motives on the part of Mariaca. His alleged ill
motives against appellant have been correctly assessed and brushed aside by the trial court,
which had ample opportunity to observe him. An examination of the transcript of stenographic
notes of Mariaca's testimony shows that even under rigorous cross-examination, he remained
steadfast in his testimony. And such testimony was corroborated on material points by Cabag,
who was also an eyewitness.
Appellant calls attention to the delay in Mariaca's volunteering to testify which, so he contends,
betrays Mariaca's ulterior motives. Appellant's contention is untenable. This Court has repeatedly
noted that witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different reactions from
witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn. Different people react
differently to a given situation, for there is no standard form of human behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.18 The reluctance of
eyewitnesses to testify on a crime and to get involved in a criminal investigation is but normal
and does not by itself affect the witnesses' credibility.19
That Cabag saw appellant only once before he testified in court20 should not detract from his
ability to recall appellant's face. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of

violence committed right before witnesses' eyes that they remember with a high degree of
reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.21
Appellant goes on to assail Cabag's testimonial claim of having had a good look at appellant's
face since, so he explained, appellant stared at the garbage collectors. Appellant contends that
such is contrary to human experience since it is not the normal reaction of a person who had just
committed a crime to stare at the witnesses, the normal reaction being to hide or conceal his
identity. Appellant's contention fails to impress. As priorly stated, this Court has long recognized
that different people react differently to a given situation. The reaction of a malefactor who is
caught in flagrante delicto may be aggression, flight or even indifference. In this case, appellant
was with three other young men, one of whom was armed with a piece of wood, while the
garbage collectors including Cabag were unarmed. It is possible that appellant and the other
accused were staring at the garbage collectors as the latter were approaching them in order to
assess their chances in engaging them in a fight.
While the incident took place at around 2:00 a.m., it is not disputed that there was a lighted
electric post nearby.22 Light from the stars23 or the moon,24 it has been held, can give ample
illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize another. A fortiori, this Court is convinced
that the illumination from the electric post sufficed for Cabag, who was near the locus criminis, to
enable him to recognize appellant.
Appellant further draws attention to alleged inconsistencies, conflicting and contradictory
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, he highlighting that of Cabag that he saw four people
(appellant, Quijada, Duetes, and Dequia), and that Mariaca testified that there were five
(himself, appellant, Quijada, Duetes, Dequia) in the vicinity. Such inconsistency does not affect
the credibility of either witness. Minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular
incident which do not relate to the gravamen of the offense charged are to be expected in view
of their differences in impressions, memory, vantage points and other related factors.25 In fact,
minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses bolster rather than weaken their credibility
as they erase any suspicion that they have been rehearsed.26
In the case at bar, any inconsistency refers to minor and collateral matters which do not affect
the substance, veracity or weight of the witnesses' testimony as it does not refer to an essential
element of the crime27 and does not have any bearing on the essential fact testified to, that is,
the killing of the victim. What is important is that both Cabag and Mariaca were consistent in
positively identifying appellant as one of the persons who participated in the mauling of the
victim.
As for appellant's reliance on defense witness Roman Tajo's testimony that he (appellant) was
not part of the group which mauled the victim, the same is misplaced, for Tajo admitted that he
did not see the faces of the assailants:
Q: You said, you cannot remember really the persons?
A: As far as their faces are concerned, we cannot identify them but as to their height, we can
estimate.
Q: The mother and the wife of accused, tell you that the accused is taller and so he was not
among those whom you saw?
A: The wife of the accused and his mother told me, that I should tell the truth, as I was really
there at the time of the incident.
Q: And the truth that you would like to convey because the accused whom you saw is taller and
not among those whom you saw.

A: I did not really see him during that time of the incident.
Q: You did not see him because you cannot really see the faces of those?
A: I saw the heights and because he is tall, he is not among those three.
Q: You said, that you did not see the faces of those three?
A: Yes, your Honor.28(Emphasis supplied)
At all events, appellant submits that there is no evidence of conspiracy between him and his coaccused.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act.
There is, however, no need to prove a previous agreement to commit the crime if by their overt
acts, it is clear that all the accused acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful design. It may
even be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime.29
In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the
victim. What is important is that the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the
death of the victim.
From the testimonies of Mariaca and Cabag, it is clear that the trial court did not err in
appreciating the presence of conspiracy. Mariaca's and Cabag's testimonies disclose that
appellant was one of those who restrained the victim while Quijada struck him on the nape with a
piece of wood, resulting in the latter's falling to the ground.
That appellant conspired in the commission of the crime charged was sufficiently and
convincingly shown by his active participation in holding the victim to render him immobile, thus
enabling Quijada to consummate the killing.30
Regardless of the extent and character of his participation then, conspiracy renders appellant
liable as a co-principal because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of
all.31 Having joined in the criminal conspiracy, appellant in effect adopted as his own the
criminal design of his co-conspirators. Appellant is, therefore, liable for the killing of the victim.
As for treachery in the killing, the trial court correctly appreciated its presence. The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected
manner of execution, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.32 From Mariaca's and Cabag's testimony that appellant and Duetes held the victim while
Quijada struck the nape of the victim, the victim was rendered defenseless. There can be no
mistaking then that the manner by which the victim was restrained and assaulted was
deliberately and consciously adopted by his assailants to ensure his demise.
The attendance of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime, though alleged in the
information, is not supported by evidence, as there is no showing as to when appellant and his
co-accused determined to kill the victim.
Although Mariaca testified that appellant and his co-accused had been drinking before the
mauling of the victim,33 that does not suffice to aggravate or mitigate appellant's criminal
liability.34 The trial court could not have appreciated intoxication - appellant's drinking beer - as
an aggravating circumstance, therefore, as the same was not alleged in the information.

Section 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that qualifying
and aggravating circumstances be alleged in the information.35 Although the crime was
committed before the effectivity of the said Rule, the same should be applied retroactively as it
would be favorable to appellant.36 But, even assuming that the aggravating circumstance of
intoxication was alleged, appellant's degree of intoxication was not proven with certainty.37
Moreover, in the absence of clear and positive proof that appellant's intoxication was habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime, it is improper to consider the same as an
aggravating circumstance. 38
Neither could appellant's alleged intoxication be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. To be
mitigating, it is necessary that appellant present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic
beverage prior to the commission of the crime sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating
reason. At the same time, he must prove that he is not a habitual drinker and that he did not
take the alcoholic drink purposely to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.39 In the absence
then of clear and positive proof as to appellant's state of intoxication, this Court cannot consider
appellant's drinking beer as a mitigating circumstance.
In fine, appellant is indeed guilty of murder, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7569. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court,
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.40
As to the civil aspect of the case, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of indemnity to
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed, it being awarded without need of
proof other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in the death of the victim and that
the accused was responsible therefor.41
As for the award by the trial court of moral damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, the same must be deleted, there being no evidence, testimonial or otherwise,
presented to support it.42
Exemplary damages must, however, be awarded in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil
Code, at least one aggravating circumstance - treachery - which, in this case, qualifies the
offense, being present.43
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of
earning capacity. Ordinarily, documentary evidence is necessary for the purpose. By way of
exception, testimonial evidence may suffice if the victim was either (1) self-employed, earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a
daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.44 In the case
at bar, however, no witness was called to testify as to the victim's income.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao, finding appellant REYMAN
FONCARDAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read as
follows: Appellant is hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Napoleon Erno, the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

People v. Amadore
What could possibly motivate a grown man to vent his lust on a girl not even old enough to
desire? Her innocence? Her helplessness? Her inability to give voice to her indignation?
Mercifully, Ma. Fe Oquindo would not be silenced. Like the many instances which have found
their way to the courts, the plight of this young girl, who was barely ten years old when initiated

into the carnal world, is but one of the countless illustrations of an evil plaguing our society
today. It is high time that this malaise is addressed not so much by the law as the family and a
societal effort to raise the slipping moral value before it degenerates further and becomes too
late to be within retrievable level.

The instant case for automatic review brings to fore anew a decision promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275 (Las Pias), of the National Capital Judicial Region, convicting
accused-appellant RODRIGO AMADORE (Amadore) of, and imposing upon him the capital
punishment for, five (5) counts of rape. The same accused-appellant, furthermore, has been
found guilty, on one other count, of attempted rape.

Amadore stood charged with five counts of rape perpetrated on MARIA FE OQUINDO, just 15
years old in 1996, in Criminal Cases No. 96-0468 to No. 96-0472, inclusive, textually reading -

That on or about the 21st day of March, 1991, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
then the stepfather of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy and influence and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO Y ANDOR, who is 10 years old,
against her will and consent.[1]

That on or about the 11th day of January, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
then the stepfather of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy and influence and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO Y ANDOR, against her will and
consent.[2]

That on or about the 14th day of March, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
then the stepfather of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy and influence and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO Y ANDOR, against her will and
consent.[3]

That on or about the 1st day of March, 1993, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
then the step-father of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy and influence and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO Y ANDOR, against her will and
consent.[4]

That on or about the 26th day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being
then the step-father of the private complainant and through moral ascendancy and influence and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO Y ANDOR, against her will and
consent.[5]

Accused-appellant was likewise indicted in three other informations, one, for violation of Section
5, Republic Act No. 7610, in relation to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information,
dated 24 October 1996, docketed Criminal Case No. 96-0473 -

That on or about the 22nd day of March 1991, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with
lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of one MARIA FE A. OQUINDO, ten (10)
years old girl, a minor, by then and there kissing and touching her private parts, against the
latters will and consent.[6] -

two, for attempted rape in an Information, also dated 24 October 1996, docketed Criminal Case
No. 96-0474, -

That on or about the 27th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to have sexual intercourse with a fifteen (15) year old
girl, MARIA FE A. OQUINDO, against her will and consent, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of
execution that would produce the crime of Rape by reason of causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance.[7]

and three, for rape in an Information, dated 18 July 1996, docketed Criminal Case No. 96-0328 -

That on or about the 11th day of June, 1996, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the stepfather of the private-complainant, and through his moral ascendancy and influence
and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

have carnal knowledge with one MARIA FE OQUINDO, who is 15 years old, against her will and
consent.[8]

Accused-appellant pled not guilty to all the charges. The cases were consolidated and jointly
tried.

Private complainant Maria Fe Oquindo testified that on 21 March 1991 she awoke to see accusedappellant, her stepfather, standing in front of her with only his brief on. He told her to remove
her panty but she refused. Scolding her for her disobedience, accused-appellant got a pillow and
placed it over her face. He laid on top of her, removed her panty, inserted his penis into her
vagina, and then moved himself up and down. She felt severe pain. The incident happened in
their house at 004-A Calabasa Street, Tambakan, Pulanglupa, Las Pias, Metro Manila.

