392 U.S.

1
Terry v. Ohio (No. 67)
Argued: December 12, 1967
Decided: June 10, 1968
___

Syllabus

Opinion, Warren

Concurrence, Harlan

Concurrence, White

Dissent, Fortas

Syllabus
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for
many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street
corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to
stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each
completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of
which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of
"casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a
couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself
as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon
McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his
overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the
store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face
the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and
seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the
outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been
a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three
were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with
carrying [p2]concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the
trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search
incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner
and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the

officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons
and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an
intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on
the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places," and
therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. Pp.
8-9.
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the
admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. P. 12.
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate
and restrained police investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of such techniques
should not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for
which that is not an effective sanction. Pp. 13-15.
4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed
here. Pp. 16-20.
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P. 16.
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find
weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. P. 16.
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in
believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search
for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous [p3] regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty
that the individual is armed. Pp. 20-27.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search and
seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat is required. P. 20.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the
particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is
warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate. Pp. 21-22.

(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct
when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. P. 22.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take
necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon. P. 24.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Pp. 25-26.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension
of danger before being possessed of information justifying arrest. Pp. 26-27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited search
which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. Pp. 27-30.
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's
hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P. 28.
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether
the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting
himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Pp. 2930.
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him,
since the search which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp.
30-31.
Affirmed. [p4]

TOP
Opinion
WARREN, C.J., Opinion of the Court
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment in the
confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious
circumstances.
Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to the
statutorily prescribed term of one to three years in the penitentiary.

[n1]

Following [p5] the

denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, the prosecution introduced in evidence two revolvers

and a number of bullets seized from Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton,

by

[n2]

Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden. At the hearing on the motion to suppress this
evidence, Officer McFadden testified that, while he was patrolling in plain clothes in
downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon of October 31, 1963, his
attention was attracted by two men, Chilton and Terry, standing on the corner of Huron Road
and Euclid Avenue. He had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say
precisely what first drew his eye to them. However, he testified that he had been a
policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35, and that he had been assigned to patrol this
vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He explained
that he had developed routine habits of observation over the years, and that he would
"stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day." He added:
"Now, in this case, when I looked over, they didn't look right to me at the time."
His interest aroused, Officer McFadden took up a post of observation in the entrance to a
store 300 to 400 feet [p6]away from the two men. "I get more purpose to watch them
when I seen their movements," he testified. He saw one of the men leave the other one and
walk southwest on Huron Road, past some stores. The man paused for a moment and
looked in a store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and walked back
toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same store window. He rejoined his
companion at the corner, and the two conferred briefly. Then the second man went through
the same series of motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window, walking
on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store window again, and returning to confer
with the first man at the corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five
and six times apiece -- in all, roughly a dozen trips. At one point, while the two were
standing together on the corner, a third man approached them and engaged them briefly in
conversation. This man then left the two others and walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton
and Terry resumed their measured pacing, peering, and conferring. After this had gone on
for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men walked off together, heading west on Euclid Avenue,
following the path taken earlier by the third man.
By this time, Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious. He testified that, after
observing their elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window on
Huron Road, he suspected the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," and that he considered
it his duty as a police officer to investigate further. He added that he feared "they may have
a gun." Thus, Officer McFadden followed Chilton and Terry and saw them stop in front of
Zucker's store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them earlier on the street
corner. Deciding that the situation was ripe for direct action, Officer McFadden approached
the three men, identified [p7] himself as a police officer and asked for their names. At this
point, his knowledge was confined to what he had observed. He was not acquainted with any
of the three men by name or by sight, and he had received no information concerning them
from any other source. When the men "mumbled something" in response to his inquiries,

Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the
other two, with Terry between McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his
clothing. In the left breast pocket of Terry's overcoat, Officer McFadden felt a pistol. He
reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. At this point,
keeping Terry between himself and the others, the officer ordered all three men to enter
Zucker's store. As they went in, he removed Terry's overcoat completely, removed a .38
caliber revolver from the pocket and ordered all three men to face the wall with their hands
raised. Officer McFadden proceeded to pat down the outer clothing of Chilton and the third
man, Katz. He discovered another revolver in the outer pocket of Chilton's overcoat, but no
weapons were found on Katz. The officer testified that he only patted the men down to see
whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the outer garments
of either Terry or Chilton until he felt their guns. So far as appears from the record, he never
placed his hands beneath Katz' outer garments. Officer McFadden seized Chilton's gun,
asked the proprietor of the store to call a police wagon, and took all three men to the
station, where Chilton and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons.
On the motion to suppress the guns, the prosecution took the position that they had been
seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest. The trial court rejected this theory,
stating that it "would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension" to find that
Officer [p8] McFadden had had probable cause to arrest the men before he patted them
down for weapons. However, the court denied the defendants' motion on the ground that
Officer McFadden, on the basis of his experience,
had reasonable cause to believe . . . that the defendants were conducting themselves
suspiciously, and some interrogation should be made of their action.
Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer had the right to pat down the outer
clothing of these men, who he had reasonable cause to believe might be armed. The court
distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the
outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. The frisk, it held,
was essential to the proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties, for, without it,
"the answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol discovered during the
frisk is admissible."
After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and Terry waived jury trial and
pleaded not guilty. The court adjudged them guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Judicial District, Cuyahoga County, affirmed. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d
114 (1966). The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed their appeal on the ground that no
"substantial constitutional question" was involved. We granted certiorari, 387 U.S.
929 (1967), to determine whether the admission of the revolvers in evidence violated
petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). We affirm the conviction.

I
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ." This inestimable right of [p9] personal security belongs as much to the
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of
his secret affairs. For as this Court has always recognized,
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). We have recently held that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," id. at
361 (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion. Of course, the specific content and incidents of this right must be
shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For "what the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the protection
of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland. Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). The question is whether, in all the circumstances of this on-the-street
encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and
seizure.
We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts to the
fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity -- issues
which have never before been squarely [p10]presented to this Court. Reflective of the
tensions involved are the practical and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on
both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to "stop and frisk" -- as it is
sometimes euphemistically termed -- suspicious persons.
On the one hand, it is frequently argued that, in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and often
dangerous situations on city streets, the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess. For this
purpose, it is urged that distinctions should be made between a "stop" and an "arrest" (or a
"seizure" of a person), and between a "frisk" and a "search."

[n3]

Thus, it is argued, the police

should be allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion
that he may be connected with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be
armed, the police should have the power to "frisk" him for weapons. If the "stop" and the
"frisk" give rise to probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then

the police should be empowered to make a formal "arrest," and a full incident "search" of
the person. This scheme is justified in part upon the notion that a "stop" and a "frisk"
amount to a mere "minor inconvenience and petty indignity,"

[n4]

which can properly be

imposed upon the [p11] citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of
a police officer's suspicion.

[n5]

On the other side, the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly
circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the traditional
jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment.

[n6]

It is contended with some force that there is not

-- and cannot be -- a variety of police activity which does not depend solely upon the
voluntary cooperation of the citizen, and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon
probable cause to make such an arrest. The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument
runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected
personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce
upon the agents of the State the commands of the Constitution. Acquiescence by the courts
in the compulsion inherent [p12] in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it is
urged, would constitute an abdication of judicial control over, and indeed an encouragement
of, substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police officers whose
judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in "the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). This, it
is argued, can only serve to exacerbate police-community tensions in the crowded centers
of our Nation's cities.

[n7]

In this context, we approach the issues in this case mindful of the limitations of the judicial
function in controlling the myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront
each other on the street. The State has characterized the issue here as
the right of a police officer . . . to make an on-the-street stop, interrogate and pat down for
weapons (known in street vernacular as "stop and frisk").

[n8]

But this is only partly accurate. For the issue is not the abstract propriety of the police
conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search
and seizure. Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police
conduct. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-393 (1914). Thus, its major thrust
is a deterrent one, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-635 (1965), and experience
has taught that it is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context,
and that, without it, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures would be a mere "form of words." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The
rule also serves another vital function -- "the imperative of judicial
integrity." Elkins [p13] v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). Courts which sit under
our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional
rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.

Thus, in our system, evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of
inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a
criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which
produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the
constitutional imprimatur.
The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of judicial control. It cannot
properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative techniques on
the ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon
constitutional protections. Moreover, in some contexts, the rule is ineffective as a deterrent.
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity. They
range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to
hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover,
hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a friendly enough
manner, only to take a different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into
the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some
of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.

[n9]

Doubtless

some [p14] police "field interrogation" conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. But a stern
refusal by this Court to condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to
the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police,

[n10]

it is powerless to deter invasions of

constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or
are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.
Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is invoked demands a constant
awareness of these limitations. The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain,

[n11]

will not

be [p15] stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and
unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it
can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and
frustration of efforts to prevent crime. No judicial opinion can comprehend the protean
variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before us.
Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating approval of police conduct outside the
legitimate investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which
trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the
Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the
judiciary, and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials. And, of course,
our approval of legitimate and restrained investigative conduct undertaken on the basis of

ample factual justification should in no way discourage the employment of other remedies
than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may prove inappropriate.
Having thus roughly sketched the perimeters of the constitutional debate over the limits on
police investigative conduct in general and the background against which this case presents
itself, we turn our attention to the quite narrow question posed by the facts before us:
whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a
limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest. [p16] Given the
narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to canvass in detail the constitutional
limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen without
probable cause to arrest him.
II
Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes
relevant. That is, we must decide whether and when Officer McFadden "seized" Terry, and
whether and when he conducted a "search." There is some suggestion in the use of such
terms as "stop" and "frisk" that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a "search" or "seizure" within the
meaning of the Constitution.

[n12]

We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that the

Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the
stationhouse and prosecution for crime -- "arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be
recognized that, whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the
English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a "search." Moreover,
it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure [p17]performed in public by a policeman
while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty
indignity."

[n13]

It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict

great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

[n14]

The danger in the logic which proceeds upon distinctions between a "stop" and an "arrest,"
or "seizure" of the person, and between a "frisk" and a "search," is twofold. It seeks to
isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman
and the citizen. And, by suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and
regulation under the Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as
well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation.

[n15]

This Court

has held, in [p18] the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate
the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.Kremen v. United
States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. [p19] United States, 282 U.S. 344,
356-358 (1931); see United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-587 (1948). The scope of
the search must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS,

concurring); see, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-368 (1964); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925).
The distinctions of classical "stop-and-frisk" theory thus serve to divert attention from the
central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment -- the reasonableness in all the circumstances
of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security. "Search" and
"seizure" are not talismans. We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment
does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of
something called a "technical arrest" or a "full-blown search."
In this case, there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden "seized" petitioner and
subjected him to a "search" when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of
his clothing. We must decide whether, at that point, it was reasonable for Officer McFadden
to have interfered with petitioner's personal security as he did.

[n16]

And, in determining

whether the seizure and search were "unreasonable," our inquiry [p20] is a dual one -whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
III
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment,
we would have to ascertain whether "probable cause" existed to justify the search and
seizure which took place. However, that is not the case. We do not retreat from our holdings
that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347(1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610 (1961), or that, in most instances, failure to comply with the warrant requirement can
only be excused by exigent circumstances, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (hot pursuit); cf. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-368 (1964). But
we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct -- necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat -- which historically has not
been, and, as a practical matter, could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead,
the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.

