Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990
JOSE SONGCO, ROMEO CIPRES, and AMANCIO MANUEL, petitioners,
vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), LABOR
ARBITER FLAVIO AGUAS, and F.E. ZUELLIG (M), INC., respondents.
Raul E. Espinosa for petitioners.
Lucas Emmanuel B. Canilao for petitioner A. Manuel.
Atienza, Tabora, Del Rosario & Castillo for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-20840-78-T entitled,
"Jose Songco and Romeo Cipres, Complainants-Appellants, v. F.E. Zuellig (M),
Inc., Respondent-Appellee" and NLRC Case No. RN- IV-20855-78-T
entitled, "Amancio Manuel, Complainant-Appellant, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc.,
Respondent-Appellee," which dismissed the appeal of petitioners herein and
in effect affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering private
respondent to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to their one month
salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred to as Zuellig)
filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) an application
seeking clearance to terminate the services of petitioners Jose Songco,
Romeo Cipres, and Amancio Manuel (hereinafter referred to as petitioners)
allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. This
application was seasonably opposed by petitioners alleging that the
company is not suffering from any losses. They alleged further that they are
being dismissed because of their membership in the union. At the last
hearing of the case, however, petitioners manifested that they are no longer
contesting their dismissal. The parties then agreed that the sole issue to be
resolved is the basis of the separation pay due to petitioners. Petitioners,
who were in the sales force of Zuellig received monthly salaries of at least
P40,000. In addition, they received commissions for every sale they made.
The collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between Zuellig and F.E.
Zuellig Employees Association, of which petitioners are members, contains
the following provision (p. 71, Rollo):
ARTICLE XIV Retirement Gratuity
Section l(a)-Any employee, who is separated from employment
due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due to
the fault of said employee shall receive from the company a
retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one (1)
month's salary per year of service. One month of salary as used
in this paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at
date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent
to total service credits, a fraction of at least six months being
considered one year, including probationary employment.
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code then prevailing provides:
Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. The termination of
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving-devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, and
other similar causes, shall entitle the employee affected thereby
to separation pay. In case of termination due to the installation
of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case
of retrenchment to prevent losses and other similar causes, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered one (1) whole year. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, Sections 9(b) and 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing
the Labor Code provide:
xxx
The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should
be included in the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of
computation of their separation pay.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of
separation pay due them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their
basic salary, earned sales commissions and allowances should be added
together. They cited Article 97(f) of the Labor Code which includes
commission as part on one's salary, to wit;
(f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or
earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in
terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task,
piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the
same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a
written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to
be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and includes
the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of
Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished
by the employer to the employee. 'Fair reasonable value' shall
not include any profit to the employer or to any person affiliated
with the employer.
Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor Code as well as
its implementing rules to include commission in the computation of
separation pay, it could have explicitly said so in clear and unequivocal
terms. Furthermore, in the definition of the term "wage", "commission" is
used only as one of the features or designations attached to the word
remuneration or earnings.
Insofar as the issue of whether or not allowances should be included in the
monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their
separation pay is concerned, this has been settled in the case of Santos v.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166, where We
ruled that "in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account
must be taken not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her
transportation and emergency living allowances." This ruling was reiterated
in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124
and recently, in Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78524,
January 20, 1989.
We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or not earned sales
commission should be included in the monthly salary of petitioner for the
purpose of computation of their separation pay.
Article 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in the definition
of the term "wage". It has been repeatedly declared by the courts that where
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation or construction; there is only room for application (Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, G.R. Nos. 24116-17, August 22,
1968, 24 SCRA 708; Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. L-2 7455, June
28,1973, 51 SCRA 381). A plain and unambiguous statute speaks for itself,
and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity.
How ever, it may be argued that if We correlate Article 97(f) with Article XIV
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor Code and
Sections 9(b) and 10 of the Implementing Rules, there appears to be an
ambiguity. In this regard, the Labor Arbiter rationalized his decision in this
manner (pp. 74-76, Rollo):
The definition of 'wage' provided in Article 96 (sic) of the Code
can be correctly be (sic) stated as a general definition. It is 'wage
' in its generic sense. A careful perusal of the same does not
show any indication that commission is part of salary. We can say
that commission by itself may be considered a wage. This is not
something novel for it cannot be gainsaid that certain types of
employees like agents, field personnel and salesmen do not earn
any regular daily, weekly or monthly salaries, but rely mainly on
commission earned.
Upon the other hand, the provisions of Section 10, Rule 1, Book
VI of the implementing rules in conjunction with Articles 273 and
274 (sic) of the Code specifically states that the basis of the
termination pay due to one who is sought to be legally separated
from the service is 'his latest salary rates.
x x x.
Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use 'monthly pay or
monthly salary'.
The above terms found in those Articles and the particular Rules
were intentionally used to express the intent of the framers of
the law that for purposes of separation pay they mean to be
specifically referring to salary only.
ROMERO, J.:
Whether or not commissions are included in determining compliance with the
minimum wage requirement is the principal issue presented in this petition.
Petitioner Antonio Iran is engaged in softdrinks merchandising and
distribution in Mandaue City, Cebu, employing truck drivers who double as
salesmen, truck helpers, and non-field personnel in pursuit thereof. Petitioner
hired private respondents Godofredo Petralba, Moreno Cadalso, Celso
Labiaga and Fernando Colina as drivers/salesmen while private respondents
Pepito Tecson, Apolinario Gimena, Jesus Bandilao, Edwin Martin and Diosdado
Gonzalgo were hired as truck helpers. Drivers/salesmen drove petitioner's
delivery trucks and promoted, sold and delivered softdrinks to various outlets
in Mandaue City. The truck helpers assisted in the delivery of softdrinks to
the different outlets covered by the driver/salesmen.
Both parties seasonably appealed to the NLRC, with petitioner contesting the
labor arbiter's refusal to include the commissions he paid to private
respondents in determining compliance with the minimum wage
requirement. He also presented, for the first time on appeal, vouchers
denominated as 13th month pay signed by private respondents, as proof
that petitioner had already paid the latter their 13th month pay. Private
respondents, on the other hand, contested the findings of the labor arbiter
holding that they had not been illegally dismissed, as well as mathematical
errors in computing Jesus Bandilao's wage differentials. The NLRC, in its
decision of December 21, 1994, affirmed the validity of private respondent's
dismissal, but found that said dismissal did not comply with the procedural
requirements for dismissing employees. Furthermore, it corrected the labor
arbiter's award of wage differentials to Jesus Bandilao. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision is hereby
MODIFIED in that complainant Jesus Bandilao's computation for
wage differential is corrected from P154.00 to P4,550.00. In
addition to all the monetary claim (sic) originally awarded by the
Labor Arbiter a quo, P1,000.00 is hereby granted to each
and diligence and close more sales in the expectation of increasing their
sales commissions. This, however, does not detract from the character of
such commissions as part of the salary or wage paid to each of its salesmen
for rendering services to the corporation. 6
Likewise, there is no law mandating that commissions be paid only after the
minimum wage has been paid to the employee. Verily, the establishment of a
minimum wage only sets a floor below which an employee's remuneration
cannot fall, not that commissions are excluded from wages in determining
compliance with the minimum wage law. This conclusion is bolstered
by Philippine Agricultural Commercial and Industrial Workers Union
vs. NLRC, 7 where this Court acknowledged that drivers and conductors who
are compensated purely on a commission basis are automatically entitled to
the basic minimum pay mandated by law should said commissions be less
than their basic minimum for eight hours work. It can, thus, be inferred that
were said commissions equal to or even exceed the minimum wage, the
employer need not pay, in addition, the basic minimum pay prescribed by
law. It follows then that commissions are included in determining compliance
with minimum wage requirements.
With regard to the second issue, it is settled that in terminating employees,
the employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before the
latter can be legally terminated: (a) a notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (b) the
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him. 8 (Emphasis ours) Petitioner asseverates that no procedural
lapses were committed by him in terminating private respondents. In his own
words:
. . . when irregularities were discovered, that is, when the
misappropriation of several thousands of pesos was found out,
the petitioner instructed private respondents to report back for
work and settle their accountabilities but the latter never
reported for work. This instruction by the petitioner to report
back for work and settle their accountabilities served as notices
to private respondents for the latter to explain or account for the
missing funds held in trust by them before they disappeared. 9
Petitioner considers this return-to-work order as equivalent to the first notice
apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought. But by petitioner's own admission, private respondents
were never told in said notice that their dismissal was being sought, only
While it is true that the vouchers evidencing payments of 13th month pay
were submitted only on appeal, it would have been more in keeping with the
directive of Article 221 15 of the Labor Code for the NLRC to have taken the
same into account. 16Time and again, we have allowed evidence to be
submitted on appeal, emphasizing that, in labor cases, technical rules of
evidence are not binding. 17 Labor officials should use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. 18
It must also be borne in mind that the intent of P.D. No. 851 is the granting of
additional income in the form of 13th month pay to employees not as yet
receiving the same and not that a double burden should be imposed on the
employer who is already paying his employees a 13th month pay or its
equivalent. 19 An employer who pays less than 1/12th of the employees basic
salary as their 13th month pay is only required to pay the difference. 20
The foregoing notwithstanding, the vouchers presented by petitioner covers
only a particular year. It does not cover amounts for other years claimed by
private respondents. It cannot be presumed that the same amounts were
given on said years. Hence, petitioner is entitled to credit only the amounts
paid for the particular year covered by said vouchers.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the NLRC dated July
31, 1995, insofar as it excludes the commissions received by private
respondents in the determination of petitioner's compliance with the
minimum wage law, as well as its exclusion of the particular amounts
received by private respondents as part of their 13th month pay is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for a
recomputation of the alleged deficiencies. For non-observance of procedural
due process in effecting the dismissal of private respondents, said decision is
MODIFIED by increasing the award of nominal damages to private
respondents from P1,000.00 to P5,000.00 each. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
PATAJO, J.:
In the present petition for review on certiorari of the aforesaid decision of the
Court of Appeals, petitioner questions the correctness of the interpretation of
the then Court of Appeals of Article 1708 of the New Civil Code which reads
as follows:
ART. 1708. The laborer's wage shall not be subject to execution
or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter,
clothing and medical attendance.
It is beyond dispute that petitioner is not an ordinary or rank and file laborer
but "a responsibly place employee," of El Grande Hotel, "responsible for
planning, directing, controlling, and coordinating the activities of all
housekeeping personnel" (p. 95, Rollo) so as to ensure the cleanliness,
maintenance and orderliness of all guest rooms, function rooms, public
areas, and the surroundings of the hotel. Considering the importance of
petitioner's function in El Grande Hotel, it is undeniable that petitioner is
occupying a position equivalent to that of a managerial or supervisory
position.