On 22 March 1991, also in the same place, accused-appellant fondled the young girls breast and
kissed her many times against her will. He did not persist and he threatened her not to tell on
him.

On 01 March 1993, while Maria Fe was playing inside the house, accused-appellant called her
and ordered her to lie down. Afraid, she obeyed. Accused-appellant then removed her panty, laid
on top of her, and succeeded in taking her. She was threatened not to mention the incident to
anyone or, if she did, he would kill her mother. At the time, only the victim and accused-appellant
were in the house.

On 11 January 1996, Maria Fe, along with her mother, sister and stepfather, was in Batangas for
a vacation. While she was playing with her cousins, she was told by accused-appellant to get
back inside the house. She refused. Accused-appellant twisted her arms and pulled her in. He
told her to lie down. She tried to fight back but accused-appellant pushed her down, removed her
panty and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After a while, she felt a sticky
substance coming from accused-appellant. When told to wash, she saw white sticky substance
coming out of her.

On the mid-afternoon of 26 February 1996, back from vacation, Maria Fe was subjected to a like
ordeal. She was in their house playing when accused-appellant asked for a massage. The witness
obliged. While giving the massage, he suddenly embraced her and made her lie on the floor. He
went on top of, and consummated his evil design on, her.

On 14 March 1996, Maria Fe was at her aunts place located just behind their own house when
she was again called by accused-appellant ostensibly to take a bath. He ordered her to remove

her panty. When she refused, accused-appellant berated her. He twisted her arms and made her
lie down. He removed her panty, laid on top of her and again satisfied his lust.

On 27 June 1996, about two oclock in the afternoon, while Maria Fe was playing just outside their
house, accused-appellant instructed her to bring him a glass of water. Just as she was about to
hand the glass of water, accused-appellant pulled her down. She tried to push him away but, as
usual, her resistance proved futile. After the sexual congress,[9] she fled out of the house. She
was still fixing her panty when one Nora Caales saw her. Caales asked what had happened. She
pretended to have just urinated. Suspicious, Caales informed Mely Anda, Maria Fes aunt, of the
incident. When confronted, Maria Fe confessed all that had happened to her in the hands of her
stepfather.

Maria Fe testified that she was even much younger when she was first abused by accusedappellant. She kept things to herself because she was afraid that her mother, Julieta Amadore,
would feel more for accused-appellant than she would for her. True to her fears, when she finally
revealed the incident to her mother, she was told - Siguro, kagustuhan mo ito. With the help of a
neighbor, she finally filed a complaint against her stepfather.

Julieta Amadore, for her part, denied having been told of any of the incidents by her daughter
Maria Fe.

Accused-appellant denied all the accusations against him, stating that their house is only 12 x 10
feet in area and that Maria Fe had her own room. He claimed that, throughout, he and Maria Fe
had a smooth relationship, and that the only reason he could think of why the cases were filed
against him was the misunderstanding that once arose when he scolded her after she had
refused to be sent on an errand.

Q What can you say about her accusation against you Mr. Witness?

A I did not do anything to her, sir. I am not a bad person.

xxxxxxxxx

Q How would you say or describe your relationship with your stepdaughter Maria Fe Oquindo?

A We have a smooth relationship, sir.

Q Would you say it is a good relationship between you and Maria Fe Oquindo?

A Yes, sir.[10]

After having heard both parties, the court a quo gave the case for the prosecution. In not giving
credence to the denial proffered by accused-appellant, the court said that neither the size of the
house nor the misunderstanding between him and the young girl could hardly overwhelm the
strong evidence against him. The trial court concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Rodrigo Amadore y Obina GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as charged in the following cases and sentenced accordingly, to wit:

1. In Crim. Case No. 96-0468, to die by the method provided by law;

2. In Crim. Case No. 96-0469, to die by the method provided by law;

3. In Crim. Case No. 96-0470, to die by the method provided by law;

4. In Crim. Case No. 96-0471, to die by the method provided by law;

5. In Crim. Case No. 96-0472, to die by the method provided by law;

6. In Crim. Case No. 96-0473, to suffer an Indeterminate Prison term of six (6) months of arresto
mayor medium as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as medium;

7. In Crim. Case No. 96-0474, to sufer an Indeterminate Prison term of Twelve (12) Years of
prision mayor maximum as minimum to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal maximum as
minimum, and to pay complainant Maria Fe Oquindo the sum of P100,000.00 in each of
dispositions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and P50,000.00 in each of dispositions 6 and 7, and pay the
costs in the foregoing dispositions.

Accused is ACQUITTED in Crim. Case No. 96-0328 for lack of evidence.[11]

In his appeal to this Court, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors -

1. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of five (5) counts of rape, attempted rape and violation of Section 5 RA 7610 in relation to Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that the accused-appellant waived the defect of
improper venue in Criminal Case No. 96-0469.

3. On the assumption that the accused-appellant committed the acts complained of in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-0468 to 0472, the Court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty for each
of the five counts of rape.[12]

In support of the first assigned error, accused-appellant would argue that it was not right for the
trial court to heavily rely on the testimony of MARIA FE OQUINDO. He contended that while she
could testify in good detail about each of the incidents covered by seven out of eight criminal
informations, a feat indeed, she was unable to recall, however, the other times when she had
similarly been sexually assaulted by accused-appellant.

In support of the second assigned error, accused-appellant, citing People vs. Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City,[13] asserts that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, and that since the
incident in Criminal Case No. 96-0469 is said to have taken place in Nasugbu, Batangas, the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias did not have jurisdiction to try the case.

In his third assigned error, accused-appellant states that the death penalty cannot be imposed in
Criminal Cases No. 96-0468 to No. 96-0472, inclusive, all the five informations having averred
him to be the stepfather when, in fact, Julieta Amadore herself has categorically stated that he is
just her live-in partner and that their union has all along been without the benefit of marriage.
Furthermore, citing the case of People vs. Dimapilis,[14] he claims that all the informations,
except for one, have failed to allege the age of private complainant, another qualifying
circumstance, essential to justify the imposition of the extreme penalty of death.

The first assigned error is an issue that relates to the credibility of a witness, a matter best
addressed during the trial stage. There is no ample reason shown for this Court to discard the
long-standing rule that it should behoove an appellate court, absent clear and convincing
justification to hold otherwise, to accord weight and respect to the findings of the trial court. The
inability of private complainant to remember all the other instances of sexual molestations

committed against her by accused-appellant can hardly downgrade her credibility. Nor would her
minor inconsistencies adversely affect her entire testimony; indeed, such incongruences or
inaccuracies in the testimony of a witness reinforce rather than destroy or weaken credibility.[15]
Furthermore, rape victims, particularly the young, are known not to cherish the memory of an
event they would rather forget.

The argument that the filing of the case against accused-appellant by private complainant has
supposedly been motivated by a simple misunderstanding between them is much too flimsy to
belabor. It would be quite absurd to think that this young girl would come up with so serious an
accusation as rape just for a senseless spite. It has more than once been said that youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[16] Neither can it be expected that a
woman would publicly admit being a victim of rape, voluntarily allow herself to be medically
probed, and endure humiliating questions in the course of trial, if her accusations were but
malicious concoctions.[17] Considering the inbred modesty and the consequent revulsion of a
woman against airing in public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that private
complainant would reveal the ignominy she has undergone unless it were true.[18]

The denial of accused-appellant cannot prevail over the clear and convincing testimony of Maria
Fe. Neither can his alibi prosper. Accused-appellant himself has testified that he would regularly
go home from work. His work as kargador elsewhere, not really that distant away, is not one that
could have prevented him from going back to the house and committing his nefarious deeds.
Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification[19]unless it is found to be so convincing as to
preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its vicinity at the time of its commission.[20] Nor can the fact that the house where the
incidents have occurred is but 12 x 10 feet be a deterrent for accused-appellant. Lust, it has
been said, is no respecter of time and precinct and known to happen in most unlikely places such
as in parks, along roadsides, within school premises or even in occupied rooms.[21]

There is merit in the second assigned error relative to Criminal Case No. 96-0469. The concept of
venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike civil cases, is jurisdictional.[22] The filing of a criminal
case with the wrong court can oust the court from trying the case. The evidence introduced by
the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 96-0469 points to Nasugbu, Batangas, as being the scene of
the offense. For lack of jurisdiction, the case should have been dismissed by the court a quo.

The defense has likewise made good point in its third assigned error. The relationship between
accused-appellant and his victim and the latters minority are qualifying circumstances that must
be correctly alleged and proved in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Apparently, the victim is not the stepdaughter of accused-appellant as has been so stated in the
informations but is the daughter of his common-law spouse by the latters marital relation with
another. A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones legal spouse by a previous marriage. Except for
the information in one of the criminal cases, the minority of the victim has, too, not been alleged.
The Court has successively ruled that the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659,[23] the attendance of any of which mandates the penalty of death, are in

the nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of the proper averment thereof in the
complaint negates the imposition of that extreme penalty.

In Criminal Case No. 96-0473, where accused-appellant fondled the breast of private complainant
and repeatedly kissed her but he did no further and there was no showing that he at the time
intended to have sex with the victim, the crime for which he should have been held guilty was
the offense of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape, punishable under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional.[24]

In Criminal Case No. 96-0474, accused-appellant may only be convicted of attempted rape,
despite what appears to be the consummation of the act, as the information has merely charged
accused-appellant with attempted rape. Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
two degrees below that is prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal
Cases No. 96-0468, No. 96-0470 to No. 96-0472, accused-appellant Rodrigo Amadore y Obina is
found guilty of simple rape in each of said cases, and he is thus sentenced to suffer a total of
FOUR terms of Reclusion Perpetua. Criminal Case No. 96-0469 is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo. In Criminal Case No. 96-0473, accused-appellant is
found guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, and he is meted an indeterminate sentence of from 3
months and four days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years, 2 months and fourteen days
of Prision Correctional medium, as maximum. In Criminal Case No. 96-0474, the conviction of
accused-appellant for attempted rape, the crime charged in the information, is AFFIRMED but the
sentence imposed by the court a quo is modified by hereby imposing, instead, an indeterminate
sentence of from three years, ten months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to
nine years and one day of prision mayor medium, as maximum. The award of civil liability of
P100,000.00 in each of the Criminal Cases No. 96-0468, No. 96-0470 to No. 96-0472, inclusive,
broken down into P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, is AFFIRMED. The
civil awards in Criminal Cases No. 96-0473 and No. 96-0474 are REDUCED, respectively, to
P10,000.00 and P20,000.00, as and by way of moral damages. Costs de oficio.