[n17]

Nonetheless, the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the requirement of
probable cause remain fully relevant in this context. In order to assess the reasonableness
of Officer McFadden's conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus
upon [p21] the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen," for there is
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.

Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-537 (1967). And, in justifying the
particular intrusion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.

[n18]

The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is

assured that, at some point, the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.

[n19]

And, in making that assessment, it is imperative that the facts be judged

against an objective standard: would the facts [p22] available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the
action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964).

[n20]

Anything less would invite intrusions upon

constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate

hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio,
supra; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959). And simple
"good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough." . . . If subjective good faith
alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the
people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only in the discretion
of the police.
Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 97.
Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and extent of the
governmental interests involved. One general interest is, of course, that of effective crime
prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable
cause to make an arrest. It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was
discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. He had observed
Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself,
but which, taken together, warranted further investigation. There is nothing unusual in two
men standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there
anything suspicious about people [p23] in such circumstances strolling up and down the
street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in. But the story
is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street corner for an extended
period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone
or anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in
the same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed
immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in
one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly, and where the two men finally

follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away. It would have been poor police work
indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this
same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to
investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but, rather, whether there was justification for
McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course
of that investigation. We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in
investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of
their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in
this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands
more are wounded. [p24] Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the
injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.

[n21]

In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to
protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may
lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in fact,
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights
which must be accepted if police officers are to be conceded the right to search for weapons
in situations where probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking. Even a limited search of the
outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, [p25] though brief, intrusion upon
cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps
humiliating experience. Petitioner contends that such an intrusion is permissible only
incident to a lawful arrest, either for a crime involving the possession of weapons or for a
crime the commission of which led the officer to investigate in the first place. However, this
argument must be closely examined.
Petitioner does not argue that a police officer should refrain from making any investigation
of suspicious circumstances until such time as he has probable cause to make an arrest; nor
does he deny that police officers, in properly discharging their investigative function, may
find themselves confronting persons who might well be armed and dangerous. Moreover, he
does not say that an officer is always unjustified in searching a suspect to discover
weapons. Rather, he says it is unreasonable for the policeman to take that step until such
time as the situation evolves to a point where there is probable cause to make an arrest.
When that point has been reached, petitioner would concede the officer's right to conduct a

search of the suspect for weapons, fruits or instrumentalities of the crime, or "mere"
evidence, incident to the arrest.
There are two weaknesses in this line of reasoning, however. First, it fails to take account of
traditional limitations upon the scope of searches, and thus recognizes no distinction in
purpose, character, and extent between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search
for weapons. The former, although justified in part by the acknowledged necessity to protect
the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon, Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964), is also justified on other grounds, ibid., and can therefore involve a
relatively extensive exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of
probable cause to [p26] arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring). Thus, it must be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a "full" search, even
though it remains a serious intrusion.
A second, and related, objection to petitioner's argument is that it assumes that the law of
arrest has already worked out the balance between the particular interests involved here -the neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative circumstance and the
sanctity of the individual. But this is not so. An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion
upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is
designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal
prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is
inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement,
whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.

[n22]

The protective search for weapons,

on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person. It does not follow that, because an officer may lawfully arrest a
person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has
committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of
evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reasonable
apprehension of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate
information to justify taking a person into custody for [p27] the purpose of prosecuting him
for a crime. Petitioner's reliance on cases which have worked out standards of
reasonableness with regard to "seizures" constituting arrests and searches incident thereto
is thus misplaced. It assumes that the interests sought to be vindicated and the invasions of
personal security may be equated in the two cases, and thereby ignores a vital aspect of the
analysis of the reasonableness of particular types of conduct under the Fourth
Amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court, supra.
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to
conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for

weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man, in the circumstances,
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-176
(1949); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).

[n23]

And in determining whether the

officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given not to his
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.Cf. Brinegar v. United
States supra.
IV
We must now examine the conduct of Officer McFadden in this case to determine whether
his search and seizure of petitioner were reasonable, both at their inception [p28] and as
conducted. He had observed Terry, together with Chilton and another man, acting in a
manner he took to be preface to a "stick-up." We think, on the facts and circumstances
Officer McFadden detailed before the trial judge, a reasonably prudent man would have
been warranted in believing petitioner was armed, and thus presented a threat to the
officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior. The actions of Terry and
Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a
daylight robbery -- which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of
weapons -- and nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time
he confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient reason to
negate that hypothesis. Although the trio had departed the original scene, there was
nothing to indicate abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at some point. Thus,
when Officer McFadden approached the three men gathered before the display window at
Zucker's store, he had observed enough to make it quite reasonable to fear that they were
armed, and nothing in their response to his hailing them, identifying himself as a police
officer, and asking their names served to dispel that reasonable belief. We cannot say his
decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was the product of a
volatile or inventive imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment; the
record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who, in the course of an investigation,
had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger,
and took limited steps to do so.
The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of
the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all. The Fourth Amendment proceeds as
much by limitations upon the [p29] scope of governmental action as by imposing
preconditions upon its initiation. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-356
(1967). The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the

Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that "limitations upon the fruit to be gathered
tend to limit the quest itself."United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (C.A.2d
Cir.1930); see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-635 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216-221 (1960). Thus, evidence
may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not
reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring).
We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth
Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons. These limitations will
have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases. See Sibron
v. New York, post, p. 40, decided today. Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a
search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent
the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. See Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964). The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the
protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope
to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer.
The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of these standards.
Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his two companions. He
did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he
had [p30] felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He never
did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered
nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon. Officer McFadden confined his
search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and
to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory
search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.
V
We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against
him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was
necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the
true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully
restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which
he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We
merely hold today that, where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where, in the
course of investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to

dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him. [p31] Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment and the opinion except where the opinion
quotes from and relies upon this Court's opinion in Katz v. United States and the concurring
opinion in Warden v. Hayden.

G.R. No. 182010

August 25, 2010

SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) challenges
the November 27, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the
July 28, 2003 Decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case
No. 02-2297 convicting Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting petitioner reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). 2 (underscoring supplied)
At the trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution, particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports issued by National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen (de Belen), 3 subject to her defenses, to thus
dispense with the testimony of de Belen.
De Belen recorded the results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Dangerous
Drugs Report No. DD-02-613,4 viz:
xxxx
SPECIMEN:
White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked "SRE" and
further placed in bigger marked transparent plastic sachet.
xxxx
F I N D I N G S:
Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the results thereof in
Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-41285 reading:

xxxx
SPECIMEN:
Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo. Bayanihan,
Maricaban, Pasay City.
xxxx
F I N D I N G S:
Volume of urine = 60 mL.
pH of urine = 5.0
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metabolite AMPHETAMINE. x x x
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on its documentary evidence and the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1 Cruzin), 6 a member of
the Pasay City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG), the prosecution established its version as
follows:
On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded
at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance
on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as "Ryan."
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he
glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a
yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when
petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police
officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case.
Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by
PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic sachet 7 on which
he marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City
Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a
memorandum8 dated December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila
requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine
the presence of shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2
Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension 9 recounting the details of their intended
surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioners arrest.
Repudiating the charges, petitioner10 gave the following tale:
At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at home, several
policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and asked her whether she knew one
named "Ryan" who they claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the area, to which she replied in

the negative. The police officers then forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG
office where she was detained.
While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed contained
shabu and recovered from her.
In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was "planted," stemming from an all too obvious
attempt by the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioners daughter Josan Lee 11 and family friend Ma. Stella
Tolentino,12corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that the police officers never informed
them of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner.
By Decision13 of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment
finding the accused Susan Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation
of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, and absent any modifying circumstance to either aggravate or mitigate the criminal liability of
the same accused, and furthermore, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One
(1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum, and to pay
a fine of P350,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus costs.
The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or "Shabu" involved in this case is declared
forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate disposition in accordance with the provisions of the
law.14 (underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to thus render any
evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.
In its challenged Decision affirming petitioners conviction, the appellate court, citing People v.
Chua,15 held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the "stop-and-frisk"
concept, a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches. 16
Brushing aside petitioners defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner failed to adduce
evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to falsely charge her, and that she
was even found positive for substance abuse.
1wphi1

In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate courts application of the "stop-and-frisk" principle in
light of PO1 Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely
noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct
that would arouse the suspicion.17
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision
but seeks a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9165.
Appellants conviction stands.

Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment. Neither did she take
steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest as well
as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal before
the appellate court.18 By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of
her arrest.19
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a
search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of
their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law
enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That
petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about
the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant is settled.
The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for
violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of
automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and
frisk" operations.20 (emphasis underscoring supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the determination of
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into
account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 21
Elucidating on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People
v. Chua22 held:
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in
accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said
case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and
who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk."
In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the
following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his
companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an
intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
1wphi1

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious
conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual
purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,

approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.23
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid
"stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners
possession - later voluntarily exhibited24 to the police operative - was undertaken after she was
interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to
petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior
and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dangerous Drugs and
Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available defenses she would raise. While such
admissions do not necessarily control in determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they
nevertheless provide a reasonable gauge by which petitioners credibility as a witness can be measured,
or her defense tested.
It has not escaped the Courts attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by adopting two completely
inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she argues that the "stop-and-frisk" search
upon her person and personal effects was unjustified as it constituted a warrantless search in violation of
the Constitution. In the same breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her version that
she was at home resting on the date in question and had been forcibly dragged out of the house by the
police operatives and brought to the police station, for no apparent reason than to try and extort money
from her. That her two witnesses a daughter and a friend who were allegedly present at the time of her
arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim that they were not informed why she was being
arrested, should dent the credibility of their testimony.
Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of petitioners, that they are
victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been held as a shop-worn defense of the
accused in drug-related cases, the allegation being easily concocted or contrived. For this claim to
prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of
regularity of official acts of government officials. This it failed to do.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility
of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.25
A word on the penalty.
While the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision, it overlooked the error in the penalty imposed
by the trial court. The trial court, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced
petitioner to "suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum."
Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as
follows:

xxxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, metamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shabu" or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to MDMA or "ecstacy," PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possesses is far behind therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is punished by a law other
than the Revised Penal Code, "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the penalty is thus in order.
The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191366

December 13, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, and
RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. HC-NO.
03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan
City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding the accused guilty of violating Section 13, in
relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During
Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
The Facts
The Information indicting the accused reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD MARTINEZ y ANGELES,
EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO, ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL
GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of law, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess dangerous drugs (shabu
residues) contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social
gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].
Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165. 3
Version of the Prosecution
As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard Azardon (PO1 Azardon),
one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the
forensic chemical officer, it appears that on September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon,
PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when
a concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales)in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report,
PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area,
the house of Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out
of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold
Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were
surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu
residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the room were seized
and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The
latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of

rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they
were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the
morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was
to give the materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for
Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they
were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them.
They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were
incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.
The Ruling of the RTC
The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ARNOLD MARTINEZ
y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino, and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act 9165, and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the
fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.4
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1 Azardon, without any
showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of denial and alibi put up by the accused.
The accused were held to have been in constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was
also found present as there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to the constructive
possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further held that although the procedure regarding
the custody and disposition of evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly
complied with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA
was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently
controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for the reversal of the
subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez

1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants to be having a pot session at the
time of their arrest;
2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to plant the shabu
paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the accused-appellants without warrant;
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently
established;
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Azardon
insufficient to convict the accused-appellants of the crime charged;
5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.
For accused Rafael Gonzales
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED
CONFISCATED DRUG.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the evidence against the accused are
inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly
established.
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue
before arraignment.5 However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does
not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 6
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it has been held that
this Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just
decision,7especially when the transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake. 8 While it is true that rules
of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not
be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the
rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive rights. 9 Thus, despite the procedural lapses of
the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear
infringement of the accuseds right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the persons of its
citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. 10 Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures
without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a
warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 11 (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii)
search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.12
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain
view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the
constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the
circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were
confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit 13 with
PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the
report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you how many
persons were actually conducting the pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed with a search
warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not know personally
Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.

Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot session in the
house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police blotter before you proceeded
to the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the person who
told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of
Rafael Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not want to be
identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the
house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and
went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could not see what is
happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of shabu on the
table while you were outside the premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT: Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you that he was
informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot session going on inside the house of
Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael Gonzales and you
arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.14

Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand,
may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest to be
valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 15
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases 16 that tipped information is sufficient
probable cause to effect a warrantless search, 17 such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench
because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other
than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers
entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case
of People v. Bolasa18 is informative on this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman were repacking
prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They
walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they peeped
inside through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the
house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the
suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the aboveenumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or
were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was
committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it.
Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As
already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags
later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally
peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants
inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and
emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance
considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accusedappellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The
arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained
during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.19
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense,
is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 20
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the
time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they
had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to
paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1

Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the
information that was reported to the police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was based on a tipoff by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?
A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of one of
the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information originated but
from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on? [No Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session was going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going on somewhere
in Arellano but you dont know the exact place where the pot session was going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the alleged pot session
because he claimed that he derived that information from somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session, sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?
A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was really happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there, sir. 21 [Emphasis
supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of plainview are: (a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the

right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search. 22
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered the house with
no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused with the subject items. If the prior
peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so
should the warrantless search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a
search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one
under exigent and emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and
address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior to
effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise
illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. 23 The subject items seized during
the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the verycorpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of
the accused.
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have glossed over
illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to present the alleged evidence of the
crime, regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionallyguaranteed rights in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the
breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of
society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law.24
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the accused would still be
in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody requirement in
dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral certainty as the
chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and
86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended
by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the
crime scene, no photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign
the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from the
time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus
delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the
presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in
possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized by law, and (iii) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug. 25 Additionally, this being a case for violation of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous
drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company
of at least two (2) persons.

The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the existence of the drug, its chain
of custodymust be sufficiently established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that
doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the
movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the
court.26 Malillin v. People was the first in a growing number of cases to explain the importance of chain of
custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.27
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 28 defines chain of custody as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature
of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the protection of the
identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or confiscated
items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity, as follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who
would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that
possession of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized
the substance from the suspect to place his marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably
with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the trial, the
officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to preserve its integrity until
it reaches the crime laboratory.

If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way
the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused.
Further, after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he
should put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal since the police officers
seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed condition of the plastic
container when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he took afterwards to preserve its
integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to present every
police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no
matter how briefly ones possession has been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although
unsealed, has not been tampered with or substituted while in his care. 29
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborates, and
provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not necessarily render the
seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such
non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In
this case, however, no justifiable ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to
properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of
the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. A review of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in
the chain of custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were confiscated from
the accused, to wit:
a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu residues.
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs colored yellow, one
(1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ).
c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.30
[Emphases supplied]

At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were indorsed to Duty
Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano) for proper disposition.31 A letterrequest for laboratory examination was prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the
following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-1."
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-2."
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues marked "DC&A-3."32
[Emphases supplied]
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by SPO3 Froilan
Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the specimens which were
submitted for testing, to wit:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:
A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with tag each
containing suspected shabu residue without markings.
B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu
residuewithout markings.
C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing suspected shabu
residuewithout markings.33
[Emphases supplied]
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a Confiscation Receipt was
issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:
DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together with our precinct
supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel
Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin Guarin apprehended the following names of persons of
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city;
EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471 Lucao Dist., this city.
REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney driver, a resident of Lucao Disttrict this city;
ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old, married, businessman, resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN, 49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a resident of
Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.
Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to Dagupan City Police
Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to record the incident and the
sachet of suspected Shabu Paraphernalias were brought to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen,
Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.

Seizing Officer:
(sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon
Affiant

(sgd.)
PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Affiant

Remarks:
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed34
[Emphases supplied]
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 (of the 49)
pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in the Final Chemistry Report,
were presented in court and marked as Exhibits "H" and series, "I" and series, and "J" and series,
respectively. Said items were identified by PO1 Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand. 35
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved as there
was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized from the accused were the same ones forwarded to
the crime laboratory for examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for
laboratory examination.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After seizure and
confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused, or
their representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official. Thus, no inventory was prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required by
law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,36admitted that no photographs were taken. The only discernable
reason proffered by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure was that the situation
happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a group and
went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.37

[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The suddenness of the
situation cannot justify non-compliance with the requirements. The police officers were not prevented from
preparing an inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides
specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the
suddenness of the situation may have had should have dissipated by the time they reached the police
station, as the suspects had already been arrested and the items seized. Moreover, it has been held that
in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer from immediately conducting
the physical inventory and photography of the items at their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with
the laws intent to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 38
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items. Some cases are People v. Garcia,39 People v. Dela Cruz,40 People v. Dela Cruz,41 People v. Santos,
Jr.,42 People v. Nazareno,43 People v. Orteza,44 Zarraga v. People,45 and People v. Kimura.46
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is instructive on the
requirement of marking, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody"
rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter
the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting
innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending
officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of
robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of
his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an
envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a different type of
handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by the handling
officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody.47 [Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz does it appear that
the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the letter-request for laboratory examination that the
subject items were indicated to have been marked with "DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3." There is no
showing, however, as to who made those markings and when they were made. Moreover, those purported
markings were never mentioned when the subject items were identified by the prosecution witnesses
when they took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets, rolled and cut
aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any individual item in each group.
Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry Report 48 that the precise number of each type of item was
indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents prior to said report, the subject items
were never accurately quantified but only described as "pieces," 49 "several pcs,"50 and "shabu
paraphernallas."51 Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates that all the subject items had "no markings,"
although each item was reported to have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing
the subject items during laboratory examination and testing. 52Doubt, therefore, arises as to the identity of

the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty that the subject items seized from the
accused were the same ones subjected to the laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of seized items in
dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,53 People v. Kimura,54 and People v. Laxa.55
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below gives rise to more
uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the items, it was prepared only three
days after. More important, the receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their
quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation receipt should provide. The only information
contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and the general description of
the subject items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory." The receipt is made even more dubious by PO1 Azardons admission in his testimony 56 that
he did not personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification57 issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject items were
indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper disposition. These were later
turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and when the
subject items were transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness testified on how
the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to their presentation in court. This Court has
highlighted similar shortcomings in People v. Cervantes,58 People v. Garcia,59 People v.
Sanchez,60 and Malillin v. People.61
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to PO1 Azardons
testimony62 that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the police station, the Letter 63 to the
Executive Director of the DDB states that the apprehending officers were tipped off "while conducting
monitoring/surveillance." Said letter also indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and
seizure occurred on September 4, 2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in the Information. It was
also mentioned in the aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan Police and Joint Affidavit of the police
officers that a glass tube suspected to contain shabu residue was also confiscated from the accused.
Interestingly, no glass tube was submitted for laboratory examination.
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecutions position that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly preserved. The two documents
specifically relied on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination,
have been shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in
dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
identity of the prohibited drug is essential before the accused can be found guilty.64
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, in People
v. Sta. Maria,65 this Court held that said section was silent as to the consequences of such failure, and said
silence could not be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA
illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying
that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases.
Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA
as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect the admissibility of
the evidence but only its weight. 66 Thus, had the subject items in this case been admissible, their
evidentiary merit and probative value would be insufficient to warrant conviction.

It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty should prevail. However, such presumption obtains only when there is
no deviation from the regular performance of duty.67 Where the official act in question is irregular on its
face, the presumption of regularity cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be irregular. When
challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over
the presumption of innocence of the accused. 68
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous drugs cases due to
the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and seizure procedure under the
law.69 Some bona fide arrests and seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused
because drug enforcement operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items.
It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and
procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs.
It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be
possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in
procedure must be recognized, addressed and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. 70
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 1171 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs) and Sec. 1572 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed
by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases
where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue,
being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping
with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of
drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The
minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of
twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a
minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of
residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest
was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should
have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no
residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 73 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).
Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12 74 (Possession of Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person
who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.
Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact,
under the same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima
facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated
Sec. 15.
1avvphi1

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law
enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when
the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test
required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a
chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only

be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the
possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO. 03269 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the accused and ordering their
immediate release from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court
within five days from receipt of this decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the
Director-General, Philippine National Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement
Agency, for their information and guidance.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized items to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

Illinois vs Lafayette

Brief Fact Summary. After an individual was arrested, his bag was searched as part of an
inventory of his belongings and drugs were found in a cigarette package.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. [I]t is not unreasonable for police, as part of the routine
procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in
his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures.

Facts. The Respondent, Lafayette (the Respondent) was arrested for partaking in an
altercation with a movie theater manager. The Respondent was arrested and he had a
purse-type shoulder bag with him on the trip to the police station. While at the station, the
Respondent took a pack of cigarettes out of the bag and the officer found drugs in the
cigarette package. The Respondent was charged with violating Illinois state drug laws.
At a pre-trial suppression hearing, the trial court ordered suppression of the drugs. The
Appellate Court affirmed and found that the state waived its argument that the search was
incident to a valid arrest. Further, that the search was not a valid inventory of respondents
belongings.

Issue. [W]hether, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for police to
search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine
administrative procedure at a police station house incident to booking and jailing the
suspect[?]

Held. The justification for such searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the
absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search. Indeed, we have
previously established that the inventory search constitutes a well-defined exception to the
warrant requirement. Further, [a]t the station house, it is entirely proper for police to
remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an
arrested person who is to be jailed. A range of governmental interests supports an inventory
process. It is not unheard of for persons employed in police activities to steal property taken
from arrested persons; similarly, arrested persons have been known to make false claims
regarding what was taken from their possession at the station house. A standardized
procedure for making a list or inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the station
house not only deters false claims but also inhibits theft or careless handling of articles
taken

from the arrested person. Arrested persons have also been known to injure themselves or
others with belts, knives, drugs, or other items on their person while being detained.
Dangerous instrumentalities such as razor blades, bombs, or weapons can be concealed
in innocent-looking articles taken from the arrestees possession. The bare recital of these
mundane realities justifies reasonable measures by police to limit these risks either while
the items are in police possession or at the time they are returned to the arrestee upon his
release. Examining all the items removed from the arrestees person or possession and
listing or inventorying them is an entirely reasonable administrative procedure. It is
immaterial whether the police actually fear any particular package or container; the need to
protect against such risks arises independently of a particular officers subjective concerns.
Finally, inspection of an arrestees personal property may assist the police in ascertain
ing or verifying his identity. In short, every consideration of orderly police administration
benefiting both police and the public points toward the appropriateness of the examination
of respondents shoulder bag prior to his incarceration.
Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some particular types of property, it
would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to make
fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be searched and
which must be sealed as a unit. Only recently in [New York v. Belton], we stated that `[a]
single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.