In its broadest sense, the word "laborer" includes everyone who performs
any kind of mental or physical labor, but as commonly and customarily used
and understood, it only applies to one engaged in some form of manual or
physical labor. That is the sense in which the courts generally apply the term
as applied in exemption acts, since persons of that class usually look to the
reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support and so are more in
need of the exemption than are other. (22 Am. Jur. 22 citing Briscoe vs.
Montgomery, 93 Ga 602, 20 SE 40;Miller vs. Dugas, 77 Ga 4 Am St Rep
192; State ex rel I.X.L. Grocery vs. Land, 108 La 512, 32 So 433; Wildner vs.
Ferguson, 42 Minn 112, 43 NW 793; 6 LRA 338; Anno 102 Am St Rep. 84.
In Oliver vs. Macon Hardware Co., 98 Ga 249 SE 403, it was held that in
determining whether a particular laborer or employee is really a "laborer,"
the character of the word he does must be taken into consideration. He must
be classified not according to the arbitrary designation given to his calling,
but with reference to the character of the service required of him by his
employer.
In Wildner vs. Ferguson, 42 Minn 112, 43 NW 793, the Court also held that all
men who earn compensation by labor or work of any kind, whether of the
head or hands, including judges, laywers, bankers, merchants, officers of
corporations, and the like, are in some sense "laboring men." But they are
not "laboring men" in the popular sense of the term, when used to refer to a
must presume, the legislature used the term. The Court further held in said
case:
There are many cases holding that contractors, consulting or
assistant engineers, agents, superintendents, secretaries of
corporations and livery stable keepers, do not come within the
meaning of the term. (Powell v. Eldred, 39 Mich, 554, Atkin v.
Wasson, 25 N.Y. 482; Short v. Medberry, 29 Hun. 39; Dean v. De
Wolf, 16 Hun. 186; Krausen v. Buckel, 17 Hun. 463; Ericson v.
Brown, 39 Barb. 390; Coffin v. Reynolds, 37 N.Y. 640; Brusie v.
Griffith, 34 Cal. 306; Dave v. Nunan,62 Cal. 400).
Thus, in Jones vs. Avery, 50 Mich, 326, 15 N.W. Rep. 494, it was held that a
traveling salesman, selling by sample, did not come within the meaning of a
constitutional provision making stockholders of a corporation liable for "labor
debts" of the corporation.
In Kline vs. Russell 113 Ga. 1085, 39 SE 477, citing Oliver vs. Macon
Hardware Co., supra, it was held that a laborer, within the statute exempting
from garnishment the wages of a "laborer," is one whose work depends on
mere physical power to perform ordinary manual labor, and not one engaged
in services consisting mainly of work requiring mental skill or business
capacity, and involving the exercise of intellectual faculties.
So, also in Wakefield vs. Fargo, 90 N.Y. 213, the Court, in construing an act
making stockholders in a corporation liable for debts due "laborers, servants
and apprentices" for services performed for the corporation, held that a
"laborer" is one who performs menial or manual services and usually looks to
the reward of a day's labor or services for immediate or present support. And
in Weymouth vs. Sanborn, 43 N.H. 173, 80 Am. Dec. 144, it was held that
"laborer" is a term ordinarily employed to denote one who subsists by
physical toil in contradistinction to those who subsists by professional skill.
And in Consolidated Tank Line Co. vs. Hunt, 83 Iowa, 6, 32 Am. St. Rep. 285,
43 N.W. 1057, 12 L.R.A. 476, it was stated that "laborers" are those persons
who earn a livelihood by their own manual labor.
Article 1708 used the word "wages" and not "salary" in relation to "laborer"
when it declared what are to be exempted from attachment and execution.
The term "wages" as distinguished from "salary", applies to the
compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times, and
measured by the day, week, month, or season, while "salary" denotes a
higher degree of employment, or a superior grade of services, and implies a
position of office: by contrast, the term wages " indicates considerable pay
June 8, 2006
Respondent Sadac anchored his claim on Article 279 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, and cited as authority the cases of East Asiatic Company, Ltd. v.
Court of Industrial Relations,15 St. Louis College of Tuguegarao v. National
Labor Relations Commission,16 and Sigma Personnel Services v. National
Labor Relations Commission.17 According to respondent Sadac, the catena of
cases uniformly holds that it is the obligation of the employer to pay an
illegally dismissed employee the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus
all other benefits and bonuses and general increases to which he would have
been normally entitled had he not been dismissed; and therefore, salary
increases should be deemed a component in the computation of backwages.
Moreover, respondent Sadac contended that his check-up benefit, clothing
allowance, and cash conversion of vacation leaves must be included in the
computation of his backwages.
Petitioner Bank disputed respondent Sadacs computation. Per its
computation, the amount of monetary award due respondent Sadac is
P2,981,442.98 only, to the exclusion of the latters general salary increases
and other claimed benefits which, it maintained, were unsubstantiated. The
jurisprudential precedent relied upon by petitioner Bank in assailing
respondent Sadacs computation is Evangelista v. National Labor Relations
Commission,18 citing Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission,19 holding that an unqualified award of backwages
means that the employee is paid at the wage rate at the time of his
dismissal. Furthermore, petitioner Bank argued before the Labor Arbiter that
the award of salary differentials is not allowed, the established rule being
that upon reinstatement, illegally dismissed employees are to be paid their
backwages without deduction and qualification as to any wage increases or
other benefits that may have been received by their co-workers who were
not dismissed or did not go on strike.
On 2 August 1999, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. rendered an
Order20 adopting respondent Sadacs computation. In the main, the Labor
Arbiter relying on Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission21concluded
that respondent Sadac is entitled to the general increases as a component in
the computation of his backwages. Accordingly, he awarded respondent
Sadac the amount of P6,030,456.59 representing his backwages inclusive of
allowances and other claimed benefits, namely check-up benefit, clothing
allowance, and cash conversion of vacation leave plus 12 percent (12%)
interest per annum equivalent to P1,367,590.89 as of 30 June 1999, or a
total of P7,398,047.48. However, considering that respondent Sadac had
already received the amount of P1,055,740.48 by virtue of a Writ of
Execution22 earlier issued on 18 January 1999, the Labor Arbiter directed
petitioner Bank to pay respondent Sadac the amount of P6,342,307.00. The
The Supreme Court held in East Asiatic, Ltd. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
40 SCRA 521 (1971) that "general increases" should be added as a part of
full backwages, to wit:
In other words, the just and equitable rule regarding the point under
discussion is this: It is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally
dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages,
plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which he would
have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped
working, but it is the right, on the other hand of the employer to deduct from
the total of these, the amount equivalent to the salaries or wages the
employee or worker would have earned in his old employment on the
corresponding days he was actually gainfully employed elsewhere with an
equal or higher salary or wage, such that if his salary or wage in his other
employment was less, the employer may deduct only what has been actually
earned.
The doctrine in East Asiatic was subsequently reiterated, in the cases of St.
Louis College of Tugueg[a]rao v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 151 (1989); Sigma
Personnel Services v. NLRC, 224 SCRA 181 (1993) and Millares v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 305 SCRA 500 (1999).
Private respondent, in opposing the petitioners contention, alleged in his
Memorandum that only the wage rate at the time of the employees illegal
dismissal should be considered private respondent citing the following
decisions of the Supreme Court: Paramount Vinyl Corp. v. NLRC 190 SCRA
525 (1990); Evangelista v. NLRC, 249 SCRA 194 (1995); Espejo v. NLRC, 255
SCRA 430 (1996) which rendered obsolete the ruling in East Asiatic, Ltd. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 40 SCRA 521 (1971).
We are not convinced.
The Supreme Court had consistently held that payment of full backwages is
the price or penalty that the employer must pay for having illegally
dismissed an employee.
In Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC 268 SCRA 497 (1997) and Bustamante v.
NLRC and Evergreen Farms, Inc. 265 SCRA 61 (1996) the Supreme Court held
that the clear legislative intent in the amendment in Republic Act 6715 was
to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the
Mercury Drug rule or the "deductions of earnings elsewhere" rule.
Attention must be called to Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended by Section 34 of Rep. Act No. 6715. The law provides as follows:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 279 mandates that an employees full backwages shall be inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. Contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, we do not see that a salary increase can be
interpreted as either an allowance or a benefit. Salary increases are not akin
to allowances or benefits, and cannot be confused with either. The term
"allowances" is sometimes used synonymously with "emoluments," as
indirect or contingent remuneration, which may or may not be earned, but
which is sometimes in the nature of compensation, and sometimes in the
nature of reimbursement.47 Allowances and benefits are granted to the
employee apart or separate from, and in addition to the wage or salary. In
contrast, salary increases are amounts which are added to the employees
salary as an increment thereto for varied reasons deemed appropriate by the
employer. Salary increases are not separate grants by themselves but once
granted, they are deemed part of the employees salary. To extend the
coverage of an allowance or a benefit to include salary increases would be to
strain both the imagination of the Court and the language of law. As aptly
observed by the NLRC, "to otherwise give the meaning other than what the
law speaks for by itself, will open the floodgates to various
interpretations."48Indeed, if the intent were to include salary increases as
basis in the computation of backwages, the same should have been explicitly
stated in the same manner that the law used clear and unambiguous terms
in expressly providing for the inclusion of allowances and other benefits.
Moreover, we find East Asiatic inapplicable to the case at bar. In East Asiatic,
therein petitioner East Asiatic Company, Ltd. was found guilty of unfair labor
practices against therein respondent, Soledad A. Dizon, and the Court
ordered her reinstatement with back pay. On the question of the amount of
backwages, the Court granted the dismissed employee the whole amount of
the salaries plus all general increases and bonuses she would have received
during the period of her lay-off with the corresponding right of the employer
to deduct from the total amounts, all the earnings earned by the employee
during her lay-off. The emphasis in East Asiatic is the duty of both the
employer and the employee to disclose the material facts and competent
evidence within their peculiar knowledge relative to the proper determination
of backwages, especially as the earnings derived by the employee elsewhere
are deductions to which the employer are entitled. However, East Asiatic
does not find relevance in the resolution of the issue before us. First, the
material date to consider is 21 March 1989, when the law amending Article
279 of the Labor Code, Rep. Act No. 6715, otherwise known as the HerreraVeloso Law, took effect. It is obvious that the backdrop of East Asiatic,
decided by this Court on 31 August 1971 was prior to the current state of the
law on the definition of full backwages. Second, it bears stressing that East
Asiatic was decided at a time when even as an illegally dismissed employee
is entitled to the whole amount of the salaries or wages, it was the
recognized right of the employer to deduct from the total of these, the
amount equivalent to the salaries or wages the employee or worker would
have earned in his old employment on the corresponding days that he was
actually gainfully employed elsewhere with an equal or higher salary or
wage, such that if his salary or wage in his other employment was less, the
employer may deduct only what has been actually earned.49 It is for this
reason the Court centered its discussion on the duty of both parties to be
candid and open about facts within their knowledge to establish the amount
of the deductions, and not leave the burden on the employee alone to
establish his claim, as well as on the duty of the court to compel the parties
to cooperate in disclosing such material facts. The inapplicability of East
Asiatic to respondent Sadac was sufficiently elucidated upon by the NLRC,
viz.:
A full discernment of the pertinent portion of the judgment sought to be
executed in East Asiatic Co., Ltd. would reveal as follows:
"x x x to reinstate Soledad A. Dizon immediately to her former position with
backwages from September 1, 1958 until actually reinstated with all the
rights and privileges acquired and due her, including seniority and such other
terms and conditions of employment AT THE TIME OF HER LAY-OFF"
The basis on which this doctrine was laid out was summed up by the
Supreme Court which ratiocinated in this light. To quote:
"x x x on the other hand, of the employer to deduct from the total of these,
the amount equivalent to these salaries or wages the employee or worker
would have earned in his old employment on the corresponding days that he
was actually gainfully employed elsewhere with an equal or higher salary or
wage, such that if his salary or wage in his other employment was less, the
employer may deduct only what has been actually earned x x x" (Ibid, pp.