People v Licyayo
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,1 petitioner Roberto
Licyayo prays for the reversal of the Decision dated 6 May 20052 and Resolution dated 12
August 20053 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27359, affirming with modification the
Decision4 dated 20 February 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lagawe, Ifugao, Branch 14,
in Criminal Cases No. 819 and 820, convicting petitioner of Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 819 while dismissing Criminal Case No. 820 for Direct
Assault as regards him.5
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On 1 February 1993, an Information6 in Criminal Case No. 819 was filed before the RTC charging
petitioner, his brother Aron Licyayo (Aron), Paul Baguilat (Paul) and Oliver Buyayo (Oliver) with
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code quoted as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses ROBERTO LICYAYO, OLIVER BUYAYO,
ARON LICYAYO, and PAUL BAGUILAT, of the crime of HOMICIDE and committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1992, in the Municipality of Kiangan, Ifugao, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill, DID then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault one Rufino Guay, stabbing him with the use of
a double bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the victim several stab wounds which directly
caused his death.
On 11 May 1993, an Amended Information7 in Criminal Case No. 820 was filed before the RTC
accusing petitioner of Direct Assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
That on or about the 16th of February 1992, in the Municipality of Kiangan, Ifugao, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, DID then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault PO3 Miguel Buyayo with the use of a bladed
weapon while the victim was in the performance of his official duties as a policeman which fact
was known to the accused.
Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial. In Criminal Case No. 819, petitioner,
Aron and Paul pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge of homicide,8 while the other accused, Oliver,
was not arraigned.9 With respect to Criminal Case No. 820, petitioner was not arraigned.10
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses three members of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Kiangan, Ifugao, namely, Joseph Danglay (Officer Danglay), Miguel Buyayo (Officer Buyayo) and
Alfonso Baguilat (Officer Baguilat); and three other persons namely, Jeffrey Malingan (Jeffrey),
Jimmy Guay (Jimmy), and Jose Guay (Jose). Their testimonies, woven together, bear the
following:
On 16 February 1992, victim Rufino Guay (Rufino), along with his friends, Jeffrey and a certain
Joel Dumangeng (Joel) attended a wedding at Mabbalat, Kiangan, Ifugao. Petitioner, together with
his friends, Paul and Oliver, were also present at the same wedding. After the wedding reception,
Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel went to Natamas Store at the Kiangan Public Market and ordered two
bottles of gin. While the three were drinking gin at the said store, petitioner, Paul and Oliver
arrived and likewise ordered bottles of gin. Later, petitioner, Paul and Oliver left the store.
Subsequently, Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel likewise adjourned their drinking session and left the
store.11
Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel dropped by at Famorcas Store. Petitioner and his brother, Aron, as well as
Paul and Oliver, were also present therein. While Jeffrey was talking to the stores owner, Larry
Famorca (Larry), a brawl suddenly occurred between Rufino and Aron. As a consequence thereof,
Rufino fell to the ground. Aron thereafter placed himself on top of Rufino and punched the latter
several times. Jeffrey approached the two and tried to pacify them. Paul entered the scene and
punched Jeffrey on the head. Thereupon, a scuffle followed.12
Officers Danglay, Buyayo and Baguilat were on their way home from the Kiangan Police Station
when they heard some individuals calling for police assistance regarding the commotion. The
three officers rushed to the scene. Upon arriving thereat, they saw petitioner holding a six-inch
double-bladed knife and walking towards Rufino and Aron who were then wrestling with each
other. Officer Buyayo, then wearing only civilian clothes and unarmed, approached petitioner and
held the latters back collar to prevent him from joining the fray. Petitioner turned around, faced
Officer Buyayo, and tried to stab the latter but he missed. Officer Buyayo retreated. The officers
introduced themselves to petitioner as policemen and pleaded with him to put down the knife.
Petitioner ignored the officers pleas.13

Afterwards, petitioner approached Rufino, who was then wrestling with Paul, and stabbed Rufino
in different parts of the body.14 Officer Baguilat fired a warning shot while Officer Danglay
immediately pounced on petitioner and disarmed the latter.15 Petitioner was brought to the
Kiangan Police Station while Rufino was taken to a nearby hospital where he later died due to
stab wounds.16
The prosecution also presented documentary and object evidence to bolster the testimonies of
its witnesses, to wit: (1) sworn statements of Officer Danglay, Officer Buyayo, Officer Baguilat,
Jeffrey, Jimmy, Jose and Arsenio;17 (2) death certificate of Rufino;18 (3) certification from the
Ifugao General Hospital stating that Rufino sustained several stab wounds which directly caused
his death;19 and (4) the knife used by the petitioner in stabbing Rufino.20
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of petitioner and his corroborating witnesses -Daniel Cayong (Daniel), Aron, and Paul -- to refute the foregoing accusations. Their version of the
incident is as follows:
On the morning of 16 February 1992, petitioner attended a wedding at Mabbalat, Kiangan,
Ifugao. After the wedding, petitioner met Paul and they proceeded to the Kiangan Public Market
where they chanced on Oliver, a certain Kimayong and Fernando who invited them for a drink in
one of the stores near the market. Later, Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel entered the store where
petitioners group was drinking and occupied a separate table. Jeffrey and Joel approached
petitioners group and sat at their table. Jeffrey shook and pressed hard the hand of Oliver. The
storeowner signalled petitioners group to pay its bills and leave. Petitioner brought out his wallet
to pay their bills but Jeffrey, who was still holding and pressing Olivers hand, told him to buy
another bottle. Petitioner pleaded with Jeffrey to let go of Olivers hand because the latter is his
friend. Jeffrey, however, warned him not to interfere if he did not want to get involved. Petitioner
glanced at the stores door and saw Rufino standing therein. Thereafter, Jimmy passed by in front
of the store and made a signal to Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel. Petitioner, Paul and Oliver paid their
bills, left the store and proceeded to Sakai Store.21
Subsequently, Jeffrey and a companion went to Famorcas Store and saw Aron and Daniel seated
in one of the benches outside the store. Jeffrey then told his companion "Can you tackle his
brother?" Sensing that he was the brother being referred to by Jeffrey and a trouble might occur,
Aron went inside the store but Jeffrey followed him. Thus, Aron went outside the store and sat on
one of the benches nearby. Afterwards, Rufino arrived at the store and approached Aron. Rufino
held the collar of Arons shirt and punched the latter on the left cheek. Jeffrey also approached
Aron and grabbed the latters arm. Aron fought back but he fell to the ground.22
Daniel immediately proceeded to Sakai Store and told petitioner that Aron was being mauled.
Petitioner went to the scene and saw Rufino and Jeffrey punching Aron who was sprawled on the
ground. Petitioner pushed Jeffrey away but the latters other companions suddenly arrived and
started hitting him. Petitioner fought back but he was overpowered. Petitioner cannot recall
anymore the subsequent events that transpired.23
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 20 February 2003, finding petitioner guilty of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 819. It acquitted Aron and Paul because the prosecution failed to
prove the existence of conspiracy. It did not rule on the liability of Oliver because he was not
arraigned in the said case. Further, it dismissed Criminal Case No. 820 for direct assault because
petitioner was not arraigned therein.24
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. 819 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Roberto Licyayo is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no aggravating circumstances,

he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 15 years
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Further, accused is hereby ordered to pay the victims heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Rufino Guay. "Per prevailing jurisprudence, death indemnity is fixed in
the sum of P50,000.00. This kind of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from other forms of
indemnity for damages and is automatically awarded without need of further proof other than
the fact of death and that the accused is responsible therefore." (People v. Julius Kinok, G.R. No.
104629, November 13, 2001; Case Digest of Supreme Court Decisions; vol. 53, No. 2).
Likewise, accused is ordered to pay the victims heirs another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
"This award is mandatory and does not require proof other than the death of the victim." (People
v. Mariano Pascua, Jr., G.R. No. 130963, November 27, 2001; Case Digest of Supreme Court
Decisions; vol. 53, No. 2).
But the Court cannot award actual damages as testified to by the victims father, Jose Guay, in
the amount of P12,000.00 since the same were not covered by receipts. The same goes true with
the alleged annual income of the deceased in the amount of P30,000.00. "Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that actual, compensatory and consequential damages must be proved, and cannot be
presumed." (Ibid.).25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 6 May 2005, the appellate court promulgated its
Decision affirming with modifications the RTC decision. In addition to the civil indemnity and
moral damages awarded by the RTC, the appellate court also ordered petitioner to pay for the
loss of earning capacity of Rufino in the amount of P580,050.00 and temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of
Lagawe, Ifugao in Criminal Cases Nos. 819 and 820 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
the award of damages, in that accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victims heirs the
following:
(a) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(b) the amount of P580,050.00 for lost earnings.26
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied. Hence, petitioner
elevated the instant case before us on the following grounds:
I.
THE INFORMATION FILED IS NOT SUFFICIENT AS IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CHARGED PETITIONER
FOR THE CRIME OF "HOMICIDE" DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 249 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE; HENCE, PETITIONER COULD NOT BE VALIDLY CONVICTED FOR SAID CRIME.
II.
GRANTING THAT THE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION AND INTOXICATION.27
Anent the first issue, petitioner points out that the Information does not specifically mention the
law which he allegedly violated and for which he was charged. Although the information accuses
him of the crime of homicide, it does not categorically state that he is being charged with
homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. According to
him, the information should have been more explicit by stating that he is being indicted for
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. He argues that

the specification in the information of the law violated is necessary to enable him to adequately
prepare for his defense, and that to convict him under such defective information would violate
his constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.28
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
With particular reference to the designation of the offense, Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure merely directs that the information must state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
The information in the instant case contains the foregoing required statements. The information
mentions the name of petitioner as the accused, the name of Rufino as the offended party, the
date and place of the commission of the crime, and designates the crime committed by
petitioner as homicide. It also alleges the act of petitioner constituting homicide which is the
unlawful stabbing of Rufino with the use of a bladed weapon.29
The fact that the information does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, does not make it defective. There is nothing in
the afore-quoted Rules which specifically requires that the information must state the particular
law under which the accused is charged in order for it to be considered sufficient and valid. What
the Rules merely require, among other things, is that the information must designate the offense
charged and aver the acts constituting it, which in this case, were obviously done. People v.
Gatchalian30 categorically stated that there is no law which requires that in order that an
accused may be convicted, the specific provision which penalizes the act charged be mentioned
in the information.
Besides, it should be stressed that the character of the crime is determined neither by the
caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the information.31 The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an
incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information
but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently
apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.32
Although the information herein does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, it, nonetheless, narrates that petitioner
stabbed Rufino with a bladed weapon during the incident which caused the latters death. The
foregoing allegation unmistakably refers to homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
which is the unlawful killing of any person without any attendant circumstance that will qualify it
as murder, parricide or infanticide.
Apropos the second issue, petitioner alleges that Rufino started the scuffle by punching Aron on
the left cheek; that by such act, Rufino had given him sufficient provocation; and that it was the
pitiful sight of Aron lying on the ground and being beaten by Rufino and Jeffrey which caused him
to stab Rufino.33 Petitioner further claims that he was intoxicated during the incident; that this
fact was affirmed by Officers Danglay and Baguilat in their court testimonies; that his intoxication
was not subsequent to any plan to commit a felony because the encounter between him and
Rufino was merely accidental and there was no previous agreement to harm Rufino; that prior to
the incident, he met old friends and had a drink with them; that such is a mere custom or
practice among Filipinos; and that his intoxication is not habitual.34