Illinois v. Lafayette
462 U.S. 640 (1983)
Annotate this Case

Syllabus

Case

U.S. Supreme Court

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)
Illinois v. Lafayette
No. 81-1859
Argued April 20, 1983

Decided June 20, 1983

462 U.S. 640
CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,
THIRD DISTRICT
Syllabus
After respondent was arrested for disturbing the peace, he was taken to the police station.
There, without obtaining a warrant and in the process of booking him and inventorying his
possessions, the police removed the contents of a shoulder bag respondent had been
carrying, and found amphetamine pills. Respondent was subsequently charged with
violating the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, and, at a pretrial hearing, the trial court
ordered suppression of the pills. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the
shoulder bag search did not constitute a valid search incident to a lawful arrest or a valid
inventory search of respondent's belongings.
Held: The search of respondent's shoulder bag was a valid inventory search. Pp. 462 U. S.
643-648.
(a) Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the
personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative
procedure at a police station incident to booking and jailing the suspect. The justification
for such searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of a warrant is
immaterial to the reasonableness of the search. Here, every consideration of orderly police
administration -- protection of a suspect's property, deterrence of false claims of theft
against the police, security, and identification of the suspect -- benefiting both the police
and the public points toward the appropriateness of the examination of respondent's
shoulder bag. Pp. 462 U. S. 643-647.
(b) The fact that the protection of the public and of respondent's property might have been
achieved by less intrusive means does not, in itself, render the search unreasonable. Even
if some less intrusive means existed, it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in
the everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which
containers or items may be searched, and which must be sealed without examination as a
unit. Pp. 462 U. S. 647-648.

99 Ill.App.3d 830, 425 N.E.2d 1383, reversed and remanded.

BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN,
POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S. 649
Page 462 U. S. 641
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether, at the time an arrested person arrives at a police
station, the police may, without obtaining a warrant, search a shoulder bag carried by that
person.
I
On September 1, 1980, at about 10 p.m., Officer Maurice Mietzner of the Kankakee City
Police arrived at the Town Cinema in Kankakee, Ill., in response to a call about a
disturbance. There he found respondent involved in an altercation with the theater
manager. He arrested respondent for disturbing the peace, handcuffed him, and took him
to the police station. Respondent carried a purse-type shoulder bag on the trip to the
station.
At the police station, respondent was taken to the booking room; there, Officer Mietzner
removed the handcuffs from respondent and ordered him to empty his pockets and place
Page 462 U. S. 642
the contents on the counter. After doing so, respondent took a package of cigarettes from
his shoulder bag and placed the bag on the counter. Mietzner then removed the contents
of the bag, and found 10 amphetamine pills inside the plastic wrap of a cigarette package.
Respondent was subsequently charged with violating 402(b) of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 56 1/2,

G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE
GRACIA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989
by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around
midnight of November 30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air
Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations
Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army
coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. 1
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 103.
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and several John Does whose true
names and identities have not as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime of illegal possession
of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1, paragraph 3, of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, and
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in their possession, custody and control, the following to wit:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to possess the same from the
proper authorities, and armed with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives and
pursuant to their conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by common
designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of rebellion, by then and
there participating therein and publicly taking arms against the duly constituted authorities,
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and removing from its allegiance the territory of the
Philippines or parts thereof. 2

In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and
several John Does were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in
Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of
attempted homicide.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to possess any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. 3 The parties likewise stipulated that there
was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to December 9, 1989.

The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence
Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together
with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt.
Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at
around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters away from the
Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct
his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the
crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then
seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and
leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew
their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh.
Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they
were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio
Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th
Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the
right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant
De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De
Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano
was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory,
written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant
was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr.
Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.
Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on November 30,
1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the
Eurocar Sales Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived at
the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is
adjacent to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is
located at the right side of the building. He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano
when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his possession. He testified that when the

military raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and made to lie on the ground face down,
together with "Obet" and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know
anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand up, the explosives were
already there.
Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police (PC-INP), and that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's
involvement in the 1987 coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he had
no job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the marketing for
them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.
De Gracia believes that the prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him because "bata raw
ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang
ipitin natin."
On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment 5 acquitting appellant Rolando de Gracia of attempted
homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, it made a recommendation that
"(i)nasmuch as Rolando de Gracia appears to be merely executing or obeying orders and pursuant to the spirit contained
in the 2nd paragraph of Art. 135, R. P. C., the court recommends that Rolando de Gracia be extended executive clemency
after serving a jail term of five (5) years of good behavior.

That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

Appellant principally contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason
that he did not have either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to
possess the same; he is neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and
explosives were found; he was merely employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the
explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano; and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He
claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before one can be convicted under Presidential Decree
No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearms, ammunition or machinery, tool
or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order
and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition and
explosives, and which criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives, damage to property and
destruction of valuable resources of the country. The series of coup d' etats unleashed in the country
during the first few years of the transitional government under then President Corazon P. Aquino attest to
the ever-growing importance of laws such as Presidential Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud
and preempt the commission of any act or acts which tend to disturb public peace and order.

I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not intent to possess is an essential element of the offense
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De Gracia did intend to
illegally possess firearms and ammunition.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. 6 This has to be so if
the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes
exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this
law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. 7

But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This
query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law,8 in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid
defenses. 9

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very
nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in
the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously. 10
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a
firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the
accused. 11 Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused
may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an
offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No.
1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in
good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be

considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, 12 such as Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is
absent, there is no offense committed.

Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty
of having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite
license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified that he was the
first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same, and he saw De
Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D4. 13 At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively contended that his act of
guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there
was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His
pretension of impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.

Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What
exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that appellant
De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from
the service for going on absence without leave

(AWOL). 14 We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the
dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his possession.
As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these
weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a large quantity of
explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor
one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily
prudent man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to carry out the
business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.

On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, and we so hold, that appellant De Gracia actually
intended to possess the articles confiscated from his person.
II. The next question that may be asked is whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this
case. While the matter has not been squarely put in issue, we deem it our bounden duty, in light of
advertence thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by the
raiding team, considering the gravity of the offense for which herein appellant stands to be convicted and
the penalty sought to be imposed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a
search warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used
as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided
the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the
former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or
arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or
even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and
intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel
forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein
were deserted.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking
into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989
when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

The view that we here take is in consonance with our doctrinal ruling which was amply explained in
People vs. Malmstedt 20 and bears reiteration:
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances
of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court
as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated

from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer
also received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada
on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous
drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was
acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the
police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of
the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search
was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of
accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his
passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so,
only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his
identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the
authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his
passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that
the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these
circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM
officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped
objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two
(2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt
to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by
the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al., vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need
not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the

absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons

committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
really in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by
the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government
and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons
and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to and
until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's
possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the
purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely participating
or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period." The court below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of
Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel,
was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov" bombs for and in behalf of
the latter. We accept this finding of the lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the court below as a
basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him. It must be
made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of
rebellion punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. These are two separate
statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a
crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that
might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and
punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as
part of a rebellion. 22
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, the Court has explained that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact that
the same act is penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if considered highly
advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused. 23 It follows that, subject to the presence of the
requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to
separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an
offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant
elements.

It was a legal malapropism for the lower court to interject the aforestated provision of the Revised Penal
Code in this prosecution for a crime under a special law. Consequently, there is no basis for its
recommendation for executive clemency in favor of appellant De Gracia after he shall have served a jail
term of five years with good behavior. In any event, this is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the
President whose decision thereon should be insulated against any tenuous importunity.
Withal, we are duly convinced that the firearms, explosives and ammunition confiscated from appellant De
Gracia were illegally possessed by him in furtherance of the rebellion then admittedly existing at that time.
In the words of the court a quo:

2. the nature and quantity of the items 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, 6 cartons of M-16
ammo and 100 bottles of molotov bombs indicate that the reports received by the military
that the Eurocar Sales Building was being used by the rebels was not without basis. Those
items are clearly not for one's personal defense. They are for offensive operations. De
Gracia admitted that per instruction of Col. Matillano he went down to Eurocar Sales
Building from Antipolo to stay guard there.
His manifestation of innocence of those items and what he has been guarding in that office
is not credible for: (a) he was a former military personnel; (b) at the birthday party of Col.
Matillano on November 30, 1989 many soldiers and ex-soldiers were present which selfevidently discloses that De Gracia, in the company of his boss, was still very much at home
and constantly in touch with soldiers and the armed rebellion of November 30, 1989 to
December 8 or 9, 1989 was a military coup d' etat; (c) it appears that he is the only person
tasked with caretaking (sic) there in the Matillano office, which shows that he is a highly
trusted right-hand man of Col. Matillano; and (d) as heretofore discussed, De Gracia was
earlier seen with some men who fired upon a car of the AFP intelligence agents. 25
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case was
committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion
perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in
connection therewith.
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its recommendation
therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are hereby DELETED, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142356

April 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 29, 2000 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles
City in Criminal Case no. 99-1261 convicting the appellant of violating Section 4, Article 2 of RA 7659, as
amended, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Appellant Lita Ayangao was charged with transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana in an information 2 that
read:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1999, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously dispatch in transit or transport fifteen (15) bricks of dried marijuana
leaves with the actual total weight of FOURTEEN KILOGRAMS AND SEVENTY FIVE
HUNDREDTHS (14.75) of kilogram, a prohibited drug.
The appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not
constitute an offense. This was denied by the trial court. Upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded not
guilty.3 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: PO3 Nestor Galvez, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and Chief
Forensic Chemist Daisy Panganiban-Babor. The prosecutions version 4 of the facts, as aptly summarized
by the trial court, was:
Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and PO3 Nestor A. Galvez, members
of the Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group based at Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles
City, received information from one of their informants that a certain woman from Mountain
Province delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to
some drug pushers. Said information was also relayed by the informant to C/Insp. Rhodel O.
Sermonia who instructed the two operatives to conduct surveillance operation against their target
female who was described by their informant as about 50 years old, 5 feet in height, straight long
hair and coming from Kalinga province.
At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their informant went to their
headquarters and informed them that their suspect is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat.
PO3 Sagum and PO3 Galvez, together with the informant, immediately went to Sapang Biabas
and parked their car near the entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas. While they were in
their car, the informer pointed to them a woman bearing the same description given by the former.
The woman alighted from the tricycle and subsequently loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top.
The two officers proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves
protruding through a hole of one of the sacks. Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police
officers and requested the woman to put out the contents of the said sacks. The sacks yielded
sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick-like substance wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A
brick, which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana
leaves. The woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-Og of

Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. Ayangao and the suspected dried marijuana leaves
were brought to the police officers headquarter at Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. The
evidence confiscated from the accused were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas
where it was examined by Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babor. The Initial Laboratory Report
issued indicated that the specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves
weighing 14.75 kilograms were found to be positive for marijuana.
The defense, through the testimonies of the appellant and Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio
Makabakle, presented a different version, again summarized by the trial court: 5
Accused Lita Ayangao denied the charge made against her and alleged that she has nothing to do
with the marijuana allegedly found in her possession. She went to Sapang Biabas "Marimar,"
Camachile, Mabalacat, Pampanga from Tabuk, Kalinga Province on August 13, 1999 only upon the
request of a certain Magda Dumpao. Allegedly, Magda bought a house in Mawaque, Mabalacat
and learned that it was being sold again. Magda then requested her (accused) to talk to Jaime
Alarcon who acted as Magdas agent in buying the house. It was Magda who instructed her on how
to go to the house of Jaime Alarcon. She arrived at the house of Alarcon at around 3:00 oclock in
the morning and was welcomed inside by Gloria and Jocelyn Alarcon, Jaimes wife and daughterin-law. As Jaime was not around, she asked the Alarcons permission if she can have a nap. Gloria
and Jocelyn allowed her to sleep on the sofa and while she was resting, at around 6:00 oclock in
the morning, somebody knocked at the door. Gloria opened it and two men, who identified
themselves as CIS agents, told Gloria that they were looking for somebody who came from Baguio
City. One of the men went to where she was then lying and asked Gloria who she was. Gloria
answered that she came from Tabuk. The police officers asked her (accused) to go with them as
they wanted to talk to her. When she refused, the policemen forced her out of the house and
boarded her to their car. While she was inside the car, she saw a sack and a carton box. The police
brought her to their headquarters at Diamond Subd., Angeles City. She was made to sit in a chair
and in her view, the sack was opened and its contents were placed in (sic) a table. She then heard
from the policemen that the contents of the sack were marijuana and accused her of owning it.
Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio Makabakle, Marimar, Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga,
testified that, as tricycle driver whose terminal is near the house of Jaime Alarcon, he did not see
any unusual incident that happened in said vicinity in the morning of August 13, 1999. He also did
not see how the accused was arrested and did not see the policemens car.
The trial court found the prosecutions version to be credible, reasoning that appellants defense of frameup was not supported by evidence and thus could not prevail over the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. The law enforcers testimonies carried the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-og is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 by
transporting fourteen kilograms and seventy five hundredths (14.75) of a kilogram of marijuana, a
prohibited drug, without authority. Said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused Lita Ayangao-Batong-og (sic) is further ordered to pay a fine of five
hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos.
SO ORDERED.6
The following assignments of error are raised in this appeal: 7
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE EXISTING SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES AND
INCREDIBILITY THEREBY CREATING DOUBT REGARDING THEIR TRUTHFULNESS AND
CREDIBILITY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING FAVORABLY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI AS A
GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN SPITE OF THE WEAKNESS
OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS
VIOLATED DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS MIRANDA RIGHTS.
After a thorough review of the records, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to discharge its
burden of proving the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial court was
supported by the evidence on record.
Regarding the credibility of witnesses, this Court has ruled time and again that this is a matter best
assessed by the trial court judge since he has the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and
deportment on the stand.8 Besides, in this case, the inconsistencies criticized by the appellant were minor
ones involving negligible details which did not negate the truth of the witnesses testimonies nor detract
from their credibility.9
Appellant also assigns as error the illegality of her arrest because she was not read her Miranda rights.
(This is in addition to her argument that the 15 bricks of marijuana were inadmissible since the warrantless
search was invalid, not having been made pursuant to a lawful arrest.) This contention is without merit
since this Court has repeatedly ruled that, by entering a plea upon arraignment and by actively
participating in the trial, an accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his arrest and warrantless
search.10 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. 11 Here, in submitting herself to
the jurisdiction of the trial court when she entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial, the
appellant waived any irregularity that may have attended her arrest. 12
Assuming, however, that there was no such waiver, pursuant People vs. Barros,13 reiterated in People vs.
Aruta,14 the waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and warrantless
search and seizure is not to be casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures to retain vitality. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was
actually committing a crime when she was arrested transporting marijuana, are act prohibited by law.
Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the
legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the
offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense.15

In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides that a peace officer may arrest a person even
without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. However, the police officer should be spurred
by probable cause in making the arrest. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.16 The determination of probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of each case. In
this case, the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from
their informant. This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search.17 Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest,
they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellants
arrival was not known by the informant. Apprehending officer PO3 Sagum testified 18 as follows:
Q So what were the information given you by your informer?
A Ang kausap po nila iyong hepe namin[g] si Maj. Rhodel Sermonia tapos po sinabi lang po sa
amin ni Maj. Sermonia ang sinabi ng informant.
Q So you did not hear the report of the informant?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the information given by your superior?
A He told us that somebody will be delivering marijuana at Sapang Bayabas and the informer knew
the person.
Q Give us the complete report?
A Sinabi po ng hepe namin na sinabi ng informant na merong babaeng magdedeliver ng marijuana
sa Sapang Bayabas at babalik daw po siya kung kailan magdedeliver.
Q On the date in question August 13 at around 6:00 oclock in the morning you were in your office?
A We were already at Sapang Bayabas, sir.
Q Which is which now?
A Nasa Sapang Bayabas na po, sir.
Q Before going to Sapang Bayabas where did you come from?
A We were in the office, sir.
Q What time where you in the office?
A That is where we were sleeping.
Q You were sleeping there?
A Yes, sir, we are stay-in.

Q And then what happened?

A Our informant came, sir.
Q What time?
A 5:00 oclock, sir.
Q What was the purpose of the informant?
A Sinabi po niya sa amin na darating na raw po iyong ano.
Q I thought that your superior already informed you that the suspect or the accused will be arriving
at 6:00 oclock the first time?
A Sabi po sa amin noong magpunta iyong informer sa office namin August 13 darating daw po
iyong babae.
Q It was on August 13 when he said that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was he talking with then?
A Iyong Chief po namin tapos kinausap ko rin po siya.
Q What time was that?
A Before 5:00, sir.
Q So they were talking before 5:00 with your Chief?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was outside, sir.
Q So you were not listening to them?
A No, sir.
Q So you do not know what they have talked about?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then what were the instruction given by your superior?
A He said we will proceed to Sapang Bayabas because there is a lady going there bringing
marijuana.
Q Did you ask the identity of the woman?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did he say?
A About 50 years of age, 5 feet and with straight long hair?
Q How about the name, was the name given to you?
A No, sir, he just said she came from Kalinga.
Q Aside from that, was the quantity of the drugs given to you that was to be brought?
A No, sir.
Q So you just learned that the woman will be arriving at Sapang Bayabas at 6:00 oclock?
A I do not know the time she is arriving.
Q He did not tell you?
A He does not know, sir.
Q The informant did not tell you?
A Yes, sir, he just said she will be coming in Sapang Bayabas.
Q You did not ask for the time?
A He does not know, sir.
Q What about the particular place where the woman will deliver the drugs?
A Hindi niya po alam basta doon sa entrance daw po ng Sapang Bayabas doon na po kami magistambay. (Emphasis and Italics supplied).
Although there was testimony by PO3 Galvez that the informant told them the exact date of arrival, the
trial court gave more weight to the testimony of PO3 Sagum that stated otherwise, as evidenced by his
finding that the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and informed them
that the appellant was arriving at 6:00 A.M. 19 The judgment call of the trial court on which of these two
conflicting testimonies to believe should prevail because it involved the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses.20 Thus, without proof that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance having a bearing
on the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, this Court will not overturn
such finding as the judge was in a better position to observe the demeanor of the two witnesses. 21
In those cases where this Court invalidated a warrantless search on the ground that the officers could
have applied for a search warrant, the concerned officers received the tip either days prior to the arrival or
in the afternoon of a working day. In People vs. Aminudin,22 this Court found that the officers received the
tip two days prior to the actual date of arrival of accused Aminudin. In People vs. Encinadak,23 the police
officers were tipped off at 4:00 P.M. on May 20, 1992 that accused Encinada would arrive at 7:00 A.M. the
next day. Thus, the officers had time to obtain search warrants inasmuch as Administrative Circulars 13
and 19 of the Supreme Court allowed the application for search warrants even after office hours.
In People vs. Aruta,24 the police officers received the information on December 13, 1988 that accused

Aruta would arrive on a Victory Liner Bus at 6:30 P.M. on December 14, 1999, giving them a day to obtain
a warrant.
In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and
informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving at 6:00 A.M. (just an hour later) that day. The
circumstances clearly called for an immediate response from the officers. In People vs. Valdez,25 this
Court upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and corresponding search of accused Valdez as the
officer made the arrest on the strength of a similar on-the-spot tip. In the case at bar, though all other
pertinent details were known by the officers except the date, they could not have applied for a search
warrant since the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days. 26Considering that the officers did not know
when the appellant was going to arrive, prudence made them act the way they did.
The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi. Appellants alibi
could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is
inherently weak27 and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and
(b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime. 28 The appellant failed to meet these two
requirements. Jaime Alarcons house where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was
only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. 29 Thus, the trial court was
correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges.
With the effectivity of RA 7659, Section 4 of RA 6425, provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000 if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or more.
Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for applying the penalties in Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code are applicable, pursuant to the ruling in People vs. Simon30 wherein the Court
recognized the suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs Act after its amendment by RA 7659. Thus, as the
appellant was found to be transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana, the trial court was correct in
imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua since there was no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, and in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law which is not applicable when
indivisible penalties are imposed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, of Angeles City, finding the appellant
guilty of transporting a prohibited drug and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine
of P500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 94953 September 5, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Tan, Manzano & Velez for accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila in Criminal Case No.
94953, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by B.P. Blg. 179.
I
The Information charged appellant as follows:
That on or about January 9, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not
being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited
drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale two (2) foils of flowering
tops of marijuana and one (1) plastic bag of flowering tops of marijuana, which are
prohibited drugs (Rollo, p. 6).
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the information
(Records p. 5).
II
On December 15, 1986, Capt. Restituto Cablayan of the National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) of
the Western Police District (WPD), instructed Sgt. Enrique David to conduct a surveillance operation in the
vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of rampant drug-pushing
in that area (TSN, December 14, 1987, p. 21).
In compliance thereof, a team led by Sgt. Enrique David, conducted a surveillance operation on
December 15 and 17, and confirmed the reported drug-pushing activities in that area by the group of
appellant and a certain Ricky alias "Pilay" (TSN, December 2, 1987, pp. 5-6). No arrest was made
because the team was instructed by their superior to conduct a surveillance operation only (TSN, January
11, 1988, p. 28).
On January 8, 1987, Malaya (Exh. "F") and People's Tonight (Exh. "K"), reported that there were rampant,
drug-pushing activities in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila, prompting Gen.
Alfredo Lim, then WPD Superintendent, to reprimand the NCIS office (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 2).
On January 9, because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt. Cablayan instructed Sgt. David to plan
a buy-bust operation and to form a
six-man team with Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr. as the poseur-buyer (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 6, January 11,
1988, p. 6).