547-548).
But the Supreme Court, in the instant case, pronounced a clear but different
judgment from that of East Asiatic Co. decretal portion, in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the herein questioned Resolution of the NLRC is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: that private respondent shall be entitled
to backwages from termination of employment until turning sixty (60) years
of age (in 1995) and, thereupon, to retirement benefits in accordance with
law; xxx"
Undisputably (sic), it was decreed in plain and unambiguous language that
complainant Sadac "shall be entitled to backwages." No more, no less.
Thus, this decree for Sadac cannot be considered in any way, substantially in
essence, with the award of backwages as pronounced for Ms. Dizon in the
case of East Asiatic Co. Ltd.50
In the same vein, we cannot accept the Court of Appeals reliance on the
doctrine as espoused in Millares. It is evident that Millares concerns itself
with the computation of the salary base used in computing the separation
pay of petitioners therein. The distinction between backwages and
separation pay is elementary. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement
is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee
and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have
been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The
bases for computing the two are different, the first being usually the length
of the employees service and the second the actual period when he was
unlawfully prevented from working.51
The issue that confronted the Court in Millares was whether petitioners
housing and transportation allowances therein which they allegedly received
on a monthly basis during their employment should have been included in
the computation of their separation pay. It is plain to see that the reference
to general increases in Millares citing East Asiatic was a mere obiter. The
crux in Millares was our pronouncement that the receipt of an allowance on a
monthly basis does not ipso facto characterize it as regular and forming part
of salary because the nature of the grant is a factor worth considering.
Whether salary increases are deemed part of the salary base in the
computation of backwages was not the issue in Millares.
G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124; Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. v. NLRC, supra.]54(Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambivalence in Paramount, that the base figure to be used in the
computation of backwages is pegged at the wage rate at the time of the
employees dismissal, inclusive of regular allowances that the employee had
been receiving such as the emergency living allowances and the 13th month
pay mandated under the law.
In Evangelista v. National Labor Relations Commission,55 we addressed the
sole issue of whether the computation of the award of backwages should be
based on current wage level or the wage levels at the time of the dismissal.
We resolved that an unqualified award of backwages means that the
employee is paid at the wage rate at the time of his dismissal, thus:
As explicitly declared in Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. vs. NLRC, the
determination of the salary base for the computation of backwages requires
simply an application of judicial precedents defining the term "backwages."
An unqualified award of backwages means that the employee is paid at the
wage rate at the time of his dismissal. Furthermore, the award of salary
differentials is not allowed, the established rule being that upon
reinstatement, illegally dismissed employees are to be paid their backwages
without deduction and qualification as to any wage increases or other
benefits that may have been received by their co-workers who were not
dismissed or did not go on strike.56
The case of Paramount was relied upon by the Court in the latter case of
Espejo v. National Labor Relations Commission,57 where we reiterated that
the computation of backwages should be based on the basic salary at the
time of the employees dismissal plus the regular allowances that he had
been receiving. Further, the clarification made by the Court in General
Baptist Bible College v. National Labor Relations Commission,58 settles the
issue, thus:
We also want to clarify that when there is an award of backwages this
actually refers to backwages without qualifications and deductions. Thus, We
held that:
"The term backwages without qualification and deduction means that the
workers are to be paid their backwages fixed as of the time of the dismissal
or strike without deduction for their earnings elsewhere during their layoff
and without qualification of their wages as thus fixed; i.e., unqualified by any
wage increases or other benefits that may have been received by their co-
workers who are not dismissed or did not go on strike. Awards including
salary differentials are not allowed. The salary base properly used should,
however, include not only the basic salary but also the emergency cost of
living allowances and also transportation allowances if the workers are
entitled thereto."59 (Italics supplied.)
Indeed, even a cursory reading of the dispositive portion of the Courts
Decision of 13 June 1997 in G.R. No. 102467, awarding backwages to
respondent Sadac, readily shows that the award of backwages therein is
unqualified, ergo, without qualification of the wage as thus fixed at the time
of the dismissal and without deduction.
A demarcation line between salary increases and backwages was drawn by
the Court in Paguio v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc.,60 where
therein petitioner Paguio, on account of his illegal transfer sought
backwages, including an amount equal to 16 percent (16%) of his monthly
salary representing his salary increases during the period of his demotion,
contending that he had been consistently granted salary increases because
of his above average or outstanding performance. We said:
In several cases, the Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the reason for
the grant of backwages. Backwages are granted on grounds of equity to
workers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work. They are a
reparation for the illegal dismissal of an employee based on earnings which
the employee would have obtained, either by virtue of a lawful decree or
order, as in the case of a wage increase under a wage order, or by rightful
expectation, as in the case of ones salary or wage. The outstanding feature
of backwages is thus the degree of assuredness to an employee that he
would have had them as earnings had he not been illegally terminated from
his employment.
Petitioners claim, however, is based simply on expectancy or his assumption
that, because in the past he had been consistently rated for his outstanding
performance and his salary correspondingly increased, it is probable that he
would similarly have been given high ratings and salary increases but for his
transfer to another position in the company.
In contrast to a grant of backwages or an award of lucrum cessans in the civil
law, this contention is based merely on speculation. Furthermore, it assumes
that in the other position to which he had been transferred petitioner had not
been given any performance evaluation. As held by the Court of Appeals,
however, the mere fact that petitioner had been previously granted salary
increases by reason of his excellent performance does not necessarily
guarantee that he would have performed in the same manner and, therefore,
qualify for the said increase later. What is more, his claim is tantamount to
saying that he had a vested right to remain as Head of the Garnet Exchange
and given salary increases simply because he had performed well in such
position, and thus he should not be moved to any other position where
management would require his services.61
Applying Paguio to the case at bar, we are not prepared to accept that this
degree of assuredness applies to respondent Sadacs salary increases. There
was no lawful decree or order supporting his claim, such that his salary
increases can be made a component in the computation of backwages. What
is evident is that salary increases are a mere expectancy. They are, by its
nature volatile and are dependent on numerous variables, including the
companys fiscal situation and even the employees future performance on
the job, or the employees continued stay in a position subject to
management prerogative to transfer him to another position where his
services are needed. In short, there is no vested right to salary increases.
That respondent Sadac may have received salary increases in the past only
proves fact of receipt but does not establish a degree of assuredness that is
inherent in backwages. From the foregoing, the plain conclusion is that
respondent Sadacs computation of his full backwages which includes his
prospective salary increases cannot be permitted.
Respondent Sadac cannot take exception by arguing that jurisprudence
speaks only of wage and not salary, and therefore, the rule is inapplicable to
him. It is respondent Sadacs stance that he was not paid at the wage rate
nor was he engaged in some form of manual or physical labor as he was
hired as Vice President of petitioner Bank. He cites Gaa v. Court of
Appeals62 where the Court distinguished between wage and salary.
The reliance is misplaced. The distinction between salary and wage in Gaa
was for the purpose of Article 1708 of the Civil Code which mandates that,
"[t]he laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except
for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance." In
labor law, however, the distinction appears to be merely semantics.
Paramount and Evangelista may have involved wage earners, but the
petitioner in Espejo was a General Manager with a monthly salary of
P9,000.00 plus privileges. That wage and salary are synonymous has been
settled in Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission.63 We said:
Broadly, the word "salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a
person for his pains or industry in another mans business. Whether it be
derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman
where the judgment is void.71 The Courts 13 June 1997 Decision in G.R. No.
102467 became final and executory on 28 July 1997. This renders moot
whatever argument petitioner Bank raised against the grant of attorneys
fees to respondent Sadac. Of even greater import is the settled rule that it is
the dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and declares the
rights and obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively,
notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent statements in the body that
may tend to confuse.72
Proceeding therefrom, we make a determination of whether the Court in
Equitable Banking Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,73 G.R.
No. 102467, dated 13 June 1997, awarded attorneys fees to respondent
Sadac. In recapitulation, the dispositive portion of the aforesaid Decision is
hereunder quoted:
WHEREFORE, the herein questioned Resolution of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: That private respondent shall be entitled to
backwages from termination of employment until turning sixty (60) years of
age (in 1995) and, thereupon, to retirement benefits in accordance with law;
that private respondent shall be paid an additional amount of P5,000.00; that
the award of moral and exemplary damages are deleted; and that the
liability herein pronounced shall be due from petitioner bank alone, the other
petitioners being absolved from solidary liability. No costs.74
The dispositive portion of the 24 September 1991 Decision of the NLRC
awards respondent Sadac attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the monetary award, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, let the Decision of
October 2, 1990 be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED
declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal, and consequently
ordering the respondents jointly and severally to reinstate him to his former
position as bank Vice-President and General Counsel without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, and to pay him full backwages and other benefits
from the time his compensation was withheld to his actual reinstatement, as
well as moral damages of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P50,000.00,
and attorneys fees equivalent to Ten Percent (10%) of the monetary award.