Under paragraph 4, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a criminal liability may be mitigated if
there was sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded
the act complained of. To avail oneself of this mitigating circumstance, it must be duly proven
that the alleged provocation originated from the offended party.35
The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl which
resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. What is evident is that Rufino and Aron suddenly
and unexpectedly grappled during the incident.36 As aptly observed by the RTC:
From the facts of the case earlier discussed, the fight between Rufino Guay and Aron Licyayo was
so sudden. In his defense, Aron Licyayo in his direct examination testified though self-serving,
that it was victim Rufino Guay who punched him first and so he fought back.
Nevertheless, this claim of unlawful aggression is belied during his cross-examination:
Q. You claim, Mr.Witness, that on February 16, 1992, you did not know the late Rufino Guay?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You therefore cannot imagine why he should assault you since you did not know each other?
A. None.
Q. You never had any misunderstanding or altercation prior to February 16, 1992?
A. None.
Q. And all of a sudden, in the afternoon of February 16, 1992 you fought each other and you
being bigger than Rufino Guay, you are on top of him, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you delivered several blows when you were on top of him?
A. No because they were already many and they held me.
Q. How many blows did you deliver when you were on top of him before the others came?
A. I do not know how many.
Q. Was it more than ten?
A. No.
Q. Was it more than fifteen?
A. I do not know.
Q. Why do you not know, Mr. Witness, were you drunk at that time?
A. No, I was not. (TSN, pp. 82-83, Crim. Case No. 820).
Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it is obvious that
immediately he became the underdog, literally even. He was easily overpowered by the bigger

and sober Aron Licyayo, who unfortunately, does not know how to count. With this development,
the situation changed. The aggressor became the attacked and the attacked, the aggressor.
But even from the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses, the former
(prosecution) prevailed in convincing this Court that unlawful aggression was not started by any
of the protagonists but that a sudden fight was started by Rufino Guay and accused Aron
Licyayo. This is verifiable from the testimony of the fourth prosecution witness, Jeffrey Malingan.
Defense on the other hand, tried to show that it was the victim who started the unlawful
aggression through witnesses Daniel Cayong and accused Aron Licyayo. They failed miserably,
however, to show this. Daniel Cayong, in his direct examination narrated that it was not only
Rufino Guay who started the trouble but rather he and his two companions Joel Dumangeng and
Jeffrey Malingan took hold of Aron Licyayo and started punching him. The latter witness, as
shown earlier, showed his bias by inculpating the deceased only to contradict himself that the
fight suddenly started when he and the deceased grappled.37
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.38
Since it was not convincingly shown that the alleged provocation originated from Rufino, the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation should not be appreciated in favor of petitioner.
We have held that where there is no evidence as to how the quarrel arose, the accused is not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.39
For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the
intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing
or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.40 The person pleading intoxication must
prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as
would blur his reason.41
In the case at bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the quantity of liquor taken by
petitioner was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact that
petitioner could recall the details that transpired during and after his drinking session with
friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing during the incident. His vivid narration
that he had a confrontation with Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel during the drinking session; that Daniel
approached and told him that Aron was being mauled; that he immediately went to the scene
and saw Aron being beaten by Rufino and Jeffrey; that he pushed Jeffrey away from Aron; that he
was allegedly beaten by the companions of Jeffrey; and that he fought back but was allegedly
overpowered --- all point to the conclusion that petitioner had complete control of his mind
during the incident.42
Petitioner cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of intoxication merely on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that he was drunk during the incident.43 Such
testimonies do not warrant a conclusion that the degree of petitioners intoxication had affected
his faculties.44 There must be convincing proof of the nature and effect of his intoxication which
petitioner failed to adduce in the present case.45
We now go to the propriety of the sentence imposed on petitioner and the damages awarded to
the heirs of Rufino.
Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal.46 There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance proven in the case at bar, the penalty should be applied in its medium period of 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.47 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence

Law, the maximum penalty will be selected from the above range, with the minimum penalty
being selected from the range of the penalty one degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is
prision mayor (six years and one day to 12 years). We found the indeterminate sentence of eight
years of prision mayor as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed by
the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, sufficient.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral
damages amounting to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.48
As to actual damages, Jose testified that his family incurred expenses for the hospitalization and
funeral of Rufino.49 However, since no documentary evidence was proffered to support this
claim, it cannot be awarded.50 Nonetheless, the award of P25,000.00 in temperate damages in
homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of the said expenses is presented in the
trial court.51 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,52 temperate damages may be recovered as it
cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount
was not proved.53 Thus, the award of temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 by the
Court of Appeals is in order.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of Rufino should be indemnified for loss of
earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code54 in the amount of P580,050.00.
In accordance with current jurisprudence,55 the formula for the indemnification for loss of
earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity
= Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income (GAI) Living Expenses
= 2/3(80 age of deceased) x (GAI 50% of GAI)
Generally, documentary evidence is necessary for the purpose of proving the victims annual
income. As an exception, testimonial evidence suffices if the victim was either: (1) self-employed,
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that in the victims line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws.56
Rufino falls under these exceptions. Jose testified that Rufino was earning an average annual
gross income of P30,000.00 from gardening and cultivating ricefields.57 Rufino was 22 years old
at the time of his death.58
We have held that in the absence of proof as regards the victims living expenses, his net income
is deemed to be 50 percent of his gross income.59
Applying the above-stated formula, the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of Rufino is
P580,050.00, computed as follows:
Net earning capacity
= 2/3 (58) x (30,000.00 P15,000.00)
= 38.67 x P15,000.00
= P580,050.00
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 6 May 2005 and Resolution
dated 12 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27359 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Fernandez
Before the Court is Federico Conrado's appeal from the decision * of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Criminal Case No. L-2593 entitled, "The

People of the Philippines vs. Melquiades Fernandez, alias 'Moding' and Federico Conrado"
convicting him and the other accused of the crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer
inter alia two (2) death penalties.
The criminal complaint dated 2 June 1982 filed before the trial court, reads as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1982, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at barangay
Taloy, municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned offended party Rebecca M. Soriano, a virgin and 15 years old, by means of force and
intimidation and against the will of the latter. 1
Assisted by counsel, the accused Fernandez and Conrado, uncle and nephew respectively,
pleaded not guilty on arraignment 2 and underwent trial.
Teofilo Malong employed Rebecca Soriano as a househelper since September 1981. Residing in
Teofilo's house were his wife and daughters Amelita and Ma. Theresa. Rebecca Soriano testified
that on 13 January 1982 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and after she had just finished
taking a bath and still naked, the two (2) accused, both in short pants, surreptitiously entered the
bathroom. To prevent her from making an outcry, a piece of cloth was tightly tied around her
neck, after which she was forcibly laid down. Conrado held her hands behind her while Fernandez
sexually abused her. She declared that, immediately after Fernandez had raped her, Conrado in
turn went on top of her and likewise succeeded in having sexual congress with her against her
will. She added that, thereafter, Fernandez got a handful of mud near the bathroom and placed it
on her vagina. Thereupon, she ran to the upper floor of the house to report the tragic incident to
Amelita Malong. 3
During the trial, Amelita Malong declared that in that afternoon of 13 January 1982, she was
combing her hair in her room when she saw the approaching Rebecca, naked with smeared mud
on her lower private part and a piece of cloth around her neck. She testified that after she was
told by Rebecca about the incident, they reported the same to her father, Teofilo, who was in his
store. She also declared that she knew both the accused because Fernandez used to spray their
mango trees while Conrado sold to them a dog sometime in November 1981. 4
Teofilo Malong likewise testified for the prosecution. He stated that upon being informed that his
housemaid Rebecca was raped by the accused, he and his family, together with Rebecca,
proceeded to the office of the INP Police Station of Malasiqui to report the crime and had Rebecca
physically examined by Dr. Wilfredo Claudio of the San Carlos General Hospital in that same
afternoon. He further said that the following day, or on 14 January 1982, he, Amelita and
Rebecca gave their written statements to the police. 5
Submitted as evidence for the prosecution was the "Medico-Legal Certificate" issued by Dr.
Claudio, indicating his findings of "hymenal lacerations at 6, 10, 3 o'clock positions and one dead
sperm cell seen on a slide examined." 6
In defense, the two (2) accused denied any involvement in the offense, both claiming they were
nowhere at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
More particularly, Fernandez claimed he was in his house at Taloy, Malasiqui weaving baskets
when the incident happened. He admitted having been formerly employed by Teofilo for about
two (2) years to spray his mango trees and stated that during the period he was hired as such,
he lived alone in a small hut constructed under a mango tree. 7 Conrado, on the other hand,
alleged that when the crime was committed, he was at Malimpuec, Malasiqui as he was hired to
spray the mango trees of a certain Mr. Overo Bo. Malimpuec is his hometown but he admitted
that he used to go to Bo. Taloy, prior to the incident, as his parents-in-law lived there. 8