At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their confidential informant, went to Garrido
Street. Upon arriving threat, they strategically positioned themselves. Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the confidential
informant proceeded to the house of appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw him
standing outside. The confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to appellant as an interested buyer
of marijuana. Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. "Ilan ang bibilhin ninyo?" (How much will you buy?). Pfc.
Orolfo, Jr., replied: "Two foils" handing at the same time the marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E") to
appellant. The latter, after placing the money in the right pocket of his pants, went inside his house (TSN,
January 11, 1988, pp. 7-9). Minutes later, appellant came back and handed two foils (Exhs. "D-1-a" and
"D-1-b") wrapped in onion paper (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 8). It was after he handed the two foils to Pfc.
Orolfo Jr., that he sensed the presence of the police operatives. He then tried to retrieve the two foils but
Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so. During the scuffle, one foil was torn. Appellant then ran inside
his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. in pursuit. The latter was able to subdue appellant. Sgt. David confronted
appellant, who admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. Appellant showed the arresting officers
a blue plastic bag with white lining containing prohibited drugs. A receipt of the articles seized (Exh. "F")
was made by Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 12-15).
Thereafter, the team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD headquarters for investigation.
Thereat, Sgt. David ordered Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to commence the investigation of appellant (TSN, January 11,
1988, pp. 19-21).
During the investigation, appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending
arrival of his lawyer (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 23).
The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for chemical analysis. A report and
certification of Ms. Aida Pascual, Forensic Chemist of the NBI (Exhs. "C" and "D"), show the drugs to be
positive for marijuana.
Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that the arresting officers merely planted
the marijuana on his person. He testified that on January 9, 1987, he arrived home from work as a
security guard of the Vergara Brothers Agency at around 3:00 P.M. After changing his clothes, he went out
to fetch his son, who was left in the care of a neighbor. Upon returning to his house with his son, he was
arrested by the police. The police proceeded to search his house, without any search warrant shown to
him. After the search, he and his wife were brought to the WPD headquarters. He claimed that inspite of
his protestation that he would like to wait for his lawyer before giving any statement, the police continued
their interrogation.
Appellant denied that the twenty-peso bill was given to him by the poseur-buyer. He claimed that he was
merely forced to sign his name on the photocopy of the twenty-peso bill (Exh. "F") and that the first time
he saw the blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was when he was at the police station (TSN, June
14, 1988, pp. 1-11).
To corroborate his story, appellant presented his younger brother, Gerry de Lara.
On October 2, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sec 4, Art II of R.A. 6425 as amended as charged in the Information;
and this Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 (Rollo, p. 24).
Hence, this appeal.

III
In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found inside
his house. Furthermore, he claims that he was not assisted by counsel during his custodial interrogation
(Rollo, pp. 55-57).
As to the legality of appellant's arrest, we find that the police operatives acted within the bounds of law.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures dealing with warrantless arrests provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat.
Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant's arrest was lawfully
effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the
buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend
the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest" (People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644 [1991]; People vs.
De Los Santos, 200 SCRA 431 [1991]).
Appellant, however, asseverates that his arrest was precipitated only by newspaper publications about the
rampant sale of drugs along Garrido and Zamora Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila (Rollo, p. 53). If appellant
implies that the police merely stage-managed his arrest in order to show that they were not remiss in their
duties, then appellant is wrong. A surveillance on the illegal activities of the appellant was already
conducted by the police as early as December 15 and 17, 1986. The newspaper reports concerning the
illegal drug activities came out only on January 8 and 14, 1987, long after the police knew of the said
illegal activities. Appellant's eventual arrest on January 9, 1987 was the result of the surveillance
conducted and the buy-bust operation.
The evidence shows that appellant ran inside his house upon sensing the presence of the police
operatives. The testimony of Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer, is as follows:
FISCAL:
Q: After placing the P20 bill in his right pocket, what did he do?
A: He went to his house and minutes later, he came back, sir.
Q: When he came back what happened?
A: He handed to me two tin foils containing suspected marijuana leaves
wrapped in onion paper.
Q: And what happened next when he returned with those items?

A: After he handed to me two foils, he sensed the presence of the operatives

and he tried to retrieve the two foils, sir, and I prevented him and during the
scuffle one piece of foil was broken, he tried to run inside the house, so I
subdued him immediately and apprehended him while he was inside the
house.
Q: After he was subdued by your group, what happened?
A: Sgt. David confronted him regarding this case and he voluntarily admitted
that he was still keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?
Q: What did the group do after he voluntarily admitted that he was keeping
prohibited drugs inside his house?
A: He pointed inside his house (sic) one plastic bag colored blue with white
lining containing prohibited drug" (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 12-14).
The policemen's entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person
caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid (1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5[a]).
We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found inside appellant's house.
The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant's arrest inside his
house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made (People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 [1990]).
We find to be meritorious appellant's claim that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill (Exh.
"E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. "F"), and the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. "H").
The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was no showing that appellant
was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3[2]).
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the conviction of appellant in view of the
abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. The ruling in People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 (1992)
isapropos:
It bears emphasis, however, that the accused appellant's conformity to the questioned
documents has not been a factor at all in his conviction. For even if these documents were
disregarded, still the accused-appellant's guilt has been adequately established by other
evidence of record. The trial court's verdict was based on the evidence of the prosecution
not on his signatures on the questioned documents. Accused-appellant's denial simply can
not prevail over the detailed and unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers who
caught him red-handed selling marijuana and who have not shown to have any ulterior
motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant.
IV
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by B.P. Blg.
179. However, said law was further amended by R.A. No. 7659.

Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed for selling, administering, delivering or
distributing less than 750 grams of marijuana, shall range from "prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity."
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or
distributing marijuana in excess of 750 grams or more shall be "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to Ten Million Pesos."
We noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as the maximum penalty
when the quantity of the marijuana involved in the offense is less than 750 grams and at the same time as
the minimum penalty when the quantity of marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. It is the duty of the
Court to harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole law (Rufino Lopez and Sons v. Court
of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 [1957]). Furthermore, one of this Court's primordial responsibilities is to give a
statute its sensible construction. This is to effectuate the intention of the legislature so as to avoid an
absurd conclusion with regard to its meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]). Therefore, when the
quantity involved is less than 750 grams, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide
a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal only.
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony," finds meaning in this case. Appellant
is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant, we first divide the amount of 750 grams into
three to correspond to the three applicable penalties, namely, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal.
If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal. If the
marijuana involved is from 250 to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if the weight
of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional.
Since there is no evidence as to the weight of the two foils and one plastic bag of flowering tops of
marijuana seized from appellant, we resolve the doubt in favor of appellant and conclude that the quantity
involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not less than 250 but not more than 499 grams.
Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on appellant is prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to appellant, who was convicted under a special law (People vs.
Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such law was interpreted in People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028,
July 29, 1994, the minimum penalty that can be imposed on appellant should be within the range
of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant shall suffer
an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to
EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180597

November 7, 2008

RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B. GOLONG, CESAR F. BELTRAN, and ROGER A.

BASADRE,petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to set aside the August 16, 2007
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied by the court through its November 14, 2007 Resolution.2
The Facts
Raul Basilio Boac, Ramon Betuin Golong, Cesar Fantone Beltran, Roger Alcantara
Basadre, and Benjamin Castaneda Alfonso are members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG). They hold the ranks of Police
Senior Superintendent, Police Inspector, Senior Police Officer II, Senior Police Officer II,
and Senior Police Officer I, respectively. In an information dated October 18, 2005, they
were charged with violation of Sec. 2203 in relation to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, as follows:
That on or before July 27, 2004 or prior or subsequent thereto in Cagayan de Oro
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused P/SR.
SUPT. RAUL BASILIO DONIDA BOAC, SG-26, P/INSP. RAMON BETUIN
GOLONG, SG-22, SPO2 CESAR FANTONE BELTRAN, SG-17, SPO2 ROGER
ALCANTARA BASADRE, SG-17, SPO1 BENJAMIN CASTANEDA ALFONSO, SG16, all public officers being then members of the Philippine National Police, taking
advantage of their official positions, while committing the offense in relation to office,
with grave abuse thereof, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, without lawful authority
or delegation from the Collector of Customs, flag down, search and seize three (3)
container vans consigned to Japan Trak surplus (Kakiage Surplus).
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Boac, Golong, and Beltran pleaded not guilty on January 23, 2006; Basadre entered the
same plea on February 20, 2006. Alfonso remained at large. At pretrial, the prosecution
and defense stipulated that in the evening of July 27, 2004, Golong, Beltran, Basadre, and
Alfonso, upon the order of Boac, but without the authority from and coordination with the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City, flagged down three
container vans consigned to Kakiage Surplus. The said vans were allowed to be brought
to the warehouse of the consignee and the actual search was done on July 28, 2004.4

Atty. Lourdes V. Mangaoang, then Customs District Collector of Cagayan de Oro City,
testified that the CIDG operatives (herein petitioners) did not have a written authority from
the Commissioner of Customs or the District Collector. According to her, Golong claimed
that they had clear orders from Boac to open and search the vans. She instructed her
personnel to open the vans only to show that there was nothing illegal in their contents.
She prepared a letter of protest addressed to Boac but it was ignored; hence, she filed the
instant case.5
Dario C. Amolata, license customs broker, testified that he went to see the vans after
learning that they were flagged down by petitioners. The following day, he went to the
warehouse with Melvin Yamit and Richard Godoy of the Enforcement and Security
Services of the BOC, Region X to witness the inspection of the vans. No contrabands
were found upon inspection. Yamit corroborated the testimony of Amolata.6
For the defense, Boac testified that on July 27, 2004, he was in Manila on leave. Beltran
allegedly informed him that three container vans with contrabands were released by the
BOC; thus, Boac instructed Golong and his team to flag down the subject vans. After the
inspection of the vans and without finding any contraband, Boac directed Golong to leave
the premises. Golong corroborated Boac's testimony, adding that he and his team did not
open the vans on July 27, 2004 because there were no representatives from the BOC.
Beltran testified that in the morning of July 27, 2004, Voltaire Sabelina, an appraiser from
the BOC, informed him that three container vans will be released from the pier around
5:00 p.m. It was alleged that inside the two of the uninspected containers were television
sets from Japan.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In convicting petitioners, the Sandiganbayan applied the following provisions of the Tariff
and Customs Code:
Section 602. The Bureau of Customs, headed by a Commissioner, has, among
other things, the following general duties, powers and jurisdiction, in respect to the
levy of customs duties, to wit:
xxxx
b. The prevention and suppression of smuggling and other frauds upon the
customs;
xxxx
j. The enforcement of the tariff and customs laws and all other laws, rules and
regulations in relation to the tariff and customs administration.
Sec. 2203. Persons Having Police Authority. - For the enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws, the following persons are authorized to effect searches, seizures and
arrests conformably with the provisions of said laws.