Should reinstatement be no longer possible due to strained relations, the
respondents are ordered likewise jointly and severally to grant separation
pay at one (1) month per year of service in the total sum of P293,650.00 with
backwages and other benefits from November 16, 1989 to September 15,
1991 (cut off date, subject to adjustment) computed at P1,055,740.48, plus
damages of P100,000.00 (moral damages), P50,000.00 (exemplary
damages) and attorneys fees equal to Ten Percent (10%) of all the monetary
award, or a grand total of P1,649,329.53.75 (Italics Ours.)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the Courts Decision of 13 June 1997
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the NLRC Decision of 24 September 1991,
which modification did not touch upon the award of attorneys fees as
granted, hence, the award stands. Juxtaposing the decretal portions of the
NLRC Decision of 24 September 1991 with that of the Courts Decision of 13
June 1997, we find that what was deleted by the Court was "the award of
moral and exemplary damages," but not the award of "attorneys fees
equivalent to Ten Percent (10%) of the monetary award." The issue on the
grant of attorneys fees to respondent Sadac has been adequately and
definitively threshed out and settled with finality when petitioner Bank came
to us for the first time on a Petition for Certiorari in Equitable Banking
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, docketed as G.R. No.
102467. The Court had spoken in its Decision of 13 June 1997 in the said
case which attained finality on 28 July 1997. It is now immutable.
IV.
We proceed with the penultimate issue on the entitlement of respondent
Sadac to twelve percent (12%) interest per annum on the outstanding
balance as of 28 July 1997, the date when our Decision in G.R. No. 102467
became final and executory.
In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,76 the Court, speaking
through the Honorable Justice Jose C. Vitug, laid down the following rules of
thumb:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor
can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
"Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual or compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the
accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition seeking the nullification of a resolution of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated April 28, 1994 vividly illustrates
why courts should be ever vigilant in the preservation of the constitutionally
enshrined rights of the working class. Without the protection accorded by our
laws and the tempering of courts, the natural and historical inclination of
capital to ride roughshod over the rights of labor would run unabated.
The facts of the case at bar, culled from the conflicting versions of petitioner
and private respondent, are illustrative.
Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that around the first week of May, 1991,
she and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked
by the hotel's management to sign an instrument attesting to the latter's
compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions of
law. 1 The instrument provides: 2
JOINT AFFIDAVIT
We, SYLVIA IGANA, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, EVELYN OGOY,
MACARIA JUGUETA, ADELAIDA NONOG, NORMA MABEZA,
JONATHAN PICART and JOSE DIZON, all of legal ages (sic),
Filipinos and residents of Baguio City, under oath, depose and
say:
1. That we are employees of Mr. Peter L. Ng of his Hotel Supreme
situated at No. 416 Magsaysay Ave., Baguio City.
2. That the said Hotel is separately operated from the Ivy's Grill
and Restaurant;
the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings from the hotel
premises. 4 According to her, respondent strongly chided her for refusing to
proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office to attest to the affidavit. 5 She
thereafter reluctantly filed a leave of absence from her job which was denied
by management. When she attempted to return to work on May 10, 1991,
the hotel's cashier, Margarita Choy, informed her that she should not report
to work and, instead, continue with her unofficial leave of absence.
Consequently, on May 13, 1991, three days after her attempt to return to
work, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission CAR Baguio City. In
addition to her complaint for illegal dismissal, she alleged underpayment of
wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
pay, night differential and other benefits. The complaint was docketed as
NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-05-0198-91 and assigned to Labor Arbiter Felipe P.
Pati.
Responding to the allegations made in support of petitioner's complaint for
illegal dismissal, private respondent Peter Ng alleged before Labor Arbiter
Pati that petitioner "surreptitiously left (her job) without notice to the
management" 6 and that she actually abandoned her work. He maintained
that there was no basis for the money claims for underpayment and other
benefits as these were paid in the form of facilities to petitioner and the
hotel's other employee. 7Pointing to the Affidavit of May 7, 1991, the private
respondent asserted that his employees actually have no problems with
management. In a supplemental answer submitted eleven (11) months after
the original complaint for illegal dismissal was filed, private respondent
raised a new ground, loss of confidence, which was supported by a criminal
complaint for Qualified Theft he filed before the prosecutor's office of the City
of Baguio against petitioner on July 4, 1991. 8
On May 14, 1993, Labor Arbiter Pati rendered a decision dismissing
petitioner's complaint on the ground of loss of confidence. His disquisitions in
support of his conclusion read as follows:
It appears from the evidence of respondent that complainant
carted away or stole one (1) blanket, 1 piece bedsheet, 1 piece
thermos, 2 pieces towel (Exhibits "9", "9-A," "9-B," "9-C" and "10"
pages 12-14 TSN, December 1, 1992).
In fact, this was the reason why respondent Peter Ng lodged a
criminal complaint against complainant for qualified theft and
perjury. The fiscal's office finding a prima facie evidence that
complainant committed the crime of qualified theft issued a
the private respondent's claim that petitioner abandoned her job. As the
Solicitor General in his manifestation observed:
Petitioner's absence on that day should not be construed as
abandonment of her job. She did not report because the cashier
told her not to report anymore, and that private respondent Ng
did not want to see her in the hotel premises. But two days later
or on the 10th of May, after realizing that she had to clarify her
employment status, she again reported for work. However, she
was prevented from working by private respondents. 19
We now come to the second cause raised by private respondent to support
his contention that petitioner was validly dismissed from her job.
Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was never intended to
provide employers with a blank check for terminating their employees. Such
a vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of confidence, if unqualifiedly
given the seal of approval by this Court, could readily reduce to barren form
the words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Having this in
mind, loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving
employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations
where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the
employer's money or property. To the first class belong managerial
employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions; and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of
their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.
Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other
hotel property from the property custodian each day and who has to account
for each and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the hotel's guests at the
end of her shift would not fall under any of these two classes of employees
for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally
apply. Illustrating this distinction, this Court in Marina Port Services,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 20 has stated that:
To be sure, every employee must enjoy some degree of trust and
confidence from the employer as that is one reason why he was
employed in the first place. One certainly does not employ a
person he distrusts. Indeed, even the lowly janitor must enjoy
that trust and confidence in some measure if only because he is
the one who opens the office in the morning and closes it at
"secured certified copies thereof from the nearest regional office of the
Department of Labor, the SSS or the BIR." 30
More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water
consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or
privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not
a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much
lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose. 31 Considering, therefore, that
hotel workers are required to work different shifts and are expected to be
available at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter
in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondent's hotel.
It is therefore evident that petitioner is entitled to the payment of the
deficiency in her wages equivalent to the fullwage applicable from May 13,
1988 up to the date of her illegal dismissal.
Additionally, petitioner is entitled to payment of service incentive leave pay,
emergency cost of living allowance, night differential pay, and 13th month
pay for the periods alleged by the petitioner as the private respondent has
never been able to adduce proof that petitioner was paid the aforestated
benefits.
However, the claims covering the period of October 1987 up to the time of
filing the case on May 13, 1988 are barred by prescription as P.D. 442 (as
amended) and its implementing rules limit all money claims arising out of
employer-employee relationship to three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrues. 32
We depart from the settled rule that an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work normally should be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges. Owing to the strained relations between petitioner and
private respondent, allowing the former to return to her job would only
subject her to possible harassment and future embarrassment. In the instant
case, separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of
continuous service with the private respondent would be proper, starting
with her job at the Belfront Hotel.
In addition to separation pay, backwages are in order. Pursuant to R.A. 6715
and our decision in Osmalik Bustamante, et al. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 33 petitioner is entitled to full backwages from the time of her
illegal dismissal up to the date of promulgation of this decision without
qualification or deduction.
Finally, in dismissal cases, the law requires that the employer must furnish
the employee sought to be terminated from employment with two written
notices before the same may be legally effected. The first is a written notice
containing a statement of the cause(s) for dismissal; the second is a notice
informing the employee of the employer's decision to terminate him stating
the basis of the dismissal. During the process leading to the second notice,
the employer must give the employee ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires.
Given the seriousness of the second cause (qualified theft) of the petitioner's
dismissal, it is noteworthy that the private respondent never even bothered
to inform petitioner of the charges against her. Neither was petitioner given
the opportunity to explain the loss of the articles. It was only almost two
months after petitioner had filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, as an
afterthought, that the loss was reported to the police and added as a
supplemental answer to petitioner's complaint. Clearly, the dismissal of
petitioner without the benefit of notice and hearing prior to her termination
violated her constitutional right to due process. Under the circumstance an
award of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) on top of payment of the
deficiency in wages and benefits for the period aforestated would be proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the RESOLUTION of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated April 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with
costs. For clarity, the economic benefits due the petitioner are hereby
summarized as follows:
1) Deficiency wages and the applicable ECOLA from May 13, 1988 up to the
date of petitioner's illegal dismissal;
2) Service incentive leave pay; night differential pay and 13th month pay for
the same period;
3) Separation pay equal to one month's salary for every year of petitioner's
continuous service with the private respondent starting with her job at the
Belfront Hotel;
4) Full backwages, without qualification or deduction, from the date of
petitioner's illegal dismissal up to the date of promulgation of this decision
pursuant to our ruling in Bustamante vs. NLRC. 34
5) P1,000.00.
ORDERED.
Code." They claim that the decision may establish a precedent that will
adversely affect the maritime industry.
The Court resolved to set the case for oral arguments to enable the parties to
present their sides.
To recall, the facts of the case are, as follows:
Petitioner Douglas Millares was employed by private respondent ESSO
International Shipping Company LTD. (Esso International, for brevity)
through its local manning agency, private respondent Trans-Global
Maritime Agency, Inc. (Trans-Global, for brevity) on November 16, 1968
as a machinist. In 1975, he was promoted as Chief Engineer which
position he occupied until he opted to retire in 1989. He was then
receiving a monthly salary of US $1,939.00.
On June 13, 1989, petitioner Millares applied for a leave of absence for
the period July 9 to August 7, 1989. In a letter dated June 14, 1989,
Michael J. Estaniel, President of private respondent Trans-Global,
approved the request for leave of absence. On June 21, 1989,
petitioner Millares wrote G.S. Hanly, Operations Manager of Exxon
International Co., (now Esso International) through Michael J. Estaniel,
informing him of his intention to avail of the optional retirement plan
under the Consecutive Enlistment Incentive Plan (CEIP) considering
that he had already rendered more than twenty (20) years of
continuous service. On July 13, 1989 respondent Esso International,
through W.J. Vrints, Employee Relations Manager, denied petitioner
Millares' request for optional retirement on the following grounds, to
wit: (1) he was employed on a contractual basis; (2) his contract of
enlistment (COE) did not provide for retirement before the age of sixty
(60) years; and (3) he did not comply with the requirement for claiming
benefits under the CEIP, i.e., to submit a written advice to the company
of his intention to terminate his employment within thirty (30) days
from his last disembarkation date.
On August 9, 1989, petitioner Millares requested for an extension of his
leave of absence from August 9 to 24, 1989. On August 19, 1989, Roy
C. Palomar, Crewing Manager, Ship Group A, Trans-global, wrote
petitioner Millares advising him that respondent Esso International "has
corrected the deficiency in its manpower requirement specifically in
the Chief Engineer rank by promoting a First Assistant Engineer to this
position as a result of (his) previous leave of absence which expired
last August 8, 1989. The adjustment in said rank was required in order
to meet manpower schedules as a result of (his) inability."