In the trial court's decision holding that the guilt of both accused had been established beyond
shadow of any doubt, the following observations and conclusions are made:
As already stated, the defense of both accused is alibi, which is not even corroborated by a
single defense witness. It is well-settled rule that alibi is the weakest defense that can be
resorted to by an accused, as it is easy to concoct or fabricate. . . .
. . . the alibi of both accused can not prevail over their positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses (especially by complainant victim of rape, Rebecca Soriano) as the perpetrators of the
crime charged, they having testified in a clear, straightforward, positive, truthful, and convincing
manner, with no motive to fabricate this serious charge of rape or falsify the truth. The alibi of
both accused can not also be given credence or weight, considering that at the time of the rape,
accused Melquiades Fernandez was in his house at Bo. Taloy, which is just 150 meters away from
the house of the Malongs, where Rebecca Soriano was raped; and accused Federico Conrado was
at Bo. Malimpuec, which is only 9 kms. away from Bo. Taloy, where Rebecca was raped that
afternoon of January 13, 1982. The evidence disclose that said distance of 9 kms. can be
negotiated in only about 30 minutes by motorized vehicle, on good road connecting the 2
barrios.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The clear, positive, straightforward, and convincing testimony of rape victim Rebecca Soriano, as
well as her immediate reporting of the incident to the police authorities, just 30 minutes or so
after she was raped that afternoon of January 13, 1982 and her giving of a sworn statement (Exh.
A) on January 14, 1982 just the day after she was raped) which was corroborated by the
statements on the same date (January 14, 1982) by prosecution witnesses Amelita Malong and
Teofilo Malong, more than convinces and satisfies this Court that the came charged was, in truth
and fact, perpetrated by both accused. 9
Hence, the judgment of conviction, now the object of this appeal, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds each of the accused MELQUIADES FERNANDEZ, alias "Moding" and
FEDERICO CONRADO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape, aggravated by
cruelty or ignominy, and, pursuant to law, hereby sentences each of them to suffer two (2)
penalties of death, to indemnify the aggrieved party, Rebecca M. Soriano, in the amount of
P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. 10
In an effort to reduce the imposed penalty of death to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment),
without disproving the charges against them, the two (2) accused assigned the following errors:
1.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR TWO (2) CRIMES
OF RAPE.
2.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE RAPE WAS
ATTENDED BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF CRUELTY OR IGNOMINY.
3.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING EACH OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO
SUFFER TWO (2) PENALTIES OF DEATH. 11
In the light, however, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Section 19(1), Article III thereof,
under which a death penalty already imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, Fernandez
withdrew his appeal. 12 The lone appellant therefore is Conrado who insists on his appeal,

notwithstanding the advice of his counsel de officio to discontinue the appeal allegedly on the
ground that "it has become moot and academic." 13
This Court nonetheless proceeded to consider accused-appellant's arguments for the sake of
verifying the correctness of the sentence imposed. We find no merit in the appeal.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of offenses in that, the accused
were convicted for two (2) crimes of rape even when under the criminal complaint against them,
there is only one (1) crime of rape alleged. The rule invoked in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court which states that there should be only one (1) offense charged in a criminal complaint or
information, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant a necessary knowledge of the
charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. But it is likewise the rule that if ever
duplicity of offenses is committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the
complaint; and failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes waiver. 14 Conrado,
after he had been convicted by the court a quo, can no longer assail its judgment by raising this
issue. Neither can he claim, as he now does, that he was denied the information that he was to
be tried for two (2) separate crimes of rape. The acts complained of, as constituting the offenses,
were stated in the 2 June 1982 complaint in ordinary and concise language that any person of
common intelligence would be able to understand and thereby know what acts he was to defend
himself against.
The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to two (2) crimes of rape is
proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. As clearly found by the trial court:
Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime, considering that
they entered the bathroom where Rebecca was, together and at the same time. Accused
Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around her neck, while accused Conrado
held her hands placing them behind her body, to prevent her from struggling or resisting. Then
after accused Fernandez had raped Rebecca, accused Conrado raped her. Both accused,
thereafter, fled from the scene of the crime together and at the same time. All these
circumstances show beyond shadow of any doubt conspiracy on the part of both accused, which
renders each of them liable for two (2) crimes of rape, . . . 15
In a long line of decided cases, it has been held by this Court that in multiple rape, each
defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally committed by him, but also for the rape
committed by the others, because each of them (accused) cooperated in the commission of the
rape perpetrated by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. 16
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy because of
the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The testimony of the examining physician that
he did not find mud on the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's
asseveration that the accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower court) mud on her private
part. It is worthwhile mentioning that the victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55
p.m. or about almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this circumstance,
the absence of mud in the victim's private part when she was examined by the physician, may
be attributed to the possibility that the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left the
house for her physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's testimony was corroborated by that of
Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared on Rebecca's private part when she
(Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the offended
party, young as she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of fabricating this
portion of her testimony notwithstanding the consequent humiliation on her person and disgrace
on her womanhood. We cannot but agree with the trial court's finding that the offense was

aggravated by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word "cruelty" used in the
dispositive portion of the judgment, to describe an alternative aggravating circumstance, is
unnecessary. The act of "plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped, is
adequately and properly described as "ignominy" rather than "cruelty or ignominy."
Third Assignment of Error
Lastly, the original death sentence was correctly imposed pursuant to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, namely, Article 335 which states that when the crime of rape is committed
by two (2) or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death, and Article 63,
which provides that when the penalty prescribed is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties (as
in this case) and the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
shall be applied.
However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no longer imposable
under the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion perpetua, the sentence on appellant
Federico Conrado has to be reduced to two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. 18 But the
indemnity he has to pay to the victim must be increased to P20,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment, as above modified, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the
accused-appellant Federico Conrado.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Ladjaalam
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person
arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or
homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate
offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a
search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms.
Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17, 1998
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him
guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2] all signed by Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information[3] was for
maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the
owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house
as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
We quote it below:

That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or
purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following
weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live
ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live
[ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79
(single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two
(2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher
paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities
concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.[7]
The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14
Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B.
JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J.
LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x
Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and
directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the
accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as
such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the
performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the
Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused
thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the
accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police
Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact
that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were not
hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police officers
were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a.
Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under
arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has
remained at-large.[9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were
dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a
reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently
released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which
he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN 1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A,
Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as

amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a
fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor
as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct
Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate
penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and
to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.[12]
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance
of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search
warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office
of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service
of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the AntiVice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the
warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the
search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin
Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police
vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants
house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid,
raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about
ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire
coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid.,
March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group
of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they
were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent
Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the
house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46,
57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the
extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of
the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and
went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old
women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women

took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid.,
pp. 19-21).
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing
an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their
presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped
from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and
asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went
to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second
floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back
of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa
at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the
magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17)
live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one
with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition
(Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second
floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut
followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP AntiVice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and
Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay
Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50)
folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations
(Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with
five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells
of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 3032).
Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police.
[O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to
appellants house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998,
p. 5) and had been to appellants house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo
and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant.
The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go
behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There
was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson
to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the
table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all
stood and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side.
They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police
are already here. They scampered and ran away because there were already shots. Locson
jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries
School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit
(Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997.

After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for
Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was
signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio
reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to
acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant
yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had
fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations
conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38
caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver
(homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No.
1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within
five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan
M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the
fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total
weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1)
crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).
The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive
Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm
and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh.
X)[14]
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court.[15] Hence, we
quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as
smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to
the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul
Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he
admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser
Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of
his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha[d] a sort
of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of
policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went
out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at]
the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back
of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him considering that the one who
arrested me does not have nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those
who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio
Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he
second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5,
id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause the door is very near x
x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to
policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun
like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman
(tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines

(Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2)
caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W)
and the white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just
produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought
by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he
said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp.
15-24, id.)
Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He
affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could
only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place
already because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998).
He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized
him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did
not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a
fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area
known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day
and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not
able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station,
he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a]
match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard
where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar
(Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw
that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name. They were killed at the
back of his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death
(tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam
whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma
Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers
entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house
(tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house
and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam.
They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the
room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was
not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to
Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa
Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the
Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5,
1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p.
9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she
had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived
and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was
intending to bring to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his
waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his back.
They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit
on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station

where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three
months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).
Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she
was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one
house between her parents house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal
Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she went
downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her husband. When
her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then
the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her
husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).
Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997,
she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven
by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He
went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and
raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to enter the room of her house,
Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons
died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he
was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already
late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate,
he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not
to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the
house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the
firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was
shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were
being counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the
search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp.
17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the
other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam
(tsn, p. 18, id).[16]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue
of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said
Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,[17] in violation of Section
3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:
It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it
was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules
of Court which provides that A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the
Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void.[19]
(emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at
the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the
testimonies of several police officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the
laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant.[21] Additionally,
the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit,
impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire

during the raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail
over appellants narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam
and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect
said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer,
within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once
to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam
after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the
accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he
committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant.
[23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14
rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)[24] used by appellant against the
police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines.[25] The trial court
observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added
that these same items were evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband and
therefore, subject to seizure[26] since appellant had not applied for a license to possess firearm
and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were
seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if
the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during
the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they
would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a
radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that
frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as
follows:
The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1
Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug
den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine
hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an
aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are
used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may
also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general
reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated
testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension
house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu
cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He
admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4)
occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants
who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated,
Walpans testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long was the extension
house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the extension
house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a.

'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive
and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law
and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the
negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[29]
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:
x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his
house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman
was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted
killing to attempted murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of
Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded
aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence against him
considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20
which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in
plain view of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number
1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that
the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and ammunition did not testify in
court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do
not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National
Treasury.[30]
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:
I
The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first
at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an
exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular
inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
III
The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine
hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.[31]
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for
ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In
addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the
Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court a
better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.[32] We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the defense had even
requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly
good idea of appellants house.[34] Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the
proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long
been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.[36] Here, there is no reason to
disturb the exercise of that discretion.[37]
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.[38] Suffice it to
state that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even
finality.[39] After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to
support appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the
contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the
approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado
Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said
you were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague
Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.

Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?

A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran
[sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I
saw two old woman.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground
floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so,
I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence
and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and
jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the
members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?

A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and
the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan
Ladjaalam.[42]
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,[43] as
follows:
Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do
not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.
FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round
[ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I
turned it over to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?

A: I put x x x markings.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?
A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].
xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL.[44]
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the
weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14
which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro
explained in open court:
Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of
gun powder nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?

A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a
person [would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there
[were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the
incident x x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the
approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his

possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecutions Certification[47]
stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not
been given authority to carry any outside his residence.[48] Further, it should be pointed out that
his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could
not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.[49]
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense
he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were planted, and that the
entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.[50] Absent any showing of an improper motive on the
part of the police officers,[51] coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence.[52] Indeed, after examining the
records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the
contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the
trial.[53] He testified thus:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of
December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote:
that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were
directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and
I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are referring to
[in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as]
your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon
of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my
companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya,
Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your
neighbors[] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.

Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in
[your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]
Crime and Punishment
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct
assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of
these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense
for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by
the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the
extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid.
The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the
court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the
prosecutions story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple counts
of attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the
policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such
complex crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision
correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which
constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.[58]
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial
court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866,
as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of
prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not
have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should
have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in
grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views
on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire

handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with
bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and
also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two
or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the
specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the
second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case,
illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph
of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA
8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of
firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It
did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the
proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring
only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating
circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person
may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed
was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty
of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the
statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[62] In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to
favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the
crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms
cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294,
should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the
original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took
effect on July 6, 1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD
1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other
crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the
specific proviso that no other crime was committed.
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court sustained
the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed
homicide. We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for
consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the
proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed
by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to
homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily,
where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While
the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the
accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in
committing an even lighter offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical injuries,[68]
both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily
arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any
perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress.
Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying
the law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use
of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision
correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial
court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at
its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Lorenzo
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol seeks to annul and set aside the following resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, to wit:
1. Resolution dated September 14, 1999,[1] dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order filed by the petitioner against the Honorable
Manuel F. Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 43 for refusing to
retroactively apply in his favor Republic Act No. 8294[2]; and,
2. Resolution dated February 8, 2000,[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the pleadings on record, the following are the undisputed factual antecedents:
Petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol was earlier charged before the sala of respondent judge with
Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866[4] and violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2826[5] (Gun Ban), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 96-149820 and 96-149821,
respectively, allegedly committed, as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149820
That on or about April 27, 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly have in possession and under his custody and control, One
(1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial no. with four (4) live bullets. Without first having secured from the
proper authorities the necessary license therefor.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149821
That on or about April 27, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) .38 cal. Rev. without serial number, with four (4) live ammunition/bullets in the
chamber, by then and there carrying the same along V. Mapa Ext. Sta. Mesa, this City, which is a
public place on the aforesaid date which is covered by an election period, without first securing
the written authority from the COMELEC, as provided for by the COMELEC Resolution No. 2828, in
relation to RA No. 7166 (Gun Ban).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the two (2) cases
were tried jointly.
Eventually, in a decision dated May 18, 1999, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in
both cases, separately sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in accordance with PD. No. 1866 in Crim. Case No. 96149820 (illegal possession of firearm), and to a prison term of one (1) year in Crim. Case No. 96149821 (violation of the COMELEC Resolution on gun ban).
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294[6] was approved into law.
Pointing out, among others, that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866
has already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 8294, hence, the latter
law, being favorable to him, should be the one applied in determining his penalty for illegal

possession of firearms, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 decision of
the trial court.
In its order dated July 15, 1999,[7] however, the trial court denied petitioners motion, saying:
While the law (R.A. 8294) is indeed favorable to the accused and therefore should be made
retroactive we are also guided by Art. 4 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Republic Act 8294 did not so provide that it
shall have a retroactive effect. The Supreme Court likewise in the case of Padilla vs. CA declared:
The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of the
appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands.
Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK.
In the herein assailed resolution dated September 14, 1999,[8] the appellate court dismissed
petitioners recourse on two (2) grounds, to wit: (a) the remedy of certiorari availed of by
petitioner is improper since he should have appealed from the July 15, 1999 order of the trial
court; and (b) lack of jurisdiction, as the issue involved is a pure question of law cognizable by
the Supreme Court.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its subsequent
resolution of February 8, 2000,[9] petitioner is now with us, submitting for resolution the
following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari;
and (2) whether the courts below erred in not giving Rep. Act No. 8294 a retroactive application.
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never put in issue the factual findings of the
trial court. What he questions is said courts legal conclusion that Rep. Act No. 8294 cannot be
retroactively applied to him. Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law. As we have
said in Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[10]
For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any one of them. And the distinction is well-known:
there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or the falsehood of the facts alleged.
Considering that judgments of regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are
to be elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases when appellant raises questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law, while appeals from judgments of the [same courts] in the exercise of
their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the
appellant raises only questions of law[11], petitioner should have appealed the trial courts ruling
to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,[12] pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the same Rules,
viz:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx

(c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45.
By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the remedy of a petition for review under Rule
45, his right to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was effectively foreclosed,
precisely because one of the requirements for the availment of the latter remedy is that there
should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
[13] the remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive.[14]
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what petitioner should have done was to take an
appeal from the trial courts order of July 15, 1999 which denied his motion for reconsideration of
the May 18, 1999 judgment of conviction.
Petitioners case is worse compounded by the fact that even his period for appeal had already
prescribed when he filed with the Court of Appeals his certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991UDK. The Rollo of said case reveals that petitioner received his copy of the trial courts order
denying his motion for reconsideration on July 20, 1999. As the same Rollo shows, it was only on
August 23, 1999, or after more than fifteen (15) days when petitioner filed his wrong remedy of
certiorari with the appellate court.
Be that as it may, the Court feels that it must squarely address the issue raised in this case
regarding the retroactivity of Rep. Act No. 8294, what with the reality that the provisions thereof
are undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. For this purpose, then, we shall exercise our prerogative
to set aside technicalities in the Rules and hold the bull by its horns, so to speak. After all, the
power of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice requires is not
without legal authority or precedent. In Solicitor General, et. al. vs. The Metropolitan Manila
Authority,[15] we held:
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its
inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed
or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of
a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. xxx Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
We shall now proceed to determine whether the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 amending P.D.
No. 1866 can be retroactively applied to this case.
Here, the two (2) crimes for which petitioner was convicted by the trial court, i.e., (1) illegal
possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 and (2) violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 on
gun ban, were both committed by the petitioner on April 27, 1996. For the crime of illegal
possession of firearms in Crim. Case No. 96-149820, he was sentenced to suffer a prison term
ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to (18) eighteen
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in accordance with
P.D. No. 1866, Section 1 of which reads:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of
Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis supplied)
When Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997,[16] the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms was lowered, depending on the class of firearm possessed, viz:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with
bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and
also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two
or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
(Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that the reduced penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294
should be the one imposed on him. Significantly, in its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,[17] the
Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner, positing further that the statement
made by this Court in People vs. Jayson[18] to the effect that the provisions for a lighter penalty
under Rep. Act No. 8294 does not apply if another crime has been committed, should not be
applied to this case because the proviso in Section 1 of said law that no other crime was
committed must refer only to those crimes committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm and
not when the other crime is not related to the use thereof or where the law violated merely
criminalizes the possession of the same, like in the case of election gun ban, as here.
As early as August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No. 8294 took effect,[19] this Court has
pronounced in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals[20] that said law must be given retroactive effect in
favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866. Since then, this Court had consistently adhered to
the Gonzales ruling.[21]
For sure, in People vs. Valdez,[22] where the accused was charged with the complex crime of
multiple murder with double frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under two separate informations, this Court even took a bolder stance by applying
Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactively so that the accused therein may not be convicted of the separate
crime of illegal possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same retroactively so as to
aggravate the crime of murder. The Valdez ruling had been applied in a host of subsequent
cases.[23]
Yet, in other cases,[24] although the Court had given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so as to
prevent the conviction of an accused of the separate crime of illegal possession of firearm when

the said unlicensed firearm was used to commit the crime of murder or homicide, the Court did
not appreciate this use of such unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance as provided
therein, when the use of an unlicensed firearm was not specifically alleged in the information, as
required by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on the matter, the present case takes center
stage presenting, this time, another twist, so to speak. Petitioner, who was charged of illegal
possession of firearms was also charged of another offense: Violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
2826 (Gun Ban), but the unlicensed firearm was not used or discharged in this case. The question
then which appears to be of first impression, is whether or not the unlicensed firearm should be
actually used and discharged in the course of committing the other crime in order that Sec. 1,
Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate crime of illegal possession of firearms may be
charged.
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin vs. People,[25] the accused was
charged and convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal possession of firearms, and illegal
possession of prohibited drugs. In the more recent case of People vs. Almeida,[26] however,
although the accused was acquitted of the separate charge of illegal possession of firearm for
lack of evidence, the Court nevertheless made the following clear pronouncement:
Furthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases that in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 8294, there can be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition if there is another crime committed such as, in this case, that of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. (Emphasis supplied)
In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed firearm was merely found lying around,
together with the prohibited drugs, and therefore, was not being used in the commission of an
offense.
Given this Courts aforequoted pronouncement in Almeida, can the accused in the present case
still be separately convicted of two (2) offenses of illegal possession of firearms and violation of
gun ban, more so because as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually used or
discharged in committing the other offense?
In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam,[27] this Court, interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of
Rep. Act No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law, and categorically held:
xxx A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to
favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal
possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in
the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said
so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
(Emphasis supplied).

The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied in the subsequent cases of People vs.
Garcia,[28] where the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellants for illegal possession of
firearms was set aside there being another crime kidnapping for ransom which they were
perpetrating at the same time; People vs. Bernal,[29] where the Court retroactively applied Rep.
Act No. 8294 in accused-appellants favor because it would mean his acquittal from the separate
offense of illegal possession of firearms; and People vs. Bustamante,[30] where, in refusing to
convict the accused-appellant of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms, the Court
declared that insofar as it is favorable to the appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294
should be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant must be acquitted of the charge of
illegal possession of firearms.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside petitioners conviction in Criminal Case
No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same
time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.
Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings considering that it would mean petitioners
acquittal of the more serious offense of illegal possession of firearms which carries a much
heavier penalty than violation of the COMELEC gun-ban resolution. However, as we have
rationalized in Ladjaalam:[31]
xxx Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such
weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries,
both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises
from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception
that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court
has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and
language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the
power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein. While we understand
respondent Peoples contention that the use of the firearm seemed to have been the main
consideration during the deliberations of the subject provision of Rep. Act No. 8294, the fact
remains that the word use never found its way into the final version of the bill which eventually
became Rep. Act No. 8294. The Courts hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived
deficiency in the final version without contravening the most basic principles in the interpretation
of penal laws which had always leaned in favor of the accused. Under our system of government
where powers are allocated to the three (3) great branches, only the Legislature can remedy
such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.
As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court from convicting petitioner of the
separate crime of illegal possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in Almeida, the unlicensed
firearm was not actually used. For sure, there is, in this case, closer relation between possession
of unlicensed firearm and violation of the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs in Almeida.
WHEREFORE, Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearms is hereby DISMISSED
while the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149821 for violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2826 in relation to Rep. Act No. 7166 (Gun Ban), is AFFIRMED.
Since petitioner has already served more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 96-149821, his immediate release from custody is hereby ORDERED unless
detained for some other lawful cause.