xxxx
d. Officers generally empowered by law to effect arrests and execute processes of
the courts, when acting under the direction of the Collector.
Sec. 3612. Violations of Tariff and Customs Laws and Regulations in General. - Any
person who violates a provision of this Code or regulations pursuant thereto, for
which delinquency no specific penalty is provided, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than one thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both. If the offender is an alien, he shall be deported after serving the sentence; and
if the offender is a public official or employee, he shall suffer disqualification to hold
public office, to vote and participate in any public election for ten years.
The anti-graft court ruled that petitioners belong to the category of officers in Sec. 2203(d);
thus, they needed a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or District
Collector in order to conduct searches, seizures and arrests. In this case, the court said,
the prosecution established the lack of said written authority; even Beltran and Golong
admitted that they did not have any authorization to search the vans. The court stated:
Verily, it was evident in the above-quoted provisions of Sec. 602 and Sec. 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code that indeed the Tariff and Customs Code vested upon
the Bureau of Customs the authority to enforce the tariff and customs laws,
including the prevention and suppression of smuggling and other frauds committed
against it.
The PNP-CIDG cannot arrogate upon itself the power which, under the law, is
exclusively vested to the Collector of Customs. The PNP-CIDG can only effect
search and seizure upon the direction of the Collector of Customs. Hence, it cannot
on its own effect search and seizure.8
On August 16, 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed judgment, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused P/Sr. Supt. Raul Basilio Donida Boac,
P/Insp. Ramon Betuin Golong, SPO2 Cesar Fantone Beltran and SPO2 Roger
Alcantara Basadre GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of Section 2203
of the Tariff and Customs Code, and, pursuant to Section 3612 thereof, are hereby
sentenced each to suffer the penalty of:
(A) imprisonment of one (1) year;
(B) pay the fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00); and
(C) disqualification to hold public office, to vote and participate in any public election
for ten years.
SO ORDERED.[9]

On November 14, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' motion for

reconsideration. Thus, we have this petition.
Assigned Errors
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 2203 OF THE TARIFF AND
CUSTOMS CODE DESPITE THE ABSENCE IN ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT THE
PETITIONERS/ACCUSED CONDUCTED SEARCH, SEIZURE OR ARREST AND
DESPITE THE EVIDENCE FROM BOTH PARTIES THAT THE PETITIONERS DID
NOT CONDUCT SEARCH, SEIZURE OR ARREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT AUTHORITY OR DELEGATION
FROM THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS IS REQUIRED WHEN THE
PETITIONERS FLAGGED DOWN THE CONTAINER VANS OUTSIDE THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS IN THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES AS POLICE OFFICERS.
Petitioners assert that they did not conduct any search, seizure, or arrest; hence, there
was no violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. During the search conducted in the
consignee's warehouse on July 28, 2004, the employees of the owner of the shipment
unloaded the goods under BOC personnel supervision. Petitioners allege that they only
witnessed the search; they did not make any seizures or arrests. After searching the first
van and half of the second van without any contraband being found, Customs Police Yamit
and Godoy decided to stop the search despite the request of petitioners to continue. Since
the Customs Police were already leaving the area, Boac instructed his team to leave the
vicinity.10
Petitioners further claim that the police's authority to stop, search, and effect seizure and
arrest, if necessary, is no longer exclusively vested on the Collector of Customs. Regular
PNP members are generally empowered by law to effect arrests in accordance with
Republic Act No. (RA) 6975, to wit:
Section 24. Powers and Functions. The PNP shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties;
(b) Maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety;
(c) Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution;
(d) Exercise the general powers to make arrest, search and seizure in accordance
with the Constitution and pertinent laws;
xxxx

In addition, the PNP shall absorb the office of the National Action Committee on
Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, all the functions of
the present Philippine Air Force Security Command (PAFSECOM), as well as the
police functions of the Coast Guard. In order to perform its powers and functions
efficiently and effectively, the PNP shall be provided with adequate land, sea, and air
capabilities and all necessary material means of resources.11
Petitioners, as members of the PNP-CIDG, also have the following functions under RA
6975:
Section 35. Support Units. The PNP shall be supported by administrative and
operational support units. The administrative support units shall consist of x x x
xxxx
(4) Criminal Investigation Unit. Headed by a Director with the rank of chief
superintendent, the Criminal Investigation Unit shall undertake the monitoring,
investigation and prosecution of all crimes involving economic sabotage, and other
crimes of such magnitude and extent as to indicate their commission by highly
placed or professional criminal syndicates and organizations.
This unit shall likewise investigate all major cases involving violations of the Revised
Penal Code and operate against organized crime groups, unless the President
assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Petitioners contend that they were investigating a possible connivance of smugglers with
some corrupt customs personnel. They maintained that their act of flagging down the
container vans was not connected with the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws,
smuggling being a form of economic sabotage which is within the powers of the PNPCIDG to monitor and investigate. Thus, according to them, no prior authority from the
Collector of Customs is required in performing their duties as police officers. Besides, they
said they immediately coordinated with the Customs Police for the latter to conduct the
actual search of the container vans; hence, there was no violation of Sec. 2203.12
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious. Petitioners should be acquitted of the charge.
The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, it is clear that petitioners neither searched the container vans nor
effected seizure and arrest. The testimony of Customs Broker Amolata, the prosecution
witness, supports this finding:
Atty. Llamas:
Q:

Did the PNP-CIDG personnel open the container vans?

A:

No, Sir.

Q:

They did not open the container vans?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:
You mentioned that you were able to talk with the PNP-CIDG personnel and
they agreed to bring the trucks or the container vans to the warehouse of the
consignee. Is that correct?
A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:
Were the container vans opened in the evening of July 27, 2004 after the
trucks were brought to the place of the consignee, were they opened?
Prosecutor Lubigan:
Your Honors, what particular time and date is he referring to, Your Honors?
Atty. Llamas:
In the evening, Your Honors, after the container vans were brought to the
warehouse of the consignee on July 27, 2004 whether the container vans
were opened in the evening of July 27, 2004, Your Honors.
Witness: No, Sir.13
It should be noted that the container vans were brought to the consignee's warehouse and
not to the CIDG headquarters. On July 28, 2004, the container vans were searched but
not by petitioners, as testified to by petitioners Beltran and Golong, as follows:
(SPO2 Cesar Beltran)
Q:

Okay, what happened when Yamit and Godoy arrived?

A:
They talked with the owner of the container vans and they opened the
container vans.
Q:

Who ordered the opening of the container vans?

A:

The persons from the Bureau of Customs and Mr. Bernales, the owner.

Q:

What happened, after it was opened?

A:

They unloaded the cargoes.

Q:

Where were you during that time?

A:

We were just there watching the unloading of the contents.[14]

(Police Inspector Ramon Golong)

Q:

So, what happened there?

A:
One of the container vans was being unloaded when I arrived while we act as
observers during the stripping of the contents. The employees of the owner of the
shipment were unloading the shipment while the Customs people were supervising
them.15
The prosecution does not rebut the above testimonies of petitioners. In fact, when
questioned by Associate Justice Norberto Y. Geraldez, the prosecution witness, Customs
Broker Amolata, attested to the same fact as follows:
Justice Geraldez:
Q:

Who brought out the items from the container vans?

A:

The employees of the consignee, Your Honors.

Q:
The PNP-CIDG personnel or the accused did not search, they were just
witnessing the bringing out of the items?
A:
They were witnessing also, Your Honors, similar of what were being done by
the employees or personnel of the Environment and Security Services of the Bureau
of Customs as well as myself, Your Honors.
Q:

Did they search the items as if they were looking for something?

A:

I cannot remember anymore, Your Honors.16

When examined by the prosecutor, Amolata testified:

Q:
Did the PNP-CIDG personnel seize any equipment on that shipment? Did
they seize any equipment inside the container vans? Did they seize anything, did
they take anything, did they get anything inside those three container vans?
A:

No, Sir.

Q:

So there was no seizure, Mr. Witness? They did not seize anything?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:
Did they make any arrest, did they arrest anybody who were there on the
27th and on the 28th of July 2004?
A:

No, Sir.

Q:
And the searching was-the opening and the taking out of the equipment were
done by the employees of Kakiage Surplus. Am I right, Mr. Witness?
A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:

It was not done by the PNP-CIDG personnel?

A:

Yes, Sir.17

The search was actually conducted by Customs Police Yamit and Godoy on July 28, 2004.
The Customs Police held the keys of the vans, as attested to by Amolata:
Q:

Who has the keys to these container vans, if you know?

A:
The keys of the container vans were kept by Captain Capacite of the
Enforcement and Security Services of the Bureau of Customs, Sir.
Q:
And what is the business of this Captain Capacite, Mr. Witness, who is from
the Bureau of customs in holding that keys despite the fact that the container vans
were already released by the Bureau of customs Region 10?
A:
He requested to have the keys of the container vans to be kept to him
because according to him, the following morning he should also be there inside the
premises of the consignee to also witness the stripping or taking out of the contents
of the container vans, Sir.
xxxx
Q:
Would you agree with me, Mr. Witness, that Yamit and Godoy has the keys
with them on July 28, 2004?
A:
I do not know, Sir, whether the keys were being given by Captain Capacite to
them.
Q:
And Yamit and Godoy were direct subordinates of this Captain Capacite.
Would you confirm that?
A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:

And the keys were with Capacite?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:
Is it normal procedure despite the fact that the container vans were already
released by the Bureau of Customs, the keys to the container are still held by
Captain Capacite?

xxxx
A:

Not normal procedure, Sir.

Q:

Not normal procedure, Mr. Witness?

A:

Yes, Sir.18

Furthermore, the vans were opened without the presence of the PNP-CIDG's team leader,
Inspector Golong. Golong testified:
Q:

During the next day, July 28, 2004, could you tell us what happened?

A:
The following day when I arrived at Barangay Agusan, the container vans
were already opened. The Bureau of Customs people and the owner were already
there.19
The search was under the direction of the Customs Police because when the Customs
Police decided to stop the search, petitioners acceded and left the premises. Boac
testified:
Q:

What happened next?

A:
About after lunch already about 1:30 to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon he called
me again informing me that the customs personnel are already leaving the premises
and I asked him what happened. He told me that the customs personnel are leaving
and were satisfied that there are no contents on the container vans, however, he
told me that the third container van was not stripped off of its contents and I asked
Mr. Golong why and I told Inspector Golong to talk to one of the customs personnel
to continue stripping the container van.
xxxx
I talked to Mr. Yamit since Inspector Golong told me that they are already stripping
the contents of the third container van and they were already leaving the place, so I
instructed Inspector Golong if I could talk to Yamit and ask Yamit if they could
continue the stripping of the vans, so he gave me the phone and I talked to Mr.
Yamit and told him to continue stripping the third container van up to the last
contents. He told me they are already satisfied that there are no contraband items in
the container vans but I insisted to just continue stripping the contents of the
container van and he told me that they are already being called by their customs
collector in Region 10, sir.
Q:

After this conversation, what did you do?