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the POEA was affirmed on June 1,
1993 with the following disquisition:
The first issue must be decided in the negative. Complainantsappellants, as seamen and overseas contract workers are not covered
by the term "regular employment" as defined under Article 280 of the
Labor Code. The POEA, which is tasked with protecting the rights of the
Filipino workers for overseas employment to fair and equitable
recruitment and employment practices and to ensure their welfare,
prescribes a standard employment contract for seamen on board
ocean-going vessels for a fixed period but in no case to exceed twelve
(12) months (Part 1, Sec. C). This POEA policy appears to be in
consonance with the international maritime practice. Moreover, the
Supreme Court in Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, 181 SCRA 702, had
held that a fixed term is essential and natural appurtenance of
overseas employment contracts to which the concept of regular
employment with all that it implies is not applicable, Article 280 of the
Labor Code notwithstanding. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb
the POEA Administrator's finding that complainants-appellants were
hired on a contractual basis and for a definite period. Their
employment is thus governed by the contracts they sign each time
they are re-hired and is terminated at the expiration of the contract
period.6
Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to this Court7 and successfully
obtained the favorable action, which is now vehemently being assailed.
At the hearing on November 15, 2000, the Court defined the issues for
resolution in this case, namely:
I. ARE PETITIONERS REGULAR OR CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES WHOSE
EMPLOYMENTS ARE TERMINATED EVERYTIME THEIR CONTRACTS OF
EMPLOYMENT EXPIRE?
II. ASSUMING THAT PETITIONERS ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES, WERE
THEY DISMISSED WITHOUT JUST CAUSE SO AS TO BE ENTITLED TO
REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES, INCLUDING PAYMENT OF 100% OF
THEIR TOTAL CREDITED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONSECUTIVE
ENLISTMENT INCENTIVE PLAN (CEIP)?
III. DOES THE PROVISION OF THE POEA STANDARD CONTRACT FOR
SEAFARERS ON BOARD FOREIGN VESSELS (SEC. C., DURATION OF
CONTRACT) PRECLUDE THE ATTAINMENT BY SEAMEN OF THE STATUS
OF REGULAR EMPLOYEES?
the MV Orient Carrier and thus, were the actual employers of their crew
members.
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual
employees. They can not be considered as regular employees under Article
280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they
sign everytime they are rehired and their employment is terminated when
the contract expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain
period of time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.19 We need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two
aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to
the employment status of seafarers.
Petitioners insist that they should be considered regular employees, since
they have rendered services which are usually necessary and desirable to
the business of their employer, and that they have rendered more than
twenty(20) years of service. While this may be true, the Brent case has,
however, held that there are certain forms of employment which also require
the performance of usual and desirable functions and which exceed one year
but do not necessarily attain regular employment status under Article
280.20 Overseas workers including seafarers fall under this type of
employment which are governed by the mutual agreements of the parties.
In this jurisdiction and as clearly stated in the Coyoca case, Filipino seamen
are governed by the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. The Standard
Employment Contract governing the employment of All Filipino seamen on
Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA, particularly in Part I, Sec. C
specifically provides that the contract of seamen shall be for a fixed period.
And in no case should the contract of seamen be longer than 12 months. It
reads:
Section C. Duration of Contract
The period of employment shall be for a fixed period but in no case to
exceed 12 months and shall be stated in the Crew Contract. Any
extension of the Contract period shall be subject to the mutual consent
of the parties.
Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of
seafarers are for a fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their
employment which is quite peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual
interest of both the seafarer and the employer why the employment status
The CEIP was formulated to entice seamen to stay long in the company. As
the name implies, the program serves as an incentive for the employees to
renew their contracts with the same company for as long as their services
were needed. For those who remained loyal to them, they were duly
rewarded with this additional remuneration under the CEIP, if eligible. While
this is an act of benevolence on the part of the employer, it can not,
however, be denied that this is part of the benefits accorded to the
employees for services rendered. Such right to the benefits is vested upon
them upon their eligibility to the program.
The CEIP provides that an employee becomes covered under the Plan when
he completes thirty-six (36) months or an equivalent of three (3) years of
credited service with respect to employment after June 30, 1973.24 Upon
eligibility, an amount shall be credited to his account as it provides, among
others:
III. Distribution of Benefits
A. Retirement, Death and Disability
When the employment of an employee terminates because of his
retirement, death or permanent and total disability, a percentage of
the total amount credited to his account will be distributed to him (or
his eligible survivor(s) in accordance with the following:
Percentage
a) Attainment of mandatory
retirement age of 60.
100%
100%
100%
xxx
B. Voluntary Termination
When an employee voluntary terminates his employment with at least
36 months of credited service without any misconduct on his part, 18
percent of the total amount credited to his account, plus an additional
of one percent for each month (up to a maximum of 164 months of
credited service in excess of 36, will be distributed to him provided (1)
the employee has completed his last Contract of Enlistment and (2)
employee advises the company in writing, within 30 days, from his last
disembarkation date, of his intention to terminate his employment. (To
advise the Company in writing means that the original letter must be
sent to the Company's agent in the Philippines, a copy sent to the
Company in New York).
xxx
C. Other Terminations
When the employment of an employee is terminated by the Company
for a reason other than one in A and B above, without any misconduct
on his part, a percentage of the total amount credited to his account
will be distributed to him in accordance with the following.
Credited Service
Percentage
36 months
50%
48 "
75%
60 "
100%
When the employment of an employee is terminated due to his poorperformance, misconduct, unavailability, etc., or if employee is not
offered re-engagement for similar reasons, no distribution of any
portion of employee's account will ever be made to him (or his eligible
survivor[s]).
It must be recalled that on June 21, 1989, Millares wrote a letter to his
employer informing his intention to avail of the optional retirement plan
under the CEIP considering that he has rendered more than twenty (20)
S.I.P. FOOD HOUSE and MR. and MRS. ALEJANDRO PABLO, Petitioners,
vs.
RESTITUTO BATOLINA, ALMER CALUMPISAN, ARIES MALGAPO,
ARMANDO MALGAPO, FLORDELIZA MATIAS, PERCIVAL MATIAS,
ARWIN MIRANDA, LOPE MATIAS, RAMIL MATIAS, ALLAN STA.
INES,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 which seeks to nullify
the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), promulgated on
November 27, 2009 and May 31, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
101651.4
The Antecedents
The facts are laid out in the assailed CA Decision and are summarized below.
The GSIS Multi-Purpose Cooperative (GMPC) is an entity organized by the
employees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Incidental to
its purpose, GMPC wanted to operate a canteen in the new GSIS Building, but
had no capability and expertise in this area. Thus, it engaged the services of
the petitioner S.I.P. Food House (SIP), owned by the spouses Alejandro and
Esther Pablo, as concessionaire. The respondents Restituto Batolina and nine
(9) others (the respondents) worked as waiters and waitresses in the
canteen.
In February 2004, GMPC terminated SIPs "contract as GMPC concessionaire,"
because of GMPCs decision "to take direct investment in and management
of the GMPC canteen;" SIPs continued refusal to heed GMPCs directives for
service improvement; and the alleged interference of the Pablos two sons
with the operation of the canteen.5 The termination of the concession
GMPC; although they were paid only P160.00 to PP220.00 daily, the
employees were provided with free board and lodging seven (7) days a week.
Neither were the respondents entitled to overtime pay as it was highly
improbable that they regularly worked beyond eight (8) hours every day for a
canteen that closes after 5:30 p.m.
The respondents brought their case, on appeal, to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC Ruling
In its Decision of August 30, 2007,7 the NLRC found that SIP was the
respondents employer, but it sustained the labor arbiters ruling that the
employees were not illegally dismissed as the termination of SIPs concession
to operate the canteen constituted an authorized cause for the severance of
employer-employee relations. Furthermore, the respondents admission that
they applied with GMPC when it terminated SIPs concession is an indication
that they were employees of SIP and that they were terminating their
employment relationship with it. As the labor arbiter did, the NLRC regarded
the closure of SIPs canteen operations involuntary, thus, negating the
employees entitlement to separation pay.8
For failure of SIP to present proof of compliance with the law on the minimum
wage, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave, the NLRC awarded the
respondents a total of P952,865.53 in salary and 13th month pay
differentials and service incentive leave pay.9 The NLRC, however, denied the
employees claim for overtime pay, holding that the respondents failed to
present evidence that they rendered two hours overtime work every day of
their employment with SIP.
SIP moved for, but failed to secure, a reconsideration of the NLRC decision. It
then elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari charging
the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision.
Essentially, SIP argued that the NLRC erred in declaring that it was the
respondents employer who is liable for their money claims despite its being
a labor-only contractor of GMPC.
The CA Decision
In its Decision promulgated on November 27, 2009,10 the CA granted the
petition in part. While it affirmed the award, it found merit in SIPs objection
to the NLRC computation and assumption that a month had twenty-six (26)
working days, instead of twenty (20) working days. The CA recognized that in
a government agency such as the GSIS, there are only 20 official business
days in a month. It noted that the respondents presented no evidence that
the employees worked even outside official business days and hours. It
accordingly remanded the case for a recomputation of the award.
Finding substantial evidence in the records supporting the NLRC conclusions,
the CA brushed aside SIPs argument that it could not have been the
employer of the respondents because it was a mere labor-only contractor of
GMPC. It sustained the NLRCs findings that SIP was the respondents
employer.
SIP moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on May 31,
2010.11 Hence, the present petition.
The Petition
SIP seeks a reversal of the appellate courts ruling that it was the employer
of the respondents, claiming that it was merely a labor-only contractor of
GMPC.
It insists that it could not be the respondents employer as it was not allowed
to operate a canteen in the GSIS building. It was the GMPC who had the
authority to undertake the operation. GMPC only engaged SIPs services
because GMPC had no capability or competence in the area. SIP points out
that GMPC assumed responsibility for its acts in operating the canteen; all
businesses it transacted were under GMPCs name, as well as the business
registration and other permits of the canteen, sales receipts and vouchers for
food purchased from the canteen; the employees were issued individual ID
cards by GMPC. In sum, SIP contends that its arrangement with GMPC was
one of contractor/subcontractor governed by Article 106 of the Labor Code.
Lastly, it submits that it was not registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment as an independent contractor and, therefore, it is presumed to
be a labor-only contractor.
The Respondents Comment
Without being required by the Court, the respondents filed their
comment to SIPs petition on August 3, 2010.12 They question the
propriety of the petition for review on certiorari raising only questions of fact
and not of law as required by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
notwithstanding, they submit that the CA committed no error in upholding
the NLRCs findings of facts which established that SIP was the real employer
of Batolina and the other complainants. Thus, SIP was liable to them for their
statutory benefits, although it was not made to answer for their lost
employment due to the involuntary nature of the canteens closure.