People v. Celino
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00731 which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, finding accused-appellants
Celino Nabong y Ocenar (aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka
Roel Salutario) guilty of the complex crime of attempted rape with homicide and imposing upon
them the death penalty.
On 5 April 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City an Information for the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide against the
appellants and a certain Arnel Miraflor y Awitan.
On 21 April 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information on the ground
that certain material evidence arose subsequent to the filing of the original information which
necessitated its amendment. Said motion was granted on the same date.3
An Amended Information was filed on 21 April 1999, indicting appellants and Arnel Miraflor for
the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide, punishable under Republic Act No. 8357, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused men conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other and taking advantage of nighttime, superior strength and by
means of treachery, evident premeditation, force and violence, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attempt to have sexual intercourse with a woman AAA,4 against her
will and consent, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of rape as a
consequence by reason of causes independent of their own spontaneous desistance, that is, AAA
resisted; and by reason or on the occasion of the attempted rape the accused, with intent to kill,
attack, assault and stabbed with a bladed weapon AAA on the different parts of her body thereby
inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.5
Upon arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty6 of the crime charged. Hence, trial
ensued.
The prosecution proved the following facts.
The four accused, Celino Nabong (Nabong), Alvin Laguit (Laguit), Nolfe Ladiao (Ladiao) and Arnel
Miraflor (Miraflor), were all construction workers employed as steelmen by EEI, a construction
firm, and assigned at its OCW-RCBC Plaza Project located at Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
The victim, AAA was a 22-year old accountant employed as junior auditor at the Alba and Romeo
Auditing Firm.
Reynaldo Patenio, a steelman of EEI construction and a co-worker of the accused, testified that
on the fateful night of 23 March 1999, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening, he and the four
accused, together with their co-workers, Rogelio Amit, Lilia and Ariel Cortez, were inside the
workers barracks at the OCW-RCBC Plaza when they decided to go out for a drinking session.
They walked from their barracks and at about 9:15 p.m. reached a nearby videoke bar in
Amorsolo Street in Makati City, just across the Makati Medical Center. There, each of them
consumed six bottles of Colt 45 beer.
By 11:30 p.m., they stopped drinking when the videoke bar closed for the night.1a\^/phi1.net
Rogelio Amit, Lilia and Ariel Cortez left ahead of the group. The four accused proceeded to Ayala
Avenue and stopped at a vacant lot in front of the Makati Medical Center, where concrete pipes
used for construction were lying around. Reynaldo Patenio, who decided to call it a day, also

stepped out of the videoke bar and was just about five meters away from the four accused, when
they invited him to join them. When Reynaldo Patenio joined the group, they taunted him and
made fun of him by pushing him around like a ball being tossed from one man to another.
Patenio was able to extricate himself from the group and was about to leave when he heard one
of the accused saying loudly "Huwag nayan, lagas nayan," which was directed at a woman who
was then boarding a jeepney. The word "lagas" means old in the Visayan dialect. At about the
same time, AAA was walking towards the center island near the corner of Buendia Avenue and
Ayala Avenue with her officemate Minerva Arguelles Frias. Laguit and Ladiao, who were then
standing by the corner of Ayala Avenue and Buendia Avenue, spotted the two women. Therefrom,
Laguit and Ladiao crossed the street and waited at the island for the two women. Minerva
Arguelles Frias then boarded a bus, leaving AAA alone with Laguit and Ladiao.
Laguit took his shirt off and was laughing while waving his shirt in the air. Ladiao, who was
between Laguit and AAA, had a smirk on his face. Nabong then appeared from the dark portion
of the vacant lot holding a "kabilya," a 7-inch pointed metal bar, sort of an improvised iced pick,
and approached Laguit, Ladiao and AAA. Nabong suddenly stabbed AAA on the right thigh using
the pointed metal bar. Simultaneously, Ladiao jumped at AAA and covered her mouth. The victim
slumped on the pavement while Ladiao, Laguit, Nabong and Miraflor crowded around the woman.
Miraflor, upon seeing what his companions were doing, hurriedly left and went to the barracks.
Patenio also left the scene and went back to the barracks about the same time Miraflor did.
Witness Ofelia A. Camba, a vendor at the RCBC Plaza, testified that on that same night between
11:00 and 11:30, while she was walking towards a creek to urinate, she overheard a group of
men talking. Upon hearing their voices, she changed her mind and instead continued to walk
towards her house at the Botanical Garden, near Urban Avenue. When she passed by the group
from where the voices emanated, she noticed two men who were seated and a man who was
standing. She later identified the man standing as Nabong. She heard Nabong, who was two
meters away from her saying "Huwag yan, lagas na yan." Having understood the remark, she
suddenly felt scared.
For her part, Virginia Mabayao, another vendor in the area, testified that at or before midnight of
23 March 1999, while she was walking along Buendia Ave., she saw three men who told her, "Hi,
ate pakape ka naman." She responded by telling them to go to her vending place located at
Ayala Avenue near RCBC. They did not follow her. She noticed that one of them who was standing
held a piece of metal while swaying his head from left to right. The other two were seated. At
around 1:00 a.m. the next day, she heard from the barangay captain of the killing incident. Later,
at the Makati police station, she saw the same men again whose identities she subsequently
learned as Nabong, Miraflor, and Laguit. She recalled that Nabong was the man who was
standing.
Minerva Arguelles Frias, through her sworn statement, disclosed that she was with the victim that
night. They walked from their office until they reached Ayala Avenue where she boarded a bus,
leaving the victim on site.
PO3 Libretto Buisan testified that on the night of the incident, he, together with PO1 Elmer
Garcia, was on a patrol duty at the Pasong Tamo, Buendia Avenue and Makati Avenue area from
8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. the following day. At around 11:45 that night, they noticed a commotion
along Buendia Avenue near Tindalo Street. As they went closer, they discovered the body of a
woman, later identified to be that of the victim, lying on the pavement on her back, her
undergarment pulled down almost exposing her private parts. Her brassiere was torn off leaving
her left breast exposed. Her dress was torn and raised showing her belly. PO3 Buisan found the
left side of the victims body heavily bloodied. The center part of the street was splattered with
blood. There were also drops of blood on the vacant lot where the concrete pipes were located as

well as on the extension of Tindalo Street. He asked the barangay tanod to bring the victim to the
hospital.
Arnel Marzan, a traffic enforcer and a Bantay Bayan at Barangay San Lorenzo, testified that at
past midnight, on 24 March 1999, he received a call for assistance. He proceeded to the scene
and found the victim still breathing and moaning. He carried the victim to a tricycle that passed
by, and together with a certain Joven Lopez, took her to the Makati Medical Center.
PO2 Rico S. Bulacan, the investigator assigned to the case, narrated that in the early morning of
24 March 1999, he conducted a spot investigation at the scene of the crime. There, he found six
concrete pieces of culvert pipes at the dark side portion of Tindalo Street corner Buendia Avenue.
He also found out that the nearby traffic post which was about 200 meters away from the corner
of Tindalo St. was stained with freshly dried blood. The bloodstains, upon laboratory examination,
tested positive for human blood. Later, he found an earring belonging to the victim near one of
the concrete culvert pipes. It was to him that witness Mabayao first confided that she saw
Nabong holding onto the traffic sign post the previous night.
Pastor Maghamil, the security guard on duty at the workers barracks said that Patenio and
Miraflor entered the barracks at around 1:30 a.m. of 24 March 1999. He also saw a man wearing
a bull cap, in white "cheleko" vest and pants walking normally toward Ayala Avenue Extension. At
round 9:00 a.m. of the same day, he learned of the incident from the construction workers. Later
in the evening, policemen arrived at the barracks to inquire as to who among the workers arrived
at dawn. He informed them that Patenio and Miraflor did.
Police inspector Thomas C. Sipin, the team leader of the group who apprehended the accused,
testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of 24 March 1999, he went to the crime scene at Buendia
Avenue. He discovered bloodstains at the back of the parking sign located at the sidewalk along
Buendia Avenue. He took samples of said bloodstains, which, upon NBI laboratory examination,
turned out to be Type O human blood. He proceeded to the RCBC barracks then to the RCBC
construction site. There, he was able to talk to two vendors, Mabayao and Camba, and the
security guard. On the morning of 25 March 1999, he came back to the barracks and invited
Nabong, Miraflor and Patenio. At the police station, PO2 Bulacan conducted an investigation of
the three invited persons.
Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, the medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that the victim was stabbed six
times with the use of sharp, pointed, single-bladed instrument, three on the left chest, one on
the right chest, one on the back right side chest level, and one on the right thigh. He said that
the cause of death of the victim was hemoperigonio or collection of blood at the abdominal
cavities caused by the stab wounds.
BBB, the mother of AAA, testified specifically on the civil liability of the accused.1awphi1.nt
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of the four accused who denied
having committed the crime and offered the defense of alibi.
The four accused admitted that they went on a drinking spree at the videoke bar at around 9:00
p.m. of 23 March 1999 with Patenio and the other co-workers. They all claimed that they left the
bar at past midnight, after which they proceeded to the nearby Burger Machine to drink coffee.
They also admitted that they never had any quarrel with Patenio.
According to Nabong, after drinking coffee with the group they parted ways. He went home to
Marikina and arrived there at around 2:00 a.m. He slept and woke up at 6:00 a.m., got his bag
then went to the barracks, arriving there at 8:00 a.m. where he slept again. When he woke up at
12 noon, he left the barracks to see a movie and returned at 2:00 p.m. He said he chose to start
to work at 6:00 p.m. that day since it was very hot to work at daytime.

For his part, Laguit testified that he consumed four bottles of Colt 45 beer at the videoke bar.
They left at past midnight and stayed at the Burger Machine for a few minutes. From there, he
proceeded to the barracks with Miraflor and Patenio. He heard of the killing on 24 March 1999,
from the guard. The whole day he stayed in the barracks. At 9:00 a.m. of 25 March 1999, he was
arrested and brought to the police station where the police asked him to confess to the killing,
but he refused.
According to Ladiao, the videoke bar was only less than five minutes walk from the barracks. He
returned to the barracks after dropping by the Burger Machine. On 25 March 1999, the police
took him to the police station.
Miraflor testified that after drinking coffee at the Burger Machine, he returned to the barracks
with Patenio, while Laguit followed them. Upon reaching the barracks, he slept. The following
morning, 24 March 1999, he proceeded to work. At around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, the
security guard assigned in the barracks told him and Patenio about the incident and that some
policemen were looking for them. The following day, he and Patenio did not report for work and
waited for the policemen to arrive. When the policemen arrived, they were told that they will be
investigated. They were later brought to the police station where two vendors arrived and
identified them as the ones responsible for the death of AAA.
The trial court subsequently rendered a decision dated 18 June 2002, finding Celino Nabong, in
conspiracy with Alvin Laguit and Nolfe Ladiao, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997." For insufficiency of
evidence to sustain his conviction, Arnel Miraflor was acquitted. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the three accused Celino Nabong y Osenar
(aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka Roel Salutario) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide who are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), as exemplary damages, one hundred eleven thousand two
hundred thirty-nine pesos (111,239.00) as actual damages, one million five hundred eight
thousand one hundred thirty pesos (P1,508,130.00) for loss of earning capacity and fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. Arnel Miraflor Awitan is acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.7
Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellants, the case was directly elevated to this Court
for review. This Court, however, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate
review, conformably with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.8
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on 9 September 2005 affirming the conviction of
appellants, with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated June 18, 2002 of the RTC, Branch
66, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 99-569 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) be awarded to the heirs of AAA as civil indemnity.9
Appellant Nabong filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution dated 23 January 2006.
Hence, the instant case.
Appellant Nabong assigns the following errors:
I. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate witness Reynaldo Patenios motive to perjure himself.