A:
So, when they are already leaving the place, the customs people, I also
ordered Inspector Golong to immediately leave the place because customs

personnel are already leaving and they don't have anymore business being there
since customs personnel are leaving the place.20
The foregoing testimony, which Golong corroborated, was not disputed by the
prosecution. It is thus very clear that the search was not done by petitioners but by the
Customs Police. Petitioners did not seize anything nor arrested anybody. They merely
observed the search which they requested to be undertaken to check for contrabands.
Notably, the consignee did not file any complaint against petitioners.
The information charged petitioners for illegally flagging down, searching, and seizing the
three container vans on July 27, 2004. Petitioners, however, could not also be held liable
for these acts. It is a fact that no search and seizure of the vans was done on the night of
July 27, 2004. The act of flagging down the vehicles is not among those proscribed by
Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Mere flagging down of the container vans is
not punishable under the said law.
We ruled in People v. Ganguso:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause
of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges
that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would
be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course,
mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the
accused is responsible for the offense charged.21
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest,
not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is
on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove
his innocence.22 In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioners committed the
acts prohibited by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is no such evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, that identifies petitioners as responsible for the alleged illegal
search. Hence, acquittal is in order.
As regards the second issue, there is no conflict between the aforequoted provisions of
the Tariff and Customs Code and RA 6975, as amended. The jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Customs is clearly with regard to customs duties. Should the PNP
suspect anything, it should coordinate with the BOC and obtain the written authority from
the Collector of Customs in order to conduct searches, seizures, or arrests. Coordination
is emphasized in the laws. While it is an admitted fact that there was no such coordination
initiated by the PNP-CIDG in this instance, nevertheless, petitioners cannot be convicted

under the Tariff and Customs Code since there is no evidence that they did actually search
the container vans.
WHEREFORE, the August 16, 2007 Decision and November 14, 2007 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are ACQUITTED of the
charge against them. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138881

December 18, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay
City, finding accused-appellant Leila Johnson y Reyesguilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, each bag weighing:
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams; and
#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams, respectively,
or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,3 whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, duty frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented
accused-appellant who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a
resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an
American on June 16, 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric
patients and those with Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. 4
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba, Laguna. She was
due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel
to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30
p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998.5

At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA
departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons,
bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. 6
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States
via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs.
Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a
result of an ectopic pregnancy.7
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile,
saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." ("Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.")
She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took
accused-appellant to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. 8
Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her
stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then
asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle." Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs,
which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the womens room. 9
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams of a
substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu."10
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st
RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket were taken and her
luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. 11
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she
was approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the
womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted
that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a
chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were taken from her, for which no
receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a certain Col.
Castillo.12
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white
packages on the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge
and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999
when she was taken before a fiscal for inquest. 13 She claimed that throughout the period of her detention,
from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to
call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines. 14
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: 15
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and
hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits "G", "C2" and "C-3") are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby

ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance
with law.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at the City Jail of Pasay City during the
pendency of this case provided that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules
and regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) "despite failure of the prosecution in
proving the negative allegation in the information;" (2) "despite failure of the prosecution in proving the
quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride;" (3) "despite violation of her constitutional rights;" and (4)
"when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt." 16
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional
rights. She argues that the "shabu" confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was
forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the
assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues,
the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or "shabu," should have been excluded from the evidence. 17
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention
and used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art.
III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante
delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person.
The trial court held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as "the questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense
and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the
Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from
being accurate.18

The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.19 Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel.20 Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found,
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless
search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been
obtained while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the
Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was
required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon,
along with their testimony to that effect, were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket,
luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the
girdle taken from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. 3/4 A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.
Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:
Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The Proceeds or Instrument Of The
Crime The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15

and 16 of Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;
6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements
as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for her possession of 580.2 grams of shabu.
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a quantitative and a qualitative examination of the
substance contained in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the examination conducted by the NBI
forensic chemist was a qualitative one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to
establish its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains indeterminate and unproved.
This contention is likewise without merit.
The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests conducted would have indicated the presence
of impurities if there were any. He testified:
PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants or impurities, it will be
discovered by just mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear in a thin layer chromatographic
examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr. Witness?
WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only appears one spot which resembles or the same
as the Methamphetamine Hydrochloride sample
....
PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants present in the chemicals you have
examined, in chemical examination, what color it will register, if any?

WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate, it will not react with the reagent,
therefore it will not dissolve. In my examination, all the specimens reacted on the re-agents, sir.
PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in laymans term?
WITNESS It is only a tawas.
....
COURT In this particular case, did you find any aluminum sulfate or tawas in the specimen?
WITNESS None, your Honor.
....
ATTY. AGOOT I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed
with 200 grams of tawas, you will submit that to qualitative examination, what will be your findings,
negative or positive, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
ATTY. AGOOT That is qualitative examination.
WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate. 21
A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the material, whereas a quantitative analysis requires
the determination of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture. Hence, a qualitative
identification of a powder may reveal the presence of heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a
quantitative analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90 percent quinine. 22
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and
C-3. Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively identifying the components of a mixture. It
is particularly useful for analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently received in a crime
lab. For example, illicit drugs sold on the street may be diluted with practically any material that is at the
disposal of the drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made available to prospective
customers. Hence, the task of identifying an illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one without the
aid of chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture into its components. 23
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests were thorough, but also that the scientifically
correct method of obtaining an accurate representative sample had been obtained. 24 At any rate, as the
Solicitor-General has pointed out, if accused-appellant was not satisfied with the results, it would have
been a simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination of the substance by another chemist.
This she did not do.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the negative allegation in the
information that she did not have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
1wphi1

Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu,"a

regulated drug, is not unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required license or
prescription. She points out that since the prosecution failed to present any certification that she is not
authorized to possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the quantum of proof needed to
sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United States v. Chan Toco.25 The accused in
that case was charged with smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred to the information
on the ground that it failed to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a
duly licensed and practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said:
The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to penalize generally the smoking of
opium in these Islands. But the legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a limited
class of smokers who smoked under the advice and by prescription of a licensed and practicing
physician . . . . Hence where one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the Opium Law, it
is more logical as well as more practical and convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of
a physician, that he should set up this fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be called
upon to prove that every smoker, charged with a violation of the law, does so without such advice or
prescription. Indeed, when it is considered that under the law any person may, in case of need and at any
time, procure the advice of a physician to use opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of
things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or can be required to be kept, it is manifest that it
would be wholly impracticable and absurd to impose on the prosecution the burden of alleging and
proving the fact that one using opium does so without the advice of a physician. To prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, in a particular case, that one using opium does so without the advice or prescription of
a physician would be in most cases a practical impossibility without the aid of the defendant himself, while
a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium should find little difficulty in establishing the fact that he
used it under the advice and on the prescription of a physician, if in fact he did so. 26
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty
he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes
to himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to do, he has no one but himself to blame.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, which requires the prosecution to present a certification that accusedappellant has no license or permit to possess shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a
crime per se and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she has a license or permit
under the law to possess the prohibited drug.
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient
to support a finding that she is guilty of the crime charged.
This contention must likewise be rejected.
Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined
to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive
on the part of the police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. This Court accords great respect to the
findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error
or arbitrariness in its findings.27
1wphi1

It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-appellant, no other witness was presented in her
behalf. Her denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 28 As has been
held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the
courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 29
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly charged with
and convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, have
been complied with by the prosecution in this case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be
upheld.
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held that courts may fix any amount within the
limits established by law.30 Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2) grams of shabu were
confiscated from accused-appellant, the fine imposed by the trial court may properly be reduced
to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accusedappellant guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty
of reclusion perpetuais hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accusedappellant is reduced toP50,000.00. Costs against appellant.
The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet returned to the accusedappellant are hereby ordered returned to her.
SO ORDERED.

.R. No. 148825

December 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425),
as amended, under an Information1 whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in
her possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE
(998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
prescription or license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene
Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution witness
Mylene Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the witness
stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon,
Vietnam.2 When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted.
Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and
Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying "Excuse me maam,
can I search you?"3 Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene
inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that the
package contained what felt like rice granules. 4 When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages
in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter
refused and said: "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los
Reyes, her supervisor on duty.5
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a
comfort room for a thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room, Mylene
touched something in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and
panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in
gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. 6 The first was taken from SUSANs
abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh. 7 Mylene
turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes. 8 The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police

Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic
packs to the customs examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline
substances9 which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. 10
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that
no investigation was ever conducted on SUSAN.11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the following
articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100
grams; (2) one American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane
ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles. 12 He said that he informed
SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt.13 Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. 14
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances surrounding the
arrest and search of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her person. 15
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision 16 finding SUSAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, 17 alleging therein that the trial judge erred in
(1) giving weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena because it
was not presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc
is not even a police officer; (3) making statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was
shifted to the accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured.
SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the
seized items were not in plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge,
SUSAN filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration
and/or New Trial.18
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellants Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial, as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued an order 19 on 26 November
2001 denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1) he explained to SUSANs counsel the effects of
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, but the latter chose to magnify the judges statement which was
uttered in jest; (2) SUSANs conviction was not based on the medical report which was not presented in
court; (3) there was no violation of SUSANs constitutional rights because she was never interrogated
during her detention without counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were found after a routine
frisk at the airport and were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing to the trial
court the following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged
existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless
search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the "Terry
search" doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in
admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or
offered in evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial
notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the
ruling in People v. Johnson.20
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the
ladies room was constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest
could not be said to have been made before the search because at the time of the strip search, the
arresting officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her body,

which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they could not have determined
whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but a
fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio,21 such stop and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in
order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of
the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her
abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to submit
her to a strip search in the ladies room, she was under custodial investigation without counsel,
which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the medical
report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on nor
offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson 22 because of its sweeping statement
allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the
safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent case should have been Katz v. United
States,23 which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States of America that "protects
people and not places."
In its Appellants Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was found flagrante
delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely
within the exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily
submitted herself to the search and seizure when she allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the
comfort room for further inspection by airport security personnel. It likewise maintains that the
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that
SUSANs conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact that she was
caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Consequently,
it supports SUSANs conviction but recommends the reduction of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSANs conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as
the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars
State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court. 24
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.25
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this
case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did not precede the search. When the
metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs
abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and
liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense."
lawphi1.et

As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room, the airport security
personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSANs body; hence, they did not know
yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by
the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to
be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done
incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. 26
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons
under the "Terry search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches
a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line
with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the
person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder

refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures.
As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in
the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge.
From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the
discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further
searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by
her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages contained only money,
aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated
that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of
the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home
(as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to
sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." 28 Thus, the
strip search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application to the
present case. That case involves accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then
the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When Olivia frisked Leila,
the former felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained that
she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an
ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her superior,
who then directed her to take Leila to the nearest womens room for inspection. In the comfort
room, Leila was asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle." She acceded and brought out three
plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
This Court ruled that the packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized during the routine frisk
at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore
admissible in evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person
flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that
such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

SUSANs reliance on Katz v. U.S.29 is misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case are
entirely different from the case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information by
telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the accuseds objection, to
introduce evidence of accuseds end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United States of America reversed
the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in the instant case,
was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved. It ruled that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth
Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to precedents and mandates
not to unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same. 30 There being a disparity in the factual milieu of
Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on
SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline
substances, which upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police
authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest
without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in
her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was not violated.

Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be
invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody
interrogation."31 Custodial investigation refers to the "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way."32 This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and
that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. 33 And the right to
counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation. 34 The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. 35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial
investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the
articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not
to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to
prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention and used in
evidence against her.36Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical report on the
physical and medical examination conducted upon appellants request, which contained the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative. She related that she was an
illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, "I gamble like an addict. I gambled
since I was young and I lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost control, I want my money
back. I owe other people lots of money. I lost all the cash of my husband. This is the first time I carried
shabu. I need the money." She denied having any morbid thoughts and perceptual disturbances.
(Emphasis supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was
not properly identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellants conviction will stand, as
the courts finding of guilt was not based on that document.
VII. SUSANs conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, we do not
hesitate to rule that that the three packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in
evidence against her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Crime.--The penalties for offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,

15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the
following quantities:

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For possession
of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the
net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the trial courts
imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation of
the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
,
Clearly, the seizure of SUSANs passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the
afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to be returned to her.37
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110,
in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellants passport, plane tickets, and girdles are
hereby ordered to be returned to her.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.