The respondents pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Courts Ruling
We first resolve the alleged impropriety of the petition.13 While it is the
general rule that the Court may not review factual findings of the CA, we
deem it proper to depart from the rule and examine the facts of the case in
view of the conflicting factual findings of the labor arbiter, on one hand, and
the NLRC and the CA, on the other.14 We, therefore, hold the respondents
position on this point unmeritorious.
We now consider the merits of the case.
The employer-employee relationship issue
We affirm the CA ruling that SIP was the respondents employer. The NLRC
decision, which the CA affirmed, states:
Respondents have been the concessionaire of GMPC canteen for nine (9)
years (Annex "A" of Complainants Sur-Rejoinder., Records, 302). During
this period, complainants were employed at the said canteen (Sinumpaang
Salaysay of complainants, Records, p. 156). On February 29, 2004,
respondents concession with GMPC was terminated (Annex "C" of
Respondents Answer and Position Paper, Records, p. 77). When respondents
were prevented from entering the premises as a result of the termination of
their concession, they sent a protest letter dated April 14, 2004 to GMPC thru
their counsel. Pertinent portion of the letter:
We write this letter in behalf of our client Mr. & Mrs. Alejandro C. Pablo, the
concessionaires who used to occupy and/or rent the area for a
cafeteria/canteen at the 2nd Floor of the GSIS Building for the past several
years.
Last March 12, 2004, without any court writ or order, and with the aid of your
armed agents, you physically barredour clients & their
employees/helpers from entering the said premises and from performing
their usual duties of serving the food requirements of GSIS personnel and
others.
Clearly, no less than respondents, thru their counsel, admitted that
complainants herein were their employees.
the employees worked for 26 days a month, no need exists to recompute the
award for the respondents who were "explicitly claiming for their salaries and
benefits for the services rendered from Monday to Friday or 5 days a week or
a total of 20 days a month."16
In light of the foregoing, we find no merit in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for
lack of merit. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101651, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172161
March 2, 2011
Antipolo, Rizal project, which ended sometime in (sic) the late September
1998. As a consequence, Zuiga and Caetes employment was terminated.
For this project, Zuiga and Caete received only the wage of P145.00 daily.
The minimum prescribed wage for Rizal at that time was P160.00.
Sometime in late November 1998, private respondents re-applied in the
Racitelcom project of Lagon in Bulacan. Zuiga and Caete were reemployed. Lopez was also hired for the said specific project. For this, private
respondents received the wage of P145.00. Again, after the completion of
their project in March 1999, private respondents went home to Cebu City.
On May 21, 1999, private respondents for the 4th time worked with Lagons
project in Camarin, Caloocan City with Furukawa Corporation as the general
contractor. Their contract would expire on February 28, 2000, the period of
completion of the project. From May 21, 1997-December 1999, private
respondents received the wage ofP145.00. At this time, the minimum
prescribed rate for Manila was P198.00. In January to February 28, the three
received the wage of P165.00. The existing rate at that time was P213.00.
For reasons of delay on the delivery of imported materials from Furukawa
Corporation, the Camarin project was not completed on the scheduled date
of completion. Face[d] with economic problem[s], Lagon was constrained to
cut down the overtime work of its worker[s][,] including private respondents.
Thus, when requested by private respondents on February 28, 2000 to work
overtime, Lagon refused and told private respondents that if they insist, they
would have to go home at their own expense and that they would not be
given anymore time nor allowed to stay in the quarters. This prompted
private respondents to leave their work and went home to Cebu. On March 3,
2000, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of wages, holiday pay, 13th month pay for 1997 and 1998 and
service incentive leave pay as well as damages and attorneys fees.
In their answers, petitioners admit employment of private respondents but
claimed that the latter were only project employees[,] for their services were
merely engaged for a specific project or undertaking and the same were
covered by contracts duly signed by private respondents. Petitioners further
alleged that the food allowance ofP63.00 per day as well as private
respondents allowance for lodging house, transportation, electricity, water
and snacks allowance should be added to their basic pay. With these,
petitioners claimed that private respondents received higher wage rate than
that prescribed in Rizal and Manila.
The CA also stated that the failure of petitioners to comply with the simple
but compulsory requirement to submit a report of termination to the nearest
Public Employment Office every time private respondents employment was
terminated was proof that the latter were not project employees but regular
employees.
The CA likewise found that the private respondents were underpaid. It ruled
that the board and lodging, electricity, water, and food enjoyed by the
private respondents could not be included in the computation of their wages
because these were given without their written consent. The CA added that
the private respondents were entitled to 13th month pay.
The CA also agreed with the NLRC that there was no illegal dismissal. The CA
opined that it was the petitioners prerogative to grant or deny any request
for overtime work and that the private respondents act of leaving the
workplace after their request was denied was an act of abandonment.
In modifying the decision of the labor tribunal, however, the CA noted that
respondent Roldan Lopez did not work in the Antipolo project and, thus, was
not entitled to wage differentials. Also, in computing the differentials for the
period January and February 2000, the CA disagreed in the award of
differentials based on the minimum daily wage of P223.00, as the prevailing
minimum daily wage then was only P213.00. Petitioners sought
reconsideration but the CA denied it in its March 31, 2006 Resolution.11
In this petition for review on certiorari,12 petitioners seek the reversal and
setting aside of the CA decision anchored on this lone:
GROUND/ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN LAW IN
AWARDING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS ON THE
BASES OF MERE TECHNICALITIES, THAT IS, FOR LACK OF WRITTEN
CONFORMITY x x x AND LACK OF NOTICE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE)[,] AND THUS, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE NLRC DECISION IN THE LIGHT
OF THE RULING IN THE CASE OF JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO AGABON vs,
NLRC, ET AL., GR NO. 158963, NOVEMBER 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573, [AND
SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE CASE OF GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC.
VS. NAGAKAKAISANG EMPLEYADO NG WELLCOME-DFA (NEW DFA), ET AL.,
GR NO. 149349, 11 MARCH 2005], WHICH FINDS APPLICATION IN THE
INSTANT CASE BY ANALOGY.13
Petitioners reiterated their position that the value of the facilities that the
private respondents enjoyed should be included in the computation of the
"wages" received by them. They argued that the rulings in Agabon v.
NLRC14and Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Empleyado Ng
Wellcome-DFA15 should be applied by analogy, in the sense that the lack of
written acceptance of the employees of the facilities enjoyed by them should
not mean that the value of the facilities could not be included in the
computation of the private respondents "wages."
On November 29, 2006, the Court resolved to issue a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining the public respondent from enforcing the NLRC and CA
decisions until further orders from the Court.
After a thorough review of the records, however, the Court finds no merit in
the petition.
This petition generally involves factual issues, such as, whether or not there
is evidence on record to support the findings of the LA, the NLRC and the CA
that private respondents were project or regular employees and that their
salary differentials had been paid. This calls for a re-examination of the
evidence, which the Court cannot entertain. Settled is the rule that factual
findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in
matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial
evidence. It is not the Courts function to assess and evaluate the evidence
all over again, particularly where the findings of both the Labor tribunals and
the CA concur. 16
As a general rule, on payment of wages, a party who alleges payment as a
defense has the burden of proving it.17Specifically with respect to labor
cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the
employer, the rationale being that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls,
records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that
overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers
have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody
and absolute control of the employer.18
In this case, petitioners, aside from bare allegations that private respondents
received wages higher than the prescribed minimum, failed to present any
evidence, such as payroll or payslips, to support their defense of payment.
Thus, petitioners utterly failed to discharge the onus probandi.
Private respondents, on the other hand, are entitled to be paid the minimum
wage, whether they are regular or non-regular employees.
Section 3, Rule VII of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code19 specifically
enumerates those who are not covered by the payment of minimum wage.
Project employees are not among them.
On whether the value of the facilities should be included in the computation
of the "wages" received by private respondents, Section 1 of DOLE
Memorandum Circular No. 2 provides that an employer may provide
subsidized meals and snacks to his employees provided that the subsidy
shall not be less that 30% of the fair and reasonable value of such facilities.
In such cases, the employer may deduct from the wages of the employees
not more than 70% of the value of the meals and snacks enjoyed by the
latter, provided that such deduction is with the written authorization of the
employees concerned.
Moreover, before the value of facilities can be deducted from the employees
wages, the following requisites must all be attendant: first, proof must be
shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; second, the
provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by
the employee; and finally, facilities must be charged at reasonable
value.20 Mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees
wages.21
These requirements, however, have not been met in this case. SLL failed to
present any company policy or guideline showing that provisions for meals
and lodging were part of the employees salaries. It also failed to provide
proof of the employees written authorization, much less show how they
arrived at their valuations. At any rate, it is not even clear whether private
respondents actually enjoyed said facilities.
The Court, at this point, makes a distinction between "facilities" and
"supplements." It is of the view that the food and lodging, or the electricity
and water allegedly consumed by private respondents in this case were not
facilities but supplements. In the case of Atok-Big Wedge Assn. v. Atok-Big
Wedge Co.,22 the two terms were distinguished from one another in this wise:
"Supplements," therefore, constitute extra remuneration or special privileges
or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary
earnings or wages. "Facilities," on the other hand, are items of expense
necessary for the laborer's and his family's existence and subsistence so that
by express provision of law (Sec. 2[g]), they form part of the wage and when
furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so
furnished, the laborer would spend and pay for them just the same.
In short, the benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an
extra remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is
supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers' basic
wages, it is a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or
item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but in the purpose for which
it is given.23 In the case at bench, the items provided were given freely by
SLL for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers
while they were working at their respective projects.1avvphi1
For said reason, the cases of Agabon and Glaxo are inapplicable in this case.
At any rate, these were cases of dismissal with just and authorized causes.
The present case involves the matter of the failure of the petitioners to
comply with the payment of the prescribed minimum wage.
The Court sustains the deletion of the award of differentials with respect to
respondent Roldan Lopez. As correctly pointed out by the CA, he did not work
for the project in Antipolo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on November 29, 2006 is deemed, as it is hereby
ordered, DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
respective position papers, after which the dispute was submitted for
decision.
While admitting in its Position Paper7 that the employees were paid all of the
days of the month even if there was no work, respondent alleged that it is
not prevented from making separate demands for the payment of regular
holidays concomitant with the provisions of the CBA, with its supporting
documents consisting of a letter demanding payment of holiday pay,
petitioner's reply thereto and respondent's rejoinder, a computation in the
amount of P1,054,393.07 for the unpaid legal holidays, and several pay slips.