II. There is no evidence on record that accused conspicuously adopted the alleged surprised
attack as a means of executing the crime.
III. There is sufficient basis on record to justify the appreciation of intoxication and low degree of
instruction as mitigating circumstances in favor of accused.
IV. The fundamental right of accused to legal counsel was violated.
For their part, appellant Laguit and Ladiao assign the following error:
BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ALVIN B. LAGUIT AND NOLFE LADIAO OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED HEREIN.
Appellants contend that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of attempted rape with homicide. They claim that
the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution is meager to sustain their convictions
and that reasonable doubt exists in their favor.
We say that, contrary to appellants posture, the prosecution has discharged, through
circumstantial evidence, the burden of proving beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellants
are guilty of the charge.
This Court cites with approval circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution on the crime
of attempted rape as found by the trial court:
Ofelia Camba xxx testified that at about 11:30 p.m. of March 23, 1999, shortly before the
commission of the crime, she passed by a place near where she sold cigarettes and some food
items. She was about to proceed to the foot of a bridge at a nearby creek to urinate when she
heard some voices from a group of three persons, two of who were seated while the other was
standing. She distinctly heard one of them- the person standing- say softly to the other two:
Huwag na yan, lagas na yan." She was only two meters away when she heard the words uttered
by one of the three person. "Lagas," according to Camba, meant old. Obviously she was the one
being referred to. She positively identified Nabong as the one who uttered the aforequoted
words.
May it be recalled at this juncture that Patenio had also testified that he heard one of the three
accused Ladiao, Laguit and Nabong- utter the same words. He said he was just a few yards
away from the three accused and heard distinctly one of them say: "Huwag na yan. Lagas na
yan."
When the body of the victim was found by PO3 Liberato Buisan and PO1 Elmer Garcia, of the
Makati City Police Mobile Unit, her undergarment was "nakababa" (pulled down) and her private
parts were almost exposed. Her brassiere was torn off leaving her entire left breast open to view.
Her dress was torn apart that her belly was likewise exposed.
Such conditions were highly suggestive of force or violence applied upon the victim that is
normally preparatory to sexual attack. Moreover, there was effort on the part of the attackers to
keep the victim from screaming or shouting for help. Patenio saw Ladiao cover the mouth of the
victim.
The words of injunction against taking interest in an old woman which can only mean that
Camba, at 46, was not worth their while, give an inkling of what the three accused had in mind.
Such words gave away their mischievous intent which, coupled with the conditions that were
found in the sprawled body of the victim when discovered, may well prove the complex crime of
attempted rape with homicide even in the absence of direct evidence.10

Likewise, the fact of the victims killing by the appellants was sufficiently established with moral
certainty by the prosecution. As aptly discussed by the trial court:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the fact of killing have not been successfully
refuted by the defense. Patenio saw Nabong as he struck the first blow- the stab on the victims
thigh. While he did not see the succeeding five strikes upon the woman with the sharpened
pointed (sic) "kabilya", there can be no doubt that it was made by Nabong or any of the two
others or both. That it could not be ascertained if the succeeding stab wounds were inflicted by
one or the other of the accused, it would not make any difference anyway since there was
unquestionably conspiracy among the three accused in the commission of the crime.
Patenio gave testimony with details only an eyewitness could have given. He was candid even to
admit he felt a bit resentful that the accused made fun of him. His testimony clearly showed that
Nabong, Laguit and Ladiao performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design which is to rape the victim- and kill her, as
they did. Laguit and Ladiao gave the victim no chance to escape nor to shout for help. They
blocked her way at the slightest indication she would escape. They covered her mouth so she
could not call for help. Then Nabong appeared and stabbed her in the thigh to prevent her even
more from running away.11
In an attempt to discredit witness Patenios testimony, appellant Nabong insists that the formers
testimony is unreliable based on the following: (a) Patenio has an ax to grind against appellants
for making fun of him; (b) since Patenio was initially taken as a suspect, he was compelled to
offer perjurious testimony against the appellants to save himself from being included as one of
the perpetrators of the crime; (c) even as Patenio allegedly saw Nabong stab the victim in the
thigh, he did not lift a finger to dissuade Nabong from his supposed act, or at least report the
incident to the police.
As a rule, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded the
highest degree of weight and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
unique opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses while testifying.12
In the case under consideration, appellant Nabong imputes ill motive to the prosecution witness
Patenio, alleging that the latter has a score to settle with the appellants for making fun of him.
However, such fact does not conclusively establish that the prosecution witness, in testifying
against the appellants, was moved by a desire to retaliate against the latter. In the absence of
sufficient proof of improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness was not so moved
and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.13 Besides, it must be recalled that it
was witness Patenio who admitted before the trial court that he felt a bit resentful that the
appellants made fun of him. This candid admission of the prosecution witness in fact bolsters his
credibility and fortifies his testimony against the appellants.
The fact that Patenio was one of the first suspects in the commission of the crime does not make
his testimony less credible. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Granting that Patenio was initially taken as a suspect in the crime, this fact does not affect his
credibility as a witness. Not all persons invited for questioning by the police turn out to be the
real culprits. It is but normal that the police will have several suspects for initial investigation.
This procedure helps the authorities to determine with clarity the real perpetrators. Some of
these witnesses even turn out to be state witnesses or eye-witness as in the case of Patenio.14
Witness Patenios failure to report immediately to the proper authority does not impinge on his
credibility. This Court has ruled that, when confronted with startling occurences, behavioral
responses of witnesses are diverse.15 Indeed, there is no uniform reaction or standard
behavioral response to grisly events.16 In numerous instances, this Court has declared that the

reluctance of eyewitnesses to testify on a crime and to get involved in a criminal investigation

are but normal and do not by themselves affect the witnesses credibility.17 The sealed lips of
said witnesses are but a natural and spontaneous reaction.18 They may opt to remain silent
rather than to imperil their own lives.19
In the instant case, witness Patenio, fearing for his safety, kept silent about the incident. This is
understandable because the witness has no relatives residing in the metropolis who may be able
to lend him a safe abode in case the appellants would retaliate against him for his testimony. In
the same vein, being an ordinary mortal, the witness, who may not have the virtues of fortitude
and altruism, cannot be expected to risk his life by preventing the appellants from completing
their criminal objective.
Appellants assert that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating treachery
since the evidence is bereft of proof that appellants plotted to carry out the attack on the victim.
Appellants contention is unmeritorious.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.20 Thus, this Court has ruled that even
frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is
unarmed.21 Treachery can still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the
danger to his/her person.22 What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate.23 In the present case, the
victim did not even have sufficient warning of the danger that was looming, since the attack
against her came from behind and was so sudden and unexpected, thus giving the victim no
time to flee or to prepare her defense or enable her to offer the least resistance to the sudden
assault.
Appellant Nabong faults the lower courts in not appreciating intoxication and low degree of
instruction in his favor.
For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the
intoxication impaired the will power of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing
or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.24 The person pleading intoxication must
prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as
would blur his reason.25 This, the appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence
that the quantity of liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties.
On the contrary, the fact that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their
drinking session is the best proof that they knew what they were doing during that occasion. The
deception, the device, the place and manner of perpetrating the crime all point to the fact that
appellants had complete control of their minds.
Neither can appellant Nabongs alleged lack of instruction be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy
alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient
intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of ones act.26 Besides, one does not have to
be educated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another
person.27
In a desperate effort to exculpate himself from the charge against him, Nabong clutches at
straws. He argues that his fundamental right to legal counsel was violated when his counsel did
not bother to secure the attendance of witnesses in his defense, particularly Nabongs cousin,
whose supposed testimony would support his defense of alibi.
This argument deserves scant consideration. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, this
issue was raised belatedly by appellant Nabong for the first time before the Court of Appeals in a

motion for reconsideration. The rule is that an issue not raised in the trial cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal, much less in a motion for reconsideration.28
At any rate, the records do not show that Nabongs counsel had been remiss in his duty. Defense
witnesses were presented in the person of the four accused and cross-examination had been
conducted by the defense counsel.
As to the award of actual damages, the trial court ordered the appellants to pay the heirs of the
victim the following amounts: (a) P6,499.00 as medical expenses; (b) P35,000.00 as burial
expense; (c) P25,740.00 cost of the burial lot; and (d) P44,000.00 expenses incurred during the
wake.
Appellant Nabong questions the award of P44,000.00 spent for the wake of the victim claiming
that the prosecution did not present official receipts for said expenses. The mother of the victim
testified that she expended the said amount for the wake of her daughter. Said expenses were
reduced into writing and marked as Exh. "V". The defense did not object to this during the direct
examination of the witness for the prosecution nor in the formal offer of evidence. Thus, the rule
stating that "evidence not objected to is deemed admitted" finds application in the case under
consideration.29 For this reason, the trial court can take into account such evidence in arriving at
the judgment.30 Hence, the trial courts judgment ordering appellants to pay P44,000.00 for the
expenses incurred during the wake is correct.
Also assailed is the certification of the victims monthly salary from her employer. It is contended
that said evidence is hearsay since nobody from the office of the victims employer testified on
the said document.
Again, this contention is unavailing. Failure on the part of the appellants to object to the
presentation of such evidence during the direct examination of the prosecution witness and the
formal offer of the certificate of employment dated 25 October 1999 issued by the victims
employer and marked as Exh. "W" makes the said evidence admissible and one that can be
considered by the trial court in its verdict.
The computation of the trial court with respect to lost earning capacity is correct. At the time of
her death, the victim was 22 years old. She had been earning P6,500.00 monthly. Loss of earning
capacity is computed by applying the following formula:31
Net Earning
Capacity
=
life expectancy
[2/3(80-age at death)]
x
Gross Annual
Income (GAI)
living expenses
(50% of GAI)
X
=[
2
3
(80-22)
]x
GAI

[50% of GAI]
X
=[
2
3
(58) ] x
P78,000

P39,000
X
=[
116
3
]x
[P39,000]
=
[38.67]
[P39,000]
Net Earning
Capacity
of the victim =
P1,508,130.00
Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, it must be noted that the penalty for the crime of
attempted rape with homicide is "reclusion perpetua to death." Since the penalty is composed of
two indivisible penalties, then for the purpose of determining the imposable penalty, Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code must be considered.32 It provides in part:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
With the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery and there being no mitigating
circumstance, the higher penalty of death should be imposed.33
In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.34 Thus, the penalty imposed upon
appellants should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.35
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00731, dated 9 September
2005 as well as its Resolution dated 23 January 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the
conviction of appelllants and the amount of damages are concerned. The sentence that shall be
imposed upon appellants, however, is MODIFIED. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without
parole. No costs.
SO ORDERED.