Laguitan, Maria Isabel G.

Laws on Natural Resources

Patricio vs. Bayug

112 SCRA 42
1. Case Summary:
-

In 1934 Policarpio Mendez obtained a patent and Torrens title for a

homestead with an area of about twenty-three hectares located at Sitio
Badiangon, Barrio Dalipuga, Iligan City. He and his wife, Petra Macaliag and
their nine children lived on the land, cleared it and planted coconuts thereon.

In 1956, Mendez sold the homestead to the spouses Eugenio Lamberang and
Ester Fuentes. In 1958, Mendez and his children filed an action to annul the
sale. Lamberang countered with an ejectment suit. On March 20, 1961,
Mendez and his children filed an action against the Lamberang spouses for
the reconveyance of the homestead.

2. Issue of the Case:

- Whether the tenants hired by the purchaser of a homestead planted to
coconuts and bananas may be ejected by the homesteader's heirs who were
allowed by the Court of Appeals to repurchase the homestead and who desire
to personally possess and till the land.
3. Law applicable:
- The intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish
agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner-cultivatorship and the
economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and "to
achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious
institutional restraints and practices" (Sec. 2).
4. Decision of the case:
- The judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Laguitan, Maria Isabel G.

Laws on Natural Resources

Lasud vs Lasud
63 O.G. 1, P. 43
1. Case Summary:
- The parcel of land subject of the action was originally a homestead of the
deceased father of plaintiff Sigbe Lasud and defendant Santay Lasud.
Original Certificate of Title No. 1232 was issued pursuant to Homestead
Patent No. 26114 in the name of their father on February 1, 1934. Because of
the death of their father plaintiff Sigbe Lasud and defendant Santay Lasud
inherited the land and became co-owners thereof.
On July 14, 1955 plaintiff Sigbe Lasud sold her interest, right and
participation in said parcel of land including her improvements thereon in
favor of her brother defendant Santay Lasud and his wife Guinantana Cia for
the sum of P550.00. Upon registration of this sale, the original certificate of
title was cancelled and a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of
Santay Lasud.
On August 10, 1959 Sigbe Lasud brought this action against her brother
Santay Lasud to compel him to reconvey back to plaintiff the one-half share
that plaintiff had sold to him in July, 1955.
2. Issue of the case:
- Whether the sale of the homestead or part thereof does not fall within the
purpose, spirit and meaning of the provision of the Public Land Act (Com. Act
No. 141, Sec. 119) authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee
thereof
3. Law applicable:
- The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that it is barred under
Article 1391 of the new Civil Code (if the suit is for the annulment of the sale),
and it is also barred under Article 1606 of the same code (if the suit is to
exercise a right to repurchase).

The appellee Santay Lasud against whom the right to repurchase or

reconveyance is asserted is a son of the original homesteader himself and is
an immediate member of the family of the homesteader and his direct
descendant and heir to the property. In point of proximity to the homesteader,
the appellee is as close to the original homesteader as the appellant who tries
to redeem the property. They are brother and sister, son and daughter of the
homesteader. Under the circumstances the Supreme Court agree with the
lower court that the sale of the homestead or part thereof does not fall within
the purpose, spirit and meaning of the provision of the Public Land Act (Com.
Act No. 141, Sec. 119) authorizing redemption of the homestead from any
vendee thereof.

4. Decision of the case:

- The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the order appealed from

Laguitan, Maria Isabel G.

Visayan Realty vs Meer

Laws on Natural Resources

96 Phil 515
1. Case summary:
- This is an action instituted by the Visayan Realty, Inc., in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the Collector of Internal Revenue seeking the refund
of the sum of P69, 138.67 paid as forest charges.
Defendant, in his answer denied the claim and, by way of counterclaim
alleged that plaintiff is still indebted to the Government in the sum of P9,
986.70, representing forest charges he has not paid during the period from
November, 1935 to December, 1940.
2. Issue of the Case:
- Whether the collector of Internal Revenue is meritorious for seeking the
refund of the sum of P69,138.67 paid as forest charges.
3. Law applicable:
-

Utilization of Forest Products. The utilization of forest products which may

exist on areas certified as alienable and disposable under this Order or on
areas within approved homestead or sales application shall still be subject to
the Forest and Internal Revenue Laws and regulations; Provided however,
That the holder of approved homestead or sales application, may be allowed
to cut, gather and remove from the land reasonable amount of timber and
other products which may need for his own personal use and not for sale of
barter, and such forest products shall be considered as cut, gathered and
removed under a gratuitious license. (Forestry Administrative Order No. 13-1,
Section 7).

4. Decision of the Court:

- The decision appealed from is REVERSED. Plaintiff-appellant is ordered to
pay to defendant-appellant the sum of P9,986.70 representing the forest
charges and surcharges said plaintiff has failed to pay during the period from
November, 1935 to December, 1940, without pronouncement as to costs.

Laguitan, Maria Isabel G.

Laws on Natural Resources

Remman vs CA
GR No. 125018
1. Case summary:
- REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are
adjoining landowners in Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat
containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit
trees while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6)

hectares of which are devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is one
and a half (1 1/2) meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.
-

Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon
was already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation.
He made several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears.
On 14 March 1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation was
already inundated with water containing pig manure, as a result of which the
trees growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against
REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased
because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's
piggery farm.

REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative

defense that measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were
already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent
any damage to the adjoining estates.

2. Issue of the Case:

- Whether the damage is only due to fortuitous event
3. Law applicable:
Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of their
negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable
for the ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 649 (1993), the Supreme Court held:
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event then
was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human
factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the
force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted

from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby
humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appellee,
resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under the Civil
Code, it is provided:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and
without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will
increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067),
which provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and
without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone
or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can
the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow.
As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the
lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any
damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation.
4. Decision of the Court:
- The petition is DENIED. The 19 October 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 16, Lipa City, holding
petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) liable to private respondent

Crispin E. Lat for damages and to indemnify the latter P186,975.00 for lost
profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is
AFFIRMED.

Laguitan, Maria Isabel G.

Laws on Natural Resources

Henares vs LTFRB
GR. No. 158290
1. Case summary:
- Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to
require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.
2. Issue of the Case:
- Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG
as alternative fuel?
3. Law applicable:
- Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
- The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the
above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to
be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle
of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decisionmaking process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning
development policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may
have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of
any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any
significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release
into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise
his or her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all
activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the
rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of
penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages
resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a project
or activity.

4. Decision of the Court:

- NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a
writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG,
is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use
CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.