Petitioner, on the other hand, in its Position Paper,8 insisted payment of the
holiday pay in compliance with the CBA provisions, stating that payment was
presumed since the formula used in determining the daily rate of pay of the
covered employees is Basic Monthly Salary divided by 30 days or Basic
Monthly Salary multiplied by 12 divided by 360 days, thus with said formula,
the employees are already paid their regular and special days, the days
when no work is done, the 51 un-worked Sundays and the 51 un-worked
Saturdays.
On March 1, 2001, Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. rendered a
Decision9 in favor of respondent, holding petitioner liable for payment of
unpaid holidays from 1998 to 2000 in the sum of P1,054,393.07. He
reasoned that petitioner miserably failed to show that it complied with the
CBA mandate that holiday pay be "reflected during any payroll period of
occurrence" since the payroll slips did not reflect any payment of the paid
holidays. He found unacceptable not only petitioner's presumption of
payment of holiday pay based on a formula used in determining and
computing the daily rate of each covered employee, but also petitioner's
further submission that the rate of its employees is not less than the
statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days and divided by twelve.
On April 11, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was
denied by the Voluntary Arbitrator in a Resolution11 dated June 17, 2002.
Petitioner received said Resolution on June 27, 2002.12
Thirty days later, or on July 27, 2002,13 petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari14 in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction to the Voluntary Arbitrator: (a) for ignoring that in said
company the divisor for computing the applicable daily rate of rank-and-file
employees is 360 days which already includes payment of 13 un-worked
regular holidays under Section 2, Article VIII of the CBA;15 and (b) for holding
the petitioner liable for the unpaid holidays just because the payroll slips
submitted as evidence did not show any payment for the regular holidays.16
In a Resolution17 dated September 4, 2002, the CA dismissed outright
petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for adopting a wrong mode of appeal. It
reasoned:
Considering that what is assailed in the present recourse is a Decision of a
Voluntary Arbitrator, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the present petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 filed on August 15, 2002, should be rejected, as such a
petition cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. And in this case, the period
for appeal via a petition for review has already lapsed since the petitioner
received a copy of the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration on
June 27, 2002, so that its last day to appeal lapsed on July 12, 2002.
x x x x18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 but it was denied by the CA in
a Resolution20 dated February 28, 2003.
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
(1) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by herein petitioner
to assail the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator.21
(2) Even if decisions of voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators are appealable to the Honorable Court of Appeals under
Rule 43, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is still available if it is
grounded on grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the Honorable Court of
Appeals erred in rejecting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court filed by herein petitioner.22
(3) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in refusing to rule on the
legal issue presented by herein petitioner in the petition for certiorari
that it had filed and in putting emphasis instead on a technicality of
procedure. The legal issues needs a clear-cut ruling by this Honorable
Court for the guidance of herein petitioner and private respondent. 23
Petitioner contends that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the applicable mode
of appeal to the CA from judgments issued by a voluntary arbitrator since
Rule 43 only allows appeal from judgments of particular quasi-judicial
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board
of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,
and voluntary arbitratorsauthorized by law.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 2. Cases not covered. - This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
did not alter the Court's ruling in Luzon Development Bank. Section 2, Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is nothing more than a reiteration of
the exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA,29as provided
for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,30 as amended by Republic Act No.
7902:31
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and
the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court took into account this exception in Luzon Development Bank but,
nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators issued pursuant
to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit, thus:
x x x. The fact that [the voluntary arbitrators] functions and powers are
provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to
said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated
therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation
Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is
the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid
down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of
Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by
Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
the interest of simple fair play. Out of concern for those with less privileges in
life, this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and
upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however,
has not blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving,
to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law
and doctrine.52
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 4, 2002 and February 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72336 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 1,
2001 and Resolution dated June 17, 2002 of the Voluntary Arbitrator are
declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Subject of the present petition for certiorari are the Court of Appeals
Resolution of April 13, 19991 and Resolution of September 3, 19992 which
dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari for having been filed six days
beyond the reglementary period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated
July 21, 1998 reading:
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in
due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period
herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event,reckoned from notice of
such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners, in the main, plead for the application of substantial justice over
procedural lapses, conformably to this Courts pronouncements in several
cases, and a liberal construction of the Rules in order to promote its objective
of securing a just disposition of every action or proceeding.3
The record shows that the September 3, 1999 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration was received by
them on September 13, 1999. On September 27, 1999, petitioners filed a
motion for 30-day extension of time to file petition which this Court
granted.4 On October 28, 1999, petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari.5 Doubtless, petitioners could not have availed of such petition as a
mere substitute for lost appeal,6 hence, this Court treats it as one for review
under Rule 45.
Indeed, Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended by the July 21, 1998 Resolution of this Court En Banc by adding to
it as second paragraph the above-quoted amendment.
The same Section was, however, subsequently amended by this Courts En
Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1,
2000 providing for a 60-day period to file petition under Rule 65 from denial
of a motion for reconsideration or new trial. As thus further amended,
Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The rule is settled that remedial statutes or modes of procedure, which do
not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not
come within the purview of the general rule against the retroactive operation
of statutes. They are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. Hence, in a long line of cases,7 the new period
under Section 4 of Rule 65 was given retroactive application. Of course at the
time the assailed Resolutions of the appellate court were issued in 1999,
Section 4 of Rule 65 had not yet been amended by this Courts Resolution in
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.
There being no reason why Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended in 2000 by this
Court, may not be given retroactive application to petitioners petition, it now
gives said application. While, normally, a remand of the case to the appellate
court for further proceedings is done,8 this Court now opts to decide the
petition on the merits to forestall further delay in its disposition.
On December 12, 1997, the Arellano University Employees and Workers
Union (the Union), the exclusive bargaining representative of about 380 rankand-file employees of Arellano University, Inc. (the University), filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging
the University with Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) as follows:
1. Interfering in union activities;
2. Union Busting violation of CBAs Article IV, Section 2;9
3. Union Busting disregarding the unions request to deduct penalties
from its members who were absent and without justifiable reasons
during union meetings; and
4. Contracting Workout the management is contracting out services
and functions being performed by Union members.10
The Notice of Strike was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-520-97.
Subsequently or on December 17, 1997, a majority of the members of the
Union filed a December 15, 1997 petition for audit11 of union funds before
the Office of the National Capital Region Director of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) against the officers of the Union.
On March 11, 1998, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR directed the Union
officers to call a general membership meeting to, among other things, render
an accounting of union funds amounting to P481,117.28 which were remitted
per the check-off statement.12
Also on March 11, 1998, then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano
certified the Notice of Strike for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) which the latter assigned to Labor Arbiter
Cristeta D. Tamayo. The Labor Arbiter set the dispute for hearing/conference
on July 3, 1998, July 17, 1998, and August 11, 1998. No settlement was
reached by the parties, however.13
On July 28, 1998, the University moved for the consolidation with the ULP
charge (NCMB-NCR-NS-12-520-97) the Interpleader14 it filed against the
Union and some of its members, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-0202036-98 and pending before Labor Arbiter Felipe T. Garduque II, and the
Complaint the Union filed for underpayment of wages arising from the
change in the manner of computation of salary of employees and nonpayment of Sunday pay, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-0142298 and pending before Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin T. Reyes, both of which
involve the same parties.15
Before the NLRC could act on the Universitys motion for consolidation, DOLE
Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, by Order16 of August 5, 1998, certified for
compulsory arbitration to the NLRC a second Notice of Strike filed by the
Union on July 16, 1998, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-07-277-98, charging
the University with the following:
a. Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), Art. V
withholding of union and death benefits;
b. Violation of CBA, Art. VI non-granting of ten (10%) percent salary
increase to some union members;
c. Illegal/unauthorized deductions in the payroll;
d. Union interference circulating letters against the union; and
e. Non-implementation of the retirement plan as approved by the BIR. 17
A strike was in fact staged on August 5, 1998.
By the same Order of August 5, 1998, the DOLE Secretary directed the
strikers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours. The order was served
upon the Union on August 6, 1998, and the following day, August 7, 1998, at
about 3:00 p.m., the Union lifted its strike.18
The strike staged by the Union on August 5-7, 1998 prompted the University
to file on August 24, 1998 a petition to declare the same illegal, docketed
as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-06897-98, which was also consolidated
with the other cases.
Resolving the consolidated cases, the NLRC, by Decision19 of October 12,
1998, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring:
1. That the Unions two notices of strike docketed as NCMB-NCRNS-12-520-97 and NCMB-NCR-NS-07-277-98 were, to the extent
as they concern the issues herein resolved, without merit;
2. That as a consequence, the University is absolved from the
charges of Unfair Labor Practicecontained in said notices of
strike;
3. The loss of employment status of all the individual
respondents in NLRC-NCR-Case No. 00-08-06897-98; and
4. That there is no diminution of workers benefits in NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-02-01422-98, because apart from the Unions failure
to prove it, the University, based on existing laws, is correct in
using 314 days as divisor in computing the daily wage of its daily
paid employees.
SO ORDERED.20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The NLRC found that what triggered the strike was the Unions suspicion that
the petition for audit of union funds was initiated by the University. The
NLRC, citing an Order of March 11, 1998 issued by the DOLE Regional
Director, found the therein petitioners to have initiated, out of their own
volition, the filing of the petition. It thus concluded that there was no factual
basis to hold the University guilty of interference in union activities.21
On the allegation of union busting, the NLRC ruled that the refusal of the
University to deduct penalties from the salaries of members of the Union who
failed to attend meetings was based on Article IV, Section 222 of the CBAvis-
-vis Section 123 of the same Article which requires as condition for a valid
checkoff prior submission to the management of individual checkoff
authorizations, a requirement which was not met by the Union.24 Besides, the
NLRC held, the law mandates that the Union should not be "arbitrary,
excessive or oppressive" in imposing a fine.25
On the claim that the University had been contracting out work, the NLRC
held that the same was never raised during the conciliation meetings at the
NCMB level.26
Respecting the second Notice of Strike, the NLRC found that only the charges
of violation of the CBA for withholding union dues and death benefits, and
the non-implementation of the retirement plan, as approved by the BIR, were
left for resolution as the Union dropped the other issues raised therein after
the NCMB hearings on July 21, 1998 and July 28, 1998.27
Crediting the explanation of the University that its withholding of union dues
and death aid benefits was upon the written request of several union
members themselves, the NLRC held that no ULP was committed.
On the charge of non-implementation of the retirement plan by the
University, the NLRC found that the same was baseless and it was in fact not
ventilated before the NCMB.28
In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-02036-98, the NLRC ruled that the University
may not be held guilty of ULP for refusal to heed the demand of the Union
that salaries of its members be deducted for their failure to attend union
meetings: firstly, because the Union itself failed to meet the requirements
provided for in Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the CBA; and secondly, an
interpleader had been filed by the University for the parties to litigate their
claims before the NLRC.29 The NLRC also ruled that the resolution calling for
such deduction was not valid as it was not even signed by the majority of
Union officers and circulated to the members.30
In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-06897-98 (the Universitys petition to declare
the strike staged by the Union on August 5-7, 1998 illegal), the NLRC granted
the petition and declared the loss of employment status of all thestrikers for
knowingly defying the Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary dated
August 5, 1998, said Order having been served upon the union on August 6,
1998 but it was only on August 7, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., that the strike
was lifted.31
In NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01422-98, the NLRC ruled that the University
was correct in using 314 days as divisor, instead of 365 days, in computing
the "equivalent daily rate"32 of pay of a worker.
The Union et al. (hereafter petitioners) filed a motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC decision which was denied by Resolution33 of January 20, 1999.
Hence, they elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for
certiorari which was, as stated early on, dismissed.
In the present petition, petitioners insist that the University violated the CBA
by withholding union dues and death benefits. The University counters that
on the request of Union members in light of their gripes against the Union
and its officers, it did withhold said dues and benefits which they deposited
with the DOLE where the parties could settle the issues among themselves.
The then prevailing Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book V34, Rule XVIII
provided that
Section 1. Right of union to collect dues. The right of the incumbent
bargaining representative to check off and to collect dues resulting
therefrom shall not be affected by the pendency of a representation
case or an intra-union dispute.35 (Emphasis supplied)
To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross
violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, means flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof.
Evidently, the University can not be faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely
heeded the above-said request of Union members.
On the NLRCs declaration of loss of employment status of the strikers, the
pertinent provision of Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 264.
xxxx
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Under the immediately quoted provision, an ordinary striking worker may not
be declared to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an
rights and obligations of the liquidation team. This would include the salaries
of the employees hired for liquidation purposes, such as MOLINA.
In its reply, petitioner insists that when it was placed under liquidation, it lost
its juridical personality, such that it could no longer enter into contracts or
transact business. All its assets and liabilities were turned over to the Central
Bank. MOLINA's complaint pertained to acts committed during liquidation
and so was correctly filed against the liquidation team. Its substitution as
party-respondent was clearly erroneous.
Hence, the issues to be resolved are: (1) Are W.O. 1 and W.O. 2 applicable to
MOLINA? (2) Is MOLINA entitled to moral damages and attorney's fees? (3) If
so, who is liable to pay MOLINA's claims?
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the labor arbiter, and
affirmed by the NLRC, that MOLINA's salary was within the coverage of the
cited wage orders. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasijudicial bodies are generally accorded respect and finality where they are
supported by substantial evidence. 11Indeed, MOLINA's monthly salary of
P3,754.60 was never at issue. What was in dispute was the computation of
his daily wage.
W.O. 1 expressly states that employees having a monthly salary of not more
than P3,802.08 are entitled to receive the mandated wage increase.
Undeniably, MOLINA was receiving a monthly salary of P3,754.60. This fact
alone leaves no doubt that he should benefit from said wage order.
On the other hand, W.O. 2 raised the ceiling for entitlement to the wage
increase. If MOLINA was covered by the earlier wage order, with more reason
should the later wage order apply to him.
Worth mentioning is the opinion 12 rendered by the National Wages Council
on the query of the Philippines Veterans Bank Retained Employees, on
whether they were entitled to a wage increase under Republic Act No.
6640, 13 viz.:
The documents attached to your query show that the Bank has
been consistently using the factor of 365 days in computing your
equivalent monthly salary prior to its being placed under
receivership by the Central Bank. This is evident in the wage and
allowance increases granted under previous Presidential Decrees
and Wage Orders, which were given by the Bank on monthly
basis, i.e., where the rest days are unworked [sic] but paid. This
awards for moral damages and attorney's fees cannot be consolidated for
they are different in nature and each must be separately
determined. 16 Since the Labor Code limits attorney's fees to ten percent of
the wages awarded, 17 and the total wage differential due MOLINA was
computed at P12,501.20, only P1,250.12 should have been awarded as
attorney's fees.
Moving on to the issue of moral damages, the records show that MOLINA
based his claim on the alleged failure of the liquidation team to implement
the benefits of the wage orders, without submitting any proof in support
thereof. It is basic, however, that for moral damages to be awarded, the
claimant must satisfactorily prove its factual basis and causal connection
with the respondent's acts. 18 In this, MOLINA failed, for which reason the
award of moral damages must be deleted.
Finally, we rule that the payment of MOLINA's claims devolves upon
petitioner, not the liquidation team. When a bank is declared insolvent and
placed under receivership, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank
determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the
financially distressed bank. 19 A receiver takes control and possession of the
assets of the bank for the benefit of its creditors 20 and concurrently
represents the bank. 21On the other hand, a liquidator assumes the role of
the receiver upon the determination by the Monetary Board that the bank
can no longer resume business. His task is to dispose of all the assets of the
bank and effect partial payments of its obligations in accordance with their
legal priority. 22 In both receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank
retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the closure of its business; in
fact, the bank may even be sued. 23 Its corporate existence is assumed by
the receiver or liquidator. The latter, however, acts not only for the benefit of
the bank, but for the bank's creditors as well. 24
In the instant case, petitioner was initially closed and put under receivership
and liquidation. Subsequently, its rehabilitation was effected by virtue of
Republic Act No. 7169 25 and Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 dated 10
April 1992. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and
activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former
position of successful operation and solvency. 26 Upon its rehabilitation,
petitioner assumed the rights and obligations of the receiver and liquidator.
This includes MOLINA's claim for unpaid wages. It must be borne in mind that
all the acts of the receiver and liquidator pertain to petitioner, both having
assumed petitioner's corporate existence. Petitioner cannot disclaim liability
by arguing that the non-payment of MOLINA's just wages was committed by
the liquidators during the liquidation period.
and the Resolution dated 30 April 1998 of the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC Case No. V-0048-97. The NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiters Decision of 29 November 1996, which found respondent
Antique Electric Cooperative ("ANTECO") liable for petitioners wage
differentials amounting to P1,017,507.73 plus attorneys fees of 10%.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioners are monthly-paid employees of ANTECO whose workdays are from
Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. After a routine inspection, the
Regional Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE")
found ANTECO liable for underpayment of the monthly salaries of its
employees. On 10 September 1989, the DOLE directed ANTECO to pay its
employees wage differentials amounting to P1,427,412.75. ANTECO failed to
pay.
Thus, on various dates in 1995, thirty-three (33) monthly-paid employees
filed complaints with the NLRC Sub-Regional Branch VI, Iloilo City, praying for
payment of wage differentials, damages and attorneys fees. Labor Arbiter
Rodolfo G. Lagoc ("Labor Arbiter") heard the consolidated complaints.
On 29 November 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of
petitioners granting them wage differentials amounting to P1,017,507.73 and
attorneys fees of 10%. Florentino Tongson, whose case the Labor Arbiter
dismissed, was the sole exception.
ANTECO appealed the Decision to the NLRC on 24 December 1996. On 27
November 1997, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision. The NLRC
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 30 April
1998. Petitioners then elevated the case to this Court through a petition for
certiorari, which the Court dismissed for petitioners failure to comply with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. On petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the Court on 13 January 1999 set aside the dismissal.
Following the doctrine in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,4 the Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On 27 September 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing
the petition for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court. The Court of Appeals explained that petitioners failed to allege the
specific instances where the NLRC abused its discretion. The appellate court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on 7 February 2001.
Hence, this petition.
outright. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for
certiorari must state the grounds relied on for the relief sought. A simple
perusal of the petition readily shows that petitioners failed to meet this
requirement.
The appellate courts jurisdiction to review a decision of the NLRC in a
petition for certiorari is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.10 An extraordinary remedy, a petition for certiorari is available
only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases. The sole office of the writ of
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.11 It
does not include correction of the NLRCs evaluation of the evidence or of its
factual findings. Such findings are generally accorded not only respect but
also finality.12 A party assailing such findings bears the burden of showing
that the tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of
evidence material to the controversy, in order that the extraordinary writ of
certiorari will lie.13
We agree with the Court of Appeals that nowhere in the petition is there any
acceptable demonstration that the NLRC acted either with grave abuse of
discretion or without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Petitioners merely stated
generalizations and conclusions of law. Rather than discussing how the NLRC
acted capriciously, petitioners resorted to a litany of generalizations.
Petitions that fail to comply with procedural requisites, or are unintelligible or
clearly without legal basis, deserve scant consideration. Section 6, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court requires that every petition be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action. Lacking such sufficiency,
the court may dismiss the petition outright.
The insufficiency in substance of this petition provides enough reason to end
our discussion here. However, we shall discuss the issues raised not so much
to address the merit of the petition, for there is none, but to illustrate the
extent by which petitioners have haphazardly pursued their claim.
On the right of the petitioners to wage differentials
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying their
claim for wage differentials. Petitioners base their claim on Section 2, Rule IV
of Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Petitioners
argue that under this provision monthly-paid employees are considered paid
for all days of the month including un-worked days. Petitioners assert that
they should be paid for all the 365 days in a year. They argue that since in
less 26 Saturdays (or 52 half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287 days means
that ANTECOs workers are deprived of their holiday pay for some or all of
the ten legal holidays. The 304 days divisor used by ANTECO is clearly above
the minimum of 287 days.
Finally, petitioners cite Chartered Bank Employees Association v.
Ople16 as an analogous situation. Petitioners have misread this case.
In Chartered Bank, the workers sought payment for un-worked legal holidays
as a right guaranteed by a valid law. In this case, petitioners seek payment
of wages for un-worked non-legal holidays citing as basis a void
implementing rule. The circumstances are also markedly different.
In Chartered Bank, there was a collective bargaining agreement that
prescribed the divisor. No CBA exists in this case. In Chartered Bank, the
employer was liable for underpayment because the divisor it used was 251
days, a figure that clearly fails to account for the ten legal holidays the law
requires to be paid. Here, the divisor ANTECO uses is 304 days. This figure
does not deprive petitioners of their right to be paid on legal holidays.
A final note. ANTECOs defense is likewise based on Section 2, Rule IV of
Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code although
ANTECOs interpretation of this provision is opposite that of petitioners. It is
deplorable that both parties premised their arguments on an implementing
rule that the Court had declared void twenty years ago in Insular Bank. This
case is cited prominently in basic commentaries.17 And yet, counsel for both
parties failed to consider this. This does not speak well of the quality of
representation they rendered to their clients. This controversy should have
ended long ago had either counsel first checked the validity of the
implementing rule on which they based their contentions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resoution of the Court of
Appeals DISMISSING CA-G.R. SP No. 51519 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.